

EQUALITY

BY

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DRAFT

A WORKING TRANSLATION BY SHAWN P. WILBUR
FROM THE NEW EDITION OF 1848

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— THIS IS A DRAFT TRANSLATION —

This translation is a significant step toward a really useful English edition of Pierre Leroux's major works, but it is far from the last step. I have attempted to render Leroux's ideas into intelligible English, but there is still a lot of work to be done to establish a consistent vocabulary, to make certain that key terms are not obscured, etc. I will return to the task after completing a similar draft translation of *De l'Humanité*, the work that served as the continuation of this one. For now, just understand that any serious use of the text should involve double-checking against the French original, which can be found on the Gallica site.

— SHAWN.

FOREWARD

TO THIS NEW EDITION.

This book, written and published ten years ago, bears the traces of the moment when it appeared. However, we did not think it necessary to follow the advice given to us to change some expressions that were inconsistent with current circumstances. The reader will easily refer to the date when we wrote, for example, when speaking of the revolutionary formula *Liberty-Equality-Fraternity*: “Erased today from our monuments and our flags, this motto only has to be pronounced to carry with it assent. Yes, we can erase it and we can make fun of it, it will never be truly erased, nor damaged by insults, for it is true, it is holy; it is the ideal to follow, it is the revealed future, it already reigns in principle, it will reign one day in fact, it is indelible and immortal.” After having been proscribed for fifty years, this motto has just reappeared, and here it is written again on our buildings and on our flags. Are we allowed to believe that the doctrine contained in this book and in other writings that belong to the same inspiration and the same philosophy contributed, for its part, to the reappearance of the immortal motto? Yes, certainly, we bear this testimony to ourselves, but with sadness, since we and the other servants of the truth have not done enough, during the time that we have been given to think and write, to prepare a more salutary and more glorious outcome for the new Revolution. Why is it not, in fact, engraved in our hearts and in all our actions, this motto, instead of being only in our words or floating in the air on the banners of our soldiers? Alas! We are reprinting this book at a time when the reappearance of the prophetic motto has only made the contrast between fact and right more striking and cruel!

But what does the laborious birth of truth matter if we have faith? Have we not seen Horace's aphorism: *Multa renascentur quæ jam cecidere...* come true miraculously? Did not the Republic, which was believed to be forever doomed to nonexistence, and which is still in truth only a word, come to suddenly replace the monarchy, which was apparently only a shadow and a ghost? If it has been given to us to acclaim the signs of Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality (I say the signs and not the things), is this not at least a guarantee that the deep meaning of these words, powerful even though they are only words, will one day be understood and realized?

Let us therefore rejoice in our souls, and let us be confirmed in all the strength of our thoughts, in the midst of our present sorrows. If our life has a real, though still invisible, purpose, let us accept the extent of the providential plan by which each of us must be redeemed. In vain the terrible discord in the midst of which the resurrecting signs seemed to be swallowed up forever seems to have returned with them to the earth: let us be sure that this discord will be temporary, and that Humanity will reach

the heaven to which it is called. Humanity cannot fail in its destiny; for God cannot break his promises. The initiation is accomplished by degrees and painfully, but it is accomplished. Let us therefore hope in God and in the progress that he has given to our nature.

As for the writing of which we are publishing a new edition, we have nothing to say about it. These pages have come to their place in the series of successive studies that have served to found the Doctrine which is our faith and which we teach; the ideas they contain were the prelude to those that we have recorded in the book of *Humanity*. Although this *Historical Essay on Equality* (for this would be the true title of this work, if it were complete) is only a draft, this draft can be useful, and that is why we are reprinting it. As for the good or bad reasons that prevented us from treating our subject with greater breadth and care, one will find them either in the work itself, or in the Preface to the book of *Humanity*.

July 1848.

PREFACE.

I demonstrate in this work that the current society, in whatever respect we consider it, has no other basis than the *dogma of Equality*, which does not prevent inequality from reigning.

Has God inspired us with an idea whose practice would be chimerical, impossible? In this case, God would not be the eternal Creator, the Life-giver, the Almighty, the All-Loving whose image is in our heart.

No, it is not so. This dogma of Equality is achievable, and it will come true. But it is only achievable on the condition of the progress that must be accomplished in our hearts and in our intelligence. This dogma of Equality is a heritage that was transmitted to us imperfectly by our fathers, and which we must in turn transmit more brilliantly and better revealed than we received it. This dogma is the moral life that comes to us from the past, and which we must leave, increased, to the future. Because everything is linked in the successive manifestations of being. The present, generated from the past, is pregnant with the future, says Leibniz admirably.

The eighteenth century, satisfied with a beginning of light in this dark night of the past, wrote, through the pen of Voltaire, at the bottom of Montesquieu's book: *Humanity had lost its titles; Montesquieu found them, and returned them to it*. It was Rousseau who deserved this praise. As for Montesquieu, I do not see what titles of Humanity he found and returned, he who admitted the monarchy, the aristocracy, the nobility, the clergy, the bourgeoisie, the plebs, he who admitted wealth and poverty, he who admitted, in a word, all kinds of inequality.¹

True sophists have called Rousseau a sophist, and have laughed at his immortal work. Hypocrisy and lies, in the pay of tyranny, became a weapon against him because he had provided no other proof in favor of Equality than the proof of sentiment. They have not reflected that metaphysics and history were lacking for Rousseau when he dared to take up the cause of Humanity.² Thus deprived of the necessary assistance, Rousseau could only make one complaint heard. But this complaint in favor of Humanity is true, well-founded, immortal, as immortal as the complaint that Jesus had previously made in favor of this same Humanity.

“Like,” he exclaims, “like the statue of Glaucus, which time, the sea and storms had so disfigured that it resembled less a God than a ferocious beast, the soul human, altered within society by a thousand constantly recurring causes, by the acquisition of a multitude of understandings and errors, by the changes occurring in the constitution of bodies, and by the continual clash of passions, has, so to speak, changed in appearance to the point of being almost unrecognizable; instead of a being, acting constantly from fixed and invariable principles, instead of that celestial and majestic

simplicity, impressed on it by its divine Author, we find in it nothing more than the misshapen contrast of passion believing itself to be reason, and of understanding grown delirious.”³

Rousseau's entire work is there, in this thought of the superiority of the human soul over the human condition. The human soul is a God, is made in the image of God, and it happens to resemble a wild beast. Sophists, who treat Rousseau as a sophist, this thought of Rousseau has occupied men for a century;⁴ it has raised Humanity:

Os homini sublime dedit, cælumque turi
Jussit.

By placing the ideal in the primitive forest, Rousseau may have been mistaken; but he showed the ideal, and excited men to seek it in the future.

Job, afflicted with evils and covered with reproach by the permission of God, groaned on his bed of ashes. The wise men of the region represent to him how vain his complaint is, and end up declaring it impious and sacrilegious. These learned men, these pious people, satisfied with the present, would be careful not to incriminate the work of God in any way. They repeat again and again to Job all the old adages and all the commonplaces with which we are accustomed to legitimize the fact and the present. Job is in darkness; he only has the feeling of justice that God has placed in his heart. But, strong in this feeling, he would dare to contest against God himself. He treats the remonstrances of his friends as hypocritical speeches, and never ceases to exclaim: “I would like to know where God is. I would bring my complaint to him, and he would justify me.” God appears, and vindicates Job against the wise men who defended the cause of God so well.

Such is Rousseau pleading, in the name of sentiment, the cause of Humanity. He is in darkness, like Job, but he speaks like him in the name of the justice of God engraved in his heart.

If since Rousseau science has made progress, if the French Revolution proclaimed human Equality, if the tradition of Humanity is better understood today, if Christianity and all previous Religion explained only asks us to lend it arms, it is thanks to him! Oh! if I had his strength! I would add to this force the relief that history and philosophy offer in my time. But what does my weakness matter? It is not appropriate for anyone to decline the duty that they feel in their heart, and I do not want to fail in the sacred cause for which Rousseau suffered, and whose defense he transmitted to me, as to all my generation.

I will therefore take up, in this writing, with the rigorous method that our time requires, the problem posed by him. I will look for the causes of the inequality of human conditions, and I will prove Equality by this tradition of Humanity that it has lacked and by the very dogmas of Religion.

I will have history before my eyes. I will have the support of a true definition of human nature. I will finally have in my heart the holy doctrine which, regarding evil as a necessary and reparable imperfection, justifies Providence and excuses Humanity, by making the stains and sins disappear in the progression of creatures and the final goal of the work.

Solon wanted each citizen to speak openly for one party in civil disputes. If Solon's law is to be followed in the present discord of mankind, I write for slaves against masters, for the weak against the strong, for the poor against the rich, for all who suffer on earth against everything which, taking advantage of current inequality, abuses the gifts of the Creator.

It is very true that Humanity groans in all its children. But this universal pain, although undivided in its essence because of human solidarity, results in oppressors and oppressed people. I want to show where this awful spectacle of one part of the human race being crucified by the other comes from, and how the murder of Abel by his brother Cain continues indefinitely in Adam's race.

No doubt the vices of the oppressed play a part in the causes of evil. All the evil is not in the oppressors. If inequality is visible everywhere, the fault lies not only with the powerful and the rich. But Jesus himself gave us the example of putting ourselves on the side of the small and inferior, and of claiming for them against their despoiling and tyrant brothers. Religion is the support of all that suffers against all that dominates on earth. I will therefore say like Rousseau, without blasphemy: O my brothers who groan in ignorance, in misery and in slavery, immense majority of the human race, it is for you that I write! I will seek to bring to light your little-known and trampled titles.

EQUALITY.

PART ONE.

THE PRESENT.

We are between two worlds: a world of inequality that is ending and a world of equality that is beginning.

CHAPTER ONE.

The French Revolution summed up politics in these three sacramental words: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. It is not only on our monuments, on our coins, on our flags that this motto of our fathers was written; it was engraved in their hearts, it was for them the very expression of Divinity.

Why these three words? Why not just one or two? Why not four or more? There is a deep reason for this.

Indeed, man being, as we have demonstrated elsewhere, triple and one in all the acts of his life, that is to say simultaneously *sensation-sentiment-knowledge*, a term is needed in politics that responds to each of these three aspects of our nature.

To the term *sensation* of the metaphysical formula of man responds the term liberty of the political formula; to the term *sentiment* responds the word *fraternity*; the term *knowledge* corresponds to *equality*.

Man is sensation at all moments of his life; this means that he is a being in the state of manifestation, and that he only exists as long as he manifests himself. Now he only manifests himself because at the same time a world external to him manifests itself to him; he is therefore a sensation: his subjective life entails objectivity for him, and consequently any mode of his life implies a certain relativity with other men and with the entire universe. His entire life is therefore a series of acts; and even when he only thinks, he acts. Now, what term will express the right he has to manifest himself, and consequently to exist? A term that will not aim to express the two other necessary faces of our being at each moment of our duration, but only this face of our life which consists in the manifestation of this life in the midst of our fellow men and the world ; in a word, a term which will express the right to act, without directly implying anything else. This abstract term is the word *liberty*. Liberty is the power to act. The

aim of politics is therefore, first and foremost, to achieve liberty among men. Making men free means making them exist, or in other words, making them manifest. Lacking liberty, there is only nothingness and death; non-liberty is the prohibition of being.

But the social man, the political man, the citizen in a word, is not only a being who manifests himself, a being in a relationship of practical relativity with other men; he is a man, and therefore he is endowed with feeling. Not only is he active, but he is sensitive, and even when he acts, he is moved emotionally. There is therefore in all his acts of civic liberty a civic sentiment attached to these acts. What is the word that will express the feeling that must produce or regulate the actions of the citizen? I ask, what other word than *fraternity* would be appropriate here? Fraternity means: It is the nature of man to carry a sentiment in all his actions; man cannot be in the presence of his fellow man, nor contract with him, without having a sentiment towards him. Now the ideal of the citizen is to love all other men, and to act in accordance with this charity, this love. This word is therefore as necessary for the definition of politics as the very word liberty; for if, lacking liberty, man does not exist, in the sense that his right to be is not recognized, it is also certain that, lacking fraternity or fraternity not being proclaimed, human nature does not exist, in the sense that it is neither defined nor recognized.

But that is not all yet: why must political society be regulated on Liberty and Fraternity; why must a true society, a truly human society, be a fraternity where everyone is free? The citizen must know the cause; he must have a dogma in this regard, because the citizen, being a man, is a being gifted not only with activity and sentiment, but with intelligence. The reason for things must not escape him: *rerum cognoscere causas*. A man of action, one says to him liberty, and he recognizes in himself the truth of this term; a man of sentiment, one says to him fraternity, and his heart applauds: but there is still in him a faculty which is not satisfied; it is intelligence, it is the need to know. We need a third term that responds to this need for science, a term that explains why we all have the right to be free, the duty to love and help each other like brothers: this third term is the word *equality*.

There is a whole science in this word, a science that is still obscure and shrouded in darkness today; the origin and goal of society are hidden in this word, as in the enigma of the Sphinx: but that does not prevent this word from being, in the political formula, the reason for the two other terms. You ask me why I want to be free: it would not be enough to answer you that I have the need, to allege to you my instinct, my nature, the desire I have to manifest myself, to live, in a word; you could reply to me by the same instinct that is in you, by the same unlimited right that you have on your side; and hence antagonism, collision, war, anarchy, despotism. This is the sad spectacle that the earth has perpetually offered to the vault of heaven. As long as intelligence does not intervene and deliver an oracle, right is only an obscure germ, and only exists in a latent and virtual manner; it is intelligence that formulates and proclaims it. So, if you

ask me why I want to be free, I answer: Because I have the right; and I have the right to do so, because man is equal to man. And likewise, if I recognize that charity and fraternity are a duty of man in society, my mind only remains in agreement by virtue of the equality of our nature.

In vain you object to me the current fact of inequality, which reigns everywhere on earth. It is very true that inequality reigns everywhere on earth; we find it at whatever period of historical times we go back to, and the day when it will disappear is perhaps still very far away. It doesn't matter: the human mind rose above this mire of misery and crime that inequality entails, and it dreamed of a society founded on Equality. Then, relating his ideal to God, as to the eternal source of beauty and truth, man said: Since, despite my weakness, I conceive a world where Equality reigns, this world must have been the desired world of God; therefore it was preconceived in God, and originally came from his hands. And, whether in fact we come from an Eden, a Paradise, a better world, or whether this world has only ever been realized spiritually within God and in our soul, and whether the only organized world where Equality has reigned until now had been the embryonic world of nature, the state of primitive savagery where the human race still touched on animality, the fact remains that we are justified in saying that Equality is germinal in the nature of things, that it preceded inequality, and that it will dethrone and replace it. This is how, from this double contemplation of the origin and end of society, the human mind dominates current society, and imposes Equality as its rule and ideal.

If then, once again, I believe in Liberty, it is because I believe in Equality; if I imagine a political society where men would be free and live among themselves fraternally, it is because I imagine a society where the dogma of human equality would reign. Indeed, if men are not equal, how can you proclaim them all free; and, if they are neither equal nor free, how can you expect them to love each other with brotherly love?

Thus, this third term *equality* represents the science in the formula. This word is, I repeat, an entire doctrine; a prophetic doctrine, if you like, in the sense that it looks rather to the future than to the present; a doctrine still in its infancy, which appears to many minds as vague, uncertain, or even false, but which is no less the doctrine already reigning in our time.

What does it matter that, as I will show shortly, the doctrine of Equality is recent and, so to speak, born yesterday, that the ancients only knew in their revolutions the cry of Liberty, that Christianity in turn only advocated Fraternity? What does that matter? I said: the question is whether Liberty alone was not a gap, if Fraternity alone was not one. We are intelligence, love, and activity; we are not only activity, or love, we are also simultaneously intelligence. The question, therefore, is to know if, for human nature to be truly satisfied in us, it is not necessary, at the same time that the need to exist makes us claim Liberty, at the same time that our heart admits Fraternity, it is not

necessary, I say, for our intelligence to proclaim Equality. But this is as obvious as daylight. This last term of the formula responds to the need to know that we carry within us, just as the two other terms respond to the need to act and the need to love, which are the two other sides of our life.

The formula is therefore complete. The citizen has a dogma, it is Equality; a motive to manifest and act is Liberty; a moral rule for acting well is human Fraternity. None of the three faces of our nature is left without expression. The political axiom responds admirably to the metaphysical axiom. It is composed, like it, of three terms, none of which is useless, and which all agree without repeating themselves.

It is very true that these three words, *liberty*, *equality*, *fraternity*, fundamentally imply one another, and that we can logically deduce the other two from one. But it is no less certain that they are of various orders, in the sense that they correspond to the three different faculties or aspects of our nature. Indeed, no matter how much you repeat to men that they are free and all free, this word liberty will only amount to a selfish right to act for them. They will conclude their own virtuality, their own activity; but no brotherly feeling for other men will result directly from it. It is in the name of Liberty that in all times and in all countries slaves have broken their chains and defeated their tyrants; but this word, good for war, has never generated either clemency or peace. No morality can result from a word that expresses the right to be, to manifest oneself, to act, but which does not express and recall sentiment and knowledge, these two other facets of life. And likewise, preach Fraternity to men; you touch them sentimentally, but you do not enlighten them. Christians became monks, and admit all despotisms. Finally, the man who would have reflected the most on the origin and purpose of society, and who would have the most sublime idea of Equality, would still need to express the dignity of his own nature with the word Liberty, and the bond that unites him to other men through that of Fraternity. Isolated, therefore, these three words each express only one side of life; and, although the other two faces are found in this one, because of the mystery of the unity that constitutes our being, although, consequently, each of these words implies, as we have just seen, the other two, nevertheless each, by its very meaning, is only a shred of the truth. But, united, they form an admirable expression of truth and life.

Holy motto of our fathers, you are not one of those vain assemblages of letters that we trace on the sand and that the wind disperses; you are founded on the deepest notion of being. Mysterious triangle that presided over our emancipation, which served to seal our laws, and which shone in the sun of the battles on the three-colored flag, you were inspired by truth itself, like the mysterious triangle that expresses the name of Jehovah, and of which you are a reflection.

Who found this sublime formula? Who said it first? We don't know: no one did it, and it was almost everyone who did it. However, it was literally not in any philosopher when the French people took it as their banner. The one who first brought these three

words together, and saw in them the gospel of politics, had a sort of illumination that the entire people shared after him: enthusiasm, in revolutions, lays bare and reveals the depths of life, as great storms sometimes expose the bottom of the seas. Perhaps it was a man from the lowest ranks of the people who, in the exaltation of patriotism, was the first to bring together these three words, which had never been used before. In this case, he was proud and ready to die for his homeland, like a citizen of Sparta or Rome, this proletarian, and this was why he cried out: *Liberty*. But, between Rome and us, Christianity had passed, and the French revolutionary remembered the one whom Camille Desmoulins called the sans-culotte Jesus; his heart therefore made him proclaim a second commandment, *Fraternity*. Now he was no longer a Christian, although he admitted the morality of Christ, and yet his intelligence needed a belief, a dogma. Nor had the eighteenth century passed in vain; this man had read Rousseau; he uttered the word *Equality*. Triple response to the triple need within us to know, to love, and to practice our knowledge and our love; and at the same time a complete summary of what this triple need, always alive in man, had generated during so many centuries and revolutions, namely, the energetic activity of the ancient republics, the sentimental elevation of the Middle Ages, and the reflection of more modern centuries. Is it strange that such a formula has made its fortune? It is one of the expressions of eternal truth. And this is why, although erased today from our monuments and our flags, it only has to be pronounced to carry with it assent. Yes, we can erase it and we can make fun of it, it will never be truly erased, nor damaged by outrages; for it is true, it is holy; it is the ideal to follow, it is the revealed future, it already reigns in principle, and it will one day reign in fact; it is indelible and immortal.

CHAPTER II.

Equality is a principle, a dogma.

In vain would we try to deny or invalidate the philosophical meaning that I have just given of the motto of our fathers. There is a base and wicked way of interpreting this motto, which the enemies of the progress of the human race never fail to adopt. According to them, it would be vice and ignorance, rather than virtue and genius, that would have enthroned this banner in the world. The people, that is to say the rabble, hearing them, would have eagerly embraced three empty words, which promised them license and a chimerical equality with their masters. The vilest passions, envy and greed, alone would have inspired this cry of war and not of peace. Thus France would have soiled itself by displaying this flag; and, after an experience full of disappointment, nothing would remain of this shipwreck, except the certainty that Equality is a chimera.

Another explanation, less base, but also petty, consists of saying that the authors of our laws and our constitutions did not understand, by this word equality, anything other than what we call civil equality, equality before the law, as it is achieved today. It would only have been a question of giving the program of a state where all citizens would, in certain respects, be subject to the law, where certain laws would be common to all, obligatory for all. Now, as in fact the Civil Code and the Penal Code do not recognize classes, and do not distinguish between citizens, it would follow that the program would now be carried out, and that the promised Equality would be achieved. To these one could reply that at least they should, in their explanation, understand the political law as well as the criminal law, and that one must be crazy to maintain that Equality reigns where a small fraction of the citizens alone have the power to make laws. But this is not even how the axiom of the Revolution should be understood. This axiom is not only about the equality of citizens, but about human equality; and, on the other hand, it is not a more or less restricted fact that is at issue, but a right that commands this fact. Between equality considered as a fact and equality considered as a principle, there is, to use an expression from Montesquieu, as much distance as between heaven and earth.

No, once again, this is not how our fathers understood their symbol. Each word of this symbol is a principle, that is to say both a dogma and a commandment. The term *equality*, in this symbol, does not mean: We will try to create a republic where all citizens will be equal. It means: Equality is a divine law, a law prior to all laws, and from which all laws must derive.

There is unanswerable proof of this for those who understand the succession of ideas, and how, first elaborated in the writings of thinkers, they then pass into public opinion, and are realized in action. Where does this word *equality* come from in the revolutionary formula? It comes from Rousseau. It is undoubtedly Rousseau, it is his books, it is his school, which gave it to our Revolution. Now, in Rousseau's writings, Equality is no less than an entire doctrine. Every writing of Rousseau is founded on the basis of Human Equality; because the very equality of the citizen is for him only a form and a corollary of the natural equality of men. So, when the soul of Rousseau passed into the people and dictated our laws to us, it was a principle, a dogma, a faith, a belief, a religion, this word of *equality* proclaimed by an entire people.

CHAPTER III.

This principle is now recognized as the very criterion of justice.

I ask those who do not see a principle, that is to say, a dogma and a commandment, in human equality, why they would find evil and contrary to all fairness, as to all sound legislation, that a father would today have the right to life and death over his children, as was practiced among the Romans, or that a master could kill or injure his servant. I ask them why it would seem iniquitous and absurd to them to re-establish slavery and feudalism in Europe, why they find admirable, on the contrary, that the poorest citizen should have action against the richest, and that the penalty of a misdemeanor or a crime is the same, whoever the offended, and whoever the criminal.

You therefore have a different justice from that of the Lacedaemonians, who wounded and killed the helots with impunity; different from that of the Romans, who wounded and killed their slaves with impunity; different from that of the nobles of the Middle Ages, who wounded and killed their serfs with impunity. You no longer weigh the sorrows according the quality of the offender and the offended, and you would find it evil if a prince today, murderer of a peasant, paid for his fault with a few Parisian sous.

But why this variation in human laws? In the past, in criminal laws, what concerned us? And today what concerns those who make laws equal for all? Undoubtedly they regulate themselves according to a principle; they do not act like fools; they make the laws according to some general and sacred idea, engraved in their souls.

Now what is this idea, this principle, this rule, this criterion, according to which so many once-law actions are now regarded as crimes, hated or punished as such?

This principle is the Equality of men.

You are indeed forced to agree that the present justice does not distinguish between one man and another man; that, having both been clothed with the character of men, they are equal in the eyes of justice.

And if justice is fair and impartial to them, it is only because they are men. This father has no right to kill his child, because the character of Humanity is on the face of this child. This rich man has no right to violate this wretch, because the character of Humanity protects this wretch against him. So you recognize a right in man, just because he is a man.

Will you say that this rule was invented to make the administration of justice easier and more regular? Such an explanation would be absurd. It is that right, I mean the current right, is precisely the recognized equality of men. This recognized equality is

before justice, it is what causes it and what constitutes it. When an irritated father or a jealous husband could take revenge and punish at will, it was because human equality was not recognized; it was because the weak did not count or mattered little before the strong. Rest assured that if the public made a difference between the races of men, justice would follow opinion, and that there would still be two or three justices, as in antiquity and the Middle Ages.

It would also be vain to try to say that the current justice recognizes equality only among the citizens of the same nation. Why, in that case, was murder committed against a foreigner punished as murder committed against a local in the country?

It should be noted, moreover, that it is not a question here of positive laws, but of the principle of these laws. I will prove at no time that the equality of the citizen, as we understand it today, is rooted in the belief that we have in the equality of men in general; that these two beliefs, since the last century, are inseparable, and are based on the same doctrine. So that we cannot object to the positive laws, and deny me the feeling that we have of human equality, by showing me that the equality of citizens often takes its place. What must be proved to me is that we are completely indifferent to the violence committed against men, whenever these men are not our fellow citizens.

Now, examine for this for yourself. I will not assume that it is a question of violence and torture inflicted on Europeans; the peoples of Europe have too many relations to ensure that there is not some mutual assurance of justice between them. But here are some slavers who are going to take slaves to your American colonies. I'm telling you that these sugar and coffee colonies need negroes to grow them. Neither the whites from Europe, nor the Indians themselves, can bear the work under this burning sun. Our planters wait, their fortune is compromised, the colonies will perish if the slavery of Africans is not confirmed or tolerated. You reply to me with this famous phrase, of which was so stupidly made a crime of the French Revolution: "Perish the colonies rather than a principle." This phrase that is accused is simply the sublime cry of conscience, it is the cry of justice, it is the *qu'il mourut* of Corneille.

But these men are black, someone says; they are of the race of Ham, and you are of the race of Japheth. You say that the difference in skin does not justify slavery; that the Swedes are whiter than the Spaniards, and that there is nothing to be concluded from it.

But, as you are told, the popes once gave Europeans a patent of sovereignty over Africa, and the great defender of the unfortunate Indians, Las-Casas, found it good and legitimate for the negroes to be reduced in Captivity. You reply that the popes had disposed of what did not belong to them, and that Las-Casas would later have been in Clarkson's opinion to emancipate the negroes.

Finally, let one raise as an objection to you the Bible and these sentences of extermination pronounced by Moses against so many peoples, you will close the book

with disgust, and you will blame these commandments on the ignorance of the human race at that time.

So nothing can prevail over your sense of justice, and that feeling is nothing but belief in men's equality.

And this belief, innate so to speak in all well-made minds, produced a result. The diplomats have made positive laws and instituted penalties against trafficking in men.

Let us therefore conclude that it is recognized today by the human mind that a man has certain rights in his sole capacity as a man; which is to say, when you think about it, that a man has virtually the same rights as any other man. From which we must necessarily draw this second conclusion, that if we cannot yet truly realize the application of this right, if we are still too ignorant, too vicious, too miserable, to organize human equality on earth, this equality is no less prior and superior to all our nationalities, to all our constitutions, to all our establishments.

CHAPTER IV.

The current society, in whatever respect we consider it, has no other basis than this principle.

Those who do not want to see a principle in human Equality cannot help but at least recognize one in civil equality. By civil equality I mean the equality of the citizen in all aspects, criminal law, political law, civil law properly speaking.

In whatever aspect, in fact, we consider society today in a large part of Europe, we find civil equality not only established in fact, but proclaimed in right. What spectacle, for example, does France present today?

1. This nation offers itself to other nations as a single body ready to defend its rights, and represented for this purpose by its army. Now what is the recognized principle of the organization of this army? It is Equality. Because it is supposed that all citizens without distinction contribute their person to military service, and that each soldier carries, as one of our princes said, his Marshal of France baton in his bag. This is in no way true, I know, and inequality reigns there as elsewhere. The rich are replaced, and the real competition for courage and merit does not exist where some, by the privilege of the fortune of their parents, leave the schools born officers, like the Nobles of the old regime, or at least equipped with a special education that opens the path to the ranks, while the sons of artisans and wine-growers have just what it takes to remain soldiers, whatever merit moreover and whatever generosity of courage nature has given them. No, equality does not exist there; but in the end the principle is proclaimed and recognized.

2. The nation makes its laws and administers itself. I admit that the principle of equality has found great obstacles in gaining recognition on this point. The nobility and the monarchy initially resisted stubbornly, in order to preserve what they called their rights and their power: this was our first Revolution. Then, this monarchy and this nobility overthrown, there was found I don't know what false monarchy and I don't know what false nobility who wanted to reign in their place: this was the Empire and the Restoration. Then another overthrow, and this time the Third Estate, which had won with the people and by the people, saw ardent doctors of aristocracy emerge from its bosom, who claimed that to it alone belonged legislative right and the government: this is the nameless state that we have before our eyes today. But finally, I ask, what other principle do you have to oppose to the sovereignty of the people, that is to say to the rights of all, that is to say to Equality? Is not this very right explicitly stated in the last of your charters as it was in our first constitutions? Then have we not seen the fall of all the governments that wanted to give another origin to power than the will of all? And although the immense majority is still disinherited from political rights, is it not agreed that the laws are made in the name of all by a few? Thus fiction

supplements reality, and at least prevents right from being out of date. Or rather the State only supports itself because the right is recognized, proclaimed; remove it, remove the fiction that replaces it, and society no longer has a basis.

3. The nation engages in agriculture, industry and commerce. What is the principle that governs these various labors? It is equality under the name of free competition. The most atrocious inequality, I know, actually reigns at this point. Real competition does not exist; because a small number of men being the only ones in possession of the instruments of labor, the others find themselves reduced to the miserable condition of serfs of industry. Some are masters of the earth, of the machines, and of all the sources of production that the genius of all men has invented during all the preceding centuries, or that it discovers every day. Production is done for them, and is regulated by their consumption; so this number is infinitely small and miserable compared to what it could be. As for the workers, they only have the right to the wage; they compete for this wage among themselves, they compete for it with animals and machines, their real competitors. Their existence, the existence of so many millions of men, of so many millions of our equals, of similar positions, of our brothers, of our fellow citizens, is left to all the hazards that improvidence, that carelessness entail, the incapacity, the passions, the follies of all kinds of the owners of capital. Society, in proclaiming competition, has thus far done nothing other than great irony: it is as if it had organized a closed field where bound and unarmed men would be handed over to other men armed with good weapons. The spectacle of liberty presented by labor and industry resembles a great deal, in truth, the penal colony of Toulon. No matter; the people have won a great victory, since the right of all to all industry and all property is proclaimed and recognized.

4. The same principle of Equality is everywhere proclaimed in criminal laws.

Here again I would be angry if someone thought I was a dupe, and if someone imagined that, deceived by the bait that was thrown to the multitude, I am foolish enough to believe that our criminal laws are equal for all, and that we thus possess the *nec plus ultra* in equity. No, in truth, I don't believe a word of it. But if it is false to say that true penal equality in fact reigns, it is true to say that in fact general penal equality is established. If it is false to say that the principle of criminal equality, as we understand it today, is the very principle of justice, it is true to say that this principle is a shadow of justice and a journey towards true equity. Let me explain.

In order for justice to be equal between the poor and the rich, there would first have to be, initially, neither poor nor rich children; it would be necessary, in other words, for public education to be given to all, as the Convention had decreed; it would be necessary that, without distinction of birth, they all receive the same moral instruction, and that they start together from the same point. They could then truly strive for virtue, and any misdeeds could be justly imputed to them. But what justice is there, I ask, in punishing an unfortunate imbecile, a man whose original condition deprived him of education, or who was driven to crime by want and poverty, in the same way and with the same penalty as a man to whom nothing that could enlighten him or spare him from crime has been refused? Do you punish a minor as you punish a

grown man? No, you have regard for the weakness of the age. How many men, due to lack of education, are truly minors in society, and should be treated as such! Justice, in its very essence, is equality: where there is so little equality in conditions I find it difficult to see what justice there is in the equality of punishment. When you run horses for a prize, you do not allow one to be loaded twice as much as the other; you carry the taste and the feeling of equality in these things to the point of weighing the jockeys who must ride on your steeds. But when it comes to human criminality, you act differently. You punish with the same penalty the theft committed by a rich person (when you punish him), and the theft committed by a poor person. Do you not see that this poor man has a burden a thousand times heavier than this rich man?

But let us move on from that; let us admit that, whatever the inequality of the various environments into which men find themselves thrown, the penalty for the offense must be the same. Does this equal justice, this equal repression take place? We believe it, everyone says it, we repeat it at every turn, we shout it from the rooftops; but it's still a lie.

Consult the statistics; they will tell you which classes pay their tribute to the prisons, to the galleys, to the scaffold. There is a society where it is impossible to be criminal without falling under the influence of the Penal Code and the police: these are the poor classes. There is another where one can commit almost all crimes without being liable to the Penal Code, or at least without having to fear it: these are the rich classes. Justice is a blind Polyphemus, a shapeless and crude cyclops: the rich, protected by their politeness and their air of innocence, shelter themselves from its attacks, as Odysseus and his companions escaped from the cave by hiding under the white fleece of the sheep.

A man of the people wants to obtain more than the salary he could honestly earn: he has no other means than violence; he becomes a thief; they seize him, they imprison him, they judge him, they condemn him to the galleys. A rich thief, a thief of the upper classes is much differently favored by fate; he carries out his industry at ease; he steals a hundred thousand francs more easily than the other steals a penny. Consider, in fact, the lucrative occupations of the upper classes, and tell me which one is the one where fraud does not reign, where it is not common, ordinary, the rule so to speak, and almost never punished. Are loyalty, probity and honor the prerogative of the princes of finance and industry? In our time the epithet *loup-cervier*, lynx, has been invented for certain capitalists; but from small to large, in this obscure forest where men today fight against each other to wrest wealth, every capitalist is a *loup-cervier*. Below these great bankers, thus described by their peers, come speculators with fortunes less gigantic, then others even more modest: but are they purer? How much shameful trafficking, it is said, how many immoral games, and how many turns of the stick are used to pay the charges that replaced the old offices! Is it in trade itself where loyalty reigns? But who does not complain today that commerce is a perpetual fraud, that deceit is its soul, and that charlatanism is its nerve? Besides, does not every man of bad faith who embraces the profession of commerce always have, as his last resource, the bankruptcy that enriches him?

I suppose a man born into the upper classes or admitted into their midst, who is very greedy, very light of conscience, and who therefore wants to enrich himself *by foul means or fair*. He will have been seduced by luxury, and he will have said to himself: I will have all this wealth, I will have a hotel, land, servants; I was born to be a prince: *Et in Arcadia ego*. This man, who has no other morality than to become powerful and rich, powerful for the sake of being rich, rich for the sake of being powerful, is in many ways the analogue of the thief who is sent to the penal colony. He has more spirit, I agree, more intelligence, that is true; but I suppose him to be devoid of morality, a real idiot from a moral point of view. How many people are made like this! Well! Justice will have no hold on him; and how far will we not see his rise! If he disdains trade, finance, or procedure, let him become a political intriguer. As a journalist, he will sell the trust that the public has placed in his paper. As a deputy, he will sell the mandate of his voters; and if he is reproached for this, he will, if necessary, subjugate his electors by ministerial favors, and he will say: I have the right to sell them, because they are mine. Why wouldn't this man become a minister? We have sometimes seen such prodigies. Then he will sell or have his mistress sell the functions of the State, or he will certainly speculate on public funds. How many examples can we cite that come more or less close to this imaginary type! Illustrious diplomats who betrayed and sold the interests of their homeland for money, honest deputies of the people who sold their votes in parliament for seats, scrupulous civil servants of all ranks who tampered with their authority, valiant generals who stole the subsistence of their soldiers, devout priests and holy bishops who have abused religion to steal inheritances, the crowd of delinquents of this type is truly innumerable.

But does the license for crime, among the upper classes, stop there? Is it limited to cleverly disguised fraud? No, the possibility of committing all kinds of crimes is everywhere in proportion to wealth; all passions can be satisfied with impunity behind the rampart of gold. Lovelace is covered by his gold, as formerly he could be by his rank and nobility. Rich Tartuffe can spin his plots with impunity, without the officer arriving at the end of the play to stop him.

It seems that in our time the supposition that I have just made of a man who would carry into the upper classes, and into the functions with which they are invested, the audacity of the Cartouches and the Mandrins of the low stage, has come true. Men with greedy souls and daring genius saw the customs of our century, and, leaving the penal colony and prison to imbeciles, they changed theaters, and received only crowns. Satire, it is true, has taken hold of them; but what does it matter to them? Perhaps it was they who made this satire. Robert Macaire is this poem of license and impunity for crime in the upper classes. This bandit traffickers in everything, trust, friendship, love, all possible feelings; and it happens to everything. Indeed, such is our time: Cartouche and Mandrin, disguised as bankers, calculate in public, and if necessary establish in court the capital at their disposal. "You can't hang a man who has a hundred thousand crowns," said insolently a trader from the last century who had deserved the noose. Today not only do we not hang such a man, but we give him all the honors.

From time to time only some of the crimes committed in the upper classes, I mean crimes positively provided for by the Code, come to light, and it is necessary to prosecute them. But even then there is no shortage of voices to cry out that we must prevent the scandal of these revelations, that such examples take away from the people the faith they must have in the morality of those who govern them, and that if decent people are thus unmasked, society is compromised. Honest society, even if it only lives by lies!

On this point too, we have taken the shadow for the body, I readily agree: *decipimur specie recti*. Equality in criminal laws, as we know it today, only serves to cover and hide deplorable inequality. But after all, how many centuries it took to get there, and it is a marvel that we got there. Let us remember that among the Romans, throughout the Republic, and long after under the Empire, any slave could be put to death by his master, without justice taking notice. It was necessary to come to Adrien for a law to be made against these murders. Still, a law was only made against the murder of slaves committed without motive; the right to kill them remained. Today not only does everyone see their life and property materially protected by the law, but it is supposed that the repression of crime is the same for everyone, that justice watches over everyone equally, that no one goes unpunished because he is rich, that no one is punished too much because he is poor. It is an admirable progress in Humanity that such an assumption is necessary today for the maintenance and stability of States.

5. The same principle of equality also regulates the conventions and contracts of citizens among themselves, and ensures their execution.

I know very well that here again it is only a fiction; that the poor person who contracts with the rich man is never sure that his right will not perish in the lawsuits. I see all the leads to inequality among the thousand pitfalls of procedure, the onerous fees that are charge, and the ease for the rich to have at their disposal attorneys, lawyers, notaries, bailiffs, and all the whole litigating army. Read what Bentham wrote on the administration of justice, and you will see what the right of the widow and the orphan is. But ultimately the equity of judges serves as much as possible as a rampart of the law. Here again the principle of equality reigns, and right is established on this principle.

6. But here is another, much more astonishing proclamation of the principle of equality. Who would have said, in the Middle Ages, that a time would come when the thought of the last citizen would be considered equal in right to the thought, not of a cleric or even of a tonsured priest, not even of a bishop or an archbishop, but of the pope, and that to the decisions of the sovereign pontiff, united even with the whole Church, and supported by twenty councils, any man, even the most ignorant of men, would have the right to refuse his suffrage and to oppose his own opinion, not only in himself, in the secret of his soul, but publicly, by speech, by writings, by all possible means of communication and expression; that no one, in a word, would report to anyone in matters of conscience, and that thus virtually every man would be pope? Yet this is what happened: because what do you proclaim under the name of freedom of thought, freedom to publish one's opinions, freedom of conscience, philosophical and

religious freedom, freedom of worship, if not equality of minds, equality of intelligence?

Here again equality is only a lie, I know; because for there to be reason for the exercise of the right conferred by this equality, the people would have to have the possibility of engaging in intellectual work, or at least some leisure to occupy themselves with intellectual things. This is a magnificent river, it is true, and it passes very close to me; but if it is impossible for me to draw a single drop from it to refresh my lips, what use is this water, so abundant and so beautiful, to me? This is the fate of the people: they have the freedom of intelligence, but they do not have the possibility of making use of it.

I am not attached, as we see, to the thousand little obstacles that are brought daily to the recognized right of thought. Legal restrictions on the liberty to write, secret or open persecutions against liberty of conscience, obstacles of all kinds to liberty of worship, all these Machiavellian ruses in which our rulers are consumed to steal in detail what they concede in bulk, are unworthy of attention on such a subject. I am talking about the general lack of organization that makes the proclaimed right of all to intelligence illusory. Nothing being organized in current society, this equality of intelligence, recognized in right, is in fact a chimera. The immense majority of the people do not participate in intellectual life; they live randomly in the life of brutes; because they have, in order to govern themselves, only their sensations, their needs, and the threat of a brutal penalty. Consider your cities and your countryside, and see if there is real use of the liberty of thought and religious liberty. There is undoubtedly equality, but it is the equality of nothingness. Will the seventy-five thousand *canuts* from the Lyon factory, for example, make great use of this right to think so generously recognized to all? The wretches have barely been born and can move their arms regularly when their parents, driven by hunger, think of using them. Locked up during the day with their loom, lying at night above this loom, in a sort of hammock, in order to save space, here they are at work for their entire lives. Yes, a man's life is spent moving his arms in the same way over and over again. Here they are transformed into machines; they become an integral part of their profession, as this profession is part of themselves; they and the profession become one whole that labors; they are the soul of this profession, but they no longer have a soul. There they are, I say, like the spider that spins its web. The spider seeks to take insects for food; it obeys its instinct, it is not otherwise gifted with intelligence. He, the canut of Lyon, weaves his web to reach the piece of bread and the piece of cheese that make up his food every day. And yet, there were perhaps, among these sons of artisans, men who had received from nature the mission of calculating the law of the stars, like Laplace, that son of a peasant, or of singing virtue and to alleviate the evils of Humanity, like Virgil, that other son of a peasant, or to lead the human race towards God, like Socrates, that son of a sculptor, or like Rousseau, that son of a watchmaker. When Socrates and Virgil lived, when Rousseau appeared, when Laplace was born, the right was not proclaimed; today it is, thanks to them and their peers: but what does it matter if the right is proclaimed, if a miracle is always needed for this man of genius, unjustly plunged into darkness and

kept in a world lower, can rise towards the light? As cruel, indeed, as the miserly Pluto, it is very rare that society lets Orpheus out of hell. We see a soul emerge by chance from the abyss into which so many other souls sink, and we exclaim with admiration at the current equality. Well! Don't you see that your very astonishment is proof of the inequality that weighs on intelligence?

But is it only for a few rare geniuses who can thus be atrophied at birth that we should have pity and tears? We owe it to all, because everyone has the right. So I am talking about all these children, all these men without exception. I am talking about the weakest of spirit as well as the strongest. I tell you that by virtue of your principle of the equality of intelligences, wherever God has placed an intelligence, that is to say wherever a man exists, this man has the right to be a man, and to live a life other than that of the brute. Man, Jesus said, does not live only by bread, he lives by light and truth: where is the light, where is the truth, where is the spiritual nourishment that today's society provides to its children?

It is necessary, you will tell me, that a part of society is thus condemned to labor; it is impossible for it to be otherwise. If you believe it, remove from your speeches these great words of liberty of thought, liberty of writing, religious liberty; or agree that you mean by this, as I said earlier, a general negation and the equality of nothingness. Liberty of thought, liberty of expressing one's thoughts, religious liberty, restricted to a few hundred or a few thousand men in a nation of thirty million, is not equality, I hope. Where one man in a hundred thousand enjoys such a prerogative, the word slavery is more appropriate than that of liberty. Say then that intelligences are slaves, that they languish in slavery, and do not say that they are free.

But really, do you believe that it is impossible for all men to make use of the faculty of intelligence that is within them? Because labor is a necessity of our nature, do you believe that it follows that a large part of the human race must be deprived of all spiritual life? You don't believe it, because you remember the past. There was a time when Christianity reigned in Europe, when the Church existed alongside civil societies, alongside the secular world, opposite Caesar. Well, then the equality of intelligences was not proclaimed, the freedom of intelligences was far from being recognized, but the use of intelligence existed for all men. Every man, in fact, even if he was originally covered with all the stigmata of servitude and all the leprosy of poverty, was introduced into the domain of spiritual life. To every man initiation, to every man moral bread; the living spring was not closed for anyone. The Church was the spiritual city where all souls were received, where all lived and were nourished. I repeat again, equality did not reign there, liberty did not reign there: there were two worlds, the priest and the layman. The only equality was that spiritual food was given to all; but the right to prepare this food did not belong to all, and so the food was not the same for the clergy and for the people. The priests gave the bread to the laity, and reserved the wine for themselves: for them the inspiring cup, for the people a less generous food. The result was horrible inequality, theocracy weighed on the world. The men responsible for preparing the intellectual nourishment of all were no longer distributing to the people anything but corrupt food, when Wycliffe and Jan Huss,

these great martyrs, demanded the cup for everyone, that is to say equality. Yes, it was necessary to overthrow the spiritual city, and proclaim equality on its ruins. But what happened? The spiritual city destroyed, nothing was put in its place. The rich therefore, the men of leisure, alone have inherited the scattered debris of the intellectual edifice. What do they do with this inheritance? That is not the question. But what have the people inherited, and what do they have in their possession? Nothing. What do we do for them? Nothing. We leave them this religion which we renounced for their own benefit; we suppose it still suits them. The fact is false. The people are as incredulous as you, their noble masters; they do not believe in the pope any more than you, no more in his priests than you, no more in the divinity of Jesus Christ than you, no more in the future life, in paradise and in hell than you; I would even say that they do not believe in God any more than you, that they are finally as deprived of moral and religious ideas as you are. No matter, you need there to be a religion, in order to say that there is one, and not appear to be dragging behind you herds of slaves similar to brutes. So what are you doing? You write in your charters: The Catholic religion is the religion of the majority of French people. You put a false label on an empty bottle, and you are satisfied. But you know very well yourselves that it is only a fiction, that Catholicism no longer reigns in France, and that the immense majority of the people no longer have a religion.

Now, these men thus condemned to work and deprived of religion, what intellectual life do they live? Where are their hours of elevation, the hours when, in the rest of the body, they rose towards God, understood his works, learned the reason of things, and gave their assent to the order of the world and even to their own? misfortune? Where are the dogmas that regulated their actions, corrected their vices, and taught them to repair their faults? Where, in a word, is for them the exercise of intelligence and the occupation of reason? All this no longer exists, all this has now passed. The rich abuse human knowledge, which is abandoned to them and handed over to them like prey; they poison themselves with it rather than nourish themselves with it, and the people are deprived of it.

I therefore say that all these great words of liberty of thought, liberty of expressing one's thoughts, liberty of conscience, religious liberty, mean nothing other than a right without realization, a virtuality without effect for the immense majority of men. But, considering the necessary progress of the human race, I say that this phase of deprivation is better, a thousand times better, for the cause of the people than the previous phase. It is not the present, in fact, the present in itself, that we must see; it is the present in relation to the past and in relation to the future. The right of all to intelligence is today proclaimed: this is an immense revolution; because the right proclaimed and not realized is superior to the use which was not covered by the right. The use of the right will come again, be sure of it; and this time the use clothed with law will not generate theocracy and superstition, but democracy and religion. A day will come when again all intelligences will take their place at the spiritual banquet; but then there will no longer be any distinction between priests and laity; the secular world will have become the Church, and Equality will reign in the double domain of

the civil sovereign and the ecclesiastical sovereign, of the priestly king and the temporal king, of the Pontiff and the Despot, of the Pope and Caesar.

This is obviously, according to us, where Europe and Christianity have been advancing since the glorious insurrection that we called the Reformation. But whether we are granted this conclusion or not, the fact remains that no one today can, without madness, refuse to admit that the legal participation of all minds in the administration of society is a *fait accompli*, that the right of each person to intelligence is one of the current bases of society, and that thus, in the intellectual respect, it is still the principle of Equality that triumphs and reigns.

7. Finally, the same principle still regulates the private relations of citizens among themselves and the host of relations that participate to different degrees in friendship and love. I know well, to repeat here my eternal observation, that current equality is on this point, as on all other points, only a lie: but here again the principle is no less proclaimed. We think one way, we act another. As an example, I only want the relationship that should be the most sacred, and which today is the most profaned, love.

Does it not seem, in fact, that equality in love is the current law of society? Everything that poets have written in favor of this equality is today received by all minds. Novelists had the art of getting us interested in some poor girl, and at the end they made her marry a prince; or else it was, conversely, a poor devil whom they married to a princess: they thus overturned, in their ideal conceptions, the narrow and barbaric barriers of reality. What ardor of passion, what thirst for love and equality at the same time, have they not kindled in the human heart! Well, today their utopia is universally accepted. Rousseau, it is true, this great logician, set his century back for a moment by posing this problem: What if it was by chance a son of a king and an executioner's daughter? The century nodded a little, and again admitted the equality. Is there reversibility of the father over the child? Why shouldn't the daughter of an executioner be worthy of marrying the son of a king? A child comes into the world, he is neither king nor executioner. Thus reasoned this reasoning century, and the sentimental revolution went hand in hand with the political revolution which, in certain cases, subjected kings to executioners.

The Revolution has accomplished its work: today, what is, in the eyes of reason, and even in the eyes of public opinion, a misalliance? Are there then nobles, patricians, so that they can debase themselves by marrying common women? No, everyone is common today, and everyone is noble.

But what is actually happening? It is still the people who have lost the cost, for the moment, of this proclamation of a right without realization. For, by abolishing the barriers that separated the house of the poor from that of the rich, we gave entry to corruption. The rich do not ordinarily take their wives from the poor classes, but they often take their mistresses there; doubly cowardly, they speculate on the wealth of some and the poverty of others.

The right itself, the recognized right of equality in love, becomes the means of this corruption. This poor young girl of obscure birth once knew that she could not marry this nobleman or this rich man: today why would she not believe his oaths?

Deceived by this equality, youth let themselves be carried away by all the ardor of their passions. The girls of the people aspire to escape from their condition through marriage, and very often only achieve shame; wealth and luxury become their goal, for which they lose sight of both love and marriage. As for rich young people, there is no longer any brake that holds them back; because equality has brought all women closer to them, and delivers them to them like prey; equality invites them to descend from their condition, as it invites women to rise above theirs; so they meet, but it is not in love that they meet. You complain about libertinism, you ask what causes it: it is the current equality, that is to say a false and lying equality. There is no longer any barrier today that can contain so much unleashed passion.

One of the results of this equality that is acknowledged, but in no way achieved, is a horrible tax levied, for the benefit of libertinism, on the poor classes. The Athenians, tributaries of Crete, sent each year a certain number of young girls to the frightful Minotaur: among us the poor classes pay the same tribute. Where do these unfortunate women come from, I ask, who reproduce among us, after eighteen centuries of Christianity, what was most frightful and most impure about ancient slavery and the license of Paganism? They come out of the ranks of the people; it is a tribute that the people pay alone. Ask your scholars: the scholars, concerning themselves with everything, have come to concern themselves with these unfortunate people; serious doctors, commissioned *ad hoc*, paint a picture of their way of life... Study them, doctors, they are the daughters of the people.

These are relegated to the last circles of hell, I agree; but hell, like Dante's symbolic painting of it, has many different circles that wind into each other. How many women and how many men move around in these innumerable circles, looking for love and not finding it, because love is equality, and the false equality that we have before our eyes robs us of real equality!

Yes, love is like justice: its very essence is equality; or rather it is justice itself and equity, that is to say equality at its highest power. What justice done to your fellow woman to love her and take her as your wife! What equality is such a bond that makes us part of her and she of us, or rather that identifies us with her and she with us, which carries on it all the faculties of our soul, and makes us dependent on her at the point where we exist in her and through her! What equality, I say, is the sacred and mysterious bond that, from the father and the mother, will produce a being participating in both and uniting them in itself! The poets and novelists were therefore not wrong: no consideration, unless it is truly sacred, can balance the divine bond that makes love.

But also carry into this bond, instead of true equality, a false idea of equality, and see what crime results. If you have no other idea of equality in love, other than the idea that no barrier separates you from the object of your desires, it is no longer an act of

justice that you are carrying out, but the greatest injustice; it is no longer equality that you achieve, it is inequality that you erect in its place.

And love, which is equality, which is justice, moves away and escapes you; and your embraces only embrace, instead of him, pain and remorse, inseparable companions of all injustice.

Is it therefore surprising that so many men and women today complain of having found nothing but eternal pain in love? Deceived by the false equality that we have before our eyes, they only seek to achieve this, and thus give themselves license to offend true equality, that is to say, love. They are free, they say. Free from what? In other words, why are they free? The right of equality in love, which is proclaimed, is proclaimed only so that we achieve this equality. But to take this right and abuse it without actually producing the act of justice that it confers on us is to behave like newly freed slaves, who do not know what freedom consists of. And this is what is ordinary today: in the absence of a true notion of justice and love, instead of love, which is equality achieved, we realize the opposite of love. And this is what the very proclamation of equality in love contributed to.

It has been said: There are no more barriers between men and women; in the name of equality, no more ranks that separate those whom love wants to unite. But what resulted from this proclamation of equality? Is this equality in love? No, it is inequality in love. For equality to result, it would have been necessary for love to be clothed with justice and holiness, that is to say, for men to understand that this bond is the greatest act of equity that we can achieve on earth, that it is the most august application of the very principle of equality, identical with that of justice. But, failing to understand this, they have only realized, in the name of equality, inequality, injustice, inequity. For, uniting without the idea of justice and equality, the bond they contract is, not true love, but the overthrow of true love, and a true crime against this love.

The ancients gave a sister to the celestial Venus, but they did not give this common Venus the same attributes as the other. We, more advanced in certain respects, have understood that equality must always accompany love; but, for lack of really knowing equality, justice, love, we have formed some confused idea where we give to one of the two goddesses what belongs to the other. And we suffer all the more the more vaguely we have a higher feeling. We aspire to equality, we proclaim it, and we achieve its opposite; we look for love, and we only find its shadow. From there, in our darkness, so much weeping and gnashing of teeth, following the word of the Gospel.

Has human morality therefore been increased by this proclamation of equality in love? I have no doubt about it; but I say that it temporarily resulted in great harm. Alas! Progress is only accomplished with suffering! Yes, it is an immense progress in human destiny to have proclaimed the right of all to the free development of their sympathy: what horrible slavery, in fact, is that of feeling and love! But until man has taken a corresponding step in knowledge, that is, until the notion of true equality in love, or, which is the same thing, of true love, is acquired, everything is reduced to an insurrection without rules, to a brutal devastation of the most beautiful of human faculties. And isn't that, in fact, what's happening today? Do we not hear on all sides

comparing the morals of our century, not to the morals of the regency, that is too little, but to the morals of the Romans in the last and solemn orgy in which the empire was destroyed.

Thus, to follow the chain of our reasoning, equality in love is admitted in principle; but in fact the inequality remains. Shall I now talk about this other inequality that weighs on the very condition of women?

Everything is linked in the moral world as in the physical world. We have not been able to emancipate slaves without eliminating the slavery of women; we could not abolish the nobility of blood without emancipating love; or rather love itself has been the principal emancipator of the human race, because it has been involved in all the revolutions which have brought about our civil and political equality. It is love, in large part, that, groaning in slavery, overthrew all barriers, and made the principle of equality reign on earth. How could it not have shared the fruit of a victory to which it had contributed so much? And that being the case, how could the woman not have benefited from it? It is no longer rank, fortune, things in a word, the earth and all the circumstances of the material environment in which we live, which decide the human will in love; no, it is love itself that decides. Now, if it is love, it is as much the woman as the man. Therefore, since each woman, as a wife, appears to us equal to her husband, all women appear to us to be on the same rank as all men. Equal to us in love and marriage, how could they not be equal everywhere? Therefore, today's society feels invincibly led to proclaim the equality of men and women.

I do not agree with those who have recently preached the emancipation of women as an insurrection. It is a question of emancipating us all through each other by making justice reign among us in all our relationships, and not of splitting us up, of dividing us into two different camps; in a word, it is necessary that woman rises through man and with him, that man rises through woman and with her, but not that one of the sexes separates and distinguishes its cause from that of the other.

There are not two different beings, man and woman; there is only one human being with two sides that correspond and come together through love. The couple is before the man and before the woman. The man and the woman are to form the couple; they are the two parts of it. Outside of the couple, outside of love and marriage, there are no more sexes; there are human beings of common origin, with similar faculties. Man is at all moments of his life sensation-sentiment-knowledge; woman too. The definition is therefore the same.

That sentiment in general predominates in women, that abstract reason generally predominates in men, that is possible: but what does it matter? Do not all the inhabitants of the same country have certain characteristics of resemblance between them that distinguish them and separate them from the rest of the world? Don't the ages present the same contrast? Don't all children, all young people, all old people have very marked relationships with each other? Does not sensation dominate in childhood; is not the mixture of sensation and sentiment the incessant motive of youth, just as knowledge is the prerogative of mature age, and becomes the source of all the qualities or all the defects of the old man? Women considered in general, independently of the

manifestation of the sex, likewise have a type, I grant; but this type does not separate them from the rest of Humanity, and does not make them a separate race that must be distinguished philosophically from man. In this respect, they will form, if you like, a nation in Humanity, or even a particular age of life: it is in this way that they are distinguished from man; not otherwise. They are, like man, sensation-sentiment-knowledge united indivisibly at all moments and in all acts of their existence. Absent love, they manifest themselves to man as human persons, and place themselves, like man, in the various categories of civil society.

It is not that I mean by this that their character, their particularity never abandons them, that they are ever men. No, any manifestation of their life always implies the virtuality of women that they have within them. But I say that this virtuality is then completely hidden in them, and as if it did not exist. We see it with the eyes of the body, but we do not feel it in our soul; or if we have the sentiment of it, this sentiment is in a virtual state within us, and we have no awareness of it.

I say more, I say that their originality, their particularity, even when it manifests itself, is of no other order than that of the three great types corresponding to the three faculties inherent in our nature, scientists, artists, industrialists, or that of the three ages of life, childhood, youth, old age. It is certainly other, but it is not of another order. Their particularity lies in the fact that they are virtually, at every moment of their existence, predestined to form the human couple with man. As long as this virtuality does not manifest itself and remains latent, they enter, as I have just said, into the generality of the human species, just like the child, the young man, or the old man, just like the scholar, artist, or industrialist. But, even when it manifests itself, as it only manifests itself by acts imbued with sensation, feeling and knowledge at the same time, no essential disparity of nature between them and us is revealed to us; but, on the contrary, we still find our own nature in theirs.

Indeed, consider what happens; consider the cause of the phenomenon, the nature of the phenomenon, the effects and the consequences of the phenomenon. First of all, the cause of this originality, of this particularity of women, is the same in our eyes as that which makes a man a scholar, an artist, or an industrialist. This cause is hidden in God, within a life that is not communicated to us. Is it not true that we roughly attribute these various faculties of men to what we call nature or organization? What does this mean, and what do these words nature and organization mean, if not the unknown and completely incomprehensible cause for us of a virtuality that can manifest itself as well as it can remain latent. Well, it's the same with women. It is to nature, to organization, to which we relate the secret and mysterious virtuality, which, from the latent state, can pass to the state of manifestation; which, from a human being in general, can make a particular being, having certain distinct properties, a wife, a mother. The phenomenon taking place, the same parity continues. For the artist loses inspiration or finds it again without being master of it, and without knowing how God acts in him; and in the same way the woman feels within herself the inspiration which makes her love, and, having become a mother, bend over the cradle of her child, without understanding anything of these profound mysteries. But both, the woman

and the artist, manifest their lives and the virtuality that is in them through acts where sensation, sentiment, knowledge are united, and where there is no something else, neither for them, nor for the natures with which they are in communication. The identity of condition is therefore still obvious.

Now draw the conclusion. For being what they are, that is to say certain very diverse potentialities, but hidden in their essence, scientists, artists or industrialists, are no less all equal, as men. While there is predominance among them of one of the three aspects of our nature, they nevertheless unite these three aspects, and that is why they are equal. They leave this general state of uniformity when the special function for which God has destined and made them suitable begins: then their particularity is revealed. Acts imbued with the triple stamp of sensation, sentiment, and knowledge, but which have their source in a particular innateness, reveal them as they are, particularize them and distinguish them. But, by only grasping within themselves and communicating to other men sensation-sentiment-knowledge, they thereby remain our equals, natures similar to ours, human persons in a word. It is the same with the woman: all that she feels within herself and all that she expresses is sensation, sentiment, knowledge, united. She is therefore always our equal and of a similar nature. The source is diverse in God, but the effects are the same, and everything that is perceivable and communicable happens to be identical. The same error that caused the thinkers that I am refuting here in passing to imagine, between the scholar, the industrialist, and the artist, an essential or natural difference, as if they had, for example, only one of the three prerogative faculties of our being, also made them consider woman as a separate type, essentially different from the type of man. But this is a serious mistake.

So, to summarize, in whatever way we consider this question, we are led to proclaim the equality of men and women. Because if we consider the woman in the couple, the woman is the equal of the man, since the couple itself is founded on equality, since love itself is equality, and where there does not reign justice, that is to say equality, there cannot reign love, but the opposite of love reigns. And if we consider the woman outside the couple, she is a human being similar to man, endowed with the same faculties to varying degrees; one of those varieties in unity that constitute the world and human society.

This way of understanding the equality of women is very different, I repeat, from the doctrine presented for this purpose in recent times, and it also carries completely different consequences. Jewish-Christian theology, born in the East at a time when the slavery of women was universal, had found nothing better than to bring woman out of the rib of Adam, and thus to subordinate her to man in the very idea of her creation. It was to consecrate, through a genetic dogma, the inequality of the two sexes and the servitude of women. In their turn, those who previously took up the cause of women, and who preached revolt to Eve, presented a theological idea that essentially separates the two sexes, while equalizing them and placing them on the same rank. Indeed, have they not given this seemingly bizarre formula of God: "God *he* is good; God, *she* is good. This formula is a return to Shaivism. But have they properly understood the ancient

cult of Shiva and Durga, those who reproduce it in this way? Did Shaivism separate the two principles? No, on the contrary, it united them indivisibly in his symbol. Certainly, M. Enfantin's formula, applied to divine manifestations, is superior to the Hebrew myth; it does not bring Eve out, by a secondary creation, from Adam's rib; it does not make her a dependency, an appendage of man; it hatches her alongside him, and constitutes her as his equal. But it has a great fault, according to us: it is to wrongly differentiate, in an essential way, what should not be thus differentiated. Yes, God is in fact the two principles, he contains them in the mystery of his essence; but he is therefore neither he nor she: he is the two united by a third. Why essentially explain in God what must not be explained, what can only be explained by destroying the very idea of God? God is neither in one nor the other of the two faces that you distinguish in him; it is in these two faces united by love, which is its third face. So the conclusion you draw from your formula is false: there is no more he and she in the human manifestation of the divine essence, that is to say in the human race, than there is in any other manifestation of the very essence of God. God only manifests itself when the he and the she, which are virtually in it, are united by a third principle, love; and it is then, and only then, that the two principles that you distinguish are revealed. And likewise, man and woman only reveal themselves as sexes when love unites them. Before love and the couple, the woman is not, so to speak; because she does not exist as a woman, she is only a human person.

Moreover, as I have already said, this unphilosophical differentiation is due to other errors of the same kind committed by the man of genius whom I have just named. Because, after having differentiated the scientist, the artist, and the industrialist, as three natures of diverse essences, between which there was no possible link except through the intermediary of the theocrat or the priest, he must *a fortiori* differentiate man and woman as two natures of diverse essences, between which also the androgynous priest would serve as a link. And this whole system, ultimately, had to be summed up in a similar distinction of the divine nature, in a duality of principles, in an erroneous reproduction of Shaivism.

Again, I do not deny that these two principles do in fact exist in God: but I ask what unites these two principles in God. You are forced to answer me that it is love. It is therefore love, and love alone, that manifests these two principles in God. It is therefore also love, and love alone, that manifests them in the human race. So the woman does not have to claim equality as a woman, as you taught her, but to claim equality as a wife, that is to say, to claim true love by raising herself even to the supreme idea of love, and by sharing it with man. Beyond that, she must only claim equality as a human person.

From this doctrine follow corollaries very different from those resulting from the system that we reject. In this system, the woman being declared free as a woman before the couple exists, the result is that her love, her sex, are handed over to her, so to speak, so that she can parade her liberty. To declare her free in this way, free in this way, free because she has a sex, is to declare her free not only to use, but to abuse her love.

But, on the contrary, declaring her free as a human person, as long as the couple does not exist, does not in any way entail the same consequence. Free and recognized as such, not in the particular title of woman, but as a human person, she becomes free without doubt, in her love as in all her faculties, but not free to abuse love. The abuse of love does not become the prerogative and the very sign of one's liberty. And see the immense difference that results. Before loving and being loved, she was not free as a woman, but as a human person; she had no sex then, that is to say, the sex in her was not manifested; it was a latent faculty, like reason hidden in the child. She loves, she is loved, here she is a woman, she reveals herself; it is love that reveals her, it is love that manifests her hitherto mysteriously veiled sex. But at the same time and indivisibly she is a wife; love having been shown, the couple exists under the holy law of equality; she is therefore only a woman for the one she loves and who loves her under this law; her liberty of love is therefore withdrawn from her at the same time as she uses it; this liberty is replaced by equality in love, by the equality of the couple. Marriage, love, therefore regains all its rights. It was through marriage that the condition of women was improved; it is through marriage, equality in love, that the emancipation of women will truly take place.

From our point of view, we must say to women: You have the right to equality, in two distinct capacities, as human persons and as wives. As wives, you are our equals; because love itself is equality. As human beings, your cause is that of all, it is the same as that of the people; it is linked to the great revolutionary cause, that is to say to the general progress of humankind. You are our equals, not because you are women, but because there are no longer slaves or serfs.

This is the truth that must be told to men and women; but it is to distort this truth and transform it into error to say to women: You are a sex apart, a sex in possession of love. Emancipate yourself, that is to say, use and abuse love. The woman thus transformed into an immodest Venus loses both her dignity as a human person, and her dignity as a woman, that is to say as a being capable of forming a human couple under the holy law of love.

We see that we are far, infinitely far from sharing the system in the name of which there has been so much noise, in recent years, about the emancipation of women, and given to this emancipation a turn that is, in our opinion, pernicious. But we nevertheless adopt with all our hearts the truth that inspired it, namely, the equality of the two sexes. Well! In fact, who does not feel this equality today, and who does not remain in agreement with it? Who today believes in the myth of Eve taken from Adam's rib? Who would dare to decide today what Milton decided so boldly, not yet two centuries ago, that woman is an inferior being who cannot elevate herself to God by herself; that Eve can only know God through Adam; that he alone of the two of them is the guide and the beacon in their common march towards the infinite Being; that he only reports to God, while she reports directly to him and to God through him:

“He for God only, she for God by him.”

No, the Genesis of the old Jew Moses is as false on this point and as abandoned today as the theology, borrowed from the same source, of the Protestant Milton. Eve is the equal of Adam; the original priority is a chimera. The two faces of God in creation are co-eternal. Love supposes two, can only exist with two, and the two united by love eternally reproduce in time and space the divine Trinity. Children of love therefore, if we suppose them to be created, Adam and Eve both existed before their birth; for they pre-existed as equals in their cause. They are only the two uncoupled halves of the mysterious androgyne. Thus nature still shows us the two principles united and forming only one being in almost the entire plant kingdom and in the lowest ranks of animality. But it is not only in her cause in God that Eve is Adam's equal. In the divine sense of things, equality between her and him has always existed. Created his equal, she always remained his equal in the divine manifestation which generated, through successive phases, the world of Humanity. Yes, beneath this apparent human inequality in which she has been classified until now, she really shared equality; because she had not only equality of suffering, but the same effective potentiality as man. She shared with man all the painful crises of the successive education of the human race; she therefore deserved as much as he, and did as much as he. Is it not in fact obvious, I repeat, that it is largely love that, from the law of slavery, has made us pass, through a thousand revolutions, to the law of equality? Woman has therefore paid her painful share to the common cause: if we are free, it is partly because of her; let her be free through us.

But is she? Is she treated as an equal by us? As a wife, does she find equality in love and marriage? As a human person, does she find equality in the city? That is the question.

Now, I will not say to you: Examine the facts, see what is happening; but I will tell you: Just open the Code, and see if this Code, which should be the ideal of justice and morality, and which apparently reflects our highest and noblest ideas, does not violate in the first place, in the most brutal way, the equality of women as wives.

Our civil law is, regarding women, a model of absurd contradictions. According to Roman law, the woman lived perpetually under guardianship: at least in this legislation everything was in perfect agreement; the woman was still a minor there. We declare her, in a multitude of cases, as free as man. For her, no more general guardianship or fiction of guardianship: her age of majority is fixed; she is capable of inheriting by herself; she inherits in equal portions; she owns and disposes of her property; there is even more, in the community between spouses we admit the separation of property. But is it a question of the very bond of marriage, where it is no longer wealth that is at stake, but where it is a question of us and our mothers, of us and our sisters, of us and our daughters. Oh! then we are intractable in our laws, and we no longer admit equality; we want the woman to declare herself our inferior, our servant, to swear obedience to us. Truly we value money more than love; we have more consideration for bags of crowns than for human dignity: because we emancipate women as proprietors; but as women, our law declares them inferior to us.

However, it is the link where the equality of woman with man is most evident, the link where, so to speak, this equality bursts forth, where it is so necessary to proclaim that without it this link does not exist. But, by an absurd contradiction, our civil law chooses this moment to proclaim the inferiority of women; it condemns her to obedience, makes her swear a false oath, and abuses love to make her outrage love.

It will be, I have no doubt, for future ages, the characteristic sign of our moral state: this article of our laws that consecrates in such formal terms inequality in love. It will be said of us: They understood justice so little that they did not even understand love, which is justice in its most divine degree; they understood love so little that they did not even include justice in it, and in their book of justice, in their Code, the formula of marriage, the only sacrament of which they still had some idea, instead of consecrating equality, consecrated inequality; instead of union, disunion; instead of the love that equalizes and identifies, I don't know what contradictory and monstrous relationship, based both on identity and on inferiority and slavery. Yes, like these formulas from the law of the Twelve Tables that we cite today, when we want to prove the barbarity of the ancient Romans, and their ignorance of justice, this article of our Codes will one day be cited to characterize our rudeness and our ignorance; for the absence of a high notion of justice is as marked there as the absence of a high notion of love.

Everything follows from this in relation to the condition of women, or rather everything is linked to this point: for will we respect the equality of women as human persons, when we are foolish enough to deny her this equality as a wife? Are women today really, as human beings, treated as equals to men? I don't want to go into this vast subject. I limit myself to a single question: What education do women receive? You treat them like you treat the people. To them too you leave the old religion that no longer suits you. These are children who are kept in the vest for as long as possible, as if this were not the right way to deform them, to destroy both the rectitude of their spirit and the candor of their soul. What does society do for them anyway? What careers does it give them access to? And yet, it is obvious, for those who think about it, that our arts, our sciences, our industry, will make as much new progress when women are called up, as they did, a few centuries ago, when the serfs were called. You complain of the misery and misfortune that weigh on your sad societies: abolish the castes that still exist, abolish the caste in which you keep half of the human race confined.

CHAPTER V.

The present evil of society results from the struggle between this principle and its opposite.

We have just reviewed society in all its aspects. Man being indivisible sensation-sentiment-knowledge, and not being anything else, society is composed of three spheres corresponding to these three faces of our nature, and it is entirely included in these three spheres. These three spheres, which penetrate each other and which never exist without one another, like the three faculties to which they correspond, are, 1. the social world of sensation, that is to say of manifestation, activity, reciprocal act, convention, contract; 2. the social world of sentiment, that is to say of the invisible and not yet manifested attraction that unites and brings together the different members of society, and leads them to contract with each other; 3. the social world of knowledge, that is to say, of the awareness that we have of our feelings and our actions, as well as of the feelings and actions of others, and that we communicate to each other. But no society can subsist unless there is a certain regulation in these three worlds, where the life of each of its members is exercised and developed. Hence the right, the right that is truly the idea that man, in each era, makes himself, and which he recognizes for his law. Right in the domain of knowledge generates religious right; right in the domain of feeling produces moral right or mores; right in the active practice of life constitutes civil and political right. Now, we have seen, in each of these three parts of the right, equality proclaimed as the law, that is to say as the only reasonable principle and the only criterion of justice that we have today.

In the sphere of society that corresponds to the act (*political and civil right*, the ancient *temporal power*, including political legislation proper, the regulation of industry and commerce, the civil and military hierarchy, civil, criminal and penal justice), equality has been formulated everywhere, and no other principle is applicable today: what is consistent with equality is just and reasonable; what is contrary to it is unfair and absurd.

In the sphere of society that corresponds to intelligence (*religious right*, the ancient *spiritual power*), same proclamation and same adhesion.

Finally, in the sphere of society that corresponds to sentiment (*moral right* or mores, that is to say what formerly temporal power, usurped by Caesar or by a caste, and spiritual power, usurped by the Pope or by the Clergy, left to the individual for all), same proclamation, same adhesion, same axiom.

Whichever way we turn, it seems that we will grasp and feel Equality. False appearance, deceptive mirage! it is the inequality that we embrace. Equality, Equality! I only hear this cry resounding around me, and I see everywhere only shocking inequality, crude despotism, and shameful slavery.

And what is most awful is that we all have the feeling of a better world, precisely because the only principle of reason and justice that we recognize today is Equality. The Genoese inscribed on the walls of their prisons and on the irons of the condemned the word *libertas*. Condemned as we are to inequality, how is it that we have written the word *equality* everywhere? We therefore treat ourselves as the Genoese treated their prisoners and their galley slaves!

Yes, indeed, we are poor condemned people. I spoke above of these unfortunate women who seemed to me to inhabit one of the circles of hell. I admit that sometimes society as a whole, with its ideal of Equality and its reality of slavery, seems to me like hell with its infinite circles. "Seek not hell outside the world," says the great poet Lucretius admirably; "it is in society that it is found:

"Atque ea nimirum quaecunque Acherunte profundo
"Prodita sunt esse, in vita sunt omnia nobis."

Are they not, in fact, in a circle of hell, all these unfortunate people who are burdened by infamous, hereditary poverty, and who see the word *Equality* written everywhere? Why are they told that there is only one race, when, from their hard and incessant work, they feel that there are two, and are uncertain if they are themselves of the race of Abel or that of Cain, they prove at least by their sufferings that in fact the sons of Adam stained the cradle of Humanity with blood, and that Cain killed his brother. It is them that the poet painted when he shows us Ugolino and his sons eternally reproducing their torture of hunger, where the father saw his children die before him: a symbol a thousand times more poignant than the ancient figure of Tantalus starving and dying of thirst in the middle of the waves and the fruits. For you would still willingly suffer hunger and thirst like Tantalus, in the midst of the luxury that surrounds you and the wealth that you produce without being able to participate in it, Proletarians, but to suffer like Ugolin, to see your children turn pale, these children as beautiful as those of the tyrant who keeps you confined in the Tower, and to feel them devoured by this hunger that gnaws at your insides, that is what is dreadful and truly worthy of hell!

And doesn't the second sphere, that of sentiment, also have its tortures and its figures of the damned? Are they not also in the circles of hell, all those who today seek life in love with an ardent soul? Ixion, the symbol of the ancients, pursued the goddess of the air in vain: the object of his love did not yet exist on earth, for the woman was only a child and a slave; he therefore sought it in the sky, and he only embraced the clouds. In Dante, the woman, the wife, is no longer a dream, it is a real existence; the lover sees his lover and knows her, he knows that Françoise de Rimini exists: but an insurmountable barrier separates them, and they look at each other sadly. Today the tyrannical hand, the hand armed with a sword, which came from behind and separated the two lovers, is no more. Why then does their torment still last?

And in the third sphere, that of intelligence, what new tortures the poets of our time have shown us! Intelligence is no longer a slave; Prometheus is no longer chained to his rock; he has broken his chains, or they have been broken for him, and he walks the

earth. But is he delivered for this? Oh, no! He has become Faust, who evokes demons, and who only gathers evil from his knowledge; he has become Manfred (the free man,⁵ the emancipated man), who desperately climbs the mountain peaks, without the vulture ceasing to devour his heart.

It is because we are, as they say, between two worlds, between a world that is ending and a new world that is beginning. We have proclaimed Equality in the sphere of activity, and we have not been able to organize the world of activity according to this principle: hence a duality, right and fact, which generates our torture. We have proclaimed Equality in the sphere of sentiment, and we have not been able to organize the world of sentiment in accordance with this principle: hence a duality, right and fact, which tears our souls. We have proclaimed equality in the sphere of intelligence, and we were unable to organize the free communion of intelligences: hence a duality, right and fact, which pursues us and makes us eternally unhappy.

Neither activity, nor feeling, nor intelligence, are therefore satisfied in us by this world that we have before our eyes.

There are truly two men in each of us, two tendencies, two different lives. The two political parties that divide us, the party of the old regime and the revolutionary party, are only the image of what is happening in each of us: our civil discords are only the reflection of the internal discord of our soul. There are two men, I say, in us; there is the future, there is the past; there is the man of the law of equality, and the man of the law of servitude. Our soul, our reason, only understands Equality as an ideal; but our practical life only realizes inequality, and our eyes do not see anything else.

So here is the problem: Was today's society, with this duality that divides it, born viable, yes or no? Which principle will triumph to the point of leading to a practice? Is it equality or inequality? If it is inequality, quickly plunge us back into the darkness of the centuries that passed before this ideal appeared to us. If it is Equality, then march towards the realization of this ideal.

It seems, in fact, a child who has been torn from the maternal womb by a cesarean operation, and who has been plunged alive back into the womb of his expired mother, not daring to entrust him to the light of heaven. Isn't this bloody revolution followed by twenty years of war quite a beautiful Caesarean operation? Can the new Humanity that you have before your eyes, I ask, remain thus between life and death? Does it not have new conditions of existence, and can it not follow them? What doctors are you, who persist in making it live the fetal life, when all the springs of this life are broken, when it needs a new environment, a new life! Hurry up; if you persist, death in turn will seize it.

That is the problem, I said. There is here the question of Hamlet, the question of the passage from one life to another, the question of death and resurrection: *To be or not to be, that is the question.*

But, whatever one may think of the future result of this situation in the world, no one at least can refuse this evidence and this conclusion, that present society, in whatever relation one considers it, has no other basis than the idea of Equality. If it does not have this basis, it must be declared that it has none. But in vain you would

deny that it even has this basis, and would you pretend to push Pyrrhonism so far as to recognize, in so many laws and proclamations, only facts. These are facts, you say. Yes, but these facts imply a cause; behind these facts, beneath these facts, there is a reason for these facts; in the mind of each man who contributes to these facts (and the whole of society contributes to them, either by wanting them or by accepting them without resisting), there is an idea that causes and generates these facts.

You ask me what this idea is. The answer is easy. In the past, to know what a man had the right to be in society, we asked of what blood, of what caste he was born. Today all caste is overthrown, the blood of one man is considered as noble as that of another, and the sole title of citizen justifies all ambitions. It is recognized that, by the very fact that a man is a citizen, he is virtually entitled to all the advantages and all the honors of the city. This new, strange, incredible belief, if we compare it to the ancient beliefs of the human race, this belief that has not been around for a hundred years is nevertheless already engraved in all souls, and this is why it shows itself in the facts, We think about this idea before practicing it; then we practice it, badly it is true, but we practice it, or we imagine ourselves practicing it. We no longer believe in races, we believe in all men, in the nation in general, and we have introduced Equality into the Penal Code, into the Civil Code, and even into political law.

We haven't gone beyond that, you will say; so that is enough; the limit is found, Equality actually reigns where it has the right to reign, and all is accomplished.

Such reasoning is madness! You admit a principle, you will be forced to admit its consequences. A principle embraces within itself a multitude of consequences that are only revealed successively. A principle is a force that marches like a conqueror: *Vires acquies eundo*. Once an idea is deposited in the human soul, it germinates, it develops, it grows every day, and eventually rises to the heavens.

Agree that Equality is not only this fact that we have before our eyes, this fact of equality before the Penal Code and before the Civil Code, but that Equality is an idea before being a fact, a belief which has already ordered and carried out certain consequences, and which may well carry out others.

CHAPTER VI.

Conclusion.

I believe I have demonstrated in the previous chapters that it is recognized today by the human mind: 1. that a man has rights in his sole capacity as a man, which amounts exactly to saying that a man has *virtually* the same rights as any other man; 2. that any member of the city has rights in his sole capacity as a citizen, which also amounts to saying that a citizen has *virtually* the same rights as any other citizen.

This is the recognized and demonstrated right. What does it matter the limit that our current ignorance imposes on this right that arises from the quality of man or the quality of citizen! This right is recognized: time will develop it.

Today you arbitrarily limit this right, and you say, by virtue of the present: Man, in this capacity of man, the citizen, in this capacity of citizen, has the right only to this or that thing. I say to you, in the name of the future: The right of man as a man, the right of the citizen as a citizen, is more extensive than you make it; man, in this capacity of man, the citizen, in this capacity of citizen, has the right to more than you think.

So be careful not to confuse the right with its current limit. Right, this infinite potentiality that results from the character of man and the character of citizen, will always have restrictions and limits. But there will be legitimate and illegitimate, reasonable and unfounded reasons. These two causes of restrictions on the right must be clearly distinguished. We must not confuse the necessary limits ordered by reason itself, with the temporary limits that ignorance and error can bring today, and which our efforts, on the contrary, must tend to make disappear.

Suspend, as much as you like, your judgment on the legitimate consequences of the principle; but admit the principle and the necessity of its legitimate consequences. Recognize then, by a true act of faith:

That, in the order of nature as it reveals itself today to our intelligence, man is equal to man, and that the legitimate consequences of this principle, whatever they may be, will be realized;

That in the city, as we understand it today, the citizen is equal to the citizen, and that the legitimate consequences of this principle, whatever they may be, will be realized.

You have to be blind, once again, to imagine that our current society, so full of suffering and scourges, has discovered the Herculean limits of justice, the *nec plus ultra* in equity; you have to have a triple blindfold over your eyes to dare to say that all the applications of a principle as new in the world as Equality have been made; and, on the other hand, only a fool can believe that the consequences of this principle can be overcome by violence or evaded by trickery. It is believing, in other words, that divine

creation will stop. So stop the movement in the universe, stop the stars in their progress, prevent the stone from falling.

PART TWO.

THE PAST.

The human race, according to Lessing's idea, passes through all the phases of a successive education. It therefore only reached the phase of Equality after having passed through the three possible types of inequality: the regime of family castes, the regime of national castes, and the regime of property castes.

CHAPTER ONE.

It was necessary, in order to reach human equality, to have a foundation in political right. Until then, right was unknown.

Until now, I have appeared to consider these two ideas, the *equality of the citizen* and the *equality of the man*, as two distinct and independent ideas. It was necessary for me to proceed in this way, in order to demonstrate to the most obstinate that Equality is not a dream, a utopia, a chimera, a vain and senseless aspiration, or simply a fact, or rather I do not know what semblance of a fact, which is found by chance in all our speeches, in all our reasoning, in all our institutions; but that Equality is a principle, a belief, an idea, and the only true, just, reasonable principle that it is given to the human mind to conceive today, when it is a question of society and our species. I have therefore separated the question into two parts: I have first taken up the irresistible judgments that we make on things that do not in any way concern our fellow citizens, but foreigners, Indians, Americans, Negroes, and I have proven that we recognize the rights of all men as men. I then took civil society as it is today; I considered it successively in our laws, in our mores, in our various works, and I once again proved my thesis. But is this separation radical, and does it exist at bottom? Do we really have, I mean, do we have today, in the nineteenth century, two different ideas on Equality, two principles regarding man, two essentially distinct ways of considering our fellow men, one of which applies to men in general and another that applies to our fellow citizens? No; these two ideas are intertwined, to the point of becoming only one in our minds. And of the two, the most general, the only one that is a belief, a principle, a

doctrine, is the idea of human equality, of which the equality of the citizen is only a particular case and, so to speak, a corollary.

If today, in the nineteenth century, we believe in equality within civil society, it is because we believe first and foremost in equality within the species. The right conferred by society is today only a restriction imposed by reason, based on the current nature of things and the current circumstances of humanity, on the more general right of man, a right that we recognize primordially.

The Equality that the ancients knew was of a completely different kind. The ancients did not know human equality, the equality of men as men: far from it, equality for them was based on the negation of this idea. They aimed, so to speak, to possess equality in as few numbers as possible, while our tendency would be to make all men participate in it. We have a science, a doctrine on this; they did not. Our equality as citizens seems to us to be injured and compromised every time that, in any corner of the world, human dignity is violated. If our rights as citizens are contested, we appeal to our rights as men; this is our recourse, our appeal, our final reason, as force and cannon were once the *final reason* of kings. We are kings, we feel ourselves to be such, we proclaim ourselves equal and free, because we are men. We appeal in this regard to our common origin, to the unity of the race. Our right comes to us from Adam; this right is therefore to all and for all. We do not therefore proceed to Equality by exclusion, whereas, I repeat, the tendency of the ancients would have been to exclude from the city as many men as possible. Society was not for them within the human race, it was founded outside the human race and against it, to defend themselves from it or to subjugate it. Look at the Greeks! All the rest of the human race is for them the Barbarians. Look at the Romans! Rome was founded to enslave the universe. And it was the same everywhere. The state of humanity at the time made this hostility necessary.

Moreover, this hostility reigned within the city as well as outside it; I mean that there was then no true law on which equality and peace could be founded within the city itself. Equality within the city was an arrangement, an art, a convenience, the result of a certain balance of power, but it was not an idea, a law. Within the city, outside the city, the state of war was the natural state of the human race.

It was necessary to come to recognize human equality in general: until we reached that point, the state of war, I repeat it again, was the natural state of the human race.

It is in vain, indeed, that you would want, in your mind, to separate a portion of this human race from the whole of humanity, and say: Equality will come so far, and go no further. I challenge you to establish true rights within your thus restricted circle. For as soon as you establish this separation, those you place outside the circle are absolutely without rights. But, at that very moment, their human character comes to protest against their exclusion, and destroy the rights you had established within your circle.

The foreigner, whatever you may say, is a man, and, in spite of you, God has given him rights. What then happens? First, the stranger without rights becomes an enemy.⁶ These two facts are obviously correlative. As long as the stranger is completely a

stranger, as long as he has no rights in his capacity as a man, he is an enemy. He cannot be indifferent; for he is not an inert thing. He is a man, a fellow human being, and, not being a friend, he is an enemy. Nature has given man great faculties to be useful or harmful to other men: he can be in their hands an instrument of profit, such as no other comparable exists on earth; but, on the other hand, he is a terrible force if turned against them; he is for them an enemy a thousand times more formidable than the most savage animal. Therefore, the human character carries its consequence from then on. Man will be a friend of man, and his human rights will be recognized, or he will be an enemy. There is no middle ground; any intermediate situation is absurd and impossible.

Thus, first of all, as long as human equality has not been recognized, the state of war has been the natural state of peoples among themselves, of nations among themselves. But don't you see that this state of war outside the city necessarily entails a state of war within the city? As soon as every foreigner is an enemy, Hobbes is right, and the citizen himself is the natural enemy of the citizen: only force and domination maintain peace between them.

Why, indeed, do you want me to recognize this man as a friend, and not that other? Do they not both have human faces? Are they not endowed with the same nature? Are they not similar to each other, and equally my fellow men? I understand that I may be friends with one, and that we may both make war on the other: there is an association, a state, a city; marvelous! But does this association, founded on self-interest, have any sanction other than self-interest? Tomorrow, then, my associate may become my enemy.

Once again, abolish human equality, and Hobbes is right. Of all the philosophers who have taken a deep look at law in order to seek the foundation of states, Hobbes, whose system is so repulsive that it has been seen as a kind of crime against humanity, Hobbes is the only one who knew the truth and dared to speak it. But human equality was neither proclaimed nor even understood in any way when Hobbes wrote. Human equality being admitted, Hobbes is wrong, and those whose eyesight is less keen than this eagle nevertheless find themselves having seen better than him.

Let us conclude: it was necessary, in order to reach human equality, to have a foundation in political right; until then, right was not known.

CHAPTER II.

Political writers, from Aristotle to Montesquieu, have only been able to elevate fact into right.

Yes, I say that social right has had no foundation until now, and that, once the belief in human equality has been abolished, states are nothing more than what Hobbes saw them to be: a conflict of blind passions and opposing interests, where despotism alone, that is, any power, any domination (what Hobbes euphemistically calls *imperium*) establishes a rule. I say that once the belief in human equality has been abolished, equality in society is a simple fact, which may or may not exist, but which, if it does exist, has no other sanction than its very existence.

Moreover, the monuments of which political science is most proud prove this assertion.

Why, I ask, did Aristotle, living among the Greek republics, indifferently accept, as equally legitimate, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy? Why did Montesquieu, so close to us, accept, following Aristotle's example, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy as equally legitimate? It is because neither Aristotle nor Montesquieu believed in human equality, and, lacking this belief, they were unable to establish equality in the city as a right. They therefore accepted, as equally fortunate and equally reasonable combinations, government by one person, by a minority or by the majority (ἓνα, ὀλίγους, πολλούς, as Aristotle says.) But what led them to this truly absurd conclusion, if not the absence of a principle?

Among the ancients, neither Plato, nor Aristotle, nor their disciples, clearly understood what right was. And how could they have known, living in the midst of small states constantly at war, in societies founded on slavery, where at most a thirtieth of the population was free? Great men though they were, they could not, from such an environment, rise to the idea of human equality; and, lacking this idea, they could only reason about social right according to arbitrary views.

Similarly, among the moderns, neither Bodin, nor Machiavelli, nor Grotius, nor Montesquieu clearly understood what right was. Everyone agrees that they each, in their own way, elevated fact to right. And how in fact could they have known right, living as they did amidst servitude and war, in societies where the clergy, the nobility and the common people formed so many separate classes, in states that were almost entirely despotic, where there were only subjects and no citizens? In turn, great men though they were, they could not emerge from such an environment to the point of elevating themselves to the idea of human equality; and, lacking this idea, they held only arbitrary views on social right.

What, then, was political science from Plato and Aristotle up to and including Montesquieu?

For some, it was an artists' utopia; for others, a science of observation. Some imagined an ideal society that satisfied their idea of beauty, as a sculptor models a statue. But their idea of beauty never extended so far as to conceive of the equality of all men. Plato is typical of these utopians, and he wasn't a utopian until then. Others laboriously sought to unravel the facts and see how things actually happen. Aristotle is typical of these scholars, and he brutally denied the equality of men.

I therefore admire their art and their science as much as anyone; but I ask these utopians and scholars what law is and what the basis of society is. They cannot tell me, because they have not experienced human equality.

CHAPTER III.

Antiquity did not know equality. Proof of this is Aristotle's Politics.

Equality of men, equality of citizens; one and the same idea under two different aspects. To separate these two indivisible aspects of the idea is to kill the idea, so to speak. If you want equality only within the city, equality thus restricted and stripped of its universal character is no longer a principle, but an interest. It is no longer equality, for it is both equality and inequality; it is rights for some and the absence of rights for others; it is the constitution of a privilege, and the establishment of two essentially different natures and situations, which in turn engender a multitude of others, which serve as degrees and transitions between the man outside the city who has no rights and the man within the city who has all rights. To pass from one of these states to the other, to enter the city, becomes the goal of human activity; and hence the play of revolutions. The foreigner, the enemy, enters the city only by passing through enslavement, through slavery, through emancipation; different layers of men more or less removed from privilege are therefore superimposed on each other, and constantly tend to overthrow the upper layers without ceasing for their part to crush those who are below them. Thus war outside the city, war within the city; struggle in all aspects, antagonism of every kind: this is the spectacle that the human race presents at this time. What then do we mean by this Equality to which we aspire? It is not really Equality that we ask for; it is rivalry with superiors, and domination over those we leave behind. Thus restricted, Equality is really only a petty conception, worthy only of the infancy of Humanity. The era in which these things are happening is not the era of Equality, but only the era of Liberty for a few. It is liberty, in fact, that is to say, a selfish and personal right, that is claimed under the name of equality.

Antiquity knew nothing else; it loved Liberty, but it did not love Equality. The ancients spoke of Equality at every turn, but for them, Equality was far from being a doctrine. On the contrary, it was a means of making a few men free at the expense of a multitude of their fellow men. Do you want to know to what extent man could misunderstand his own character in his fellow man, despise his own image, reject his own nature and condemn it to torture? Open the most serious political books of antiquity, and, above all, take the book of Aristotle, the undeniably truest and, as true, the highest example of all antiquity.

I truly do not know by what incredible error a writer of our time could seriously propose to popularize Aristotle, and to spread him everywhere, even to cottages, as a political Gospel *worthy of our era*. There is not a single proletarian today whose political morality is not superior to that of Aristotle.

All of Aristotle's politics is depicted and summarized in this first sentence of his book, where he gives society as its foundation, not right, but interest: "Every state," he says, "is obviously an association founded on interest. Men never doing anything

except with an eye to their own personal advantage, it is clear that all associations aim at satisfying interests, and that the most important interests of all must be the object of the most important of associations, that which includes all the others; and that one is precisely called State and political Association.” (Book I, ch. 1.)

Was Hobbes, who had meditated on Aristotle, wrong to conclude that the natural society of men was a state of war and antagonism, and that only law and domination established rights among them? In this, he was merely interpreting Aristotle; and when he reproached his master for having been so weak as to define man elsewhere as a sociable animal, as if there were some mutual sympathy between men, he was merely correcting him and recalling his own principles.

Now, the world in which Aristotle lived had one free man for every thirty-nine slaves; and Aristotle found this situation normal and legitimate. So here he is, taking self-interest as the basis of society, and beginning by trampling underfoot the self-interest of thirty-nine men out of forty!

What sophism does his reason suggest to him for this? We are familiar with this sophism: who hasn't read his famous discussion of slavery, or heard of it? The Slave is outside the city, and has no rights, and he has no rights because he is of an inferior nature.

What now! Can't this inferior nature elevate itself, perfect itself, transform itself? And if so, why not grant it a *virtual* right, a potential right to exist, a limited right, restricted in the present, but which the future can realize? No. Aristotle refuses to recognize anything in the Slave. He, that is, all of antiquity, the Greeks, the Romans, decided that the Slave would always be a slave, always more like an animal than a man, always an inferior creature; They have cast an eternal anathema upon the Barbarians and the Slaves... May God's justice be accomplished, and may the Slaves and the Barbarians in turn crush these proud citizens!

People seek the providential cause of the overthrow of the Greek cities, the overthrow of the Roman Empire, the overthrow of the civilization of that time by the Slaves and the Barbarians. They are astonished, they complain, they accuse divine justice, they see only obscurity and mystery, they deny progress and perfectibility in this regard. Yes, this overthrow of ancient civilization is a stumbling block to the faith of many. You speak of progress, we are told; why the Middle Ages, why triumphant barbarism? Is such a cataclysm not a difficulty for your doctrine? But truly, on the contrary, one must be blind not to see the necessity and justice of this overthrow. You ask why Greco-Roman civilization disappeared under the insurrections of the Slaves and the blows of the Barbarians. I answer you that there was a judgment of God on this, a judgment just like his justice. You ask me the crime, here it is:

In the name of all antiquity, Aristotle establishes that between slaves and their masters there is no agreement, and that between the free, all agreement is based on self-interest: a double outrage to human nature! Here are Aristotle's sentences: Read, and see if eternal justice could have suffered from such lessons, and if the law, ignored, would not have had to overthrow a world from which such teachings emerged:

"It is obvious," says Aristotle, in the name of Greco-Roman civilization, "that among men some are naturally free and others naturally slaves, and that, for the latter, slavery is as useful as it is just." (*Politics*, Book I, ch. 2.)" This is what eternal truth has declared false, and what eternal justice has declared unjust. The Slaves, the Barbarians, responded to Aristotle by adopting a Genesis which said: God made man in his image, and we all came from Adam.

"When one is inferior to one's fellows," says Aristotle again, "as much as the body is to the soul, the brute to man, and this is the condition of all those in whom the *use of bodily forces is the best thing to be hoped for in their being*, one is a slave by nature. For these men, as well as for the other beings of whom we have just spoken, the best thing is to submit to the authority of a master; for he is a slave by nature who can give himself to another; and precisely what gives him to another is to be able to go only to this point of understanding reason when another shows it to him, but not to possess it in himself." (*Ibid.*) In the name of reason, Aristotle here commits the greatest possible outrage against reason. For reason reveals to us that there is no man like the brute, and that every man being, like ourselves, intelligence and feeling at the same time as sensation, the *best option* to be expected from such a being is not the exclusive use of his bodily powers. That your slave has less intelligence than you, that is possible; but are you then supremely intelligent, so that his intelligence cannot help yours, supplement yours in some way, make up for the deficiency of yours? As soon as you recognize a spark of intelligence in him, you are not reasoning well in denying it, and you are unjust in annihilating it as much as it is in you to do so. This again is what eternal reason, so rashly invoked by Aristotle, has condemned; it has shown the defect and imperfection of reason in those masters who denied reason in their slaves. These masters, so full of pride, did not know that each person's reason is borrowed from everyone's reason, and that to prevent reason from developing and manifesting itself in such a large part of the human race was to restrict the ocean of reason from which we all draw our light. Providence willed that the reason of the Slaves should increase the domain from which these proud men drew their reason, and it caused these Slaves and Barbarians to invent what the genius of their tyrants could never have suspected.

Moreover, Aristotle, that is to say, the ancient man, betrays himself on this point; for, coming to education, he does not want any to be given to the Slave: "Virtue," he says, "is necessary to the Slave only in proportion to this narrow duty of not neglecting one's work through intemperance or laziness." (*Ibid.*, ch. 5.) This is miserable, it must be admitted, and reveals the selfish interest of the master. Aristotle, to be worthy of his thesis, should have maintained that the Slave was not susceptible to education or virtue.

It is not Aristotle, as a genius, one can well imagine, that I am censuring here, it is ancient man. At several points in his discussion, we see Aristotle's natural genius grappling with the reality of his time. He agrees that many Slaves give the lie to his doctrine, that many free men also give the lie to it by their vices and their ignoble qualities. He regrets that the Creator did not better mark, in the stature of the body and in the features of the face, the distinction between the two natures. But prejudice

prevails, and it nevertheless persists everywhere in its principle: “The power of the master is absolute and without control.” (*Ibid.*, ch. 5.) — “The Slave is absolutely deprived of will.” (*Ibid.*) — “The Slave is a part of the master; it is a part of his body, living although separate.” (*Ibid.*, ch. 2.) — “The Slave is part of property.” (*Ibid.*, ch. 3.)” — And finally, speaking of the acquisition of goods, he goes so far as to say: “Thus war is still in some way a natural means of acquiring, since it includes that hunting that one must give to wild beasts and to men who, born to obey, refuse to submit; it is a war that nature itself has made legitimate. (*Ibid.*, ch. 3.)” What did you have to answer, descendants of Aristotle, when the Turks took your sons and daughters to recruit their seraglios? For, as if by calculation of the exact justice of Providence, the Greeks were delivered over to the harshest of the barbarians, and slavery was exercised upon them more than upon any other race.⁷

CHAPTER IV.

New proof that antiquity did not know equality. Plato's *Republic*.

Let us leave the scholar and consult the utopian. Aristotle, the man of facts, could only reveal to us the facts of the time he wrote, the facts of antiquity, namely, war, antagonism, slavery; and, theorizing this fact, he could only deduce from it the doctrine we have seen, namely the right of the strongest, disguised by him under the name of the most intelligent. This doctrine, which is no more moral than that of Hobbes, or rather, which is exactly that of Hobbes, has horrified us. Since we absolutely must have the exact measure of what the ancients knew in terms of human equality, or, what amounts to the same thing for us, in terms of justice, let us question Plato. Let us open his *Republic*. Isn't the title he gave it *Dialogue on Justice*? And here is Socrates, the most just of the men of antiquity, discoursing on justice, who, casting off all constraints, imagines at will a republic founded on the very idea of beauty, on the most ethereal type his soul could conceive. Ah! We shall no doubt be satisfied. Plato must have understood human equality better than Aristotle.

One approaches Socrates and Plato only as one approaches Christ, with respect and love. When I think of all that is truly divine in the *Republic*, I cannot help but think that it is this that Rousseau, after Fontenelle, should have compared to the *Gospel*; for it is, along with the Gospel, the greatest book that has come from the hands of men. No matter, this is the case for saying: *Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, magis arnica veritas*.

To assert that Socrates, discoursing on justice, did not know justice, that Plato, seeking the beautiful ideal of human society, missed his mark — isn't that a formidable thing to say, and yet how true it is! A remarkable demonstration of the progress of humanity, this critique we can so boldly make of the greatest geniuses of antiquity. Dwarfs lifted on the shoulders of these giants, as has often been said, we measure with our gaze more space than their eyes, however sharp, could measure.

After all, there is a remark to be made that can reassure us and allow us to criticize with piety the masters of the ideal, Socrates and Plato. When Socrates, at the beginning of Book V, is about to expound the consequences of his type of republic, does he not himself tremble at the thought of making a mistake, and does he not have a presentiment that he is going astray? His friends encourage him to speak; but he hesitates, and he only agrees to explain himself by imploring Adrasteus, the deity charged with punishing involuntary crimes, to forgive him for the crime he might commit:

GLAUCON.

“Have no fear, Socrates. You are speaking to people who are neither unreasonable, nor obstinate, nor ill-disposed towards you.”

SOCRATES.

“Is it not with the intention of reassuring me that you speak to me in this way?”

GLAUCON.

“Yes.”

SOCRATES.

“Well, your words produce in me quite the opposite effect. If I myself were fully convinced of the truth of what I am about to say, your encouragement would be fitting; for one can speak safely and confidently before discerning friends when one knows that one will tell them the truth on very important subjects, in which they take a great interest. But when one speaks, as I do, searching and groping, it is dangerous, and one must fear, not of arousing laughter (such a fear would be childish), but of straying from the truth, and of dragging one's friends into error on matters where it is of the utmost consequence not to be mistaken. I therefore implore Adrasteus not to be offended by what I am about to say; for I consider it a lesser crime to kill someone unintentionally than to deceive them on the subject of beauty, goodness, justice, and honesty. Even so, it would be better to run the risk with one's enemies than with one's friends.”

GLAUCON.

“Socrates, if your words lead us into some error, we will absolve you as if you had committed manslaughter.”

SOCRATES.

“The law declares innocent he who has been absolved in this life; and if he is innocent here, it seems likely that he will be so there as well.”⁸

We who are there, as Socrates says, will reply to Socrates that he was indeed mistaken, but that he was mistaken in seeking the salvation of men, mistaken in

enlightening them, and that he is not only absolved of his error, but glorified for his error.

We know what Socrates was afraid to say. This secret, which he so dreaded letting slip, and which was wrenched from him with a sort of violence by his friends, is the community of women and the community of children. Socrates, indeed, was mistaken on this point; there is no doubt about it. Humanity has not and will never admit a community that would radically destroy human individuality. But was it only in this that Socrates committed the involuntary crime he so feared to commit? And did he not err in an equally dangerous manner on other points? Or rather, was it not because he erred elsewhere on a crucial point that his general solution, having been found to be false, necessarily led him to these false consequences?

A remarkable example of the intimate bond that unites all aspects of morality, that also unites morality and politics, and ultimately unites morality, politics, and religion! It is because Socrates was mistaken about slaves that he was so prodigiously mistaken about love and marriage; it is because he missed the beautiful in politics that he missed it in morality; and it is also for this reason that his religion was not that of humanity, and that it was necessary to await Christianity.

Socrates, as we shall see, did not clearly conceive of human equality; and not having conceived of human equality, he no more conceived of civic equality; he therefore thought more of organizing castes in his republic than of functions. Then, to repair the defect of these castes, he was drawn to the abolition of the family and consequently of marriage. It is when he reaches this point that he fears committing an involuntary crime: the crime has already been committed. In our opinion, on the contrary, he repairs it as much as is in him, when, carried away by a divine ideality, he seeks that equality he did not initially perceive, and pursues it through everything, *by fair means or foul*, until he concludes, if necessary, with the radical abolition of the family and marriage. His idea in this was false, but his feeling in it was true, for he sought Equality. Humanity was inspired by his feeling, and abandoned his idea; it sought the solution of Equality elsewhere.

Enlightened, I repeat, by eighteen centuries of Christianity, it is easy for us today to see the flaws in Socrates' politics, morality, and religion, the flaws of this republic that Plato, in his enthusiasm, calls *the most beautiful that ever was*. Yes, Socrates, we might dare to say, you were mistaken on the subject of beauty, goodness, justice and honesty; and you were mistaken on this subject not only where you feared to err, but also where you expressed yourself with complete confidence, and where you advanced freely like a man who believes he is walking on solid foundations. This is because at the point at which you lived, sublime thinker, Humanity was still too poorly formed for it to be possible for your Soul, divine as it was, to dare to conceive of human equality. But you

contributed prodigiously to bringing about this equality, and that is why you are and will always remain comparable to Jesus, your successor.

When we analyze the *Republic*, when we seek the weft and substance of this marvelous fabric where all the Muses seem to have worked in concert, we arrive at two formulas: a metaphysical formula of man, and a political formula that corresponds to the first. With infinite skill, which constitutes the entire beauty of this famous work, Socrates conceals his metaphysical formula; he appears to be constructing his society *a priori*, while in reality he directs himself in this construction according to his definition of man. Then, at the conclusion, introducing man himself, he shows in man three faculties corresponding to the three orders he has imagined in his republic; and, as if this encounter and similarity were a matter of chance for him, he exclaims: "You see! A God had directed us in the plan of our republic, and guided us in the footsteps of justice." (Book IV.)

Let us, I say, break down this artistic work in which Plato seems to have stolen their methods from Sophocles and Aristophanes, in order to introduce a thousand incidents and create magical twists and turns; and let us see, coldly, if the metaphysical formula that he uses is true and if the application that he makes of it to politics is exact and rigorous.

The three faculties that Plato distinguishes in man are: 1. reason; 2. sentiment, which he calls strength, courage, irascible appetite, and in general sentiment (θυμός, *animus*); 3. sensitive or concupiscible appetite, that is, the true or exaggerated needs of the body.

The human soul, according to Plato, is therefore threefold; it is composed of three things, three principles, which can and must be distinguished. This is a great and important truth in which we believe with all our hearts, and which we could not find in Plato, the prince of philosophers, the metaphysician par excellence, without leaping with joy; for we were unaware that it was so expressly stated in his works when, a few years ago, we took it upon ourselves to oppose it to the false psychology taught today.⁹ Lacking sufficient erudition, we then had to cite, to support this truth that we perceived, only passages borrowed from thinkers who were no doubt august, but who do not have superior authority in metaphysics; we quoted Pascal, Bossuet, to show to the psychologists of the *self* of pure spirit that the Christians themselves never imagined that human understanding had no relation to the body, that man was an angel, according to Pascal's expression: "Man is neither angel nor beast;" but that they had always believed, on the contrary, that the body and understanding formed, according to Bossuet's expression, "a natural whole." And from these two principles, reason or knowledge, and sensation, we had concluded a third, sentiment, which participates in both of them and unites them. This was for us the psychological truth. Since then, we have rediscovered this truth in Leibniz; and we have even shown that all the work of German philosophy, or rather all the immense work of philosophy since Descartes, has had as its goal and result

the achievement of a complete demonstration of this truth.¹⁰ Here it is again offered to us in Plato, and in such a remarkable way that it is the basis of his finest and greatest book. What consent there was among so many philosophers, thus agreeing, throughout the centuries, to define man as a triple essence in his unity!

It is evident, in fact, that Plato's definition of man is, or is the basis of, the same definition to which we so often refer in our reasoning, which seems to us to be the basis of all philosophy. Man, we said at the very beginning of this writing, is in all the acts of his life, sensation-sentiment-knowledge indissolubly united.

But does Plato understand this definition of man precisely as we understand it? It must be admitted that Plato, whether he discovered this truth himself or received it from earlier philosophies,¹¹ did not carry it to the ultimate perfection. We can say that he clearly understood the trinity of the human soul, but that he misunderstood its unity, and that thus this very trinity was not well understood by him, in the sense that the important point is never to separate the mystery of our unity from that of the three principles or aspects that constitute this unity. Plato acted a little like a physicist who, having decomposed a ray of light by the prism, would then reason on the simple rays, and would deny the white color that contains all the other colors, and which is none of them. He distinguished rather than united; he decomposed by analysis, and he did not recompose by synthesis. In a word, he saw too much in the three faces or faculties of our nature as parts (this is how he always calls them), and did not see enough that together they constituted only one whole, a natural whole, according to Bossuet's admirable expression, a unity finally. Plato says *human soul*; he therefore says a unity, a whole, a single being, a single thing; and he immediately forgets it to say that this soul has three *parts*. And then he considers these parts as three beings, as three things; he separates them as much as possible, instead of making them play indivisibly and compete together. Instead of understanding that they exist only because they coexist, he imagines them independent, and believes them by their nature to be at war, in struggle, in opposition. One is put by him in the last rank, subordinated, degraded, debased: it is sensation. Reason, on the contrary, or knowledge, takes the reins of the human soul as absolute sovereign, that is to say, it becomes the absolute monarch of this divided empire. Finally, after having long sought to which side the third will turn, that is to say, what Plato calls the irascible appetite, he decides that the irascible appetite, suitably educated, will take up arms in favor of reason.

Well! No doubt, reason must rule; intelligence is what distinguishes man from the animals. But can reason do without sensation and sentiment? Or rather, in every act of reason and knowledge, do not sentiment and sensation necessarily intervene?

Plato, entirely preoccupied with the important distinction he conceived in the human soul, turns his dialectic to clearly recognizing reason as something different from the instincts of the body and the instincts of the heart. But he goes so far as to suppose it independent, existing and manifesting itself; and this is where he is mistaken.

A man, he says, is thirsty, and he refrains from drinking because drinking would be harmful to him. Do you not see here two very different *parts* of his soul, one that drives him to drink, the lustful appetite, the other that keeps him from drinking, reason?

The argument is not sound. A man who, driven by thirst, abstains from drinking is absolutely in the same situation as a man who chooses the lesser of two evils. Suffering from thirst is a suffering comparable to an injury, an illness, and any other painful condition that sensation can make us experience. But to refrain from drinking when thirsty is equally to suffer from the apprehension of the physical harm that might result from drinking. Reason is undoubtedly distinct between these two sensations; but, although distinct, it is not independent. We must not say, as Socrates does, that reason first pronounces, and then sentiment takes up arms in favor of reason; we must say on the contrary that reason appears and produces its consequence, which is its law, its manifestation, only because sentiment has spoken before it; or rather sensation, sentiment, knowledge, constitute one and the same act, truly indivisible. The thing is obvious. In the example used by Socrates, the soul, as I have just said, is between a present evil and a future evil, which seems to it greater than the first. How does it become aware of this future evil? What do we call the idea it has of it? It is called sentiment; for we say of a man, in this case, that he is afraid of becoming ill. Thus reason leaves behind the comparison between a sensible affection, thirst, which is an illness, and a sentiment, the fear of another illness; it takes its point of support in a sentiment to resist a sensation. But this feeling, which you cannot help calling fear, dread, is a passion; it itself contains a sensation. Therefore, although reason is something distinct from sensation, it nevertheless manifests itself only concomitantly with it; and that man who resists what Plato calls concupiscible appetite, finds himself, even while resisting it, to be concupiscible appetite, that is, sensation.

Thus Plato opened the door to the insane Stoicism that denied that pain was an evil, and to the insane asceticism that despised life and, in order to be great, committed suicide as much as is permissible for man to do by destroying the constitutive harmony of the three necessary aspects of his being.¹²

That is his entire error, but it is serious, so serious that it leads to all the false consequences that fill his *Republic*. I believe I will have no difficulty in demonstrating this.

Plato admirably understood that society is the image of man. This truth, that society is similar to man, that man is the small world of which society is the great world; that there is identity between them, that he reflects it as it reflects

him; finally, on other proportions, that man is a summary of Humanity, just as Humanity is only a man; this truth, I say, on which certain modern philosophers have insisted so much, and with reason, is found in germ in Plato: "The affections and morals of a society," he says, "are found in each of the individuals who compose it, since it can only be from there that they have passed into society." (Book IV.) Guided by this light, Plato claimed to form a just society according to the idea he had of a just man. This is his compass; and he makes it known to us himself, and puts it in our hands, when having arrived at the end of his search for a perfect republic, returning to the individual, he says: "If then we find in the soul of man three parts, which correspond to the three orders of our republic and between which there is the same subordination, we will give to the individual the same name that we gave to society." (Book IV.) Reverse this proposition, suppose that Socrates said to himself: "If I find in the state three orders which correspond to the three parts of the human soul, and between which there is the same subordination, will not this society be the perfect society, since it will resemble the perfect man;" and you will have all the secret of Plato in the construction of his Republic, and at the same time the secret of all his errors. By his errors, I mean that, having erred in his metaphysical formula, he also erred in his political construction, precisely because he applied his metaphysical idea too well, as he had conceived it. I do not mean by this that he was wrong to seek to realize the similarity of human society and the human soul, a similarity that has always been and always will be the direct cause, known or unknown, of the organization of societies.

Socrates, therefore, sets to work without telling his friends what guiding principle he is following; and, like the three parts he knows exist in the human being — knowledge, sentiment, sensation — or, to use physical symbols, the head, the heart, and the body — he creates a society composed of a head, a heart, and a body, that is, of an intelligence that presides and governs, a sympathetic feeling that obeys this intelligence, and a common instinct related to external nature. Hence, three orders in the republic: magistrates, warriors, and artisans or laborers.

These three orders undoubtedly exist and will always exist in society: this is not where Plato is mistaken. On the contrary, it is a great glory for him that he arrived through metaphysics at a classification so true that all of history, the history of all times and all peoples, is nothing but its reproduction. Plato understood their metaphysical necessity; He gained knowledge, in the exact sense of the word, of what was merely a fact resulting from man's natural instinct. Yes, society is and always will be composed of three orders or three classes arising from the predominance in certain men of one of the three aspects of our nature, and at the same time from man's necessity to live under these three aspects. These three orders, these three classes, are found in India under the names of *Brahmins*, *Chatrias* and *Sudras*; in Egypt, under the names of *priests*, *warriors* and *laborers*. Less obvious and more intermingled, though still

very evident in the Greek republics and Rome, these three terms were reproduced in the Middle Ages under the names of *clergy*, *nobility* and the *third estate*.

But what is the progress of humanity on this point? The progress is that these three orders or classes were first castes, and that they tend to be in the future only functions. The progress is that they first invaded the whole of man, to such an extent that in India, for example, there are no Indians, but Brahmins, Chatrias or Sudras, and that in the future there will only be men who will have this or that of the three functions inherent in all society, but who will not for that reason be absorbed by society.

Placed at the boundary between the Eastern and Western worlds, a disciple of Egypt, but a precursor of Christ, Plato tries in vain to escape the caste system. He elevates this system with one hand, and strikes it down with the other. He wants to break it by eliminating heredity, but he constitutes it in another way, giving it all the more reality by removing what made it at first glance more absurd.

Yes, Plato still creates castes: he idealizes them as much as possible, he makes them as beautiful, as reasonable as possible; but they are nonetheless castes. Nothing is more admirable than his profound research into the character of the magistrate, in whom he discovers a philosopher, and into the character of the warrior, in whom he shows us the man of feeling and the artist. These three terms — *magistrates*, *warriors*, *laborers* — are thus transformed under his pen into *philosophers*, *gymnasts* and *artisans*, or, in other words, into *scholars*, *artists* and *industrialists*. But, as in the very recent system in which Plato has been reproduced, these three classes of society are considered by Socrates as three distinct men, of diverse and, so to speak, incommunicable natures. Plato thus arrives, like the author of the modern system we are discussing, and which was evidently modeled on him, at three distinct castes, corresponding to the three aspects of our nature: sensation, sentiment and knowledge; his system therefore has all the defects of the one we are discussing, or rather, whoever knows one knows the other.

This is because Plato, having misunderstood the unity in his metaphysical formula, completely lost sight of the unity in his political formula.

There are three parts to the human soul, I agree, provided that Plato agrees that these three parts constitute a single whole.

Similarly, there are, and must necessarily be, three parts to human society, but only on the condition that these three parts constitute a single whole.

Now, under what condition will these three parts constitute a single whole? On the condition that this whole be felt and truly existent, not merely perceptible by an abstraction of the intellect, but felt and, as I just said, alive.

This whole must therefore reside somewhere in a living being.

Now, only the men who compose society truly exist. As for society itself, it is not a truly existent being.

The unity of society must therefore be felt and manifested in one man, in several men, or in all of them.

Now, what reason would there be for this unity to reside in one man, and not in others? It must therefore reside in all.

Here then is the problem: Will the unity exist in the republic because there will be three parts in this republic that apparently converge? Plato believes this, and is mistaken in this. Social unity thus conceived is a fiction, an abstraction, a vain shadow, a mere phrase.

The general or collective being that we call society truly exists only insofar as it is reflected in individual beings, in truly living persons. Society does not exist without man. The question, therefore, is not simply to compose a republic of three precisely proportioned parts, but to compose a republic of three precisely proportioned parts to the effect of producing a man who is also composed of three precisely proportioned parts, like the republic. In a word, society or the republic is only *a milieu* that man creates, similar to himself, in order to be able to live there and develop in accordance with his nature. Created himself in the image of God, he creates in turn in his image; but what he creates is not the ultimate goal, nor even in any way the goal that he sets for himself. The goal that he sets for himself is himself, and through it it is the development of what God has placed in him, that is to say, it is the divine image that he carries within him; and thus, in the final analysis, it is still God that he has in view. But to be passionate about society, about the milieu, about the mirror of man, about his work, to the point of forgetting man himself, the being truly existing after God, is fetishism, idolatry, an error. Be an artist, Socrates, but do not forget the goal of art, which is man.

Socrates forgets this in his republic; he makes art for art's sake. If he has achieved the idea of a republic that seems beautiful in itself, he is satisfied; and he does not ask himself whether a single man in his republic is beautiful.

We must see the naive enthusiasm of genius in this memorable creation of Plato, which has served humanity so well, despite its fundamental error. I will abbreviate the beautiful passage where Socrates sums himself up and proves to his friends that his republic is perfect:

SOCRATES.

“Son of Ariston, our city is finally formed. Call your brother, call Polemarchus, and all those who are here. Try together, with the help of some torch, to discover where justice and imposture reside... If the laws that we have established are good, our city must be perfect... It is therefore evident that it must be prudent, strong, temperate, and just... Prudence reigns in our republic, because good counsel reigns there... This prudence resides in the magistrates, who are the true guardians of the state... For every well-governed republic owes its prudence to the science that resides in the smallest part of itself, that is to say, to those who are at

its head and who command. It seems that nature produces in small numbers the men whose task it is to meddle in this science which, alone among all sciences, deserves the name of prudence... As for strength, it is not difficult to discover it in our republic, it is the body in which it resides and which gives the state the name of strong... Our city is strong through a part of itself in which resides a certain conservative virtue, founded on the idea that it received from the legislator in its education. Strength, in fact, is not a brutal and ferocious courage, but it is the just and legitimate idea of what is to be feared in all things, and what is not... If our warriors, chosen with such precautions, prepared by music and gymnastics, preserve well the idea of the things which are to be feared, the republic will be strong. Whether other citizens are cowardly or courageous, nothing can be concluded from this in relation to the strength or weakness of the state... Our republic is also temperate, it is mistress of itself, if it is true that one must call temperate and master of himself every man, every state where the most estimable part rules over the less so. It is not, certainly, that one does not find in our republic passions without number and of all kinds, pleasures and pains in women, in slaves and even in most of those who are said to be of free condition. You will find there few simple and moderate desires, founded on just opinions and governed by reason; and this will only be in those who join to a good nature an excellent education. But do you not see at the same time that, in our city, the desires and passions of the multitude, which is the lower class of society, are regulated and governed by the prudence and wills of the few, who are the wise?...

Let us stop Socrates here to note that, after having located, so to speak, prudence or intelligence in magistrates, courage or strength in warriors, he no longer follows their similitude, which would oblige him to make the third class the seat of the third political virtue he distinguishes, that is, temperance. But how could he have followed this similitude to the end? Strangers to science and art, the men of the third class, these men of the concupiscible appetite, as Plato says, or of sensation, as we would say today, these artisans, these manufacturers, are necessarily abandoned to sensation, since they are themselves devoid of intelligence and feeling. Moreover, they are not even free, for they are guarded and bridled by warriors who are themselves governed by magistrates or philosophers. Thus abandoned to this concupiscible appetite, to this base sensuality which is considered to be part of their essence, they are therefore further degraded by slavery. How could they be the seat of a virtue so directly contrary to all the conditions of their innateness and their education? That would be absurd. They are nothing but a flock which is used and governed. Plato never envisages them otherwise. They therefore become temperate only because they are governed. They do respond, in Plato's idea, to the third virtue,

to temperance, but indirectly, and as a result of the coercive action which is exercised over them, without consulting either their intelligence or their feelings. So Plato, seeking where this temperance resides, places it both within and outside them:

SOCRATES.

“When the members of society are thus disposed, in whom will you say temperance resides? In those who command or in those who obey?”

GLAUCON.

“In both.”

SOCRATES.

“Indeed. Temperance is not like prudence and fortitude, which are each found only in one part of the state, yet make it prudent and strong; whereas temperance is a sort of concert established by nature between the superior and inferior parts of a society or an individual, to decide which part should command the other.”

There remains nothing left for Socrates to do but conclude. And he concludes with that grand word, *justice*, which for him is equivalent to virtue and perfection. Now, where does he find this justice? Listen carefully:

SOCRATES.

“The republic is just because each of the three orders that compose it does only what is its duty.”

This is the last word of Socrates and Plato on the subject of human justice. Justice requires that there be three orders in the state: shepherds, dogs and a flock; that magistrates be skilled shepherds, warriors be the active dogs of these shepherds, and the multitude be the obedient flock of these dogs and these shepherds.

Let us raise our voices against Socrates here with all the certainty that today's morality gives us.

No, the goal of politics is not to form a state composed of three men of different essences: a brute under the name of artisan, a herdsman under the name of warrior, and an intellectual man under the name of magistrate. The goal of politics is to make every man, as much as possible, a complete man, that is, a composite of intelligence, sentiment, and sensation.

It is obvious that Plato killed man in favor of his ideal of society. But there is more: he did not even meet this ideal. And when this great artist, enamored with his work, exclaims: “This is the most beautiful republic that ever was,” we are entitled to tell him that we are imagining a more beautiful one. His republic is constituted only in appearance, it is perfect only in appearance, it is the type of justice only in appearance. It lacks something: the soul, the unity.

Just as Plato had too much divided and fragmented the human soul, he has too much divided and fragmented human society. This, as I have already said, is

the source of all his errors; and this is also why his republic is not the ideal he sought.

It was necessary, after having distinguished three orders in the state, that is, three functions, to then show how the state was neither one, nor the other, nor the third of these functions, nor an assembly of the three, but how an indecomposable unity resulted from the harmony between these three functions, a unity that was truly the state; then, taking up the similarity of the individual and society, in order to show that the citizen reappeared in this state, no longer as a functionary, that is, as a part, but as a citizen, that is, as a complete unity, adequate to the state and of the same quality. It is this new synthesis that is lacking in Plato's *Republic*, which was not possible with the foundations he had adopted.

Indeed, how could a complete man find himself in a society where real castes reign, in a society whose generative principle is that some will be intelligent and will govern by science, cunning and skill; that others will be docile, obedient like a shepherd's dogs; and that the third will be ignorant, abject, without courage, without generosity?

But I go further, and I say to Plato that, following his very principles, his conclusion makes his premises absurd, or vice versa. For where, O Plato, is your just man in such a republic? I am willing to admit that your republic is just; but there are no more just men. A just man, you said, is one in whom intelligence governs sentiment and sensation. Are your artisans just? They have no intelligence governing within them; for it is an alien intelligence that governs them. They have no sentiment to help the reason they lack; for sentiment is the strength that resides in the camp of your warriors. Are your warriors likewise just? No; for the governing intelligence is outside of them in the secret sanctuary of their magistrates and priests. Only the latter, then, are just: but are they really, occupied as they are in governing by cunning the irascible appetites of their warrior disciples, and trampling underfoot, like vile cattle, artisans and slaves? Therefore, in your republic, there will not be a single just man according to your definition, or at least the majority will not be just. Thus justice, in the very sense in which Socrates expounds it, is banished from this republic, without which, however, Socrates sees no justice on earth.

And if there are no just men in such a republic, how can the republic itself be just? This justice, this perfection, which Socrates sees in his republic, is therefore, as I have already said, only apparent; it is only in words and is in no sense real. The intelligence placed at the summit of this society is not a normal intelligence; for the men in whom it resides are supposed to be only intelligence; they differ as much from other men, to use the comparison familiar to Plato, as the shepherd differs from his dog and his flock. What sympathy would make them take an interest in this flock? None. Now, what is intelligence thus separated from sentiment and from present and sensible reality? A very bad guide, susceptible to the most serious errors, and exposed to the deepest

darkness. From whence would come the true inspiration for this intelligence thus foreign to Humanity? These sublime old men, without heart and without entrails, whom Plato places at the head of his city, could well, if they were in good faith, lead Humanity into an insane asceticism; or, if they allowed themselves to be won over by earthly passions, become skillful hypocrites and great mystifiers. Witness the papacy, which, as I will show presently, has realized to a certain extent the government of Plato.

Sentiment, in turn, is for Plato nothing but blind, fanatical, superstitious courage. These Platonic warriors, led by skillful means, resemble the servants of the Old Man of the Mountain and the crusaders of the Middle Ages. Finally, sensation, too despised, degraded, trampled underfoot, takes revenge by rising up like a serpent: the most impure passions must stir this mob of slaves who make up the people in Plato's city.

Thus, nothing is normal in this republic, neither intelligence, nor sentiment, nor sensation. After having completely destroyed the divine work, which is man, Plato arrives, in his artificial work, society, at nothing but a veritable monster.

This is because Plato, I repeat, did not understand the true relationship between man and society. He imagined artificially making man live through society. Indeed, man lives and must live through society; but he must live through it naturally. By this I mean that he must remain a man, and live *fully*, according to his nature, even while living through society. Now, he cannot live *fully* without being *by himself*, and consequently without society being outside of him, proceeding from him, depending on him, being something other than himself. He is therefore radically and completely distinguished from it, at the same time as being identical with it. This is the mystery that Plato failed to understand.

There is truly an identity between man, or the citizen, and society. But, instead of the true identity that must exist between them, one can grasp a false identity; and this is what Plato did. There is also a real and certain differentiation to be established between man, or the citizen, and society. But, instead of the true difference, one can grasp a false one; and this is also what Plato did.

When Plato says to his citizen: You will be a craftsman, a warrior, or a magistrate in the republic, and you will be nothing else, you will no longer be a man, he establishes at the same time a false identification of man with society and a false differentiation of man with this same society. Indeed, he distinguishes and differentiates man from society in that man is only intelligence, or feeling, or sensation, in other words is only head, heart or members, while the republic is all of these. The differentiation is too strong: man, who is thus only a part of the triplicity, placed opposite this living triplicity which constitutes the State, is necessarily annihilated; for he is too distinct from society for any relationship to be appreciated between them. And,

conversely, when Plato seeks the identity of man and society in a complete identification, so that man is truly either the head, or the heart, or the muscles of this society, society itself disappears and is annihilated; for before this living man who finds himself invested with social power, to the point of being its head, for example, the abstract being called society is nothing more than a vain shadow and a meaningless word. Society belongs to this man who is its head; he carries it with him; he is it, therefore it is in him; and, just as a certain monarch said: "The State is me," he can and must say: Humanity is me. Hence, once again, Eastern Lamaism or the Papacy of the West, that is, the annihilation of Humanity in a man.

No, this is not where the true identity of man and society lies, and their true differentiation. This identity and this differentiation lie in the fact that society, a complete being, magistrate-warrior-artisan, or, in other words, scholar-artist-industrialist, is reflected in the complete man, knowledge-sentiment-sensation, corresponds to his whole nature, provides nourishment for all his faculties, really engenders him and governs him; just as, reciprocally, it is the result of all these same faculties of man, the product of this man, engendered as it is by him and governed by him, his work in a word, his house so to speak, and the simple environment in which he lives.

I will establish this proposition later; I will show that such is really the relationship between man and society; I will seek to know how this sort of equilibrium and this mutual penetration can take place, and how it must be realized more and more as Humanity perfects itself. I will limit myself for the moment to a comparison which will roughly convey my idea. How do we become aware of our body? Is it not by looking at ourselves in another body, which reflects our features? What we see in this way is therefore not our body; it is the mirror in which we look at ourselves. Therefore, what makes the image is the mirror. But the mirror itself, if our body were not in front of it, would not reflect this image. It is therefore our body also which makes the image. Nevertheless our body and the mirror are entirely independent of each other, although we know our body only by means of one and the other. It is the same with human life. Human life is the knowledge, the sentiment, the sensation that result from the coexistence of man and society: remove one or the other, and life ceases and disappears like the image we were just talking about. Man and society are, however, as distinct, as independent as our body and the mirror in which we look at ourselves. But there is, from man to society, from society to man, a mutual penetration by which they merge without ceasing to be distinct, just as our body and the mirror are united in our image. Now, under what condition will it be said that a man has seen himself in a mirror, and that a mirror has reproduced his image? On condition that he sees himself entirely, and that the mirror is large enough for this. It is therefore necessary, in the same way, that man and society exist normally, that man be one and complete there, and that society be equally one and complete. Neither Plato's man nor Plato's

society are such. Plato makes three compartments in this mirror which is his republic. At the top, a first compartment, that which corresponds to the head; below, a second, which corresponds to the chest; and at the bottom, a third, which corresponds to the legs. Then, by a sort of spell, which is the education he gives to some and refuses to others, he makes it so that this mirror can only reflect the features of those who put themselves in it through one compartment at a time. The men who pass before this mirror are therefore divided by it: some have only a head, no chest and no legs; others, on the contrary, have only a chest without a head and without legs; still others have only legs. And Plato finds that this mirror reflects objects admirably, because he places the heads of some on the chest and the legs of others. But really one can say that there is no longer either mirror or men.

Plato, by disseminating intelligence, feeling, and sensation in three different parts of society, and by localizing them in an absolute manner, obviously only reproduced India and Egypt. Instead of one human species, he has three; and he is precisely at the level of the Vedas: "From his mouth (corresponding to the head), from his arm (corresponding to the chest and the heart), and from his feet (the part that supports and touches the earth), the Sovereign Master," say the *Laws of Manu*, "produced, for the propagation of the human race, the Brahmin, the Chatria, and the Sudra."¹³ (Book I.)

This is India, this is Egypt: what does the Greek genius, of which Plato is the finest incarnation, add to this? How, after recognizing the absolute existence of the Brahmin (the *philosopher* or *magistrate*), the Chatria (*warrior*), and the Sudra (*artisan*), how, I ask, will Plato escape the awareness of this principle, which is the eternal permanence of castes? I have already explained how he strives to escape it; it is by radically abolishing all heredity, all property, all individuality.

Here a new aspect of Plato's genius opens up, an aspect that rehabilitates Greece, elevates it above India and Egypt, and gives it the role of intermediary between the Orient and Christianity. Plato, after having created castes, works to destroy them as much as he can, by preaching *unity*.

A singular contrast of genius! Plato has two tendencies in his *Republic*, and, so to speak, two faces, like the ancient symbol of Janus. He looks to the past and the future: he breathes, so to speak, the old Orient, but at the same time he aspires to the West which is about to be born; he is priestly and hierarchical, but he is also egalitarian; he is the apostle of castes, but he is also the apostle of their destruction; his principle is the distinction of intelligence, sentiment and sensation, of the head, the chest and the feet, as clear and as pronounced as the followers of Brahma had it; but he also has unity as his principle, like the Buddhists and the Christians. The preaching of Buddha in India, for the abolition of castes, was four or five centuries before Plato, and from Plato to Christianity the same space of time elapsed. Thus placed between Buddha and Jesus, Plato could not fail to share in their inspiration. He does, in fact, share in

it to a sublime degree. Listen to him summarize the spirit of his *Republic* in the *Laws*:

“The most beautiful city, the best form of government, and the best laws are those in which the ancient proverb that says that *everything is truly common among friends* is most literally practiced in all parts of the state. Wherever this city arrives, or should one day arrive, let women be common, children common, goods of every kind common, and let every imaginable care be taken to remove from the commerce of life even the very name of property; so that the very things that nature has given as their own to each man become, as it were, common as much as possible, such as eyes, ears, hands; and let all citizens imagine that they see, hear, and act in common, that all approve and blame the same things in concert, that their joys and sorrows revolve around the same objects. In a word, wherever the laws aim with all their power to make the State perfectly one, one can be assured that this is the height of political virtue; and whoever tries to assign another end to society will find neither a better nor a more just one. In such a city, whether its inhabitants are gods or children of the gods, who are more than one, life is spent in joy and happiness. This is why we must not seek elsewhere the model of a perfect republic; but we must attach ourselves to this one, and approach it as closely as possible. (*Laws*, Book V.)

Has a Christian mystic ever taken the idea of community further?

One can, it is true, contrast Plato with himself. One might reply: If the supreme principle of society is that everything be common among friends, first ensure that there are only friends in society. Now, this is what you are far from undoing. What a supposed association of friends, indeed, is one in which there are three orders as distinct as your magistrates, your warriors, and your laborers. What unity is there in a society divided into three societies, in a nation divided into three nations!¹⁴

We can still reply to Plato that the means by which he tries to correct his error of castes is itself an error; and that after having made too strong a distinction between men, he then establishes among them too strong a community; that he thus destroys man in two ways, first by distinction, then by confusion: 1st, by dividing him from other men, by separating him from the total unity; 2nd, by confounding him with other men, by absorbing him completely in the great number that forms each of the partial unities which he distinguishes in the State.

But leaving aside Plato's system, rejecting the idea in him only to take up the sentiment, it turns out that Plato has pushed Humanity towards two sublime goals: the organization of society and the unity of society. Indeed, change his castes into functions; suppose that Humanity one day manages to organize itself in such a way that each member of society contributes to the social work in one

of the three functions distinguished by Plato, without however ceasing to be a complete man — and tell me if it will not result that Plato will have taught a great thing, order in society, the necessary organization of society into three functional orders; if he will not thus have been on the path to truth. Suppose in the same way that men manage to establish among themselves a social community where the community can exist without human individuality suffering, and that they truly realize the unity of the species without man being annihilated for that — and tell me if Plato will not still have been gifted with a prophetic genius, and if he will not have been still in this on the path to truth. His error is in the form that his two sentiments have assumed; His error lies in the idea, that is, in the manifestation of his thought. But, stripped of its envelope, its shell, its form, his double thought is true, fertile and immortal.

An admirable thing, indeed, and one that we have already had occasion to note in the case of many other great men, the thought of a philosopher can be true even when the idea under which he presents it is false.¹⁵ If you tear the thought from its ephemeral and perishable form; if you take the essence of the thought, so to speak, you have a great truth. But if you focus on the form, you have only an error, an error apparently necessary at the time it appeared; an error that may have been influential and have led humanity, but an error. This is what happened to Plato: by preaching the abolition of heredity, property, and personality, in favor of his ideal of society, that is, the caste system, it turns out that he preached for the unity of the human race; just as by preaching the organization into castes, he also taught men the means of organizing society into functions that would definitively abolish castes.

For me, all of Plato is summed up in this sublime and senseless speech, half truth and half error, which Socrates says he would address to his citizens to make them adopt his system, that is, castes and the community of children:

“You are all brothers, I would say to them; but the God who formed you has made gold part of the composition of those among you who are fit to govern the others: therefore they are the most precious. He has mixed silver in the formation of warriors, iron and bronze in that of farmers and other artisans. Since therefore you all have a common origin, you will ordinarily have children who will resemble you. But it may happen that a citizen of the golden race has a son of the silver race; that another of the silver race gives birth to a son of the golden race, and that the same thing happens with regard to the third race. Now, this God mainly orders the magistrates to pay attention, above all, to the metal of which the soul of each child is composed. And if their own children have any mixture of iron or bronze, he does not want them to be pardoned, but to relegate them to the state that suits them, whether that of artisan or farmer. He also desires that if the latter have children who have gold or silver, they are raised, some to the condition of warriors, others to the dignity of

magistrates, because there is an oracle that says that the republic will perish when it is governed by iron or by bronze. (*Republic*, book III.)

You are all brothers! What a beautiful phrase, and well worthy of the precursor of Christ! Socrates is admirable when he delivers this oracle of the brotherhood of all men. He approaches, I say, Jesus. But note that at that very moment the light that illuminated him darkens, and he returns to the Vedas, to the Eastern world, to the castes, when he adds: "But among you, some are gold, others silver, and a third group bronze." If this is so, then we are not brothers! We are not alike; for we cannot understand each other, being endowed with such diverse faculties and being of truly incommunicable natures! This is the point that Socrates did not pass, and which it took Jesus to pass.

The Vedas, I repeat, also say to the Indians: You are all brothers, that is, you all came from Brahma: but some came from his head, others from his chest, the last from his feet. Socrates does not overturn the caste system when he says to some: You are made of gold; to others: You are made of silver; to the last: You are made of bronze.

Jesus had to go up the mountain and cry out: *Blessed are the poor in spirit!*

I spent a long time without understanding this saying of Jesus. Taken as a disdain for intelligence, it would be neither true nor sensible. What does it mean then? It is a protest against that right derived from intelligence, which Plato and Aristotle boast about, in order to maintain the caste system. It means: You are all of the same nature; you are all a compound of gold, silver, and bronze, that is, of knowledge, sentiment and sensation. But even those in whom bronze predominates are called like the others; they are no less than the others in the kingdom of heaven, that is, in the ideal. They have the same right as the others, because the virtuality which is in them can make them similar to the others, and that which is above all bronze can become, by the portion of gold and silver mixed with this bronze, a compound just as precious as that which now appears all gold. Do not, therefore, deny the right to the poor in spirit, do not relegate them to a caste, as they are called like the others; do not say that they came from the foot of Brahma and that they will eternally preserve the trace of this origin; do not say that they are only bronze, and do not make them the crude pedestal of your statue with a golden head.

This is what Jesus said, and it is superior to what Socrates had said. The glory of Socrates, the glory of Plato, is to have served as introducers to the doctrine of Christ. They precede him, they prepare his coming, they perhaps formed him, as I will say later: in any case, they carry before him the torch he will receive from their hands to make it shine far and wide over the world.

CHAPTER V.

Comparison of Plato and Aristotle with respect to the Notion of Equality.

Put aside Plato's sublime ideality, that sort of prophetic spirit that inspires him; take the form of his thought, instead of the very essence of his thought; dwell on his idea, instead of penetrating what is hidden beneath this idea: and Plato is not superior in morality to Aristotle.

When Plato deals with his warriors, his artists, he is full of humanity, unction and tenderness. It can be said that then his thought rises to the intuition of absolute truth. But the field and what one might call the space of this thought does not extend beyond this favored caste, from which Plato brings forth, as from a nursery, his philosophical natives, his sages, his magistrates. All of humanity is concentrated for him in this small space: he sees it in this form, elsewhere he no longer sees it. Do not speak to him of the third caste, of the multitude, *ignobile vulgus*. He barely deigns to consider that it exists.

The essence of his thought is therefore in what he says about this caste: in it, I repeat, he feels and loves all of humanity; and it is thus, and in this limited way, that he is great, sublime, full of tenderness, as I have just said, and admirably religious. But insofar as his thought stops at this circle, it is crude and immoral.

This is the difference between him and Aristotle. Plato sees the future through a breakthrough he has made for himself: it is not the sky, but a breakthrough of the sky. Aristotle tries, so to speak, to push back the entire thick mass of clouds that hide this sky from him; and, thus failing to discover any point of it, one can say not only that he does not see it, but that he does not seek it. The one senses the truth through the erroneous form that his genius has conceived; his thought is deeper than his idea. In the other, on the contrary, the form of thought is adequate to the essence of thought.

So nothing is more futile, in my opinion, than these questions so often asked and debated about Aristotle and Plato: which is the more republican, the more favorable to the cause of the people, the more humane to slaves, the more partisan of equality. If I had to pronounce on these idle questions, I confess that, taking things literally, I would give the advantage to Aristotle. Everything that Plato lost, so to speak, of humanity in this exclusive concentration that makes him see everything in the intellect, Aristotle regains, and therein lies his superiority. Aristotle, less exclusive than his master, is thus a little more republican than him, a little more humane in favor of Slaves, a little more partisan of Equality.

But neither one nor the other, I repeat, knew right. We have seen that Aristotle admits, as equally legitimate, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy; but ultimately, he accepts democracy. Plato condemns it absolutely, and places it in the ranks of his *unjust* governments. (*Republic*, Book 9.) His book should rather be called Plato's *Monarchy* than Plato's *Republic*. For, after having summarized the entire people into a small number of wise men who are their head, the masterpiece would be to summarize this small number into a single man, and thus we would arrive at the monarchy. And indeed, Plato, far from being averse to it, willingly consents to it in twenty passages. But since his magistrates are really scholars and philosophers, and since these philosophers, as he takes great care to say, are metaphysicians and priests, it follows that his monarch is ultimately a supreme pontiff, a sovereign pontiff, a pope in a word. It seems that, passing through Christianity and the Barbarians, Plato's idea was realized, and that he found his king and his college of magistrates or philosophers in the pope and the clergy, his guardians of the flock in the warriors called nobility, and his artisans aided by Slaves in the third estate aided by Serfs.

Aristotle, although he starts from the same principle as his master, intelligence, since it is on intelligence that he establishes slavery, nevertheless admits a sort of equality of all free men; and society appears to him to be an association, a contract in the interest of all. The happiness of all therefore appears to him to merit the care of the legislator. He therefore does not absolutely sacrifice industrial workers to artists and scholars. In Plato, as I have already said, you will search in vain, either in the *Republic* or in the *Laws*, for a single passage where he deals with any care with the third caste, that of artisans and laborers, with the people in a word, with the most numerous class of his republic as with any society. If it is a question of warriors and magistrates, he is not short of explanations on the education that must be given to them; he opens up for them the whole treasure of his genius; He demonstrates, in their favor, the encyclopedic link between the sciences and the influence of the arts in properly directing and governing the human heart. But there is no education for the people. We do not even know if the community he admits for warriors extends to this caste. Perhaps he did not believe the multitude capable of conceiving and practicing it. He does not explain himself, at least on this subject.¹⁶ It seems that he considered it beneath the legislature to provide for any laws that the wisdom of shepherds, aided by the courage and devotion of dogs, could impart to the flock.

All the more so does he have no concern for Slaves. To concern himself with them would be a profanation for him. The Slave is evidently for him, as for Aristotle, something more like a brute than a man. He quotes Homer's profound words about Slaves: "When a man falls into slavery, Jupiter takes away half of his soul;" but he does not inquire whether it is lawful to take away a man's soul or half of his soul, and whether there is not some right which still protects a

man thus degraded. He is evidently on this point, I repeat, of Aristotle's opinion; the Slave is for him only property. Listen to the laws he lays down when, in his second Treatise, having abandoned his model Republic as too superior to Humanity, he condescends to make regulations for the reform of the society of his time:

"Whoever kills a Slave *shall be freed to purify himself*, if the slave belongs to him. If it belongs to another, and he killed him in anger, he shall compensate the master."

"If a Slave strikes a freeman, whether foreign or citizen, he shall be delivered bound to the freeman he struck. The latter shall put him in shackles, and, after beating him with stirrup leathers for as long as he sees fit, without, however, causing any harm to the slave's master by inflicting too serious injuries, he shall return the slave to him, so that he himself may treat him according to the following law. Any Slave who strikes a freeman shall be delivered bound to his master by the person he struck; and his master will keep him in chains until the Slave has obtained pardon from the person he has mistreated. (*Laws*, Book 9.)

Aristotle, certainly, is no more cruel, despite the aphorisms that I have cited. On the contrary, he mitigates the barbarity of slavery as much as he can when he speaks of the practice that should be made of it. Moreover, he at least took the trouble to discuss the question, and to seek the reason for the right of the strongest in the right of the most intelligent. Plato has such disdain for what is not, in his eyes, endowed with intelligence, that he does not even discuss when it comes to this subject. There is a place in his *Republic* where he wonders whether his warriors will fight for plunder; He finds this unworthy of them, and in this regard, he expresses the wish that the peoples of Greece stop making slaves of one another. But it is not slavery that he condemns.

On the question of women, Plato is no superior to Aristotle. Aristotle, after speaking of the relationship between master and slave, adds: "The relationship of the sexes is analogous; one is made to command, the other to obey" (*Politics*, Book I, Chapter 2); and elsewhere: "The administration of the family rests on three kinds of power: that of the master, that of the father, and that of the husband. The slave is absolutely deprived of will; the woman has one, but as a subordinate; the child has only an incomplete one. It is the same with the moral virtues." (*Ibid.*, ch.5.) Plato, it is true, often assimilates woman to man. He admits warrior women who would receive the same education as warrior men. But does this mean understanding the equality of man and woman? His warrior women would necessarily be inferior to his warrior men; and consequently this assimilation would only increase, or rather increase tenfold, the distance between the two sexes. Plato recognizes this, and sees no harm in it. It is obvious that for him, as in his system, women are only inferior men. Hence also all his errors about love; hence this intervention of magistrates in the union of

the sexes and reproduction, which would debase Humanity and reduce it to the rank of animals.

No, Plato did not have a superior idea of woman to that which Aristotle formed of her. He is more liberal towards her only in appearance. He did not understand her equality as wife and mother; and that is why, while assimilating her to man, it turns out that he does not really raise her to the same rank as himself, but on the contrary he delivers her to him without right, as an inferior being. Does not love transformed into a legal reward "for those who have distinguished themselves in war or elsewhere" recall the saddest abuses of feudalism? What becomes of woman where she is disposed of without her, and where she is only the conquest and prey of a more valiant sex? It was for want of having known the equality of the strong and the weak, of woman and man, of the child who utters his first cry and of the father who gave birth to him, that Plato wrote his fifth book of the *Republic*, in which the human soul, such as the progress of the centuries has made it today, is horribly offended. I defy anyone to read this fifth book without a horrible pang of the heart. What legislation, indeed, is that which suppresses true love, which annihilates marriage, and which finally necessitates, authorizes, orders abortions, exposures and the murder of children! All these cares of Plato's shepherd-magistrates "so that the flock does not degenerate;" these *festivals* accompanied by sacrifices and epithalamia which they give "to better hide their game, because otherwise the flock would be exposed to open sedition; "and the *drawing of lots*, where things are so skillfully arranged that wicked subjects fall to fortune, and not to the magistrates, for the misfortune of seeing themselves excluded;" and the *common fold*, where children are brought immediately after birth, "so that no mother can ever recognize her own;" and the license granted to men and women after a certain age; and the horrible reservations that this conceded liberty entails so that the republic does not suffer from it; and finally that secret and unknown place "where the children of wicked subjects will be hidden, as is fitting, and even those of others who have some deformity;" all of this horrifies us today!

We see, then, that for lack of having known human equality, the artist Plato outrages Humanity no less than his disciple, the scholar Aristotle; I do not even know if he does not commit more cruel outrages against him: in any case, his are more painful, because they come from a more friendly and devoted heart. It is the stab of Brutus. Humanity can say to Plato: "And you too, my son!"

CHAPTER VI.

After Plato and Aristotle, humanity had progress to make before further philosophical progress was possible. It is this step taken by humanity, without new light and without any other ideal, that constitutes history from Plato to Jesus Christ.

We now have the exact measure of what the ancients knew in terms of equality, and all the fine republican sentiments displayed by their historians, poets, and philosophers can no longer delude us. We are certain that, not having known the rights of man, they did not know the rights of the citizen; in other words, that having grossly violated human equality in the slaves, they had no true idea of equality in the city. We have seen that the most moral and intelligent among them did not know what law was, and consequently could not provide any certain basis for politics; but that, in the highest exaltation of their being, they only managed, like Aristotle, to consecrate the fact, or, like Plato, to idealize this fact in an erroneous form; so that, despite their prodigious genius, they only knew the Slave society that they had before their eyes, that is to say, a society without law and without principle, or an ideal society which, being so to speak the quintessence of the other, turns out to be at once more sublime and more absurd, since it consecrates, regularizes, and sanctifies, so to speak, all the defects of the first.

This is a great and remarkable confirmation of what we have advanced elsewhereⁱ on the necessary relationship between philosophers and Humanity. When philosophers, inspired by the humanity of their time, have given all they can give, it is up to humanity in turn to take a step forward under the influence of their inspiration. After Plato and Aristotle, humanity had immense progress to make before further philosophical progress was possible. It is this step taken by humanity, without new light and without any other ideal, that constitutes history from Plato to Jesus Christ.

The Greek republics resembled those small islands of greenery that sometimes form on the lava of volcanoes: the fire that must one day destroy these oases gives them, while awaiting catastrophe, an air of happiness and celebration; it seems that all the forces of nature, which engender no living creature in the abyss, are concentrated to produce a miracle of vegetation on the surface. What a volcano beneath the Greek cities, this barbaric world that provided them with their slaves, and which seemed to exist only to fuel the

ⁱ See *De l'Eclectisme*, Part One, § 3. — [A small number of notes, missed in the first revision of the text, will appear in this draft as footnotes, while the remainder of the notes appear as endnotes. The error will be corrected in the next revision. — TRANSLATOR]

leisure of their citizens during peace, to exercise their activity in war, and to exalt their personality and pride at all times! Aristotle, Plato, and all the others always begin by saying: I suppose that this volcano will remain eternally inert, I suppose that this lava will be the last, I suppose that this central fire will never give us any other emanations than those we receive from it today; this being said, I thus build my republic. And at the base of their republic they place layers of men under the name of slaves. This base was lacking one fine day, and the edifice was ruined.

There is even in the architecture of the ancients a symbol of this truth. Did not Greek and Roman architects often use caryatids that seemed to support their monuments? And these caryatids, they were... what? Barbarians, men in chains, slaves. The caryatids grew tired of serving as such support, and, having risen, overturned the edifice, as Samson overturned the pillars of Gaza.

It was absurd, indeed, it was unjust, infamous, that out of thirty or forty human creatures, there should be only one true man.ⁱⁱ Therefore, a world other than the world of Alexander was needed, and an ideal other than Plato's republic. Alexander was succeeded by Caesar, Plato by Jesus Christ.

For this remaking of the human race where Slaves were to be transformed into free men, Greece would have been too miserable a theater. The entire Mediterranean basin and the farthest possible horizon around this lake were not too vast a stage for such a revolution. Hence the fortune of Rome, and its work following Greece. A small tribe of Italy was charged with temporarily enslaving the world, with the end that one day the world would be freed and saved. Rome, or rather the Roman patriciate, worked for five hundred years at this enslavement. Greece fell under Rome; a multitude of peoples had the same destiny. Then the knot that held all these elements subjugated broke: this knot was the city of the patricians. A general assault was given to this city. The Latins in the social war, the Plebeians in the civil war, the Slaves in the servile war, destroyed it as best they could. Then there was nothing but great confusion; but

ⁱⁱ Including women, the proportion would be higher; but this approximate ratio is only true for Greece. In the Roman Republic, the proportion of slaves to free men was much more frightening. When, around the time of the Gracchi, the Romans confiscated all the lands of the peoples they had conquered, the rich soon absorbed the entire conquest and, in order to cultivate their domains, prodigiously increased the number of their slaves; Italy was covered with these private prisons called *ergastulas* where they kept them, fifteen by fifteen, locked up at night: "The poor," says Plutarch (*Life of the Gracchi*), "shorn of their possessions, no longer showed any zeal for military service, and no longer desired to raise children. Thus Italy was soon to be depopulated of free inhabitants, and filled with barbarian slaves whom the rich employed in cultivating the land, to replace the citizens they had driven out." It was on seeing Italy thus empty of citizens and covered with slaves, on a journey he made from Rome to Numantia, that Tiberius Gracchus conceived his plans for agrarian laws. It was not uncommon among the Romans for a citizen to own twenty thousand slaves. They distributed them in *decuria*, which, taken together, could be compared to an army.

this was the world required by Providence for the coming of a new ideal. This violent assembly of a multitude of diverse races, this crude, material unity, without principle, was personified in a man, and called himself Caesar. What is the empire, what is Caesar? A multitude gathered from all points of the universe, without law, without ideal, without morality, without religion, awaiting Jesus Christ. In this shadow of the old society, there was no longer really either patriciate or plebs, neither patrons nor clients, neither Romans nor allies, neither free nor freed, neither Masters nor Slaves; for all were slaves: there was nothing left but a confused multitude, and one man above this multitude: *Cesar, morituri te salutant*. The human race dependent on one man, what a solemn spectacle and what a lesson! All the rights of the ancient society legitimately summarized in the rights of a man who had become the master of all, the sole representative of free men, the only one invested with the despotic power of fathers over children, of Masters over their Slaves, the only citizen and the only senator; and this blind man, ignorant, given over to his passions, often insane, denying the gods and the future life like Julius Caesar, villainous like Nero, or troubled like Caligula! What a trial, and how those times were marked by a divine seal! But that is not all: Providence wanted as many men as possible to be summoned to this meeting. It was necessary that the races who had so long provided the Roman world with Slaves should themselves come to occupy the stage. Rome had gone far away to seek the Barbarians; they in turn come to swoop down upon her. Here they are, running from the four corners of the earth. What do they want? What drives them thus? Ask Attila or Alaric; they reply that an unknown force is driving them. A force? Which one? They don't know, but they are called, they march. Did Rome, against which they march, know better in the past what she was doing when she marched against them? Were the oracles of the Capitol clearer than those in the forests of Germany? Ask Cicero or Virgil why Rome conquered the world: they know nothing. Christianity is the key to this enigma: Rome conquered the world, and the Barbarians in turn conquered Rome, so that solidarity, fraternity, and the unity of the human race might begin.

Indeed, precisely at the moment when material unity was established under Augustus and Tiberius, a man appeared, a wise man, who came to present to the world a new plan for a republic. This man, who came to create for the world without slaves a utopia similar to the one Plato had created for the world with slaves, was Jesus Christ.

We must leave to Jesus all the glory for his work. Let us admit that, setting aside what had been said before him in the East, what Jesus came to say to the West was indeed new. Read, reread all the classical literature of Greece and Rome: where will you find in this literature the religion of humanity, where will you find the unity of the human race seen as a single being? You will not only find human brotherhood conceived sentimentally; even more so, the

metaphysical idea that makes this brotherhood a knowledge and a dogma is completely missing from all this literature.

We must go back to the time when Jesus appeared to find among the ancients some accents of humanity analogous to his Gospel. Apart from a verse of Terence, a few words of Cicero, a few phrases of Seneca, the whole of antiquity has nothing from which we can conclude, I do not say the reciprocal solidarity of the human race and the unity of the human species, but the brotherhood of men, in the most vulgar sense. The first time that the sentiment of collective Humanity was expressed in Rome, it was a freedman, a child of Carthage, taken from his family and raised by the Romans as a slave, who formulated it; and this formula was so new that it struck everyone with astonishment. "The first time," says St. Augustine, "that this beautiful verse of Terence's was heard spoken on the stage in Rome:

"Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto,"

there was universal applause in the amphitheater; not a single man was found in such a large assembly, composed of Romans and envoys from all the nations already subject or allied to their empire, who did not seem sensitive to this cry of nature." This cry was new, indeed, and it is remarkable, I repeat, that it was a freedman who made the Romans hear this cry, the precursor of the Gospel. Moreover, this cry was for the Romans nothing more than a beautiful verse dropped among them in their theatrical games; and it can be said that Terence himself was like the sibyls, who did not understand, or only half-understood, what God inspired them to say. After Terence, no one among the Romans went further down this path than he. Cicero may well repeat and admire Terence's verse; he will even willingly speak of a bond of charity that must unite the entire human race, *charitas humani generis*. But from this intuition, what does he conclude? Nothing. It seems that he only glimpsed human fraternity to extract a few sonorous phrases from it. We must go as far as Seneca to have something more precise. Seneca speaks of a universal benevolence that extends to all men, to slaves as well as to free men, and which derives, he says, from a natural obligation: *Quid liberalitatem tantum ad Togatos vocat? Ilominibus prodesse natura jubet: servi liberine sint, ingenui an libertini, justæ libertatis an inter amicos clatce, quid refert? Ubicumque homo est, ibi beneficio locus est.* (De Vit. beat., c. xxiv). But when Seneca expressed himself in this way, advanced minds were already on the threshold of the new religion; and while he was discussing this point as on every other accessory idea, Jesus, whose doctrine this idea was, was dying on the cross for this idea.

CHAPTER VII.

Jesus is the Destroyer of Castes

Jesus is the Buddha of the West, the destroyer of castes, the one whom the echo of the world, awakened after eighteen centuries, will hail as the most sublime of revolutionaries, and whom the French Revolution will recognize as its principle and source. Legislator of fraternity while waiting for Equality to become possible, he comes to spread throughout the world the doctrine of the unity of the human race. The world will adore him for eighteen centuries without understanding him, and he will only be truly understood when he is dethroned from the rank to which superstition had placed him.

One could, to a certain extent, see only one thing in the Gospel: *the project formed and executed by Jesus to give profound meaning to the sign of equality in the antiphonal republics*; and the Gospel thus conceived would be no less admirable.

What was the sign of civic equality in the ancient republics? The COMMUNAL MEALS.

Well, it is this sign, this symbol of Equality, that Jesus perfected in his EUCHARIST.

The entire institution of Jesus is there. It was about showing men that they all formed but one body and one soul. He found an initiator, a messiah, to teach this to men at the expense of his own life. Antiquity had a Decius, who threw himself into the abyss to save Rome; it had a Socrates, who preferred to die rather than lie: here is a Decius as superior to the first as Humanity is to Rome; here is a Socrates who is not content to suffer death when it comes, but who, having received a greater mission, goes himself to meet death.

Listen to Jesus himself reveal his plan in advance:

"I am the bread of life. Your fathers ate the manna in the wilderness and died. This is the bread which came down from heaven, so that whoever eats it may not die. I am the living bread which came down from heaven. If anyone eats of this bread, he will live forever. *And the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.*" (St. John, ch. 6)

And everything is fulfilled as he had willed. The Gospel is a drama of which the Passover, celebrated by Jesus with his disciples, is the climax; for there is no interval between Passover and Jesus' death.

Jesus comes to Jerusalem to celebrate his Passover, that is, to die. He gathers his disciples, washes their feet himself, and eats with them. "And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and having given thanks, he broke it, and gave it to his disciples, and said: *Take, eat; this is my body.* And having also taken the cup, and having given thanks, he gave it to them, saying: *Drink from it, all of you; for this is*

my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins. But I say to you, I will not drink from now on of this fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it anew with you in my Father's kingdom." St. Matthew, ch. 26, y. 26-29.)

The disciples question Jesus; he strengthens their souls with his words; Then, thinking that everything is over, that his mission is accomplished, that he has instituted the *EGALITARIAN MEAL*, and that he is going to die, because he must die to give this meal its meaning and value, he turns his mind away from the earth and begins to pray:

"Jesus said these things, then, raising his eyes to heaven, he said: 'My Father, the hour has come... I have glorified you on earth; *I have finished the work you gave me to do.*'" (St. John, ch. 17).

What then is this work that he has completed? Do you want to know? Listen to his prayer for his disciples and for Humanity in them:

"Holy Father, keep in your name those you have given me, *so that they may be ONE*, as we are one... Now I pray not only for these, but also for those who will believe in me through their word, that they all may be one. As you, O Father, are in me, and I in you, *that they also may be in us*, and that the world may believe that you sent me. I have shared with them the light you gave me, *that they may be ONE*, as we are one. I am in them, and you in me, *that they may be perfected in UNITY.*" (Ibid.)

And when he had uttered this prayer, his mission was completed; he crossed the brook Kidron, and saw Judas coming towards him with Pilate's henchmen.

The sacrifice is accomplished: *Consummatum est*. The sign of *union* is found; the victim is sacrificed. But it is immortal; it will therefore always be able to provide for the common meal, for Passover, for the Banquet of Equals. The doctrine of *unity* is sown in the world. Here is St. Paul who cries out: "There is neither Jew nor Greek; neither slave nor free; neither male nor female. For you are all *ONE* in Christ Jesus: *Non est Judæus, neque Græcus; non est servus, neque liber; non est masculus, neque femina. Omnes enim vos unum estis in Christo Jesu.*" (Galatians 1:28) The Agape has begun; the Agape, that is, the meal of union, the meal of love.

What were the communal meals of the Greek cities, the meals of the free men of Plato and Aristotle, compared to the Agape of Christ! Who took part in the feasts of Plato and Aristotle? Slaves were excluded; only free people participated; there was one guest for every thirty or forty men. At the feasts of Plato and Aristotle, where was the moral nourishment, the spiritual bread, as Jesus called himself? There, everything was material; the bread they ate was bread. Only, they gathered to eat together; but they didn't know that they were living the same life. It took one man to make himself a victim, and give himself, so to speak, as food for other men, to teach them that they nourish one another spiritually, that they are each other's life, that they form but one body and have but one life.

But this man, who made himself the victim of the feast to impart this great lesson, was careful not to exclude the Slaves from the feast. Far from it, it was with the poor that he celebrated his initiation meal.

O Jesus, how great you still are after Socrates, who preceded you on your painful path, and who died like you for the salvation of mankind!

CHAPTER VIII.

On the bond that unites Jesus to the legislators who preceded him in the West. Jesus continued the spirit of the ancient regulations, but extended their thinking in a new way.

Great as Jesus was, however, if we wish to understand him, we must not separate him from Humanity.

The establishment of the Roman Empire, almost immediately followed by the coming of Christ, is undoubtedly the most striking confirmation of what I have demonstrated so far: that antiquity knew neither Equality nor Fraternity as we understand them today after Christianity, that is, as a dogma, as a principle, as a right. When we see the Romans, after five centuries of republican rule, transition to a despotic state with no resistance other than that of the privileged classes; when we consider that this resistance was only a *de facto* resistance, without the law ever being operational; that everything was limited to blind struggles, battles, proscriptions, massacres, without any philosophy directing the blows; when we see Brutus kill himself while denying virtue; when we see, in Tacitus, the likes of Thrasea, Soranus, Seneca, dying at the order of a tyrant, stoically no doubt and nobly, like gladiators on the stage, but without complaint and without appeal, as if tyranny were legitimate and law should never prevail, we remain more and more convinced of this truth: that antiquity, lacking human equality, did not know law.

But if right did not exist among the ancients, at least the germ of law existed among them. Indeed, if they lacked the notion of human equality that constitutes law, they had the seed of this notion: for, while ignoring the brotherhood of men when it came to men in general, they positively recognized this brotherhood within a restricted circle, the caste; and thus they possessed simultaneously the seed of Brotherhood, of Equality, and of law.

It is this seed that Jesus developed; and, not yet able to develop it freely within society itself, he at least saved it by placing it in a sort of sanctuary called the *Church*. When I say Jesus, I do not mean that he alone did everything in this work. A multitude of men worthy of cooperating with him took part in it; and just as he had precursors, he had successors.

It is time to understand that what we call Revelation is not a superhuman revelation; that the revealer, as he is called, had been preceded by a multitude of other revealers; that Jesus, the analogue in our West of the Eastern Buddha, who came long after him and as if following his movement, did, like him, only continue the spirit of the ancient regulations, giving a new form to their thought.

The thought of the ancient legislators was, as I have just said and will demonstrate, not the equality of men, but the equality of a certain number of men chosen to dominate others; not the brotherhood of men in general, but the brotherhood of equals, that is, brotherhood within caste. Buddha and Jesus, destroying castes, made them human brotherhood.

The Western world having reached, in the time of Caesar, such a point of confusion that the castes were ruined in the West without being destroyed either in principle or in fact, and that slavery was also ruined without being annihilated either in principle or in fact, it was necessary, both human and providential, that a man should appear who, reproducing the thought of the ancient legislators in this environment thus transformed, would give to this thought a more extensive and apparently entirely new form.

This man who reproduced the thought of the ancient legislators in a new environment, and who, driven by the same inspiration as them, but dealing with a new Humanity, was both them and different from them, old and new, copyist, so to speak, and original, is the legislator, or, if you will, the revealer, Jesus.

I will show the link that unites Jesus to the legislators who preceded him in the West; I will show that his law, his Gospel, his *good news*, is not something abnormal and without antecedents; on the contrary, it is, from a certain point of view, only the continuation, the reproduction, the development of previous legislation, although, if we consider it from another point of view, that is, in terms of the abolition of castes, it is profoundly distinct from them.

The Buddhists regard Buddha as a final incarnation of the spirit of truth that had animated before him Krishna, Vishnu, and all the deified prophets of India. Buddhism is nonetheless the destruction of this caste system, of which Brahmanism and Vishnuism, on the contrary, were the sanctification. How then do Buddhists understand that Buddha, the destroyer of castes, is an avatar of the same divine spirit that, in other ages, had established and sanctified these castes? Here it is. According to them, the destruction of castes was, so to speak, hidden and included in the sanctification made of them by Krishna or Vishnu, because in preaching brotherhood to the Brahmins alone, Krishna and Vishnu implicitly preached human brotherhood, as Buddha did later.

Well, I say in the same way that Jesus was a new incarnation of the spirit of truth that had animated the legislators of the West in the time of castes and slavery, although the preaching of Jesus, like that of Buddha, had as its object the destruction of the castes and slavery, which these legislators had established or maintained; I say that the author of the Gospel essentially reproduced, although in a new, more august and grander form, the living thought that dictated to Plato his *Republic*, the thought that inspired Pythagoras his legislation, the thought that dictated to Lycurgus the laws of Sparta, to Minos those of Crete, to Moses those of the Jews, to Sesostris or Hermes those of Egypt, and to the deified Brahmas those of India.

Reader, you must be patient and follow me in my proofs; For if you do not understand, as I do, the character and mission of Jesus, I have nothing to say to you about Equality. If we do not agree on the past, we cannot agree on the present or the future.

CHAPTER IX.

Christianity is the extension of the ancient city to all men.

The subject I am compelled to raise here is immense. It concerns the capital significance of Christianity. I could accumulate a multitude of preliminary considerations. I prefer to launch myself into the very middle of the question, *in medias res*. Enough prefaces have been written on Christianity.

I therefore ask permission to follow the idea I have expressed, that Christianity is nothing other than the extension of the ancient city to all men, and that the sacrifice of Jesus and his Eucharist are only the symbol of this idea. From this well-understood connection will flow a multitude of other connections, which will bring to light the true character and true mission of Jesus.

There is no one, in fact, who does not admit that the Eucharist is the summary of Christianity. Well, I say that the Eucharist is the MEAL OF EQUALS of Sparta and of all the ancient cities extended to all men.

This *meal of equals* was, I will demonstrate, the basis of all ancient legislation. This, then, is the root of the legislation of Jesus. In this sense, Jesus only reproduced the legislators who had preceded him. But he, and after him his apostles, and in particular St. Paul, extended this *meal* to all men: this is the glory and the novelty of Jesus.

I will first prove my first proposition, namely *that the COMMON MEALS were the SPIRITUAL as well as the TEMPORAL basis of all the ancient legislation of the West*. I will then prove the second, that is, the analogy of the institution of Jesus with the institutions of his predecessors.

CHAPTER X.

The *egalitarian meal*, limited to caste, was the spiritual as well as temporal basis of all ancient Western legislation. This truth is demonstrated: 1. by the Lacedaemonian Phiditia; 2. by Cretan Andria; 3. by the communal meals of the ancient peoples of Italy, of certain peoples of Asia Minor of Dorian origin, and of the Carthaginian Hetairia; 4. by the cenobitic institute of Pythagoras; 5. by the communal life of the priests and warriors of Egypt.

Everyone has heard of the *communal meals* of Sparta; but almost everyone has two misconceptions about them. First, people imagine that this was an institution specific to Sparta. Sparta is regarded, like Montesquieu, as a *singular* and bizarre form of legislation that had no analogue in antiquity. "When you see in the Life of Lycurgus," says Montesquieu, "the singular laws that he gave to the Lacedaemonians, you believe you are reading the *History of the Sevarambes*."¹⁷ (*Spirit of the Laws*, book IV, ch. 6.) These laws were not so singular, so particular to the Spartans as is believed; and the *communal meals*, for example, symbol of the spiritual community of equals, and basis of their temporal community, are found, as we shall see, in all ancient cities. Secondly, we imagine that these meals were only meals, that is to say, a way of living materially, a sort of arrangement of domestic economy; this is a gross error: these meals were communal because the spirit of the legislation was the community or, in other words, the fraternity of equals.

What is Sparta? The *city of equals*. What was even the social name of the Spartans, the true citizens? The Equals (οἱ Ὀμοιοί). Sparta consisted of *ten thousand equals* composing the city, dominating over thirty thousand Laconians who did not have this title of *equals*, over the serf Helots, and over the Slaves. This is what Sparta was: a horrible inequality, a cruel barbarity pushed to atrocities that make nature shudder, if we consider the totality of the men who composed the empire of Lacedaemon and lived on its territory; but a model fraternity, a model equality, a model community, if we consider only the caste of true Lacedaemonians, that is, *equals*.

It is clear that Sparta was for Pythagoras, for Socrates, for Plato, for Xenophon, for Aristotle, for Zeno, for all the grave and serious philosophers of antiquity, the city par excellence and, so to speak, an inspiration. Neither Athens nor any other city held the same prestige for them. Sparta was in their eyes holy and venerable, as Rome was for the Romans, as Jerusalem was for the Jews, as modern Rome was for the Catholics. Lycurgus, the founder of its laws, seemed to them to be endowed with a character quite similar to that which the name saint later represented.

Now, where did this sanctity of Sparta and the institutions of Lycurgus come from in their eyes? Why does Plato always have Sparta in mind in his ideal republic, in this republic whose perfect model, he says, exists in heaven, that is, in the divine ideal? Why does Xenophon, that other disciple of Socrates, find nothing but an adorable and divine perfection in all of Lycurgus's legislation? Why does he constantly repeat that so much wisdom could only have been inspired by Jupiter (*Republic of Sparta*)? Why, according to all the ancients, were Apollo himself and the Pythia regarded as the counselors who had guided Lycurgus, and forced, by their oracles, the Lacedaemonians to follow his prescriptions and keep them?¹⁸ This is because there was indeed at the bottom of all these institutions a divine idea, a sacred goal, drawn from the very contemplation of the Divinity. This idea, this goal, was the establishment of human fraternity, that is to say, of the true society of men.

Everything in Lycurgus's laws converged toward this goal, and the *common meals* were only the sign of the spirit of Equality pervaded in these laws. These meals were therefore not a purely material thing: they were a consecration, and, to use theological language, a sacrament; they were the sacramental sign of the city. No one could attend them if he was not one of the *equals*, and no one was considered one of the *equals* if he did not attend regularly. Attendance at *common meals*, says Aristotle, conferred political rights on Sparta. (*Politics*, Book II.) A citizen of Sparta, therefore, was a man who took a seat at the common banquet: all of Lycurgus's legislation is summed up in this. Let us listen to Plutarch; After speaking of the purely political reform introduced by Lycurgus, that is, the establishment of the senate and the ephors, he continues thus:

“The second and boldest of Lycurgus's establishments was the division of land. There existed in this respect, among the citizens, such a prodigious inequality, that the majority, deprived of all possessions and reduced to misery, were a burden to the city, while all the wealth was in the hands of a few. Lycurgus, who wished to banish from Sparta insolence, envy, avarice, luxury, and the two greatest and two oldest diseases of all governments, wealth and poverty, persuaded the Spartans to put all the lands in common, to make a new division of them, to live henceforth in perfect equality, in order to give all distinctions to merit alone, and to recognize no other difference than that which naturally results from contempt for vice and esteem for virtue. He proceeded at once to this division, divided the lands of Laconia into thirty thousand shares which he distributed to the inhabitants of the countryside, and made nine thousand shares of those of the territory of Sparta for as many citizens... A few years later, Lycurgus, returning from a journey, was passing through Laconia, which had just been harvested; and, seeing the perfectly equal piles of sheaves, he said, smiling, to those who accompanied him, that *Laconia resembled an inheritance that several brothers had just shared among themselves*... To eliminate all kinds of inequality, he also undertook to divide movable property. But, foreseeing that it would be difficult to do so if he removed it openly, he took

another course and attacked avarice indirectly. He began by abolishing all gold and silver money, and permitted only iron money. This new money banished all inequality from Sparta... Finally, with the intention of pursuing luxury even further and completely uprooting the love of wealth, Lycurgus established a third institution, which may be regarded as one of the most admirable: that of *public meals*. He obliged the citizens to eat all together, and to feed on the same meats, regulated by law... These *public meals*, which the Cretans call *Andria*, are called *Phiditia* by the Lacedaemonians, either because they cement among them goodwill and friendship, *phiditia* being put for *philitia* (from φιλεῖν, to love), or because they accustomed them to frugality and saving, which in Greek is called *pheido*. But nothing prevents us from believing with others that they added the first letter of this word, and that they say *phiditia* for *editia*, from the Greek word which means to eat.¹⁹ The tables were each of fifteen people, a little more or a little less... Even children went to these meals; they were taken there as to a school of temperance, where they heard discourses on government, etc. (*Life of Lycurgus*.)

Community, fraternity, unity, this is evidently the spirit that dictated all his laws to Lycurgus; and the sign of this community, this fraternity, this unity, was the *common meals*. Thus Plato, who calls Sparta the philosophical city par excellence, and who claims that the Spartans are the only Greeks who cultivate true wisdom and true science (*Protagoras*), indissolubly unites in his idea the *communal meals* with *fraternity*. Hardly had he sketched out the plan of his republic and organized his caste of warriors, than he exclaimed: "Let them go, at mealtimes, into common dining rooms, and let them live together as warriors should live in the camp." (*Republic*, book. III.)

But was this custom of communal meals, a sign of fraternity and equality, unique to Sparta, and is it found only there, or rather in Plato's imaginary republic? No; it is so far from being unique to Sparta that one can assert, on the contrary, that it was an almost universal custom among ancient peoples, or at least that all legislators had prescribed it, as a sign of religious policing among men.

Aristotle points out the great antiquity of this custom; he draws a parallel with the institution of castes, and assumes it to be just as ancient. Indirectly criticizing Plato for having presented as an invention of his genius the division of citizens into various orders and the community within certain of these orders or classes, he says: "In political philosophy, this necessary division of individuals into distinct classes, warriors on one side, laborers on the other, is not depicted as a contemporary or even recent discovery. It still exists today in Egypt and Crete, instituted there, it is said, by the laws of Sesostris, here by those of Minos. The establishment of *common meals* is no less ancient, and dates back for Crete to the reign of Minos, and for Italy to a much earlier period. The tradition of the latter country relates that it was from a certain Italus, who became king of Enotria, that the Enotrians changed their name to that of

Italians. It is added that Italus made the Enotrians, who were previously nomads, farmers, and that, among other institutions, he gave them that of common meals. Even today, some cantons have preserved this custom with laws from Italus. It existed among the Opics, inhabitants of the shores of Tyrrhenia, and who still bear their ancient surname of Ausonians. It is found among the Chonians, who occupy the country called Syrtis on the coasts of Iapygia and the Ionic Gulf: we know, moreover, that the Chonians were of Oenotrian origin. *Communal meals* therefore originated in Italy; the division by classes comes from Egypt, for Sesostris is much earlier than Minos. We must believe, moreover, that in the course of the centuries the genius of men has met several times, or, to put it better, an infinite number of times: the same needs have suggested the same means of satisfying them; and what one can think of a multitude of customs, one can also think of political institutions. Everything in this respect is very old.” (*Politics*, book IV, ch. 9.)

Nieburh (*Hist. Rom.*, book. I) thinks that Aristotle must have drawn all this precious information about ancient Italy from the works of Antiochus of Syracuse, a historian who lived about a hundred years before him, and about whom Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Strabo speak. But, whatever the source from which Aristotle drew, what should we think of this assertion, that *communal meals* in Italy dated back to a time well before that of the laws of Crete? Everyone knows that Lycurgus borrowed his legislation from that of Minos. But did the chain of which we so clearly have one end in the legislation of Lycurgus go back much further, as Aristotle says? and what connection did the ancient legislations that Aristotle points out to us in Italy have with the Cretan legislation? In our opinion, however much they were anterior to the latter, they were nevertheless connected with it. Aristotle is not wrong in asserting that these ancient customs of Italy predated Minos and did not come directly from Crete; which does not prevent them from appearing to us to be closely related to Cretan legislation. This is because the legislation of Minos itself was, as so many reliable testimonies from antiquity attest, only the development of an ancient legislation which, from Phrygia, had passed into Greece and Italy, by several successive emigrations, with the Idaean Dactyls. It was this legislation of the Dactyls which originally civilized Greece and Italy. Indeed, it was in Phrygia, it was on the island of Crete, that the traditions of Greece and Italy placed the birth of religion and civilization. It was from Phrygia that Saturn came to Italy. It was in Crete that the Curetes or Corybantes, that caste of priests who were to the warrior caste of the Titans what the Druids were among the Gauls, the Magi among the Persians, and the Salians among the Sabines, had saved the young god Jupiter from the wrath of his father Saturn. This ancient Greek and Italian religion of Saturn and Jupiter therefore seems to me to have had its primitive roots in an earlier legislation, which, carried into Greece and Italy, served to instruct and civilize the savage inhabitants of those lands. Seeing Minos develop in such an evident way in his legislation the principle of *community within the*

caste, I cannot, I confess, help thinking that this idea was also found in the earlier civilization, that is to say, in the civilization of Saturn and Jupiter. This would explain the remarkable conformity that Aristotle makes known to us between Italian antiquity and Cretan antiquity. The very name Italy, which he says was given, along with the law of *common meals* to the Enotrians, by a king named Italus, recalls the sacred Ida from which the Dactyls took their name of Idaeans. This would also explain this golden age, this reign of Saturn, which is the boundary and the starting point of Roman civilization, and whose image was preserved in the Saturnalia.

I cannot help adding that I noticed, while reading Herodotus, a curious fact, which seems to me to throw some light on this subject. We have just seen that Aristotle cites, among other Italian peoples who had communal meals, the Chonians (Χῶνες) who lived in Magna Graecia, at the southern end of Italy. We know that opposite these Chonians, on the other side of the Adriatic Gulf, was a province of Epirus, whose inhabitants were also called Chonians or Chaonians (Χάονες). It was in this part of Epirus that the famous forest of Dodona was located, where the ancient Greeks were said to have long lived on acorns, and where they had been civilized by the oracle of Jupiter, served by a kind of cenobites called Selles, of whom Homer and Sophocles make mention. But these are not the only Chonians of whom antiquity speaks to us. Herodotus also mentions the Caunians or Conians in Asia Minor (Καύνιοι, Κώνιοι, and Καυκώνιοι, depending on the manuscripts; *Caunus* or *Conus* of the geographers); and he reports of them a circumstance which would make me believe, despite the difference in spelling, that the Conians of Herodotus were a people similar to the Chaonians of Epirus and the Chonians of Magna Graecia. "This people," he says, "has laws very different from those of other nations, and which distinguish them greatly from their neighbors (the Carians). For for the Conians it is the most beautiful thing in the world to gather at table to drink together in groups composed according to age and friendship, men as well as women and children: "Νόμοισι χρέωνται χεχωρισμένοισι πολλὸν τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ Καρῶν τοῖσι γὰρ κάλλισον ἐστὶ, κατ' ἡλικίην τε καὶ φιλότητα, εἰλαδὸν συγγίνεσθαι ἐς πόσιν, καὶ ἀνδράσι, καὶ γυναιξί, καὶ παισὶ.." (Book I.) Herodotus adds that these Conians boasted of having their origins in Crete. It seems to me difficult not to see in these common libations, regarded by the Conians of Asia Minor as a noble and religious institution, the *communal meals* of Crete, from which this people claimed to have descended; and this being so, it is difficult not to establish a connection between this people and the Chonians of Crete. This peculiarity of *communal meals*, which so strikes Herodotus, and which seems to him to characterize this people, a peculiarity which also characterized, according to Aristotle, the Chonians of Italy, would lead me to believe, I confess, that this very name of Conians, as Herodotus writes, or, with the aspiration, of Chonians, was a significant name which expressed this community of life (Κοινὸς, *common*, from which *cenobite*, *cenobitic* life, etc.). From then on, we understand

this substitution of name of which Aristotle speaks, and how the original Enotrians took the name of Chonians, which expressed the regime of life which they had been made to adopt.

But, whatever one may think of this connection and of the facts relating to Italy cited by Aristotle, at least it is impossible to doubt the existence of communal meals in Cretan legislation. All antiquity, I repeat, attests to us that Lycurgus had sought his laws in Crete, and moreover the laws of Crete still existed in the time of Plato and Aristotle. I will content myself, on the legislation of Minos, with quoting the summary that a learned professor, M. Poirson, makes of it, according to the most reliable authorities:

“The island of Crete,” he says (*Outline of Ancient History*), “was populated successively by natives called Aeto-cretes, then by various Greek tribes belonging to the Pelasgians, the Achaeans, and the Dorians. Placed on the path of all the colonies which, from Libya, lower Egypt, and Phoenicia, went to Greece, Crete early received the seeds of civilization and the various cults of these different countries. Also the Greeks placed in this island the birthplace of most of the Gods, and of Jupiter in particular. Around the year 1500, while Pandion reigned in Athens, Minos I and the Idaean Dactyls passed from Asia into the island of Crete. Minos united all the peoples under his laws, and built several cities, among others Gnosus, Festus, and Cydonia. He gave laws on this subject which he supposed to have received from Jupiter. In the system of government which he established, there were societies of free men, all united under the same government, all equal among themselves, and all served by slaves; *no individual property* of territory; *the men eating at public tables*, and their families subsisting on common provisions; the youth trained regularly in the exercises of gymnastics, navigation, and war; severe morals maintained by rigorous laws; honors granted as a reward for age and merit alone; the entire community recognizing the prerogative of a hereditary king, who held his authority from Jupiter, but who was only regarded as protected by the Gods as long as he continued to observe justice and maintain the inalienable privileges of his subjects. While Minos gave the Cretans this form of government, Rhadamanthus, his brother, established himself in the islands of the Aegean Sea, Chios, Lemnos, the Cyclades, delivered them from the brigandage of pirates, and gave them laws so equitable that several others came to place themselves under his domination, as well as the coasts of Asia Minor. Centuries were to pass before Theseus and Lycurgus borrowed from the legislation of Minos. But, from the beginning of heroic times, the Greeks admired in their law of nations the repression of piracy, the first rules of which had been laid down by Rhadamanthus; and the north of Greece, as well as Thrace, were partly rescued from barbarism by the Idaean Dactyls, or Curetes, who had passed into Greece and the islands of the Aegean Sea. These priests, who discovered iron in Crete, knew how to extract metals from the heart of the earth, to melt them, and to forge them into weapons and tools. Skilled in agriculture, they taught how to

gather animals wandering in the countryside and to form herds of them, to raise bees and to extract honey from their hives. Finally, they were attributed the power to command nature by means of spells and enchantments; an error which was probably based on their real knowledge of physics. On the one hand, the Dactyls or Curetes penetrated the island of Samothrace, initiated Orpheus into their mysteries and knowledge, and gave birth to that ephemeral civilization that we see in Thrace. On another point, we see them, animated by a proselytism that was both political and religious, winning over to their beliefs and doctrines the neighboring Greeks of Parnassus, who had obeyed Deucalion, and who, under the name of Hellenes, were beginning to play an important role in Greece. In this part of Greece, they spread their arts, at the same time as they became the preachers and ministers of the cult of Jupiter, and they established that of Apollo at Delphi, whose oracle and first temple they established."

I pass on to the other testimonies that Aristotle provides us with on the *common meals* of ancient cities. In this kind of comparative politics that Aristotle makes in his book between the various governments that existed in his time, he almost always begins by comparing the States in terms of *common meals*. This is one of the reasons that makes him give superiority to the laws of Crete over those of Sparta: "The *common meals*, which the Spartans call Phidities (φιδίτια), were poorly organized, and the fault lies with their founder. The costs should have been borne by the State, as in Crete. In Lacedaemon, on the contrary, everyone must contribute the share prescribed by law, and the extreme poverty of some citizens does not allow them even to meet this expense. The intention of the legislator is therefore completely missed. He wanted to make *common meals* a completely popular institution, and, thanks to the law, it is nothing less than that. The poorest cannot take part in these meals. *And yet, from time immemorial, political rights have been acquired only on this condition.* It is therefore lost for anyone who is unable to bear this burden." (*Politics*, Book II, Chapter 6.)

Aristotle returns later to the superiority of Crete in this regard: "The organization of *common meals* is better in Crete than in Lacedaemon. In Sparta, everyone must provide the quota fixed by law, under penalty of being deprived of their political rights, as I have already said: in Crete, the institution is much more popular. From the fruits that are harvested and from the herds that are raised, whether they belong to the State or come from the dues paid by the serfs, two parts are made, one for the worship of the Gods and for public officials, the other for common meals, where men, women, and children are thus fed at the State's expense." (*Ibid.*, ch. 7.)

It is not only in Italy, Greece, and Lacedaemon that Aristotle points out the existence of common meals; he asserts that the constitution of Carthage was partly based on this institution: "Carthage also seems to enjoy a good constitution, more complete than that of other states in many points, and in some respects similar to that of Lacedaemon. These three governments of Crete, Sparta, and Carthage have great relations with each other, and are far superior

to all known governments; and what proves the wisdom of their constitution is that, despite the share of power it grants to the people, in Carthage, a very remarkable thing, no riot or tyrant has ever been seen. I will cite some analogies between Sparta and Carthage. The *common meals* of the Carthaginian hetairia resemble the Lacedaemonian phidities, etc.” (Book II, ch. 8.)

From the facts cited by Aristotle, let us move on to his personal opinion on *common meals*, and the use he would like to make of them in a model city. The importance he attaches to them is immense. It is through common education and *common meals* that he thinks he can introduce into the State the degree of unity and community that true human society seems to him to entail. Rightly criticizing the absolute identification that Socrates, in Plato's *Republic*, makes between man and society, Aristotle maintains that the harmony of citizen and student will be sufficient if education and meals are common. “In Lacedaemon and Crete,” he says, “the legislator had the wisdom to found the community on the use of public meals.” (*Ibid.*, ch. 2) Aristotle admits this institution, and formulates his laws in this regard in the plan of his model city: “The establishment of *common meals* is generally regarded as perfectly applicable to any well-constituted state. I am also of this opinion. But all citizens without exception must come and take their places there; and it is difficult for the poor, by bringing the share fixed by law, to be able to also provide for all the other needs of their families. The costs of divine worship are still a common burden of the city. Thus, the territory must be divided into two portions, one for the public, the other for individuals. The first portion will be subdivided to provide for both the expenses of worship and those of *common meals*. As for the second, it will be divided again so that each citizen, possessing at the same time both on the border and in the surroundings of the city, will be equally interested in the defense of the two localities. This distribution, equitable in itself, ensures the equality of citizens and their union against common enemies.” (Book IV, c. 9.)

Having thus given *common meals* as the basis of social life, Aristotle neglects no detail in regulating its execution. He follows this execution and it directs him even in the architecture of his city: “As it is necessary, for *common meals*, to divide the citizens into several sections, and as the walls must, at intervals and in the most suitable places, have towers and guardhouses, it is clear that these towers will be naturally intended to receive companies of citizens.” (*Ibid.*, ch. 11.) But Aristotle's moral and political point of view is shown even better in the details he enters into regarding the *common meals* of the magistrates: “The buildings dedicated to the pontiffs will be as splendid as they should be, and will serve both for the solemn meals of the magistrates and for the performance of all the rites that the law or an oracle of the Pythia has not made secret. This place, which will be seen from all the surrounding districts that it is to dominate, will be such as the dignity of the persons it will receive requires. At the foot of the eminence where the building will be situated, it will be appropriate to find the public square, built like that which is called in Thessaly

the *Square of Liberty*. This place will never be polluted with merchandise, and entry will be forbidden to troops of artisans, laborers, and any isolated individual of this class, unless the magistrate formally calls them there... As for the lower magistrates responsible for pronouncing on contracts, on criminal and civil actions, and on matters of this kind, or else responsible for policing the markets and what is called city policing, the place of their *meals* must be located near a public square and a busy district. The vicinity of the market square where all transactions take place will be especially suitable for this purpose. But as for the other square we spoke of above, it must always enjoy absolute calm; this one, on the contrary, will be intended for all material relations." (*Ibid.*)

We see that Aristotle, following the bent of his genius, is much more struck by the institution of *common meals* considered as a practical fact, as an ancient and venerable custom at the same time as useful, than he is occupied with the spirit hidden beneath this fact, that is to say, the social or rather spiritual community of men: this is the complete opposite of Plato. But finally, when it comes to formulating the degree of community that Aristotle admits in the State, the *common banquet* seems to him both the *spiritual* and the *material bond* of civic equality. Without doubt, he does not, like Plato, make this banquet a religious and almost holy thing, because, once again, the community affects him less than it affects Plato; but he nonetheless gives this institution a high meaning, a considerable value, a significance that is at once religious, moral, and political. Ask him, I repeat, where the unity of his republic lies; he will show it to you in *common education* and *common meals*. We therefore still find in him, although to a much lesser degree, the same social principle of *community in caste* which inspired his master Plato, and more anciently Plato's master, Pythagoras.

As for this one, everyone knows that his institute was positively founded on community. One was admitted into his society only by putting one's goods in common, by reason, says an ancient (Timée, in *Diog. Laert.*) that "goods must be common among friends:" we have seen that this is also the axiom of Plato in his Republic and in his Laws. Everything that is known of the regime of the Pythagoreans is so similar to the community of Christian monks, that it is really not worth insisting on this point here. The *cenobitic* or *communal* life of Christianity is, in a multitude of other respects, as in this essential respect of the community of goods, only the reproduction of the *cenobitic* life of the Pythagoreans; I will limit myself to recalling on this subject the testimony of Aulus-Gelle: "*Omnes simili qui a Pythagora in cohortem illam disciplinarum recepti crant, quod quisque familiæ per cuniquæque habebat, in medium dabant; and coibatur sort cietas inseparabilis, tanquam illud fuerit antiquum court sorteum, quod re atque verbo appellabatur κοινόβιον.*" (*Noct. Att.*, book I, c. 9.) It is reasonable to think that the various legislators that the school of Pythagoras gave to Italy, such as Gharondas and Zaleucus, established, if not a complete community between citizens, at least the use of *public meals*. This is all the more likely since the

Pythagoreans must have found this custom practiced in Italy, where it had been brought by the ancient Greek emigrations or rather, as we have said, by the Idaean Dactyls. We have seen, in fact, that Aristotle asserts that the custom of these public meals existed on the coasts of the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas, long before Minos prescribed them in Crete. It is evident, moreover, when one is willing to reflect on it, that the bitter struggles that the Pythagoreans instigated in Magna Graecia, the bloody persecutions that were exercised against them until their complete extermination, had as their cause this equality and this community that they wanted to introduce into society with a religion purified of idolatry.

I fear that the reader will tire of this dry enumeration into which I am forced, and will believe himself very far from Christianity. I admit, in fact, that one does not at first easily see the connection between the egalitarian banquets of Crete and Sparta, nor even between the common life of the Pythagoreans, and the mystical banquet of Jesus. But patience, we are going to get very close to the Eucharistic Supper with the Passover of Moses, and we will be very close to the Agapes when we have attended the *common meals* of the Essenes.

However, before moving on to the legislation of Moses, we must say a word about Egypt, from which Moses emerged, as did Pythagoras. Egypt, in fact, is one of the principal elements of this new synthesis that has been called Christianity. If it is true that Christianity has partly its source and its tradition in Egypt, the very essence of Christianity according to us, that is to say, the dogma of human fraternity, of unity in God, must be shown in Egypt under the guise of castes. Will we then still find *common meals* in Egypt? More than that, we find there, as a fundamental fact of its legislation, communal life. Egypt was truly constituted on a large scale on the principle of *community within caste*. All the testimonies of antiquity attest to us that the two upper castes of Egypt, the priests and the warriors, lived in community. It is known that all the inhabitants of Egypt were divided into three classes, the priests, the warriors, and the laborers and artisans.²⁰ Strabo tells us (book XVII) that as a consequence of this division, the lands in each nome were divided into three equal parts assigned to these three castes.²¹ Living in common buildings, and subject to a graduated hierarchy, the priests of Egypt had no real individual property; they had, like the Christian priests in relation to the goods of the Church, and like the monks in the different religious orders which covered Europe, only the use of a common property. The same was true, up to a certain point, of the military caste. It is true that a certain property was devolved individually to each member of this caste on the common fund of the goods of this caste; but this was only a delegation attached to the function. Twelve acres of land were the legal property attached to the function of warrior. But this property, to be thus determined, was not for that reason individual. There is, on this point, a remarkable passage from Herodotus. After having said that the military caste, which according to him amounted to more than four hundred thousand men,

bore in certain provinces the name of *Calasires*, and in others that of *Hermotybias*, Herodotus adds: "They alone, after the priests (πάρεξ τῶν ἱερέων), enjoyed in Egypt the signal privilege that was assigned to them by right twelve arpents of land exempt from all kinds of charges or dues. The arpent is one hundred Egyptian cubits, and the court of Egypt is similar to that of Samos. These twelve arpents were assigned and distributed to all; but they only enjoyed them by succeeding one another in turn, and *never the same ones had the enjoyment of the same lands*: Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τοῖσι ἅπασιν ἦν ἐξαραιρημένα " τάδε καὶ ἐν περιτροπῇ ἔκαρποῦντο, καὶ οὐδαμῶς οὐτοί. Every year a thousand Calasires and as many Hermotybiae came to serve as guard for the king; and then, besides the twelve acres, they were given to each one a day five pounds of bread, two pounds of meat, and the value of two or three pints of wine." (Book II.) I do not know whether we should conclude from this passage that each priest also had the right, by reason of his title, to twelve acres of land. It seems to me that Herodotus only mentions the priests in connection with these privileges of the men of war, to clearly mark the distinction which existed between these two superior castes, provided with territorial property exempt from all tribute, and the inferior castes, who lived under the regime of individual property, and who were subject to taxes. As for the priests, I repeat, everything shows us that they lived in a complete community. To be convinced of this, it would be enough to read what Porphyry reports about the *prophets*, based on a writing by Chaeremon, a Stoic philosopher who had traveled in Egypt, and who was considered a very profound and very truthful observer. These prophets had to begin by renouncing all care for practical life: "In Egypt," says Porphyry, "the common law of the priests is this (Κοινὸς τῶν κατ' Αἴγνπτον ἱερέων θεσμός ἐστιν), that those who wish to devote themselves to the study and interpretation of divine things must first abandon all material care, and absolutely renounce what occupies other men, in order to consecrate their entire life to the Divinity." He then shows us these prophets enclosed in the sanctuary, protected from the sight of the profane by the troop of inferior priests, who serve them, so to speak, as guards; avoiding the common people on every occasion, and even other priests when it came to their studies, their purifications and their particular rites; but spending the rest of the time with their colleagues in complete simplicity and in complete poverty, that is to say in a complete abandonment of all individual wealth: Τὸν δὲ ἄλλον χρόνον ἀπλούτερον μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐπεμίνυντο. Then, speaking of the hours of the night when they devoted themselves to the observation of the stars and to prayer, he said that they intermingled these occupations with conversations between || re them to ward off sleep. It is true that this regime of life so full of abstinence was practiced to this extent only by the *prophets*, the *hierostolists* (whose clothing and person were significant of sacred things), and the *hierogrammatists* (whose function was to write history and transmit religious doctrine); but he adds that, as for the other priests, and as for the troop of *pastophores* (porters), of the *neocores* (decorators),

and of the other servants of the gods, they were also required to practice the same regime of life and to purify themselves in the same manner: Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ πατοφόρων καὶ νεωκόρων πλῆθος, καὶ ὑποπουργῶν τοῖς θεοῖς, καθαρεύει μὲν ὁμοίως. It is in vain that one would want to restrict this community of priests to those who composed the colleges of the three metropolises, Memphis, Thebes, and Heliopolis. The entire caste, directly belonging to these three great choniatims or colleges, was spread in truth throughout all of Egypt; but the number of temples and other religious buildings was immense,²² which clearly shows that they were dedicated to communal life. Moreover, when we see the Egyptians pushing their scruples to the point that, according to Herodotus, the same warriors never had the enjoyment of the same lands, but that they succeeded one another in the exploitation of these common lands, so that the principle of the community was not violated, how can we believe that the priestly caste did not, all the more so, profess this community and an absolute renunciation of individual property? I will add that we could conclude this solely from the doctrines that the Greek philosophers borrowed from Egypt. Do not the ancients tell us that it was from Egypt, and from the choniatim of Thebes, that Pythagoras received his doctrines and took the idea of his institute? Does not Plato, in his *Republic*, seem to have his eyes turned both towards the Cretan or Spartan community and towards Egypt? It is also noteworthy that among the various functions of the priestly caste, whose names have been translated for us by the Greeks, we find in the first rank the *comastes* (κωμάσαι in Synesius, *De Provid.*), who presided over the feasts in the temples, a function analogous to that of the Roman *epulones*. Finally, it is likely that Moses modeled himself on the priestly principle of the Egyptians in his institution of priests among the Jews; and we know that Moses did not want the priests or the Levites to be included in the division of land, so that they would not individually have any landed property. Everything therefore proves that not only did the priests of Egypt have a common property, which is an incontestable fact, but that even this common fund of the priestly order remained undivided, even in use, between all its members, and that only the fruits were distributed hierarchically between them.

CHAPTER XI.

Demonstration of the same truth by the legislation of Moses. Passover has the same meaning in the law of Moses as Phiditia has in the laws of Minos and Lycurgus.

I now turn to the Jewish *Passover*, and I say that this institution has the same meaning in the law of Moses as the common meal or Phiditia has in the laws of Minos and Lycurgus. By this, I mean, first of all, that just as Phiditia was the sign of the institution of the Equals in the law of Minos and Lycurgus, so Passover was, in the law of Moses, the sign of the institution of the Jews. Certainly, circumcision was not the sign of the institution of the Jewish nation; for it is probable that the Jews adopted this custom from the Egyptians. We know, in fact, that all Egyptians were circumcised (Herodotus, Book II; Strabo, St. Jerome, St. Ambrose), and that the Ethiopians and Phoenicians were also circumcised.²³ What, then, was the true sign of the Jews' institution? It was the Passover, that is, a solemn meal, but one entirely peculiar to the Jews in the circumstances attached to it and the ceremonies associated with it. Here is how the Hebrews were ordered to celebrate it in Egypt for the first time:

"And the Eternel spoke to Moses and Aaron in the land of Egypt, saying:

"This month²⁴ shall be the beginning of months for you; it shall be the first of the months of the year for you.

"Speak to all the assembly of Israel, saying: On the tenth day of this month, each one shall take a lamb or a kid, according to the families of the fathers; a lamb or a kid for each one's family.

"But if the family is less than enough to afford a lamb or a kid, let him take his neighbor who is near his house, according to the number of persons. You shall count how many are needed to eat a lamb or a kid, according to what each of you is able to eat.

"Now the lamb and the kid shall be without blemish, male, of the same year; You shall take it from the sheep or from the goats;

"And you shall keep it until the fourteenth day of this month; and the whole congregation of the assembly of Israel shall slaughter it between the two evening meals.

"And they shall take some of its blood and put it on the two doorposts and on the lintel of the houses where they eat it.

"And they shall eat its flesh roasted in the fire that night; they shall eat it with unleavened bread and with bitter herbs.

"Do not eat anything half-cooked or boiled in water; but let it be roasted in the fire, its head, its legs, and its entrails. "And leave nothing

left until morning; but if anything remains in the morning, you shall burn it with fire.

"And you shall eat it with your loins girded, your shoes on your feet, and your staff in your hand; and you shall eat it in haste: it is the Passover of the Eternal.

"For I will pass through the land of Egypt that night, and I will strike down every firstborn in the land of Egypt, both man and beast, and I will execute judgments against all the gods of Egypt. I am the Eternal.

"And the blood shall be for a sign on the houses where you are kept; for when I see the blood, I will pass over you; and there shall no plague be among you to destroy, when I strike the land of Egypt.

"And this day shall be for a memorial to you, and you shall celebrate it as a solemn feast to the Lord throughout your generations; you shall celebrate it as a solemn feast by a perpetual ordinance." (*Exodus*, ch. xii.)

I leave aside the supposed miracle of the exterminating angel who killed all the firstborn of the Egyptians in one night, and spared those of the Hebrews. Does the Bible's account in this place half-hide, as has already been pointed out, a secret conspiracy of the Jews to regain their freedom and a kind of *Sicilian Vespers* attempted by them against the Egyptians? This is clearly indicated by this chapter of *Exodus*, as well as by other circumstances of the exodus from Egypt. But, whatever the case, it is evident from this very story that the Passover's purpose, in its first institution, was to separate the Jews from the Egyptians and make them a separate people; and this was also subsequently the purpose of its perpetual celebration. Founded in commemoration of a historical event entirely peculiar to one race, the Passover had nothing in appearance similar to the religious ceremonies of other nations.²⁵ But at the same time, founded to unite the Jews into a nation and to establish sociability among them, it had the character of any corresponding institution in other legislations.

The Jewish people therefore seem to me, above all, to be characterized by their Passover. The Jews, as we know, had three great festivals, and the first and most solemn was Passover. The obligation for every Jew to celebrate it was so severe that anyone who neglected to do so was to be condemned to death: "The Eternal spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: If any man of you or of your descendants shall be defiled by reason of a dead body, or shall be in a journey far from your land, he shall not fail to celebrate the Passover to the Eternal... But if anyone forbears to keep the Passover, he shall be cut off from among his people, and he shall bear his sin, because he did not offer the offering to the Lord in its season (*Num.*, c. ix, v. 10-13.) "It was on the three solemn feasts, and in particular on the Passover, that the unity of the nation was founded: "You may not sacrifice the Passover in all the places of your dwelling, which the Lord your God gives you; but only in the place which the Lord your God will choose to cause his name to dwell there; there you will

sacrifice the Passover at even, as soon as the sun sets, at the same time that you came out of Egypt... Three times in the year every male among you shall appear before the Lord your God in the place which he will choose, namely, at the Feast of Unleavened Bread (the Passover), and at the Feast of Weeks, and at the Feast of Tabernacles; and no one shall appear before the Lord empty-handed. But each one shall give according to what he has, according to the blessing which the Lord your God has given you." (*Deuteronomy 17:17*)

Passover, like all the legislation of Moses, of which it was the symbol, had two characteristics: on the one hand, it distinguished the Jews from all other nations, and on the other hand, it united the Jews among themselves and made them brothers. On the one hand, it was the feast of emancipation, of the escape from slavery; it was the sign of separation from other peoples, the particular sign of the Jew; it was the sign of insurrection against all dominators, whoever they might be: Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, or Romans. But, on the other hand, it was also the sign of the fraternity of the Jews among themselves, the sign of their union; it was for them (what Christianity has developed) a true *communion*. We must not forget that the Jews were the nation that was able to simultaneously issue this great precept of sociability: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself," and hold all other peoples in abomination. The fraternity of the Jews among themselves and their profound distinction from other peoples — these are the two characteristics of the legislation of Moses, and they are everywhere imprinted in the Bible. Passover united them both in an inseparable way, both the first time it was celebrated and subsequently; in Egypt, when it was a question of shaking off the yoke of slavery, as in the Promised Land, when it was a question of living as a nation; as in the lands of exile and on distant journeys, when the Jew turned his gaze toward the Temple and attached himself in heart to his nation, to the nation chosen by the Eternal.

But what is a nation? A nation can be constituted on the plane of equality or on the plane of inequality. We have seen that the Greek *Phiditia* of Minos and Lycurgus also aimed to resolve this second problem, that is, not only to constitute a nation (the caste), but to constitute it on the plane of equality. Did the Jewish Passover have the same character? Certainly not, at first glance, and if we consider it alone and in itself; but certainly yes, if we compare it with another institution of Moses, the Sabbath, the Sabbatical Year, and the Jubilee.

We must not and cannot separate Passover from the Sabbath, the Sabbatical Year, and the Jubilee. For reasons I will explain, Moses could not put the entire spirit of his legislation into Passover; But what he could not incorporate into this institution, he spread into another institution with three parts, the Sabbath, the Sabbatical Year, and the Jubilee, which complement each other and complete the Passover.

So if someone objects to me: "The Spartans and the Cretans ate together every day, while the Jews, on the other hand, only ate one meal together each year, or rather by family; some thus *communed* daily, others were without

communion all year round, except for one day when they gathered religiously and solemnly in memory of a past event — what connection can there be between these two practices?" If, I say, this objection is raised, the answer seems easy to me. Do not, I will say, separate Passover from Jubilee. Passover is the sign of the institution of a people who found Equality after their work on the Sabbath, the Sabbatical Year, and the Jubilee Year, and who thereby constantly maintained within themselves the spirit of sociability and fraternity, as much as the organization of their work allowed. I will explain my idea.

A pastoral and agricultural people, the Jews were dispersed in a fairly fertile country,²⁶ but dotted with lakes, hills, deserts, and arid lands, which isolated them from each other as in a kind of oases. They thus continued, although settled in a stable manner, the nomadic life of the patriarchs. I mean that they lived in a sort of semi-society, scattered as they were because of the cultivation of the land and the care of the herds, directing their children, their servants, and their slaves themselves. It must not be forgotten that they came from the lowest caste of the ancient world, and that they would have been incapable of governing themselves as the upper castes did, and of governing a people they had conquered. Their character and their destiny are well depicted in this extermination that they carried out of the peoples of Palestine. Men from the upper castes of the ancient world would not have exterminated the vanquished, but would have enslaved them, would have made Helots or Perioecians of them, as in Crete and Sparta. They knew only how to exterminate the inhabitants and take the country. They therefore remained workers in this country which they had usurped, and scattered in the villages and in the fields, like the Laconians, subjects of the Spartans, and the Perioecians, subjects of the Cretans. It was therefore impossible to bring them together at common tables and make them live in common. Moses, imbued with the ideas of Egypt, where, as we have seen, legislation was based on the community, could not therefore establish it among his people, nor his successors after him. It appears, from the Bible, that Moses had first had the idea of taking all the firstborn of the families and making them a higher caste, a caste of priests; but he encountered such obstacles in the nature of this people that he renounced his project, and chose for the care of sacred things the family of Aaron and the tribe of Levi. The rest of the people were therefore left to the same kind of life that reigned in Egypt in the lowest caste, life in non-community. But the individual and the family being thus abandoned to themselves without social intervention, the result was necessarily inequality and all the evils that accompany it. Moses understood this. Passover, the only *communion* that it was possible to establish between these men thus separated, in no way remedied these evils. It was a sign of general unity and nationality, that was all. Moses sought in another institution a remedy for individualism and the inequality that was to emerge from it. This other institution is the Jubilee in its three forms of Sabbath, Sabbatical Year, and Jubilee properly speaking. Passover therefore takes on a new meaning from the

Jubilee. Passover and the Jubilee in these three aspects, this is the summary of the Mosaic legislation. Now add to Passover the Jubilee thus complete, unite, as you have the right, these two institutions of Moses; and you come very close, as regards the spirit of the legislation, to the Cretan and Spartan community. I mean that these two institutions united and serving as a complement to each other present absolutely the same spirit, indicate the same goal, produce, to a certain point, the same effect, as the Spartan or Cretan community. Moses seems to have said to his people: "You are equal, you will all celebrate the Passover together. This is the sign of your fraternity, your equality, your unity. But I know that your works require that each of you be left to himself; you are a people of shepherds and farmers. The Egyptians despised you as such. Show them that you can be a people as moral as they are. They live together in cities, classified as priests and warriors. Among them, you were of the lowest caste, which lives individually, and even you were at the bottom of this last caste. Be a people. The Eternal has chosen you. Now, you will only be a people if you practice the sociability that makes the upper castes of Egypt a people. Workers, and not warriors or priests, live then as the lowest caste lives, in non-community, in individualism, in selfishness, in inequality: but every seven days, every seven years, and every seven times seven years, become equal again. Remember that you were Slaves, that you are of the lower caste. You are forced to still live the life of this caste; but ennoble this life by respecting among you those who will be most condemned to work. The Lord gives you six portions of time for inequality; the seventh is his, he dedicates it to Equality. You will be unequal six days of the week; but every seven days you will become equal again; for among you the servant will not work more than the master on this seventh day. There will be among you rich and poor; and the rich will tend by avarice to invade everything. But all the || In seven years you will become equal again; for in the seventh year, both the poor and the rich will freely enjoy the blessings of God. Inequality will be carried among you to such a point that there will be men without property, Hebrews who will sell themselves to their brothers; and you, who were Slaves in Egypt, you will have Slaves. But every seven times seven years you will become equal again, and this time Equality will be more marked; for this time property will return to its former masters, inheritances will be remade on the basis of equality, and the Hebrew who has sold himself will become free. This time Passover will not be an empty name; it will truly be the Passover of equals, the egalitarian meal." This is this admirable legislation (admirable for antiquity) that those who understood it have rightly called *the agrarian law of the Jews*.

One need only read the Bible to find there expressly and in their own words the sentiments we have just attributed to Moses, and to perceive in the Passover and the Sabbath combined the plan of a legislation directed towards Equality. But since Passover could not have been anything other than a general sign of nationality and fraternity, the Sabbath, which remedies its inadequacy,

becomes a sacred and first-rate law. Since individual work is inevitably necessary, Moses remedies the disadvantages of this individual work by the obligatory cessation of this work, which he calls Sabbath (cessation, rest). All the festivals and Passover itself thus become Sabbaths. This cessation of work, this rest, with the aim of reestablishing equality as much as possible in the midst of a society given over to individualism, is so much the basis and essence of Moses' legislation that the precept of Sabbath daycares recurs constantly, as if it were the entire law:

"You shall keep my *Sabbaths*, and you shall reverence my sanctuary: I am the Eternal." (Levit., ch. xxvi, v. 2; ch. xx, v. 30, et passim.)

But how could one impose on these selfish workers, necessarily bent on the oppression of their fellow men through their greed? How, I say, could one impose on them this cessation of work, this restorative rest from inequality? It was necessary to give a reason for this rest. Moses did so. It is the creation of the world in six days, and God's rest on the seventh. We do not know if, in the ancient science with which Moses was nourished, there was any basis for this belief in the divine work completed in six days. Tacitus, who, amidst the strange errors he uttered about the Jews, said a few profound words about them, may well have indicated the origin of this idea by relating it to astronomical phenomena and to ancient and obscure connections between the Jews and the ancient religion of Saturn, to whom the seventh day was also consecrated.²⁷ However this may be, one thing is certain: if the creation of the world in six days is so clearly marked in Genesis, it is because the legislator, who wanted to institute the Sabbath, knew well the use he intended to make of it. Thus the creation of the world or its government comes to the aid of legislation, and legislation seems to be nothing other than an imitation and a copy of the divine work:

"And God had finished on the seventh day the work which he had done; and he rested on the seventh day from all the work that he had done:

"God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it, because on that day he had rested from all the work which he had created by acting." (*Genesis*, ch. h, v. 2-3.)

Once this foundation is laid, the commandments follow. First, the Decalogue, where, alongside the most august commandments of social law, the seventh-day rest takes its place, as just as sacred as the prohibition against murder or the precept to honor one's father:

"Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy;

"Six days you shall labor and do all your work;

"But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Eternal your God;" you shall not do any work in it, you, nor your son, nor your daughter, your male servant, nor your female servant, nor your livestock, nor your stranger who is within your gates;

"For in six days the Eternal made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day. Therefore the Eternal blessed the Sabbath day and sanctified it. (*Exodus*, ch. 20, v. 8-11.)

One of the Israelites, while they were still in the desert, was wronged for not strictly obeying this precept of the Decalogue: he was condemned to death and stoned by the people. (*Num.*, ch. xv.)

Then, in the detailed book of laws and precepts, *Leviticus*, in the chapter on feasts, the weekday Sabbath is again presented as the first of the feasts:

"The Eternal also spoke to Moses, saying:

"Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: These are the solemn feasts of the Lord, which you shall proclaim, and the holy convocations; these are my solemn feasts.

"Six days shall work be done; but on the seventh day, which is the Sabbath of rest, there shall be a holy convocation; You shall do no work, for it is the Sabbath of the Eternal in all your dwellings. (*Leviticus* 23:1-3)

Until this point, in the Bible, a mysterious veil conceals the meaning of this very formal commandment of rest. But finally, the profound meaning of this institution is revealed in the establishment of the week of years, or the Sabbatical Year, and the square of this week of years leading to the Jubilee; for once, it is impossible not to clearly see the purpose of the Mosaic legislation:

"The Eternal also spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai, saying:

"Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: When you come into the land which I give you, the land shall rest; it shall be a Sabbath to the Lord.

"For six years you shall sow your field, and for six years you shall prune your vineyard, and gather in its yield.

"But in the seventh year there shall be a Sabbath of rest for the land; it shall be a Sabbath to the Lord; you shall not sow your field, nor prune your vineyard.

"You shall not reap the fruit that grows naturally from that which falls in the harvest, nor gather the grapes of your vineyard that is not pruned; it shall be a year of rest for the land.

"But whatever grows from the land in the Sabbath year shall be food for you, for your male servant, for your female servant, for your hired servant, and for the stranger who lives with you,

"And for your livestock, and for the animals that are in your land; all its yield shall be for food.

"You shall also count seven weeks of years, seven times seven years, and the days of these seven weeks of years shall amount to forty-nine years.

"And you shall sound the trumpet with a loud blast on the tenth day of the seventh month; on the day of atonement you shall blow the trumpet throughout all your land.

"And you shall sanctify the fiftieth year and proclaim liberty throughout the land to all its inhabitants. It shall be a year of jubilee for you; and you shall return each to his possession, and each to his family.

"This fiftieth year shall be a year of jubilee for you; you shall not sow or reap the yield of the ground, nor gather the fruit of the unpruned vineyard.

"For it is the year of jubilee; it shall be sacred to you. You shall eat whatever the fields yield in that year.

"In the year of Jubilee, you shall return each to his possession.

"Now if you sell anything to your neighbor, or buy anything from your neighbor, let none of you trample on his brother.

"But according to the years that have passed since the Jubilee, you shall buy from your neighbor; according to the number of years of the yield, they shall sell to you.

"According to the number of years, you shall increase the price of what you buy, and according to the number of years, you shall decrease it; for they sell to you according to the number of crops.

"Therefore let none of you trample on his neighbor, but fear your God, for I am the Lord your God...

"The land shall not be sold at will; for the land is Mine, and you are strangers and residents with Me.

"You shall also allow the right of redemption for the land in all the land of your possession.

"If your brother becomes poor and sells anything he has, the one who has the right of redemption, that is, the one who is near in blood, shall come and redeem what his brother has sold.

"But if the man has no one who has the right of redemption, but he has been able to find enough for the redemption of what he has sold,

"He shall count the years since the sale was made, and restore the surplus to the man to whom it was made, and so he shall regain his possession. "But if he does not find enough to repay him, the thing he sold will remain with the one who bought it until the year of Jubilee. Then the buyer will go out in the Jubilee, and the seller will return to his possession...

"And if your brother becomes poor with you and sells himself to you, you shall not use him as slaves; "But as a hired servant and a foreigner, he will be with you, and he will serve you until the year of Jubilee.

"Then he will go out from you, he and his children, and will return to his family, and he will return to the possession of his fathers;

"For they are my servants, because I brought them out of the land of Egypt; therefore they will not be sold as slaves are sold. "You shall not be a harsh master to him; but you shall fear your God.

"And as for your male and female slaves who are yours, buy them from the nations around you; you shall buy from them the male and female slave.

"You may also buy them from the children of the foreigners who live with you, even from their families born and raised in your land; and you shall possess them;

"And you shall leave them as an inheritance to your children after you, that they may inherit them as possession, and you shall use them forever. But as for your brothers the children of Israel, no one shall rule harshly over his brother." (Leviticus 25:25)

Do I need to add anything to the clear, manifest meaning of these words? Is there anything more evident, I ask, than the spirit of such legislation? Is not the idea of equality imprinted in these pages of the Bible in characters as majestic as they are indelible? And when we see the profound meaning of the Jewish Sabbath thus revealed, would we not be tempted, I repeat, to believe that the divine Sabbath, after the six days of creation, is merely a clever preparation for the human Sabbath intended to provide men with the greatest possible equality?

Once again, I reject this idea; I certainly do not believe that the creation of the world in six days and the rest on the seventh was a fraud employed by Moses to support his legislation. It would be enough, as I have already noted, to find elsewhere this seventh day dedicated to Saturn, the king of the golden age, and the patron of the Saturnalia, that is to say also of a sort of Jubilee where the Slave became free again, to feel that Moses was led to his genesis of the seven days, as well as to his sabbatical legislation, by an ancient doctrine at once physical and moral, cosmogonic and legislative, which was not particular to him, but which was widespread throughout the ancient world.

Mundum regunt numeri, this is the motto of the ancient scholars; this is the axiom that the Indians, the Chaldeans, the priests of Egypt, transmitted, with a science of numbers today very mysterious, to Pythagoras, from where some reflections came to Plato. It is obvious that the creation in seven days and the Sabbath are due to this doctrine which attributed to the number seven a marvelous power. Every Chaldean astrologer, according to the testimony of the ancients, recounted a multitude of things on the miraculous virtue of the number seven; and in the festivals of Egypt the emblematic cow made seven times the circuit of the temple. The Egyptian priests, according to Porphyry (*De Abstin.*, lib. iv), never let seven days pass without purifying themselves by fasting and abstinence. Let us not forget that Abraham, the primitive stock of the Jews, came from Chaldea;²⁸ and that Moses, according to Scripture itself, "had been instructed in all the knowledge of the Egyptians, and had thereby become powerful in words and deeds." (*Acts*, c. vi, v. 22.)

Obviously, first of all, the genesis of Moses, this genesis in seven days, or in seven times, is linked to the calendar, to the seven-day week. Moses himself established this relationship and puts us on the right track when he established the week in the image of creation. Now, this calendar dates back well before Moses. This seven-day period was in use among almost all peoples, with a perfectly uniform distribution of days corresponding to the seven planets. The Indians, the Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Arabs, as well as the Hebrews — in short, all the nations of the Orient — have always used weeks composed of seven

days. This week is also found among the Romans, as well as among the ancient inhabitants of Gaul, the British Isles, Germany, northern Europe, and even America. Therefore, the cosmogony of Moses is not unique to him; nor was it created expressly for his legislation.

Then, secondly, this virtue of the number seven did not apply only to astronomical phenomena. Astrology as a whole, that is, a kind of universal science, employed this number in its explanations. The growth and decay of living bodies were considered to be subject to it. The medical doctrine of climacteric years and crises in illnesses — this doctrine of Hippocrates, Pythagoras, Galen, all Greek and Roman physicians, and a large number of modern ones — was based on this number. Now, this doctrine had its source in the most ancient beliefs of the Orient. Finally, unless we believe, as some scholars have, that all the ancient traditions of all peoples come from the Jews, we must still recognize that the idea of governing man, society, and the *microcosm*, as the universe, God's world, and the *macrocosm* were believed to be governed, is not entirely unique to Moses. For here returns that curious parallel between the legislation of Moses, which consecrates the seventh day to God, and through him to Liberty and Equality, and the traces that remain of the ancient legislation that consecrated the number seven to Saturn and to Liberty and Equality.

So, ultimately, we are led in any case to this conclusion: that Moses' cosmogony was not created expressly for his legislation, but that, on the contrary, it was from a certain theory about how the world was created or was maintained by a continual creation that this legislator transferred the number seven into his legislation.

But because Moses applies this cosmogonic and universal doctrine to his legislation, is the underlying idea of his legislation any less perceptible and less clear? When one has read the passages I have just cited, and so many others from the Bible that agree with them, it is impossible not to recognize that the Sabbath number is only the instrument used by Moses, but that the underlying idea of his legislation is to establish the greatest possible equality among the Jews.

And this is precisely what made the number seven so sacred among the Hebrews. On the one hand, ancient science had consecrated it, and it seemed to govern the world: *Mundum regunt numeri*. On the other hand, the entire legislation reproduced it and seemed to be governed by it. The people, the vulgar, therefore, do not have such a false idea of the Jew when they summarize Judaism by the Sabbath. Such, in fact, is in its depth this legislation so simple in form, so grand, so majestic, but so linked, so followed, so complicated by the return of one and the same idea. God is the master of the seventh day, because he created the world in six days, and rested on the seventh: this is the basis of the whole edifice. But, being thus the master of the days, and having reserved the seventh for himself, he reserved it to establish among men the greatest

possible equality and fraternity: this is how he wishes to continue his creation in Humanity; this is how he intends the human world to be governed. And hence all worship; hence the Sabbaths of God, that is to say, the egalitarian festivals. All of Moses' legislation thus seems to be concentrated in the observance of the Sabbath.²⁹ But, on the other hand, the sign of the institution of the Jewish people was the Passover; it is impossible, I repeat, to separate the worship of the Sabbath from that of the Passover; so that everything comes back to the idea I have set out, that Moses, having been able to institute only an annual Passover, supplemented it with the Sabbath.

So, in the final analysis, as I have argued, the Jewish Passover, although it was celebrated only once a year, is found to have the same tendency as the Lacedaemonian Phiditia, and in general as the communal meals of ancient Cretan legislation. The idea that identifies these two institutions seems to me as solid as it is obvious; it is this: For a people to be a people, there must exist among its citizens a certain community, a certain equality, a certain fraternity; they must regard each other as equals, as brothers, as forming together one family; and the sign of this fraternity is the communal meal. This is the identical germ of sociability in the legislation of Moses and in that of Minois and Lycurgus. I am not saying, of course, that sociability was constructed on the same level in Jewish legislation and in Greek legislation; far from it: here the castes, there a single nation, a single caste, so to speak. But I am saying that sociability was manifested in both legislations by an analogous sign and symbol. I believe I have sufficiently demonstrated this.

CHAPTER XII.

Demonstration of the Same Truth by the Essene Passover-Eucharist.

From the Jewish Passover, understood as we have just explained it, there is not far to go to arrive at the Eucharist of Jesus. The legislation of Moses in fact leads to the sect of the Essenes; in other words, according to us, developed Mosaism becomes Esseneism, and Esseneism is immediately contiguous with Christianity. But this transition from the legislation of Moses to that of Jesus through the Essene sect, or, in other words and to use signs and symbols, this passage from Passover to the Eucharist through what I would willingly call the Essene Passover-Eucharist, is of the utmost importance and deserves our attention. Without this transition, in fact, it is difficult to understand the transformation that Jesus brought about in Mosaicism; and without it, too, the intimate link that unites the Christian Eucharist to the Passover and the Jewish Sabbath would escape us.

We do not have the idea of the historical importance of the Essenes that we should have. We are vaguely content to know that there was among the Jews a sect very close to Christianity. We regard the Essenes as a variety of Jewish monks; and just as we attach only secondary value to Christian monasticism, relative to the essence of Christianity, we also grant these monks of Judaism only a very mediocre influence on the general development of Humanity. They did not, it is true, produce great events; they waged neither wars nor conquests, like the Greeks or the Romans. Their books are now completely lost and they left no monuments of art. But are they, I ask, any less important for that? They made the transition between Mosaism and Christianity; they directly produced Jesus Christ: this is a reason, no doubt, which should make us consider them in history with more attention and curiosity than we do.

I have always wondered why the adversaries of Christianity did not make greater use of the reliable documents we possess on the Essene sect. It must be that their supreme contempt for the doctrine and institution of Jesus, which they did not understand, blinded them to the point that, finding a weapon they could use usefully, they rejected it, because this weapon was borrowed from Mosaism, which they despised just as much as Christianity itself. But how did the Jewish Rabbis, and the apparently impartial writers whose only task is to explain the phenomena of history, fail to see the brilliant light that results from the existence of the dogmas and practices of Christianity within Judaism itself, prior to Jesus? How, for example, does the author of a recently published Life of Jesus, Mr. Salvador, devote barely a few pages, without truth or precision, to the sect of the Essenes? How did this writer, whose aim is to subordinate Christianity to Mosaism, understand nothing of the intimate relations of Jesus with this Jewish sect? This can still be explained to me in the same way. For if

Jewish or adjacent writers understood the light that results from the Essene sect to interpret Jesus Christ and his work, they would thereby understand that Mosaism could not stop and stand still, that Sadduceeism was an impotent error, that Phariseeism on the contrary and Essenianism were the natural and necessary development of the Mosaic Revelation, and that Jesus was the greatest and the last, so to speak, of the Essenes, just as St. Paul, his second, was the greatest and the last, so to speak, of the Pharisees. They would thus understand that the work of Moses, transformed by Phariseeism and Essenianism, legitimately resulted in Jesus and St. Paul; and consequently they would renounce their false opinion on the absolute perfection of Mosaism. As for the indifferent and purely explanatory writers, having no doctrine in their hearts and minds, it is not surprising that they see nothing of the value of Essenianism, and that having reduced all understanding of history to a dead and faithless intelligence, they do not grasp the light even where it shines most. Be that as it may, it is certain that until now, in the philosophy of history, misunderstood Essenianism has only a purely anecdotal scope. We see, I repeat, in the Essenes only monks, in the Essenes Therapeutae only madmen; we do not want to see there a social idea, an idea at once religious and political, divine and human; we see exalted and superstitious people, and, after having thought or said that Jesus could well have been of this sect, to have lived in this sect, we stop, and we believe that we have said everything. But if Jesus was a legislator for the human race, if he was not simply a superstitious devotee, and if we grant that he was imbued with the Essene doctrine, this Essene doctrine was therefore itself a legislation; the Essenes were therefore not only superstitious devotees, exalted, fanatical monks. In this case, what was their legislation? what was the axiom of this legislation? and what providential work did they accomplish in the development of Humanity? We see that the question returns in its entirety, and that there is no more way of bringing Jesus closer to the Essenes in a purely religious respect while separating him from them as a legislator, than there is a way of isolating the religious devotion of the Essenes from their social dogma.

The truth I am seeking to establish at this moment, namely that all legislation prior to Christianity spiritually and materially contained the germ of the dogma that Jesus brought out of the swaddle of castes, that is to say, the dogma of the unity of the human race in God, this truth, I say, will, I believe, cast a whole new light on Essenianism.

It is known that in the eighteenth century a controversy arose among scholars, not about the Essenes in general, but about the Therapeutae. The most learned of the Benedictines, the illustrious Bernard of Montfaucon, struck by the almost complete identity of the religion of the Therapeutae and that of the first Christians, made every effort to demonstrate that this portion of the Essenes were true Christians. Montfaucon's arguments were weak, no doubt, or rather false and absurd, as to the historical point: an obvious mistake by

Eusebius, a gratuitous hypothesis by which one succeeded in reducing by a few years the period of Philo's testimony, that is almost all that Montfaucon alleged, in this respect, in favor of his opinion, against which all scholars were unanimous. But his invincible argument was the resemblance of beliefs, morality, and practices, among the Therapeutae and among the Christians: "I will never be persuaded," he said (*Réponse au président Bouhier*), "that the Therapeutae of whom Philo speaks in his book on the Contemplative Life were not Christians. The characteristics of Christianity are so palpable there, that I do not understand how one can even think of attributing them to others. A sect spread throughout the universe, both among the Greeks and among the Barbarians, which one entered by renouncing one's father, mother, brothers, sisters, relatives, goods and possessions; where there were several works composed by the ancients and leaders of this profession, to serve as laws and precepts for all others; where one found priests, deacons, virgins, monasteries, a sacred table to celebrate with bread the holiest of all the mysteries; where one prayed to God towards the rising sun; all this, I say, fixes me invariably in the party that I have taken. I see there only Christianity." The controversy to which this opinion gave rise remained without result, because it had two apparently contradictory results. On the one hand, it was amply demonstrated, against the opinion of Montfaucon, that the Therapeutae were prior to Jesus Christ, and that they were indeed Jews; but, on the other hand, their intimate relationship with Christianity remained no less incomprehensible. We shall see if, in these relationships that so embarrassed the scholars of the last century, everything, down to this sacred table on which the holiest of all mysteries was celebrated with bread, is not easily explained to us.

I will do on this subject what I have done so far for the legislations I have had to discuss; I will cite texts, and the reader will draw his own conclusions. Three excellent authors of antiquity, Josephus, Philo and Pliny, have left us notions about the Essenes that are perfectly in agreement with each other and very detailed. Thanks to their testimonies, there is no point in history more certain, more indubitable. I will add that, when one has understood the essence of this sect of Mosaism, everything in their accounts becomes so clear that one can say that the most well-known philosophical sects of Greece are no better. Nothing absolutely important is missing from the picture that these three authors have given us. However, there is still some advantage to be taken from later writers. It is true that neither Eusebius nor Porphyry, who partly repeated their accounts, one in his *Evangelical Preparation*, the other in his *Treatise on Abstinence*, add any new features. Dio Chrysostom, a contemporary of Pliny, had written on the Essenes: unfortunately, his book is lost; only a mention of them remains in a work by Synesius. But several Fathers of the Church also spoke of the Essenes and the Therapeutae, and they do not always limit themselves to repeating Josephus or Philo; they give us some new and valuable information: this will be

judged by what I will extract from St. Epiphanius. I will begin by quoting Josephus.

The testimony of Josephus is very impressive. Coming from the priestly race and the ancient Hasmonean kings, he held, as we know, the highest offices among the Jews. He was also attached to the sect of the Pharisees; his testimony is therefore very impartial. He himself tells us that he had studied the Essene sect before deciding on Phariseism: "At the age of thirteen," he says, "I wanted to learn the various opinions of the Pharisees, the Sadducees and the Essenes, which are three sects among us, so that, knowing them all, I could attach myself to the one that seemed to me the best. Thus I learned about them all, and tested them with much work and austerity... At nineteen, I began to engage in the exercises of civil life, and embraced the sect of the Pharisees, which approaches more than any other to that of the Stoics among the Greeks." (*Vie de Josèphe écrite par lui-même.*) Here then is the portrait that Josephus paints of the Essenes in the second book of his *Guerre des Juifs* (book II, ch. 8):³¹

"There are," he says, "among us three philosophical sects.³² The first is that of the Pharisees; the second that of the Sadducees, and the third that of the Essenes or Essenians,³³ which may be considered the most serious and the most remarkable of all.³⁴ The Essenes are Jews by birth, but united among themselves by a mutual love, much more closely than are other men.³⁵ They consider sensual pleasure as evil, and continence and victory over one's passions as virtue. There is among them a distance³⁶ from marriage. They take children from others, of an age tender enough to be formed by education, treat them as if they were their own, and inculcate in them their beliefs and their morals. It is not that they destroy marriage or the natural succession which results from it, but they are afraid of the weakness and intemperance of women.³⁷ What they are truly averse to is riches. A wonderful community³⁸ reigns among them, and it would be impossible to find one richer than another. For it is a law that all who enter the sect must give up their goods to it, so that in none of them may be seen either the humility that poverty gives, or the pride that riches give, but that the goods of each, gathered together like those of brothers, are the property of all. They consider it a stain to anoint their bodies and to perfume themselves; and if, in spite of themselves, they happen to be affected by this defilement, they go immediately to wash. This is because they consider it an honor to be little concerned about their adornment, provided that their clothes are always very white. They choose several among themselves who take care of the common goods, and who distribute indiscriminately among all the revenues, according to the needs of each. They do not have a particular city where they reside; but in each city they live several together; and when members of the sect arrive from some other place, they go and lodge with each other: and although they perhaps see each other for the first time, one would say old friends. So, never carrying anything with them, they travel without expense.³⁹ They only change their

clothes and shoes when their garments are torn by accident, or are worn out by use. They neither buy nor sell; but each one, providing what is in his power to the one who needs it, receives from him in exchange what is useful to himself; and even, without any exchange, each one is free to receive from whomever he pleases. As for what concerns the Divinity, their religion is very particular.⁴⁰ In the morning, before sunrise, they do not utter a word pertaining to the common cares of life, but address to him ancient prayers,⁴¹ as if they were begging him to appear and enlighten them. Then each one receives from the directors⁴² the signal to go and devote himself to work in the trade he knows or the occupation that is proper to him. After having worked with ardor until the fifth hour⁴³, they assemble again in one place; and, having girded themselves with linen veils,⁴⁴ they purify their bodies by bathing in cold waters. This purification completed, they go in a group to a particular room; the entrance to this room is forbidden to anyone who is not of their sect. They, purified as I have just said, they walk towards this place as towards a holy temple: it is the refectory.⁴⁵ They sit in silence: the baker puts loaves of bread before them, and the cook serves each a plate of the same food. The priest⁴⁶ then prays⁴⁷ over the food:⁴⁸ no one is allowed to taste it before this prayer. When they have finished eating, he prays again:⁴⁹ thus, at the beginning and at the end of their meal, they thank God and give him thanks.⁵⁰ Then, having taken off, as sacred, the garment with which they had covered themselves,⁵¹ they return again to their work until evening. They then return to supper with the same ceremonies; and if guests have arrived, these take their places with them at the banquet. Never is there any clamor or tumult heard in these houses; for each one speaks in turn, and they do not take one another's words. Their neighbors are therefore astonished by this inner silence, which seems to them a strange mystery. The cause, however, is very simple; it is their constant sobriety, and the care with which they measure their food and drink, so as never to exceed their true need. They conduct themselves in all things according to the advice of their leaders.⁵² Nevertheless, there are two points on which they remain entirely free to act as they please: when it is a question of giving help, or of alms. Each of them is free to help as he sees fit those who are worthy, and to provide food to those who need it. If it is question of relatives, that is another thing; they cannot dispose of anything in favor of their relatives without the authorization of superiors. Always calm and self-possessed, full of equity, of inviolable good faith, lovers of peace, a simple word from them is more sure than all the oaths of others. They even avoid oaths as the mark of perjury; for they consider as already convicted of lying the one who needs to call God to witness. They study with care the writings of the ancients,⁵³ seeking there especially remedies and aids for the soul and for the body. Also, they have discovered, for the cure of ailments,⁵⁴ many useful plants and marvelous properties of mineral substances. They do not receive immediately those who wish to enter their society. But first, for a year, whoever wishes to be admitted, while living far from them, shares their food; He is also

given a spade, the kind of apron⁵⁵ I have spoken of and a white garment. When he has shown constancy during all this time, he approaches more closely to their way of life, and participates in a holy way in the waters of purification.⁵⁶ However, he is not yet admitted to the common meals.⁵⁷ After the experience that has been made of his perseverance and courage, his morality and character must still be tested, which lasts two whole years. Only then is he received into the society, if he appears worthy. But before sitting at the common table,⁵⁸ he makes solemn vows,⁵⁹ engaging first to honor God and to serve him religiously; then to observe justice towards men, and to do no harm to anyone, either of his own accord or by any foreign impulse; always to hate the wicked and to side with the righteous; to keep inviolably the faith to all, and especially to the powers,⁶⁰ for all power comes from God;⁶¹ and if he himself comes to command others,⁶² not to be proud of his authority and not to distinguish himself from his inferiors either by the splendor of his clothing, or by luxury and pomp, but always to love the truth, and to despise and reject flattery and lies; to keep his hands pure from all theft, and his soul far from any personal advantage that would not be holy and legitimate; to have nothing hidden from his brothers, and to reveal nothing of them to other men, even when it would be life. They add also to these oaths that of transmitting the doctrine as they received it, without changing the dogmas; of stealing nothing, and of having in equal veneration both the books of the sect and the names of the announcers or evangelists by whom they were written.⁶³ Such are the oaths by which they strengthen those they admit into their society against their own weakness. They expel from it anyone who, on the report of credible witnesses, is convicted of having violated his promises; and all those who are thus condemned usually perish a miserable death. For, bound by their oaths and by their customs, they cannot find their subsistence among strangers, who reject them; they are therefore reduced to living on grass, and hunger soon consumes them. Also, they often have pity on them, when they see them near to expiring; they judge that they are sufficiently punished for their crimes, and give them relief. There is nothing comparable to their equity and the accuracy with which they bring their judgments. They are never less than a hundred when they judge; but what has been decided on by this number remains immutable. They have the greatest veneration, after God, for the name of the Lawgiver (Moses); and if anyone blasphemes him, he is punished with death. They make it their honor to obey the elders and the number.⁶⁴ Also when ten of them are gathered together, no one speaks unless the other nine refuse him. They avoid spitting before them or to the right, and doing any work whatsoever on the Sabbath day, more carefully than all the other Jews. Not only do they prepare their food the day before, so as not to light a fire on that day, but they would not dare to change the position of a utensil; they even abstain from satisfying the needs of nature. On other days (according to the law of Deuteronomy, ch. xxiii, v. 12-13), digging a hole in the ground, a foot deep, with this spade which I have said they give to their

neophytes,⁶⁵ and carefully covering themselves with their clothes, as if they feared to defile the light of God, they squat down, then pour into this pit the earth which they have taken from it; they always choose for this the most solitary places. Although this action is natural, they are accustomed to purify themselves afterwards, as they would do with a defilement. They are divided, according to the antiquity of their reception, into four different degrees; the last arrivals are regarded as so inferior to the preceding ones, that these must protect themselves from their contact and purify themselves from them as they would do with regard to foreigners. They live very long and often beyond the hundredth year, which obviously comes from their regimen of life so simple and so well regulated. Moreover, despising suffering, and capable of overcoming pain by their strength of soul, they prefer death to life, when death is glorious. The war against the Romans has clearly shown what they are in all trials. Neither by breaking their limbs, nor by burning them slowly, nor by any other kind of torture, could one bring a single one, either to utter a blasphemy against the Lawgiver (Moses), or to eat food that they reject; neither a prayer to their executioners, nor tears in the midst of tortures ever escaped them; but, smiling in the midst of tortures and mocking those who applied them, they have always been seen to give up their souls with joy, like people who knew that they would find them again. For it is a firm and decided opinion among them that bodies are corruptible, and that the matter that composes them changes and has nothing permanent, but that souls always subsist and are immortal; that, descending from the most subtle ether, they enclose themselves in our bodies as in a prison, attracted by a certain natural charm; but that, when they leave these bonds of the flesh, feeling themselves delivered from a long slavery, they rejoice and take flight.⁶⁶ To the souls of the good (and in this they agree with the Greeks) they assign a dwelling beyond the ocean, in a region where neither rain nor snow falls, where a devouring heat never reigns, but which is refreshed by a gentle zephyr from the ocean with its breath. To the souls of the wicked they assign as a dwelling a deep, dark place, of horrible sadness, subject to all the extremes of the elements and full of tortures which never end.⁶⁷ It seems to me that it is for exactly the same reasons that the Greeks assign the Islands of the Blessed⁶⁸ (the Fortunate Islands) to those of their great men whom they call heroes or demigods, while they send the villains to live in hell, the abode of the impious,⁶⁹ where their myths tell that Sisyphus, Tantalus, Ixion, and Titye suffer: firstly, they think that souls do not perish, but are immortal; then to encourage men to virtue and keep them away from evil; for it is certain that the good will become better in this life by the hope of a reward after death; and that the blind fury of the wicked will be restrained by thinking that although they may hide their crimes during this life, their immortal soul will suffer punishments after death. This, then, is what the Essenes, in their theology,⁷⁰ teach about the future, thus offering an inevitable bait to those who have once tasted of their wisdom. There are also among them people who claim to know

the future, and who are trained in this from childhood by the study of sacred books,⁷¹ by special purifications, and by giving themselves over to the understanding of ancient prophecies: they are rarely mistaken in their predictions.⁷² There is another class⁷³ of Essenes who, agreeing with the first on the diet, moral principles, and legal practices⁷⁴, differ from them in the opinion on marriage. These say that not to marry is to cut off the greatest part of life, succession⁷⁵, and that moreover, if everyone thought this way, the human species would soon be extinct. But, regarding marriage as something sacred, they postpone their wedding for three years after they have resolved to marry a woman, and it is not until she has been purified three times for the purpose of being able to procreate that they marry her. When they become pregnant, they keep away from them, thus showing that it is not for pleasure, but to have children, that they marry. The women take the bath like the men, after having stripped off all their clothes to cover themselves only with the belt or apron of which I have spoken.⁷⁶ Such are the customs of this sect. As for the first two sects of which I have mentioned, the Pharisees are those who are considered to have the most perfect knowledge of our laws and ceremonies. The main point that distinguishes them is that they attribute everything to God and to the divine will,⁷⁷ in such a way, however, that in most cases it still depends on us to act for good or for evil, without anyone being able to escape the action of God. They also hold that souls are immortal, but that only those of the righteous return to other bodies after this life, those of the wicked remaining delivered to eternal torment. The Sadducees, on the contrary, absolutely deny the intervention of a Providence. According to them, God is unable to induce us either to good or to evil. Good and evil are decided by us alone, and each of us conducts himself in this by his own strength and will. They go further; they deny the permanence of souls; they deny the punishments of hell;⁷⁸ they deny the rewards. The Pharisees are benevolent among themselves, and cultivate concord in the common interest: the Sadducees, on the contrary, are harsh with one another, and do not treat each other better than strangers.”

This passage is not the only one in which Josephus speaks of the Essenes. Whenever Jewish doctrines are in question, he dwells on Essenianism. In his *Antiquities* (book XIII, ch. 5), recounting the resistance under the Maccabees against the Greek kings who succeeded Alexander, which came to the reign of Jonathan, a century and a half B. C., he interrupts the narrative of events to speak of the dogmatic divisions which existed then among the Jews: “At that time,” he says, “there were among the Jews three sects who thought very differently about human things: one was called the Pharisees, the second the Sadducees, and the third the Essenes.⁷⁹ The Pharisees say that some things, and not all, are the work of fatal destiny,⁸⁰ but that some also have their cause in themselves, are contingent and not produced.⁸¹ But the Essenes celebrate destiny⁸² as the mistress of all things without distinction, and maintain that

nothing happens to men except by its suffrage. As for the Sadducees, they completely erase destiny,⁸³ thinking that it does not exist, and that human affairs do not have their cause and their end in it: it is in ourselves that they place this cause and this end; it is we ourselves who become the causes of the good things that come to us and who engender our sorrows by our own folly. But I have already treated this subject at some length in the second book of the *Guerre de Juifs*."

Josephus, however, returns to it again a little later in his *Antiquities* (book XVIII, ch. 1). It is on the occasion of what he calls the fourth sect, or the sect of Judas and Saddoc. This fourth sect had above all as its dogma that every Jew should live and die free, and recognize no other domination than that of God; it arose during the census ordered by Augustus. Josephus, who regards this fourth sect as one of the principal causes of the ruin of the Jews and their extermination by the Romans, carefully distinguishes it, as very recent, from the three ancient ones, to which, in this connection, he returns again: "From all antiquity,"⁸⁴ he says, "the Jews had three sects of national philosophy." And after having spoken of the Pharisees and the Sadducees, he continues thus: "The Essenes⁸⁵ like to leave to God the absolute government of all things.⁸⁶ They make souls immortal, thinking that there is a sure reward for the just as a reward for his virtue. They send their offerings to the Temple; but they do not offer sacrifices there, because of the difference in the purifications they practice; and, excluded for this reason from the common sanctuary, they offer their sacrifices at home.⁸⁷ They are, moreover, the best and most moral of men.⁸⁸ Their principal occupation consists of agriculture. Their equality⁸⁹ is admirable, and surpasses that of all those who, like them, profess virtue,⁹⁰ who are very few in number, it is true, both among the Greeks and among the Barbarians, although among the latter such institutions are very ancient.⁹¹ For, in order that justice may be perfect and unalterable in their society, all goods are common among them, and he who came rich does not enjoy his riches more than he who brought nothing. Those who practice this kind of life number more than four thousand.⁹² They do not marry women, nor do they attach themselves to owning slaves, because they consider the latter practice unjust, and they see in the former a source of rivalry and division. But, living thus apart from the common people, they fulfill the ministry of servants to one another.⁹³ They choose, to receive their income and all that the land yields, the best among them; and they consecrate priests for the preparation of bread and food.⁹⁴ They live in a way that differs in no way from that of the Pleistians of the Dacians, and which is just as remarkable."⁹⁵

I will conclude these quotations from Josephus by mentioning what he reports in the fifteenth book of his *Antiquities* (ch. 10). Speaking of the oath of fidelity that Herod demanded from his subjects, under penalty of life, he says that the sanctity of the Essenes seemed so respectable to this prince, that he

exempted them from this oath, along with two famous rabbis, Pollion and Samea, who had courageously refused to take it, as contrary to the law of God: "He did not want," he says, "to punish those who call themselves Essenes,⁹⁶ and who lead among us a kind of life similar to the institute of the Pythagoreans among the Greeks. I have spoken elsewhere in great detail of this society. But it will not be useless to report here for what reasons Herod honored them, thinking that there was in them something superior to human nature.⁹⁷ The account I am about to give is in no way unworthy of the severity of history; for it shows the opinion that was formed of this sect." Josephus then recounts the prediction that an Essene prophet, named Manahem, had made to Herod as a child, that he would one day be king.

I pass to the testimonies of Philo. It is Philo whom I should have cited first, if I had followed the chronological order; for he is half a century older than Josephus. In one of his moral treatises entitled: *That every virtuous man is free*,⁹⁸ he contrasts the wise who follow a doctrine with the vulgar who live at random. "The earth," he says, "is peopled with men greedy for riches, honors and pleasures; but the number of wise, just and honest men is in comparison very small. However, they are not without their being found, as much among the Greeks as among the barbarians." Philo cites as proof certain philosophers of Greece: "But," he adds, "it must be admitted that it was especially among the barbarians that wisdom and virtue were cultivated, and not by a few isolated men, but by entire troops." And after having mentioned the Magi of Persia and the Gymnosophists of India, he proudly contrasts the Essenes with them: "Palestine and Syria also have their wise men, their virtuous men. For among the populous nation of the Jews, who occupy a good part of that country, there is a kind of people who are called Essenes;⁹⁹ they number, I believe, more than four thousand.¹⁰⁰ By a rather careless etymology, it is true,¹⁰¹ I would not hesitate to derive their name from the Greek word Hosios (xxx, saint), although they make themselves principally servants¹⁰² of God, not by immolating victims to Him, but by raising their souls to Him as a worthy sacrifice. In the first place, they live in villages, fleeing from the cities, because of the iniquities familiar to those who live there, knowing well that, like the contagion of a foul air, the approach of the wicked causes an incurable evil. Some working at agriculture, others occupying themselves with events favorable to peace, they live by helping and assisting one another. They never hoard gold or silver, nor do they think of acquiring large tracts of land to appropriate the income: they ask absolutely only for what is necessary for the necessities of life.¹⁰³ For, almost alone of all men, living without wealth and without property, by choice and deliberate intention rather than by misfortune, they nevertheless find themselves, in my opinion, the richest, since they have the simplicity and moderation which are such a great wealth. You will not find a craftsman among them who works to make an arrow, a dart, a sword, a breastplate or a shield; in a

word, no kind of weapons, machines or instruments used for war, nor even one who devotes himself to any of those apparently peaceful occupations, but which so easily turn to harm. I mean the different kinds of trade and traffic, that source of insatiable greed: they completely suppress it. They do not know what markets, shops and factories are. There is not a single slave among them; they are all free, all equal. They condemn the domination of masters not only as unjust, as destructive of holiness among men, both in those who exercise it and in those who suffer it, but even as impious, since it breaks the law of nature, which, engendering and nourishing as mother all men in absolutely the same way, as legitimate brothers, not only in name, but in fact, certainly did not will that it should be so; avarice and iniquity alone having defiled this kinship of men, and put in place of fraternity¹⁰⁴ disunion, in place of love war. Of sciences and philosophy, they take only a part; they leave to the sophists and vain talkers dialectic with all its subtleties, as of little use to the acquisition and practice of virtue. They leave physics to the makers of ambitious suppositions, regarding it as too inaccessible to the human mind, with the exception of the considerations that nature provides us on the existence of God and the creation of the universe.¹⁰⁵ It is morality above all that they elaborate,¹⁰⁶ guided as they are by our holy laws,¹⁰⁷ which it is impossible for the human mind to have conceived without divine inspiration. They study them at all times, but especially on the seventh day, in a very special way; for it is a sacred day, on which they abstain from all work. Going to the holy places called synagogues, they place themselves in rows according to their order of reception, the new ones after the old ones, and stand ready to listen with all due respect. Then one of them takes the books,¹⁰⁸ and reads from them. Another, one of the most learned, explains what has been read, passing over everything that is sufficiently known, and stopping only at what presents some difficulty. For, most of the time, it is by parables and figures, in imitation of the ancient sages, that they like to philosophize.¹⁰⁹ They train themselves in holiness, justice, and domestic economy, to social duties, to the science of true goods, true evils and indifferent things, of what one should desire and what one should avoid and flee, always regulating themselves on three principles, which are for them the measure of everything, the rule of everything, the basis of certainty in all things:¹¹⁰ *To love God, to love virtue, to love men.*¹¹¹ Of their love for God they give a thousand striking signs: the constant purity of their whole life and the respect they have for the chastity of others, their habit of never making an oath, of never lying, of always making God the author of all good, and of never thinking that anything bad comes from him.¹¹² As for their love for virtue, they testify it sufficiently by loving neither riches, nor vain glory, nor voluptuousness, by their continence, their patience, their moderation, their simplicity, their modesty, their respect for the laws, their constancy and other similar qualities. Finally, they show their love for their neighbor by their benevolence and charity, by a fairness superior to anything that can be said, and by their community,¹¹³ on which it is

appropriate that I dwell a little here. In the first place, no house belongs to any of them, which does not by that very fact belong to all. For, besides the fact that they live there together as a family, it is open to any newcomer who is part of their doctrine. Moreover, all the provisions it contains are for all: an office for all the inhabitants or guests, a common cloakroom for all, food made available to those who are responsible for preparing meals. It would be impossible to find to the same degree, anywhere else than among them, this brotherhood, which makes men united by blood ties or by friendship live under the same roof, share the same fate, eat at the same table. Everything that one would cite, in truth, would not be similar. For they keep nothing of what they have earned as a reward for their labor by working during the day as their own property; but, bringing everything to the community, they make it the property of all, the comfort of all their needs. So that infirmities are never aggravated among them. The weak and the sick, and those who care for them, are not neglected or abandoned to suffering, unable to provide for their needs; for they find their necessities assured in the superfluity of the strong and the able-bodied; and they can enjoy this without shame, for it is also their property. As for the elderly, nothing equals the honor that is held for them, the respect they inspire, the tenderness that is felt for them: one might say that loving children nourish their fathers in old age; but these fathers have a thousand arms at their service, a thousand minds to come to their aid. These, I hope, are the athletes of virtue that philosophy has produced, without the trappings of Greek names, by offering them praiseworthy actions for gymnastics, from which would emerge a freedom beyond all attack.¹¹⁴ This freedom has indeed been seen; it has been shown under so many tyrants who have weighed on this country, and who have deployed in turn all kinds of tortures and seductions. Some, striving to surpass the savage ferocity of the brutes, omitting no cruelty, immolating their subjects in troops, or tearing them alive into shreds like butchers, have not rested until their own ruin has been consummated by the justice that oversees human affairs; the others, transforming their rage into a new kind of perversity, composing a subtle poison and spreading it skillfully, taking a softer voice when their fury was greater, caressing like the dog that is about to bite, have caused irreparable harm, and have left everywhere in our cities, as a reminder of their impiety and their hatred of men, the eternal ruin of those whom they knew how to attack with such perfidy: but none, neither among the most openly cruel, nor among the most deceitful and cunning, has been able to succeed in incriminating the society of these Essenes or of these Saints.¹¹⁵ All, overcome by the virtue of men, feeling powerless to harm them, as if they were dealing with beings naturally independent, with creatures free in themselves, free with a freedom beyond all reach, respected their fraternal meals¹¹⁶ and their community superior to all praise, an admirable example of a life full of perfection and greatly blessed.”¹¹⁷

In the treatise that follows the one I have just cited, and which is entitled *On the Contemplative Life*,¹¹⁸ Pliny moves from the ordinary or practical Essenes, as he calls them, to the contemplative Essenes, who were called Therapeutae in Greek. It is here that we will finally see, with even more clarity than in all that we have just reported, that the basis of the Essene religion was the *Eucharistic dogma* and the dogma of the *egalitarian banquet*. But before quoting these pages where Philo speaks mainly of the Essenes he had seen in Egypt, I believe it is good to place before the reader the passage where Pliny speaks about those of Palestine, and indicates, with the precision of a geographer, the part of Judea where they mainly inhabited. For, although Josephus told us that the Essenes did not inhabit any particular city, but were spread over several, it is clear from his own account, in which he represents them as being occupied mainly with agriculture, that they must have been principally settled in some place. Pliny indicates this place, at the same time as he confirms the great antiquity that Josephus attributes to this sect. It is on the shores of the Dead Sea, at a certain distance from its shores, ten or twelve leagues from Jerusalem, and even closer to Bethlehem where Jesus was born, that he describes the Essenes as forming a sort of separate nation. He thus ends his description of Judea with them: "On the western shore of Lake Asphaltite are the Essenes, who move far enough from the shores to avoid receiving its unhealthy emanations: a solitary nation, and the most astonishing that can be seen in the whole world: without women, and despising all sensuality; without money; living among palm trees. They reproduce in the same number by constantly recruiting foreigners; for there are always enough people tired of life, whom the tide of fortune pushes to adopt their customs. It is thus that, for thousands of centuries, a truly incredible thing, we see the eternalization of a people where no one is born: so fertile is the disgust of life in others for them! Below them was the town of Engadda,¹¹⁹ the most renowned, after Jerusalem, for the fertility of its territory and its palm groves, but which today is also¹²⁰ nothing more than a heap of ruins. Further on, Masada,¹²¹ a castle located on a hill, very close to Lake Asphaltite."¹²²

I come finally to the Therapeutae, and I am going to quote almost in its entirety the little treatise by Philo in which he introduces us to them. It is here, I repeat, that the mystery of Essenianism is most exposed. We shall see that long before Jesus Christ, the Jewish Passover had become something very close to the Eucharist. All that Josephus has told us about the meal ceremony among the Essenes takes on a new character and a more evident clarity in the description that Philo gives us of the *sacred feast* of the Therapeutae, that is to say, of the most devout of the Essenes, of those who separated themselves completely from all active life to devote themselves to contemplation. I beg the reader to bear in mind, when reading what Philo reports, that this treatise of Philo was certainly written before Christianity had penetrated into Egypt. Philo was between twenty-five and thirty years old when Jesus came into the world; he was

approaching his sixtieth year when Jesus began his preaching. This is the most conservative calculation that can be made regarding Philo's time. For far from being permissible to suppose him to be less ancient, as Montfaucon did by trampling underfoot all the inferences of history, it would be much more likely to suppose him older by ten or even twenty years.¹²³ What is also certain is that his writings on the Essenes, which we quote here, are works of his youth or middle age, and not of his old age. They were therefore composed not only long before the Gospel had penetrated into Egypt, as I was content to assert just now, but long before Jesus preached in Galilee, and probably even before the time when Jesus' birth is usually placed.¹²⁴

Never in any of his works does Philo speak of Jesus, his Gospel, his apostles, or anything related to Christianity. And how, indeed, could he have known of the event that occurred in Judea, if it is true, as all Christian tradition proves, that nascent Christianity had a first period of incubation during which it left Palestine only to spread through St. Paul to the coasts of Asia Minor? Philo, who lived in Egypt, must have been more than ninety years old at the time when the Gospel is said to have been brought to Alexandria by St. Mark.¹²⁵ Everything that Eusebius, and after him St. Jerome, have said about Philo's Christianity is as chimerical as it is absurd. It is his two works on the Essenes and the Therapeutae that have deceived them. It is noteworthy that no Father of the early centuries of the Church fell into this gross error. Neither Clement, nor Origen, who lived in Egypt, nor Athanasius, who was Patriarch of Alexandria, nor St. Justin, who had traveled in that country, nor Tertullian, nor finally any other person before Eusebius, confused the Jews known under the name of Therapeutae with Christians.¹²⁶ It was only two hundred years after Philo, and a hundred years after Tertullian, that Eusebius, who cites no guarantor of what he advances, astonished to find so many marks of Christianity among the Jews, imagined that these Therapeutae whom Philo described could well be the disciples of St. Mark. He did not dare, it is true, to absorb the Essenes for the benefit of Christianity, because the error would have been too scandalous; but he distinguished the Therapeutae from the Essenes against all reason and despite the rather positive text of Philo.¹²⁷ Then to explain how Philo, so attached in his writings to Mosaism, had taken so much interest in nascent Christianity, he had to make another supposition; he imagined that Philo could well have known St. Peter on his journey to Rome, and, on his return to Alexandria, lovingly describe the Church of St. Mark.¹²⁸ St. Jerome copied Eusebius. There is not a word in the two Treatises in question which does not clearly contradict this supposition. Philo speaks of Jews, Essene Jews, and not of Christians. These fabulous assertions of Eusebius and St. Jerome prove only one thing: that Christianity pre-existed in many respects in Essenism, and that, struck by an evidence that was impossible to deny, they were reduced to supposing (pie, since the Essenes so closely resembled the Christians, it was

necessary that these were the first Christians. They were not entirely mistaken: only these Christians were much earlier than Jesus Christ, and Jesus himself came from their midst. It is even certain that Philo described these Christians before Jesus had preached in Galilee, and perhaps even, as I have said, before he was born.

Moreover, what led Eusebius and St. Jerome astray in their assessment of Pilatus and his works on the Essenes is easily explained in any case by Essenianism itself. For it is infinitely probable that Pilatus, although a Pharisee, had, as Josephus did later, studied and practiced Essenianism to a certain extent, that he had come into contact not only with practical Essenes, whether those who married or those who lived celibately, but also with those contemplatives from the environs of Alexandria whom he describes for us; in a word, that he was, to a certain extent, an Essene in heart and by initiation. The enthusiasm with which he speaks of the Essenes would naturally lead us to suppose this, even if we did not have certain passages in his writings that confirm this idea. But there remain for us indications of what one might call the Essenianism of Pelion. For, in one of his treatises¹²⁹ among others, he speaks of a time “during which he lived solely occupied with study and contemplation.” He complains that “fate, the enemy of virtue, plunged him into the sea of public affairs;” he regrets those years “when he found pleasure only in the meditation of divine precepts and divine oracles; when he had no earthly thoughts; when he felt a profound disgust for pleasures, riches, and glory; when he regarded himself as a man rapt in spirit above the earth.” He adds that some, seeing him renounce his first life to throw himself into public office, “deplored his fate, like that of a man who had become blind.” However, he says, “I reopen these eyes that were thought to be lost, for fear that I should spend my whole life in darkness, like a man abandoned by God.” Do we not recognize here a striking resemblance with Essenianism itself, as Josephus and Philo describe it to us? There is more: where does Philo come from this habit of allegorizing about Scripture, which appears in him on every page? Does it not come by chance from Essenianism? Does he not, in fact, represent the Essenes to us as an allegorical school, which gave to all the facts of Scripture a metaphysical and moral meaning? Philo therefore finds himself very much resembling the Essenes and he represents them, so to speak, in several respects.¹³⁰ His Mosaism, well characterized elsewhere, is an Essene Mosaism. Now, since Christianity itself was drawn largely from the same source, everything came together to ensure that fourth- and fifth-century Christians, such as Eusebius and St. Jerome, could not escape the illusion of mistaking the Essene contemplatives described by a Jew himself imbued with Essenianism for Christians.

Now that the reader cannot be deflected from the conclusion to which I wish to lead him, by wrongly persuading himself that perhaps the testimonies I cite were written under the influence of Christianity, that either Philo himself, or

the Essenes of whom he speaks, had received from the preaching of Jesus a certain modification and an entirely new impulse; now, I say, that the reader cannot have such an idea, since these testimonies of Philo are proven to be prior to Christianity, and that all the other writings of Philo, which are certainly Jewish, and devoted to Moses without any restriction, are nevertheless imbued with more or less the same character, I will continue to quote what he reports of the Therapeutae. I only remove from his account everything that is foreign to the subject that concerns us:

“After having spoken of those of the Essenes who practice the active life, and who seem to me, I admit, superior in everything to other men, or at least, if I must use some consideration to express my thought, superior in a multitude of respects, I see myself led naturally by my subject to speak of those who have embraced the contemplative life.¹³¹ I will not invent anything, as is the too common custom of poets and writers, who rarely find, it must be said, truly beautiful things to paint; but here, without any art, I will be content to aspire to grasp the truth, for I know that the most eloquent would waste his effort in trying to surpass it. Yet one must make an effort to render it; for it would not be just if the greatness of virtue in these men should become a cause of silence for those who believe that nothing beautiful should be kept silent. The aim pursued by these philosophers¹³² is manifestly indicated by the name by which they are designated. For they are significantly called¹³³ Therapeutae and Therapeutrides,¹³⁴ either because they profess a medicine superior to that which is widespread everywhere (the latter, in fact, cures (xxx, *therapeuei*) only bodies, while the other cures souls prey to those serious and rebellious diseases which culminate in pleasures and cupidities, sadness and fears, avarice and foolish dissipations, injustice, and the whole innumerable train of passions and vices); or else because they have been taught by nature and by our holy laws¹³⁵ to serve (xxx, *therapeuein*) the Being who is better than the good, simpler than the one, and more principled, if I may express myself thus, than the principled unity.¹³⁶ Who can be compared to them, I ask, among all those who cultivate piety?¹³⁷ Is it those who honor the elements, earth, water, air, fire, called here by one name, elsewhere by another, Vulcan, Juno, Neptune, Ceres?¹³⁸ But the elements are only matter without soul and without movement in itself, subject to the Worker to realize through it all the ideas of forms and qualities.¹³⁹ Shall I put in parallel with them those who worship the celestial bodies and their influences, the sun, the moon, the fixed or wandering stars, or the whole sky, or the world in its universality? But all these things did not make themselves; they were born by the science of an infinitely wise Builder.¹⁴⁰ Are these those who worship demigods that I would like to equal to the Therapeutae? Demigods, that is to say, beings at once mortal and immortal, what could be more absurd? Are these the worshippers of idols, that is to say, pieces of wood or stone from which the artist makes at his pleasure a god, a table, or a basin? I pass over in silence

the divinities of the Egyptians, who, gentle and tractable, worship wild beasts, who, reasonable, honor brutes, who, allied by a certain kinship with God,¹⁴¹ prostrate themselves before monsters worse than animals themselves, and who, masters and sovereigns, serve beasts born to obey and serve them. Let us leave these incurables, who are precisely the opposite of the Therapeutae;¹⁴² let us leave them to infect with their mad opinions not only their fellow citizens, but the neighboring nations; they are deprived of the most necessary of all the senses, I do not say of the sight of the body, but of that of the soul, by which alone we can distinguish the true from the false. Yes, let them give themselves over to their errors; but let the race of Therapeutae, taught to see, always enjoy the sight of being; that it does not stop at the sensible sun, and that it never leaves this rule which leads to sovereign felicity.¹⁴³ Those who embrace this kind of life do not do so to follow custom, nor at the solicitation of others; but, ravished by celestial love, like the Bacchantes and the Corybantes, they are agitated by a sort of divine fury until they see the object of their love.¹⁴⁴ Then, because of the desire they have for a blessed immortality,¹⁴⁵ regarding themselves as having already ended their mortal career, they abandon their goods¹⁴⁶ to their sons and daughters, or to their other relatives, whom they willingly place in full possession of their inheritance, or, if they have no relatives, to their friends. For it is right that those who without hesitation seize true wealth, wealth that sees clearly, should yield blind wealth to those who are still blinded by their thoughts.¹⁴⁷ After they have thus abandoned their goods, being no longer held by any chain, they flee, without ever turning their heads behind them, leaving brothers, children, wives, father, mother, all their relatives, all their friends, the societies they frequented, and the places where they were born and brought up; for they know that whatever holds us by habit holds us strongly. They therefore flee, but they do not go to some other city for that reason; they are not like those slaves who manage to be sold to new masters, unfortunate ones who only change their servitude without ever breaking it. Every city, in fact, even one governed by the best laws, is full of tumult, confusion and infinite disorders, which no one who has once been touched by wisdom could bear. It is outside the city walls that they choose their residence in gardens and wild and solitary places,¹⁴⁸ seeking retirement, not out of a kind of misanthropy, as one might believe, not to flee from men, but only to avoid the company of those who do not have the same thoughts and whose association seems useless and dangerous to them. This society of men is widespread in many parts of the earth, and it was right, in fact, that Greeks and Barbarians should be participants in so great a good; nevertheless they abound more in Egypt, in all the nomes, and principally around Alexandria.¹⁴⁹ But from all sides¹⁵⁰ the most distinguished among them come, as if it were their homeland, to form a sort of colony of Therapeutae¹⁵¹ in a place admirably suited to this kind of life, and which is situated on the shore of Lake Mariout,¹⁵² on a low eminence. It is a place of perfect security, where the air is excellent. The

security that one enjoys there comes from the fact that all around are spread numerous country houses and villages. As for the purity and sweetness of the air, they result from the fact that gusts of wind rise continually from the lake, which flows into the sea, and from the sea, which is very close at hand; the winds that come from the sea are dry, those from the lake humid, and their mixture makes the air more favorable to health. Their dwellings are very simple, and built solely to protect them from heat and cold. They are not crowded together, as in cities; for this is not what would be necessary for people who love solitude: but neither are they too far apart, because of the community of living that they practice,¹⁵³ and so that they can, if necessary, help each other against thieves. Each has his holy retreat which is called Semnea and Monastery, and where, alone and apart, he accomplishes the mysteries of the religious life.¹⁵⁴ They never carry there food, drink or anything that concerns the needs of the body, but the laws and oracles of God revealed by the prophets, hymns and other books, by the worship and understanding of which they are raised and perfected. They always have the thought of God present to their minds, so much so that even in their dreams their imagination only traces for them the beauties of divine perfections. Many of them even speak in their sleep,¹⁵⁵ interpreting in their dreams the most profound dogmas of sacred philosophy.¹⁵⁶ They are accustomed to pray twice a day, morning and evening; in the morning at sunrise, asking for what could be called and what is truly the beautiful light of a beautiful day, that is to say, that their soul be filled with the celestial light;¹⁵⁷ and in the evening when the sun sets, so that their minds, entirely freed from the weight of the senses and sensible things, and withdrawn into their own dwelling place, as it were into their secret council, may apply themselves to discovering the truth. All the time between morning and evening is employed in meditation. For, reading the Holy Scriptures, they seek wisdom by way of allegorism, under the traditions and emblems of the wisdom of our ancestors, regarding what is contained in the written letter as so many symbols of a veiled nature, but whose essence is manifested in the interpretations of our mind.¹⁵⁸ They have, in fact, many ancient works composed by those who formerly founded this sect, true monuments of interpretative and allegorical science, and which they use as models to try to do the same thing.¹⁵⁹ They do not limit themselves to thinking; they compose poems and hymns to God, in verses of all kinds of measures, and in all the forms used by poets, which they make easier to fix in the memory by the accompaniment of a serious and religious chant. They remain six days of the week in these monasteries, occupied in study, not crossing the threshold of the door, and not even casting their eyes outside.¹⁶⁰ But on the seventh day¹⁶¹ they assemble as in a common council, and place themselves in ranks according to age, with gravity and decorum, their hands hidden under their clothes, the right on the breast, the left placed on their side.¹⁶² Then the oldest and most instructed in dogmas takes the floor, and delivers, with a calm face and a calm and uniform voice, without

passion, without outbursts, a speech full of sense and wisdom, not aiming, like the rhetoricians and sophists of the day, at the brilliance of the sentence and at what is called eloquence, but seeking, either in exposition or in interpretation, that solidity and that accuracy of thought which does not stop at flattering the ear, but which penetrates to the soul and establishes itself there firmly. All the others listen in profound silence, showing their approval only by nodding their eyes and heads. This common Semneia where they meet every Saturday is divided into two enclosures, one for the men, the other for the women: for the women are not excluded from this meeting;¹⁶³ on the contrary, they have their designated place there, having no less zeal or less holy resolution than the men. The dividing wall is a kind of parapet raised only three or four cubits, and empty from above to the roof; in such a way that the respect due to the modesty of the women is preserved, and at the same time those who attend these meetings easily receive the help of speech, nothing preventing the voice of the speaker from reaching them.¹⁶⁴ Temperance is for the Therapeutae like a sort of solid foundation, on which they build the edifice of all the virtues. None of them eats or drinks until after sunset, because they believe that the study of wisdom alone worthily occupies the light of day, and that the needs of the body should be attended to only during darkness; which means that, devoting the entire day to the first of these cares, they give only a small part of the night to the second. Several of them, in whom the taste for science and the love of contemplation are carried to the highest degree, remain up to three days without eating. There are even some who, nourished, so to speak, and satisfied with wisdom alone, which pours out its treasures more abundantly, very easily double this fast, and pass up to six days without taking any food, living as it is said that cicadas live, on air, dew, and song.¹⁶⁵ But, regarding the Sabbath day¹⁶⁶ as entirely solemn and holy¹⁶⁷, they constantly cease their abstinences when it returns, and are pleased to honor it in a particular way; for on that day they not only take care of their soul, they also remake their body by food, giving it, like beasts of burden, some respite after long labor. They eat nothing well-chosen: coarse bread, and for all their food salt, to which the most delicate add hyssop as seasoning; the water of the fountains is their drink. For they wish to appease these two mistresses that nature has given to the human race, hunger and thirst; they wish, I say, to appease them, but they do not wish to flatter them, and they give them only what is absolutely necessary to be able to exist. They eat, therefore, in order not to be hungry, they drink in order not to be thirsty; but they have an aversion to excess and satiety, as the most formidable enemy of the soul and the body. We have two kinds of ramparts against the inclemency of the air, the clothes with which we cover ourselves and our houses: as for houses, I have already said that theirs are devoid of all luxury, solely suited to the service they require of them, and made for necessity alone; their clothes are equally simple, and chosen for the purpose of protecting them from the cold and the heat: in winter, instead of furs, a robe of coarse cloth; in summer, a short sleeveless jacket or a simple

linen shirt. For they attach themselves in everything to simplicity, thinking that ostentation has as its principle the lie, while, on the contrary, simplicity has truth as its principle, both being the expression of the different source which produces them, and consequently deserving one of hatred and the other of love; for from lies flow all kinds of evil, and from truth flow all happiness, whether in the purely human order or in the order of divine things. I now want to speak of their assemblies and the manner in which they rejoice in feasts.¹⁶⁸ But this will only be after having said what happens at the feasts of other men, in order to make the difference between them better felt...” (Here Philo paints a picture of the gluttony and drunkenness that usually reigned at the meals of the Pagans. He describes those great orgies which the Romans had introduced, and which the Greeks and the Barbarians then tried to imitate. He does not even spare those Socratic banquets which Plato and Xenophon have told us about. He finds this entourage of frivolous and dissolute young people, of instrument players, dancers, tricksters, jesters, and slaves of all kinds, these games and futile conversations where it is only a question of love and even of infamous pleasures, a setting hardly worthy of Socrates and philosophy. Then he continues:) “... You see, even those renowned banquets over which Socrates presided are not only imbued with futility, but carry within themselves their condemnation, when one has the courage to shake off the false reputation of honesty that has been given them. I will therefore oppose to them the banquets of those who have transformed their regime and have transformed themselves by the observation and theoretical understanding of the phenomena of life, following the most sacred traditions of the prophet Moses.¹⁶⁹ In the first place, the solemn meeting of the Therapeutae that I am going to describe takes place after seven Sabbaths, because of their veneration not only for the simple septenary, but for its square;¹⁷⁰ for they know that it is a pure and ever-virgin number. It is the eve of the greatest festival, which falls on the fiftieth day, another most holy and generative number, because of the square of the right triangle, the principle of the generation of all things.¹⁷¹ After they have assembled, all dressed in white garments, and have been introduced into the light with a majestic ceremony by one of the ephemerents¹⁷² (this is the name given to those who fulfill this ministry), before placing themselves on the beds, standing in good order, and raising their eyes and hands to heaven, their eyes as if accustomed to see what is worthy of being seen, their hands as if pure from all gain and having on no occasion been defiled by lucre,¹⁷³ they pray that the meal they are about to make may be pleasing to God and according to his will.¹⁷⁴ After the prayers, the elders take their places in the order of reception.¹⁷⁵ For they do not regard as elders the old men and those who are most burdened with years; These are only children in their own sense, if they have embraced the rule late: the ancients are those who, from their earliest youth, have walked and matured in this contemplative homeland of philosophy, which is the most beautiful and the most divine. There are also women at this meal, old for the most part, and

virgins. Attached to chastity, not by constraint, like many priestesses that one sees among the Greeks, but rather by a voluntary resolution which takes its source in the zeal and love of wisdom, or because from a very early age they hastened to embrace common life,¹⁷⁶ they despised the pleasures of the body, not wishing to have mortal children, but ardently desiring to conceive those immortal fruits such as only the soul that loves God is of itself capable of engendering by the fecundity of the intelligible rays which the Father diffuses in us, and by which we discover the dogmas of wisdom.¹⁷⁷

“The seats are distributed in two rows: the men are on the right, and the women on the left. If anyone imagines that the beds are, if not magnificent, at least soft and delicate, as for honest people devoted to philosophy, let him know that they are simple mats, made of the most common material, namely papyrus, a local plant; these mats are spread on the ground, raised at the elbows, to lean on. Without giving in entirely to Lacedaemonian rudeness, they attach themselves to simplicity, rejecting everything that sensual pleasure infiltrates.

“They do not have slaves to serve them, deeply convinced as they are that the possession of slaves is against nature. For she has engendered us all free; the injustice of a few and the avarice of jealous hearts, by producing inequality, the source of all evils, have alone given power to the strongest over the weakest.¹⁷⁸ Therefore, in this sacred feast,¹⁷⁹ there are no slaves, as I have just said: all are free men who serve, not by force or command, and without waiting for orders, but voluntarily, and eager to anticipate the desires of the guests with the best grace in the world. Not even the first comers are taken for this work: the young people who have the most merit, the most polite of all, the most virtuous are carefully chosen from the company; and these, like true and legitimate children, serve their fathers and mothers with joy, esteeming these common relatives¹⁸⁰ dearer and closer than those of blood; and indeed, is there anything dearer to the wise and closer to them than virtue? They fulfill this ministry without a belt and a flowing tunic, so that no mark of servitude, no emblem recalling slavery, may be seen at this feast. I know that when reading this, some will laugh: let those whose actions are worthy of compassion and tears laugh!

“No wine is served on these days,¹⁸¹ but only very clear water, cold for most of the guests, and heated for those of the elderly whose decrepitude requires this care.¹⁸² The table, moreover, is clean of any bloody food or food coming from any animal whatsoever: bread for food, some salt for the stew, to which hyssop is sometimes added as a delicacy for the most greedy. Right reason commands them to keep wine away from their meals, as priests do from their sacrifices;¹⁸³ for wine is a poison that infiltrates us with madness, and exquisite foods whet lust, the most insatiable of wild beasts. Such are the preludes to the feast.

“But, someone will ask, when the guests are seated in the order I have mentioned, and the servers are standing in line ready to perform their duties,

do they not clink glasses and indulge in merriment? On the contrary, more reserved and more silent than before, not one would then dare to stammer a word or breathe more heavily than usual. Someone proposes a question on the Holy Scriptures, or resolves a question posed by another, without taking any care over the very words he is about to pronounce. For he does not value a reputation for eloquence; he seeks only to see more clearly the object of his aspiration and, having seen it, to share it with those who, while having less keen eyesight than he, have a desire to know similar to his own. He speaks slowly, he insists, he repeats himself often, in order to better engrave his thoughts in minds. For fine orators, who speak quickly and who discourse breathlessly, have this disadvantage, that the minds of their listeners, incapable of walking at this pace, often give up following them and stop halfway. The entire attentive audience listens in a uniform attitude. If they understand, they show it by a slight sign and by their looks; if they are satisfied, they nod their heads, and this is also visible on their faces; If they have any doubts, a shake of the head and the index finger of the right hand held in the air sufficiently demonstrate this. The young men who stand to serve do not listen with less attention than those who are seated.

“Their interpretations of the Holy Scriptures consist of allegories.¹⁸⁴ For the whole Law seems to them to resemble a living being, whose body would be the textually expressed dispositions, and whose soul is the invisible spirit hidden beneath the words, a spirit in which an intelligence guided by reason begins by seeking the properties that matter to it, as one reads in the mirror of the eyes, discovering the marvelous beauties of thoughts beneath the form that envelops them, and rejecting or dissipating symbols, to bring to light the naked meaning, for the use of those who with little help can perceive invisible things through the visible.¹⁸⁵

“When the president appears sufficiently edified, looking at the audience, he thanks with a gesture the one who spoke; and immediately a cry of joy arises from the whole assembly, which seems to call for the feast. Then the one who has risen sings first a hymn to God, newly composed by himself or coming from some ancient poet.¹⁸⁶ For these poets have left the words and the music of a multitude of compositions, trimètres chants, processional canticles, hymns properly so-called, spondaic as in the libations, chants before the altar, for the stations, for the choirs, admirably worked, and unfolding in a great number of stanzas. After him, the others sing, each in turn, with all the appropriate gravity, all listening in the greatest silence, except when it is necessary to repeat the refrains or to intone the responses; for then they all depart with one voice, men and women.

“When each has finished his hymn, the young people introduce the table of which I spoke just now, on which is the most sacred of foods, leavened bread, and for seasoning, salt, to which is added hyssop. This is a reproduction of the

holy Table placed in the vestibule of the Temple: for on this table are bread and salt, without other foods (only the bread is unleavened, and the salt unmixed). It was fitting, in fact, that the purest and simplest things should be attributed to the highest priests,¹⁸⁷ as the reward of the holy ministry, and that the others, while participating in divine worship and striving to rival their superiors, should nevertheless abstain from bread, so that the highest might have this privilege.

“After the meal,¹⁸⁸ they celebrate the holy vigil¹⁸⁹ of the whole night, in the manner I will describe. First they stand close together, forming two choirs, on each side of the hall, one composed of men and the other of women. Each of these two groups has its choirmaster, chosen as being the most worthy and the most artistic in the sense of harmonious beauty and of elevated and proper art.¹⁹⁰ Then they sing hymns to God, to various kinds of measures and tunes, sometimes together, sometimes in groups that respond to each other, accompanying their songs with gestures, dances, prostrations, and making marches, or stations, turning in a circle or arranging themselves in a line, according to the meaning of the compositions they are performing. Then, when each of the two choirs has been satisfied with these delights, when they have drunk, so to speak, the wine as in the feasts of Bacchus, but the wine of the love of God, they all mingle together, and form one choir from the two, in imitation of that which took place formerly on the shores of the Red Sea, following the miracle that had been accomplished there. For the sea, at the command of God, became the salvation of the Hebrews and the ruin of their oppressors. The waters, having suddenly separated and solidified like two walls, opened a wide and dry path, by which our fathers reached the heights of the opposite continent; then, closing soon, and flooding the passage again, they swallowed up in their bosom the enemy determined to pursue the people of Israel. All therefore, men and women, seized with a divine transport at the sight of such unexpected help, and of a marvel that surpassed all that they could conceive and expect, formed a single choir; and they sang hymns of grace¹⁹¹ to this God who had saved them, the men led by Moses the prophet, and the women by Mary the prophetess.¹⁹² It is above all in the image of this magnificent concert that the Therapeutae and the Therapeutrides mix their songs and respond to each other. The high sound of the women's voices unites with the deeper voice of the men, and the result is admirable musical effects and a perfect symphony. Everything is beautiful in these choirs: the thoughts are beautiful, the words too, and the choristers, animated by art, by true art, breathe equally and show true beauty. Thoughts, words, and performers have no other goal than piety.

“Drunk with this beautiful intoxication until morning, having neither a heavy head nor heavy eyes, but more awake on the contrary than when they came to the meal, turning their gaze and their whole body towards the East, and, as soon as they see the sun rise, stretching out their hands towards the sky,

they implore the serenity of the day, truth, and the gift of right reasoning.¹⁹³ These prayers completed, each one returns to his Semnea to cultivate there, according to his custom, philosophy, their only labor and their only trade.

“This is what I had to say about the Therapeutae, these contemplative followers of life and those who have lived in life and in the spirit alone, citizens of heaven and of the true world, naturally dear to the Father and Creator of all things for their virtue, which earns them this friendship, the most intimate of rewards: they have placed virtue above fortune; they have attained the supreme good.”

How beautiful and instructive are these pages written by Philo *before the preaching of the Gospel!* Who does not see in the Essene regime the embryo of Christianity as a whole? And who could refuse to conclude that Christianity was truly nothing other than the explanation of the Essene Doctrine through the abolition of esotericism?

Does this truth make the mission of Jesus less respectable, less sublime, less divine? No; in our opinion, the mission of Jesus is not tarnished by this; and we will hold him no less dear to our hearts because we have found an origin for his Doctrine.

Essenianism dated back to the earliest times of Mosaicism, which itself dated back to primitive religion. But Essenianism was an almost eclipsed sect within Judaism, and Judaism itself was an almost obscure sect in the immense empire where so many idolatries and diverse cults coexisted in a confused way. It was necessary to save the human race, say the Christians; that is to say, it was necessary to pour upon the human race, with the blood of a saint, the doctrine of truth which will one day make all men live in the natural and divine law. It was therefore necessary to do what Jesus and after him St. Paul did, to abolish all the false religions of the earth, by allowing the *Holy Philosophy* to emerge from the narrow circle in which it was hidden. Jesus did this by the exaltation of sentiment and by his death, St. Paul by his works, by his science, and by his death also. And when I cite St. Paul after Jesus, I do not mean to forget the other apostles, companions of Jesus, and co-workers in his work; nor all that legion of philosophers who converted to Christianity, to bring to it the traditions of the oriental world and the authority of Greek and Roman genius; nor that legion of great minds who followed the first converts, and who were the Fathers of the first six centuries; nor that multitude who had action above all through devotion and sacrifice, those martyrs, men and women, who suffered all humiliations and all pains; nor finally those solitary souls who carried into the heart of the deserts the exaltation of a new conception of life and the aspirations of a soul disappointed by the world in its infinite hopes, and who ended by formulating the Monastic life, reproduction of the Essene life. What Christian, in fact, could separate the saints from the holy of holies, from Jesus? No, the work was not proper and particular to Jesus; It was collective and united. Jesus was, so to

speak, the leaven that is put into the dough to make it ferment and produce bread.

To understand Jesus otherwise, at the point in time we live in, would be idolatry. The greatest mark of respect we can give to the revealers is to unite them together in the eternal and immanent Revelation that enlightened Humanity in its cradle and will enlighten it throughout all ages.

That being so, what impiety can there be in giving a procession prior to the one we rightly call the divine Redeemer, and whose coming and death indeed mark an era of resurrection in Humanity? There is, certainly, no impiety in discovering the radiant path that, from Jesus, the founder of Christianity, goes back to Moses; and there is no more to discover the roads which unite Moses to Orpheus, Moses and Orpheus to Egypt, Egypt to Chaldea and India. Certainly, we have not discovered these relationships in all their depth in the study that we have just made; but, with a pure and sincere heart, seeking the truth with all our soul, we have put ourselves on the trail of these relationships, and we have, at least, demonstrated, by the very origins of Christianity, this important truth, that *Christianity is the extension of the ancient city to all men*.

At the point we have reached, the entire history of Christianity is revealed; and, its profound meaning being given to us, nothing would be easier, it seems, than to penetrate this history, to shed a whole new light upon it. But we will be careful not to undertake this labor. Montesquieu recounts, in the Preface to *The Spirit of the Laws*, that he often began and often abandoned this work; he says that he sent the pages he had written to the winds a thousand times, that he felt his father's hands fall every day, that he followed his object without forming a plan, and found the truth only to lose it. "But," he adds, "when I had discovered *my principles*, everything I was looking for came to me, and, in the course of twenty years, I saw my work begin, grow, advance, and finish." Happy Montesquieu! We do not have the leisure that the Eighteenth Century gave us to carry a work in our bosom for twenty years, to meditate on it and to accomplish it.

CHAPTER XIII.

Conclusion of this Second Part.

And yet we believe we have discovered and expounded some *principles* in this book. We will summarize them, until it becomes possible for us, God willing, to follow and unfold all their consequences. Alas, the time in which we live is one of turmoil and agitation, and our life in particular is full of difficulties and obstacles.

This time in which we live, this so painful time, has been the starting point of our reflections. By examining, in the First Part of this writing, entitled the PRESENT, society as it appears today, we have recognized and proven:

1. That the French Revolution rightly summarized politics in these three words: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity;
2. That Equality is a principle, a dogma; that the term *Equality*, in the revolutionary symbol, means: Equality is a divine law, a law prior to all laws, and from which all laws must be derived;
3. That this principle, although not at all put into practice, is nevertheless today admitted as the criterion of justice;
4. That current society, from whatever side one considers it, has no other basis than this principle;
5. That the current evil of society results from the struggle between this principle and its opposite.

And we have concluded:

That, in the order of Nature, as it reveals itself today to our intelligence, man is equal to man, and that the legitimate consequences of this principle, whatever they may be, will be realized;

That, similarly, in the City, as we conceive it today, the citizen is equal to the citizen, and that the legitimate consequences of this principle, whatever they may be, will be realized.

But having thus gathered the meaning of the *Present*, we wanted to go back to the *Past*, to see if it would confirm or deny the hopes that we base on this dogma of Equality.

Hence the Second Part of this writing, the PAST.

Now the *Past* has completely confirmed what we had discovered in the Present. We have assured ourselves that the previous life of Humanity contained the germ of Equality. All the great religions, all the great philosophies, all the great legislations, contain this germ. The general aim of the Second Part of our work is to give clear and certain proof of this. The profound meaning of

religions, or rather of the unique and eternal Revelation, identical and yet diverse in its successive phases, emerges clearly from the texts that we have compared and commented on. Religion is in essence human Solidarity, of which Equality is one aspect.

If the development of Equality had been as advanced at one time as at another, there would have been no progress. Now progress, whatever its primary cause, is the law of the human species. Our entire study of the past has therefore led to proving, on the one hand, that the seed of Equality has always existed, and, on the other hand, that this seed has never been as ideally developed as it is today.

And yet, I repeat, eternal Revelation, manifested by all the great religions, has always proclaimed human Equality.

Hence, in the past, an antinomy that we have endeavored to follow and clarify.

This antinomy still persists, which is why social law has had no foundation until now. Human Equality, understood and accepted, can alone provide a foundation for political law. Also, I repeat, until now law has not been known.

We have proven this by demonstrating that from Aristotle to Montesquieu inclusive, political writers have only been able to elevate fact into law. We will not return to the analysis we have given, in this respect, of Aristotle's *Politics* and Plato's *Republic*. Aristotle takes the fact for the ideal: Plato, that great artist, while seeing the ideal, does not see it; for he is still confined within the castes.

Primitive religion was superior to Plato's ideal; and this is why Mosaism, which, whether in its Genesis dogmas or in its legislation, contained the principle of human Equality, triumphed over all religions and all philosophies where this principle was, to varying degrees, obscured and disfigured.

Christianity, descended from Mosaism in a direct line, made Equality make further progress, by bringing to men this lesson: "You are all sons of the same God; you are all brothers, so love one another as brothers." But, having emerged, as we have seen, from a sect of Mosaism, from the Essene sect, he did not go beyond the science of the Essenes nor their practice. The beatific life of his monks only reproduced the life of the Essenes; and, while dominating the world, he allowed *infraternity*, that is to say inequality, to remain. To defend himself, he was obliged to admit and invoke the false and absurd distinction between the spiritual and the temporal, of the heavenly kingdom and the earthly kingdom, of God and Caesar. It is therefore true to say that the coming of the Gospel has directly influenced only feeling, and has acted only indirectly on knowledge and activity. Christianity has not brought the science of the organization of Equality: consequently, although, under the name of Fraternity, the principle of human Equality happens to have been proclaimed by Jesus, it

was only as a utopia commanded by Charity, which at the same time includes and connects the love of God and the love of men.

Just as after Plato and Aristotle, Humanity had to make progress before a new philosophical progress would be possible, and it is this step taken by Humanity without new light and without any other ideal that constitutes history from Plato to Jesus Christ, so after Jesus, Humanity had to make progress before a new philosophical progress would be possible, and it is this step taken by Humanity without new light and without any other ideal that constitutes history from Jesus to the end of the Eighteenth Century and the French Revolution.

This is how HUMAN EQUALITY emerged little by little, laboriously and successively from the barriers that obstructed it, and which, as I will say later in the General Conclusion of this work, are none other than the *Castes*. By abolishing the primitive castes, which relate to the family, it first manifested itself as an individual aspect, and was called LIBERTY. By abolishing the castes which succeeded the primitive castes, and which relate to the fatherland, to the city, it manifested itself under a sentimental aspect, and was called FRATERNITY. By abolishing or tending to abolish the third form of castes, that which relates to feudalism, to property, it manifests itself under an aspect which, comprising at the same time the individual and his fellow men, unites their interest in the same right, and it is finally called EQUALITY.

We thus find, at the end of our study of the past, the synthesis that psychology had revealed to us at the very beginning of this book.¹⁹⁴ These are the three aspects of our nature: Sensation, Sentiment, Knowledge, which have successively manifested Liberty, Fraternity, Equality.

Human nature, in fact, gives us three distinct terms, though merged in the unity of life: Sensation, Sentiment, Knowledge. These three aspects of being generate three needs, which we will call rights or duties, as we wish: *Liberty*, responding to Sensation; *Fraternity*, responding to Sentiment; and *Equality*, responding to Knowledge. And these three needs intervening in the world have created history. Thus history gives us three epochs.

Liberty responds to the childhood of our West, Fraternity to its youth, Equality to its mature age.

Everything in the development of this West has therefore taken place according to the very law of the development of individual life.

Liberty, corresponding to the life of Sensation, of manifestation, responds in a preponderant manner to childhood. Children love liberty for themselves, but they are willingly without pity for others, as the poet says, and above all the notion of the rights of others escapes them and is unknown to them. Fraternity, corresponding to the life of Sentiment, responds in a preponderant way to youth. Youth is the age of love, friendship, and enthusiasm. Finally, Equality,

corresponding to the life of Knowledge, responds in a preponderant way to mature age.

Humanity, as one man, has thus successively passed through these three phases; and it will end up uniting them. Liberty remains the right of modern man; Fraternity, his duty: but Equality is the doctrine on which both his right and his duty are based.

At the end of the evolution of history, Equality is therefore, however unorganized and misunderstood it may be, the law of souls, the law of laws, the right, the only right.

And it has three terms, which are distinct although they imply each other. Either, indeed, there is no law or religion on earth, or it is no longer a question today of Liberty alone; for it would be the liberty of a few to the detriment of others; — nor of Fraternity alone, for the fraternity of Christianity has only achieved inequality and alms; — nor of Equality alone; for equality which would not achieve liberty and fraternity, would only be equality in nothingness, and would not give satisfaction to human nature, such as it reveals itself today.

Today the formula is complete, and it calls for a solution; it is threefold and one at a time: *Liberty-Fraternity-Equality*. As for us. Men, emerging from the past, and almost emerged from the present which flees and collapses, here we are before the FUTURE, which must realize these three terms.

CONCLUSION

OR

GENERAL LAW OF THE PAST.

CHAPTER I.

The three possible kinds of inequality, or Castes.

For a long time I considered history with torment, with anxiety, seeking a general law of the past, so that order would appear to me and appear to others in the apparent disorder of past centuries, and so that there would be no would have given rise to this trouble of the soul of which Herder speaks thus: "How many I have known who, on the immense ocean of human history, sought in vain this God who, in the immutable sphere of the physical world, they saw with the eyes of their soul and recognized with an ever new emotion in each blade of grass, in each grain of sand! In the temple of earthly creation, from all sides arose a hymn to the glory of power and eternal wisdom. On the contrary, in the theater of human actions, it was only a permanent conflict of blind passions, of unregulated forces, of destructive arts, of vanished good designs. The story resembles this loose web hanging in the corner of a palace, and inextricable threads still preserve the traces of a recent carnage after the insect which had woven it has hidden itself from view. However, if there is a God in nature, this God is also in history. For man is also a part of creation; and, even in the midst of his passions, and even in his last wanderings, he does not fail to follow laws as beautiful, as immutable, as those that govern the revolutions of the celestial bodies."¹⁹⁵

Here is the law of the past, as metaphysics and history have made it known to me:

The human race, following Lessing's idea, passes through all the phases of a successive education. It therefore only arrived at the phase of equality after having passed through the three possible sorts of inequality:

1. The regime of the castes of family,
2. The regime of the castes of homeland,
3. The regime of the castes of property.

The human spirit aspires to escape from this triple regime of castes, which is slavery, to enter into liberty. This is what characterizes the point of time in which we live.

Today we are between two worlds, between a world of inequality and slavery that is ending and a world of equality that is beginning.

CHAPTER II.

Explanation of the word Caste.

I must explain this word *Caste*, and justify the use I make of it.

“We call *Castes*,” says the Dictionary of the Academy, “the tribes between which the Indians are *divided*.”

The characteristic of castes in the East is, in fact, *division*. This word expresses the separation, the division of a people into several peoples, or, in general, the separation of the human species into several parts, into several species.¹⁹⁶

Political writers, through lack of reflection, have not seen until now that the oriental castes are only one of the three forms of the idea of caste. And hence the emptiness of all political science.

The right of man and his interest being free communion with the whole human race, and, through the human race, with the whole universe, everything that destroys this right, everything that divides the human race, everything that pens up men in herds hostile or indifferent to each other deserve to be severely condemned, whether the means of this division, of this separation, of this *confinement*, is called the family, or political law, or civil law; and the name *caste*, consecrated for one of these kinds of imprisonment and separation, can very legitimately be applied to the others. This being the case, why, if divisions constituting parts in Humanity, species within the species, are based on property, would I not see there property castes? Why should the divisions of peoples, which have led to so many wars and shed so much blood, not also be philosophically designated under the term caste? In a word, why should divisions originating from only one of the modes of human manifestation, the family, be considered castes? Politicians, you have tarnished the oriental castes, which for centuries have fallen into decadence; but your eyes do not see other castes just as real and just as harmful to Humanity, and your ignorance protects them!

I therefore understand by *castes of family*, or *family caste*, the limitation of the natural liberty of man by the false extension given to the *family*.

By *castes of homeland*, or *homeland caste*, I mean the limitation of the natural liberty of man by the false extension given to the city or *homeland*.

By *castes of property*, or *property caste*, I mean the limitation of the natural liberty of man by the false extension given to *property*.

Human nature produces three things: family, country, property.

These three things, inherent in human nature, are good in themselves, but have become evil and produced evil.

This resulted in three modes of slavery for man.

All human society until now has been affected, simultaneously, although to varying degrees, by these three modes of slavery.

In the course of the ages and the development of Humanity, these three modes of slavery have predominated in turn in human societies, starting with the slavery that results from the family, continuing with the slavery that results from the city, and ending with the slavery that results from property.

All the ancient empires, India, China, Persia, Chaldea, Egypt, the entire Orient, were the seat of the regime of family castes.

Greece, the Roman Empire, the entire south-western part of Europe, until the time of the Barbarian invasion, were the seat of the caste regime of the homeland.

The regime of property castes began with the invasion of the Barbarians, and has continued down to us. It dominates today in Europe and America.

Thus high antiquity, middle antiquity, and modernity are three very distinct ages, three ages that follow one another like three possible phases of inequality or slavery.

And, in space, three different seats of civilization correspond to these three ages of history. If Benares, Babylon or Memphis were the seat of the ancient caste regime, that is to say of the vice of the family castes, if Sparta and Rome were the seat of the middle caste regime, that is to say of the vice of city castes, it can be said that England and the United States of America are today the most apparent seat of the vice of individual property, or of the modern caste regime .

Civilization marched from East to West, and from the equator to the pole, changing principles and vices. The empires where the vice of family slavery reigned were the first to be founded in the East, and the first to collapse. The empires where the vice of social slavery reigned were then founded on the borders of Asia and Europe, and collapsed like the preceding ones. Finally came, in the north, empires that were based on the vice of proprietary slavery: these flourish today; but every great soul has despised this false splendor of a civilization where man becomes a thing, and values himself by the gold he possesses or is possessed by.

CHAPTER III.

The man of the Castes.

Rousseau attributes the origin of society to the establishment of property, which he does not know how to explain: "The first," he says, "who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say *This is mine*, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. How many crimes, wars, murders, how many miseries and horrors would the human race have been spared by someone who, tearing up the stakes or filling in the ditch, had cried out to his fellow men: Be careful not to listen to this imposter; you are lost if you forget that the fruits belong to all, and that the earth belongs to no one."¹⁹⁷

Rousseau transported back to primitive times an idea inspired by his time, a vice of the society of his time. It is quite certain that modern society is mainly based on property, and that the main cause of current inequality is the false property that reigns today. But it is false that society began there, that the first empires suffered to the same degree from this vice, and that inequality had no other sources. The slavery that results for the man from the family and the city is no less than that which results from property, and preceded this by many centuries.

Ask ancient man what he is and what his rights are: he quickly goes back to his race, he tells you the name of his tribe and his most distant ancestor; he comes from Melchizedek or Abraham; he came out of the head, or the hand, or the foot of Brahma. Pariah, he is not even surprised that there are Pariahs and Brahmins; he only recognizes his rights as those that he has inherited; he only knows himself, so to speak, and is conscious of himself, because he knows those who engendered him and who passed before him on earth through the same furrow of birth as he did. This man therefore only really exists through his ancestors: if he has no ancestors to name, he does not know what he is, he enters into nothingness, he ceases to be.

Address the same question to the man of middle antiquity, to the Greek, to the Roman. He will answer you by showing you the city around him. *Sum civis Romanus*, this is the brilliant title that the Roman orator gives to his clients, as a safeguard against torture. And did we not see St. Paul himself, the great destroyer of the castes of nations, obliged to resort to this title of Roman citizen for protection! In middle antiquity, man is no longer confined to castes of birth, but to castes of homeland; he is born before every subject of his country, and his right comes from this quality. He is entitled because he currently has a certain society with those around him. He and his fellow citizens form an alliance, a

city, from which results for everyone the right, and all the right. But this city is separated from the rest of the human race, as was the birth caste. The duality of Brahmins and Pariahs was followed by the duality of Greeks and Barbarians. Man is therefore still only associated with an infinitely restricted portion of Humanity. He is the associate of anyone who is part of the same city as him; but he is hostile to all other men, and reciprocally all other men are hostile to him. All other men are foreigners to him, *βάρβαροι*. There he is who makes war on them, who reduces them to slavery, or who is reduced to slavery by them. His city therefore, which constitutes his power, at the same time limits his power: by the very fact that he has enemies, he is weak; and by the very fact that he has slaves, he is a slave.

Finally, ask the same question to the feudal man, to the man of the Middle Ages, or to the bourgeois of today, who succeeded the man of the Middle Ages and who lives, without knowing it, under the same regime.¹⁹⁸ The man from the Middle Ages will show you his fortress, and lead you to the limits of his land. This land belongs to him, but he belongs to this land; it is the land that limits him and constitutes him. Let the king destroy his manor, and all his rights will be destroyed. Likewise the bourgeois today shows you the capital he has at his disposal; it is his feudal castle. His power is in his gold, but conversely his life is chained and limited by his gold. Let his capital be destroyed, the wretch is lost! He becomes a serf of industry, from the tyrant that he was. And even as a tyrant, he is only a tyrant up to the limit of his capital.

This, I repeat, is the distinctive and predominant character of each of the three great phases through which Humanity has passed until our times.

What we call Civilization, without us having clearly formulated until now what this civilization consists of, has moved, as I said, from the equator to the pole. At the equator, man was characterized and limited by his birth title; later, on the shores of the Mediterranean, he was characterized and limited by his title of citizen; still later, in modern Europe, he was characterized and limited by his title of proprietor.

Certainly, I do not intend to say that birth castes were radically abolished when what I call *middle antiquity* came. Nor do I intend to say that the political castes that succeeded them were radically destroyed when the regime of property castes began to take on the main influence in the Middle Ages. I only mean that, for those who understand history, three great eras, characterized by three different predominances, share the life of the human race down to us: 1. the *era of birth castes*, or the oriental era, India, Persia, Babylonia, Egypt; 2. the *era of the homeland castes*, or the Mediterranean era, the Greeks, the Romans; 3. the *era of property castes*, or the feudal era, which still continues today.

The caste regime of birth, the caste regime of homeland, the caste regime of property, are in ruins around us. At least, the ideal of the human spirit has surpassed all that.

CHAPTER IV.

The new man.

From the midst of all these ruins comes a new man; he is the man of modern times: he is the man who has received in his heart the teachings of Christianity and Philosophy.

Modern man has ancestors other than those of the flesh; so he does not argue about his ancestors: he is a man, and this title is enough for him.

Modern man does not feel dependent, in his essence, on the place where he was born, nor even on the nation that gave birth to him. He feels not only a *citizen* in this nation from which he came, but a *member of the sovereign*. He even feels like something more; because, as if he feared alienating his liberty, he put at the head of his Constitutions a distinction between the *rights of man* and those of the citizen.

The proof that the castes of countries have lost all their influence in his eyes is that he rejects the slavery of any race of men as odious, and that he regards war as a scourge, and in many cases as a crime.

Modern man declaims on the stage:

The first to be king was a fortunate soldier;

or:

Our priests are not what a vain people think,
Our credulity makes all their knowledge;

or even :

The great are only great because we are on our knees: let us get up.

Ancient man did not conceive of society without masters and slaves, without priests, without nobles and without kings. Modern man no longer conceives of masters, slaves, priests, nobles or kings. He calls himself his own priest, he calls himself his master, he feels noble, he feels himself a king, simply because he is a man. Luther taught him to do without the nobility of the Church, Descartes to judge everything by himself, Rousseau to regard himself as a member of the only legitimate sovereign. He is therefore neither king nor subject, he is man; he is neither layman nor priest, he is man. Man, in his eyes this quality says it all; nothing bounds or limits it; it embraces all times and all places, all generations and all peoples.

Thus, while in the past man was always hidden under qualities, today the quality of man is first.

By dint of overturning all the barriers of space and time, the human mind has arrived at an immense generalization. One God for all men, the earth for the home and inheritance of all, and all past generations, to whatever races they may have belonged, as ancestors of each of us.

What new consciousness must have emerged for man from such a thought! Humanity, once divided into a multitude of streams, appears to us today as a single whole. Ancient man, with his particular gods, and his race isolated from others, felt like a wave in the current of a river: modern man, with his united God and his united human race, feels part of an ocean.

It is this new sentiment that man has today regarding himself that basically constitutes what we call Equality.

Feeling himself to be part of a great whole, man puts himself in contact with everything, sees himself as linked to everything, and finally comes to understand that he has the right to everything.

This new sentiment, this new consciousness that man has today of himself is basically nothing more than the transformation and development of the sentiment and consciousness that constituted ancient man. The difference, as I indicated earlier, is only that of a river at the meeting of all rivers, at the ocean.

The castes have become the only caste, that is to say the human race. Man is therefore no longer the man of this or that caste, but the man of the only caste that exists, the man of the human race. When he was only the man of a particular caste, he only felt entitled to certain things: having become the man of the whole, he feels entitled to everything.

Now, as it is only in his capacity as a man that he feels this right to everything, he cannot help but recognize this right in others, who also have this quality of man. It is because he is a man that he has rights: therefore it is man who has rights, man in general; therefore all men have the right.

Hence a certain incontestable, primordial, absolute notion of the right of all to everything. Hence two faces in Equality, two faces that respond to each other and one of which cannot exist without the other. Equality happens to be the personal, individual, selfish sentiment that each man has regarding himself; but at the same time it cannot be that without being the most positive and certain recognition of the rights of others.

Equality, this word sums up all the previous progress accomplished so far by Humanity; it sums up, so to speak, the entire past life of Humanity, in the sense that it represents the result, the goal, and the final cause of the entire career already covered. It is so that Equality could appear that all the initiators and all the revealers have succeeded one another, that all the discoveries have been made, that so many wars have taken place, that so much blood has flowed on the earth, that so much sweat has been shed for so many centuries by the entire mass of humankind. The individual sufferings of men, like the collective sufferings endured by them, had the providential goal of Equality, the sentiment of Equality, the notion of Equality. It is so that the human mind arrives at this

notion that Socrates and Jesus are divinely dead; but it is also for this purpose that the compass was discovered, America discovered, the printing press discovered, all the great inventions discovered. It is also for this purpose that the Alexanders, the Caesars, and the Napoleons passed on earth; but it is also for this same final cause that the slaves laboriously leveled the roads that served the armies of the conquerors.

END.

NOTES

- ¹ We do not think that we will be accused of injustice towards Montesquieu, because we refuse him praise that belongs to Rousseau.
- ² In the times of Rousseau, history was not a science, but an account of facts, and a truncated and fragmentary account. The philosophy of history was, as Bacon said, a *desideratum*, since it was in part the efforts of Rousseau that provoked it. In the absence of history, was there at least a psychology on which he could rely to reason properly about the nature of man? No. This true psychology could be found in germ in Leibniz, but Leibniz was far from being understood; what was popular was sensualism, it was Condillac.
- ³ *On the Inequality of Conditions*, preface.
- ⁴ The *Discourse on Inequality* is from 1754.
- ⁵ *Freedman*, *affranchi*.
- ⁶ *Hostis*, stranger, enemy.
- ⁷ Translation of M. Barthélemy
- ⁸ From the French translation of Grou.
- ⁹ In the *Revue Encyclopédique*, from 1831 to 1835.
- ¹⁰ See *De l'Éclectisme*, 1 vol. in C. Gosselin's bookstore, and the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*.
- ¹¹ I consider it quite certain that Plato received this truth from Egypt and the school of Pythagoras. But it would be straying too far from my subject to demonstrate it. See *De l'Éclectisme* and the articles *Platon* and *Pythagore* in the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*.
- ¹² The way in which Pythagoras and Plato understood the relationship and generation of the three aspects of the human soul constitutes a large part of their philosophy. It is quite clear that I cannot discuss such a vast subject here. See the articles on PYTHAGORE and PLATON in the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*.
- ¹³ The text I am quoting adds a fourth caste, the *Vaisyas*, whom it says emerged from the thigh of Brahma, while the Sudras emerged from his feet. But it seems obvious to me that the importance acquired by the Vaisyas (landowners and merchants) was the sole cause of this distinction between them and the Sudras.
- ¹⁴ This truth, that Plato's society or nation is divided into three true nations, did not escape him. He sometimes calls his orders *nations*: "The *nation* of artisans is sacred to Vulcan and Minerva, from whom we hold the arts necessary for life; just as the *nation* of those who, by other arts, protect and guarantee the work of artisans, is sacred to Mars and Minerva." (*Laws*, Book XI.)
- ¹⁵ See the *Réfutation d'Eclectisme* and several articles in the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*.

¹⁶ He does not explain himself positively, but everything proves that this is his idea. Obviously, in his republic, the only true men are those who live in community; as for the others, who are not men, but species of inferior beings, if not brutes, their law is the regime of property. The production of wealth, the economy and industry in all its extent are the work of the multitude given over to individualism and avarice under this regime of property. If Plato did not clearly explain this point of common or individual property in relation to the third caste, that of the workers, it is because he did not suppose that the thing could be called into question. This third caste had to live in the inferior state of individual property. Moreover, this obviously follows from a passage in Book III of the *Republic*, when Socrates thus contrasts the regime he wants to give to the warrior class with the regime proper to the multitude: "First, I desire that none of them should have anything that is his own, unless it is absolutely necessary; then, that they should have neither house nor store that everyone cannot enter. As for food suitable for sober and courageous warriors, the *other citizens* will be responsible for providing it to them, as a just reward for their services; so, however, that they have neither too much nor too little for the year. Let them go, at meal times, to common dining rooms, and let them live together as warriors should live in camp. Let them understand that the Gods have placed divine gold and silver in their souls, that they consequently have no need of the gold and silver of men, that it is not permissible for them to sully the possession of this immortal gold by the alloy of earthly gold; that the gold they have is pure, whereas that of men has been at all times the source of many crimes. That thus they are *the only ones* among citizens who are forbidden to handle, even to touch gold or silver, to live under the same roof with these metals, to put them on their clothes, to drink from gold or silver cups. That this is the only way to preserve themselves and the State. But that, as soon as they have lands, houses, money *of their own*, from the guardians that they are, *they will become savers and laborers*; defenders of the State, its enemies and its tyrants. They will spend their lives hating each other, setting ambushes for each other, and will have more to fear from enemies within than from those without. That then they and the Republic will run with great strides towards their ruin." It is clear from this passage that these *other citizens* who must provide the warriors with their subsistence, these *savers and laborers*, from whom the warriors must distinguish themselves so radically, must have owned land, houses, and money of their own; and it was they who composed Plato's third caste. In this respect, Plato reproduced the type of Egyptian civilization, where the first two castes lived on a common fund, while the different industrial castes were under the regime of individual property.

[missing note: i. See *De l'Eclectisme*, Part One, § 3.]

[missing note: ii. Including women, the proportion would be higher; but this approximate ratio is only true for Greece. In the Roman Republic, the proportion of slaves to free men was much more frightening. When, around the time of the Gracchi, the Romans confiscated all the lands of the peoples they had conquered, the rich soon absorbed the entire conquest and, in order to cultivate their domains, prodigiously increased the number of their slaves; Italy was covered with these private prisons called *ergastulas* where they kept them, fifteen by fifteen, locked up at night: “The poor,” says Plutarch (Life of the Gracchi), “shorn of their possessions, no longer showed any zeal for military service, and no longer desired to raise children. Thus Italy was soon to be depopulated of free inhabitants, and filled with barbarian slaves whom the rich employed in cultivating the land, to replace the citizens they had driven out.” It was on seeing Italy thus empty of citizens and covered with slaves, on a journey he made from Rome to Numantia, that Tiberius Gracchus conceived his plans for agrarian laws. It was not uncommon among the Romans for a citizen to own twenty thousand slaves. They distributed them in *decuria*, which, taken together, could be compared to an army.]

¹⁷ A political novel similar to Thomas More's *Utopia*, which appeared in Holland at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

¹⁸ “Lycurgus,” says Cicero (*De Divinat.*, I), “had the laws he intended for Lacedaemon confirmed by the authority of the Delphian Apollo. Plutarch relates that before proposing his laws, Lycurgus went to Delphi, made sacrifices to Apollo, and brought back from there the famous oracle in which the priestess calls him “beloved of the Gods and rather a god than a man.” We have this oracle in Herodotus (*Clio*), and at greater length in Théodoret. (*Therapeut.*, disc., ix).

¹⁹ Φιδίτια or ρειδίτια could be a contraction of φιλῶν ἐδίτια, *convivia publica amicorum*; but it is more likely that this word corresponds exactly to the term ἀνδρία of the Cretans and that it derives for the first syllable, from φῶς, *vir*, ἴφι, *fortiter* (root φύω, *gigno*), as ἀνδρία derives from ἀνὴρ, *vir*.

²⁰ Herodotus subdivides this third caste into shepherds, swineherds, merchants, interpreters and seafarers. Other ancient authors indicate different subdivisions. But as for the deep line of demarcation that existed between the two upper castes and the lower castes, it is incontestable. “In Egypt,” says Herodotus, “not a single member of the military class learns a mechanical trade; but all apply themselves, from father to son, to the profession of war.” (Book 5.) Herodotus had noticed the resemblance that the constitutions of all the ancient peoples of the West presented in this respect, and the particular analogy which the constitution of Sparta had with this caste system: “Truly,” he says (*Ibid.*), “I cannot affirm whether it is from Egypt that the Greeks borrowed this custom that the healing profession is transmitted from father

to son. I see, in fact, that among the Thracians, the Scythians, the Persians, the Lydians, and among almost all the barbarians, those who do not practice the mechanical arts and who profess arms are esteemed the most noble, while the craftsmen and their children are considered the least important and the lowest in each nation. This is also what is observed in Greece, especially among the Lacedaemonians. For it is not the same in Corinth, where artisans are held in great esteem.”

²¹ Diodorus (Book I) does not destroy this testimony, but rather confirms it, saying that all the lands of Egypt were divided into three portions, one of which belonged to the king, another to the priests and the third to the warriors. In this respect, the difference between these two contemporary authors is only apparent, and is easily explained. The lands assigned to the priestly and warrior orders were exempt from all taxes, as Herodotus tells us (book II). The third part of the land, subject to taxation, should therefore be considered the king's share, and as falling under his sovereignty. Moreover, according to what Herodotus reports (book II), this sovereignty dated back to an ancient division of the lands made by Sesostris, who had imposed a tribute on all those among whom he had made this division.

²² According to an Arabic manuscript, translated from a very ancient Coptic book and cited by Maillet (*Description de l’Egypt*), the number of these buildings may have been as high as fifty thousand.

²³ “*Colchi et Aegyptii et Aethiopes ab initio pudenda circumcidunt. Nam et Phaenices, et Syri qui sunt in Palæstina, didicisse ab Aegyptiis et ipsi confitentur. Syri vero qui iluvium Thermodontem et Partbenium acclunt, et liorum contermini Macrones, a Colchis se nuper didicisse aiunt. Hi enim ex hominibus soli sunt qui circumciduntur.*” (Herodot., liv. II.)

Some modern writers had thought that circumcision was perhaps not in general use in Egypt, and that it was only obligatory for priests; but the mummies, all circumcised, have proven the contrary. Moreover, this custom was equally widespread among all the neighbors of the Jews. The Bible itself teaches us that the Ishmaelites, Midianites, Idumeans, Ammonites and Moabites practiced it like the Hebrews: “Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, that I will punish every circumcised person who has foreskin, from Egypt, Judah, Edom, the children of Ammon, Moab, and all who are in the ends and at the ends of the wilderness; for all nations have foreskin, and all the house of Israel have the foreskin of the heart.” (*Jeremiah*, ch. 9, v. 25-26.) When I quote the Bible, I use the Ostervald version; I must warn that Le Maistre de Sacy has incorrectly rendered this passage from Jeremiah.

²⁴ The first month of spring, which is called *Nisan*.

²⁵ It appears that the Egyptians had a religious festival that may have partly given Moses the sign of the Passover or, as theologians say, the material of

this sacrament. I find in Selden (*De Dis Syris*, prolegom.): “*Ægyptiis quotannis in Judaico Pascliate (id est, eudem tempore quo Pascha) greges et arbores minio, relui alexelerio, illinire solemne erat. Id ex depravato traditionis sacra: de Hebræorum superliminaribus sanguine illitis intellectutu manavit; quocumque fusius narrat Epiphanius, in Hæresi Nazaræorum.*” But it is evident that this kind of exorcism practiced by the Egyptians took on a completely different and new meaning in the institution of Moses.

²⁶ The ancient Jews engaged little in trade: “We are not,” says Josephus (*Apolog.* 1), “a trading nation; we have few dealings with other nations; our cities are not on the seashore. We inhabit a fertile region, and we derive happy fruits from it through cultivation and labor.” The Sacrificers and Levites, who were not included in the division of the land, led the pastoral life so beloved by the patriarchs, having no other possessions than flocks.

²⁷ “Some,” says Tacitus, “see in this custom of the Jews to rest on the seventh day, only a love of rest and a cessation of labor; and it would also be for this reason that they give every seven years a whole year to idleness. But, according to others, it would be an honor paid to Saturn: either because the Jews received the elements of religion from the ancient inhabitants of Crete, the Idaeans, who, expelled with Saturn, also came to Italy to give us our first laws, or because of the seven stars which, from the highest sphere of the sky, govern mortals and all perishable things, the star of Saturn is the one that is carried into space with the greatest power and speed, and that most of the celestial bodies accomplish their effect and complete their course by the number seven and its compounds: *Septimo die otium placuisse ferunt, quia is finem laborum lulerit, dein, blandiente inertia, septimum quoque annum igitur adiacentem. Alii honorem eum Saturno haberi: seu principia religionis tradentibus Idaeis, quos, cum Saturno pulsos, et conditores gentis acceperimus; seu quod e seplem sideribus, quibus mariales reguntur altissimo orbe, præcipua potentia Stella Saturni faictur, ac pleraque cœlestium vim suam et cursum septimos per numeros conficiant.*” (*Histor.*, book v, ch. 4.)

²⁸ It is known that there existed among the Jews a sect of Sabians or Sabaites, who were descended from the ancient Chaldeans, and who had a multitude of books attributed to Abraham and the other patriarchs. Several of these books still exist. A portion of the ideas and fables that composed them have passed into the Talmud. The Kabbalah is largely the work of these Sabaites. The cult of angels, stars, and numbers concealed the essence of their beliefs.

²⁹ And this legislation was followed and put into practice. It is not only the Bible that attests to this; we have other testimonies on this point. The Rabbis recognize, it is true, that there was a Jubilee of more than fifty years after the return from captivity and the second temple. But the observance of the Sabbatical Year lasted until the complete fall of the Jews. Josephus (*Ant. Jud.*, book XI, ch. 8) reports that while Alexander was in Jerusalem, the high priest

Jaddus asked him as a favor to let the Jews live according to their law, and to exempt them from tribute in the seventh year. The Samaritans make the same request to this prince, because they also observed the Sabbatical Year. It is said in the first book of *Maccabees* (ch. vi, v. 49) that Antiochus Eupator having held the city of Belsara in Judea under siege for a long time, the inhabitants were forced to surrender by the shortage of food, because it was the year of rest for the land. Josephus also tells us (book XIV, c. 17) that Julius Caesar imposed on the inhabitants of Jerusalem a tribute which had to be paid every year, except the Sabbatical Year, because nothing was sown or harvested during that year. He adds (c. 28) that during the siege of Jerusalem, made by Herod and Sosius, the inhabitants were reduced to the greatest shortage of food, because it was the Sabbatical Year. Tacitus (*Hist.*, book V. ch. 1), in a passage I quoted above (page 164), also attests to the seventh-year rest observed by the Jews.

³⁰ Besides President Bouhier, who responded victoriously to Montfaucon, we can cite Scaliger, Blondel, Saumaise, Grotius, Henri de Valois, Et. Le Moine, Cotelier, Father Pagi, Basnage, etc., who all recognized or proved that the Therapeutae were incontestably Jews. Bernard de Montfaucon was the only one who made them Christians: and not a single scholar of any renown dared, after him, to maintain this paradox.

³¹ This passage and the others that I quote here on the Essenes seem to me so important for the philosophy of history, that I can hardly think of any more valuable testimonies from antiquity on any subject whatsoever. I will endeavor to translate them faithfully. The versions that we have are very defective. The translation of these passages from Josephus by Arnauld d'Andilly, and that of Philo's treatise by Montfaucon, are nothing but a tissue of misinterpretations.

³² Or religious: τρία παρὰ. Ἰουδαίοις εἶδη φιλοσορεῖται.

³³ The ordinary text of Josephus here reads Ἑσσηνοὶ, while in the same passage cited by Porphyry (*De Abstin.*, lib. iv), we read Ἑσσαῖοι. Moreover, Josephus, in his *Antiquities* (book xv, c. 13, et passim), uses the two names indifferently.

³⁴ Ἡ καὶ ἐδόκτε σεμνοτάτη εἶναι (in Porph.). The ordinary text reads: Ο δοκιῖ σεμνότητα ἀτκεῖν.

³⁵ Ἰουδαῖοι μὲν τὸ γένος, φιλάλληλοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταλέον.

³⁶ Ὑπερογία. Josephus is speaking here of the class of Essenes who abstained from marriage. We will see later that there was another class of Essenes who adopted and sanctified it.

³⁷ The sentence ends there in the text of Josephus given by Eusebius (*Præpar. evang.*) and by Porphyry (*De Abstin.*); but in the ordinary editions of Josephus,

there is added: "Not believing that any of them keeps faith with their husbands."

³⁸ Κοινωνητικὸν, αἱ, χοιωνικόνν (in Porphyry and Eusebius).

³⁹ The text of Josephus cited by Porphyry and Eusebius says nothing more. But in the ordinary editions of Josephus, there are a few details added; we read: "Also, when they travel, they do not carry any baggage; they only have weapons to defend themselves against thieves. In each city, a curator chosen for this purpose (κῆδεμὼν ἐξάιρετος) is responsible for taking care of foreigners, providing them with clothing and everything they need. Moreover, their manner of dress and their air are as modest as those of young people under good discipline."

⁴⁰ τδίως εύσεθείς.

⁴¹ πρὶν γὰρ ἀνατχεῖν τὸν ἥλιον, οὐδὲν ρθέγ/ονται τῶν δεθελῶν" πατρίους δὲ τίνας εἰς αὐτὸν εὐχὰς, ὥσπερ ἱκετεύοντες Some scholars, misled by the letter, have seen in these prayers a kind of idolatry and sun worship; but this way of understanding is absurd. It is evident that when Josephus praises the piety of the Essenes, as he does here and in his Antiquities, he could not have meant that they stupidly worshipped the material sun, and urged it by their prayers to hasten its rising. It is clear that it was to God that they addressed their prayers, directing them towards the sun. This does not only mean, it seems to me, that they prayed to God, as is commonly said of the first Christians, by turning towards the rising sun; but it means that they worshipped God, as did the first Christians, in his physical manifestation of the sun. What is more beautiful than this psalm of David, which was perhaps one of those ancient prayers, one of those songs of the ancestors (πατρίους εὐχὰς) of which Josephus speaks: "My soul, bless the Eternal! O Lord my God, you are wonderfully great, you are clothed with majesty and magnificence. He (the Eternal) *wraps himself in light as with a garment*, he spreads the heavens like a pavilion... he makes the winds his messengers, and devouring fires his servants... He has established the earth on its foundations so that it will never be shaken. You have covered it with the formless deep as with a garment, and the waters stood on the mountains: they fled at your rebuke, and quickly fled at the sound of your thunder; the mountains stood up, and the valleys sank down in the place that You established for them... He leads the fountains through the valleys, and makes them flow between the mountains... He brings forth bread from the earth, and wine that strengthens the heart of man. He made the moon to mark the seasons, and the sun knows its setting. You bring darkness, and the night comes, during which all the beasts of the forest walk; the young lions roar after the prey, and to seek their food from the Mighty God. But *when the sun rises*, they withdraw and lie down in their dens. *Then man goes out to his work and to his labor until evening*. O Lord, how many are your works! You have made them all in wisdom, the

earth is full of your riches... Do you hide your face, your creatures are troubled; do you take away your breath from them, they faint and return to their dust; do you send back your spirit to them, they are created anew, and you renew the face of the earth... I will sing to the Lord all my days, etc.” (Psalm CIV.) Here God is evidently worshipped in his manifestation, the universe, that is to say in his activity and in the work resulting from his activity. It is not the universe that the Psalmist worships, but it is God in the universe; it is he whom he discovers behind this universe; it is his power, his love, and his intelligence, that he sees in this objective medium that we call the world, and which is at once a veil that hides the Divinity, and a reflection that shows and reveals it. It was certainly in this sense that the Essenes prayed before sunrise. This passage from Josephus is further explained by what Philo reports of the Therapeutae; we will see this testimony later. Moreover, it is impossible not to feel the striking analogy that there is between this morning prayer of the Essenes to the sun, that is to say to the divine Sun, to the spiritual Sun hidden behind its emblem or rather its manifestation, and the famous prayer of India, the Hymn to the Sun, the Sàvitri, summary of the Vedas according to the book of Manu (book II, sl. 76-78), that every Brahmin recites morning and evening. In this prayer of India, the holiest of prayers, it is also to the Sun, Savitri, that one addresses oneself in appearance, but in reality it is to the divine Sun. See our article BRAHMANISM, in the Encyclopédie nouvelle.

⁴² Ἐπιμελητῶν, *curatorum*.

⁴³ Eleven o'clock in the morning, according to our way of calculating time.

⁴⁴ Josephus designates here only by this general term of linen veil, σκεπόςμασι λινοῖς, what he further calls the sacred garment, ἱερὰς ἐσθῆτας, and what he then designates purely the word belt or apron, περίζωμα, *perizoma*. It is evident that this belt with which the Essenes covered themselves, to the exclusion of all other clothing, in the ceremony of their daily bath and their common meal, is the belt (*perizoma* of the Vulgate) with which Adam and Eve were surrounded in the earthly paradise: “And the eyes of them both were opened; and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves belts: Consuerunt folia ficus, et fecerunt sibi perizomata.” (Gen., ch. iii, v. 7.) We know that, in the early days of Christianity, a large number of Christians made it their duty to imitate, in religious ceremonies, this nudity of Adam and Eve. The same custom reappeared among the Adamites of Bohemia in the fourteenth century, and among some Anabaptists.

⁴⁵ Καὶ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀγνείαν εἰς ἴδιον οἶκον. πυνίασιν, ἔνθ; μηδενὶ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων ἐπιτέτραπται παρελθεῖν αὐτοί τε καθαροὶ τὸ δειπνητήριον. This passage, so clear and so evident, has hardly been understood until now. It has not been seen that this particular room, which strangers never entered,

was precisely the refectory, the place of the holy banquet. However, Josephus says so expressly, and, as if to make it clearer, he adds that they walked there as if toward a temple.

⁴⁶ Ο ἱερεὺς.

⁴⁷ Πικοντεύχεται.

⁴⁸ The text given by Porphyry adds: "Who is pure and not filthy."

⁴⁹ Ἐπεύχεται.

⁵⁰ Τεραίρουσι τὸν Θεόν. The ordinary text of the works of Josephus adds, ὡς χορευόν τῆς τροφῆς, "for having provided them with their food;" which appears to be an interpolation.

⁵¹ Ἐπείτα, ὡς ἱεράς, καταθέμενοι τὰς ἐσθῆτας.

⁵² Ἐπιμελητῶν.

⁵³ Τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν ἐνγράμματα.

⁵⁴ πρὸς θεραπείαν παθῶν. I note this word θεραπείαν used here by Josephus, because it agrees well with the explanation that I will give later of the Therapeutae.

⁵⁵ ἱρημένον περίζωμα, in the editions of Josephus; περίζωμα only in Porphyry.

⁵⁶ Καθερώτερον τῶν πρὸς ὀγνείαν ὑδάτων μεταλαμβάνει, in Porphyry. The ordinary text, in Josephus' editions, has καθαρωτέρων, which appears to be a mistake, but which does not change the meaning in any way. With this variant, it should be translated: "he approaches more and more their way of life, x and partakes of the holiest (purest) waters for purification."

⁵⁷ Εἰς τὰς συμθεώσεις.

⁵⁸ Or, even more literally, before tasting common food, Πρὶν δὲ τῆς κοινῆς ἄφασθαι τροφῆς.

⁵⁹ Ὅρκους ὄμνυσι φρικώδεις

⁶⁰ Τοῖς κρατοῦσιν.

⁶¹ Or *no power comes without God's permission*: Οὐ γὰρ δίχα Θεοῦ περεγίνεσθαι τινὲ τὸ ἄρχειν.

⁶² This can be understood as much of the civil and military dignities that the Essenes sometimes occupied in the cities where they resided, as of the ranks of their hierarchy. Josephus (Jewish War, book II, chap. 20, and book III, ch. 1) speaks of an Essene named John, Ἰωάννης ὁ Εἰσαῖος, who was governor of Thamna, and who gave battle to the Romans near Ascalon.

⁶³ This passage has greatly embarrassed commentators; and many regard it as corrupt. The text is everywhere, in the Works of Josephus as in Eusebius and in Porphyry: Τὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων ὀνόματα. "the names of the angels" (literally of the envoys), Havercamp proposes to read: τῶν ἀγνείων, "the methods of purification." But it seems to me that there is nothing to change. It is evident

first of all that it is not a question of angels, as some have believed, wrongly relating to the Essenes what St. Paul says in his epistle to the Colossians (chap. h, v. 18): "Let no one control you by the worship of angels, etc." It is quite true that certain Jews, even at that time, gave angels as guardians to each man, and that the worship of angels was widespread in Palestine, especially in the sect of the Sabaites, of which I spoke above (See page 170, note). But nothing that we know of the Essenes suggests that they were devoted to this worship; everything seems to prove the contrary. Moreover, the very context of Josephus' sentence irrevocably demonstrates that he did not want to speak of angels, but of something relating to the books of Essene doctrine. It is clear, in a word, that it is a question of the respect that one should have for the authors of these books. Also Prideaux, in his History of the Jews, and others, have understood this way, although the word ἀγγέλων remained an enigma for them. They translate: "The divine revealers or messengers who had composed these works." Arnauld d'Andilly understood: "the initiators who had transmitted the doctrine to the catechumens." But why so many difficulties? Ἀγγέλων here means the evangelists. This is what so many learned men who have been embarrassed by this term have not reflected on. The word *evangelists*, to signify the announcers of a doctrine or a religious event, is in fact well before Christianity. *Evangelist* is called in Greek εὐσγγελιστής, or εὐάγγελος, or simply ἄγγελος, *annunciator*. It is not only among the Jews that this term announcer was used in a religious sense. In the Greek language, the one who had had a revelation, or who had consulted an oracle, and who came to report the answer of this oracle, was called ἄγγελος, and the act of announcing an oracle was called ἀγγελίη or ἀγγελία, in Latin *denuntiatio*. Whoever had been thus invested with the divine word must have believed himself to have a mission, that of revealing it. Thus the ancient glossaries translate ἀγγελῆ by *praecipua potestas renuntiandi oraculi quod quis audivit*. This direct meaning produced another. An oracle of the Divinity, thus transmitted, took on, so to speak, a value, and demanded a reward. It was said: "You have received an oracle, you owe a gospel," that is to say, a sacrifice of thanksgiving. Hence an expression, apparently singular, which is found in Greek authors and even among the Latins: θύειν εὐαγγέλοι., *to sacrifice gospels*. "Phocion," says Plutarch, "having received the news of the death of Philip of Macedon, would not allow the people to sacrifice gospels, οὐ. εἶα. τὸν δῆμον εὐπγγέλια θύει." (Life of Phocion). Cicero writes to Atticus: "*O suaves epistolas tuas uno tempore datas, quibus εὐαγγέλια quae reddam nescio, deberi quidem plane fateor.*" Among the Hebrews, it was the same thing; God could not receive an oracle, that is to say, make his will known, without those to whom he first made it known having thereby a particular mission, that of signifying it, of announcing it, in other words of *evangelizing*; and they were called evangelists. There are many proofs of this: "*üomnus dabit verbum evange lizantibus*: The Lord will give the evangelists

something to speak." (Psalm., lxxvii, v. 12.) — "*Excelsum ascende, tu qui evangelizas Sion; exalta... qui evangelizas Jerusalem*: Get up on a high mountain, you who preach the gospel to Zion; raise your voice, you who bring good news to Jerusalem." (Isaiah., xl, v. 9) — "*Dominus jussit Ecce super montes pedes evant gelizantis*: The Lord has given commandment... Behold on the mountains the feet of the evangelist who brings his will. (Nalium, i, v. 15.)" Now what was said of a will or a particular decree of the Divinity should also be said of a doctrine: the thing is evident. When the disciples of Jesus began to spread his doctrine and to announce his coming, they naturally took the name of evangelists: "*Et int rantes domum Philippi evangelistae*." (Acts, 21, v. 8.) "Evangelist meant one who, by words or writings, propagated the doctrine of the new kingdom, *evangelium regni*. St. Paul clearly marks this meaning in twenty places: "Some," he says, "have the charge of teaching (of evangelizing); others are rather pastors than doctors: *Alios vero evangelistas, alios autem pastores*." (Ephes. Ch. iv. v. 41.)" And elsewhere, writing to Timothy and recommending him to watch over the purity of the doctrine: "Do the work of an evangelist: *Opus fac evangelistae*." (II Tim., v. 4.) St. Paul also speaks very often of his own gospel, that is to say of his doctrine, of his way of understanding the coming of the Messiah: "*Quia evangelium nostrum non venit ad vos*." (I Thess., i, v. 5.) — "*Evangelium quod evangelisatum est a me*." (Gai., i, x. 11.) — "*Contuli cum illis evangelium quod praedico*." (Ibid., n, v. 2.), etc. From all this it seems to me impossible not to conclude: 1. that those among the Hebrews who felt themselves divinely charged to announce the will of God, whether a simple commandment, or a dogma or a set of dogmas, were called announcers, a word which is literally translated into Greek by ἀγγέλου, a term also consecrated in the religious language of the Greeks to express the same mission; 2. that this expression, consequently, is in no way particular to Christianity, since it is found in the ancient Jewish books; but that this term was, so to speak, permanent, both among the Hebrews and among the Greeks, to express the special mission of those who had to teach either the particular will of God or a religious doctrine. It is therefore not surprising that Josephus, speaking of the sacred authors of the Essenes, calls them, following Hebrew usage and using the consecrated term of the Greek language, ἀγγέλου, that is to say, the revealers, the announcers, or the evangelists, ἀγγέλος being absolutely the same thing as εὐάγγελος or εὐσγγελετής.

⁶⁴ That is to say to the greatest number, to the plurality, to the majority, τοῖς πλείοσιν.

⁶⁵ Νεοσυζότοις.

⁶⁶ καὶ γὰρ ἔρρωται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἦδε ἡ δόξα, ρθαρτὰ. μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα, καὶ τὴν ὕλην οὐμόνιμον αὐτοῖς " τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἄθανχτον ἀεὶ διαμένειν, καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι μὲν, ἐκ τοῦ λεπτοτάτου φοιτώσας αἰθέρος, ὥσπερ εἰρκταῖς, τοῖς

σώμασιν, ἵγγμε τινὶ ρυσικῇ κατασπωμένας” ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀνεθῶσι τῶν κατὰ σάρκα δεσμών. οἷον δὴ μακρᾶς οὐλείος ὀπηλλαγμένας, τότε χκίρειν καὶ μετεώρους φέβεσθκιω.

⁶⁷ Ταῖς δὲ ρούλαις, ξορώδη καὶ χειμέριον (ρτοσεῖξοσιπι) ἀρόβίζονται μύχονν γέμοντα τιμωριῶν ἀδιαλείπτων.

⁶⁸ Τὰς Μακήρων νήτους.

⁶⁹ Α’σεῶῶς.

⁷⁰ Εοο λογοῦσιν.

⁷¹ Βαλικας. It is probably a question here of the ordinary books of the Jewish canon, the Bible. But yet nothing absolutely excludes the idea of books of deuterosis specific to the Essenes. In general, Josephus and Philo seem to accept as national everything that belongs to the sect they describe. They begin by dividing the Jewish religion into three sects; and, having done this, what is specific to one appears to them, by that very fact, to be part of the national religion, to be an integral part of Jewish doctrine and tradition, just as much as everything found in the other two sects.

⁷² Josephus, in his books, reports several times predictions of the Essene proplates. In the Jewish War (Book I, ch. 3), the Essene prophet Judas predicts the death of Antigonus, one of the sons of Hircanus, killed by his brother Aristobulus (103 BC). Further on (ch. II), an Essene named Simon explains a dream of the ethnarch Archelaus, and his interpretation is fulfilled by the exile that Augustus imposed on this prince (8 AD). In the Antiquities (Book XV, ch. 13), an Essene named Manahem predicts to Herod as a child that he will be king of the Jews. Herod, having become king (40 BC), remembered Manahem, and sent to ask him if he would reign for a long time. Satisfied with the answer, which gave him a fairly long term, Herod, says Josephus, always had the Essenes in esteem, and allowed them more freedom than all other sects.

⁷³ Τάγμα.

⁷⁴ Εξη καὶ νόμιμα.

⁷⁵ Τὴν διαδοχὴν, succession, that is, the very transmission of life. The doctrine of the Essenes being, as I will show presently, the religion of life, of being, in the highest and deepest sense, those who abstained from marriage out of fear appeared to others to be attacking life itself in its essence; for life must be transmitted; this is what this phrase of Josephus expresses.

⁷⁶ Δουτρά δὲ ταῖς γυναιξίν, ἀπεχομέναις ἐνδύματα, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἐν περιζώμοτι. Some editions wrongly bear ἀμπεχφμέναις.

⁷⁷ εἰμαρμήνη, destiny. Josephus uses the greek term of *destin*, for want of uu holding to express the action of God on his creatures, considered either in

the sense that it is called predestination, or in the sense that it is called grace, or finally in the general sense of Providence.

⁷⁸ Τὰς καθ' ὁδοῦ τιμωρίας.

⁷⁹ Εἰσσηνῶν.

⁸⁰ Εἰμαρμέν.

⁸¹ Τινὰ θ' ἐν' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, συμβαίνειν τε καὶ οὐ γίνεσθαι. Commentators (see Havercamp's edition) appear embarrassed by this passage, and several have wanted to correct the text, failing to understand the distinction between the words συμβαίνειν and γίνεσθαι. The latter expresses what happens naturally, what is generated, what is born through the continued action of the Creator. The latter expresses an undetermined and necessary contingency, or what occurs through the actions of creatures themselves.

⁸² Divine will, Providence.

⁸³ Providence.

⁸⁴ Ἐκ τοῦ πάνν ἀρχαίου τῶν πατρίων.

⁸⁵ Ἐ σήνοι.

⁸⁶ Θεῷ καταλιπεῖν τὰ πάντα.

⁸⁷ εἰς τὸ ἰερὸν ἀνκθήματα τε σέλλοντες, θωσίας οὐκ ἐπιτελοῦσι, δικρορή' ἀγ εἰὼν ἄς νομιζοῖν, καὶ, δι' αὐτὸ εἰργόμενοι τοῦ χοινοῦ ' τρ τ. τὰς θυτίας ἐπιτοδοσς, ' ΤΗ Κρ μ τν.

⁸⁸ Βέλτιτοι δὲ ἄλλως ἄνδρες τὸν τρόπον.

⁸⁹ The text says τὸ δύκοεον, their justice, to say their society of justice, their society of equality, as the rest of the sentence sufficiently proves.

⁹⁰ That is to say, who live in sects in the practice of virtue, like the Greek philosophical sects.

⁹¹ Ἐ' κείνοις δ' ἐκ παλαιοῦ. This testimony from Josephus is remarkable, and confirms the antiquity he assigns to the Essenes.

⁹² Τάδε πράσσουσιν ἄνδρες ὑπὲρ τετρακισχίλιοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες.

⁹³ Διακονίῳ τῇ ἐπ' ἀλλήλους ἐπιχρῶνται.

⁹⁴ Αἵ ποδέκτας δὲ τῶν προσόδον χειροτονοῦσι καὶ ὁπότα ἡ γῆ φέροι ἄνδρα ἀγαθοὺς, ἱερεῖς δὲ ἐπὶ ποιήσιν σίτου τε καὶ θωμάτων προχειρίζονται.

⁹⁵ τοῖς Πλείτοις λεγομένοις. These *Pleistes* of the Dacians are believed to be the disciples of Zamolxis, Gele by nation, who, a slave of Pythagoras, is said to have accompanied his master to Egypt. Returning to his own people, he brought there the same institutions as Pythagoras in Magna Graecia. Strabo speaks of these Pleistes; but his text, probably corrupted, calls them Κτίται. On this, Scaliger, without any other authority, thought of changing the name designated by Josephus into Πολισαῖ, *conditures urbium*, because Κτίται has this meaning. But Πλείσοι, *plurimi*, that is to say those who live together in

groups and who have abandoned the regime of individuality, is a significant name which returns to that of Κώνιοι, *coutubernales*, of which we spoke above (p. 139). Have we not just seen (page 190) that Josephus also characterizes the Essenes by their respect for number, for the majority, for plurality: "They obey the plurality," he says: "Τοῖς πλείοσιν ὑπακούειν ἐν καλῷ τίθενται."

⁹⁶ ἑσσαιῶι, and later Κ'σσηνοί.

⁹⁷ Μειζόν τι ρρονῶν ἐπ' αὐτοῖ: ἢ κατὰ τὴν θνητὴν ρύτιν.

⁹⁸ Περὶ τοῦ πάντα σπουδαῖον εἶναι ἐλεύθερον.

⁹⁹ ἑτσαῖοι.

¹⁰⁰ Πλήθος ὑπὲρ τετρακισχίλιους, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν.

¹⁰¹ Οὐκ ἀκριθεὶ τύπῳ διαλέκτῳ Ἑλληνικῇ παρώνυμοι ὁσιότητος. At the end of this passage, we see Philo repeating this remarkable connection between the name Essean or Essene and the Greek term *Hosios*, saint: "The Esseans" or otherwise the saints, he says: Ἑσσαιῶν ἢ Ὀσίων. St. Chrysostom (in Acts, homil. XLVI) made the same connection, probably after Philo. From this some scholars have imagined that the name Essenes was a truly Greek name, like that of Therapeutae, which, according to Philo, was borne in Egypt by the most devout of the Essenes who had passed into the contemplative life. The name Ossenia, which St. Epiphanius attributes to a sect of the early days of Christianity, has seemed a confirmation of this idea, because it is even closer to the Greek term *Hosios*. From this comes Scaliger's system, that the Essenes were, under a Greek name or under a degenerate Hebrew name, the descendants of the Kasideans or Kasidim (Assidœi of the Vulgate), who united around the Maccabees, in the religious war which the Jews supported so heroically against the Greek kings, successors of Alexander. But one fact alone destroys this system: that Josephus, as we have just seen, speaks of the Essenes at the very time of the Maccabees, and dates their existence back much further. According to him, this philosophical sect existed in the Jewish nation from all antiquity. Now the Kasidim, the Saints of the Maccabees, do not appear at all, in the three or four passages that we have on them (I Macch., n, 42; vu, 13; II Macch., xiv, 6), as a philosophical or religious sect having a doctrine, but only as the gathering of the strong and the saints of Israel, resolved to die for the defense of the fatherland and of religion. Scaliger himself does not make these Kasidim a sect, but a simple brotherhood distinguished solely by their devotion; for the Temple, they offered every day, except for a certain day of the year, a lamb, and this sacrifice was called the oblation of the Kasidians for sin. What connection does all this have with the Essenes, who, as we have seen from the testimony of Josephus (see page 196), were excluded from the Temple as regards sacrifices? It seems to me that this is a very bad understanding of Philo. Philo wants to indicate, it is true, that *Hosios* is, in a certain distorted way, the root

of Essene; but he also indicates very sufficiently that this name is Hebrew and not Greek, when he adds that this is a careless etymology οὐκ ἀκριβεῖ τύπῳ. What does he mean then? That the word Essene and the word Hosios are not only analogous in meaning, but analogous in root; that there is a certain common root on this point between the Hebrew and Greek languages; that from this comes the complete similarity of these two words, as to form and meaning; that consequently one can, without attaching too much rigor to it, take Hosios. Saint, for the root of Essene. Philo, in a way, reveals to us by this, through the veil of the Greek language, the deep root of the word Essene. What is this root? This is what I will say later.

¹⁰² Θεραπευταὶ.

¹⁰³ Ἀλλ' ὅσα πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίους χρείας τοῦ θείου ἐκπορίζοντες. It is the daily bread of the Gospel: *Panem quotidianum da nobis hodie*.

¹⁰⁴ Οἰχειότητος.

¹⁰⁵ Περὶ ὑπάρξεως Θεοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γένεσεως.

¹⁰⁶ Διαπονοῦτιν.

¹⁰⁷ The text simply says: Τοῖς ποτρίοις νόμοις, the laws of their fathers, or in general of fathers, ancestors; but it is impossible not to understand this as referring to the laws of Moses. The reflection that Philo adds proves this. Moreover, the Essenes, living entirely differently from the other Jews, had no other laws. Several passages are also cited where Philo, speaking of the Jews in general and of Jewish law, expresses himself in exactly the same way.

¹⁰⁸ τὰς Βίβλους. Is it only a question of the sacred books of the Jews in general, of the Bible, or are they Essene books on the Bible, books of deuteronomy? This seems to me very difficult to decide. We will see Philo say later, speaking of the Therapeutae: "Among them are found the writings of the ancient leaders of their sect, who left them several books full of allegorical explanations of Scripture; and it is on these models that they regulate their morals and their discipline." It is therefore difficult to believe that these were not the very books that they read in their synagogues.

¹⁰⁹ τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα δία συμθόλων «ρχαιοτρόπῳ ζηλώσει παρ' αὐτοῖς Ῥύοσορεῖται. The exact meaning of this passage is very difficult to determine; for it literally offers two quite different meanings, each of which is sufficiently clear in itself. If by Βίβλους, the books, we mean that we are talking about books particular to the Essenes, and not only about the Bible, we must translate as I have done. The meaning then is that these books read in the synagogue, these Essene books, were full of parables and figures, and consequently required explanations which were given by the doctor who spoke after the reading. If, on the contrary, we want to understand by Βίβλους; only the books of the Jewish canon, or rather only the Mosaic books, the Pentateuch, we must translate the last sentence thus: "For they explain

most of the passages of Scripture in a figurative sense, following the method of their ancients.” The explanation would then have consisted of allegorizing Scripture, explaining it through allegories, by giving the metaphysical or moral meaning of the facts contained in the Bible. Indeed, we will see later, from what Philo reports about the Therapeutae, that the Essenes were great allegorists. Moreover, however we interpret the letter of this passage, the two meanings it presents always come together and merge into the same idea.

¹¹⁰ ὅροις καὶ κανόσι.

¹¹¹ Τῷ τε ριλοθέῳ, καὶ ριλαρέτῳ, καὶ νιλανθρώπῳ.

¹¹² Τὸ πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον, κακοῦ δὲ μηθενὸς νομίζειν εἶναι τὸν Θεόν.

¹¹³ Κοινωνίαν.

¹¹⁴ We must remember the title of this treatise by Philo: *That every virtuous man is free*.

¹¹⁵ Εσσαίων ἢ ὀσίων.

¹¹⁶ Συσσέτια.

¹¹⁷ Βίου τελείου καὶ σρόδρα εὐδαίμονος δεῖγμα.

¹¹⁸ περὶ Ειοῦ θεωρητικοῦν.

¹¹⁹ Engaddi, also named in the Bible Asason-Thamar: “Ecce consistunt” in Asason-Tlhamar, quæ est Engaddi (2 Paral., c. xx, v. 2). *Thamar*, palm tree; *gad*, prosperity.

¹²⁰ Pliny wrote after the destruction of Jerusalem. The capture of Jerusalem by Titus occurred in the year 71 of the Christian era, thirty-eight years after the preaching of Jesus Christ. Pliny died in 79.

¹²¹ Massada. Josephus (Jewish War, book VII, c. vm et seq.) gives a description of this fortress, first built by Jonathan Maccabeus, later fortified by Herod, and which was the last refuge of the sect of the Zealots, so fiercely opposed to the Romans.

¹²² Here is the text: "Ab occidentali littore Hesseni, quod fugitant usque qua nocet: gens sola, et in tolo orbe præter cæteras mira; sine ulla fœmina, omni" Venere abdicata; sine pecunia; socia palmarum. In diem ex aequo conve» narum turba renascitur, large frequentantibus quos vita fessos ad mores eo» rum fortunæ lluctus agitat. Ita per sæculorum milliu, incredibile dictu, gens k æterna est in qua nemo nascitur, Tam fœcunda illis aliorum vitæ pcenitentia est! Infra hos Engadda oppidum fut, secundum ab Hierosolymis fertilitate palmelorumque nemoribus, nuncalterum bustum. Inde Masadacaslellum in » rupe, et ipsum haud procul ab Asphaltite."

les Solin, the plagiarist of Pliny, reproduces this passage thus, destroying the style and mixing in errors: "Interiora Judææ quæ occidentem contuentur Essæni tenent, qui, præditi memorabili disciplina, recescerunt a rilu gentium universarum, majestatis, ut reor, providentia ad hunc morem

destinati. Nullæ ibi fœminæ; Venere hanged himself abdicarunt. Pecuniam nes ciunt. Palmis victorious. Nemo ibi nascitur, nec tamen delicit hominum multitudo. Locus ipse addictus pudicitiae est, ad qnem plurimi licet undique gentium properent, nullus admittitur nisi quem castitalis lides et innocentiae meritum prosequatur. Nam qui reus est vel levis culpæ, quamvis summa ope adipisci ingressum velit, divinitus summovetur. Ita per immensum spao tium sæculorum, incredibile dictu, æterna gens est, cessanlibus puerperiis. Engadda oppidum infra Essænos fut, sed excisum est: verum inclytis nemoribus aihuc durât decus, lucisque palmarum eminentissimis nihil vel ævo vel bello derogatum. Judeæ terminus Massada castellum.”

- ¹²³ Josephus, speaking of the embassy that the Jews of Alexandria sent to Caligula in the year 40 of the Christian Father, that is to say, only seven years after the passion of Jesus, represents Philo as having already attained great celebrity. "The head of the legation," he says, "was Philo, a man illustrious in every respect (τὰ πόντα ἔνδοξος), brother of the *alabarche* (chief magistrate) of the Jews of Alexandria, and very skilled in philosophy. (*Antiq.*, book xviii, c. 8.) Philo himself tells us, in the account of this embassy, that he was older than the four other deputies who were sent with him; which suggests that he could not have been less than sixty or even seventy years old at the time. For there is no evidence that the Jewish council, which was generally composed only of old men, would have chosen a younger man to head such an important deputation, which was to solemnly defend a religious cause. Philo himself portrays himself in his account as an old man; for he begins thus: "How long shall we old men be children, old indeed in body and hair, gray with age, but as foolish in our judgments as children without experience?" And, continuing, he speaks of himself as a man full of years and formed "by the great and numerous events which he had seen in his time." Now it is very likely that he wrote this account at the very time of his embassy, and not later. Eusebius, in fact, reports that he read it in Rome, in full senate, under the empire of Claudius, and that it was very applauded by all the listeners; which leads one to judge that this reading took place shortly after the death of Caligula, when the senate was in the first transports of joy at being delivered from such a wicked emperor. Philo, in fact, at the time of this event, could not yet have left Rome; for he had had an audience with Caligula at the end of the year 40, and this emperor was killed at the beginning of the year 41, before having decided the matter for which Philo had been sent to him. It is therefore certain that Philo was an old man (and we know that the Jews did not take this title of old man until they were seventy years old) around the year 41 of the Christian era. Basnage and most writers who have carefully examined this question have therefore fixed Philo's birth in the year 723 of Piome, 31 years before the common Christian era.

¹²⁴ Indeed, in the first of the two, he fixes with some precision the time when he wrote them; for, speaking of the siege of Xanthus by Brutus, and the heroic defense made by the inhabitants of this city in memory of Caesar, he says that this event was still recent: οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ, *recenti adhuc memoria*. Caesar was assassinated in the year 709 of Rome, and Brutus's defeat occurred in 712. We must therefore place the siege of Xanthus and the desperate action of its inhabitants, who all allowed themselves to be killed rather than surrender to Caesar's murderer, in the year 710 or 711, that is, forty-three or forty-four years before the Christian era. Now it may well be supposed that Philo, writing before the birth of Jesus or about the time of his birth, that is to say, about forty years after the siege of Xanthus, expressed himself as he did; but that he could have expressed himself thus if he had written after the preaching of Jesus, when more than seventy years had elapsed since the event of which he speaks, is what has no probability. It seems to me to be proven by this single remark that these works of Philo were written by him in his youth, about the age of thirty, during the period of his life when, as he relates, he occupied himself solely with studies and philosophy, and when he acquired for himself that celebrity with which Josephus shows us him surrounded at the time of his legation.

¹²⁵ Eusebius, St. Jerome, all the historians and ancient Martyrologists, agree in saying that St. Mark was the first disciple to enter Egypt: Primus Alexandriae Chritum anuntians, etc., says St. Jerome, speaking of St. Mark in his Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers. It is said that he gave himself or received from St. Peter this mission as early as the 9th year of Claudius' empire, 49 AD, but that he wandered for twelve years as a vagabond in Libya and the neighboring provinces, because he did not dare enter Alexandria without a particular revelation that led him there. It is true that this whole tradition is very uncertain and almost fabulous. But even if we were to trace, as Eusebius does, the introduction of Christianity into Egypt back to the year 43 of the Christian era, it is evident that Philo, already in his seventies, must have received no influence from it, and that his writings, all composed before this time, must bear no trace of it: it is in indeed, what their reading proves in the most manifest way.

¹²⁶ See the Letters of President Bouhier in response to Montfaucon (p. 247 et seq.), where this point of controversy is abundantly established.

¹²⁷ In his eighth book of the Evangelical Preparation, Eusebius formally acknowledges that what Philo says about the Essenes refers to the Jews; but in his Ecclesiastical History he attributes to the Christians what the same author says about the Therapeutae. However, the distinction was so unnatural and so unfounded that he did not dare to approach it clearly; he got out of this difficulty by being vague, and he preferred to appear to contradict himself rather than to explain himself. St. Jerome was more direct

in suppressing, in his Catalogue, the first treatise of Philo, the one in which the Essenes are discussed, and by confusing it with the second.

¹²⁸ It should be noted, however, that Eusebius and St. Jerome only insinuated these fables as very uncertain rumors. St. Jerome himself only supports them on the striking connection he finds between the Therapeutae described by Philo and the Christians. "I place," he says, "Philo the Jew in the rank of our ecclesiastical authors, because in writing a book on the first Church of Mark the Evangelist in Alexandria, he lavished praise on ours: In nos trorum laude versatus est." Then, in the list he gives of Philo's writings, he removes the treatise where the Essenes are spoken of; and, confusing it with the treatise on the Contemplative Life, he characterizes these two works as relating to the first Christians: "Et de vita nostrorum librum," de quo supra diximus, id est de Apostolicis viris, quem et inscripsit xxx, quod videlicet coelestia contemplentur et semper Deum orent, et sub aliis indicibus." Suidas, who repeats the same error, does even better: he takes the treatise where Philo speaks of the Essenes, the treatise That every virtuous man is free, for a treatise on the Christians: De vita Christianorum. It is evident that neither Suidas nor St. Jerome had carefully examined the writings of which they speak. Photius, who had read them, is much more exact; "I have read," he says, "the treatises of Philo on those who embraced the philosophical life among the Jews, either by devoting themselves to pure contemplation or by practicing the active life. Some called themselves Essenes, and others Therapeutae." He therefore positively recognizes both as Jews; which does not prevent him a little further from adopting the fable of Philo's relations with St. Peter. St. Augustine was not mistaken about this supposed Christianity of Philo; he says positively that Philo did not believe in Jesus Christ: "Vidit hoc Philo quidem, vir liberaliter eruditissimus, unus illorum cujus eloquium" Graeci Platoni æquare non dubitant, et conatus est aliqua interpretari, non ad Christum intelligendum, in quem non crediderat, etc. "(In Faust, 1. XII, cap. 39.)

¹²⁹ *On the Special Laws of the Decalogue, Part II.*

¹³⁰ I may have occasion to provide further irrefutable proof of this later.

¹³¹ Ἑσσαίων περὶ διαλεχθεῖς οἱ τὸν πρακτικὸν ἐξήλωσαν καὶ διεπόνησαν Εἶον, ἐν ᾗ πᾶσιν, ἢ, τὸ γοῦν εὐρορητότερον εἰπεῖν, τοῖς πλείοσις μέρεσι διενεγκόντες αὐτίκα. καὶ περὶ τῶν θεωρία» ἀσπασαμένων, ἀκολουθία τῆς πραγματείας ἐπόμενος, τὰ προσήλонта λέξω. Montfaucon, wanting to accommodate this sentence, unfortunately for him too clear and too positive, to his feeling that the Therapeutae were not Essenes, but Christians, was obliged to distort its meaning. He translates: "After having spoken of the way of life of the Essenes, who are almost always occupied with bodily exercises, it is appropriate to speak now of a type of people who devote their whole life to contemplation;" and he strives to refute Scaliger, Blondel, Thomas Bruno,

and all those who had taken the meaning which presents itself so naturally. But his translation is quite simply a misinterpretation: "Philo, says on this subject Basnage" (Hist. of the Jews, book II. c. 23), wanting to raise the glory of his nation, opposed the Essenes to the Greek philosophers; and presently, in fulfilling his plan, he adds the Therapeutae to them. The second work is the continuation of the other. He assures us of this; he only wants to continue what he began, and to make a continuation of his first design. He wants to speak of the contemplative Essenes, after having spoken of the active Essenes. It is therefore necessary that the Therapeutae have some connection with the Essenes: otherwise the order would not require that one speak of the one after having spoken of the other. Besides, the article xxxx, by the xxxx he designates those of whom he is going to speak, necessarily refers to the Essenes. He spoke of the Essenes who are attached to the active life; now, in continuing his work, he is going to represent those who love the contemplative life. These are the Essenes, whose name makes the first word of the book; # it is impossible to refer this article xxx to any other word than to the Essenes whom he named first. The Therapeutae were therefore a branch of the Essenes. Some scholars, however, and Bouhier among others, while recognizing that the Therapeutae were Jews, admit a distinction between them and the Essenes. This distinction is false. This will be proven later by comparing what Philo reports of the sacred feast of the Therapeutae with what Josephus reports of the Essenes' common refusals, and with what Philo himself says about it in the passage previously quoted. Let us add that independently of this identity on the most important rite of the religious life of the one and the other, identity which forms, in our eyes, an irrefutable proof, all the probabilities would still be for the opinion of Scaliger, Basnage, and other scholars, that the word Essene was a generic name which signified equally those of this sect who devoted themselves to the active life and those who embraced the more particularly contemplative life, and who were then called Therapeutae. Indeed, it is enough to consider the context of Philo's sentence, to see clearly that he opposes in this sentence the contemplative life, θεωρίαν, to the practical life, τὸν πρακτικὸν θίον. Now, after having spoken of the Essenes as he did in his previous Treatise, after having painted them as the most religious and meditative of men, after having told us that they lived devoted to the reading and interpretation of the Law and the Prophets, after having spoken to us of their books of allegorical explanations, etc., he would now paint them as men without spirituality, simply occupied, as Montfaucon translates, with bodily exercises. It would, however, be necessary to say that Philo reserves the spiritual and contemplative life solely for the Therapeutae, if one did not want everything in this sentence to refer, without exception, to the Essenes, with the sole distinction that among them some worked, and others, living without working, limited themselves to contemplation. But the matter is important enough for me to add still

other considerations which will complete the dispelling of all the clouds. If the Therapeutae were not Essenes, why did Philo, when he wanted to contrast the Jewish philosophers with the Greek philosophers, or rather when he wanted to cite sages in support of his thesis that every virtuous man is free, not name them, and only name the Essenes? Will it be said that this is because he wanted to speak at first only of Palestine and Syria, and that the Therapeutae lived mainly in Egypt? This answer has no solidity. For, first of all, Philo, who lived in Egypt, should more naturally have cited the contemplatives of Egypt, and cited them before the Essenes, if he had not known that the Therapeutae belonged by their very doctrine to Jewish Essenianism. It is evident, on the contrary, that the Therapeutae being for him another sort of Essenes, he must have begun with those of the sacred land, who had antiquity and tradition on their side. Moreover, he does not say that the Therapeutae existed only in Egypt; he says, on the contrary, that they were spread in several lands of the earth; he does not except Palestine and Syria: he could therefore have spoken of them from the beginning. Secondly, if the Therapeutae were not of the Essene sect, to which Jewish sect did they belong? They were Pharisees, replies Bouhier. But if they were Pharisees, how is it that Philo, who was himself a Pharisee, at least ostensibly, did not distinguish them on this point from the Essenes, and that on the contrary, in the same sentence in which he begins to speak of them, he places the Essenes above all men (which Montfaucon, to note in passing, prudently omitted in his translation)? Finally, it is enough to refer to this assertion so often repeated by Josephus: "There are among the Jews three different sects, three very ancient sects, etc." "How, if the Pharisees had had the Therapeutae, would Josephus have differentiated, to the point that he did, the sect of the Essenes from that of the Pharisees? If the Pharisees had had the Therapeutae, would Josephus have noted, as he does on every occasion, the particular way of life of the Essenes. Truly the Essenes would have been very little different from the Pharisees, and it is inconceivable that Josephus would have put so much distance between them. The difference is in fact so slight, that Montfaucon is obliged, in order to distinguish the Therapeutae of Philo from the Essenes of Josephus, to attach himself to a minute detail, and to point out that, according to Josephus, the Essenes in Palestine changed their clothes only when these clothes were torn, while, according to Philo, the Therapeutae in Egypt had winter and summer clothes. But, I repeat again, all these reasons yield to the one I stated first, namely, the conformity of the rite, both social and religious, of the common meal, or of the Passover. Moreover, I will show further that the very name of Therapeutae is derived from that of Essenians.

¹³² Or sectarians of wisdom, Τῶν φιλοσόφων.

¹³³ Κ'τύμως.

- ¹³⁴ Θεραπενταὶ καὶ Θεραπευτρίθες. This Greek name for Therapeutae is, in a certain sense, only the translation of the Hebrew name for Essenes. This is what I will demonstrate later.
- ¹³⁵ ΕΑ φύσεως καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν νόμων. It is clear that by these holy laws of which Philo speaks, he means the Jewish law, the Mosaic revelation.
- ¹³⁶ Θεραπεύειν τὸ ὄν, ὃ καὶ ἐγαθοῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστι, καὶ ἐνὸς εἰλεκρινέτερον, καὶ μονᾶδος ἀρχεγονώτερον.
- ¹³⁷ Or who profess any religion whatsoever: Τῶν ἐπαγ)ελλομένων εὐσέβειαν. "In good faith," says President Bouhier about this passage in his refutation of Montfaucon, "can we be persuaded that a Jew, and a Jew perfectly instructed in his religion, would have spoken in this way about Christians, while his fellow Jews drove them from their synagogues as reprobates and impious? For you know that this is how they behaved from the time of Jesus Christ himself, according to the testimony of St. John, ch. 9, v. 22." (Letters, p. 6)
- ¹³⁸ I warn you that I am abridging the text a little at this point.
- ¹³⁹ τὰ δὲ ποιχεῖται. ἄψυχο ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἐσότης ὑποθεθλημένη τῷ Τεχνίτῃ πρὸς ἀπάσας σχημάτων καὶ πο. This is indeed Plato's theory of the Ideal or of the xxx. Is it from Plato, as is usually supposed, that Philo took this doctrine? He gives it to us as Jewish and Essene; and everything proves that he is right, and that he only found it in Plato. The source of this great metaphysics was long before Greek philosophy.
- ¹⁴⁰ Ὑπὸ τίνος Δημιουργοῦ τελειοτότου τῇ» ἐπισήμην.
- ¹⁴¹ οἱ συγγένειαν ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ Θεῖον.
- ¹⁴² Α' θεράπευτοι, *incurabiles*.
- ¹⁴³ Το ἃ θεραπευτελόν' ἐνός, ὅλῃ εἰν ἀτὶ Χμόνδιδάρλῃμ' Ἡδὲ, τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας Εκίφ καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὲν ἥλιον πὶ νέτω, καὶ μηδέποτε τὴν τάξιν ταύτην τιπέτω πρὸς τελείων ἄγουσαν εὐθινονίαν. All these expressions are remarkable. This view of being, by which Philo characterizes the basis of the religion of the Therapeutae, agrees with what we will have to say about the very name of Therapist or Essene. This precept of not stopping at the sensible sun recalls what Josephus says about the Essenes' prayer to the divine sun (see above, p. 183).
- ¹⁴⁴ Ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἀρπασθέντες οὐρανίου, καθάπερ οἱ βαχχενόμενοι καὶ χορυθαντιῶντε-, ἐνθορσιάζουσι, μέχρις ἂν τὸ ποθούμενον ἴδωσιν. These words clearly show that *ecstasy* was a frequent state among these contemplatives. We will see further proofs of this truth later.
- ¹⁴⁵ Διὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ μκαρίας ζωῆς: ἵμερον. This single trait would be enough to show that the Therapeutae were Essenes, and to overturn the supposition that they could belong to Pharisees. Indeed, the Essenes, as we have seen from Josephus, were the only Jews who believed in a blessed

immortality after death: as for the Pharisees, they brought the good back to earth, and admitted only a series of transmigrations (see above, pp. 191-194). Therefore, only Essenes could, as Philo reports here from his *Therapeutae*, ardently aspire after death as a prisoner aspires after his freedom, embrace the hope of eternal happiness, and attempt to enter into it in this life by the effort of contemplation and spirituality. The Pharisees' doctrine on the future life always brought them back to earth. A contemplative Pharisee in the way Philo describes in his *Therapeutae* would not have been a Pharisee. What then do the examples, very rare and very uncertain, that Bouhier was able to cite of Pharisees given over to asceticism and various austerities, such as for example Banus, whose disciple Josephus made himself for a time (Life of Josephus written by himself), and who is said without any certainty to have been a Pharisee, prove? Nothing, absolutely nothing. These kinds of ascetics abandoned Pharisees by the very kind of life they embraced. Pharisees, in fact, far from leading to the purely contemplative life, rejected it. It is therefore absurd to believe that it produced entire troops of contemplatives. Let us add that Josephus, who contrasts the contemplative tendency of the Essenes with the realistic and human tendency of the Pharisees, would not have failed to point out the astonishing exception of the *Therapeutae*.

- ¹⁴⁶ This passage is the only one which, at first sight, would make one doubt whether the *Therapeutae* were Essenes; for the Essenes of Judea lived in community, and here it is a question of individual property and inheritance. But does this really result in a serious difficulty? I do not think so. Have we not seen, in fact, that Josephus says positively that besides the Essenes living in celibacy, there were some who admitted marriage (see above, p. 193). These, according to Josephus, had the same doctrine as the others, the same morality, and also practiced the community of goods. But Josephus, who was mainly concerned with describing the bulk of the Essenes, that is to say, those who were established on the shores of Lake Asphaltites, does not go into any detail about those who were married. He represents them only as another society, a different order: ἕτερον τάγμα, *alius ordo*. However, it is very difficult to believe that the introduction of the natural branch could have been arranged with a complete community, such as that of the pure Essenes living in celibacy. These, in fact, rejected marriage only because they saw in it a source of divisions and the almost necessary rupture of brotherhood. It is therefore very probable that this second class of Essenes, whom Josephus did not describe, had introduced into its midst some particular customs relating to the family. This is all the more likely since the feeling of the purity of marriage, and consequently of individuality on this point, is shown to the highest degree in what Josephus says about them on this subject. The Moravians, who copied and still faithfully reproduce the Essene community today, were nevertheless obliged to place the natural

family in a sort of independence in certain respects, and to create a circle for it outside the large family. But if this was the case in Judea among the married Essenes, how much more should it be the case in foreign countries, everywhere where we are told that the Essene doctrine was introduced. This is all the more necessary since, outside Judea, the Jews were mainly engaged in commerce. We therefore conceive of a sort of half-Essenes, so to speak, proceeding from the main sect, but deviating from it on the point of the community of goods, admitting it in principle, but not practicing it strictly, because of the environment in which they found themselves. They were to the true Essenes what the Quakers are today to the Moravians. The Moravians live in a more perfect community of goods: the Quakers positively admit property, while condemning, as superfluous, that which exceeds natural needs, read how could it not have been so, I ask. 9 how could the Essene doctrine, as pure metaphysics and pure morality, independently of practice, not have spread throughout the entire body of the Jewish nation, when Josephus and Philo represent this doctrine to us as a national doctrine, as a national philosophy, that is to say, as constituting the Jewish religion in the same way as Phariseeism or Sadduceeism? Judaism for them is either Esseneism, or Phariseeism, or Sadduceeism, or rather it is a common stem, but which needs to present itself under one of these three aspects. Is it believed that things would have been so presented to these two profound writers, if Essenianism had been entirely limited to those who lived in community and celibacy on the shores of the Dead Sea? No, they would not have seen in this doctrine a national doctrine, and the most august of all, as Josephus calls it. But this Essene congregation had spread its faith in a certain number of minds; the Essene doctors were doctors in Israel, in the same way as the Pharisee or Sadducee doctors. From there, everywhere, in the Jewish nation, a certain number of men attached to this deuterosis, to this interpretation of Mosaism. I quoted above a passage from Josephus, which clearly proves what I am putting forward here. It is when Josephus says that under the Maccabees, about two centuries before Christ, the entire nation was divided by the different opinions of the three rival sects. Do we not see here clearly that the Essenes had partisans, followers throughout the body of the nation, or at least among the most religious men who took the most active part in the political affairs of this memorable period? Certainly, Josephus does not mean here the four thousand Essenes who formed the congregations on the shores of Lake Asphaltites, but the intervention of their opinions in general affairs. There must therefore have been, either in Palestine and Syria, or in the other countries where there were Jews, a certain number of half-Essenes, as I said just now. All inductions prove this truth. From where, in fact, did these catechumens, always more numerous than was necessary according to Pliny's report, from whom the communities on the shores of Lake Asphaltites were recruited, if not from these half-

Essenians, prepared by the doctrine, and who finally came to realize it in a more or less advanced form? In Judea, they brought their goods to Essene society, because this society lived by working in agriculture and other professions. But in Egypt, for example, where practical Essene society had not been established, they left their goods to their children, their parents, their friends, and became contemplatives. It even seems to me that this explains quite naturally this kind of vagueness which remained on the two works of Philo with which we are concerned, and which has caused so many difficulties and different opinions among scholars. This cloud that Philo left over the relationship between the Therapeutae and the Essenes was, to a certain extent, at the heart of things. He could not have expressed himself otherwise than he did. Indeed, were these men who in Egypt became Therapeutae Essenes? One could answer yes and no. They were so in doctrine, they were so in heart, they aspired to be so in fact, and they became so by suddenly becoming Therapeutae, that is to say, Essenes under another name. But born into Essene families who nevertheless did not practice community, or else coming from Pharisaic or Sadducee families, often given over to the profession of commerce, married, isolated with their families in the midst of foreigners or Jews who did not share their belief, they found themselves forced to live for a long time the individual and proprietary life: in this sense, they were not Essenes. The Essene doctrine had, in fact, this disadvantage and this sort of inferiority compared to Phariseism and Sadduceism, that at the moment when the community of life was not realized, the principal rite of this doctrine, that is to say the common meal, the Passover-Eucharist, not taking place, and not being replaced by anything, this religion was erased so to speak, and was taken precedence by the other two, which lived by legal practices. The Israelite therefore most turned towards the spiritual life had to become a Pharisee, or at least mingle with the Pharisees, if he wanted to have a cult and a religious manifestation, if he wanted to act religiously on his compatriots engaged in the individualistic life, and enslaved to practices and ceremonies. Hence so many Jews, Essenes in heart and doctrine, but ostensibly Pharisees, like Josephus and Philo. Do not these two authors seem, in fact, to tell us, or rather do they not tell us formally: "Essenianism is the true religion, it is the true and pure Mosaism: and yet both were Pharisees. How many Jews could be in the same situation! How much more, exercising no dignity in the synagogues, could be Essenes and profess that sect without practicing the common life? 1 Now, supposing that this were so, is it not evident that these Essenes, in heart only, must, as the religious spirit developed in them with the course of the years, reject property with all the more ardor, as it was an offense to their religious belief, and tend all the more towards pure contemplation the more they had been kept in the places of proprietary life? Hence the ardor with which Philo represents them as throwing themselves

into the contemplative life, and leaving to their children or their friends those goods which they had in holy horror, as having for too long hindered their salvation. I think therefore, in the last analysis, that the Jews being spread in a multitude of places, the Essene doctrine, one of their three doctrines, and the most religious according to Philo and Josephus, was spread everywhere with them, that is to say that it had more or less numerous adherents in every country; but that the pure practice of Essenianism was concentrated in Judea, and in a corner of Judea, on the shores of the Dead Sea; that the married Essenes of whom Josephus speaks, and who also lived in Judea, could well still be subject to the almost absolute regime of the community; but that besides these many Jews shared the Essene doctrine to a lesser degree, making an effort to attain this life regarded by them as the only religious and the only moral, but only managing to practice it by a sudden passage towards the contemplative life that Pkilon describes to us among these Therapeutae.

¹⁴⁷ Here in the text there is a comparison of the Therapeutae with Democritus and other philosophers who, like them, renounced their possessions to devote themselves to study. I delete these developments.

¹⁴⁸ What Philo says next shows that they were going to join other solitary people who had withdrawn from the world before them.

¹⁴⁹ Πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐς τὸ γένος" ἔδει γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τελείου μετασχεῖν Ἑλλαφα καὶ τὸν Βόρθαρων, Πλεονάζει δὲ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, καθ' ἕκασον τῶν ἐπικαλουμένων νομῶν, καὶ μάλις περὶ τὴν Κλεξάνδρειαν. At the time when Philo wrote, the Jews were mixed with all nations: "The Jewish nation," he says, "in another of his works (Legate, ad Caiam), "is not, like other nations, confined to a single country; it inhabits almost the entire universe, and has multiplied so greatly in every country, that often the number of Jews almost equals that of the natural inhabitants." With regard to Egypt, it is certain that they were there in very large numbers. Philo also tells us (in Flaccum) that they alone occupied almost half of the city of Alexandria; now we know that Alexandria had a million inhabitants, according to Diodorus Siculus. There were also some in proportion in the other provinces of Egypt, and in that part of Libya which is neighboring it, and which even took its name from them. of Palaestina Libya.

¹⁵⁰ Οἱ δὲ πανταχόθεν ἄριτοι, *ex omnibus locis optimi*. It is quite likely that this refers mainly to Egypt. However, since the Therapeutae lived, as we shall see shortly, in community, and consequently formed congregations that were naturally united by the bond of Essenianism, there is nothing to prevent us from believing that some came to Alexandria from all countries. As for this word ἄριτοι, *the best*, we can also understand that they were the most intelligent and the most pious. According to the details given later by Philo, it seems that it was the most ecstatic or the most disposed to ecstasy who

came to reside in this congregation at Lake Mareotis. But we also see, from what he reports, that they were the most learned, since the occupation of these solitary beings was to compose songs and treatises on religious philosophy.

¹⁵¹ Θεραπευτῶν ἀποικίαν σέλλονται. Montfaucon translates: “They send those among them, etc.” But σέλλονται does not seem to me to positively signify that these Therapeutae who went to Lake Maria were sent there by superiors. The word σέλλονται properly refers to ships setting sail to a certain place; and it is because of the idea of a *colony* that Philo uses it here. Moreover, as it is certain, from what Philo reports later, that the Therapeutae did not live solitary lives, but in community, and that they consequently had, like the other Essenes, leaders, superiors, we can very well accept Montfaucon's meaning, which is also that of the Latin version: *Optimus quisque mittitur*.

¹⁵² Ὑπερ ἡμνης Μαρίας. This is the famous lake of Alexandria, called Mareotis in Ptolome and Maroa in Strabo.

¹⁵³ Δι' ἣν ἀσπάζονται κοινωνίαν. This is remarkable. It is therefore quite certain that these Therapeutae, given over as they were to contemplation, nevertheless practiced the communal life, like the other Essenes. Montfaucon did not understand this point; he translates: “Their houses are not too far apart, so that they can visit each other easily.”

¹⁵⁴ Ἐκάστω δὲ ἕξιν οἶκημα. ἱερὸν, ὃ καλεῖται Σεμνεῖον καὶ Μονασήριον, ἐν ᾧ μονούμενοι τὰ τῆς σεμνοῦ θίου μυσηρία τελοῦνται.

¹⁵⁵ Πολλοὶ οὖν καὶ ἐκλαλοῦσιν ἐν ὕπνοις. It is quite difficult not to see *ecstasy* in these men who speak in their sleep, and who interpret religious dogmas in their dreams.

¹⁵⁶ Or of religion: πῆς ἱερᾶς ριλοσορίας

¹⁵⁷ The reader should recall what Josephus says about the Essenes' prayer to the rising sun. (See above, p. xxx.)

¹⁵⁸ Ἐντυγχάνοντες γὰρ τοῖς ἱερωτάτοις γράμμασι. ριλοποροῦτι, τὴν πάτριον ριλοσορίαν ἀλληγοροῦντες, ἐπειδὴ συνθολαὶ τὰ. τῆς ῥητῆς ἐρμη»είας νομιξοῦσι εὐπεῶς ἀπολεκρυμένης, ἐν ὑπονοίαις δηλουμένης.

¹⁵⁹ Ἔστι δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ συγράμματα. παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἳ τῆς αἰρέσεως ἄρχηγεταιὶ γενόμενοι πολλὰ μνημεῖα. τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀλληγορουμένοις ιδέας ἀπέλιπον, οἷς καθάπερ τιτὶν ἀρχετύποις χρωμενοι, μιμοῦνται τῆς προαιρέσεως τὸν τρόπον. This is one of those passages against which the hypothesis of the Christianity of the Therapeutae shatters like glass. Would one believe that Montfaucon seriously supposes that this multitude ancient writings of which Philo speaks, xxx, these numerous monuments of allegorical science left by the founders of the doctrine of the Therapeutae, were the few epistles that we have under the name of St. Peter and St. Paul, and the Gospel of St. Mark 1 11 is indeed obliged to this absurd supposition; for it is asked to which

monuments of Christianity what Philo says can be referred. President Bouhier (Letters, p. 29 et seq.) has completely refuted the arguments that Montfaucon uses to support this incredible dream. He shows how, even admitting that Philo only wrote in the year 68 AD, it is absurd to suppose that the epistles of St. Peter and St. Paul had reached Egypt at that time. ; how absurd it is to believe that Philo could have treated as ancient three men who were still living at the time when he himself was writing, or who had just recently ended their lives; for, according to all the known facts of the history of Christianity, St. Peter and St. Paul did not die until 66, and St. Mark in 67 or 68. What interested above all in nascent Christianity was the news of the coming of the Messiah: all science and all desire for science vanished before this fact. And Philo would not have said a single word about this fact! Far from it, he would have painted for us the Therapeutae, so recently established by St. Mark, as peacefully busy composing allegorical books! and in speaking of the models they imitated, he would have meant to speak of the very recent writings of St. Peter, St. Paul and St. Mark! But are these writings of the Apostles then monuments of allegorism? Allegorism plays only a secondary role; what occupied the Apostles above all was the messianic fact, and the government of the nascent society of Christians. If Philo had known St. Peter in Rome, as Eusebius cleverly supposes, would he not have said a word about the novelty of this doctrine of the Therapeutae of which he speaks with such enthusiasm? Would he have given as ancient writings the letters of one of his old friends, whom he must have believed to be still alive? In truth, all the suppositions that Montfaucon is obliged to make to support his hypothesis are only good for provoking laughter. It is obvious that we are talking here about the books of Essenianism, the writings of those ancient Essene evangelists of whom Josephus speaks (see above, p. 187), and whom Philo himself characterizes (see p. 202) in the same way. that he characterizes here the books of the Therapeutae, that is to say as monuments of allegorism..

¹⁶⁰ It is quite probable that they often spent both nights and days in these oratories. But this does not follow from the whole of Philo's account. In any case, their true dwelling was the common house, the large monastery where they met to eat. Philo says in fact that they never brought any food into these cells, which were only their study and meditation rooms. He also states positively that they practiced the communal life. What we can read is that their life was half eremitic, half cenobitic. Certain monks of Christianity, who embraced the eremitic or solitary life, also combined it with the cenobitic or communal life. Thus the order of the Canjaldulos, founded at the end of the tenth century by St. Romuald, participated in the way of life of both the Desert Fathers and the disciples of St. Benedict. "In eodem loco," says the historian of this order, speaking of St. Romuald, "et Monasterinm

etseparatas solitariarum cellas ædificare consuevit. (Camald. ordinis llistoria, auct. Hastivillio). What Philo means here positively is that for six days of the week the Therapeutae meditated apart, shut up in their cells or hermitages, not leaving them all day, and not even letting their eyes wander on the objects outside, while on the seventh day, the Sabbath, they met in the synagogue. This common assembly and the common meal which they took together would be substantiated to justify what Philo says, that they practiced communal life. But it is quite evident, from the whole of his story, that their community was not limited to this meeting on the Sabbath day: only that one was the rule and completely obligatory. Moreover, they had large Semnea where they came every evening to take their meal and spend the night. I would readily believe that morning and evening prayers were said in common. In a word, they practiced the same society as the Essenes of Palestine, with the exception that the latter devoted themselves during the day to bodily work, while the Therapeutae devoted themselves solely to contemplation. But this difference led to another. It is evident in fact that men devoted to bodily work needed to take much more food than men who were old for the most part and devoted solely to contemplation. Also the Essenes of Judea met twice a day, in the morning at eleven o'clock and in the evening, to eat together, while the Therapeutae ate only in the evening. Philo even reports that many remained three days without eating, and that some lived in abstinence for the entire week, eating only on the seventh day. These abstinences are not surprising in the climate of Egypt, and among men, many of whom were given over to ecstasy; there are a thousand similar examples in the history of ecstasies. But it resulted from this that they could, during the week, remain very solitary, without violating the common life.

¹⁶¹ Τοῖς ἑβδομαῖς. It is the Sabbath day; but Philo, no more than Josephus, never uses the word σάββατον; witness the title of one of his treatises: Περὶ τῆς ἑβδομῆς καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν, which must be translated of the Sabbath and the festivals. This attachment of the Therapeutae to the Sabbath, which is even more positively marked in what Philo says further on, did not fail to be very embarrassing in the system of Montfaucon. For we know that the Christians early transferred to Sunday, that is to say to the first day of the week, the rest of the seventh day and all that was connected with it among the Jews. We believe we can already find some indication of this change in the writings of the Apostles. Two passages are cited, one from St. Paul (1 Cor. c. xvi, v. 2), and the second from the Apocalypse of St. John, (c. i, v. 10), where Sunday is mentioned. The first, it is true, proves nothing: but, in the second, the text formally designates Sunday, that is to say the day of the sun among the ancients, under the name of the Lord's day: "I was in the spirit," says St. John, "on the Lord's day: ἐν τῇ κυριακῇ ἡμέρῳ." The ancient Constitutions called Apostolic, Canones Apostolorum, also speak of Sunday under this name: "Si

quis clericus inventas fuerit die Dominico jejunare vel Sabbato, præterquam uno solo, deponatur (art. LXV). But the date of these Constitutions is completely unknown; It is only believed that they relate to the second or third century. What is certain about the institution of Sunday is the very positive testimony of St. Justin in his Apology to the Emperor Antoninus, written in the year 140 of the Christian era. I will quote this passage later; it will serve to show the continuity between the Essene Sabbath of Saturday accompanied by the sacred feast, and the Christian Sabbath of Sunday accompanied by the Eucharist. As for the very substitution of Sunday for Saturday, St. Justin attributes it to two motives, namely the creation of light in Genesis, and the resurrection of the Savior, which was said to have taken place on this day. Eusebius says almost the same thing: "The divine Word," he says (in Psalm., XCI), "despite the repugnance of the Jews, transferred the Sabbath to the day on which light had its origin. It gave us the image of true rest by instituting Sunday, the day of salvation, when this savior of the world, after having put an end to the marvelous deeds he had performed among men, became victorious over death." Does it not seem that, while separating themselves hostilely from the Jews and cutting themselves off from the Essenes, the Christians, in this comparison of Jesus to the sun or to light, were still inspired by the Essene cult, by prayer to the divine Sun?

¹⁶² This kind of attitude serving to express the recollection and rest of the Sabbath was not peculiar to the Therapeutae. Philo, in his treatise *That Dreams Are Sent to Us by God* (part II), introduces a Pagan mocking in these terms the solemn gravity of the Jews during the day of Saturday: « What then! If some pressing danger arose on that day, if the enemy, or a fire, or a plague suddenly appeared, you would remain calm in your houses! Or, if you left them, it would be with your accustomed demeanor, your right hand hidden under your robe and your left placed on your hips, so that, despite yourselves, you would not be forced to do anything for your salvation! etc.

¹⁶³ We will see a little further on that they also took part in the sacred feast of the great Sabbath.

¹⁶⁴ This separation of men and women seemed to Montfaucon a solid mark of the Christianity of the Therapeutae. He takes great pains (p. 144 et seq. of his *Treatise*) to demonstrate, by means of the Apostolic Constitutions and various passages from Origen, Eusebius, St. Ambrose, and St. Chrysostom, that from all antiquity, in the Christian churches of the East, women, or at least virgins consecrated to retreat, were separated from men by a wall or a partition. But in this the Christians had only followed the example of the Jews. Montfaucon forgets that such a separation existed in the temple of Jerusalem (Josephus, *Jewish War*, book vx). This custom is still observed today in Jewish synagogues.

¹⁶⁵ It is evident that Philo was thinking of the beautiful ode of Anacreon. The Greek poet's cicada seems indeed a symbol of the contemplative life that Philo describes to us here. "O cicada," said Anacreon, "how happy I find you, you who, on the tops of the trees, after you have drunk a little dew, sing like a queen! All that you see in the fields is yours; all that the seasons bring belongs to you. You are the friend of the plowmen, to whom you do no harm; you are honored by mortals, O sweet prophet of summer. The Muses love you, and Phoebus also protects him; he gave you a piercing voice. Old age has no harm to you. To whom can I compare you? You are truly wise, you have no ancestors but the earth, you love harmony, you know no pain, you have neither flesh nor blood; ah! you are almost like the Gods!" (Od. XLIII.)

¹⁶⁶ τὴν ἐξόομην.

¹⁶⁷ Πανίερον καὶ πανέόβτον.

¹⁶⁸ That is to say, after having indicated, as he has just done, their diet, he will describe how they conduct themselves at these meals, choosing as examples their greatest rejoicings, their finest gala days, to use this expression: ἱλαρωτέρας ἐν συμποσίοις διαγωγὰς. It must not be believed, in fact, that the sacred meal of Pentecost, which Philo then describes, was essentially different from the Sabbath meal, or even from the ordinary meal of each day. There was no truly essential difference; the substance was always the same; The unity of God and the unity in God, and consequently brotherhood and community, were as well expressed and symbolized, and at the same time as well practiced, in the daily meal as in the meal of the Sabbath day, or in that of Pentecost. The social and religious idea in all its aspects, and the realization of this idea, were found identically in both. The ordinary meal was therefore just as sacred in itself as that of the feast days. Only on these days there was among the Therapeutae a sort of redoublement of spirituality: the intelligence of the holy mystery of human and divine society was revealed with greater care; there were, in a word, certain preparations and certain accompaniments which were not found in the ordinary banquet. This is what made the Saturday *communion*, not holier, but more solemn and more august than that of other days, and that of Pentecost was even more so in these characteristics. To be sure of this truth, it is enough to reread what Josephus told us about the daily meals of the Essenes (See above, p. 184), and to compare his account with that which Philo will give. Moreover, it was absolutely the same among the Christians. The banquet of the Eucharist, which was celebrated among them every Sunday, was no less holy than that of their great feasts, such as Easter and Pentecost; just as it was no holier in its essence than that which the disciples made in common every day, when the Church was founded after the passion of Christ

¹⁶⁹ Τῶν ἀνατεθεικότων τὸν ἴδιον Θίον καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἐπισήμη καὶ θεωρίᾳ. τῶν τῆς φύσεως πραγμάτων, κατὰ τὰς τοῦ προρήτον Μωσέως ἱερωτάτοις ὑρηγήσεις.

This qualification of disciples of Moses that Philo here gives to the Therapeutae, and this very positive assertion that their doctrine was linked by the most sacred traditions to the doctrine of the prophet (that is to say that it was a deuterosis of Mosaism superior to that of Phariseism and Sadduceism; which comes back precisely to what Josephus says of Essenianism, which he calls the most religious, the most serious, the most august Mosaism, σεμνοτότη), were certainly very embarrassing in Montfaucon's hypothesis. But it is not even worth making the remark, so untenable is this hypothesis in all points. I prefer to draw the reader's attention to this definition of the Therapeutae, that Philo says "to have transformed their own regime and their very being" by observation (ἐπισήμη) and theory (θεωρίᾳ) of the phenomena of life: "for this is how the expression τῆς φύτσεως προγμάτων must be understood. It is not, in fact, a question of physical facts, of natural phenomena; these were not the ones principally studied and understood by the Therapeutae, although the theory of life includes them. But φύσις, in its general meaning, is life (root φνω, *gigno*). Further on, at the end of this piece, Philo still calls, in the same sense, the Therapeutae contemplators of life, θεωρίαν ἀσπασαμένοι ρύσεω.

- ¹⁷⁰ Οὗτοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀθροίζονται δι' ἑπτὰ ἑβδομάδων, οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀπλὴν ἑβδομάδα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ὁδυνάμιν τεθηπότες ἀγνὴν γὰρ καὶ ἀεὶ πάρθενον αὐτὴν ἴσαπιν. Is not the attachment of the Therapeutae to the Sabbath, and consequently their severe and profound Mosaism, marked here in a truly irrefutable way? Montfaucon has again tried in vain to distort the meaning of this passage. He translates it: "They assemble principally for seven consecutive weeks, having veneration not only for the septenary simply considered, but for the virtue of this number, which they know to be a virgin number, always chaste." There are two obvious misinterpretations in this interpretation. Philo does not say that the Therapeutae assembled for seven weeks, from Passover until Pentecost: they lived, basically, in community; consequently they were always gathered together, and not only at this time of year. But Philo says that they celebrated in a solemn way the seventh Sabbath after Passover, falling on the eve of the fiftieth day of Pentecost: *Post septem hebdomadas elapsas conventus suos instaurant*, translates the old Latin version of Gelenius. It is therefore quite wrong that Montfaucon, to destroy this evident proof of Mosaicism, cites several texts from the Fathers of the Church, in order to prove that the Christians spent the fifty days between Passover and Pentecost in joy. It is certain that the death of Jesus having immediately followed the feast of Passover, and the Apostles having been seized with enthusiasm and ecstasy, or, as we say, illuminated by the Holy Spirit, on the day of Pentecost, this period of the year between the two great Jewish festivals, must have been for the Christians the object of commemorations, and taken place in their worship, with a certain character

of novelty, although at bottom these festivals were only a transformation of Judaism. But what does this matter in relation to Philo's text? Philo says that the Therapeutae honored the seventh Sabbath after Passover, which he confirms by saying that it was the square of the septenary that they celebrated in this way. This is Montfaucon's second error: he did not understand the word *δυνάμιν*, *power* or *square* in the language of the geometers, which he translates as *virtue*. Diophantus (book I, def. 2): "Καλεῖται ὁ μὲν τετοάγωνος, δύνουςις. It is therefore evident that this is only a question of a festival which fell both on the number 7, the simple Sabbath number, and on the number 49, which is the square of 7, and consequently on the seventh Saturday, the eve of Pentecost: Προεόρτιος μεγίστης ἑορτῆς ἦν πεντηχοντῶς ἔλαχεν, says Philo himself in the following sentence. Thus the Therapeutae honored in a very special way not only the number seven, but its square. Here we are in the depths of Mosaic legislation, based, as we said above, on the ancient philosophy of numbers. We have seen, in fact (p. 164 et seq.), the important role of the number seven in the Law of Moses, a holy number, a Genesis and creative number, if I may express myself thus, a number considered by Moses both as having presided over divine creation and as having to preside over human society; a number evidently consecrated by him to equality, to fraternity, in the institution of the Sabbath, the Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee. The Essenes therefore, these true disciples of Moses and his most profound interpreters, lionized not only this number but the square of this number: what is astonishing in that? Have we not seen that Moses himself, besides the Sabbatical Year, which is the Sabbath of years, had instituted the Jubilee, which is the square of this Sabbath of years? The Essenes applied this rule of the square to the feast of Passover. They celebrated it to its second power, so to speak, in their sacred banquet on the seventh Saturday after Passover: this was indeed the characteristic of men who had more than others the sense of the Philosophy of the Law. I have shown above the intimate link which exists in the legislation of Moses, between Passover and the Sabbath. Passover is the rite of fraternity, the Sabbath is this rite repeated, although in a less solemn way, and subservient to the number seven, the creative number. The square of the Sabbath reproduced for the Essenes, in the course of each year, what Moses, because of the imperfection of men, and in particular of the people with whom he had to deal, had only been able to demand for the square of seven years, that is to say, the realization of equality. Moreover, it must not be believed that this square of the Sabbath was not implicit in the Law of Moses. What in fact is Pentecost, the second of the three Jewish festivals? Is it not the solemn function of the weeks, and is not the egalitarian intention marked there as clearly as in Passover: "You shall count to yourself seven weeks" (Iss. 16); You shall begin to count the seven weeks from the time you began to put in the sickle to harvest (this was the time corresponding to the Passover

feast). Then you shall keep the feast of weeks (that is, the Sabbath of the Sabbath, or the square of the seven) to the Lord your God, by presenting the freewill offering of your hand, which you give according to the blessing that the Lord your God has given you. And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God, you, your son, your daughter, your male servant, your female servant, and the Levite who is within your gates, the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow who are among you, in the place which the Lord your God will choose to make his name dwell there. And you shall remember that you served in Egypt, and you shall observe to keep these statutes. "The Jewish nation celebrated, in truth, this solemn feast of weeks on the fifth day after Passover, and not on the forty-ninth; but the feast really began from the forty-ninth day, which was a Sabbath. In any case, the meaning of the fixing of Pentecost is not in doubt: it was indeed the square of seven that was celebrated. As for what Philo adds that the Therapeutae regarded the number seven "as a pure number" and always virgin, "this is due to the ancient numerical philosophy which had guided Moses himself. I have already spoken above, (p. 170) of the virtues which this philosophy attributed to this number; I will not return to them. I will content myself with explaining the denomination of pure and virgin number which was given to it. This name, reported here by Philo, is, moreover, so certain that, in the kind of metaphysical algebra which constituted the profound science of the ancients, this number was called the Virgin or Pallas. Macrobius gives us the proof: "Nulli aptius jungitur monas incorrupta quam Virgini. Huic aulem » number, id est Septenario, adeo opinio virginitatis inolevit, ut Pallas quo que vocitetur. Nam Virgo creditur quia nullum ex se parit numerum duplicatus qui intra denarium coarctetur, quem primum limit observation esse numerorum; Pallas idco, quia ex solius monadis foetu et multiplicatione processit, sicut Minerva solo ex Uno parente nata perhibetur." (InSomm. Scipio., lib. I, c. vi.) And elsewhere, bringing the septenary closer to the monad: "Nec gnerantur nec génerant monas et septem." (Ibid., c. v.) But one would not understand this explanation of Macrobius well, if one saw in it only this property of the number seven of being the only one of the first ten numbers which is at the same time a prime number and without a multiple in the circle of ten. The idea of a chaste number, as well as the idea of the chastity of Minerva, to whom this number was dedicated, were due to profound reasons, which I can only indicate here summarily. In this great metaphysics, which is today rejected with disdain because it is not understood, the universe in all its orders, whether numerical, geometric, musical, astronomical, physical, physiological, or psychological, is symbolized by numbers. Numbers therefore represent both substances and modes; they are the symbol of substance and the rule of the forms it takes. But in this kind of architecture or creation, some symbolize substance more particularly, and others form: "Sunt qui aut corpus efficiunt, aut efficiuntur,

aut vim" obtinent vincutorum," says Macrobius, speaking of the numbers that were called full. This latter characteristic of being rather a bond than of being something united by this bond was the special character of the number 7. It was the number of form rather than of substance. It was the architectural number par excellence, the number of the Demiourgos or of Minerva. "Septenarius numerus," says Cicero (Somn. Scipio), "rerum omnium fere noclus est;" to which Macrobius adds: "Non immerito liic numerus totius fabricæ dispensator et dorninus." Other numbers, even the most sacred, such as the ternary and the quaternary, symbolized substance, and not only form. Thus, to take an example from psychology, the ternary or the Triad is the expression of the soul. This is incontestable for us as for the ancients (See above, p. 81 and following): "Ternarius assignat animam tribus suis partibus" absolutam: quarum prima est ratio, quam λογικὸν ἡ appellat; secunda animositas, quam θυμικὸν vocant; tertia cupiditas, quæ ἐπιθυμητικὸν nuncupatur. (Macrobius, *ibid.*) "Well, in this sensation-feeling-knowledge Triad, each of the three constituent elements exists substantially. One of the three terms, it is true, results from the other two; but nevertheless it is in the same way as the other two. The number 3 in this formula therefore expresses not only the generation of this third term, nor the existence of three terms, but this third term itself. The same is true of the Quaternary or the Tetrad, which is only the Trinity considered in terms of the simultaneity and coexistence of the three terms that compose it. In this famous Tetrad of the Pythagoreans, the harmonic unity that results from the ensemble of the three strings, so to speak, of our being is still a new term that is expressed by the number 4, at the same time that this number expresses the sum of the elements of the formula. The numbers 3 and 4 are therefore symbols of substance, and not pure symbols of mode or form. It was not the same, according to the ancients, with the number 7, composed precisely of the sum of the ternary and the quaternary. It retained from its compounds only the property of presiding over life, without being involved in phenomena as substance; it appeared in these phenomena only as a link, a kind of chain of things, vinculum, compago, nodus, as Cicero and Macrobius say. It was therefore the constructive number so to speak, the number which served as rule and measure. It was not it which gave the substance of things, but this substance could not take a regular order without it. It was therefore par excellence the number of the divine Worker, of the Demiourgos, of Wisdom, or of Minerva, of the divine Word. And, for the same reason, it was a chaste number, since, occupied with directing and regulating the generation of things, it was not directly the subject of this generation, but only its rule and its light. Hence the chastity attributed to Minerva, chastity which was reproduced in her symbol the number 7, when one considered it in the purely numerical order, as Macrobius points out to us in the passage I have quoted.

¹⁷¹ Α' γιώτατος καὶ φυσικώτατος ἀριθμῶν, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ὀρθογωνίου τριγώνου δυνάμεως, ὅπερ ἐξιν ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ὅλων γενέσεως. Numerical philosophy seems to me to have rested principally on this incontestable and profound metaphysical truth that two things cannot coexist without a third thing existing thereby, which is their link, their relationship, and consequently participates in both. The symbol of this principle of the generation of all things was for the ancients the right triangle. Here is the reason. Two lines cannot meet at a certain angle without the third side of a triangle being thereby determined. This third line therefore depends on the other two. We must therefore ask ourselves this question: How can we obtain the value of this third line as a function of the other two? Now this third line participates in the other two, not only by virtue of their length; but also by virtue of their direction. This direction is given by the cosine of the angle they form between them. But, in the case where the two lines meet at a right angle, the cosine of the angle they form vanishes, and the third side remains determined by the other two only. Hence this famous formula for the square of the hypotenuse, which Pythagoras, it is said, was the first to discover, and for which he sacrificed a hecatomb. The relationship of the third term to the two which generate it shines in fact in this particular case, with admirable clarity and simplicity. That being so, in the case of an isosceles right triangle, if we give the side the sequence of numerical values 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, etc., the square of the hypotenuse will be represented by the numbers 1, 8, 4, 8, 32, 30, 72, etc., and the hypotenuse by the roots of these numbers. But none of these numbers will reproduce the lateral or primitive number in its very form, except in the case of the number 5 and its tenfold multiples. For 5 being the primitive side, the square of the hypotenuse is 50 or 5 tens. In this case, therefore, the ratio of the generated number to the producing number appears, so to speak, even more evident, since the very form of the primitive number is partly preserved. It is true that this is due to the decimal arithmetic system; In the duodecimal system, it would be the number 6 that would have this property. But the ancients believed in the absolute value of the decimal system, for reasons that I do not have to explain here. In any case, we understand that, just as they took geometry as a symbol of the generation of things by the monad and the dyad, and in geometry the right triangle and its property as a more evident symbol of that generation of things, that is to say, of the relation of the third term generated to the two generative terms, because this relation is indeed clearer in this case, so they had to take the particular case where the triangle had 5 as a side, as a perfect symbol of this same generation, because in this case the generative virtue, that is to say, the relation and the reproduction, showed themselves most manifestly and so to speak without veil. This is what Philo says here.

- ¹⁷² Αευχειμονοῦντες φαιόροι μετὰ τῆς ἀνωτάτω σεμνοτήτος τίνος τῶν ἐρημερεντῶν. Montfaucon, in his blindness, claims to draw from this name of ephemerutes a proof that the Therapeutae were Christians. "This name," he says, "is found in use among Christians to mark those who celebrated in their turn." He quotes a passage from St. Athanasius, who, speaking of the birth of Jesus Christ, says that one can compare the house where he was born to the church, the crib to the altar, St. Joseph to the ephemerute, the shepherds to the deacons. But this interpretation of the word *ephemerute* is absurd. This word is taken from the ancient mysteries. It signifies the one who leads the initiate to the light (ἐρ' ἡμέραν). The initiate who reached the last degree of initiation was called epopte, the seer; The last ceremony of initiation was called epiphany, the manifestation. The name ephemerutus is composed of the same roots. Light and darkness being the symbols of knowledge and ignorance, these symbols naturally had to be used in the ceremonies. This is why Philo shows us the Therapeutae dressed in white and led by an ephemerute.
- ¹⁷³ This hatred of gain, lucre, profit, of everything that is not true and pure exchange between men, is the very character of practical Esseneism, as Josephus and Philo have represented it to us in the passages cited above. If the Therapeutae had not been Essenes, why would Philo have chosen this trait to depict these contemplatives?
- ¹⁷⁴ Προσεύχονται τῷ Θεῷ θυμῆρη γενέσθαι καὶ κατὰ νοῦν ἅπαν τῆσαι τὴν εὐωχίαν. These are almost the very terms that Josephus uses to describe the prayer at the beginning and end of the Essenes' meal. (See above, pp. 184 et seq.)
- ¹⁷⁵ Ταῖς εἰσκρίσεσιν ἀκολουθοῦντες. There were therefore receptions. The Therapeutae therefore formed a society among themselves, like the Essenes. They were therefore not different from the Essenes in this respect. This root confirms what I have already demonstrated previously.
- ¹⁷⁶ Ἡ συμβιοῦν σπουδάσασθαι. This is yet another feature which clearly shows that the basis of the Therapeutae' life was the Essene life, life in community. Philo, meaning that several of these Therapeutae had remained virgins all their lives, because they had left the world early, says that they had embraced community life early. Montfaucon, who did not understand how the communal life and solitary meditation were united and mingled among the Therapeutae, omitted this passage in his translation, which, moreover, is almost everywhere defective and false. But how could his opponent, President Bouhier, have based his opinion that the Therapeutae were Pharisees on the fact that Philo, according to him, says nowhere that the Therapeutae practiced community! Seeking to which Jewish sect they could belong, "The maxims of the Therapeutae," says Bouhier, "were directly opposed to those of the Sadducees; their morals were also different from those of the Pharisees, who had as a rule to live in common, whereas the

Therapeutae, according to Philo, lived separately from one another." Philo says precisely the opposite, and his whole story proves the community of life of the Therapeutae! We can only attribute this error by Bouhier to Montfaucon's bad translation; he will have been content with it, and will not have carefully examined the text.

¹⁷⁷ Τῶν περὶ σῶμα. ἡδονῶν ἡλόγησαν, οὐ θνητῶν ἐκγόνων, ἀλλ' ἀθανάτων ὀρεχθεῖσαι, ἃ μόνη τίκτειν ἄρ' ἑαυτῆς οἶα τὲ ἐς ἡ θεοφιλῆς ψυχῇ, σπεύραντος εἰς αὐτὴν ἀκτῖνας νοητὰς τοῦ Πατρὸς, αἷς δυνήσεται θεωρεῖν τὰ σορίας δόγματα. I beg the reader to note this name of Father given in an absolute manner to God, and these intelligible rays which come from God and fertilize the soul in love with God, as light comes from the sun and illuminates our eyes made to see it and to see by it. Philo, for the period in which he wrote, is here for us, as he is indeed in all his works, an excellent mirror to make us understand the intimate link which exists between the Essene and Platonic doctrine and Christianity. I will touch later on on this point of the transition to Jesus and Christianity. But I note, in passing, these expressions which recall both Plato and the Gospel. In Plato's doctrine, the *Aâ*.o; or Word is to God what light is to the sun; it is the Son, and God is the Father. Christianity was partly the continuation of this idea, one of the applications of which is the incarnation of the Word in the womb of a Virgin. Is not the Virgin Mary conceiving the divine Word in fact the anthropomorphism of those Therapeutrid Virgins of whom Philo speaks, who received in their soul the Light or the Son, emanating from the divine sun or the Father?

¹⁷⁸ Διακκονοῦνται δὲ οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνδραπόδων, ἡγούμενοι συνόλως τὴν θερχπόντων κτήσιν εἶναι παρὰ οὐσί». Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρους ἅπαντας γεγέννηκεν " αἱ δὲ τινῶν ἀδικίαι καὶ πλεόνεξαι ζηλωσάντων, τὴν ἀρχέκοκον ἀνισότητα καταζεύξοιται, τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀσθενεσέροις κράτος τοῖς δυνατωτέροις ἀνῆψαν.

¹⁷⁹ ἐν δὴ τῷ ἱερῷ τοντω συμποσίῳ.

¹⁸⁰ Κοινοὺς γονεῖς.

¹⁸¹ Does Philo imply that the Therapeutae drank wine on other days? I do not believe so, since he says formally a little further down that reason had taught them to live, *Εἰοῦν*, in abstinence from wine. I believe that the expression these days, *ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις*, simply means in these gala days, in these festivals. This remark has some importance; for if the Therapeutae had specifically kept wine away from their meals on the great feasts, from their Easter-Encharist, although they ordinarily used it, one could object to me the wine of the Christian Eucharist, and claim to see there a great difference. But it is evident, from all that Philo says, that abstinence from wine was general among the Therapeutae and based on hygiene, and that they only rejected wine from their sacred feast because they rejected it from their ordinary banquets. As for the use of wine in the Christian Eucharist, I will speak of it

later, and I will show that this substance was in no way part of the essence of the sacrament, and that it was only occasionally its matter. Water was used in it like wine, since the councils forbade the use of pure wine: *If in panem oblationis non immittit fermentum et sal, nec aquam cum vino in sunctum calicem, anathema sit.* (Ancient formula cited by Cotelier and Martène.)

¹⁸² Since the Therapeutae drank and ate only after sunset, and consequently after the Sabbath had expired, nothing prevented them from lighting a fire and heating their drink. Moreover, not all hot water was indiscriminately forbidden to the Jews on that day, but only that which was heated by fire; for for that which was in the sun, their doctors permitted its use. They even kept ovens heated from the day before. The argument that Montfaucon draws from this practice of the Therapeutae, to prove that they were not Jews, is therefore ridiculous. It is true that S. Justin (*Dialog. cum. Tryph.*) tells us that the Jews reproached the Christians for drinking hot on their Sabbaths, as a criminal non-observance: *Μηδὲ ὅτι θερμόν πίνομεν ἐν σαθρασι δεινὸν ἡγεῖσθε.* But there is no parity between the non-observance of the Sabbath of which the Christians boasted and the practice in question here.

¹⁸³ *Νηράλια γὰρ ὡς τοῖς ἱερεῦσι θύειν, καὶ τούτοις διοῦν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος ὑρηγεῖται.* We can compare this passage with another passage from Philo in his *Treatise On Drunkenness, Περὶ Μέθης*, where, speaking of the Jewish priests who abstained from wine in their sacrifices, and comparing them in this respect to the Therapeutae, he says: *Σχεδὸν γὰρ ἱερέων καὶ θεοχρευτῶν Θεοῦ μόνον τὸ ἔργον νηφάλια θύειν,* Bouhier makes this comparison to show, against Montfaucon, that the Therapeutae were Jews; but we can also note that in this last sentence the supper of the Therapeutae is completely assimilated to the sacrifices of the priests; *νηράλια. θύειν.*

¹⁸⁴ Word for word: are replaced by conjectures in allegories: *Δὲ ὑπονοιῶν ἐν ἀλληγορίαις.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ἀπασα γὰρ ἡ νομοθεσία. δοχεῖ τοῖς ἀνδρόισι τούτοις εἶχέναι ξώω καὶ σῶμα μὲν ἔχειν τὰς ῥήτας διατάξεις, ψυχὴν τὸν ἐναπολείμενον τοῖς λέξεσιν ἄορατον νοῦν, ἐν ᾧ ἥρξατο ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ διαφερόντως τα οἰκεῖα θεωρεῖν, ὥσπερ διὰ κατόπτρον τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξαίτια κάλλη νοημάτων ἐμφερόμενα κατιδοῦσα, καὶ τὸ. μὲν σύμθολα διαπτύξασα καὶ δικκαλύψασα, γυμνὰ δὲ εἰς φῶς παραγαγῶνται τὰ ἐνθύμια, τοῖς δυναμένοις ἐν μικρᾷ ὑπομνήτεως τὰ ἀρανῇ διὰ τῶν φανερῶν θεωρεῖν.* The Therapeutae' method of allegorizing seems to me to be perfectly characterized in this sentence. It is evidently primarily that kind of allegorism that theologians call tropological or moral. Holy Scripture, says Philo, is for the Therapeutae like a living being. Just as, therefore, when dealing with a living being, with an animal, we first seek its properties, and read, so to speak, its true nature and its intentions in relation to us in its gaze and in its eyes, so these wise men seek, through the corporeal mirror of the Law, the living intention of the Law in relation to

them and to their duty. The Law, the book, the Bible, in a word, is therefore not a definite fact, but an idea, or rather an inspiration; not a rule having for its sole purpose what it appears to say, but a rule which relates to those who question it, and which speaks to them under the veil of facts and prescriptions. Or rather these very terms of idea, inspiration, rule, do not yet exactly render the thought: it is not an idea, it is life itself which communicates itself; it is a living being which puts itself into relation with those who consult it; It is a father who speaks in images and parables to his children. This is not in any way, or at least it is not primarily, that kind of allegorism which served to found Christianity, and which consisted in seeing in the events of the Bible a prophetic image of the events of the new Covenant. It is quite certain that St. Paul and the first Christians allegorized on Scripture in the manner of the Therapeutae. Thus everything that St. Paul says about the circumcision of the flesh, which he transforms into spiritual circumcision, relates well to this kind of allegorism. It is also true that the Fathers of Christianity, later, following the example of Philo himself and the Essenes, allegorized in the same way as them. Photius even attributes this custom of the Fathers exclusively to Philo: "It is from him," he says (Biblioth. N. CV), "that I believe came to the Church the custom of giving the Holy Books an allegorical and figurative meaning." But it is also certain that the facts of the life of Jesus and the events that followed became the subject of another allegorism that one could call historical, and which consisted in seeing, in the facts of the Bible, other facts and not directly ideas. This is the kind of allegorism that would only be appropriate for Christians. But what Philo says here does not indicate, I repeat, in any way this kind of allegorism. It is quite evident, on the contrary, that Philo means to speak of an allegorism in all points similar to that which he himself employed in all his works. It is therefore in vain that Eusebius and, according to him, Montfaucon claim to take advantage of this habit of the Therapeutae of interpreting Scripture allegorically to prove their Christianity. In fact, it is certain that with the exception of the Sadducees, the different Jewish sects indulged in allegorism. The mystical doctors among the Jews even took their name from it; they were called Darschanim, that is to say, makers of allegories or sermons. And, on the other hand, it is also certain, in fact, that Philo's sentence positively indicates that kind of inspiration that truly sublime books and those marked with the stamp of the divine have the privilege of communicating, and not a positive and historical interpretation as Eusebius claims.

¹⁸⁶ Η καινὸν αὐτὸς πεποιηκῶς, ἢ ἀρχαῖον τίνα τῶν παλαιῶν ποιητῶν μέτρα γὰρ καὶ μέλη καταλελοίπασιν πολλὰ (αἱ. ποιηται) ἐπῶν τριμέτρων, εἰς, etc. Does Philo mean poems and songs specific to the Therapeutae? Yes. Otherwise, why would he speak of those numerous compositions whose different genres he

delights in enumerating? Everyone in Alexandria must have been well aware that Jewish poets, in general, had left behind numerous sung poems. This nation was very given to the singing of hymns. Traces of this can be seen from the time of Moses. David, with his sacred poems, further increased this taste. St. Hippolytus, in the fragment we possess of his Commentary on the Psalms, says that this prophet in some way changed the worship of the Hebrews by the great number of songs he mixed into it. There is in Scripture an example of their nocturnal prayers and songs in the temple. It is that of Anna the prophetess, *quæ non discedebat de templo, jejuniis et obsecrationibus serviens die ac nocte*. Philo, in one of his works, speaking of the devout Jews of Alexandria, includes among their mortifications their pious vigils. The Talmudists have explained this ancient custom even more clearly. Buxtorf, who has collected in his Synagogue all that they have said about it, tells us that, on the eves of certain festivals, they practiced almost, in this respect, the same thing as the Therapeutæ. For they assembled in their synagogues to pray to God and to sing his praises. They sang until well into the night, and even the most zealous remained in this exercise until the next day. This custom, moreover, still exists among them today: *Pergunt postea, says Buxtorf, et cantum in multam noctem producunt. Quidam, qui pietate sunt admirabili, et gravem poenitentiam agere volunt, per totum festum diu noctuque stant in pedes, canunt et orant indesinentes, ut ego quosdam vidi*. It is therefore quite certain that the Jews must have had, in the time of Philo, very numerous sacred compositions, verses and music. But is it these poems in general, or rather particular poems, transmitted in the sect of the Therapeutæ, that we are talking about here? It seems obvious to me, once again, that Philo means poems composed only by these solitaries, or in general by Essenes. To be convinced of this, it is enough to compare what he says here with what he said previously (See page 225): "They have many ancient works composed by those who once founded this sect, true monuments of interpretative and allegorical science, and which they use as models to try to do the same thing. They do not limit themselves to thinking and meditating; they compose poems and hymns to God, in verses of all kinds of measures, and in all the forms used by poets, which they make easier to fix in the memory by the accompaniment of a serious and religious song." The opinion of Montfaucon, who claims, according to Eusebius, that Philo wanted to speak of the recitation of the Psalms and the reading of other parts of Holy Scripture, both of the Old and the New Testament, does not deserve to be refuted.

¹⁸⁷ Όταν δὲ ἑκατος διαπερανῆται τὸν ὕμνον, οἱ νέοι τὴν πρὸ μετροῦ λεχθεῖσαν τράπεζαν εἰσκομίζουσιν ἐ' ἧς τὸ παναγέστατον σιτίον, σρτος ἐξυμωμένος μετὰ προσοψήματος ἀλῶν, οἷς ὕσσωπος ἀναμέμικται, δι' αἰδῶ τῆς ἀνακειμένης ἐν τῷ ἀγίῳ προνάῳ ἱερᾶς τραπέζης. Ἐπὶ γὰρ ταύτης εἰσὶν ἄρτοι καὶ ἄλες ἄνευ ἡδυσμάτων" ἔξυμοι μὲν οἱ ἄρτοι, ἀμιγεῖς δὲ καὶ οἱ ὄλες. Προσῆκον /ἀρ ἦν τὰ μὲν

ἀπλούεατα καὶ εἰλικρινέκατα τῇ κρατίσει τῶν ἱερέων (πια. τῶν ἱερώων ἐπὶ ὑπὶφ. εὐί.) ἀπονεμηθῆναι μερίδι, λειτουργίοις ἄθλον τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους τὰ μὲν ὅμοια ζηλοῦν ἀπέχεσθαι δὲ τῶν ἄρτων, ἵνα ἔχωσι προνομίαν οἱ κρείττονες. The greater part of the controversy between Montfaucon and President Bouhier revolved around this phrase, which neither of them seems to have understood. Montfaucon, who wanted to see in the Therapeutae of the Christians of St. Mark, and in their meal, not a Jewish Eucharist, a Eucharist that was the source of the Christian Eucharist, but the Eucharist itself, as it was practiced among Christians, claimed to distinguish two different meals in the feast described by Philo. He therefore imagined that this labiate brought by the young people was a table different from the table of the feast, that it was the true holy table on which, at that moment, the mysteries were celebrated. This expression that Philo uses: *the bread, the sacred bread, the most sacred of foods*: τὸ παναγέστατον σιτίον, ἄρτος, carried his conviction, and did not allow him to see anything there other than the Eucharist. Basically, and in principle, he was right: for the Therapeutae it was indeed, and for Philo it is indeed, the sacred meal that became the Christian Eucharist; but it was not for that reason a particular celebration, different from the common meal that the Essenes took. There are not two feasts there. As for salt and hyssop, Montfaucon regarded them as being purely ceremonial, or as serving only in a preparatory rite; he claimed to be able to demonstrate that until the beginning of the eleventh century salt and hyssop were used to bless the altar before celebrating Mass. The leavened bread of the Therapeutae did not embarrass him any more; for, although the question of unleavened bread and leavened bread is subject to great difficulties, the most common and the most reliable opinion is that from all antiquity the Churches of the East consecrated with leavened bread. Finally, the absence of wine, which is not mentioned in Philo's text, was explained for him by the ignorance in which Philo could have remained of the true mysteries of Christianity.

It is evident that this opinion of Montfaucon, even if it were not overturned by the other peremptory reasons which dominate this whole controversy, is not tenable. Philo's account is admirably clear. Until now he has described only the preparations for the feast; here the table is brought. It was the custom among the ancients to carry and take away the table at each service; I will only give as proof the description that Philo gives of the meals of the rich in the part of his Treatise that I have deleted (See p. 232): "They bring," he says, "successively up to seven tables, or even more, laden with all that the earth, the sea, the rivers, and the air, provide that is most delicate and exquisite... And so that nothing is lacking of all that nature produces, others come at the end laden with all kinds of fruits, not to mention those that are reserved for the New Year's Eve or snacks. These tables are then taken away, etc." There is therefore nothing surprising that until the moment

where Philion is here in his story, the table was not set, everything having taken place until then in moral discourses and religious songs. But this table that is brought is so much the true table of the feast, that Phil calls it: *the table that was mentioned earlier*: τὴν πρὸ μικροῦ λεχθεῖσαν. Now previously, in fact, after having spoken of the servants of the feast, he had described the ordinary meal: “On these days, no wine is served, but only water... Never meat; it is the bread that does the office, and the salt the seasoning; to which, for the delicate, only hyssop is added.” This is the table of which he spoke and which will appear. And indeed what foods appear on the table that is brought? The same ones that he mentioned, bread, salt, and hyssop.

As for President Bouhier, he was mistaken in another way. He wanted to see in this meal, so often called by Philion the *sacred meal*, only a feast without any meaning. He therefore interpreted this sentence in such a way as to make this sacred meal a lay feast, kept at a great distance from the meal that the Jewish priests had in the Temple with the showbread, *pains de proposition*. Here is how he translates: “Everyone having finished his hymn, the young people bring the table of which we spoke above, where is this very venerable dish, that is to say, leavened bread, and for seasoning salt mixed with hyssop; and this by a respectful distinction for the holy table placed in the sacred vestibule of the Temple, on which only bread and salt are placed, without any other seasoning; namely, unleavened bread and pure salt. It is reasonable, in fact, that the simplest and purest dishes should be the portion of the most excellent of all orders, which is that of the priests, as the price and reward of their ministry. As for the people, they must be content to imitate them by doing something similar, and nevertheless abstaining from these sacred breads, so that only the principal ones have the privilege of touching them.” This translation is a misinterpretation. The proof that Philion does not want to place the meal of the Therapeutae below the meal that the priests had in the Temple with unleavened bread, is that he begins by calling the fermented bread that they ate, the most sacred of foods: “Ἐρ’ ἦς τὸ παναγέστατον σιτίον, ἄρτος ἐζυμωμένος. What he then adds: Δὲ αἰδῶ τῆς ανακειμένης ἐν τῷ ἀγίωπρονήῳ ἱερᾶς τραπέζης, does not mean: by a respectful distinction for the holy table placed in the sacred vestibule of the temple; but signifies, on the contrary, by honor for this table, by veneration for it, and truly by imitation. Philo's obvious intention is to compare the meal of the Therapeutae to this sacred meal of the Levites, and to assimilate it completely to it. What did this meal of the Levites consist of? Bread and salt. What does the Therapeutae's meal consist of? Also bread and salt. It is true that they add a little hyssop. But what difference does that make? Since Philo warned us above that this hyssop was only for the most delicate, διὰ τοὺς τρυφῶντο. The majority therefore absolutely ate the Levites' meal. It is true that their bread was fermented. But what difference can that make,

since, in Philo's view, bread, although fermented, is the most sacred of foods. If Philo had seen such a profound difference between leavened bread and unleavened bread, he would not have started by calling bread even leavened, πανακγέζοτον σιτίον. The remark he makes concerning the showbread of the Temple, which was unleavened, and the salt of this table to which nothing was added, is only a parenthesis, an incidental phrase, whose sole purpose is precision and perfect accuracy of the facts. In a word, Philo's idea is to make us understand the sanctity of the Therapeutae's meal by comparing it to the meals of the Levites with the showbread. He therefore means and he says positively: In the law, this proposition is the privilege of the most religious of the Levites, that is to say, of the most virtuous men of the Hebrew people; it was good and fitting to establish this distinction in the ministry of the altars, λειτουργίας ὁθλον. But here all participate in the bread. The proof that Philo had this comparison in mind is that a little higher he makes it very clearly and very explicitly, when he says that the Therapeutae live as the holiest priests sacrifice: Νηγόλια ἡὰρ ὡς τοῖς ἱερεῦσι θύειν, καὶ τούτοις θιοῦν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος ὑρηγεῖται. Is it necessary to add another remark to these reasons which seem to me invincible? If Philo's sentence had the meaning that Bouhier gives it, Philo, when he says that with the exception of the priests of the first order, the lower members of the priesthood and the laity were excluded from eating the showbread, would he not have said that they had to abstain from unleavened bread, instead of simply saying that they were deprived of eating the bread, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἄρτων. The meaning of the sentence, if Philo's entire reasoning had focused on this distinction, imperatively required that he add αδυμων; as Bouhier himself does in his translation by the paraphrase of these sacred breads.

What therefore emerges incontestably from this sentence of Philo is that the Therapeutae imitated in their sacred meal the religious meal ordered by Moses with the showbread, and reserved in the Law only for the Levites. This is the positive and literal meaning of this important passage.

¹⁸⁸ Μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον. This expression would further prove, if necessary, against Montfaucon's supposition, which we have just refuted. It is evident that it is indeed the meal of the Therapeutae that Philo has just spoken of immediately, since, continuing, he says: Μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον. If he had wanted to distinguish a second sacred feast, that is, a special celebration of the mysteries, from the common meal, he would have said: Μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ δεῖπνον.

¹⁸⁹ Ἱερὰν παννυχίδα. This is what the Pagans called *sacra privigilia*.

¹⁹⁰ Εμμελέζοτος. The ancients called ἐμμέλεια (concinntas), a kind of serious and decorous dance, which was also called a tragic dance. It was the only one, among the peaceful dances, to which Plato gave his approval.

¹⁹¹ Εὐχαριτηρίους ὕμνους.

- ¹⁹² Exod., c. xv: *Sumpsit ergo Maria pvophelissa, soror Aarun, tympanum in manu sua; egressaque sunt omnes mulieres post eam cum tympanis et Choris, quibus prvrinebal*, etc. Among the Hebrews, as among the Indians, the Egyptians, and all the peoples of antiquity, dancing was part of divine worship. In the ceremony of the transport of the Ark [Hcg. lih. II, c. 6), we see David, dressed in a linen ephod, and at the head of all the people of Israel, dancing to the sound of trumpets and other musical instruments: *Et David saltabat lotis viribus ante Dominum*, etc.
- ¹⁹³ This must be compared with what we saw above in Josephus on the Essenes' prayer to the rising sun. (See p. 183.)
- ¹⁹⁴ See our first chapter.
- ¹⁹⁵ *Idées sur la philosophie de l'histoire de l'Humanité*, book XV, preamble.
- ¹⁹⁶ The Hindus themselves relate their word caste to this idea of *separation*: "This name," says a traveler, "takes, in usage, a great expression; it designates not only the four castes, but the profession, the pay of a person, etc. They say: *Tanti ka zat*, the profession of the weavers; *Kon zat toumara*, what is your nation? (*Des castes de l'Inde*, by Morenas.)
- ¹⁹⁷ *On Inequality of Conditions*, second part.
- ¹⁹⁸ the present form of property, born within feudal property, is of the same nature. The rent and the *droit du seigneur* are identical things.