

A NEW PROUDHON LIBRARY



OF JUSTICE IN THE  
REVOLUTION AND IN  
THE CHURCH

BY

PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON.



VOLUME TWO.



A WORKING TRANSLATION BY SHAWN P. WILBUR

FROM THE NEW EDITION,  
REVISED, CORRECTED AND EXPANDED, ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN  
1860.



CORVUS EDITIONS, 2023



## TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

The WORKING TRANSLATIONS presented here are part of an attempt to establish an edition of the major works of PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON. The goal is not simply to provide individual translations, but to provide a collection of translations that work well together to ease the task of the student of Proudhon's thought. A later stage will involve considerable annotation, including some attempts to connect the various works, but the connections have to be discovered before they can be noted, so it has been necessary simply to prepare as great a volume of relatively clean draft translations as possible as quickly as possible. At present, the raw materials for the NEW PROUDHON LIBRARY project amount to well over a million words of new translation, together with the drafts that I have accumulated since starting to translate Proudhon's works in 2006.

The present volume — the second of four covering the 1860 revised and expanded edition of JUSTICE IN THE REVOLUTION AND IN THE CHURCH — contains drafts that have been subject to at least two rounds of revision. It is quite possible that some errors have still escaped the process, but it is unlikely that they will pose particular problems for readers. There are some questions of style that are still unsettled. At times, for example, Proudhon goes beyond the normal French gendering of some key terms — among them, significantly, the Revolution and the Church — to real personification, so readers may find, for instances, that the Church is at times referred to as “it” and sometimes as “she.” Final decisions on some of these questions may ultimately depend on larger patterns in Proudhon's work.

In the interest of easing the work of tracing Proudhon's keywords and fundamental concepts across and between works, the tendency has been to translate the relevant terms rather uniformly. Where there are obvious English equivalents for French synonyms — *labor* and *work* for *travail* and *œuvre*, for example — I have generally maintained the existing patterns of usage, except where that practice would obscure familiar English phrases. (*Droit de travail* has generally been translated as *right to work*.) Some key distinctions have been more rigorously maintained — *right* and *law* for *droit* and *loi*, for example — even in some instances where the temptation is strong to have recourse to more familiar constructions.

It is important to note that these choices are not driven by any particular uniformity in Proudhon's own use of terms. On the contrary, because Proudhon understood most concepts as “indefinable notions,” always subject to additional clarification in context and sometimes to startling swings in meaning. (*Anarchy* is the most striking example of this tendency, marking, as it does in Proudhon's works, both the *social problem* and a significant element of its solution.) At times, the goal is simply to reduce the potential of introducing additional uncertainty in the translation process. There are, of course, terms in French that are subject to multiple meanings that are difficult to render in English without simply making

a choice among them: *esprit* for *spirit* and *mind*, *conscience* for *conscience* and *consciousness*, *expérience* for *experience* and *experiment*, etc. In these cases, and some derived from them, the practice has generally been to translate the word in all cases with the phonetically similar English term. In these cases, it is often possible to see the two most logical options as a choice between *the language of the Church* and *the language of the Revolution*. In instances where real confusion would be introduced, more specific choices have been made, but elsewhere readers are encouraged to treat the various senses of the French term as part of a single *series* of meanings and to pay close attention to contexts.

The 1860 edition of JUSTICE was first released as a series of twelve installments, each of which included a revised Study from the 1858 first edition, together with a series of endnotes, marked by letters in the text, and an application of the theory to current events, under the title “News of the Revolution.” In addition, a new “Program on Popular Philosophy” was added at the beginning of the first installment.

As Proudhon attempted to maintain a relatively uniform size for the individual installments, he ran into various difficulties. Some volumes seemed to require very extensive notes and some of the “News of the Revolution” essays sprawled into works too long to be included in the appropriate volumes. The conclusion of the study “Bourgeoisie and Plebs,” which begins at the end of the Sixth Study, was finally included in the Eighth Study, while the essay that was to supplement the Ninth Study was postponed to the Tenth. *La Pornocratie*, which is identified as “News of the Revolution” in manuscript form and was originally intended to supplement the Tenth and Eleventh Studies, ultimately remained unfinished. In the interest of simplifying the study of the work, I am moving the “News of the Revolution” sections with clear connections to particular studies into the volumes where those studies appear, so, for example, both sections of “Bourgeoisie and Plebs” appear in the Appendix to the Sixth Study in this volume.

This volume also includes a short supplementary appendix, containing two long passages from the 1858 edition that were not included in the 1860 publication.

As the process of translation, revision and annotation continues, the current drafts of all translations will be available online at proudhonlibrary.org. The texts by Proudhon will be supplemented by selected works of criticism, relevant correspondence, commentary, etc. Notices of group readings will also be posted on that page.

— Shawn P. Wilbur

September 3, 2023.

OF JUSTICE  
IN THE REVOLUTION AND IN  
THE CHURCH





OF JUSTICE IN THE REVOLUTION  
AND IN THE CHURCH.

FOURTH STUDY.

THE STATE.



CHAPTER ONE.

Phenomenon of the instability of states. — Antipathy of the human conscience for the government. — Origin of divine right and of its equivalent, the sovereignty of the people. — Example of the French nation. — Position of the political problem.

MONSIGNOR,

I. — The man who possesses faith is truly happy: he doubts nothing; regarding all things he has ready answers, peremptory explanations.

“Ask the Christian,” said Jouffroy, “where the human species comes from, he knows; ask where it is going, he knows; ask how it is going, he knows.

“Ask this poor child, who has never thought of it, why he is here below and what he will become after death: he will give you a sublime answer, which he will not understand, but which is no less admirable for that.

“Ask him how the world has been created, and to what end; why God put animals and plants there; how the earth was populated, whether by one family or by many; why men speak several languages; why they suffer, why they fight and how it will all end: he knows.

“The origin of the world, the origin of the species, the question of races, the destiny of man in this life and in the next, man’s relationship with God, man’s duties towards his fellows, the rights of man over creation: there is nothing that he does not know. And when he grows up, he will not hesitate any more regarding natural right, political right or the right of peoples: for of all that comes, all of that flows clearly, and as if by itself, from Christianity. (*Mélanges.*)

You know, Monsignor, how the philosopher Jouffroy, our illustrious compatriot, lived, and how he died: so enough irony. Better than anyone, after a youth spent in the raptures of faith, he had fathomed its mysteries; and he had shown that these so-called explanations of which the Christian boasts are allegories to which faith itself is powerless to give meaning. This is what he would have shown you, for example, on the subject of *natural right*, *political right* and the *right of peoples*, which you pride yourself on having taught the world and of which you do not even know the first word today. Otherwise, I would ask you, Monsignor, you doctor of theology and inspector of the faith, to explain to me the phenomenon that I am going to submit to you.

II. — It is a fact that I won't try to diminish, that society, judging at least from appearances, cannot do without government. We have never seen a nation, however uncivilized, that was deprived of this essential organ. Everywhere public power is proportional to civilization, or, if you like it better, civilization is in proportion to its government.

Without government, society falls below the savage state: for persons, there is no liberty, property, security; for nations, no wealth, no morality, no progress. The government is at once the shield that protects, the sword that avenges, the balance that determines right, the eye that watches. At the slightest disturbance, society contracts and groups around its leader; the multitude expects its salvation only from him; those most brazen in their opposition to all discipline invoke him themselves, as a present, omnipotent divinity.

Such words are not suspect from my mouth, and you can take note, for the future, of this decisive concession. Anarchy, according to the constant testimony of history, has no more use in mankind than disorder in the universe: *Non datur in κόσμῳ ἀκοσμία*. Pardon me, Monsignor, for this gibberish, which I tried in vain to translate into our language.

Explain to me now how, on the one hand, this same power is for the people a subject of perpetual mistrust, of secret hostility and, on the other hand, how, despite the importance of its function, which should make it venerable, sacred, it is subject to perpetual instability, to endless catastrophes?

1. To see that the government is a subject of distrust for the people, we need nothing but their constitutions and charters. Government always promises, it reassures, it offers guarantees, it binds itself by oaths. Nothing is more beautiful, nothing bears witness to a greater honesty, a deeper devotion, than its manifestos; nothing is more engaging than its harangues, its circulars, its messages; as much as it knows itself to be necessary, so much does it show itself to be full of goodwill. What good are all these oratorical precautions, however, if it is truly the force that



defends, the Justice that distributes? We fear it more than we love it; we suffer it rather than adhere to it. The wise move away from it, and there is not so vulgar a soul that does draw honor from doing without it. The philosopher says: *Necessary evil!* And the peasant concludes: *Let the king tend to his business, and I will tend to mine!*

This unfriendly disposition of the public conscience towards the government is old. *Do not seek empire*, says the Gospel. *Do not make yourselves judges*, that is to say sovereigns. *Let him who wants to command others be treated as a convict!*... In the paradise promised after this life, the blessed soul no longer knows obedience; it is freed from it as it is freed from sin, it shares with Christ its spouse the eternal reign. Our devotional books are full of this image of bliss from above. To be freed from all government, what an ideal! And what an idea!

2. What seems to justify this sentiment of the nations is that government everywhere appears in a state of interminable agitation, demolition and reconstruction. Could it be a law of society that what should ensure stability and peace in it is precisely devoid of peace and stability? Marriage, the family, property, institutions of the second order, living in the shadow of power, follow their progress through the ages, without shocks, surrounded by universal respect. What prevents the government from enjoying such a destiny?

III. — One thing to note is that it is from the bad opinion that has always been conceived of the power and its stability that two principles have arisen, which have been disputed for centuries in the political world: divine right and sovereignty of the people.

However far we go back in the history of governments, we find peoples constantly occupied with the means of conferring on their sovereigns the conditions of justice, intelligence and duration, which amounts to saying the means of governing their government.

Originally, it was believed that to institute public authority, — that gigantic, inconvenient, terrible, and wavering power, — nothing less than an investiture from the gods, an order from heaven, was needed. Every dynasty, among the ancients, was of divine filiation. Alexander and Caesar descended from the gods. Christianity has not abolished this theory, which is proper to the whole religious age: it has only modified it according to its dogma. Here again the legitimate sovereign is he whose title is written on the altar, and who derives all his rights from religion. Clovis and Charlemagne are sacred through the Church, like David and Solomon through the synagogue: their dynasties are part of the heritage of God. *Your son, Madame*, said Chateaubriand to the Duchesse de Berry, *is my king!* Eldest daughter of the Church, France cannot, without adultery, recognize another. There is not until the Reformation any nation

that did not yield to this law: Calvin was the prince of Geneva the day he became its pontiff, and because he was its pontiff. When England embraced Protestantism, English royalty had to embrace it in its turn: if James II lost his crown, it was not, as has been said, because he abused divine right, but because he abandoned it, denying the divinity of the Anglican Church.

The kings, it is true, had little difficulty in submitting to a formality that, making them enter into religion, could only assure their power and prepare their apotheosis from afar. There is no example of a prince who took it into his head to protest, in the name of his sword, against the divine sanction demanded of him by public opinion. But whatever advantage resulted for the prince from this theological fiction, it is no less true that divine right, imposed by the people or assumed by the chief, testifies to the sovereign mistrust that men, from the beginning, have had of the morality of power, as well as its effectiveness. Wherever a state has been formed, it has been necessary for the head of this state, in order to have his mission accepted, to place it under a transcendent authority. When it comes to government, monarchy, aristocracy or republic, man no longer trusts man; he recognizes only the gods. The Tarquins expelled, the consuls were entrusted with both civil and priestly power; by the order of heaven, religion was so intimately united with the Republic that the Caesars, with all their power, could never make themselves *kings*. That would have been sacrilegious; they had to content themselves with the title of EMPERORS.

But what can even the blessings of Heaven do against the inner vice that kills governments? All monarchies, aristocracies and democracies established on divine right have fallen. We accuse the weakening of religion, the criticism of the jurists, the progress of philosophy, disuse and who knows what else... We have sometimes attacked the imbecility of princes, sometimes popular tumults, sometimes time, which wears out everything. Vain explanations, against which the sentiment of the people protests — the people whose first care is to constantly raise up the defeated government, and always to the same conditions and under the same formulas.

In our days, divine right seems to have fallen into disfavor. It would be a gross illusion to believe that because the word has been rejected, the thing has been renounced. Never, on the contrary, were we more careful, in rebuilding power, to invoke the intervention of heaven. Only, we said to ourselves that in the end, to give the investiture to the prince, there was no need for a pontifical anointing; that the spirit of God was in the public square as well as in the choir of a church; that it was only a question of gathering the citizens, and that, each casting his vote in the presence of the Supreme Being and after the solemn sacrifice, the sovereign would arise, as by a prophetic evocation, from the assembly of the people .

Thus divine right is never lacking in power. In fact as in right, it is always that principle, and it alone, that enthrones the government. The democracy of the nineteenth century cried out louder than that of the Middle Ages: *Vox populi vox Dei*, which M. Mazzini translates by these words, *Dio e popolo*. Thanks to this maxim, Napoleon I and Louis-Philippe, starting from national sovereignty, could believe themselves as legitimate as Louis XVIII and Henri V: the only thing changed was the mode of registration.

The only thing to notice in this system is that it testifies to an even greater mistrust than the first. As if the consecration of the priest were ineffective, the people depend only on themselves for divine revelation. Thus supported, power, it seems to them, will no longer be able to perish or do harm.

Alas! It was quickly seen that by substituting the investiture of the people for that of the Church, we fell into a worse superstition; that instead of improving power and consolidating it, it was depraved: so that we found ourselves having sacrificed the fruit of ten centuries of political elaboration to the hallucinations of a demagoguery without tradition, without ideas, given over to the fury of its instincts. Religion for religion, the popular urn is still below the holy Merovingian ampulla. All it achieved was to turn distrust into disgust, and skepticism into hatred.

IV. — It is therefore in vain that, following the example of the most famous nations, the French people, applying sometimes priestly divine right, sometimes popular divine right, have exhausted all the forms of simple government, pure aristocracy, pure monarchy, pure democracy. They have not been able to attach itself to any form, and all are equally repugnant to them.

It is in vain that we then tried all kinds of mixed government, marrying and fusing together, in a single system of temperate or representative monarchy, the nobles with the commoners, the legitimate with the illegitimate. Nothing can hold: the machine, barely established, is falling apart; more than ever the balance seems unstable and the fatigue of the nation at its peak.

Allow me on this subject to quote the words of a monarchist writer, M. Albert de Broglie:

“What is really, one wonders, the form of internal government that suits the French nation? In the matter of government, what does it want and what can it do? What are its abilities and inclinations? How does its story advise it and what does it bequeath to it? Where is its experience and its tradition? Does it aspire to political liberty? So what has possessed it so often to let it slip away so easily? Is it to the yoke of a master that it wants to lend its shoulders? Then why these sudden and impetuous explosions of independence that reappear from century to

century? Why this rapid decline and this profound fall of absolute power the very day following the day when, freed from all shackles and victorious over all its enemies, it was placed entirely in the hands of an adored family, and had only to govern in peace a submissive nation?

“If the French nation is made to be free, why has it lent itself so willingly to absolute power for so long? If it was born to serve, why did it so solemnly and abruptly change course?”

M. de Broglie speaks only of the French nation; his observations apply to all.

It is a long-established point of history that every nation, whatever desire it may have to ensure its government, continually tends to change its form, and that, unable to achieve this according to its daily aspirations, it ends by overthrowing it, thus accomplishing in a day what was to be the work of centuries. There is no nation, however short its course, that does not offer an example. — This results, says Machiavelli, following Aristotle, from the nature of things. — No doubt: but what is this nature? Aristotle and Machiavelli do not explain it. How, while paternal authority, marriage and the family experience no opposition from the people, while improvements take place there without resistance; how, I say, can an organ as important as the State, to the preservation of which all wishes are acquired, be subject to an existence so tormented, so precarious?

Let us listen again to M. de Broglie.

“There are, we know, fortunate minds through which these perplexities do not pass. We have recently read, and even in very good circles, very consistent and very well constructed theories of the history of France, in which everything seems to hold together marvelously. According to these makers of systems, the two principles that have always presided over the development of France, Equality and Authority, are also sufficient for all its wishes. The greatest measure of equality possible under the care of the greatest amount of authority imaginable, that is the ideal government of France. This is what the crown and the third estate have sought together, through our long agitations.

“A *royal democracy*, as it has been called, — in other words, a master and no superiors, equal subjects and no citizens, no privileges but no rights, — such is the social constitution that suits us. This is called the historical government of France and the glorification of the principle of authority; it is recommended, in flowing terms and by trivial reasoning, to the imitation of the legislators of our age and to the love of future generations.

“We do not deny the painful confirmations that such a system can find in the precedents of our own history. We have shown ourselves how, between the carelessness of the nobility, the failures of the third estate and the skill of the crown, almost all our political commotions ended in the simultaneous progress of equality and authority. But it is nevertheless impossible to separate this

movement from its end, and this end was the catastrophe of the French Revolution. If it is true that the combination of equality and despotism is the natural government of France, how is it that the old monarchy perished just when it came closest to this ideal? If it is true that the French nation only asks for two things, a yoke and a level, and that every Frenchman readily agrees to obey provided he has no one to respect, how is it that the day when this double desire was almost fully satisfied, an era of decadence opened for royalty that nothing could avert, and for the nation a series of agitations that sixty years could not finish? Would it not be because the government founded on equality in obedience, the result of the successive faults of the Third Estate, flattering all its weaknesses, still did not satisfy any of its generous aspirations and consequently left the nation in a secret dissatisfaction with itself? Is it not above all that this form of government contains conditions that make all stability impossible, and make *royal democracy* the least solid, as well as the least noble of political institutions?" (*Revue des Deux-Mondes*, January 15, 1854.)

It is not correct to say, as M. de Broglie does, that *royal democracy*, he means imperial democracy, is the least solid of governments. It is just as solid as the monarchy and the aristocracy. I would even dare to say that no political institution offers so much stability. There is nothing firmer, more fixed, more immutable than instinct. An ignorant mob, purged of all generous and philosophical ferment, giving itself a prince of its own, forms a political whole that can last as long as itself, indefinitely. Such is the Turkish government, which dates back more than 500 years, and of which Abdul-Medjid is the *thirty-fourth* sultan. If the Turkish Empire, after having used up in long wars the physical and conquering faculties of its nation, has fallen into a consumptive state, if it arouses the contempt even of our soldiers, it is not so much its fault as that of the nations that surround it, that clutch it with their active civilization and, penetrating it from all sides, forcing it to reflect, accelerate its dissolution. The more they rise, the more it seems to decline; but that is no reason to say that by itself it lacks stability. The Ottoman Empire could last ten centuries under the protectorate of Russia; it dies at the hands of the reason of the Western powers.

Be that as it may, we can conclude from the reflections of M. de Broglie that France, after having passed through five or six kinds of government, does not yet know where to stop; that she rejected them all successively and with the same energy; that political skepticism has grown in the country as a direct result of shifts in authority; that not only is faith in power extinguished, but antipathy has reached its peak, and that, were it not for some feeling of self-preservation or fear that holds it up and holds the masses down, the power, which increases its constriction day by day, would fall quickly: so that the more, over time, that public reason grows and civilization develops, the more the antagonism between

society and government bursts forth.

Such is, Monsignor, the enigma of which I ask you, you to whom faith teaches so many things, the solution. What does this endless evolution mean? If there is a normal system of government for nations, and reason inclines us to it, unless we suppose that government is only a harmful superfluity, from whence comes the French nation, intelligent among all, generous, full of audacity, loving liberty to the point of license, equality to the point of ostracism, public order to transportation, mad for legality and mad for arbitrariness, how is it that such a nation has not found it yet?

M. de Broglie tends to accuse the country: I would rather incline to accuse the very nature of the government. But all these recriminations from the people to the sovereign are puerile; they only prove one thing, that the country and the government, despite their good will, cannot get along together, and it is for this that I ask the reason.

What if, the intentional question being set aside on both sides, the parties placed back to back with their reciprocal grievances, we must relate the political evolutions of which our nation is the passive and very instructive subject to a *general law*, if, as Machiavelli claimed in his speeches on Livy, societies are condemned to roll endlessly in this fatal circle, and if contemporary events have only justified the Florentine theory in this respect, what then is this law? What is the reason for all these adventures? By what considerations of theodicy, of metaphysics, of social economy, can we explain this shocking, immoral antinomy of a being, Society, in continual struggle with its motor function, with its master organ? What secret cause incessantly opposes the interest of the prince to the interest, first of the least, then of the greatest number, and thus precipitates the states towards their ruin? As if the government had in the heart of the social life, which alone is continuous and progressive, a life of its own and limited, as if consequently its periodic renewal were for societies a condition of endurance!

V. — I will not make my readers wait for the solution.

As we have just seen, I reduce all of political science to a single question, that of STABILITY.

How is it that from high antiquity down to our own day the constitution of states has been so fragile that all publicists, without exception, have declared it essentially unstable? How are we to give it stability and duration?

It is from this special side that I approach the political problem; it is on this ground, still unexplored, that I pose the question.

And this is my answer:

What must be considered above all in government is not the origin (divine right, popular right or right of conquest); nor is it the form

(democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, simple or mixed government); it is not even the organization (division of powers, representative or parliamentary system, centralization, federalism, etc.): all these things are the material of government. What must be considered is the spirit that animates it, its inner thought, its soul, its IDEA.

It is by their idea that governments live or die. Let the idea therefore become true, and the state, however reproachful its origin, however defective its organization may appear, rectifying itself according to its secret thought, will be safe from all attack from without, as from all corruption within. It will radiate its thought around it, and will increase unceasingly in extent, in depth and in force. On the contrary, if the idea remains false, then its legitimacy, popularity, organization, military power will not hold: it must fall.

Now, as the idea, avowed or not avowed, of governments has hitherto been a prejudice radically opposed to Justice, a false political hypothesis; as, on the other hand, the succession of states in history is an upward march towards Justice, we can, from this double point of view, of theory and history, classify them all according to three different ideas, which we will examine one after the other:

1. Idea of *Necessity*, which is that of pagan antiquity;
2. Idea of *Providence*, which is that of the Church;

These two ideas, antitheses of each other, are the opposite extremes of an antinomy that embraces the whole religious age;

3. Idea of *Justice*, which is that of the Revolution and which constitutes, in opposition to religious government, human government.

Thus, it is with government as with property, with the division of labor and with all economic forces: taken in itself and disregarding the more or less juridical thought that determines it, it is a stranger to right, indifferent to all moral ideas; it is an instrument of force. As long as the government has not received Justice, it remains established on the ideas of fatality and providence, it tends towards inorganism, it oscillates from catastrophe to catastrophe. The problem is therefore, after having prepared the economic ground, to apply justice to the government, thereby freeing it from fatality and arbitrariness. Such is the object of the Revolution.

## CHAPTER II.

Of the government according to necessity. — How the instability of the State results from the inequality of fortunes. — Metaphysics of the reason of state. — Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Rousseau, Machiavelli.

VI. — The greatest of the ancient divinities, before which all the others, like mere creatures, bowed their heads, was Destiny, *Fatum*, *Parca*, *Necessitas*, *Sors* or *Fors*, *Fortuna*; in Greek, Μοῖρα, Ἀνάγκη, etc.

It is by Destiny, said religion, and in its wake philosophy, that is explained all that happens in the universe, the destinies of mortals and the revolutions of empires. Before it all questions fall, every search comes to an end: it is the first and last reason of things.

Why these debacles of nations and thrones, collapsing on top of each other, in perpetual instability? — It is Destiny that wills it, it was written in its book, it is the spindle of the Fates that turns: *sic volvere Parcas!*

Why am I poor and oppressed, while another, who is perhaps worth less, commands and enjoys? — It is Destiny that has thus established it; it is fate that assigns us to each our lot, *sortem*, μοῖραν. Who would dare protest against its decrees?

— And why shouldn't I complain? What is there in common between me, a free being, who possesses Justice, and Destiny? — Impiety! The gods themselves are subject to Destiny; and you, worm of the earth, you would protest against it! You would be fortunate if, with the help of these Immortals, who give you the example of submission, you manage to read even a few lines of the eternal book! Knowing your fate in advance, you will fulfill it with more certainty, you will avoid whatever could divert you from it: it is the only means left to you to add to your fortune if it is favorable, and also to soften it if it is contrary.

Thus proceeds human genius. Instead of seeking the reason of things in the analysis of the facts, checking its first glimpses by repeated observations and rectifying its judgments, it settles, it decides, it decrees, it plays, without realizing it, the role of the Destiny it adores. Then it gives itself myths, it surrounds itself with fables and mysteries; it creates for itself, in order to ward off Destiny, a pharmacopoeia of sacraments and a whole kennel of divinities.

What is saddest is to then see philosophy repeating in pedantic phrases the teachings of superstition, and presenting its pastiches as discoveries. Let us laugh, if we like, at the fatalistic theology of power, which Mahomet summed up in one word, *Islam*, resignation: but what have the doctors of political science given other than a materialistic deduction from



the Eastern myth?

VII. — All of the authors who have dealt with politics, from Plato to Rousseau, therefore agree that instability is inherent in government, so that according to these authors, the state, obeying its natural and social necessity, is constantly marching to its ruin.

But how and why is instability inherent in the state? Because it is not enough to allege the necessity, it is still necessary, however mysterious it is, to make sure that it exists. Where does it come from, this necessity, the thought of which hovers, like the bird of death, over the political world? Where does it lie, and what is its source? Is it in the principle, in the conditions, or in the end of government that it is found?

The aim of government, among all ancient peoples, has been to make justice prevail against the incursions of barbarism, whether internal or external. The history of the oldest civilizations, in China, India, Chaldea and Egypt, of their wars, of their expeditions, of the invasions they have experienced, demonstrates this. Plato, who is honored with the discovery that justice is the capital object of government, was here only the interpreter of primitive legislation, just as his republic is only a counterfeit of the first utopias. Now, since the State has Justice as its mandate, consequently Justice as its law of organization and action, in all these respects the political institution having nothing illegitimate about it, eminently vital, it seems that the State should be, in essence and destination, safe from any harm. What does Plato say about this? Well, Plato first despairs of the stability of the state. He expects nothing, for its preservation, from the efficacy of right. After having laid down in principle the legitimacy of the institution from the point of view of the motive, he concludes with the necessity of its fall. So he presents his republic only as an ideal.

If power is irreproachable in its purpose; must we blame its origin or its form?

On the one hand, as regards its origin and enthronement, it does not appear that they exert a serious influence on the stability of states. Whoever the prince may be, whether he comes from election or divine right, whether he installs himself by usurpation or by conquest, the country always shows itself to be of good composition if he does justice. As for the constitution of power, it can be all the less a principle of ruin since it is most often given by the physical constitution of the country: soil, race, genius, language, religion, etc. It is by virtue of this principle that the history of each people pivots on a central institution, the symbol, formula of its native constitution, an expression of its genius, a kind of palladium and rallying cry, which only perishes with it : in India, caste; in Egypt, the priesthood; among the Arabs, the tribe; in Greece, the

amphictyony; in Italy, ancient and modern, the Church and the Empire; in France, the monarchy; in Germany, the diet; in England, the parliament; in Spain, the Cortes; in the Netherlands, the bourgeois; in Sweden, the peasants; in Poland, the nobles, etc.

We have in France a striking example of this persistence of the native form of the state. After a period of fourteen centuries, or, counting the Roman emperors, almost nineteen, royalty was removed by the Revolution. To create social balance, the first thought is to remake the government. What will be the form? Democracy! cry the revolutionaries. But no: no sooner has democracy abolished royalty and the king than it works to reproduce them by unitary *centralization*, by *command*, *regulation* and the *uniform*. The ground thus prepared by the legislators, the people have only to complete the work with their vote. As soon as they can intervene, they give themselves a leader, Napoleon; and we don't even have the balanced monarchy of 94, we have that of Louis XIV and Charlemagne.

There is in all these facts a sort of testimony of nature that, in spite of revolutionary accidents, invokes the spontaneity and autochthony of the state and renders the immanent cause of its instability more obscure. It is not there, obviously, that we must look for the primary cause of political cataclysms; let us add that it is not there either that the authors believe they have discovered it.

VIII. — What renders the State fatally unstable is, says Aristotle, the *inequality of conditions and fortunes*. Such is the general cause of revolutions: all the others are only secondary. Now, as inequality increases with civilization, we can add to the principle of Aristotle this corollary, that the more society advances, the more the condition of states becomes precarious; on this point, too, history confirms what philosophy has said.

Inequality of conditions, instability in the state: here then, in two words, according to Aristotle, is the crux of politics and the key to history. This is the decree of destiny, and this decree is irreformable.

Whereupon I will observe two things:

1. If it is true, as the Peripatetic and his successors claim, that inequality is a law of nature, it cannot, precisely for this reason, become a cause of subversion for the State. On the contrary, as it is an element of humanity, it is also an element of politics, and it is consequently a condition of stability for power. It implies a contradiction that a being should perish while obeying its own law. In this hypothesis, Aristotle's theory, which is that of Plato, Machiavelli and all the others, would be contradictory.

2. But it is not true that inequality is a law of nature and of society: on this point I no longer have to prove myself. I have demonstrated, by legal

and mathematical reasons, that the inequality of fortunes, — although it may be the object of a certain tolerance by virtue of express conventions and in the interest of economic relations, — has nothing in itself, however, that is necessary and human; that insofar as it is the fact of nature, it is an accident that the prudence of the legislator, the skill of the economist and the wisdom of the pedagogue are called upon to remedy; insofar as it results from political, mercantile and industrial anarchy, it is a violation of right. I will not return to this thesis, which is henceforth invincibly certain.

It being thus demonstrated that the inequality of fortunes is neither a law of nature, nor a social law, the observation of Aristotle, that this inequality is the cause of the instability of states, becomes true again, except for a few modifications:

*a.* Whatever the inequalities that nature allows to persist between men, for which no one ever dreamed of laying a grievance against the State, it is not these inequalities that by themselves and directly provoke revolt against the government and bring about revolutions; it is the political iniquity of which they are the pretext, which makes the State an ambush set for labor and liberty.

*b.* The inequality of conditions, the recognized and avowed cause of the instability of the State, being no longer a law, but an accident of nature, it follows, contrary to the opinion of Aristotle, that the State instability is no longer necessary; it is accidental.

*c.* And since power, according to all politics, is established for the supervision of Justice, which is to say to maintain the balance between interests and services, it follows that the remedy for political instability is found: it is to renounce the preconceived hypothesis of a necessary inequality, and, in place of this disastrous idea that corrupts Justice and upsets governments, to give to the State, as idea and as foundation, economic equilibrium.

Thus the theory of political instability and, as a result, that of political necessity or the reason of state, which has inspired all legislators, philosophers and statesmen, and which still governs societies today, this theory is three times false: it is false in its metaphysical datum, in that it supposes a cause, and consequently a state of necessary subversion; it is false in its notion of inequality, which it makes both a law of nature and a social law, which means a law of right; it is false, finally, in the conclusions that it draws from the observed facts, which would be, on the one hand, that the subjects of the State can have the idea of revolting against a natural and social law, so as to jeopardize the stability of the government and, on the other hand, that the instability of the state is, like its cause, eternal, while it is truly only provisional.

We now hold the thread that will lead us through the political maze

and give us the secret of all the agitations and tumblings of governments. The history of the states is nothing other than the evolution of this disastrous error, inequality, which begins at the very origin of societies, of which philosophy has then made itself the echo, and which was not to end until the appearance of a new science.

It is conceivable, moreover, that the phenomenon must have led people astray for a long time. It was necessary to go through religious equality, then through political equality, before conceiving, with the clarity that we bring to it today, economic equality. With unanimous sentiment, pagans and Christians, monarchists and democrats, agreed to consider inequality as a law of nature and of Providence, against which no one had the right to protest and which, imposing itself on practical reason, thus becoming the reason of state, finding its expression and its consecration in the social pact, systematically led the State from shipwreck to shipwreck.

Established on such a conception, society is in the process of suicide; the power, guardian of justice, is powerless to fulfill its mandate: it is an organ of iniquity. Forced fatally to support an order of things whose immorality does not take long to offend souls, to use violence against the citizens, from this moment it is lost. In place of Justice reigns the reason of state, whose last word, the funereal term, is *tyranny*. (A)

It has been remarked before me: the life of states is a dialectic. Nothing shows it better than this system of necessity.

IX. — The political order, as Aristotle has shown, being linked to the economic order, both interdependent, one can foresee what influence the principle of social inequality, followed, supported *per fas et nefas*, will exercise on the stability of the State.

The power, in fact, having and being able to have no object but to protect Justice, and Justice being inequality, it is clear that the government will have peace or will be delivered up to agitation according to whether the interests are more or less disturbed by the lack of balance and by their antagonism; in other words, it is evident that the iniquity that affects the social order will be communicated in the same proportion to the governmental order. So that, as the economic order finds itself, through the inequality that it consecrates and develops, placed outside the law, the political order, instituted for its defense, will inevitably also be led to free itself from the law.

Thus, as inequality grows between citizens and makes society totter, the government, forced to use more and more force, turns to despotism, to tyranny, and becomes demoralized. By its violence, it loses the support that society at first lent it; by the need to defend itself, it concentrates, it deforms its own constitution, it shrinks its base more and more, until finally being no longer buttressed either by the society that is withdrawing

or by the division of its functions, it loses its balance and falls.

Let historians, more poets than philosophers, accuse after that he corruption of mores, the ambition of the great, the passions of the multitude and the weakening of religion for the decadence of empires, it is clear that these explanations do not reach the primary cause; they only touch on its effects.

So long, therefore, as the economic balance has not been established, the problem of government is posed in these terms, which make its existence an impossibility:

“Given a nation, with its territory, its industry, its interests, its religion, its customs, its relations, its instincts, its genius; the inequality of fortunes and the subordination of ranks being both the condition of existence of society and the cause of its agitations: to organize within this society, with its men and its resources, a public FORCE before which every interest vanishes, every will bends, all resistance breaks down; then, by means of this force, to discipline and lead the nation, to maintain it in obedience as long as possible; to exercise power, at home and abroad, in the sense of aristocratic privilege, of the hierarchy of functions, of the subordination of the masses and of governmental prerogative; all with the greatest glory for the prince and profit for the upper class, the least turbulence and misery among the common people.”

In this program, which is that of all the powers, of all the theories, of all the utopias, Justice is counted for nothing or almost for nothing. It cannot be otherwise: Justice, in the hypothesis of natural and social inequality, a hypothesis that is none other than that of the original forfeiture, becomes a superfluity, an embarrassment for a power whose principle is necessity; the means, force; the object, to prevent by force the revolt of misery against privilege.

According to the degree that the prince is inspired by one or another of the elements of which the physical constitution of the country is formed, there will be a politics of *instincts*, a politics of *interests*, a politics of *tradition*, a politics of *war*, a politics of *religion*. All these forms of politics have been glorified in turn by the fine minds of each century; they are glorified more than ever today. But there never was a politics of justice; there never could be. Justice, taken as the principle, means and goal of government, is a revolutionary utopia, which can only be realized through equality.

X. — These principles, I mean these hypotheses, once admitted, namely, that inequality is the law of nature and of society, and that consequently it serves as a yardstick for politics, we have the metaphysics of the system.

Society is sacred. It is the source, the subject of Justice, if Justice is

anything, since, without going back to God, who in creating humanity gave it his laws, outside of society there is only the state of war, barbarism, lawlessness.

Theoretically, whoever says Justice says equality. In fact, this equality is belied by nature, which, making us unequal in our persons, subjects us to this fatal trinity: inequality before nature, inequality before fortune, consequently inequality before society and before the law.

Before this invincible inequality, the reasonable and pious creature bows with resignation; the wicked, by the concupiscence of the flesh and the pride of the spirit, revolts and conspires against the eternal hierarchy.

Now society, by creating the governmental organ for its defense, confers on the prince his rights over persons and things, and renders him inviolable.

It follows from this that if society demands, in order to maintain its hierarchy, the sacrifice of certain interests, the Power cannot shrink from the execution of this order; that everything the prince accomplishes from this superior point of view is legitimate; that he would be guilty if he failed in this duty; that if, from plebeian to plebeian, from noble to noble, from church to church, it is good that equal justice be religiously followed, it is no longer the same from proletarian to aristocrat, from layman to cleric, from citizen to prince, from the prince himself to the nation.

Which amounts to saying that the government, established in appearance and with a common good faith to serve as an organ of right, also possesses the privilege of disregarding right, if necessary, and of guiding itself only by the reason of state; that thus, mandatary of Justice, it is superior to Justice; that consequently, the older it grows, the more, necessity impelling it, it heaps on iniquities on its head and advances its ruin.

This theory of arbitrariness as well as fatalism, which resolves itself, as we see, into a contradiction, has been seriously upheld in our day as the quintessence of morality, the last word of politics.

The statesman, say the adepts, obeys two different maxims, two laws, two morals, depending on whether he applies the ordinary rules of justice or whether, rising to a higher sphere, he considers the reason of state. But his soul is not disturbed by it: as much as the general prevails over the particular in science, so much, in the conscience of the statesman, political morality, high morality, prevails over vulgar morality. For him, the customary distinctions between the just and the unjust change and are inverted as soon as there is a question of public safety and the reason of state. What is useful to society, that is to say to the hierarchy, to the nobility, to the clergy, to the prince, passing in the front line, is the true good; what can harm them is evil: so much the better for the citizen whose right conforms to it, so much the worse for those whose right is contrary

to it. It is a risk that all those who live under the law of the State tacitly undertake to run: society only exists at this price. ISLAM, resign yourself!

XI. — From this metaphysics, given *a priori* by the prejudice of inequality, has sprung a long tradition, in which philosophers and legislators show themselves to be unanimous. History has developed accordingly: the system of the reason of state, which is none other than the system of the *Fatum*, motivated on the principle of a purely hypothetical inequality, governed all the ancient peoples; it governs the moderns.

For one must not imagine, because Christianity has poured its baptismal water over the world, that paganism, which was the first to give the sanction of destiny to inequality, has disappeared. In politics, paganism still lives; it shares the religion of mortals with Christianity, and the more imminent the dissolution of the social body becomes, the more it boasts of curing it by force.

Plato, who had seen so well that Justice and virtue are the only and true bases of the State; who accused the demagogy of his time of having made politics an art of crime; who, playing on the word ἀρίστοι, recalls his fellow citizens to the government, no longer of the rich and powerful, but of the *best*, and presents to them for this purpose an ideal of a republic where Justice alone, according to him, commands and governs; Plato, in his famous utopia, while he imagines he obeys only Justice, in reality only follows the reason of state. Incapable of balancing the *debit* and the *credit* of each citizen, looking at inequality as a necessary law, he finds nothing better than to suppress every kind of individual right and to impose an absolute standard on everyone's heads. It is the reason of state raised to the highest power: community of goods, community of women, common meals, elimination of wealth, luxury, poetry, art, that is where the prince of political men and moralists is led by the theory of necessity.

A more positive spirit, endowed with too keen a sense of human realities to fall into this communism, which he rightly censures, Aristotle, while giving greater importance to liberty, to the rights of man and of the citizen, remains none the less, like Plato his master, a faithful follower of necessity, a practitioner of the reason of state. He had seen better than anyone the relationships that unite the political order and the economic order: the first two books of the *Politics* deal with civil society, property, family, labor, slavery, finance, etc. To crown it all, he had collected, analyzed, compared as many as one hundred and fifty constitutions, the substance of which is summarized in his book. Nothing helped: neither the erudition of the publicist, nor the observations of the economist saved the Aristotelian utopia from the pitfall by which that of Plato had failed. The times had not come: science was too weak, prejudice too strong,

reason too confused, conscience too benumbed. Like Plato, Aristotle gives preference to the aristocracy or government of the best, and distinguishes at first sight in society three classes of men: a superior, governing class; an obedient lower class, or plebs; and a servile class, working for the other two.

Was it necessary to be born a man of genius, to be called Aristotle, to give us this travesty of the mythology of the *Fatum*? As aristocratic government is born of necessity, it has necessity for its law! It is more metaphysical than the fable, but it is certainly less beautiful. But tell me then, O philosopher, what difference do you then make between aristocracy and despotism? What does it matter, to speak in the name of necessity or the reason of state, whether the despot be one or several? Will the government be more equitable, more moral, more rational, less inclined to inorganism by the fatal concentration of its powers? And then how do you know that in all this there is necessity?

Whoever speaks of Plato and Aristotle speaks of the thought of Greece and the Orient in what was both most positive and most ideal: in them we possess all of antiquity: theory, practice and history.

Roman history, from the expulsion of the Tarquins to Caesar, is the dazzling demonstration of this truth, that the power raised above justice by reasons of the state cannot support a constitution unless it imposes one that it wears out in the long run, and that its last word is strength. Without philosophizing so much, and long before having received the visit of Cyneas, the conscript fathers had understood this and treated accordingly the plebs, who in turn returned it to them in perpetual riots.

This Roman constitution, which gained the admiration of Polybius, was maintained only by force of revolutions and revisions, exempt from disturbances then only when the people were occupied with war. After four hundred and sixty years of agitation for civil liberty and political equality, Rome finds peace only in perpetual dictatorship: from this moment dates its decadence, the fatal end of an evolution whose point of departure had been the patrician justice, inequality.

Feudalism belongs to the system of Providence: we will speak of it below.

XII. — At the end of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and soon after the Reformation, seem to bring to weary nations some refreshment. But the theory of necessity revives, as if, in order to learn Justice, the reason of peoples had needed, in unlearning the Gospel, to relearn Destiny.

Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza founded the State on the principle of necessity, and all three ended in despotism. What I find odious in these philosophers is that where Mahomet, in the feeling of his impotence, limits himself to an elevation of heart to God, — *Resignation!* — they



claim to put reason. There is no iniquity worse than that of the Sage: *Corruptio optimi pessima*.

Before the establishment of the State, says Spinoza, there is neither just nor unjust, neither good nor evil. Whence it follows that whatever the State does for its own preservation can never be unjust: this, according to Spinoza, would imply a contradiction. He therefore grants that the State has the right to govern, if need be, by violence and to send the citizens to death, even for the slightest causes; only he trusts in the prudence of the sovereign, which the misunderstanding of the use of force would endanger. He does not see, as Aristotle saw very well, that, given inequality, the rest necessarily follows, abuse of force, consequently dissolution of the state, *fatum*.

Also the consideration of danger hardly stops despots. *L'Etat, c'est moi*, says Louis XIV. One can see in his Memoirs the strange lessons that, in the name of divine right and in the most devout style, he gives to his grandson on the manner of governing peoples. Alas! Alas! If this autocratic policy is necessary, it must be said that the corruption of society by the monarchy is also necessary. Was it the eighteenth century that corrupted Louis XV, and with him the monarchical constitution; or was it Louis XV, the pupil of Louis XIV, who corrupted the eighteenth century? Perverted from the breast by this family tradition, Louis XVI did not shrink, despite his sincere piety and his real virtues, from lies, betrayal, even poison, if we are to believe Buchez, as soon as he believed them necessary to maintain his crown. And the Emperor Napoleon I, who for a moment thought he was the heir of kings, *Our poor uncle*, have we not heard him repeat the words of Louis XIV: *La constitution, c'est moi?* With the principle of fatality and antagonism taken as the basis of society, with the reason of state taken as the law of government, the public domain is identified with the prerogative of the prince, the constitution of the state with the will of the emperor, the nation with his person. The law no longer exists: everything is regulated by order of the dynast, rendered *secundum artem*.

The democracy has followed, albeit from afar, the example of the aristocracy and royalty. As its aim was never to achieve justice in the economy, but only to repress the insolence of the great and to moderate bourgeois exploitation, equality was for it only a myth, the constitution a hindrance to its adversaries, a cobweb to itself; as for its policy, it never abandoned the reason of state. The social contract of J.-J. Rousseau does not differ in any way, in this respect, from the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Spinoza, and from the practice of despotism: extract from *Institutions* of Calvin, that says it all. Democracy has had its morality of public safety, its suspensions of liberty and justice, its exceptional tribunals, its laws of silence, its purges, its terrorism, its *auto-da-fé*. May

it finally understand that this politics that it is mad about is the very cause of its defeats, and that there is no salvation for it except in the economic balance, the only principle that belongs to it, and the one that none of its adversaries will ever dare to challenge or admit.

Let us say, however, to the honor of the human race, that rarely did the conscience of princes measure up to the principle that made them act. Almost all ignored it and, when for the first time the revelation of it was made to the world, they defended themselves against it as against a monster. Kings and pontiffs, ministers and philosophers practiced the reason of state as M. Jourdain made prose, without knowing it; the people were not scandalized by it: it was always called justice. Even today, the most learned critic could hardly see in Machiavelli's book anything other than calumny, irony or hyperbole.

XIII. Machiavelli had perfectly observed that the instability of the political equilibrium, whatever the form of government, has its first cause in the opposition of interests, in other words, in the inequality of fortunes: he expressly says so in his *Décades*. This posited, Machiavelli goes no further: he does not ask whether this opposition is a fact of nature or the result of a false opinion; whether, therefore, the antagonism that it creates in the government is the expression of an absolute necessity or only of a hypothetical necessity. Machiavelli sticks to the common belief. He supposes, with Aristotle and all the publicists, that the inequality of conditions is given, like that of climates, by the nature of things, and he starts from there. If, by chance, he tries to go back in thought to the cause of this first fact, he then throws himself into mysticism; he appeals to the *law of the spheres*; he is remaking a mythology. Full of contempt for the Church and Catholicism, which he accused of having corrupted Italy, unable to return to the mythology of the ancients, Machiavelli devoted himself to astrology; he creates for himself, for the needs of his intelligence, a religion that responds to everything: it is the *movement of the spheres*, a new figure of destiny.

Society can therefore, according to Machiavelli, exist only on inequality and antagonism, the spheres having thus regulated it for all eternity; on the other hand, social interest being the greatest of all, and the State or the prince representing society, he did not hesitate to sacrifice, in any case, justice to the reason of state. Hence a new and formidable opposition that, added to that of interests, was to end by prevailing against the government and bringing about its ruin.

All the states that have existed and that exist, said Machiavelli, revolve in this invariable circle: monarchy, aristocracy, democracy. — Let us move on to the mixed states.

The nation begins with royalty: to the prince, he recommends killing,

at once and without dragging out the execution, all his enemies.

The aristocracy seizes power: he advises it to exterminate the dynasty, down to the last offspring.

Democracy comes in turn: he recommends that it kill all the nobles...

He would have told the Church, if the Church had needed his advice, to burn all the heretics, all the philosophers, all the socialists, who on their side were bound to massacre all the priests, if ever they became the masters.

For the rest, Machiavelli concerns himself neither with public right nor with the constitution: he had too much genius, too much good sense, too much frankness for that. For him, government is not the application of justice to matters of state; it is the art of establishing oneself in power, of exercising power, of maintaining it, of extending one's power, according to the law of the spheres, by all possible means, if necessary by Justice, even by a constitution.

— But, you observe, with this system of proscriptions the government makes itself odious and prepares its ruin. — Nothing is more true, replies Machiavelli; but the government cannot exist under other conditions, since its mandate is to maintain the inequity of the social economy. Moreover, everything having to have an end, it is no longer a question here of founding for eternity, as the prophets promised David, but of providing a sufficient and glorious career. Does the wise man work to make himself immortal? No, but to live as best and as long as possible. Beyond that, there is no politics, no government, no society.

Of course, where the means of right are required, the statesman must not neglect them. — *It is to be hoped*, says Machiavelli, *that things could always be regulated by Justice; but, as the thing IS IMPOSSIBLE, it would be folly to compel oneself to do so.*

Thus Machiavelli's theory is not double, as has been believed: based on pure right, if it is a question of a republic; based on the reason of state, if it is a question of a monarchy. In all his works Machiavelli is consistent: it is always the same policy, always the same deduction, based on the same hypothesis. Machiavelli grasped the logic of his subject, and, what is better, what made his frightful reputation and raised against him all the anathemas, he had the courage of his convictions.

What Adam Smith and the Physiocrats did in the eighteenth century for the economy, carefully separating it from politics and justice, discovering the fatalism of its laws, the opposition of labor and privilege, etc., Machiavelli, two and a half centuries earlier, had done for politics, separating it equally from Justice and the economy, and making its procedures a kind of rubric for the use of all powers, without worrying otherwise about what anyone could find moral or immoral there. It is thus that we have heard Rossi say: Political economy is one thing, and morality

another. In just the same way, Machiavelli had said: Politics is one thing and Justice another.

XIV. We have the secret of political fatalism, we know its theory and we can assess in a few lines this religion of Destiny, on which so many and such insipid volumes have been written.

1. In society as in nature, say the fatalists, conditions are naturally unequal. *Justice* therefore has nothing absolute about it; it is subordinated to a higher law, of which the *government* is the organ. This law is INEQUALITY. This is fatal.

2. The inequality of conditions engendering a divergence of interests that it is impossible to put an end to by Justice, the government is armed, in order to overcome resistance, with a superior prerogative that enables it to suspend Justice and liberty: it is the *reason of state*. This is fatal.

3. But this prerogative soon appears incompatible with the division of power; it demands that the most complete liberty be left to the prince; it rejects what is called a *constitution*, the object of which would be to limit political power, and as government is above all a force of will and action, it is inseparable from the person of the prince: there is an *identity between prince and the state*. This is still fatal.

4. Therefore, by the fact of the sovereign action, there will be *concentration*, incessant absorption of the faculties of the nation in the princely faculty; of the thought, of the possessions, of the self of the nation in the thought, the possessions, the self of the first magistrate. This is still fatal.

5. From there, first, the *corruption* of the social body by the governmental instrument, the first invincibly repugnant to the *inorganism* of the second, as much as to its reason of state.

Hence, in the second place, the reaction of the citizens against the prince, the antagonism between society and the government.

Hence, finally, revolution, a change of label in the power, if not the death of the nation and the State: all that is fatal.

These propositions are linked to one another by an indissoluble relationship. The necessity of the first admitted, that of the others follows from it; together they constitute the metaphysics of government, such as it has been exercised since the origin of societies, and except for the rare and illusory reservations that Christianity and the Revolution have introduced into it. German philosophy has in turn made variants on this ancient theme: it has not changed it.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> In the 1858 edition, this section is followed by a series of questions and responses, similar in character to the “Small Political Catechism” that ends this study. They can be found in an appendix at the end of this volume.

## CHAPTER III.

Of government according to Providence: — Decree of predestination:  
eternal reign of Christ; catholicity; theocracy.

XV. — It is here above all that whoever wishes to sincerely evaluate the influence of religious thought must consider, not so much its primordial expression, as its constitutive tendencies.

It has been said again and again, especially since 1830, that Christianity, at its origin, had something ultra-democratic about it, which all innovators at odds with the Church have taken care to recall. A school was formed to link Christianity to the Revolution through this fact: it counts for its principal representatives, after MM. Buchez and Ott, Messrs. Arnaud (de l'Arriège), Frédéric Morin, Bordas-Demoulin, Huet, Hubert Valleroux, Chev , and a few others. The system of these gentlemen is well-known: they avail themselves of the customs long followed in the Church for the election of bishops, the holding of councils, etc.; passages from the Gospel, the Epistles and the ancient Fathers are quoted, concerning temporal government, in which universal suffrage is presented as a divine institution, of apostolic, canonical, civil and natural law:

In good faith, is this the way to judge the politics of a church? What does it matter what the first Christians said or stammered? It is a question of the MOVEMENT OF THE IDEA, and they speak to us about the *point of departure* of this idea, about its *thesis!* What was to become of the Church, and what has it become, by virtue of its principle and its religiosity? This is what we have to see. It is a question of tendency, therefore, and not a question of origin..

Now, what Christian society tended to become, as regards the political order, I am going to tell you.

First, according to the neo-Christians as according to the ultramontanes, all power, democratic or monarchical, is by *divine right*. Father Lenoir, whose democratic ways seem to make him a neo-Christian, says it in very clear terms:

“The people are the true sovereign, immediately established by God. Universal suffrage is the means by which this collective mediator makes known the divine will. This is what Abb  Lacordaire said one day in these words: God said to the nations: *Go and govern yourselves*. (B) (*Dictionnaire des Harmonies de la Foi et de la Raison*, col. 1532 to 1545.)

Thus, according to Catholic and neo-Christian democracy, the people,

*collective mediator*, does not speak from its own authority and from an immanent Justice; it only renders, like the Sibyl, the oracles of the divinity. Its law, which is its religion, is superior to it; its conscience, like its understanding, is subject to it.

Now, as soon as the idea of the divine penetrates somewhere, Justice emerges from it. What does their religion say to the people?

I have shown in the preceding chapter that religion, as far as the question of the state is concerned, resolves itself, for polytheistic peoples, into one word, *fatality*. We know what consequence they drew from this formula for the policy of the prince and the constitution of the government: It was to rid them both of Justice.

Christianity changes religion, *Nova facit omnia*. It therefore changes the idea of government, that is to say, what is soulful, living, substantial in it, which sooner or later must give it its legitimate form. What new politics will result from this change? Will it be more in conformity with the idea of right?

Alas! Let us not wait for the Gospel, seizing error at its root, to affirm positive equality: it knows only communism. Let us not wait for the Church to subordinate her authority and her faith to Justice, for her to organize the government accordingly and purge it of its reason of state. The power according to Christ is even more jealous of its power than the power according to fate; and if the Church repudiates Machiavelli and the law of the spheres, she has no less horror of liberty, of Justice, of the political constitution, of progress, of everything that, in a word, tends to emancipate man.

XVI. — Christianity rejected the thought of ancient government for several reasons.

How, first of all, was it to reconcile the principle of necessity with the notion of an all-powerful, all-wise God, creator of matter, governing everything by his Providence and repairing in a better life the misfortunes of this one? The idea of destiny, absolute, blind, without justice, without mercy, implied the negation of divinity itself; if pressed at all, it led straight to materialism.

How then, regarding this great fact of social inequality, can we be satisfied any longer with the worn-out, condemned explanation of a brutal and unintelligent necessity? Oh, what! On all sides the slave, the proletarian, the oppressed, rose up against destiny and against the empire; they appealed against fatality to divine Justice; this appeal constituted the whole of Christianity; and the Church would repeat to them, with paganism, that if they suffered, if they fasted, if they despaired, it was by *force majeure*, by the nature of things, by the will of destiny!

As for the revolutions of the states, an object of scandal even in

paganism, by which the gods, protectors of the cities, found themselves convicted of impotence, it was even more impossible for the Church to admit the theory. Apart from the fact that this theory, giving rise to the instability of necessity, seemed contradictory, the Church, heiress of the synagogue, made for the revolutions of empires a providential title. It was for her that all this movement had taken place, not for her that Europe had conquered Asia and Rome had commanded the Universe. If evolution were eternal, the argument collapsed. From now on, on the contrary, Christ was going to put an end to these ephemeral establishments, which all promised order and only gave anarchy, *Qui dicebant : Pax! pax! et non erat pax*. It had been the thought of the Caesars themselves and the hope of the Romans. *Imperium sine fine dedi*, I gave them an endless empire, says Jupiter in the Aeneid, 1. 1, v. 279; an empire of peace, justice and harmony:

Aspera tum positis mitescent sæcula bellis;  
 Cana Fides, et Vesta, Remo cum fratre Quirinus  
 Jura dabunt.... (*ibid.*, v. 291-293.)

Would the Christ announced by the prophets, the Christ, son of Jehovah, give less than Jupiter? Would the Church remain below Caesar, the Gospel below the Aeneid?

Logic driving minds unwittingly, revolution, at least in dogma, was inevitable.

To the principle of *Necessity* therefore succeeds, by opposition, that of PROVIDENCE;

To the theory of governmental *evolutions*, the affirmation of an ETERNAL REIGN, prepared by previous evolutions;

To the *plurality* of cults and states, political and religious UNIVERSALITY, CATHOLICISM.

The idea is of a higher morality; however, the Church intending neither to establish equality among men — her dogma of prevarication does not permit this — nor to make Justice reign exclusively and to abdicate her own prerogative, what satisfaction can she give to consciences? How will the new regime be better than the old one?

Let the reader, if he wishes to have an understanding of ecclesiastical history, please descend with me for a moment into the depths of Christian theology; it is no more difficult than to visit a mine shaft: there he will find the secret of priestly government, a secret that a bishop would have some difficulty in confessing.

XVII. — From the combined notions of Providence in God, of original prevarication in man, and of redemption through Christ, theology deduces logically, necessarily, a prodigious theory, to which I call the attention of all transcendentalists, because it is contained in every transcendental

hypothesis, as much, for example, in the theodicy of M. Jules Simon as in the carnal rehabilitation of M. Enfantin: I mean *predestination*.

Predestination, in the Christian system, is the counterpart of what is in rational morality the egalitarian theory, the principles of which we have formulated in the two preceding studies, and from which we will deduce below the forms of the government of Justice: it is the providential decree, taking the place of a social charter. Here is how Bergier, the classical theologian, summarizes its dispositions.

It is only a question, in the extract that we are about to read, of predestination in relation to salvation. But Providence, like grace, embraces everything; and as the temporal is given only with a view to the spiritual, as the social order is typified by the order from above, what is said of predestination in the other life must also be understood of predestination in society.

All Catholics agree:

“1. That there is in God a decree of predestination, that is to say an absolute and effective will to give the kingdom of heaven to all who in fact attain it;

“2. That God, in predestining them to eternal glory, has also given them the means and the graces by which he infallibly leads them there;

“8. That this decree is in God through all eternity, and that he formed it before the creation of the world, as St. Paul says, *Eph*, 1, 8, 45;

“4. That it is an effect of his pure goodness; that thus this decree is perfectly free on the part of God and exempt from all necessity;

“5. That this decree of predestination is infallible; that it will infallibly have its execution; that no obstacle shall prevent its effect: thus declares Jesus Christ (*John*, c. x, 27, 28, 29);

“6. That, without express revelation, no one can be sure that he is of the number of the predestined or of the elect;

“7. That the number of the predestined is fixed and immutable; that it cannot be increased or diminished, since God has fixed it for all eternity, and since his foreknowledge cannot be deceived;

“8. That the decree of predestination, however, imposes no necessity on the elect to practice good: they always act very freely, always retain, at the very moment that they fulfill the law, the power not to observe it;

“9. That predestination to grace is absolutely gratuitous; that it has its source only in the mercy of God; that it is prior to the anticipation of any natural merit;

“10. That predestination to glory is not founded on the anticipation of human merits, acquired by the forces of free will alone: for finally, if God found in the merit of our own works the motive for our election to eternal glory, it would no longer be true to say with Saint Peter that one can only be saved by Jesus Christ;

“11. That entry into the kingdom of heaven, which is the end of predestination, is so much a grace, *grati Dei vita æterna*, that it is at the same time a wage, a crown of justice and a reward for good works done through the



help of grace.”

Bergier then cites the authorities in support of these eleven propositions; then he reports the points on which the Catholics dispute among themselves, which I will dispense with mentioning, as those on which they agree enough for our edification.

It follows from this doctrine, exclusively orthodox, that, the whole human race being, by the effect of original sin, a mass of perdition, only those who please God will be predestined, independent of their own merit, so much so that predestination here is tantamount to a real lottery. It is no longer destiny, no doubt, since destiny is blind; but it is something that is hardly better for man, since the decree of predestination, prior to all merit and demerit, is a pure act of God’s good pleasure, unmodifiable, irrevocable. If the Supreme Judge were to play, like Bridoye, determining the predestination of men with the outcome of the dice, such a predestination, freed from all juridical consideration, would be, relative to us, neither more moral nor more judicious.

Note, moreover, that predestination does not exclude equality; it supposes it, and that is the marvelous thing. If souls were unequal, if God in creating them endowed them with graduated faculties appropriate to the functions that they will have to fulfill in life, the decree of predestination could be motivated by their native qualities; it would still be gratuitous, but it would not be without motives; in the final analysis, the destiny of each would be proportional to his means. This would be ordinary logic, an application to the vocation of souls of the theory of final causes. But such is not the order of Providence: before God their creator all souls are equal; they lose their equality only by union with the body, which has fallen under the power of Satan. Here, then, the purpose that bursts forth everywhere in the constitution of creatures no longer takes place. The Sovereign Arbiter causes whomever he pleases and how he pleases to be served for his purposes; he makes a king of the shepherd, of the sycamore cutter a prophet, of the fisherman an apostle, of the beggar a pontiff. It is thus that his judgments manifest themselves and disconcert the reason of men.

XVIII. — From the ante-worldly predestination, the object of which is the assured salvation of certain souls, with a view to the more or less random redemption of the mass, we are currently transported to the government of humanity.

We already know that, from the point of view of Christian theology, humanity is not governed by immanent and fixed laws; it has fallen from this condition, given over to the spirit of disorder, unable by itself to regain balance and devote itself to Justice.

Hence, first, that inequality of ranks and fortunes that paganism

attributed to necessity, that modern economists, in agreement with politicians, relate to the same necessity, and which is nothing else, according to the Church, but a consequence of sin.

Hence, in the second place, the impotence of governments for which right cannot suffice, and which antagonism, inorganism and revolutions devour.

It is possible that in this state of decline humanity has preserved a confused memory of its law, which is equality: this is what its legal aspirations and its incessant revolts would explain; but, weaned as it is from original grace, given over to all the contradictions of the evil spirit, in the midst of a nature that has become rebellious, its attempts remain fatally fruitless, its institutions are always utopian, and sooner or later degenerate into anarchy. There is no stable equilibrium in the economy of society on this earth; there is no normal government for nations. Pauperism and tyranny, egoism, ambition, envy, pride, to reduce them all, the reason of state: such is our lot forever.

All that remains for us to do all and that the Church prescribes for us is to bring about, in view of the world to come, our reconciliation with God, by subordinating to this great end both our public economy and our governments.

Let us therefore conceive once and for all that, the end of man not being here below, everything in the present must be ordered for this superior end, which is announced to us and guaranteed by religion.

The time we have to spend in this vale of tears being thus only a time of expiation, a struggle against our inclinations and against the devil, it clearly follows that Christian society cannot be organized for liberty, peace and happiness: this would make us enjoy from this life onwards the condition of saints. It can only be organized for war. It is called the *Church Militant*, marching to the conquest of heaven, under rulers instituted from on high, through the trials that it pleases the Divine Mercy to sow in its path. It is an endless crusade of all humanity against the genius of evil, where the soldier refreshes himself at times on the stage, but where the most absolute obedience, the most perfect abnegation, are the first law and the first duty.

How then could such a destiny be compatible with this equality that the most ancient myths, disfigured monuments of the Adamic revelation, already relegated far behind them, towards the incalculable period of the golden age? How could it agree with the hypothesis of a democratic power, where each citizen would exercise the sovereign prerogative and retain his freedom?

The life of the Christian is a militia, *Militia est vita hominis super terram*. Every day he receives his pay, *Sicut dies mercenari dies ejus*. The constitution of the Christian state must therefore be the same as that of an

army, *Sicut castrorum acies ordinata*. It is repugnant to reason, as much as to faith, that it be otherwise.

If such is the idea that animates the Christian government, it is easy to say what its law is. It is not Justice; it is still the reason of state, but the reason of state explained, sanctified by the decree of Providence, made more moral by the conformity, formal or presumed, of the will of the people to the order of God, and by faith in his promises.

The Christian government, in fact, no less antipathetic to organization than the pagan government, without distinction of powers, without parliamentary discussion, without control, without guarantees, raised above justice, nevertheless has its own morality. It is moral as the government of an army in the field is moral, as the penitentiary system is moral, as the penal colony is moral, as all discipline is moral. Doubtless right suffers from more than one attack; but, the end of society not being, on the earth we inhabit, right, which would be the sovereign good, the end of ends, the supreme end, this end being expiation, by which alone we can conquer, for another life, Justice or beatitude, the morality of the government is saved if this preparatory end is obtained, and we know that it can only be obtained by discipline.

Political inequality, a corollary of economic inequality, is explained and motivated in the same way. Just as, according to the decree of predestination, the object of the spiritual and temporal favors of the Most High is not necessarily the most skillful, the most courageous, the most beautiful man, the one whom human wisdom would judge, by reason of his faculties, the most worthy, but he whom it pleased God to choose; thus, in Christian government, the most favored is not always, far from it, the best deserving, but he whom the religious authority, assisted by the Holy Spirit, has designated. It is understood, moreover, that the choice of the Church is made preferably on subjects in whom appear the signs of predestination, such as nobility, fortune, piety, obedience, and all the Christian virtues, *Qui enim habet, dabitur ei; et qui non habet, etiam quod habet auferetur ab eo*.

XIX. — Where is, I will be asked, the Christian government?

I answer without hesitation: In the Church, in the episcopate, whose supreme head is the Pope. It is through the institution of the episcopate that Christianity translates its idea politically: the bishop, ἐπίσκοπος, that is to say the overseer, here, is literally the representative of Providence. The people, collective mediator, as the Abbé Lenoir says, does not institute it; it does not lay hands on it, it does not confer powers on it. Power comes from above, brought first by Christ, like fire from heaven by Prometheus, then communicated to the apostles, who transmitted it to their successors. The prerogative of the people, where it is exercised, goes

only as far as the presentation of the subject to be instituted: a matter of pure indulgence, convenience, circumstance, which is not essential to the sacrament and which could have fallen into disuse without the episcopate losing any of its authority.

Yes, the popular Christian idea is that the government of society resides in the priestly body, in the power called spiritual, from which the temporal emanates and derives its legitimacy. Such is the idea that the people, in agreement with the papacy, have long maintained; an idea that forms the basis of the pact of Charlemagne, and to which Italy sacrificed herself. For centuries the Church had to compromise on the separation of powers, without daring to qualify it, as it had the right to do, as heretical. But Providence watches, faith commands hope, and Christ said: *The gates of Hell*, that is to say, the INFERIOR POWER, *will not prevail*.

It could not prevail, indeed, that power, as long as humanity is Christian. This is how the theme of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual plays out:

1. Society is based on the idea of God.

2. Because of the respect that the Divinity commands and the end assigned to us by revelation, faith has precedence over Justice, dogma is the true rule of morality, — “Where the fear of God does not exist,” says Machiavelli, who denied Christianity, but who believed in the influence of the spheres and assumed *a priori* the perversity of man, “where the fear of God does not exist, the empire must succumb;” which means that the government is not based on reason, but on mystery.

3. The dogma, therefore, principle and rule of right, being given, the Church, charged with the teaching of the dogma, arises as the embryo and paradigm of the social body; the spiritual order is made a type of the temporal and communicates its law to it.

4. Last consequence: legislative power, having theology or theodicy as its principle, belongs essentially to the Church. Princes and kings are only the executors of its canons; and the Pope, *servant of the servants of God*, is elevated above all republics and all thrones, above humanity.

Such is the doctrine from which Luther and Calvin, more Christian than the popes, drew the last and execrable conclusions, the first by giving the signal for the extermination of the peasants of the Rhine, raised by him against the Church; the second by sending to the stake, not papists, which would have been only a reprisal on his part, but reformers like him, emancipated from the Church, such as Michael Servet; a doctrine of which Savonarola, like John Huss, was the victim, after having been made its apostle; the doctrine that every theist will find at the bottom of his theodicy, provided he follows the deduction in good faith; that J.-J. Rousseau reproduced in his *Social Contract*, and in whose name

Robespierre guillotined the republic; the doctrine that today serves the King of Prussia to strike from the constitution that he had sworn to liberty, equality and all the guarantees of right that surrounded his government:

“I will never consent,” said William IV in his speech at the opening of the Diet of 1847, “that between our master, who is the God of heaven, and this country, there slips a sheet of paper, in some way like a second Providence, to govern us with its paragraphs and to replace by them the ancient and holy fidelity.”

It is against this doctrine that all the protests of the universal conscience and the great acts of history have been produced since the end of the Roman Empire: the quarrel over investitures, the separation of the spiritual and the temporal, the attempts of Arnaud de Bresce and Rienzi, the privileges of the Gallican Church, the schism of Avignon, the institution of parliaments, the bourgeois charters, the concordats and, in short, the French Revolution, the crime of which, in the eyes of the Church, is much less having taken away its possessions than having raised the government on the basis of Justice, by founding Justice itself on Humanity.

But it is time to follow the Church in her practice: practice, much more than words, is the expression of the idea.

## CHAPTER IV.

### Typical practice of government, or priestly government.

XX. Some have written, and Bossuet seems to have leaned towards this opinion, that formerly the Church, through its councils, was a sort of representative government; that thus the true principles of the political order were in it, long before the Revolution affirmed them. A part of the lower clergy inclines towards this doctrine, of which the assassin of Mgr Sibour was the sad apostle.

Another illusion, which a judicious philosophy cannot authorize.

The *constitutionality* of the Church is no truer than its republicanism. That would be to mistake, in fact, one of the forms of human government, only temporarily followed in the Church, but which the Church has always impatiently supported, for the form of ecclesiastical government, which is none other than that of Providence itself.

The now abrogated practice of councils was originally due to the simultaneity and independence of apostolic establishments: it could only be transitory. For those who know the facts, the period when the councils flourished was the most unfortunate in Catholicism. The Church would have perished twenty times over if, with the help of the secular arm, she had not found the means of neutralizing this disorganizing influence and finally of extinguishing it. Councils! Discussion in the order of revelation! Really, I am only surprised by one thing, and that is that the Church did not dare, from the century of the apostles, to place the anathema on these tumultuous convocations. Pope Clement, successor of Peter, in his *Epistle to the Corinthians*, where he reminds them of the true discipline concerning the government of bishops, had laid the first foundation of the ecclesiastical edifice. The episcopate being established on divine right, the popular election sometimes intervening, like the emperor later, only to designate the subject, but not to confer on it the powers, the papal hierarchy ensued without difficulty. Absolutist elements, such as the episcopal chairs were from the time of the apostles, could only result in an absolutist concentration. From Nicaea to Trent the work continued unabated; now the ultra-montane theory reigns unopposed. Pius IX, during the promulgation of the last mystery, made an act of papal infallibility: Bellarmine triumphs, Bossuet is condemned. All of Christendom was thrilled by it: Catholics, non-Catholics and neo-Catholics felt the supreme blow that the Church had just dealt to the morality of the people, to liberty.

Calumny! exclaims M. de Montalembert at this word: the Church is a

friend of all governments, and of free governments more than of others. It has no preference for any form; it accepts them all, and condemns none.

Let's be clear. If it is a question of the purely temporal part of social government, of that which the Church calls the *épiscopat du dehors*, and on the subject of which she is indeed forced to make concessions to the susceptibility of peoples, doubtless the form matters little. What does the monarchy or the republic matter if, moreover, the State is subject to the Church, as spiritual authority demands and as the rigor of dogma prescribes? Everything is there: the honest and simple faith of constitutional Belgium or republican Switzerland is without doubt more agreeable to the Holy See than the despotism of Tsar Alexander; but who would dare also deny that it prefers the government of the King of Naples, Ferdinand the Bombardier, to that of Victor-Emmanuel, and Austrian absolutism to our charters of 1814 and 1830?

The real question here is to know what forms preferably affect the priestly government, since it is the typical government, the one that must absorb, convert all the others. How does the Holy See lead Christendom, I mean that part of the Church that has remained faithful to it? What are its relations of jurisdiction, of administration, with the bishops? How do these, in turn, govern their priests, their monks, their Levites, and all their militia? Does liberty enter into this system, and to what extent? Is justice inviolable within it? Is liability insured? Order guaranteed?... For, as the priests do to each other, they will do to their flocks: it is the law and the prophets.

XXI. — A country priest, in a manuscript that I have before me, sums up ecclesiastical government as follows. Note, Monsignor, that in citing this unsuspecting testimony, I am far from giving my approval to the regrets that it expresses. It is failing the Church and changing the spirit of Christianity to introduce into it forms of government and guarantees that tend to nothing less than to cast suspicion on the apostolic mandate and to render the Christian faith useless. My priest is an honest man, I guarantee him so. The spirit of the Revolution seduced him like many others; he is no longer a Christian.

“The most absolute arbitrariness presides over the destinies of the clergy. The bishop, authority without counterweight and without control, holds our fate in his hands, disposes of us as he pleases. He dismisses us, disgraces us, condemns us to a perpetual vicariate, strips us of our salary, our reputation, our honor, strikes us with bans, without any power in the world intervening in the exercise of this monstrous power.

“Like the captain on board a ship, Monsignor is master after God. But, the crossing made, the captain comes respectfully to submit his management to the oversight of his superiors; the bishop recognizes no other chief than himself, for

the recourse of a priest to the metropolitan primate or to the Pope was never anything but a mystification.

“Before 89, the existence of the clergy resting on the possession of immense goods, the collation of which the secular power had reserved for itself, a certain independence was assured to the happy beneficiaries, while the most hardworking and the purest part of the clergy groaned in oppression and poverty. The Concordat of 1802, which restored worship and improved, in one respect, the condition of ecclesiastics, destroyed even the last vestige of their liberty; the clergy was left defenseless at the mercy of a few prelates. Bonaparte, who placed all the powers in his hands, thus assured himself a power of forty thousand priests in the person of eighty bishops.”

Do I need to remind him? The Concordat, as regards the government of the clergy, was a return to true discipline. Thus Constantine had used it when, in the exhausted empire, he appealed to the bishops, and found within the ranks of the Church a new army, enthusiastic, trained for a long time in obedience and, in this respect, more convenient to despotism, more manageable than the praetorians.

“The ecclesiastical charter is entirely reduced to a single article, a single word, obedience. The oath that the vassal swore to the suzerain in feudal times is imposed on us under the circumstances most calculated to strike our young imaginations. On the day of the ordination, the bishop, majestically enthroned with the miter on his head, we kneel before him, our hands in his, we swear absolute obedience to him and to his successors. So he will be able to remind us of our commitment if necessary and demand that it be carried out. To our timid observations, he replies victoriously: You have made a vow to obey; no resistance, or I will ban you. Now, the interdict signifies condemnation to irons, to the ball and chains, to hard labor. — Are you unaware, said Mgr. Caron, former bishop of Le Mans, one day, to a country priest whom he had just mistreated beyond measure and who dared to complain, do you not know that I have you under my domination, and that I can break you when I please and as I please?”

“The bishops know better than anyone the abuses of their power. To mask the loathsome, they affect to surround themselves with liberal institutions: chapters, councils, officialities, synods. Let’s not stop at words, and look at things.

“The members of the council are exclusively nominated by the bishop, and, as they derive their existence, position, and dignities from him alone, these so-called councilors are so obsequious as to make the great Turk’s mutes jealous. — Make me a canon, Monsignor, said a cure to his bishop; I will not oppose you! So episcopal absolutism is expressed every day with a naiveté that goes beyond all bounds. At Le Mans, for example, the pastoral letters, the *Ordo*, bore at the head, from time immemorial, the formula: Published with the consent of the chapter. The *Consensus capituli* has disappeared, and it simply reads: By order of the illustrious and most reverend lord J.-B. BOUVIER, bishop of Le Mans.”



“In the past, the accusations brought against ecclesiastical islands belonged to an ecclesiastical court, the officiality. Apparently, it still exists; in reality, it is dead, and very dead. It appears in the *Ordo* in the same way as the names of our colleagues who died during the year and are registered in the obituary. Never for half a century has it given life. The clergy imagines that it has its own court of justice, because the *Ordo* mentions it, like a people who believe themselves to be free because liberty is written in the constitution. If some day the officiality revives, Monsignor will know how to compose it of members who render services, and not judgments.”

Here I cut off my author.

On last April 6, the Council of State issued a declaration of abuse against the Bishop of Moulins, guilty:

“1. Of having imposed on several parish priests of his diocese a written and signed waiver to avail himself of their irremovability and to exercise any recourse against the civil authority in the event that the bishop deems it appropriate to revoke or change them for serious and canonical reasons; 2. of having, by a synodal statute, pronounced excommunication *ipso facto* and without preliminary intimation against those who would address themselves to the secular power to claim its support in all that concerns the jurisdiction of statutes, mandates and other ecclesiastical prescriptions, in matters of benefits, titles, doctrine or discipline; 3. of having composed the chapter of the metropolitan church without the intervention of the civil authority.”

On this occasion, the liberal, even the republican press made common cause with the ecclesiastics suspended by Monsignor de Dreux-Brézé, on whose complaint the declaration of abuse had been returned, and vigorously attacked the bishop in the name of the Concordat.

I understand, up to a certain point, the Concordat, a treaty of pacification between a revolutionary nation, which had not ceased to be Christian and insisted on appearing so, and the head of Catholicism, obliged to bow before an invincible necessity. Nor does the decree of April 6, 1857 surprise me: it is the more or less logical consequence of a contradictory situation.

But it was up to the independent press to re-establish the truth of the matter. Now, the truth is that between the spiritual power and the temporal power there is no possible reconciliation; there can only be a subordination. Is the society, of which the government is the expression, of the Revolution or of the revelation? Does it come from man or from God? Does it have its principle in right or in dogma? Is Christ its servant or its author? Depending on how you answer the question, you will have declared the preponderance of the temporal over the spiritual, or of the spiritual over the temporal; the head of the empire will be pope, after the manner of Victoria, the king of Prussia and the tsar Alexander, or servant

of the pope; and the two ecclesiastics suspended by Mgr de Dreux-Brézé, and Mgr de Dreux-Brézé himself, should be considered as civil servants or ministers of the Church. In the first case, France is Protestant, and opinions in matters of faith becoming ecclesiastically free, as they are politically free, there is no longer either faith, church, or religion. In the second case, the emperor is subject, like the humblest of the faithful, to obedience towards the Holy See and, far from being able to blame a bishop for having dismissed from their functions two parish priests *for canonical reasons*, and having declared excommunicated *ipso facto* those who would *appeal* to secular power in matters of *ecclesiastical jurisdiction*, his duty is to lend a hand to the bishop and to strip the refractory of their salary.

Can one conceive of an Emperor of the French, a creature of the Revolution, declaring abusive the dismissal of two parish priests *for canonical cause*? Or, again, declaring abusive the *ipso facto* excommunication of any ecclesiastic calling from episcopal authority to secular authority, *in matters of benefits, titles, doctrine and discipline*? Or, finally, declaring abusive the composition of the chapter made without *intervention of the civil authority*? Let the Emperor, following the example of Henry VI, declare himself head of the Church, well and good, but, wanting to combine the benefit of orthodoxy with the prepotence of the Revolution, give warnings to the newspapers that attack the Holy See and to those who fight the Concordat, this is what was called, thirty years ago, *bascule*, a seesaw; it is hypocrisy.

The late Mgr Sibour, before his appointment to the Archbishopric of Paris, had published a work in which he shared the liberal ideas of the refractories of Moulins, as well as those of the priest whose writing I quote. It was expected that once in power he would not hesitate to put into practice what he himself had so learnedly taught. Nothing came of it. Bishop Sibour — may God delight his soul! — abjured, if not in word, at least in deed, that is to say in heart, his first opinions. He understood, like the bishops of Moulins and Le Mans, the impossibility of reconciling the hierarchy, especially in a time of religious dissolution, with the pretended rights of the clerics; and everyone knows that his firmness in maintaining true discipline was the chief cause that armed the heretic Verger.

I would have many other observations to make on this subject to the Council of State. I could say to it: You who see the speck in the eye of Bishop de Moulins, tear out the beam that is in yours. Back to my manuscript.

“The synods once enjoyed a certain freedom of representation and discussion. So, in 1851, an immense cry of joy greeted the occasion of a diocesan assembly. The parliamentary era, the system of constitutional guarantees, was about to begin for the clergy. We dreamed, in our simplicity, of a regeneration by the ecclesiastical states-general, analogous to that of France in 1789.

“Bitter disappointment! The synodal meetings had no other effect than to serve as register offices for ordinances emanating from Their Highnesses, which rendered the position of the priests more pitiful. There were creations of archpriests and deans, lower stars, responsible for enlightening the flock in the absence of the central sun. Here, they prohibited the rochet with sleeves; there, the square bonnet was replaced by the barrette; elsewhere there was serious discussion on the question of whether the headwear should be the bicorne or the tricorne. Of reforms, improvements, guarantees, not a word. More tenure, but in favor of the deans; the priests are revocable and can be exploited at will; the good pleasure of Monsignor decides their fate without appeal. A priest incurs the enmity of the mayor, the castellan, a sister, a devotee: an anonymous letter denounces him to His Greatness, who sacrifices him without a hearing.

“We possess a pension fund, made up of our money. It is the bishop who disposes of it, always by virtue of the principle of sovereign authority; and in no case, whatever be the age and the infirmity, do we have a *right* to a pension. The bishop alone, through the ministry of a commission that he appoints and directs, judges the advisability of accepting or rejecting complaints.

“Under this regime of authority guaranteed by obedience, in the absence of regulations and positive right, favor disposes of positions, advancement and rewards. The modest priest, recommended by his merit alone and not supported by a courtly protector, lay or ecclesiastical, male or female, is sure to vegetate all his life in obscurity. Why, they said to the Archbishop of \*\*\*, don’t you pull Curé C., so industrious, so learned, so exemplary, out of his hole? — Because he asks nothing, he replied.

“No contest; no advantage, either for merit or for seniority. Theological and scientific struggles are replaced by races for the parish, *steeple-chases*, we would have to say. The best runner is sure of victory. In a diocese close to the capital, the minister of a lucrative parish happens to die: immediately solicitations rain down on the bishopric. To raise the price of his favor, the bishop said to the chosen one: I give you preference over 53 of your brothers!

“My faith,” said a priest, “I did like everyone else: my parish cost me 500 francs. The archpriest of \*\*\*, very powerful in the bishopric, was begging for the reconstruction of his church. He addressed me in a meaningful way, I understood, and for 25 louis I had my nomination.”

XXII. I am wary of these anecdotes, all the more so since I am far from giving to the services of every kind that are made in the Church for the maintenance of worship the simoniac meaning that the secular conscience is only too inclined to attribute to them. In principle, let us not forget, the Church subsists on voluntary donations. Its ministry, of a superhuman order, is not subject to the laws of mercenarity, any more than religion falls under the law of *supply* and *demand*. Of course donations to the Church, as well as almsgiving and fasting, are seen as a

means for sinners to obtain heavenly graces and to redeem themselves from their sins. Now, among the graces that can be merited by austerity in favor of the Church, the ecclesiastical dignities figure without contradiction. In the past, how many great lords and great ladies became heads of religious communities, simply because they had been their benefactors, their founders! Was there a trade for that? Between these two disparate facts, the donation of the funds and the appointment of the donor by the hierarchical superior, is it necessary to establish a relationship of venality? It would be as absurd as saying that you, Monsignor, got your cardinal's hat in exchange for a monstrance of gold. Here is the story, as it has been recounted to me:

Towards the end of 1848, when Pius IX was still in Gaeta, you prescribed prayers for the salvation of His Holiness. Sermons were delivered on this occasion, in which the poverty of the pope and the persecutions that the republicans made him suffer were depicted in lamentable hues. The spirits thus prepared, a collection is announced, of which Monsignor must carry in person, in the name of the Besançon church, the product to His Holiness. The collection was said to be abundant; no one could tell me the number. The rich had paid his offering, the widow had deposited her pittance. Going to Rome and passing through Paris, Your Eminence saw a superb monstrance at a goldsmith's, intended at first for the chapel of Queen Marie-Amélie, and the delivery of which had been prevented on February 24. You believed, apparently, that this rich piece of furniture would be more pleasing to His Holiness than a cash sum; and it was after your visit to the Holy Father that you were elevated to the cardinalate.

No, I say, I don't believe in this so-called simony. I know perfectly well that if, in the eyes of the Church, the abandonment of one's possessions is a mark of a vocation, it is not for that reason the price of enthronement.

But here is where I stop you.

The ministry fulfilled by the Church in exchange for the services it claims, divine office, sacraments, indulgences, is a ministry of faith.

Its government, its hierarchy, its discipline, are also of faith.

The mode of recruitment of the priestly personnel, the bestowing of powers, all this is still authentic. It would be the overthrow of religion to introduce into the Church, for all these purposes, the forms and guarantees of civil and political administration. Faith is everything here: birth, fortune, gifts, genius, services rendered, age, holiness itself, the wishes of the people are nothing. Faith is above rules, above what human prudence takes for right: such is its prerogative.

I admit that such a regime can be sustained, but on condition that faith exists, that there is faith everywhere, living faith, in the priesthood, in the people, among the ministers as well as among the governed. For if faith

cools, however slightly, and yields to worldly influences and considerations, so skillful in covering itself with the pretext of religion, then all is lost: we fall into arbitrariness and all its corruptions.

Well, Monsignor, I ask who guarantees to us that this condition is fulfilled? Who protects Christianity against failures of faith? Is it still faith that will guarantee faith?

I would be ashamed to press the argument with you. What is certain is that, faith being of all things the most fragile, the lightest, the most inconstant, the most precarious, *Modicae fidei*, said Christ unceasingly to the apostles, the government of faith is by nature the most immoral of governments. Favoritism, nepotism, bribery, extortion, venality, waste, disorder, oppression, denial of justice: these are, along with the absolutism of command, the inclemency of authority, the inquisition of consciences, and the secret justice, the elements of all power established on faith, devoid consequently of forms and guarantees.

XXIII. — It was in vain that Christ said, expressly to the heads of the Church: Render your accounts, *Redde rationem*. Accounts! Yes, they say, in the next life, in the judgment seat of God; not on earth, to our own subordinates, which would be contradictory. What! The Church, the sovereign power, is to render an account to the people! Authority is to be accountable to obedience! It is not accountable to itself. Was Madame de Meillac, superior of the community of Notre-Dame de Bordeaux, able to make Madame Saint-Bernard, who had preceded her in the administration of this community, render her accounts? And when, after a re-election, she wanted to take back her books, which had momentarily fallen into unfaithful hands, did she not find them slashed and the pages removed? And in the lawsuit brought by Madame de Guerry against the ladies of Picpus, on what is the argument of Bishop Bonamie, the defendant, based? Incredible thing! precisely on the absence of written documents! You claim 1,303,783 francs from us, said Bishop Bonamie to Madame de Guerry: where are your titles? I challenge you to produce them. And Madame de Guerry, who gave everything, cannot invoke the accounts of the community. These books do not exist; there is no open account for anyone! The donations fall into the *common fund*, like manna on the camp of Israel. Indeed, the *vow of poverty*, which forms the basis of religious communities, excludes the idea of this selfish accounting. So that what, for a merchant, would motivate a declaration of fraudulent bankruptcy, in religion, is deemed to be holy. (*Mémoire à consulter pour Mme de Guerry*, par M. Émile OLLIVIER, 1887.)

Writings, supporting documents, a control, a union, a court of accounts just now! All of that is heresy, anarchy! The politics of heaven has nothing in common with the commercial code. The episcopate, which

invented neither the printing press, nor the compass, nor the railways, nor the electric telegraph, did not invent double-entry bookkeeping either. It pushes back with all its might against the introduction of this practice of distrust into an administration that is only a matter of faith. And it is a thousand times right. Subject the ecclesiastical government to the rules of secular administration, and you declare *ipso facto* that religion is useless; you substitute political economy for revelation.

Moreover, this method of management is not peculiar to the Church: it is the essence of communism. With the severity in the accounts and the inspection of the writings, no community is possible (*System of Economic Contradictions*, vol. II, ch. xv). In this regard, I have witnessed some curious facts. In 1846, when the founder of Icarie, Cabet, was busy collecting subscriptions for the surety of the *Populaire*, he happened on several occasions to use the sums paid for the surety for other purposes. Cabet then explained that what he had done with it had been *for the good of the community*, and the bill of indemnity never failed him. Have we not seen him, in 1849, assigned to the correctional police by an unfortunate Icarian who had spent all his assets making the trip to Nauvoo and had only encountered the most dreadful misery, availing himself of article 1837 of the Civil Code, on the universal society of goods and gains, to prove that the plaintiff, who fortunately for him had reserved a few hundred francs, had violated his commitments as a communist and to win his case? This is precisely the thesis of Bishop Bonamie against Madame de Guerry, with this difference however that, the constitution of Picpus having been changed, Madame de Guerry restored to her rights.

Cabet was an honest man, rigid, like a lawyer, in his convictions. He too, with fraternity, charity, community and love, was unknowingly remaking Catholicism. His first care, in Nauvoo, was to have himself awarded the dictatorship: in a country of liberty, where the land is available for nothing, the work more demanded than offered, it was to provoke against him the revolt of all the instincts. His mistake cost him his life. Cabet died of grief after being deposed by his church: his friends in Europe have collected his memory.

XXIV. — In the country of faith, we go from miracle to miracle. Would one believe that this regime of absolutism presupposes, as a natural state of man before sin, the absence of any government, anarchy? Nothing, however, is more true.

I had occasion in my previous *Study* to make a similar observation with regard to property. Property, and the inequality of condition that follows, according to Malebranche, Dom Calmet, and all the founders of orders, is not of divine institution, it is an effect of original sin.

So it is with government. Take away original sin, the doctrine of the

Church, in political matters, is anarchy. The institution of power, in her eyes, is a consequence of evil, hence a necessity of penance. And that is logical: without property, there is no matter for government, since there are no rights, nor even interests. The community's horror of any kind of report shows this clearly. All are one. Also the Church in its very hierarchy imitates this anarchy as best it can. Dogma is invariable, discipline is by no means uniform. So many religious houses, so many different rules: *Alius quidem sic, alius verd sic*. Although obedience, after dispossession, is the keystone of the building, strictly speaking it is not the superior that the religious individual obeys; it is the rule. To obey the man, against the rule, according to Saint Bernard, Saint Thomas and the most learned casuists, would be a sin. Now, what is the rule? A revelation. So that the man who disappropriates himself and swears obedience to the rule, *dying to the world*, that is to say to political and social life, recognizes nothing between God and himself: he is an anarchist. To say how this anarchy of principle is reconciled with the authority of fact is another matter: Catholicism, like the Malthusian economy, is the world of contradiction.

I quote the words of a Catholic writer, M. Huet, quoting in his turn MM. Bordas-Demoulin and the Abbé de Sénac. It is not for such propositions that these gentlemen will be excommunicated:

“After a thousand years of such a terrible regime (the governmental and feudal inorganism), an entirely different civilization, slowly prepared, but which explodes like a thunderclap, bursts forth towards the end of the last century. Emancipated INTERNALLY, and living the life of the spirit, humanity rises from its long bondage, takes possession of itself, and, for the first time, *rejects the domination of the State*. It is a great day in the history of the world, a day worthy of eternal memory, when the legislators of the first Christian nation, of the eldest daughter of the Church and of civilization, solemnly abjured the ancient basis on which until then societies had rested, to recognize no other foundation for them from now on but human nature and its immutable laws.”

Mr. Huet speaks like a partisan of immanence, a true anarchist. Only, like Sosie in the *Amphitryon*, he takes his image for God: a kind of hallucination from which one no longer recovers, when, under this disastrous influence, one has written a volume in-8°. He continues:

“In the eyes of the Christian, *the true origin of governments cannot be anything other than the corruption of our nature*, a corruption that does not come from God, but from man. If our race had kept its original perfection, social life would have flourished in a fraternal freedom, without command, without obedience. (*Règne social du christianisme*, p. 73 et seq.)

And three pages later, this estimable author begins to mock the anarchists, whose only wrong is to base anarchy on justice, the sincerity

of accounts, the balance of forces and values, while the Church bases its own on revelations! But let us close this parenthesis.

XXV. — One thing is known from now on: the Church, starting from the holiness of God and the prevarication of man, could no more have political justice than economic justice. Its principle, in the order of liberty as in that of interests, is to deny Right, that is to say, to have no principle. In this it is logical, faithful to dogma and far superior to the theists of the modern school, who claim to preserve in the same theory transcendence and liberty, to combine Justice and heaven together.

As for me, whose reason rejects to all hypocrisy, I sincerely admire the faith that has created this system; that, on the ruins of ancient right, has dared to institute such a government. I especially admire it for daring to return there; and when the deist, stammering a name that burns its lips, speaks to me of restoring morality to religion; when the parish vicar, a simple soldier in the priestly army, availing himself of a few misinterpreted phrases from the Gospel, asks for a code that defines and guarantees his rights; when the dagger of a false democracy threatens the heart of the pontiffs, I say: Honor to the episcopate! It alone has faith and understanding; to it therefore the AUTHORITY.

Authority! A terrible word, which alone can sustain a superhuman hope, and which marvelously expresses all that Christianity has been, all that it must have been.

What the Declaration of Rights is to the revolutionary, in fact, authority is to the Christian. It is his program, it is his code and his charter. — Is it for nothing, by any chance, that I believe in God? For nothing that this God manifests himself, as the eclectics assure us, to my conscience and my reason? Is it for nothing that by an inconceivable mystery he effected the redemption of my soul and that then, to guard me against the return of the evil one, he instituted his Church, whose leaders are animated by his Spirit? What would be the use of believing in the Holy Spirit, in the presence of this Spirit in the priesthood, if rules of government were still needed for the Church, as rules of conduct are needed for the faithful? Stop talking to me about political rights, parliamentary forms and all your constitutional procedure. All of this is atheism. I am a Christian: I have my faith, I have my Christ, who, save for the inevitable accidents of the imperfection of our nature, guarantees me, as much as I can desire, the wisdom and fealty of my pastors. Are they therefore worth less than your ministers, your prefects, your deputies, for not being braced in all their acts by the articles of a constitution?

Admittedly, such a speech is irreproachably logical, and of a loftiness that astonishes Justice itself. Perhaps, in times of apostolic fervor, I would not have known what to answer: today experience has demonstrated the



illusion.

What Christianity has said of liberty, of equality, of happiness, that they are not of this world, we can, by turning the argument on it, say with infinitely more reason of authority. It is not made for mortals; and I am of the opinion that the Church, by prescribing obedience to us, has justly taken the opposite view of truth and morality. From the first to the nineteenth century, authority, even assisted by the Holy Spirit, has succeeded in making itself respectable only by armoring itself with Justice, which means by surrounding itself with the safety nets of the Revolution. Take away the legal forms, what I will call the mores of power, and authority is nothing more than tyranny and sacrilege.

And that is why I cannot abide the hypocrisy of those who, having neither faith nor justice in their hearts, make authority a mask under which their wickedness is sheltered. *The principle of authority must be restored*: this is their answer to everything, like Agnelet's bleating in *L'Avocat Patelin*. Outside of authority there is no salvation: let no one tell them more; they are edified, they no longer hear anything. And there is no shortage of fools who admire: predestination, which would be nothing without Providence, I mean without authority; does it not serve as a slap in the face?

Authority, Providence, Predestination: what pompous ideas! How much this style, full of poetry and mystery, outweighs the technical, utilitarian jargon of constitutional mechanics! You are transported to the ancient centuries; you see again the oak of Saint Louis, the keys of Peter, the rod of Aaron, the crook of Jacob. It makes me cry with pity. A literary lordling asks no more than to convert to the absolute regime. Ah! The Church does not borrow her ideas and her symbols from the routine of industrialists and merchants; they are rays that she steals, like Prometheus, from the hearth of the Absolute. Like Jehovah, she surrounds herself with darkness and mystery; she proceeds by revelations, fulgurations, bolts from the blue. She is sovereign, indisputable Providence, whose dew falls on the elect while her hailstones and thunderbolts seek out the wicked, and who hides her hand. You are exalted without anyone seeing who carries you, or struck with an invisible stroke: it is the finger of God that touches you, *Digitus Dei est hic*.

Enough of that, my lords. Your Levites are wrong to complain, since they are Christians and their desire is to revive the ancient faith. But we, men of the Revolution, who know how to discern the past from the future, we have the right to say that your Providence, your authority, has no moral sense.

We read in the ecclesiastical history that, the Christians of Alexandria having demolished the temple of Serapis in a riot, the machines with which the priests operated their illusions were found in the cellars, and

that the reputation of the god suffered greatly. We also know the practices of spiritual power, and how little faith remains in the sacristies. And I could dispense with talking about it; but, given the inclination of the masses to mysticism, it is not without interest to present to them from time to time the raw reality before their eyes.

XXVI. — The mainspring of ecclesiastical justice is denunciation and espionage. One of your colleagues in the episcopate, Mgr Bouvier, bishop of Le Mans, has composed a Manual for this purpose in which he sets up all the faithful spies of the clergy, who on their side watch over the flock, and the priests who denounce one another. In this work Mgr Bouvier authorizes papal constitutions, which had never been received nor even promulgated in France, but to which it is necessary to believe that the Concordat gave the force of law. Here is what we read in his supplement to the treatise on marriage, *De clericis sollicitantibus*, p. 43:

“Several sovereign pontiffs order penitents to denounce to the inquisitors or to the bishops the confessor who has solicited them to evil. Gregory XV extended this obligation to any of the faithful who know that a priest abuses confession to satisfy his immorality, or who makes dishonest remarks, etc.”

A long thesis follows to prove that any individual without exception, man, woman, young man, young girl, knowing, no matter how, the misconduct of an ecclesiastic, is required to denounce it. Nothing is simpler than the procedure to follow:

“The penitent will write or have the name of the culprit written on a note that they will give to the confessor, who will send it to the bishopric; or they will go themselves to fulfill their mission; or finally they will simply designate the prevaricating priest to his director, with authorization to make him known to the bishop.”

Thus confession, instituted as a means of ecclesiastical policing with regard to lay people, again becomes a means of policing with regard to clerics, by the reciprocal denunciation of one by the other. For the rest, it is understood that denunciation applies to any kind of offense committed by action, by word or by opinion, and that the name of the informer must remain unknown to the bishop and the confessor, as well as to the denounced. So that, thanks to the confessional and the box of the bishopric, an individual can multiply and vary his denunciations against whoever he wishes, as many times as he pleases.

I borrow the following details from the priest whom I have already quoted:

“A teacher finds herself pregnant and believes she is mitigating her fault by blaming it on her priest. Judgment, or rather condemnation of the priest. Before leaving his parish, he ascends the pulpit and calls on God and men to witness his

innocence, What a sacrilege! To give the lie to episcopal infallibility! This cry of an irreproachable conscience set the seal on the reprobation of the poor priest. He had to leave the diocese and take refuge in a foreign country. — However, the teacher falls ill; the fear of death makes the memory of her calumny more poignant; she calls her confessor, the same who, on her first declaration, had made a report against the priest, confesses his crime to her. New report from the confessor. Then the bishop ends where he should have started: he examines the case, recognizes the innocence of the banished priest, recalls him from exile and entrusts him with another parish.

“— Pay my baker, a woman familiar with the iniquities of denunciation wrote to me, or I will denounce you! — I still have the letter, and I had reason to repent having treated lightly the threat of this unfortunate woman.

“Not a day goes by when denunciations do not reach the bishopric. I complained one day to a colleague of childish accusations made against me. — Hush up, then, he said to me; I am on my forty-third denunciation, and I am not complaining.

“The little town of St-D... had a vicar whom it idolized for his virtue, and above all for his charity. A sister denounced him as guilty of negligent preaching. Women who have entered religion play a great role in ecclesiastical government; their influence is far greater than that of the servants. In the diocese of Le Mans, for example, any member of the community of Evron enjoys the title of licensed spy. The abbot receives the order to leave immediately. The parish priest learns of the dismissal of his vicar only by the nomination of the replacement. He went to the bishop and addressed him with vigorous reproaches. This one, who was no longer thinking of such a small thing, finally opens his eyes and admits his mistake. — But, he adds, I cannot go back on my decision; I maintain it: I only regret not having known the truth sooner.

“A priest uses his power to break the affair of a married woman with a young man. What does the lover do? He denounces the priest himself and accuses him of having wanted to seduce his mistress. The overzealous guide only miraculously escaped dismissal.

“A vicar maintained an amorous correspondence with a young woman. In the meantime, he obtained an advantageous position and left the diocese. Before leaving, struck by a sinister presentiment, he entreated the object of his tenderness to burn his letters. After many tears and groans, they compromised on both sides, and it was agreed that only one would be kept. The vicar left; the repentant girl turned to God; her confessor, by dint of obsessions, snatched the fatal letter from her and immediately placed it in the hands of the bishop. The means of denying such a play? The priest didn't even try it: he confessed everything, and his future was shattered. Today he lives in Paris, but he no longer belongs to the clergy. Only once did he write to his former mistress: Your inexperience has been taken advantage of. I do not blame you. You have lost me forever. May God forgive you as I forgive you. Be happy!

“From an early age, the heart and conscience of the young seminarian are molded to this role. Revered superiors speak to him in the name of heaven, in the name of the glory of God and the salvation of souls; they command him to denounce, and he will denounce, on pain of the curse from above and the chastisements from below. New crusader, he will obey the supreme call: *God wills it!* In time, it is true, thought, like Samson, breaks unworthy bonds. Returning to probity, to honor, the priest of a mature age will refuse to prostitute his ministry to denunciation. But let him be careful not to show anything of the independence of his feelings: he would soon find himself accused by the Pharisees of the priesthood of connivance with the corrupt.”

XXVII. — How far this slave discipline is from the revolutionary theory that posits in principle that every man, by virtue of his moral sense, has the right of high and low justice over his fellow man; that, by virtue of this right, and in order to avoid revenge, organizes justice, by involving, in place of the individual, the city as *jury* in all civil, political and criminal affairs; that rejects anonymous denunciations, and demands the appearance of witnesses; that, finally, as a last guarantee, far from admitting the slightest shadow of authority in the judge, submits the judgments, through the public nature of the hearings, to the control, to the sanction of public opinion!

But, with each recrudescence of the regime formerly founded by the Church, we see these juridical mores of the Revolution, so noble and so pure, undermined by arbitrariness; administrative notes take the place of testimonies; the private judgment is introduced, the jury disappears from civil cases, then from state affairs, then from the criminal courts, and loses in the end even knowledge of political and press offenses. Could it therefore be that divine Justice, of which the Church claims to be the organ, cannot bear the clarity and serenity of human Justice, and that the Grand Justicier, in order to manifest his judgments, needs provost courts, tribunals of exception, councils of war, with their cortege of inhuman forms and immoral maxims?

O priests! Will you never be able to cast your eyes on yourselves, descend into your consciences, and there, in the silence of your religion, examine your faith? You are men too; and I have no doubt, for I accuse neither your intentions nor your life, that many among you are people of honor and virtue. It is therefore to what is best in you that I appeal. Consider what a terrible situation your dogma places you in. Under cover of a gospel of peace, brotherhood and love, you are, for the enslavement of peoples, brought up in chains, accustomed to espionage, and your job is to betray. It is not in your hearts, nor in your breviary; but it breaks out throughout your history and results inevitably from your theology. What is honest, generous and holy in you is only one more means of success for

your immoral mission, and it is by the principle of conscience, by thinking of saving souls, that you have made yourself the enemies of the human race. You resemble the adulterous woman spoken of in the book of Proverbs, who has lost even the sense of her fornication. “She ate,” said the Sage under the veil of a metaphor to make Juvenal tremble; “she rinsed her mouth, and then she said: I didn’t do anything!... *Comedit, et tergens os suum dicit: Non sum operata malum.*”

## CHAPTER V.

### Perversion of public morals by providential government.

XXVIII. — Before continuing this review, let's take a look at the road we have travelled.

The purpose of the State is to organize, render and enforce justice. Justice is the essential attribute, the main function of the State. The care of the general interests and of defense are for the State only accessories, dependencies of its juridical faculty.

Justice, the law of the material, intellectual and moral world, has EQUALITY as its formula.

But, in the first two periods of civilization, under paganism and Christianity, equality suffers a serious exception in the generally accepted fact of the *inequality of fortunes*.

The result is that the State, instituted for Justice, finds itself at the same time obliged to defend a thing that in itself is not just, that exists only through the effect of ignorance and prejudice, so that the action of the State becomes contradictory. Placed between hostile parties, one of which has wealth on its side, the other numbers, after having been tossed about for some time, it always ends by succumbing. Then, as the inequality of conditions always remains, in the eyes of the parties, the necessary fact, it happens that instead of carrying the reform to the very seat of the evil, in the world of interests, they are content to carry it into the political world; one modifies the constitutions, one change the dynasties, one passes from monarchy to democracy and from democracy to monarchy; we surround the government with some new bond at each evolution, which makes it less active and weaker; and always the government begins to lurch again and rushes in without anything being able to hold it back. Such is this despairing instability, the most curious and most obvious phenomenon in history.

To explain this state of affairs, two theories arise: the pagan theory of *fatum* and the Christian theory of Providence. We have seen in what they both consist.

The ancients considered the inequality of fortunes a natural and fatal thing. From this fatalism, which was invincible, according to them, they deduced, with all the logic in the world, the necessity of slavery, the distinction of castes, the omnipotence of the State and, finally, its instability. The State, charged with maintaining justice and inequality, could thus never be wrong; its reason had to prevail over any other reason, its prerogative over any other right: this is what we have called the reason

of state.

Christianity, for its part, saw in the inequality of conditions an accidental fact, resulting from a first prevarication. It therefore considered mankind to be in a state of penance; it says that Christ had come to prepare us for rehabilitation; that to this end he had entrusted his authority to his Church, and created in this Church two correlative powers, the spiritual power and the temporal power, in other words, the priesthood and the empire. The idea of ancient fatalism was therefore discarded; a new dogma took its place, the dogma of Providence, the meaning of which is that the world, after having been created in perfect harmony, fell, through the revolt of Satan and the prevarication of our first father, into disorder; that this is how inequality entered the world; and that if this great organism continues to work, it is thanks to the incessant intervention of the Creator, whose indefatigable foresight at every moment puts things in their place, revives the movement, maintains life, makes disorder serve order; thanks above all to the merit of the blood of Jesus Christ, which has made man more disciplinable, less a slave to the concupiscence of the flesh and the pride of the spirit.

Under pagan law, humanity was irremissibly condemned: slavery, tyranny, the insurmountable distinction of castes, the antagonism and instability of states, and the stupid belief in destiny were the signs of this condemnation.

Under Christian law, humanity is on the way to rehabilitation: slavery, as a consequence, is abolished; tyranny replaced by a Church in which cities, kingdoms, empires, princes and subjects, nobles, clerics, bourgeois and serfs, all equal in Christ and merged into one spiritual fold, form in the temporal a vast hierarchy against which no force of Satan can prevail, so long at least as she remains faithful to the faith.

But, as we have pointed out, there is this in common between the two theories, that the Church of Christ also has, like the church of destiny, its *raison d'etat*. Its mission is no longer to make prevail, all the same, a law of sin, a fatal law; it is to lead humanity through a sick world, despite the difficulties aroused at every moment by a diabolical wickedness, to the port of salvation, sometimes by undergoing a condition of misfortune that it is in the power of no one to change, and trying to make it serve the divine order and the sanctification of souls; sometimes by creating, in another spirit, institutions that serve the faithful as models and refuges, that maintain their faith, their charity and their hope.

Here, as before, it is therefore always the principle of authority that dominates: that is inevitable. Justice is subordinated to the reason of state: the state does not result from a contract that emanates from citizens and binds them to each other; it results from the relationship of subordination expressed by these two terms: AUTHORITY, which no longer commands in

the name of necessity, but in the name of salvation; and the *subject*, who obeys. Just as, therefore, the government of Providence in the universe is a government of reparations, restorations, revivals, rehabilitations, predestinations, twists and turns; likewise the government, in Christendom, is a government of dictatorship, of privileges, of prerogatives, of palliatives, of expedients, of *motu proprio*, of police, of exceptions, of sudden attacks: so that Christianity, which should, by redeeming humanity, reform the State, quite simply ends up putting, within the State, good pleasure in the place of necessity, and consequently makes it more immoral than before.

XXIX. — Indeed, the fatalist theory violates Justice, but by necessity: it can, up to a certain point, protest its good will and its good faith. It is in spite of himself that the sovereign has recourse to the reason of state: he would prefer to follow right, but no one is bound to the impossible.

The providential theory, on the contrary, violates Justice with premeditation, deliberately, by religious principle. The pagan did not worship *Fatum*, asked nothing of it, although he sought to discover its decrees. The Christian never ceases to implore Providence; he kisses it feet, he only expects his subsistence and success from its favor. This idea of a sovereign steward, who in the absence of fixed laws arbitrarily governs all things, is the source of the profound immorality that characterizes Christian government, and embraces the whole holy hierarchy, from the servant of the Inquisition to the person of God.

It is from faith in the Church that God, being the author of moral laws, can at will depart from them for the accomplishment of his designs. The Bible is full of examples. It is Jehovah who suggests to Jacob all his trickery towards his brother and his father-in-law; it is he who inspires Joseph with the advice that the latter gives to Pharaoh to organize an immense monopoly, by means of which the king becomes owner of all the land of Egypt; it is he who commands the Hebrews to steal the vessels of the Egyptians. In *Kings*, he sends to Ahaz a *spirit of falsehood*; in *Judges*, he does not allow the sons of Heli to attend their father's performances, because his intention is to *kill* them; in *Exodus*, he hardened Pharaoh to ruin him; in the *Prophets*, he commands Hosea to approach a prostitute and bear children with her, etc.

It is a regime of dispensations, of exceptions, of privileges, where the notion of the just and the unjust vanishes before the miracle.

The Gospel faithfully followed this theology, as seen in the parables of the prodigal son, of the late-coming workers, of the talents loaned at usury, of the pigs thrown into the sea. The power to *bind* and to *loose* given to the Church has no other meaning than this *ad libitum* suspension of the laws of justice and morality, through considerations of Providence.



And all of this is irreproachably logical: God, being the author of the moral status imposed on humanity, cannot himself, in his cosmic administration, be compelled to do so. If it pleases him to give birth to his Christ from an Abraham pimping his wife, from a swindling Jacob, from an incestuous Judah, from an adulterous and murderous David, from twenty idolatrous kings and perjurers, we can only bow down and worship his purposes. The departure from Justice by the very author of all Justice is the greatest proof of revelation: it proves to us that there truly exists a God, provident and free, enacting in the fullness of his liberty the laws of the world and of humanity, and even mathematical truths, as Descartes says. Take away from God this faculty of evading the laws that he has made, of departing from them, of suspending their action, and God becomes, like the phantoms of paganism, subject to *fatum*; he himself is *fatum* or, to put it better, there is no longer any God.

Such, then, is the government of Providence in the universe, such will be the typical or priestly government, such in its turn must be the lay government, which derives from it.

It was according to these principles that Bossuet composed for the son of Louis XIV, whose education had been entrusted to him, first his *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*, or Demonstration of Providence, then his *Politique tirée de l'Écriture sainte*, which is its corollary. In these two works, Bossuet aimed to oppose the Christian and providential doctrine of the government of societies to the fatalistic doctrine of the pagans, renewed by Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza.

Bossuet understands the law of the monarchy as that of the Church. Doubtless he recommends clemency, justice, chastity, good faith, economy, temperance and all the Christian virtues to the prince; but he also places among his prerogatives the *lettres de cachet*, the *coups d'état*, the violation of consciences, mass proscription, and all the summary means that the insurgency of the people may call for. It is Bossuet who gives us that beautiful expression: *Everything that is done against right is null and void*. But this maxim embarrassed him little: the supreme right, in his eyes, was authority, the social hierarchy, the accomplishment of the destinies of the Church; and as soon as orthodoxy or authority is at stake, Bossuet does not hesitate to impound justice. God commands it: *Providentia*.

We are full of that ecclesiastical spirit that has survived, within Christian society, the dislocation of the temporal and the spiritual, and the division of the Church itself. It is not for nothing that princes were called *bishops from outside*, and that Charlemagne is represented dressed in the cope, like a metropolitan bishop. To the machiavellianism of antiquity, the modern State joins priestly providentialism: civilization has covered itself with a double wound. The Revolution, which was to abolish this atrocious regime, only made an insignificant breach in it, through the ineptitude of

its leaders. After the September massacres and the suppression of worship in 93, the martyred Church was able to say, like Christ ascending to heaven: I am leaving, but I leave you my spirit! This spirit was Catherine Théot's messiah, Robespierre; it was the president of the theophilanthropists, Laréveillère-Lepeaux; it was the author of the Concordat, Napoleon.

Today, as in the Middle Ages, and in spite of the divisions that agitate the State and the Church, everything bows before authority, everything yields to the reason of state. Justice and morality are suspended; laws no longer apply; the distinction of powers is abolished; the courts judge at their own discretion; the state of war becomes the normal state; war itself is seen as a judgment of God. Before the central authority, representative of the reason of state, communal liberty is annihilated, personal liberty sacrificed, freedom of opinion suspect, freedom of assembly prohibited. In the face of the reason of state, the home loses its inviolability, paternal authority surrenders, the marital bed is forced to open its curtains, labor sits idle, the patient has no right to have an opinion on his treatment. I would fill a volume if I wanted to cite all the facts that have come to my knowledge, which prove that between the government of the Pope, so decried, and the imperial government, such as it was remade on December 2, there is no difference but the name. (C) A few citations will suffice to establish the thesis.

XXX. — In 1848, during the June insurrection, the Constituent Assembly, in order to bring about the radical repression of the revolt, declared the city of Paris in a state of siege. Since then, the same measure has been repeated several times. The state of siege, as you know, Monsignor, is, among other things, the suspension of justice and legal guarantees, and the concentration of all powers in the hands of the military authority.

The suspension of justice and laws! This means, Monsignor, the destruction of the moral world, the abolition of humanity.

Where can such an idea come from? Are there in the life of peoples times when the suspension of justice can be regarded as a law of public safety? The theory of fate says yes, and the theory of providence says the same. No less than two powers of this order were needed to force consciences, which all protest against such an extremity. Cincinnatus abdicated the dictatorship after fourteen days of command, yet he had only taken it to fight the enemy. General Cavaignac dropped it the day after the battle; the Constituent Assembly itself, although full of Christians, fighting for property and for the Church, declared that the state of siege was an exceptional measure that should be shortened as much as possible. It is clear that what fate excuses and the Church absolves, the human

conscience condemns: on what side, if you please, is morality?

Now, since December 2, 1851, we can say that the state of siege has become the normal state of the country. All powers are united in the same hand; all liberties are suspended, all discussion stopped: good pleasure is the law, oversight a fiction. The Church found her account there: she did not cry at the immorality, she did not launch her lightning; she did not begin to complain until the day when the Emperor, as absolute as the Pope, saw fit, in the interest of his personal policy, to ask the Pope to dismember his authority. Why, Monsignor, instead of rising up against the very principle of this absolutism, did you only protest against the application made of it to you personally?

Ah! you say, it is that in fact of government one can say that everything is exceptional, since according to the principle of the fall and by virtue of the redemption that followed, the condition of humanity is extra-legal, full of grace and exception. Whence the result that if the authority of the Church is shaken, the civil authority falls, its absolutism being able to be justified only by faith, of which His Holiness is the organ.

Well answered, Monsignor: neither Bellarmine nor Bossuet would disagree with this explanation. Now let us see where it takes us. All the politics of the Church, all its policy derives from this.

XXXI. — The Church has had a hand in the affairs of the Orient. When the quarrel broke out, two tendencies manifested themselves in Europe, one for a peaceful solution, the other for the way of arms. The most intelligent, the most friendly to justice and liberty, believed that diplomacy could do in 53 what it did in 56; they said that war was no longer of this century, protesting with all the more force that in their opinion war would decide nothing, and that victory, whatever it was, would be hardly less prejudicial to the victor than to the vanquished. Ambition, the pride of princes, the covetousness of states, democratic chauvinism, the instinct of plunder that animates the masses and drives them to war, prevailed.

With what eye, then, did the Church, mistress of morals, view war? Why did she not appear at the peace congress? Didn't the principle of *catholicity* command her to raise the dispute at her bar and, if her authority was disregarded, to abstain? Isn't the *amphictyonia* Christian?

War, replies the Church, enters into the plan of Providence, consequently into the forecasts of the Catholic empire. The army is also a church, a terrible church, freed from all human rights and duties, whose dogma, religion, economy, government and morals are summed up in this word, which is its reason of state, *orders*. The soldier knows neither family, nor friends, nor citizens, nor Justice, nor homeland: his country is his flag; his conscience, the order of his chief; his intelligence is at the end

of his bayonet. This is why the Eternal is a warrior, *Dominus vir bellator*, as well as a God of peace, *deus pacis*. This is why the Church has had warlike pontiffs, Urban II, Innocent III, Gregory IX, leaders or instigators of crusades, Julius II and a host of others.

Indeed, is not war the permanent state of humanity? War against the devil, war against heresy and philosophy, war against the flesh and against the spirit; consequently, war of peoples and governments against each other, war everywhere, war always. Could Justice exist from nation to nation, from prince to prince, from state to state, when it does not exist within the nation itself from prince to subject, from government to citizen?

War is the violent expression of religious thought. The army, like the Church, is the world of privilege, favoritism, indulgence, passive obedience, contempt for life and human dignity. It is, they say, the home of heroism and devotion, it is also that of betrayal and cowardice. Read, in the memoirs and correspondence of the time, the complaints of soldiers of all ranks under the consulate and the first empire. There, there is no morality, no concern for rights and laws. — *Does he fight well?* asked a general, apropos of a soldier brought before a court-martial for the crime of rape. — Yes. — Be indulgent. This is the word of the Church: *Does he go to mass?* — Yes. — Be indulgent. The crime of the soldier, like that of the Christian, only takes on seriousness insofar as it compromises command, hierarchy, discipline. The military oath above all; but the civic oath, what does it matter?

So let us not be surprised if the Church prays, if she fasts, if she sings for apparently contrary parties: basically it is always the same cause that she defends, the same truth that she proclaims. By virtue of the pact of Charlemagne, renewed from century to century by pragmatic sanctions and concordats, the Church remains the spiritual sovereign of the nations, which she directs, on the one hand through her pontiffs, her bishops, her legates and, on the other through kings and emperors, her sons, according to the law of a perpetual state of siege. Perhaps if the peoples abandoned themselves completely to ecclesiastical leadership, if kings and emperors were only the executors of the orders of the Holy Father, perhaps Christendom would enjoy a lasting peace. But disobedience is everywhere; God delivers the nations to their reprobate senses. It is for their own chastisement that they arm: no matter what side declares the victory, it is necessary to consider it as a judgment of God.

Suspension in perpetuity of Justice and morality, for the glory of God, the triumph of the Church and the salvation of empires, such then, in the final analysis, is the Christian system: what a masterpiece!

XXXII. — At the time when Catholicism was more a truth than it is

today, the Pope, head of the Church, in order to chastise princes, allowed himself from time to time to release subjects from the oath of fidelity. Certain authors, die-hard democrats, found the thing superb: the Pope, they say, was then the head of the Christian democracy; he represented the sovereignty of the peoples and exercised their rights. This reason, imagined after the event and based on other data, would perhaps be admissible if the papal excommunication had been motivated by some crime against justice and liberty. But it was usually a question of a prince who married his *commère* or his cousin, or who did not agree with the sovereign pontiff on the question of investitures, and, frankly, it was a question of compromising for very small things some very great interests. The feudal chief being the incarnation of society, to release his subjects from the oath of loyalty was tantamount to social dissolution and, what is worse, to the transfer of nationality to a foreign sovereign. To kill a nation, to annihilate order and the homeland, in retaliation for the prince's irreverence towards the Church was, once again, to copy too slavishly the dogma of forfeiture. Destruction of nationality, great God! destruction of morality.

Things have changed over the past six centuries. The Church no longer relieves peoples of their oaths to kings; rather it releases kings from their oaths to peoples. It must always bind or unbind something. This becomes more scabrous. As a result, it does not appear that the excommunicated princes of the Middle Ages, when their peoples had no cause to complain of them, found themselves very badly done by the ecclesiastical anathema; we have even sometimes seen subjects and kings, loose and bound, make common cause against the papacy. Nowadays, the converse does not occur in the same way. The Stuarts thought themselves released from their oath to the nation: they perished, some by the hand of the executioner, some in exile. Louis XVI thought he was freed, and the guillotine was his reward. Charles X thought he was loosed, and he went into exile. The leaders of the Holy Alliance, after having overthrown Napoleon, who had been bound, it is true, for his irreverence towards Pius VII, believed themselves, as for them, loosed in relation to their peoples, and 1848 gave them a jolt from which they have not recovered. More beautifully, the Church binds and unbinds, binds peoples and unbinds potentates. Suspension of public law, abrogation of social guarantees in favor of the arbitrariness of the prince: suspension of morals.

XXXIII. — France, after having made the revolution of 1789 for the conquest of her liberties, made two more, those of 1830 and 1848, to defend them. Among these liberties, one of the most important is that of the municipality. If, on the one hand, by the abolition of internal customs, by the unity of weights and measures, by national representation, the

nation marks its unity; on the other, by its *federations*, by municipal and provincial independence, it attests to its local liberties, corollary and complement of the liberty of the citizen. Without the liberty of the commune, the individual is only half free, the feudal yoke is only half broken, public right is ambiguous, public probity compromised. One of the things that most occupied the government of July and that of 1848 was the organization of the communes. How is it that today all local life, all free thought is absorbed in the action and thought of the government?

I said to a provincial mayor: For sixty years your city has become unrecognizable. What has it done with its character, its will, its action, with everything that made it a moral, intelligent and free being, if I dare say so, a person? Where, finally, are its mores? Everything is dead in it, worn down by governmental machinery and centralizing absorption. Let us not talk about individual liberty. That would be out of season: you yourself, chief of the urban police, can do nothing in this respect for your constituents. Let us talk about your liberty, your municipal autonomy. You are preceded, subordinated in all your faculties: 1. by the prefect; 2. by the Attorney General; 3. by the central commissioner; 4. by the rector of the academy; 5. by the general of the division; 6. by the archbishop; 7. by the bank; 8. by the Receiver General; 9. by the railroads; and shortly, 10. by the docks... Your city is, for power and for the privileged bodies that hold their precarious existence from it, a barracks, an office, an agency, a branch, a school, a public prosecutor's office, a station, a store: but none of that is you, you are zero. Make an act of will, and the general besieges you, the archbishop excommunicates you, the prefect and the commissioner denounce you, the attorney general adjourns you, the bank withdraws its credit, the railroad its wagons. You are only stones, old gables, a ruin. a store: but none of that is you, you are zero. Make an act of will, and the general besieges you, the archbishop excommunicates you, the prefect and the commissioner denounce you, the attorney general adjourns you, the bank withdraws its credit, the railroad its wagons. You are only stones, old gables, a ruin.

And what is true of any commune taken at random is true of all of them: the life of the departments is concentrated in the chief towns, the life of the chief towns has its hearth in the capital, and all the life of the capital is collected in a few special establishments that elaborate it for the rest of the country, the Palace, the Stock Exchange, the Academy, the Prefecture of Police, the Castle. Let Paris, after that, and the 37,000 communes following its example, have a more or less large number of licensed taverns, supervised public balls, censored theaters, well-informed newspapers, abandoned churches, purged libraries, medal-winning peddlers, illustrated sheets, the centralization is not at risk in that: such licenses will never check the government.

The inaugurator of this dreadful system in Europe was Diocletian. But the idea is Christian; it belongs to the messianic movement and dates from earlier than the empire. It is one of those oriental fantasies that the Church alone, with its indisputable orthodoxy, with its unitary liturgy, with its hierarchy of celestial spirits, model of the priestly hierarchy, with its idea of a sheepfold applied to human government, could make enter souls by sanctioning it with a revelation. *Fiet unum ovile et unus pastor*; we can say that it was the dream of Jesus Christ. Suppression of municipal liberties, attack on morality.

XXXIV. — The Church serves as an office of public spirit: not content with directing public opinion and, if need be, supplementing it, it serves as a scout for the government.

By virtue of the Concordat of Franz-Joseph, the bishops of Lombardy, under the pretext of safeguarding religion and mores, placed a ban on all books of philosophy and science that seemed to them of a nature to oppose the faith. If I believe the confidences of our booksellers, the clergy of France exercises no less influence on the policing of writings. Suspension of intelligence, suspension of morals.

In a commune where a conference of ecclesiastics was being held, we saw arriving at full gallop a courier dispatched by the prefect of the department to ask these gentlemen which candidates they wanted for their respective town halls. I leave you to imagine the effect that this deference of the high functionaries of the State towards the clergy must produce on the peasants who voted for the empire precisely in hatred of the priests and their regime.

Moreover, it is no new thing that the powers emerging from the Revolution seek the support of the clergy. A minister of Louis-Philippe complained to him of the choice he had made of M. Bouvier as bishop of Le Mans. "Sire," said the minister, "your M. Bouvier is only a peasant." — "I know it," answered the king; "but this peasant is worth ten thousand bayonets to me." Did Bishop Bouvier, out of gratitude, *loose* Louis-Philippe from his oaths?

Thus, in the domain of administration as in that of ideas, clerical thought, in collusion with that of government, replaces free thought. It cannot be otherwise, if one considers that the commune is for the priest only a counterfeit of the parish, a focus of schism, where the priest must return by virtue of the pastoral mandate: *Where the sheep are, there must be the shepherd*. But this also supposes that the sheep are all incapable of thinking for themselves; otherwise we are forced to conclude: Suspension of the public spirit, suspension of morality.

I do not ask what use the clergy has made of its influence in our recent political commotions; I like to believe that it only fulfilled a mission of

charity. The Terror seemed to have returned; a general purge, compared to which Robespierre's purges would have been only a game, was taking place. Things were pushed to the point that the Minister of the Interior, M. de Persigny, one day thought himself obliged to restrain, by an official circular, this zeal for proscription. According to one *rumor*, there would be lists all drawn up for a first batch of 40,000; what is certain at least is that the police file of a friend of mine bears the number 37,000 and so; and that a German publication has been announced in a Cologne newspaper containing a list of 6,000 elite individuals, reputed to be the most unhealthy in Europe, over whom, at the first disturbance, the hand of the counter-revolution must be extended.

I do not attribute, I repeat, all these denunciations to the Church. I know that there are no more monitors published; but it is she who has shaped our civil and political mores, and her hand has allowed itself to be seen enough in these sad events for us to have the right to ask her to account for them. The inventor of the famous *categories*, M. de Labordonnaye, was a fervent Christian; and the separation of the *good* and the *wicked*, at the Last Judgment, is one of the most familiar allegories in our sermonaries. If the weapon of excommunication is exhausted, we have not given it up for that. Last year, in Cologne, the clergy having invited the inhabitants to cease all relations with a private individual excommunicated for reason of lack of devotion, the whole city went to be registered with the proscribed, showing by this act of high tolerance that, if the Church is immutable, the century marches on, on the Rhine as well as on the Seine. Did we not think we saw, at the feasts celebrated in Lyon for the enactment of the *Immaculate Conception*, some of the ecclesiastics take note of the houses that were not illuminated? And the Sisters of Charity, doing the collection at home, either for expenses and foundations of worship, or for the poor, for their poor, are they not also accused of a similar service? Suspension of public trust and charity: suspension of morality.

XXXV. — In Italy, mixed marriages are illegitimate. In France, if the imperial government listened to the counsels besieging it, the unions formed only at the town hall and not blessed by the priest would also be annulled, the women declared coquettes and their children bastards. Such is the spirit of the Church, transmitted from age to age from Moses and Aaron, who doubtless held it from above. What is the meaning of these prohibitions? It is because love, marriage, paternity and the family, institutions of nature, prior to religion itself, are suspect in the Church; it is because it is there that we find the asylum of liberty, of independence, of free inquiry, of true charity, of inviolable Justice; a fortress erected by the human heart against theocracy and absolutism, from which revolt will



issue sooner or later, if the priesthood does not seize it.

But who are you, militia of Christ, to consecrate my marriage? What do conjugal society and your celibacy have in common? Why do I need, in order to become the companion, the support, the counsel of a woman and her children, your blessing and your faith? The marriage contract is the social contract par excellence: what more is needed than the sanction of family and society? You want to confess my wife: that's enough for me to drive her out as an infidel; to catechize my children: that's enough for me to refuse to recognize them. When politics, harmony, hygiene itself, command the crossing of languages, ideas, geniuses, religions, as well as races, you, in the interest of the Church, claim to prevent it! Back! Any intervention of authority between husband and wife, between the father of the family and the children, is a dissolution. What domestic Justice has joined you shall not separate. Suspension of conjugal dignity on grounds of religion, suspension of morality.

A widowed father, whom a judicial inquiry has made known as a model father, is accused by a guardianship council of having changed his religion and, on this ground, is prosecuted before the courts, in order to see himself stripped of his guardianship of his children and separated from their persons. Assuredly it is a less than glorious thing for our age, a private individual occupying himself with religious questions to the point of making it the capital thing of his life, and believing himself, after mature reflection, obliged to change his faith. If the guardianship council had criticized this father for lacking judgment, I would have understood its concern to a certain extent. But the council is even more religiously stubborn than the father: the latter is attached to Protestantism, the council wants to force him to remain Catholic. Let Justice enter into these considerations, and here is the family given over to the fantasy of worship, the children engaged in perpetuity by the baptism of their father, the latter by the baptism of his children, and both discharged from all mutual rights and duties by the sole fact of a change of religion. Suspension of paternal authority: suspension of morality.

In Rome, a new religious order, the *Socconi*, was established by Pius IX for the purpose of religious policing. They enter the houses on days of abstinence, uncover the pots and jars, make sure *with their own eyes* that the law of lean food is faithfully observed. At the same time, they visit libraries and offices, seize impious books, denounce and arrest those who conceal them. Isn't it true, as I was saying earlier, that the family is suspect in the Church? Violation of the domicile: violation of morals.

Once inside the house, the Church no longer respects anything, neither the bed of the woman in childbirth, nor that of the young girl who is nailed to the pallet by a fatal illness.

A doctor friend of mine practices medicine in a locality where his zeal,

his modesty, no less than his talents, have endeared him to everyone. But he does not *practice religion*: and the priest, the nuns, the devout battalion, have sworn to make him lose his clientele. First of all, the priest doesn't want the doctor to deliver babies; he read in I don't know what biography of Feller a furious article, according to which any woman who gives birth by a doctor must be considered immodest and a prostitute. He refused absolution to a young girl with a malady of the chest because the indiscreet doctor had taken the liberty, once, in front of witnesses, of carrying out auscultation on the patient. How you catch fire, *Monsieur le Cure!* Don't you know that the most essential condition of the art of healing is the patient's confidence in their doctor, and that this confidence is the most free and the most chaste in a woman? Violation of the patient's liberty, attack on her life. I don't need to add: attack on morals.

XXXVI. — Everyone has heard of the association for the celebration of Sunday, whose members undertake not only not to labor, or cause to labor, to buy or sell, on the forbidden days, but also to employ only people observing by their example the sacred rest, and refusing their orders and commands to offenders. It is excommunication applied to commerce and industry, and transformed into an instrument of monopoly. What a signal sanction given to the government of Providence! Never, it is fair to say, had the government thought of intervening with this intolerant, vexatious genius, in matters of industry and commerce, any more than in those of conscience. But what power does not dare, the Church, more powerful than power, does not fear to undertake. First of all, it is only a question of a particular and entirely free association, for a special object, the fulfillment of a duty of religion. Then, when the association has become numerous, when it has surrounded a certain number of towns and departments, a petition will be addressed to the Emperor, who, granting the piety and the unanimous complaints of his people, will convert into a law of the state the prohibition against laboring on Sundays. Suspension of the liberty to labor: suspension of morals.

I think I read somewhere, but the fact has since been confirmed to me by a number of people, that in the Doubs department alone the police, at the request of the Church, closed down more than three hundred consumer establishments, under the pretext of drunkenness and trouble brought to the divine service. — What do morals have in common, you ask, with the cabaret? — First of all, a cabaret is property, and I haven't heard that the police, or the factory, by having the corks removed, compensated the owners. But I want to consider the thing only in its most frivolous aspect, the pleasure of the consumer. For thirty years I have frequented cafés, cabarets, taverns, estaminets, restaurants: the *casino*, or club, is beyond my means. Single, I had no other living room than the café;

married, I find there from time to time, with company that I would not meet elsewhere, an always pleasant distraction. Since the Revolution, the cafe and the cabaret have become more and more part of the mores of the peasant. Not everyone is able to have their wine or beer in their cellar: the public establishment is a domestic necessity. Let the father of a family be taught not to get drunk on it, not to devour the subsistence of his wife and children, if he can to even avoid slandering the Church and the government. All in good time. But I maintain that these meeting places serve more for the progress of civilization than the house of prayer, and that instead of destroying them, an intelligent police would tend to perfect their use. It is true that one learns there less worship than liberty: that is why the Church, the aristocracy and the power hate them. Their security requires that citizens live isolated in their homes, held in solitary confinement. Prohibition of free meetings, hindrance to morality.

XXXVII. The idea of a God as author and subject of Justice entails this consequence that, if the infraction of the precept is reprehensible and deserves punishment, the offense against the divine person is still more serious and entails double punishment. This is the principle of sacrilege and of the laws of majesty, proper to the religious age, from which no theism can claim to be exempt. The torture of the Chevalier de La Barre, condemned in 1766, for some impertinence towards worship, to be burned alive, is in everyone's memory, and we know what debates the proposal of a law of sacrilege aroused under the Restoration. The revolutionary legislator stigmatizes it; but I would not dare answer that, in practice, sacrilege is not always considered by our courts as an aggravating circumstance, leading to the application of the maximum. What I can say is that a judgment of the court of Rouen, of February 1853, confirming a judgment of the correctional court of Yvetot, condemned to six months of prison a young man guilty of having taken communion, on Christmas Day, without having gone to confession.

Here is a fact reported by the newspapers last year:

"In Sarnen, Switzerland, a man was sentenced for robbery of a church to the following penalties:

"A quarter of an hour in a straightjacket under the guard of the executioner;

"Sixty blows of the rod applied by the executioner;

"Five years with the wheelbarrow;

"Ten years of internment in his home town;

"Loss of civil and political rights;

"Prohibition of marriage;

"Exclusion from exercises of piety;

"*Amende honorable* to the Church, a noose around the neck, a torch in hand;

"Damages, trial costs, etc., etc."

It is to these disciplinary mores that some would like to bring us back today. Depravity of penalty, depravity of morality.

But the God who punishes is also the God who gives grace; and thrice happy is the culprit whom the Church covers with its wing! It is a principle in theocracy that, as men cease to be equal by the fact of predestination, neither are they so before fortune, nor before the law, nor even before punishment. And it is in consequence of this principle that before the Revolution, priests, nobles, all persons elevated in dignity, more rarely guilty than the others because the law was more favorable to them, rarely punished because, judged by their peers, they could find in their peers only accomplices, when the punishment finally reached them, were struck much more gently and with forms that took away from the torture all its ignominy. Our morals, in this respect, were singularly amended by the Revolution. But who would dare to say that our so-called Voltairean bourgeoisie is entirely purged of all Catholicism?

In a department that I need not name, a peasant and his wife martyred with pins, driven into the breast, the belly and the womb, a young servant, whose crime was to have had too much indulgence of the husband. The coward made his peace by fulfilling the office of executioner with his shrew. A criminal trial was imminent; but the culprit was of good peasantry, a farmer, a client of M. \*\*\*, who was on best terms with MM. \*\*\* and \*\*\*. Was it necessary, for a feminine revenge, provoked by a marital peccadillo, to bring desolation, shame to a whole honest, considered, pious family? We would compensate the unfortunate, we would admonish the husband and the wife: would it not be better, for justice, for religion, for public morals, than the scandal of an assize court? The affair was covered up. How many similar ones I could cite, especially when the culprit is a member of the priesthood! But I want to be as discreet as you. *Indulgentiam, absolutionem et remissionem peccatorum nostrorum tribuat nobis omnipotens et misericors Dominus. Amen.* Those guarded by the Church are well guarded. I quoted this line because it depicts the bourgeois temperament, honest at bottom and the enemy of talk. But if this way of repairing wrongs has its advantages, does it not also have its dangers? Subtraction of the culprit from the condemnation of the laws, subtraction of morality . . . . .

XXXVIII. — It is thus that in the Christian system, providential reason, subordinating juridical reason, is led everywhere to suppress morals, replaced by the regime of predestination and war.

And it is with this system of dogmatic immorality that the Church flatters herself with regenerating societies, consolidating states, enlightening the religion of princes, and forming good citizens, or better

said, good subjects: for, as we have seen it previously give us in turn the *good man* and the *good poor man*, it has also discovered the type of the *good subject*, of the obedient, passive subject, inert in his conscience, and in his reason, in his will, such a state, finally, as absolutism requires.

GOOD MAN, — GOOD POOR MAN, — GOOD SUBJECT: these three phrases sum up the jurisprudence of the Church, in what concerns persons, property and government. It is its *public right*, its *right of peace and war*, its *domestic right*, its *municipal right*, its *administrative right*, its *penal right*, its *right of peoples*.

For me, hear this, Monsignor: until the thunder of another Sinai, drowning the voice of the Revolution by which I swear, signifies to mortals the decrees of an authority that my Reason avows, I deny, like Destiny, your Providence, and I declare your predestination, your discipline, no less than the reason of state of Machiavelli, of Hobbes, of Spinoza, immoral; I challenge both their metaphysics and your theology. Without concerning myself with the nature of God, the genesis of souls and the whole transcendental universe, I affirm, with Pelagius against the bishop of Hippo, with the instinct of this class of disinherited from which I came against the interested fatalism of a satiated caste; I affirm, with the entire Revolution, the essential morality of our nature, liberty, dignity, the perfectibility of my fellows, and their civil and political equality. I affirm, I say, Justice in economy and government.

I do not blame our long servitude, any more than our misery, either on the will of men or the conspiracy of interests: in this respect, the way in which I have traced the evolutions of human thought through the symbols of religion and the manifestations of history testify to the moderation of my feelings. I acknowledge the infirmity of the first generations, the inevitable mistakes of the founders, the innate mysticism of the human spirit, following which overflowed the egoism of the castes, the pedantry of the philosophers, the Machiavellianism of the princes and the procuring of the schemers.

Let the counter-revolution applaud this theocratic upsurge. We know what its piety is worth. I dare say that the conscience of the people is with me. Posterity will judge.

## CHAPTER VI.

### Revolutionary initiation: uprising of souls against Providence.

XXXIX. — The greatest revolt of which humanity has given the spectacle in the past is the one that agitated the nations from the first slave war, 439 years before Christ, until the victory of Constantine over Maxentius, in 312. It can be called the revolt of the mind against Destiny. It is from this revolt that Christianity emerged.

It must have been a strange spectacle, in a fatalistic society, under a fatalistic religion and empire, this drive of peoples to rebel against what reason recognizes as most invincible, to deny what is least deniable, necessity. An insurrection against *Fatum!* It was absurd, and that is why it was sublime.

Now that history has revealed to us the answer to the riddle — fall of paganism, abolition of slavery, end of the empire of the Caesars, transformation of society, promulgation of a new dogma — we admire this divine genius, which the contradiction of its own thought cannot take hold of, and we say: Honor to the revolt!

Certainly, if the mind can be struck by religion, it can only be so with regard to the mind: it is repugnant that what thinks bows before that which does not think. Must we now ask ourselves why society, having denied Destiny, knelt before Providence? Providence was that society, it was its image.

But here is a revolt, more formidable than the first, fermenting in the heart of the fascinated multitudes; a conjuration whose idea, titanic in its audacity, monstrous in its formula, crushes: it is nothing less than a revolt against Providence itself.

Man, the being who thinks, who reflects, who reasons, who deliberates, who sees the principle and the end of things; man, constantly occupied with tomorrow, tormented by his individual and social destiny, speculating as far as the eye can see regarding final causes, the goal of creation, the why of the universe; this man, whose thought can be defined as a long forecast, rebelling against Providence, against the ideal of his own understanding: what could be more inconsistent, more mad? Who will interpret for us this new mystery?

I note the fact, not in the popular clamor: the people, who know neither where they come from nor where they are going, who are incapable moreover, when they obey a new thought, of investing it with an expression that is adequate and their own, the people here tell us nothing. And the agitators with their manifestos, the philosophers with

their utopias, tell us no more. Madmen follow the multitude, whom they seem to lead, engaged like them in tradition, their eyes turned towards the past, distorting, in their outmoded and contradictory style, ideas of which they have no understanding. I note it, this strange fact, in the reversal of consciousnesses, whose poles are displaced, whose orientation is no longer the same, which we have seen, for this reason, for about a century, become more and more refractory to all the conditions of the regime based on authority, refractory to Providence.

The people, in our times, are far from being blasphemous and sacrilegious; but they are profoundly undevout. Worship is no longer among their habits. Separating religion from Justice, they are convinced that the latter suffices for man, that the former is supererogation, and they have invented a phrase to translate this thought of lofty indifference: *The faith of the collier*.

The people have understood, moreover, the natural, dogmatic alliance of the altar and the throne, of the priest and the noble. So they left the church to the bourgeois, distrusting bigotry as much as the clergy.

The people aspire to an egalitarian government, based on absolute, immanent laws, like those that science discovers every day in the universe. Science, positive, objective, juridical truth, in everything and everywhere, such is their ideal. Providence, good pleasure in the government of the universe and of society, is repugnant to them.

Resignation, as well as faith, is dead in their heart, they want right, labor, liberty, expecting their well-being only from their own efforts, and ready to do justice to power as well as to religion.

All these sentiments, still obscure and ill-defined, penetrate souls: they are imbued with them, and if I dare say so, *transnatured*. And the more the reaction rages and makes efforts to avert the danger, the more the revolt gains, without newspapers, without doctors, without missionaries.

XL. — Here, Monsignor, allow me for a few minutes to enter the scene: I could not do better, to show in its depth this phenomenon of social psychology and to reveal, *flagrante delicto*, this new state of consciences, than to quote some observations that affect me; you gave me the right by your indiscreet revelations.

“The Proudhons, says my biographer, are peasant bureaucrats and readers of Codes. The whole race is fundamentally revolutionary.

“From this family came a famous jurist.”

To be fair and not to confuse the innocent with the guilty, it should have been added that the branch from which *the famous jurist came* is perfectly conservative and pious, something I do not envy it; that it has always lived on good terms with the government, from which it has, not

long ago, received distinctions, which does not bother me either; that finally it did not provide only people of law, as there are also people of the church there. It is the blessed branch, from which an unhappy branch has separated. Thus the schism of Jeroboam broke the unity of the people of God; thus the Middle Ages had its Ghibellines and its Guelphs; thus, since 89, France is divided into two parties, the party of the Revolution and the party of the Counter-revolution. There is no family on earth that does not have its left and its right, and does not reproduce this irremediable split on a small scale.

The *professor*, as the famous jurisconsult was called in the family, said one day, speaking of the line to which I have the misfortune to belong: *There was a drop of bad blood among the Proudhons; it passed to that side.* What he said, moreover, did not come from malice, far from it: he never refused service or advice to these stubborn litigants of the younger branch; it was pure impatience. As for him, he preferred to let himself be robbed than to plead: he could lose.

I heard this remark when I was a young man. *The drop of bad blood!* You understand, Monsignor, what that means: the whole doctrine of predestination is there. It is this fatal idea that, infiltrated into the soul of nations, explains their struggles and gives the word of providential government. So therefore, I and those of my branch, we were predestined to poverty, predestined to revolt, predestined to trials, to prison, predestined to the Antichrist! Can you imagine the effect of this sentence, pronounced by a famous jurist, who had also worn the cassock, on a brain of thirteen?

At base, there was something true in the professor's idea: I noticed it. I had gone for a week's vacation in the mountains with my cousins from the left. As luck would have it, we found ourselves lodged in a barn inhabited by another family of cousins, but from the right. Every evening we prayed together. One day, in a fit of devotion, the one in charge — he was a cousin on the right — began a succession of *pater* and *ave* for a multitude of special graces of which he thought each of those present should feel the urgency and the price as much as himself: a *pater* and an *ave* to obtain grace for this, a *pater* and an *ave* to get the pardon for that. There were five of us, and the string didn't end. Suddenly one of the Proudhons on the left gets up, puts on his cap and says: *You are boring us with your PATER; as for me, I don't want pardon.* There was a universal burst of laughter. Since then it has been impossible for me, whatever desire I may have, to pray to God.

I would like a philosopher, from the eclectic school or the Scottish school psychologizing doctorally on this *Ite missa is* of a peasant bored by prayer, *I don't want any grace*, to tell me, after having probed his conscience, if it does not seem to him that this man, who counts only on



his courage, has a healthier, more virtuous soul than the blessed one who tires the heavens with his obsequies? Is it not true that there is a surge of morality here that obliterates all the formulas of pagan and Christian worship? Certainly, you would hardly maintain that this movement, so pure, so prompt, of human valor, is an effect of grace, since it is the negation of grace itself. And what Cicero, Seneca and all the Fathers say, that virtue in man is a gift of divinity, cannot find its application here, since here is a virtue that consists precisely in wanting to do without the favor of heaven.

Now, if the human conscience, once given, is capable of spontaneously bringing itself to action, which means to virtue, it possesses in itself, *a priori*, and for the whole duration of its existence, Justice; we have no use for additional, later and superior graces, and the doctrine of predestination is an impertinence. There are no favorites of the Divinity among us: there are only the brave and the cowardly.

That is not all. With Justice, we no longer have anything to do with Providence from above, just as the universe, with attraction, no longer needs God to constantly come and relaunch the movement of the spheres, ready to wane. Society works on its own, based on the reciprocity of respect and service; any intervention of the Supreme Father is useless, dangerous, immoral; it is nonsense. So what good is the Church? Of what use is the provision of the pope and the princes? What good is their command?

This, I dare say, is felt by every man of the people in whom the practices of prayer and the sophisms of a silly philosophy have not atrophied the moral sense; what sustains, against the corruptions of mysticism and ignorance, the conscience of societies; and what I learned from childhood, and which an education without principles could not destroy in me, as much for the conduct of the will as for that of the understanding.

XLI. But, Monsignor, I am not only a Proudhon; and if it is true, as certain physiologists claim, that in families the males derive above all from the mother, you will see that I could well accumulate the vices of several races. If my posterity continues to cross paths as my father and mother did, God knows what terrible catastrophes society is threatened with!

My maternal grandfather, after having served for ten years as a simple soldier under Louis XV, returned to his village, where he married and lifted a plow. This happened about twenty years before the Revolution. At that time the nobility, with a minimal fraction of the third estate, formed the body of the predestined; the people were condemned to hell. From the name of the regiment, Tornésis or Tournaisis, (Tournay), where my

grandfather had served, the peasants nicknamed him in patois, *Tournési*. This was all the fruit he brought back from his campaigns. However, the commune where he lived enjoyed, by its old charters, the right to cut wood in a nearby forest, called La Recompense, which was part of a fiefdom of the lords of Bauffremont. The guard Brézet, being zealous, took it into his head one day to prevent the poor users from exercising their rights: so many offenders, so many reports. Tournési, bolder than the others, wanted to plead: it was the earthen pot against the iron pot; then, it was the justice of the lord who judged. He was ruined by fines. One day, at high noon, the guard Brézet surprises him, with his cart and his horses, in recidivism. He had gone to get a tree he needed for the top of his house; and as, despite the condemnations, he did not intend to allow the right to expire, he was not hiding. — What is your name? said the guard. I officially denounce you. — My name is *Retournes-y*, replies the other, playing on his nickname. — Give me your axe. — Take it! — And he throws it on the ground, between two, each having its share of field and shadow. Here are the two men, the guard on one side drawing his sword, the peasant on the other brandishing a log. What happened I cannot say: suffice it to say that the guard returned home exhausted, and gave up the ghost before the twentieth day. On his deathbed, he refused to declare the murderer, known to everyone; he says he only got what he deserved.

To do justice to oneself, and by the shedding of blood, is an extremity that perhaps exists among the Californians, assembled yesterday to search for gold, but from which the fortune of France preserves us! Thank heaven, the Revolution of 89, by putting an end to feudal tyranny and the vexations of its henchmen, changed forever, I hope, this dreadful regime. It endowed our country with an enlightened, vigilant, honest judiciary, without complacency for power, without partiality for the nobles, and who would know how, on occasion, to maintain the rights of a poor commune against the encroachments of a Lord of Bauffremont.

I am therefore far from setting up my grandfather's act as an example: who better than I knows that a civilized society does not seek its models in barbaric necessities? I am just asking who bears the primary responsibility for the murder? Who had founded the feudal society? Who had created this system, where authority doing justice, respect and right not being reciprocal, the law being the expression of good pleasure, the balance of the judge always stumbling on the side of power, and morality had no refuge but in the despair of the oppressed? Was it not the Church, with its terrible dogma of the fall, having misery as its consequence, servitude as its corollary, predestination as its rule?

If the lord claims to exercise the right of justice over me, in my turn I claim to exercise the right of justice over the lord: such was the thought that armed Tournési. He would have struck the lord's justice, as he struck

his guard; he would have struck the lord himself. Why not? Was he not, at this hour, against an insolent tyranny, the organ of public reprobation, the avenger of the imprescriptible right? The commune, whose solemn silence covered him like a shield, had it not long since, by its complaints, by its very resignation, rendered its verdict?

Virgil, in the eighth book of the Aeneid, represents the tyrant Mézentius fleeing the hatred of his subjects, who pursue him from asylum to asylum, and, arms in hand, demand his extradition:

Ergo omnis furiis surrexit Etruria justis;  
Regem ad supplicium præsentem marte reposcunt.

When kings themselves can be struck by this hue and cry, would the anger stop before a boyar's dog?

The crime of Tournési, if it was one, is the same as that of those intrepid constituents who, in 89, overthrew the noble regime, and laid the foundations of a new society. For you doubtless do not think, Monsignor, that the deputies who took the Tennis Court Oath, any more than the gangs who took the Bastille, engaged, from the point of view of the existing procedure, which the representatives affected to follow, in a legal act? This deliberation, this oath, soon followed by a terrible insurrection, all this, what is it but the revolt of consciences against providential discipline, a justice exercised on royalty, the eldest daughter of the Church, from whom was supposed to emanate all righteousness? In 89, the entire French nation was anti-predestinate, and it produced the acts. Also the Tennis Court Oath, and the taking of the Bastille which was its consequence, and the removal of royalty on October 5 and 6, and the return from Varennes, and August 10, remained in the consciousness of the people as acts of high morality; and the more impartial history becomes over time, the more it celebrates them.

XLII. — This right of individual justice, the necessary basis of social justice, which testifies so loudly in favor of immanence, is found everywhere at the origin of societies. Moses only consecrated it by regulating it; his *cities of refuge* are its express recognition. He goes further: he establishes cases of general security where each Jew is invested by law with the ancient right of personal justice, and required to exercise it.

“If a false prophet arises among you,” says Deuteronomy, “man or woman, you will not listen to him, you will not spare him, you will not hide him from justice; but you shall kill him forthwith, *statim interficies*; strike him first, and all the people will strike him after you.”

This is what the Jewish doctors called the *judgment of zeal*, of which the Bible furnishes many examples, namely in Phineas, Elijah, Joad and

Mathatias. Idolatry was likened to the crime of high treason: every citizen was judge and executioner. It has suited the Abbe Bergier to cast doubt on this institution of Moses and even to falsify the text of Deuteronomy. We know the reason for this infidelity: the Christian theory of predestination and Catholic discipline cannot tally with this republican appeal of the Hebrew legislator to personal justice, to the immanent Justice of humanity.

See, however, to what we are reduced and what degree the provocation has reached!

A pamphleteer dedicated to the service of episcopal providence publishes my biography, which is worse, in my opinion, than preventing me from exercising a right to cut wood. If this notice were as innocuous as the most sensitive self-esteem might have wished, I would still ask: By what right does this man deign to touch my person? How is it lawful to write a biography of a citizen, either for good or ill? But it is not for my glory that M. de Mirecourt published his pamphlet: as much as it is in him, he pours ridicule, odiousness over my whole life; he pursues me even in my race. He puts the interdiction on my work, on the subsistence of my family; he singles me out for the censure of power, the hatred of the conservative bourgeoisie; he excommunicates me. I want to defend myself, to respond to the libel, to denounce the intolerable influence of the clergy in this country, to return blow for blow to whom it may concern. No justice for the impious: printers and booksellers close their doors to me. The seal of the Church is on my polemic: I will hardly be allowed to publish a book of philosophy, a big scientific, metaphysical, historical, political, economic book, but not at all polemical, which will not be looked at by the hundred thousand onlookers who devoured my biography. The censorship, prompted by the Church, halts my just reprisals. No recourse: in the state in which the religious recrudescence has placed us, the law does not protect private life; public justice is silent, the prosecution is watching. The police read the pamphlets of M. de Mirecourt twenty-four hours before the sale, and give the *exequatur*: the court will only be involved on my complaint; and if the violence of the outrage compels it to crack down, for it will not trouble itself for a joke, it will relate the defamation throughout in its judgment, without saying whether it is contrary to the truth or not, and will allot me for my lost reputation 93 francs in damages. (*See* the convictions pronounced against Mirecourt by the Tribunal de la Seine, 1857, for the benefit of Mirès and Bocage.) Suppose that I take revenge: according to you, Monsignor, who governs by grace, I will have committed a murder, worthy of the last torture; according to eternal law, organized by Moses, I will have done an act of justice, a moral thing. Frankly, do you believe that there are many men today who, in the bottom of their hearts, hesitate between these two

definitions?

XLIII. — Rest assured: despite the violence we are witnessing, I do not believe that liberty needs to use force from now on in order to claim its rights and avenge its insults. Reason will serve us better; and patience, like the Revolution, is invincible. Then again, I have not received from my ancestors only lessons in murder. Listen once again:

Tournési, argumentative and moderately devout, was on bad terms with the priest of the parish, the Curé Blessemaille. One year, noticing that he was the object of gossip, he thought he should celebrate Passover. Who do you think he went to for absolution? To Curé Blessemaille himself, to this vindictive priest, who was seized with horror at seeing his enemy, prone to holding forth on his conduct, enter the confessional. In a holy anger, he wanted to send him away. “Go to someone else,” he told him. — “I only know my pastor,” replied Tournési humbly. And Blessemaille was forced to absolve him, what is more, to serve him communion himself with his own hand. Isn’t that, Monsignor, a pretty trick for a peasant soldier? Ah! priest, you say that I am proud, a litigant, an envious, an unbeliever. Well, I will make you raise your hand and swear on the Host that you have found me blameless. Unworthy of communion! You will say; a profanation of holy things, an attack on religion and morals! Slow down, please: the scandal, if there was one, was only for the priest; as for the witnesses, the edification was complete, for they were all laughing. For the rest, a man who unites, like Tournési, all the domestic and social virtues, who has no other fault than to hit the guard and mock the chaplain, is essentially moral; he lacks only grace.

Tournési died in the winter of 89, from a fall he had on that frightful ice of imperishable memory. He went from house to house, singing revolutionary laments, in which, following the style of the time, feudal institutions were represented as a punishment from heaven, and the misery that overwhelmed the people as their consequence:

Christians, let us contemplate the scourges  
With which God punishes our crimes!

My mother still sang them to us: I forgot the rest.

My mother, his favorite daughter, wept for this father for two long years; his wife, whom he had married while besotted with another love, but with whom he had known how to make himself welcome, lost her vision from sorrow. Show me a pope, an emperor, who has excited so many regrets. The predestined make themselves feared: their intercession is demanded, but they are hardly mourned. My mother often told me that I resembled Father Tournési in the forehead, the eyes, the open laugh, and the broad chest. She kept telling me about his family life, his speeches, his

resolute air. As for me, I put him on the level of Plutarch's men.

## CHAPTER VII.

Of government according to Justice. — Realism of power; collective force;  
Constitution of the Republic.

XLIV. What makes the life of a state, as we said at the beginning, what determines its stability or its obsolescence, is its idea. If this idea expresses a relation of justice, the state will be protected internally from all dissolution; externally, no power will prevail against it. If, on the contrary, the idea that governs the State is false and iniquitous, even though it would have universal prejudice in favor of it, the State, in contradiction with itself, will sooner or later perish.

It seems from this that the law of equality having been demonstrated, we no longer have to concern ourselves with the government. Let the government be regulated according to the law of equality and, whatever its form, from the moment that it exists only for Justice, it is assured of living; its constitution becomes a secondary thing, which can be left without inconvenience to popular fancy or local tradition.

However, such a conclusion would only be true within a certain limit: that is to say, the balance of services, products and fortunes having been established, one can entrust to Justice the task of consolidating the State, and of giving the final form to the government. Apart from that, we would be making a grave mistake if we supposed that the economic equilibrium being established, the government could preserve the organization that it had previously given itself according to its idea of inequality. The indifference of economics in matters of government does not go so far.

The IDEA of government given, the *form* follows: these two terms are linked to each other, as the organization of the animal is to its destiny. We know what the form of states has been until now, according to the idea of the exploitation of man by man: despotic centralization, feudal hierarchy, patriciate with clientele, military democracy, mercantile oligarchy, finally constitutional monarchy. What is the proper form of republican government, organized by and for equality? This is a question from which it is impossible for us to escape. Justice, otherwise, would be lying to itself; it would not be Justice, having less creative force than its opposite, iniquity. (D)

That is not all. So far we have only considered government as a form of action: we have not asked ourselves whether this form covers something real; whether it should be seen as a combination of the human brain or the manifestation of a positive nature. Now, the State having its idea, which is its conscience; then its form, in other words its organism,

which is its body, we are necessarily led to believe that this word, State, power, government, indicates a true being, since that which unites the two attributes of existence, the idea and form, soul and body, cannot be reduced to nothingness. What is this reality of the state? In what does it consist? Where are we to find it? Let me explain.

XLV. — From the beginning of these studies, we asked ourselves the question: What is Justice?

And the result of our research has been to demonstrate that, religion making Justice a divine commandment, philosophy a simple relation, a necessity of reason, Justice, according to both, is reduced for the conscience to an abstraction; that thus the right lacking in reality within us, all of morality was a pure prejudice, a benevolent submission, in no way obligatory, to certain proprieties in themselves devoid of foundation. In such a state of affairs, atheism was right to maintain that Justice is a word, that good and evil are words; that there is no other right than force, and that all that theology and metaphysics utter in this regard is pure fantasy, logomachy, superstition.

However, we see Justice leading humanity, producing civilization by its development, raising high the nations that observe it and, on the contrary, dooming those that forget it. How are we to attribute effects so powerful, so real, to an idea without a subject, to a chimera?

To explain history and save morals, to explain religion itself, it was therefore necessary to demonstrate that Justice is something other than a command and a relation; that it is also a positive faculty of the soul, a power of the same order as love, superior even to love, a reality finally: and this is what we have undertaken in these studies.

Another question.

After having recognized Justice, in its essence and its reality, we asked ourselves, passing from persons to things: What is the law of the production and distribution of wealth, in other words, what is economy? Does there really exist, can there exist a science of this name, having as its object a determinable reality, possessing proper principles and definitions, a method; or should we see in this so-called science only the acts of a mercantilism without principles and laws, caprices of the imagination, zigzags of the will, in which it would be illogical to look for a shadow of reason, and which only fall under the good pleasure of the government?

In the latter case, it is clear that political economy, summed up in one word, liberty, except for the reservations imposed by the State, is not in itself a science: it is a negation, and the conclusions of socialism are baseless.

For us, on the contrary, economics is a science in the most rigorous



sense of the word; a science whose aim is to study an order of phenomena that, although produced under the initiative of liberty, and infinitely variable, nevertheless obey constant laws, the certainty of which is equal to that of all the laws that rule the universe. *Forces* and *laws*, that is what makes the reality of economics: there is nothing else in physics itself. Thanks to this realism of justice and economy, society is no longer an arbitrary phantasmagoria, a passing figure; it is a creation, a world.

Now I continue:

What is the power in society? What produces government and what gives birth to the state? Does the political idea correspond, like the juridical idea and the economic idea, to a reality *sui generis* or is it still only a fiction, a word?

According to the Church and all the mythologies, social power does not have its basis in humanity: it is of divine constitution. According to the philosophers, who tried to determine its conditions, government would result from the abandonment that each citizen makes of a part of his liberty; it would be the product of a voluntary renunciation, a kind of joint-stock company, in itself nothing.

Some men of recent times seem to have felt the radical insufficiency of all these conceptions. "Without the individual," they said, "without liberty, government, society itself, are assuredly nothing; but can we not also say that, society once formed, it is something other than the individual, an organism that imposes its laws on the latter?..." This is how the hypothesis was formed of a social being, real, positive and true.

But this is only a hypothesis: What attests to this reality? In what does it consist? How are we to grasp it? How are we to analyze its parts? Here everything remains to be done, and if the Revolution does not inspire us, we have only to confess our impotence: there is no government.

I therefore reason regarding the government as I reasoned about the economy and justice. Government is something in which, despite all miscalculations, humanity persists, which neither violence, nor cunning, nor superstition, nor fear, are sufficient to explain. *A priori*, I affirm that the political institution expresses, not a convention or an act of faith, but a reality.

That will be the subject of this last chapter. (E)

# SMALL POLITICAL CATECHISM.

## FIRST INSTRUCTION.

### Of social power, considered in itself.

QUESTION. — Every manifestation covers a reality: what makes up the reality of social power?

ANSWER. — It is the collective force.

Q. — *What do you call collective force?*

A. — Every being, by the mere fact that it exists, that it is a reality, not a phantom, possesses in itself, to some degree, the faculty or property, as soon as it finds itself in the presence of other beings, to attract and to be attracted, to repel and to be repelled, to move, to act, to think, to produce, at the very least to resist, by its inertia, influences from without.

This faculty or property is called *force*.

Thus force is inherent, immanent in the being: it is its essential attribute, which alone testifies to its reality. Take away attraction and we are no longer assured of the existence of bodies.

Now, individuals are not alone endowed with force; collectivities also have their own force.

To speak here only of human collectivities, let us suppose that individuals, in whatever numbers one wishes, organized in any manner and for any purpose whatsoever, combine their forces: the resultant of these agglomerated forces, which must not be confused with their sum, constitutes the force or power of the group.

Q. — *Give some examples of this force.*

A. — A workshop, made up of workers whose work converges towards the same goal, which is to obtain such and such a product, possesses, as a workshop or collectivity, a power of its own: the proof is that the product of these individuals thus grouped is far greater than what the sum of their individual products would have been, if they had worked separately.

Similarly, the crew of a ship, a limited partnership, an academy, an orchestra, an army, etc., all these collectivities, more or less skillfully organized, contain power, a power that is synthetic and consequently specific to the group, superior in quality and energy to the sum of the elementary forces of which it is composed.

Moreover, the beings to which we attribute individuality do not enjoy it by any other title than the collectives: they are always groups formed according to a law of relation, in which the force, proportional to the arrangement at least as much as to the mass, is the principle of unity.

From which we conclude, contrary to the old metaphysics:

1. That any manifestation of power being the product of a group or an organism, the intensity and quality of this power can serve, as much as the form, the sound, the taste, the solidity, etc., in the recognition and classification of beings; 2. that, consequently, the collective force being a fact as positive as the individual force, the first perfectly distinct from the second, the collective beings are realities in the same way as the individuals.

Q. — *How does the collective force, an ontological, mechanical, industrial phenomenon, become political power?*

A. — First of all, any human group, family, workshop, battalion, can be regarded as a social embryo; consequently the force in it can, to some extent, form the basis of political power.

But it is not in general from the group such as we have just conceived of it that the city, the State is born. The State results from the union of several groups, different in nature and object, each formed for the exercise of a special function and the creation of a particular product, then united under a common law and in an identical interest. It is a collectivity of a higher order, in which each group, taken as an individual, contributes to the development of a new force, which will be all the greater as the associated functions are more numerous, their harmony more perfect and the provision of forces, on the part of the citizens, more complete.

In short, what produces power in society and which makes the reality of that society itself, is the same thing that produces force in bodies, both organized and unorganized, and which constitutes their reality, namely the relation of the parts. Suppose a society in which all relations should cease between individuals, where each would provide for his own subsistence in absolute isolation: whatever friendship existed between these men, whatever their proximity, their multitude would no longer form an organism; it would lose all reality and all force. Like a body whose molecules have lost the relationship that determines their cohesion, at the slightest shock it would crumble into dust.

Q. — *In the industrial group, the collective force is easily perceived: the increase in production demonstrates it. But in the political group, by what sign can it be recognized? How does it differ from the force of ordinary groups? What is its special product and what is the nature of its effects?*

A. — The vulgar have always thought that they see social power in the deployment of military forces, in the construction of monuments and in the execution of works of public utility.

But it is clear from what has just been said that all these things, however great, are effects of the ordinary collective force: it matters little whether the producing groups, maintained at the expense of the State, are devoted to the prince or work for their own account. It is not there that

we must look for the manifestations of social power.

The active groups that make up the city differ from each other in organization, as well as in their idea and object; the relationship that unites them is no longer so much a relationship of cooperation as a relationship of commutation. The social force will therefore have the character of being essentially commutative; it will be no less real for that.

Q. — Show this by examples .

A. — CURRENCY. — In principle and result, products are exchanged for products. In fact, this exchange, the most important function of society, which moves so many billions of francs in value, so many billions of kilograms in weight, would not take place without the common denominator, both product and sign, called currency. In France, the amount of cash in circulation is, it is believed, about two billion francs, 10 million kilograms of silver or 645,161 kilograms of gold. From the point of view of the goods that this instrument moves, and supposing all business done in cash, it may be said that this quantity of money represents a driving force of several million horsepower. Is it the metal of which the currency is made which possesses this prodigious force? No: it is in public reciprocity, of which the currency is the sign and guarantee.

BILL OF EXCHANGE. — Currency, despite this marvelous power given to it by the relation of commutation among the producing groups, is not yet sufficient for the mass of transactions. We had to make up for it by an ingenious combination, the theory of which is as well known as that of money. The annual production of the country being 42 billion, one can, without exaggeration, carry the sum of the exchanges that this production implies to four times as much, that is to say 48 billion. If business were done in cash, a quantity of currency of at least half, if not equal, would be needed: so that the use of bills of exchange acts in reality as twenty billion francs would do, in specie of gold or silver. Where does this power come from? From the relation of commutation that unites the members of society, groups and individuals.

BANK. — The discounting of bills of exchange is a service for which private banks charge a fairly high price, but for which the Banque de France, which has the privilege of issuing bearer notes and having them accepted everywhere, requires a payment two-thirds less. And it is proven that this payment could be reduced by another nine-tenths. New economy obtained, consequently new force created, because of social relations. Because whoever says economy of costs, says, in all things, reduction of inert force or dead weight, consequently increase of living force.

RENT. — Three causes contribute to the production of rent: land, labor and society. Let us first disregard the land. As for labor, we know how, by the separation of industries and the formation of the working group, production is increased, the number of individuals remaining the same: it

is an effect of the collective force, of which we have spoken above. But this is not the end of the advantages of this division. The more the groups, by multiplying, multiply the relations of commutation in society, the more the number of useful objects and their utility itself increase. Now, this increase in utility, which results, with equal territory and the quantity of the effective service not changing, from the relation of the groups, what is it but rent? Thus, creation of wealth, creation of force.

GENERAL SECURITY. — In an antagonistic population, such as existed in the Middle Ages, the Church may make its threats heard, the courts display their tortures, the kings and their roughnecks pound their spears on the flagstones of their barracks, but security is non-existent. The land is covered with dungeons and fortresses; everyone arms himself and locks himself in; plunder and war are the order of the day. People accuse the barbarity of the time for this disorder, and they are right. But what is barbarism, or rather what produces it? The incoherence of the industrial groups, moreover very few in number, and the isolation in which they act, like the agricultural groups. Here, then, the relation of functions, the solidarity of interests that it creates, the feeling that the producers acquire, the new consciousness that results from it, do more for public order than armies, police and religion. Where are we to find a more real and more sublime power?

These examples suffice to explain what the power to which the social collectivity gives rise is in itself. It is with the help of this power, converted into taxes, that the princes then obtain the gendarmerie and all the apparatus of coercion that serves them to maintain themselves against the attacks of their rivals, often against the wishes of the populations themselves.

Q. — *This changes all the received ideas about the origin of power, about its nature, its organization and its exercise. How can we believe that such ideas could have established themselves everywhere, if really they must be held to be false?*

A. — The opinion of ancient peoples on the nature and origin of social power bears witness to its reality. Power is immanent in society, like attraction in matter, like Justice in the heart of man. This immanence of power in society results from the very notion of society, since it is impossible for units, atoms, monads, molecules, or persons, being agglomerated, not to sustain relations among themselves, not to form a collectivity, from which springs a force. Whence it follows that power in society, like gravity in bodies, life in animals, Justice in consciousness, is a thing *sui generis*, real and objective, the negation of which, society being given, implies contradiction.

By its power, the first and most substantial of all its attributes, the social being therefore makes an act of reality and life; it arises, it enters

into creation, in the same way and under the same conditions of existence as other beings.

This is what the first peoples felt, but expressed in a mystical form, when they related the origin of social power to the gods, of whom their dynasties were daughters. Their naive reason, surer than their senses, refused to admit that society, that the State, that the power that manifests itself in it, were only abstractions, although these things remained invisible.

And this is what the philosophers did not see, when they gave birth to the State from the free will of man, or to put it better from the abdication of his liberty, thus annihilating by their dialectic what religion had taken so much care to establish.

Q. — *An essential condition of power is its unity. How will this unity be ensured if the formative groups remain equal, if none obtains preponderance over the others? Now, if this preponderance is granted, we revert to the old system: what is the point of assigning power to the collectivity?*

A. — The diversity of functions in society no more leads to divergence or plurality in power than the diversity of operations in the workshop leads to diversity of the final product. Power is one by nature, or it does not exist: far from creating it, any competition or prepotence, either of a member or of a fraction of society, would only serve to abolish it. Does the electricity cease to be one, in the battery, because this battery is composed of several elements? All the same the quality of social power varies, its intensity rises or falls, according to the number and the difference of the groups: as for unity, it remains immutable.

Q. — *Every force presupposes a direction: who directs the social power?*

A. — Everyone, which means to no one. Political power resulting from the relationship of several forces, reason first says that these forces must balance each other, so as to form a regular and harmonious whole. Justice intervenes in its turn, to declare, as it did in the general economy, that this balance of forces, conforming to right, demanded by right, is obligatory for all consciousness. It is therefore to Justice that the direction of power belongs; so that order in the collective being, like health, will, etc., in the animal, is not the fruit of any particular initiative: it results from the organization.

Q. — *And what guarantees the observance of justice?*

A. — The very thing that guarantees us that the merchant will respond to the coin, public faith, the certainty of reciprocity, in a word Justice. — Justice is for intelligent and free beings the supreme cause of their determinations. It only needs to be explained and understood in order to be affirmed by everyone and to act. It exists, or the universe is only a phantom and humanity is a monster.

Q. — *So social power, however elevated it may be, does not in itself imply justice?*

A. — No: like property, competition and all the economic forces, all collective forces, power is, by nature, foreign to right; it is force.

Let us say, however, that force being an attribute of all reality, and all force being able to increase indefinitely by association, consciousness acquires all the more energy in men and respect for the Justice of certainty, as the social group is more numerous and better formed: this is why in a civilized society, however corrupt or enslaved it may be, there is always more justice than in a barbaric society.

Q. — *What is meant by division of powers?*

A. — It is the very unity of power, considered in the diversity of the groups that form it. If the observer places himself in the center of the fascicle, and from there traverses the series of groups, the power seems to him divided; as he looks at the resultant of related forces, he sees unity. Any true separation is impossible. This is why the hypothesis of two independent powers, each having their world apart, such as we imagine spiritual power and temporal power today, is contrary to the nature of things, a utopia, an absurdity.

Q. — *What is the proper object of social power?*

A. — It results from its definition: it is to add unceasingly to the power of man, to his wealth and to his well-being, by a superior production of force.

Q. — *Who benefits from the social power, and generally from all collective force?*

A. — To all those who contributed to its formation, in proportion to their contribution.

Q. — *What is the limit of power?*

A. — Power, by nature and purpose, has no other limit than that of the group it represents, the interests and ideas it must serve.

However, by the limit of power, or powers, or more exactly the limit of the action of power, we mean the attributive determination of the groups and sub-groups of which it is the general expression. Each of these groups and sub-groups, in fact, up to the last term of the social series which is the individual, representing vis-à-vis others, in the function assigned to him, the social power, it follows that the limitation of power, or better of its distribution, regularly accomplished under the law of justice, is nothing other than the formula for the increase of liberty itself.

Q. — *What distinction do you make between politics and economics?*

A. — At base, these are two different ways of conceiving the same thing. One does not imagine that men need, for their liberty and their well-being, anything other than force; for the sincerity of their relations, anything other than Justice. Economics presupposes these two conditions:

what more could politics give?

Under current conditions, politics is the art, equivocal and chancy, of creating order in a society where all the laws of the economy are misunderstood, all balance destroyed, all freedom suppressed, all conscience warped, all collective force converted into a monopoly.

## INSTRUCTION II.

**Of the appropriation of the collective forces, and the corruption of social power.**

*Q. — Could it be that a phenomenon as considerable as collective force, which changes the face of ontology, which almost touches on physics, has for so many centuries eluded the attention of philosophers? How have public reason, on the one hand, and personal interest, on the other, allowed themselves to be deceived for so long, regarding a thing that interests them to such a high degree?*

A. — Nothing comes except with time, in science as in nature. Everything begins with the infinitely small, with a germ, invisible at first, that develops little by little and tends to infinity. So that the persistence of errors is in proportion to the greatness of truths. We should therefore not be surprised if the social power, inaccessible to the senses in spite of its reality, seemed to the first men an emanation from the divine Being, as such the worthy object of their religion. The less they were able, through analysis, to realize this, the more vivid was the feeling among them, very different in this from the philosophers who, coming later, made the State a restriction of the liberty of the citizens, a mandate of their good pleasure, a nothingness. Even today, economists barely name the collective force. After two thousand years of political mysticism, we have had two thousand years of nihilism: I don't know how else to name the theories that have reigned since Aristotle.

*Q. — What has been, for peoples and for states, the consequence of this backwardness in the knowledge of the collective being?*

A. — The appropriation of all the collective forces and the corruption of social power; in less severe terms, an arbitrary economy and an artificial constitution of public power.

*Q. — Explain yourself on these two counts.*

A. — By the constitution of the family, the father is naturally invested with the ownership and direction of the force resulting from the family group. Soon this force is increased by the labor of slaves and mercenaries, whose number it helps to increase. The family becomes a tribe: the father, preserving his dignity, sees the power at his disposal grow accordingly. It is the starting point, the type of all analogous appropriations. Wherever a



group of men is formed, or a collective power, there is formed a patriciate, a lordship.

Several families, several companies, coming together, form a city: the presence of a superior force is immediately felt, the object of everyone's ambition. Who will become its custodian, beneficiary, organ? Usually, it will be the one of the chiefs who has in his lordship the most children, relatives, allies, customers, slaves, employees, beasts of burden, capital, lands, who, in a word, has the greatest collective strength. It is a law of nature that the greater force absorbs and assimilates the lesser forces, and that domestic power becomes a claim to political power: so there is no competition for the crown except among the strong. We know what became of the dynasty of Saul, founded by Samuel in defiance of this law, and what trouble King John, nicknamed *Sans-Terre*, had in asserting himself on the throne of England. He would never have triumphed over the resistance of the barons had it not been for the charter that he granted them, which became the foundation of English liberties. Without departing from our history, when the mayor of the palace, Pépin de Herstal or Hugues le Blanc, had become more powerful, in men and in fiefs, than the king, he was made king, in spite of the ecclesiastical consecration that protected the suzerain. In 1848, when Louis-Napoleon was elected President of the Republic, the people of the countryside believed him to have a fortune of twenty billion.

Moreover, the alienation of the collective force, besides being the result of ignorance, seems to have been a means of preparing the races. To shape the primitive man, a little savage, for social life, a long trituration of bodies and souls was, it must be believed, necessary. The education of humanity being done by a kind of mutual teaching, the law of things wanted the instructors to enjoy certain prerogatives. In the future, equality will consist in each being able in turn to exercise mastery, just as he will have endured discipline.

Q. — *What you say clearly shows how the great social disinheritance was consummated, how inequality and misery became the scourge of civilization. But how are we to explain this resignation of consciences, this submission of wills, which for so long has hardly been disturbed by a few revolts of slaves, fanatics and proletarians?*

A. — The ancient religion of power would explain the fact up to a certain point. We submitted to power because we regarded it as coming from the gods, in a word, because we worshipped it. But this religion is lost: dynastic legitimacy, seigneurial rights and divine right are no more than odious words, which have been replaced by the haughty principle of the sovereignty of the people. However, the phenomenon persists: the men of our days do not seem less ready to submit to the authority and the exploitation of a single person than their fathers did in the past. Flagrant

proof of the vanity of theological and metaphysical theories, whose principles can alternately perish or assert themselves, without the facts of which they were supposed to be the cause, or which they were supposed to prevent, ceasing to occur.

On this sad subject, which misanthropy and skepticism take advantage of, a banal excuse for so much betrayal and cowardice, the theory of collective force provides a peremptory answer, which singularly raises the morality of the masses, while leaving to their infamy the oppressors and their accomplices.

By the grouping of individual forces, and by the relation of groups, the whole nation forms a body: it is a real being, of a superior order, whose movement involves all existence, all fortune. The individual is immersed in society; he comes under this high power, from which he would separate only to fall into nothingness. However great, indeed, the appropriation of collective forces, however intense the tyranny, it is obvious that a part of the social benefit always remains with the masses and that, in short, it is better for each one to remain in the group than to depart from it.

It is therefore not in reality the exploiter, it is not the tyrant whom the workers and the citizens follow: seduction and terror have little to do with them. It is the social power that they consider, a power that is ill-defined in their thinking, but outside of which they feel that they cannot subsist; a power whose seal the prince, whoever he may be, shows them, and which they tremble to break by their revolt.

This is why any usurper of public power never fails to cover his crime with the pretext of public safety, to call himself father of the country, restorer of the nation, as if the social force drew its existence from him, while he is for it only an effigy, a stamp and, if one can say so, a commercial reason. Also he will fall with the same ease as he established himself, on the day when his presence seems to compromise the great interest that he pretended to defend: that is, in the final analysis, the cause of the fall of all governments.

Q. — *The social power constituted in a principate, appropriated by a dynasty or exploited by a caste, what becomes of its relations with the nation?*

A. — These relations are completely reversed. In the natural order, power is born of society, it is the resultant of all the particular forces grouped together for work, defense and justice. According to the empirical conception suggested by the alienation of power, it is society, on the contrary, that is born of it; it is its generator, creator, author; it is superior to it: so that the prince, from a simple agent of the republic, as truth wills it, is made its sovereign and, like God, its judge.

The consequence is that the prince, occupied with his personal domination, instead of ensuring and developing social power, creates for

himself, through the army, the police and taxation, a particular force, capable of resisting any attack from within and of compelling the nation to obedience if necessary: it is this princely force that will henceforth be called the power. Napoleon III, like Napoleon I, speaks of *my army, my fleet, my ministers, my prefects, my government*; and he is right to say so, for none of this is any longer for the nation; it is all, on the contrary, against the nation.

Q. — *How, then, is justice conceived?*

A. — As an emanation of the power, which is the very negation of Justice. Indeed, in the normal condition of society, Justice dominates the power, from the balance and the distribution of which it makes a law. Under the dynastic regime, the power dominates Justice, which becomes an attribute, a function of authority. Hence the subordination of Justice to the *reason of State*, the last word of the old politics, the condemnation of all the governments that follow it, which Christianity, by adding to it the *reason of salvation*, has not sanctified. Let princes and priests quarrel over the exercise of power: neither is worthy of it, because they all disregard the supremacy of right.

Q. — *How, in this system of usurpation, are the relations of citizens determined with regard to persons, services, and goods?*

A. — As Justice is before power, so it will be in the nation: that is to say that, Justice being regarded as an emanation of force, both human and divine, force becomes in everything and for the everything the measure of right, and that society, instead of resting on the balance of forces, has inequality as its principle, that is to say the negation of order.

Q. — *What can be, after all this, the social and political organization?*

A. — It is easy to see that. The collective forces appropriated, public power converted into an appanage, individuals and families, already unequal through natural chance, become more so through civilization: society is constituted as a hierarchy. This is expressed by the dynastic religion and the oath of fidelity to the imperial person. In this system it is a principle that Justice, or what is called by this name, always leans on the side of the superior against the inferior: which, under the appearance of an ineluctable autocracy, is instability itself.

And, sad thing, everyone here is an accomplice of the prince, the spirit of equality that Justice creates in man being neutralized or abolished by the contrary prejudice, which the alienation of all collective force renders invincible.

Q. — *How, in this travesty of Justice, of society and of power, is unity preserved?*

A. — The nature of things dictates that unity results from the balance of forces, made obligatory by Justice, which thus becomes the true sovereign, and which, in this capacity, gives instructions to all

participants in public power . Now unity will consist in the absorption of every faculty, of all interests, of all initiative in the person of the prince: this is social death. And as society can neither die nor do without unity, antagonism is established between society and power, until catastrophe occurs.

Q. — *In this state of things, the lessening of power has always seemed a guarantee for society: what does such a reduction consist of, and what can be its use?*

A. — Apart from what the prince possesses by way of patrimony or private domain; apart also from the command of the armies, the collection of taxes and the appointment of civil servants, the principle is that he leaves the surplus, land, mines, crops, industries, transport, banks, commerce, education, to the free enjoyment, absolute disposition, unbridled competition or immoral coalition of the privileged class. What is of the economic domain is not supposed to concern him; he must not meddle in anything. In a word, the abandonment to a caste of feudatories of the true social force, that is what is called the limit of power, which is adorned with the name of public liberties. An absurd transaction, which no government is in control of, and which will soon produce a new ferment of revolution. Today, in France, the emperor is master of everything, but for that very reason he is in ever-increasing danger of losing everything: what the future, in one manner or another, will demonstrate.

Q. — *Thus conditioned, the power is without object.*

A. — No: the object of the power is precisely then to maintain this system of contradictions, while waiting for Justice, and as an inverted image of Justice.

Q. — *Give the synonymy of power.*

A. — The artificial constitution of the power having altered the notion, language must have been affected by it: here, as everywhere, words are the key to history.

Considered as the prerogative of the prince, as his establishment, his profession, his trade, social power was said to be the *State*. Like the people of the nation, the king says: my state, or my estates, for my domain, my establishment. — The Revolution, transferring the property of the power from the prince to the country, preserved this word, synonymous today with *res publica*, republic.

As the personnel of the power is supposed to govern the nation and preside over its destinies, we give to this personnel and to the power itself the name of *government*, an expression as false as it is ambitious. In principle, society is ungovernable; it only obeys Justice, on pain of death. In fact, the so-called governments, liberal and absolute, with their arsenal of laws, decrees, edicts, statutes, plebiscites, regulations and ordinances,

have never governed anyone or anything. Living an entirely instinctive life, acting according to invincible necessities, under the pressure of prejudices and circumstances that they do not understand, most often letting themselves go with the flow of society, which from time to time breaks them down, they can hardly, by their initiative, make anything but disorder. And the proof is that they all end miserably.

Finally, if we consider in the power that eminent dignity that makes it superior to every individual, to every community, we call it *sovereign*: a dangerous expression, from which it is to be hoped that democracy will preserve itself in the future. Whatever the power of the collective being, it does not therefore constitute, in the eyes of the citizen, a sovereignty: it would almost be worth saying that a machine in which a hundred thousand spindles turn is the sovereign of the hundred thousand spinners that it represented. We have said it, Justice alone commands and governs, Justice, which creates power, by making the balance of forces an obligation for all. Between the power and the individual, therefore, there is only right: all sovereignty is repugnant; it is the denial of Justice, it is religion.

### INSTRUCTION III.

**Of the forms of government and its evolution during the pagan-Christian period.**

*Q. — Thus the history of nations and the revolutions of states would be nothing but the play of economic forces, sometimes thwarted and disturbed, according to the views of the prince, the egoism of the great and the prejudices of the people, sometimes favored and harmonized according to right?*

*A. — It is so: just add that arbitrariness must come to an end, Justice always bringing society back to equilibrium, and must sooner or later definitively triumph over subversive influences.*

*Q. — During this long period, which one could, in a sense, call revolutionary, since the State never ceased to go from revolution to revolution, what were the forms of power?*

*A. — Depending on whether the government is supposed to belong to one, to several, or to all, it is called monarchy, aristocracy or democracy. Often also a compromise takes place between these elements, and the result is a mixed government, which is supposed for that to be more solid, but which does not sustain itself better than the others.*

In another sense, we call *forms* of government the conditions to which the existence of the power is subject. Thus the Charter of 1830, after having fixed the principles of public right, defines in a few chapters the

forms of government, that is to say what concerns the king, the chambers, the ministers and the judicial order.

The idea of setting down the conditions of power in writing dates back a long time: the Jews attributed their constitution to God, who would have given it to Moses, under the name of *Berith*, alliance, pact, charter, or testament.

These constitutions are all based on the preconceived idea that society does not walk alone, possessing in itself neither virtuality nor harmony; the power as well as the direction coming to it from above, through the intermediary of a dynasty, a church or a senate, one could not exercise too much prudence in the organization of power, the choice of the prince, the election of senators, the legislative and administrative formalities, the jurisdiction, etc.

Q. — *Which of these governmental forms deserves preference?*

A. — None: apart from what they derive from the nature of things, which makes them the expression of the genius of the people, their faults are the same; this is why history shows them continually supplanting each other, without society being able to find stability anywhere.

Consecration of the principle of inequality by the lack of balance in economic transactions;

Appropriation of the collective forces;

Establishment of a fictitious power in place of the real power of society;

Abolition of Justice by the reason of state; .

The direction left to the arbitrary will of the prince, if the State is monarchical, and, in any other hypothesis, to the cabals of the parties;

Continual tendency towards the absorption of society by the State:

These, during the preparatory period, are the foundations on which the political order is constituted, whatever denomination it takes and whatever alleged guarantees it gives itself.

Q. — *Whoever says democracy, however, says the restoration of the nation in the ownership and enjoyment of its forces: how is it that you seem to condemn this form of government like the others?*

A. — As long as democracy has not risen to the true conception of power, it can only be, as it has been until now, nothing but a lie, a shameful and short-lived transition, sometimes from aristocracy to monarchy, sometimes from monarchy to aristocracy. The Revolution preserved this word as a tooting stone; we have made of it for seventy years a stone of scandal.

Q. — *So, unless there is a revolution in ideas, all political stability, all social morality, all liberty and happiness for man and citizen are impossible?*

A. — It is not only history that reveals it, nor justice and equality that

show it to us as their inevitable sanction; it is economic science, in its most elementary, most positive, most real aspect, that proves it. The collective forces appropriated, the social power compressed and alienated, the government oscillates from demagoguery to despotism and from despotism to demagoguery, sowing ruins and multiplying catastrophes, in almost regular periods.

Q. — *Is there nothing more for the philosopher to gather from this study of the formation, increase and decline of the ancient states?*

A. — They were, by their very inorganism, the revelation of the new State and, as it were, an embryogenesis of the Revolution. What progress, indeed, what idea do we not owe them?

Development of the economic forces, among which, in the first rank, are the collective forces;

Discovery of the social power in the relation of all these forces;

Reason of the governmental forms, variable according to race, soil, climate, industry, relative importance of the constituent elements, serving to mark the center of political gravity in each country;

Idea of universal solidarity or humanitarian force, emerging sometimes from the struggle, sometimes from the agreement of states;

Idea of a balance of economic and social forces, attempted under the name of balance of powers;

Elaboration of right, superior expression of man and society;

A broader intelligence of history, to begin again from the point of view of this physiology of the collective being; so many centuries of an apparently negative civilization, because it was the enemy of equality, becoming centuries of affirmation, showing the genesis and the balance of forces:

This is what philosophical thought discovers beneath the revolutions and cataclysms; here, for the constitution of the order to come, is the fruit of so many disappointments and pains.

Q. — *It is perpetual peace that you announce, after so many others. But don't you think that war, having its principle in the unfathomable depths of the human heart, the war that all religions advocate, which a trifle is enough to initiate, like a duel, is incoercible, indestructible?*

A. — War, in which the Christian worships the judgment of God, which so-called rationalists attribute to the ambition of princes and to popular passions, war has for its cause the want of equilibrium between economic forces, and the inadequacy of written, civil, public and international right, which serves as a rule. Any nation in which the economic balance is violated, the forces of production constituted a monopoly, and the public power handed over to the discretion of the exploiters, is, *ipso facto*, a nation at war with the rest of the human race. The same principle of monopolization and inequality that presided over its

political and economic constitution pushes it to monopolize, *per fas et nefas*, all the wealth of the globe, to the enslavement of all peoples: there is no better established truth in the world. Let there be a balance, let Justice come and all war is impossible. There is no longer any strength to sustain it; that would be to suppose an action of nothingness against reality, a contradiction.

Q. — *You explain everything by collective forces, by their diversity and their inequality, by their alienation, by the conflict that this alienation raises, by their insensible but victorious tendency, thanks to the help of an indefectible Justice, to balance. What portion of influence do you give, in human events, to the initiative of heads of state, to their advice, to their genius, to their virtues and their crimes? What portion, in a word, to free will?*

A. — It was a priest who said it: *the man acts, and God leads him*. The *man* is absolute, inexperienced, blind will, to whom the empire of the earth is promised; *God* is social legislation, which unwittingly directs this untamed will, which enlightens it little by little, and in the end makes it similar to itself. Man's part in historical action is therefore, in the first place, force, spontaneity, combat; then the recognition of the law that leads him, which is none other than the balance of his liberty, Justice. The free being in struggling manifests, by its oscillations, the formula of its movement; it is this formula that constitutes civilization and takes the place of providence for us: that is the whole mystery. Let the day break and this whole staff of rulers who swarm in the darkness disappear.

Q. — *What is theocracy?*

A. — A symbolism of social force.

Among all peoples, the feeling of this force gave rise to the national religion, under the influence of which the domestic religions gradually vanished. Everywhere the god was this collective force, personified and worshipped under a mystical name. Religion thus serving as the basis of government and justice, logic would have it that theology became the soul of politics, that consequently the Church took the place of the State, the priesthood that of the nobles, and the sovereign pontiff that of the emperor or the king. Such is the theocratic idea. The product of Christian spiritualism, it waited to appear on the day when, all nations uniting in a common faith, the preponderance would be acquired in souls for the things of heaven over the things of earth. But it was a dream of a moment, an attempt as soon aborted as conceived, which was always to remain in the state of theory. The Church, placing the reality of her ideal in heaven, above and outside the social collectivity, thereby denied the immanence of a force in this collectivity, just as she denied in man the immanence of Justice; and it was this force, of which the princes remained the sole depositaries and organs, that caused the Church to be excluded.



Q. — *What improvement has Christianity brought to the government of peoples?*

A. — None: it only changed the protocol. The ancient noble, patrician, warrior or sheik, affirmed his usurpation by virtue of necessity; the noble Christian affirms it in the name of Providence. For the former, nobility was a fact of nature; for the second, it is a fact of grace. But on one side as on the other royalty supported the privilege of nobility, religion consecrated it. Hence the pretensions of the Catholic Church to sovereignty, and her attempt at theocracy, energetically repulsed by the princes, and soon abandoned by the theologians themselves. A transaction took place: the separation of the spiritual and the temporal was erected into an axiom of public right; a new ferment of discord was stirred up among the nations. Half pagan, half Christian, politics dragged itself into tyranny; Justice was sacrificed more than ever, and liberty compromised.

#### INSTRUCTION IV.

##### Constitution of the social power by the Revolution.

Q. — *In what terms did the Revolution express itself on the reality of the social power?*

A. — There is no express statement in this regard. But just as much as the Revolution rejects the ancient mysticism, which placed Justice and power in heaven, so much is there for it insufficiency in the nominalism that followed, which tends to make of the collective being and of the power that is in it, like Justice, words, conceptions. There is not an idea, not an act of the Revolution that can be explained with this metaphysics. All that it has produced, all that it promises, would be an empty edifice and a new disappointment of transcendence, if it did not suppose in society an effectiveness of power, consequently a reality of existence that integrates it with all creation, with all being. Moreover, the silence of the Revolution on the nature of power concerns only the first two acts of this great drama: are we not today, especially since 1848, in the full eruption of revolutionary ideas? And don't science and philosophy join induction in confirming our thesis?

Q. — *Can you, in the absence of texts, give your reasons?*

A. — Science tells us that every body is a compound of which no analysis can find the last elements, held together by an attraction, a force.

What is the force? It is, like substance, like the atoms it holds together, something inaccessible to the senses, which intelligence grasps only through its manifestations, and as the expression of a relations.

The RELATION, this, in the final analysis, is what all phenomenality, all reality, all force, all existence is reduced to. Just as the idea of being

envelops that of force and relation, so that of relation inevitably presupposes force and substance, becoming and being. So that wherever the mind grasps a relation, experience discovers nothing else, we must conclude from this relation the presence of a force, and consequently a reality.

The Revolution denies divine right, in other words the supernatural origin of social power. This means, in principle, that if a being does not possess its power of being in itself, it cannot exist; indeed, that, the power that is revealed in society having for expression human relations, its nature is human; consequently the collective being is not a phantom, an abstraction, but an existence.

In the face of divine right, the Revolution therefore posits the sovereignty of the people, the unity and indivisibility of the Republic. Words devoid of meaning, fit only to serve as a mask for the most appalling tyranny, and sooner or later belied by the event, if they do not refer to the higher organism, formed by the relationship of industrial groups, and to the commutative power that results from them.

The Revolution, renewing civil right as well as political right, places in labor, and only in labor, the justification of property. It denies that property, founded on the good pleasure of man, and considered as a manifestation of the pure self, is legitimate. This is why it abolished ecclesiastical property, not based on labor, and converted, until further notice, the profit of the priest into wages. Now, what is property, thus balanced by labor and legitimized by right? The realization of individual power. But social power is made up of all the individual powers: therefore it also expresses a subject. The Revolution could not assert its realism more energetically.

Under the regime of divine right, the law is a commandment: it does not have its principle in man. The Revolution, through the organ of Montesquieu, one of its fathers, changed this notion: it defined the law as the *relation of things*, *a fortiori* the relation of persons, that is to say of faculties or functions, giving birth through their coordination to the social being.

Coming to the government, the Revolution formally says that it must be constituted according to the double principle of the *division* of powers and their *ponderation*. Now, what is a division of powers? The same as what the economists call division of labor, which is nothing but a particular aspect of collective force. As for ponderation, so little understood, moreover, I need not say that it is the condition of existence of organized beings, for whom the absence of equilibrium leads to sickness and death.

It is useless to recall the acts, more or less regular, accomplished since 1789 by virtue of this revolutionary ontology: administrative

centralization, unity of weights and measures, creation of the ledger, foundation of the central schools, establishment of the Banque de France, before our eyes the merging of the railways, pending their exploitation by the State and their conversion into a system of workers' societies. All these facts, and many others, bear witness to the realistic thinking that presides over our public right. Thanks to all these achievements, France has become a great organism, whose power of assimilation would lead the world, if it were not deprived by those who exploit and govern it.

Q. — *How is it that for seventy years the application of these ideas has made so little progress? How, instead of the free state, identical and adequate to society itself, have we preserved the feudal, royal, imperial, military, dictatorial state?*

A. — This is due to two causes, henceforth easy to appreciate: one is that the balance of products and services has not ceased to be a *desideratum* of the economy; the other, that the appropriation of collective forces has been maintained, developed, as if it were a natural right.

Hence this whole series of inevitable consequences: in the nation, preservation of the ancient prejudice of inequality of conditions and fortunes, formation of a capitalist feudalism in place of noble feudalism, recrudescence of the ecclesiastical spirit and return to the practices of divine right; in government, substitution of the bascule system for the weighting of forces, concentration leading to despotism, monstrous development of military force and the police, continuation of Machiavellian policy, destruction of justice by the reason of state and, to conclude, more and more frequent revolutions.

Q. — *What do you call a bascule system?*

A. — The bascule, also called *doctrine*, is in politics what Malthus' theory is in economics. As the Malthusians claim to establish equilibrium in the population by mechanically hampering the generative function; in the same way the doctrinaires make the balance of powers by transpositions of majority, electoral reorganization, corruption, terrorism. The constitutional machine, as we have seen it operate since 1794, with its distinctions of upper and lower houses, of legislative and executive power, of upper classes and middle classes, of large and small colleges, of responsible ministers and irresponsible royalty, was inevitably a bascule system.

Q. — *One could not explain better, in what touches the reality of the social being, the intimate thought of the Revolution. But the Revolution is also, it is above all, liberty: in this system of balances, what becomes of it?*

A. — This question brings us back to that of the balancing of forces that we have just raised.

Just as several men, by grouping their efforts, produce a force of collectivity, superior in quality and intensity to the sum of their respective

forces; in the same way several working groups, placed in a relationship of exchange, engender a power of a higher order, which we have considered to be specifically social power.

For this social power to act in its fullness, for it to give all the fruit that its nature promises, the forces or functions of which it is composed must be in equilibrium. Now, this equilibrium cannot be the effect of an arbitrary determination; it must result from the balancing of forces, acting on each other in complete liberty, and making with each other an equation. Which supposes that, the balance or proportional average of each force being known, everyone, individuals and groups, will take it as a measure of their right and submit to it.

Thus the public order depends on the reason of the citizen; thus this social sovereignty, which at first appeared to us as the resultant of individual and collective forces, now presents itself as the expression of their liberty and their justice, attributes par excellence of the moral being.

This is why the Revolution, abolishing the corporative system, the privileges of mastery and the whole feudal hierarchy, has declared as the principle of public right the liberty of industry and commerce; this is why it has raised above all the councils of state, parliamentary and ministerial deliberations, the freedom of the press, universal control, the jurisdiction of the citizen over every individual and over every thing, which it proclaimed by instituting the jury.

Liberty was nothing: it is everything, since order results from its self-balancing.

*Q. — If liberty is everything, of what does government consist?*

To get an idea of this, let us look at the budget and lay down a principle.

The object of government is to protect liberty and to enforce justice. Now, liberty and justice tend by nature to be gratuitous: they take care, so to speak, of themselves. Like labor, exchange and credit, they have only to defend themselves against the parasites that, under the pretext of protecting and representing them, absorb them.

What does the liberty of commerce cost? Nothing; perhaps an additional cost for the maintenance of markets, ports, roads, canals, railways, motivated by the greater affluence of merchants.

What do liberty of industry, liberty of the press, all the liberties cost? Again, nothing, except a few measures of order relating to statistics, patents of invention and improvement, copyrights, etc.

In short, the old state, by the anomaly of its position, tends to complicate its resources, which means to increase its costs indefinitely; the new state, by its liberal nature, tends to reduce its own indefinitely: such is, expressed in budgetary language, their difference.

It is therefore enough, in order to have free, normal, cheap government, to cut off, reduce or modify, in the present budget, all the

articles carried in the opposite direction to the principles that we have established. That's the whole system: there's nothing else to worry about.

*Q. — Give an overview of the new budget.*

*A. —* Let us suppose the Revolution accomplished, peace assured without by the federation of the peoples, stability guaranteed within by the balance of values and services, by the organization of labor, and by the reintegration of the people into the property of their collective forces.

*Public debt. —* None. It implies a contradiction that in a society where services are balanced, fortunes leveled, credit organized on the principle of mutuality, the State can contract debts, as if this society had something other than its instruments of production and its products. No one can become his own lender, other than through labor. What the old government is incapable of doing, the new democracy will always do: it will provide for its extraordinary expenses by extraordinary labor. Justice commands it, and it will never cost a quarter of what the capitalists demand.

*Pensions. —* None. Every individual, in whatever category of service he belongs, owes labor all his life, except in the case of sickness, infirmity or mutilation. In this case his subsistence is regulated by the law of general insurance, and credited to the account of his corporation.

*Civil list. —* None.

*Senate. —* None. The duality of the chambers is due to the distinction of classes or, what is the same thing, to the divergence of interests, marked by these two words: labor and capital. In the democracy these two interests are merged. The Senate, an inert body in the empire, would be an outrage to the Republic.

*Council of State. —* None. The Council of State overlaps with the legislative body and the ministers.

*Legislative corps, or assembly of representatives: it costs today about two millions. Accept this number.*

Alongside the Legislative corps, an office of jurisprudence will be created, an office of historical, legal, economic, political and statistical information, to enlighten the representatives in their work. The Court of Cassation is part of this office. Expense to be added to the previous one.

Now, the public debt, consolidated and for life, forming with the expenses of war, police, dynasty and aristocracy, the most unproductive part of the budget, that is to say approximately one billion to 4,200 millions, one can judge, by this economy, what power of order is found in liberty and justice.

*Service of Ministers. —* The legislative power is not distinguished from the executive power. The representatives of the nation, being the delegated heads of the various public services, industrial groups, corporations and territorial districts, are all, in fact, real ministers.

These ministers, whom the parliamentary monarchy found so difficult to hold together, although their number did not exceed seven or eight, now numbering two hundred and fifty or three hundred, appointed by all the members of their respective categories and perpetually revocable, form, by their meeting, a national convention, a council of ministers, a council of state, a legislature, a sovereign court. As for their agreement, notwithstanding the heat of the deliberations, it is guaranteed by that of the very interests that they represent.

Q. — *And what guarantees the agreement of interests?*

A. — As we have said, their mutual balancing.

Q. — *Pass on to the budget of the ministries?*

A. — The expenses of the ministries are of two kinds, according to whether they form part of the general expenses of the nation, or whether they must be reported to the service of which the minister or deputy is the organ. In the first case, they must be imputed to the budget of the State: such are the expenses of the Legislative Body itself, of the monuments; in the second they fall to the charge of the groups, corporations and territorial circumscriptions: such are the expenses of the railroads, the budget of the communes, etc.

This distinction established, we can proceed to the settlement.

*Justice.* — The judicial hierarchy reduced to its simplest expression, the jury organized for civil as well as for criminal cases, the costs of justice consist of: 1. the salaries of the judges, directing the hearings and applying the law; 2. that of the organs of the public ministry, charged with supervising the observance of the laws throughout the country. The first is the responsibility of the municipalities, which choose the judge; the second is charged to the State budget.

*Interior.* — Assembled, in part in the public ministry, which oversees but does not administer; in part in the communes, in part in other ministries.

*Police.* — At the expense of the localities.

*Cults.* — None. No more Church, no more temples. Justice is the apotheosis of humanity. The former budget for worship passes to the sanitary service and to public education.

*Public education.* — Part at the expense of the localities, part at the expense of the State.

*Finances.* — Assembled at the Central Bank.

*Collection of taxes.* — The creation of public warehouses in the cantons and arrondissements for the regularization of markets will make it possible everywhere to receive taxes or rents in kind, which amounts to saying in labor, of all forms of taxation the least burdensome, the least vexatious, the one that lends itself least to the inequality of distribution and to the exaggeration of demands.

There is no need to pursue this detail any further. Everyone can give himself the pleasure of it, and judge for himself, by criticizing the budget, what would become of the government, in a nation like France, if we applied to it this great principle, at once moral, governmental and fiscal: That Justice and Liberty subsist by themselves; that they are essentially gratuitous, and that they tend in all their operations to suppress their protectors as well as their enemies.

#### INSTRUCTION V.

##### Questions for discussion.

Q. — *What would you do the day after a revolution?*

A. — It is useless to repeat. The principles of the economic and political constitution of society are known: that is enough. It is up to the people, their representatives, to do their duty, taking advice from the circumstances.

The question of the revolutionary future has always preoccupied the old parties, whose whole thought is to stop the *cataclysm*, as they say, by *cutting their losses*. It is for this purpose that a number of aristocratic, Catholic, dynastic and even republican publications have appeared over the past six years, the authors of which ask nothing better than to pass as enemies of despotism and devoted to liberty. It would be a great naivety to take such manifestos for models, and to play with programs. Let the people understand the meaning and scope of this word, *Justice*, and take it by the hand: this is their revolutionary future. As for the execution, the idea being acquired, the execution is infallible.

Q. — *What do you think of dictatorship?*

A. — What good is it? If the purpose of the dictatorship is to found equality through principles and institutions, it is useless: it takes no one other than those of the 20 arrondissements of Paris, supported by the people of the 86 departments, fulfilling its mandate in three times twenty-four hours. If, on the contrary, the dictatorship has no other end than to avenge the insults of the party, to put the rich to contribution and to quell a frivolous multitude, it is tyranny: we have nothing more to say about it.

Dictatorship has always existed; it has more popular favor than ever. It is the secret dream of a few madmen, the strongest argument that the democracy can provide for the preservation of the imperial regime.

D — *What is your opinion on universal suffrage?*

A. — As all constitutions have done since 1789, universal suffrage is the strangulation of public conscience, the suicide of the sovereignty of the people, the apostasy of the Revolution. Such a system of suffrages may well, on occasion and despite all the precautions taken against it, give

power a negative vote, such as in the last vote in Paris (1857): it is incapable of producing an idea. To make universal suffrage intelligent, moral, democratic, it is necessary, after having organized the balance of services and ensured, by free discussion, the independence of the votes, to make the citizens vote by categories of functions, in accordance with the principle of collective force that forms the basis of society and the state.

Q. — *What will be the policy towards foreign countries?*

A. — It is very simple. The Revolution must go around the world: the peoples are functions of each other, just like, in the State, industrial groups and individuals. As long as there is not a balance on the globe, the Revolution can believe itself in danger.

Q. — *Will the Revolution, supposing it is made in Paris or Berlin, declare war on the whole world?*

A. — The Revolution does not act in the manner of the old governmental, aristocratic or dynastic principle. It is right, the balance of forces, equality. It respects neither cities nor races. It has no conquests to pursue, no nations to enslave, no frontiers to defend, no fortresses to build, no armies to feed, no laurels to gather, no preponderance to maintain. Its policy abroad consists in preaching by example. Let it be realized at one point and the world will follow it. The power of its economic institutions, the gratuitousness of its credit, the brilliance of its thought, are sufficient for it to convert the universe.

Q. — *The old society will not yield without resistance: who are the natural allies of the Revolution?*

A. — Every alliance of people to people is determined by the idea or the interest that dominates it. Does capital rule? We have the English alliance. Despotism? We have the Russian alliance. The dynastic spirit? We have the Spanish marriages and the wars of succession. The Revolution has for allies all those who suffer oppression and exploitation: let it appear, and the universe extends its arms to it.

Q. — *What do you think of the European equilibrium?*

A. — Glorious thought of Henri IV, of which the Revolution alone can give the true formula. It is universal federalism, the supreme guarantee of all liberty and all rights, which must, without soldiers or priests, replace Christian and feudal society.

Q. — *Federalism finds little favor in France: couldn't you render your idea in other terms?*

A. — To change the names of things is to come to terms with error. Whatever Jacobin prudence may have said, the real obstacle to despotism is in federative union. How did the Macedonian kings become masters of Greece? By being declared chiefs of the amphictyonie, that is to say by replacing the confederation of the Hellenic peoples. Why, after the fall of the Roman Empire, could not Catholic Europe be reformed into a single



state? Because the mother thought of the invasion was independence, that is, the negation of unity. Why did Switzerland remain a republic? Because it is, like the United States, a confederation. What was the Convention itself? Its name proves it, an assembly of the federated. What is true of states is equally true of cities and districts within the same state.

Q. — *In this federation, where the city is as much as the province, the province as much as the empire, the empire as much as the continent, where all the groups are politically equal, what becomes of the nationalities?*

A. — The nationalities will be so much the better assured as the federal principle has received a more complete application. In this respect, we can say that for thirty years public opinion has been on the wrong track.

The feeling for the homeland is like that for the family, for territorial possession, for the industrial corporation, an indestructible element of the consciousness of peoples. Let us even say, if you will, that the notion of homeland implies that of independence and sovereignty, so that the two terms, state and nation, are adequate to each other and can be considered as synonyms. But it is far from the recognition of nationalities to the idea of using them for certain restorations that have become useless, not to say dangerous.

What is called today the re-establishment of Poland, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, is basically nothing other than the unitary constitution of vast territories, on the model of the great powers, whose centralization weighs so heavily on the peoples; it is a monarchical imitation for the profit of democratic ambition; it is not liberty, and still less progress. Those who talk so much about restoring these national unities have little taste for individual liberties. Nationalism is the pretext they use to evade economic revolution. They pretend not to see that it is politics that has made the nations they claim to emancipate fall under tutelage. Why then make these nations start again, under the banner of the reason of state, a test already completed? Would the Revolution amuse itself, like the Emperor Napoleon I, cutting and recutting the Germanic Confederation, reorganizing political agglomerations, creating a unitary Poland and Italy? The Revolution, by making men equal and free through the ponderation of forces and the balance of services, excluded these immense agglomerations, the object of the ambition of potentates, but pledges of an insurmountable servitude for the people.

Q. — *Does the dynastic principle have any chance of rising again?*

A. — It is certain that the world has not hitherto believed that liberty and dynasty were incompatible things. The old French monarchy, by summoning the Estates General, initiated the Revolution; the constitution of 1794, imposed by the National Assembly, the charter of 1814, imposed

by the Senate, that of 1830, corrected by the 221, bear witness to the country's desire to reconcile the monarchical principle with democracy. The nation found various advantages in this: it seemed to reconcile tradition with progress; the habits of command were met, the need for unity; the peril of presidencies, dictatorships and oligarchies was averted. When in 1830 Lafayette defined the new order of things as a *monarchy surrounded by republican institutions*, he conceived what analysis has revealed to us, the identity of the political order and the economic order. The true republic consisting in the balance of forces and services, it was pleasant to see a young dynasty hold this balance and guarantee its correctness. Finally, the example of England, although equality is unknown there, that of the new constitutional states, give new support to this theory.

Doubtless the alliance of the dynastic principle with liberty and equality has not produced in France the fruit that was expected of it; but it was the fault of governmental fatalism: the error was here common to the princes and to the nation. Moreover, although the dynastic parties have shown themselves since 1848 not very favorable to the Revolution, the force of things brings them back to it; and as France, in all her fortunes, has always liked to give herself a Premier, to mark her unity by a symbol, it would be an exaggeration to deny the possibility of a dynastic restoration. How many republicans have we heard say: He will be my prince, who will wear the purple of liberty and equality! And they are neither the least pure nor the least intelligent; it is true that they do not aspire to dictatorship.

However, it must be recognized that if the dynastic principle can still play some small role, it will only be as an instrument of transition from the political regime to the economic regime. From now on, it cannot be denied that it is considerably reduced. The constitutional system, a *sine qua non* of modern royalty, has destroyed the prestige of the monarchy. The crowned head of state is no longer a real king; he is a mediator between parties. What will he be when equilibrium is produced by itself in the state through the fact of the equilibrium of economic forces? The kings themselves no longer take themselves seriously: they are no longer the personification of their people. The posterity of kings can return, we know in advance on what conditions, but royalty never. It is no longer even a myth: *Non datur regnum aut imperium in oeconomy*.

Q. — *And what do you expect from the parliamentary system?*

A. — Despite its previous misunderstandings, despite the see-sawing that dishonored it for so long stemming from purely economic causes, its reappearance is inevitable. Parliament has become a form of French thought: it will survive all dynasties. The economic revolution, by constituting social power according to true principles, will perhaps

modify parliamentary mores; it will not repeal the institution. Languages and the genius of languages vary; eloquence assumes more or less happy forms: speech is immovable like thought.

Q. — *What has been, thus far, the greatest act of the Revolution?*

A. — It is neither the Tennis Court Oath, nor August 4, nor the Constitution of 94, nor the jury, nor January 24, nor the Republican calendar, nor the system of weights and measures, nor the ledger: it is the decree of the Convention of November 10, 1793, establishing the cult of Reason. From this decree emanated the senatus-consultum of February 47, 1810, which, by reuniting the Papal State with the empire, tore up for all Europe the pact of Charlemagne,

Q. — *What will be the greatest act of the Revolution in the future?*

A. — The demonetization of silver, the last idol of the Absolute.

Q. — *The Republic organized according to the principles of economy and right, do you believe the State is safe from all agitation, corruption and catastrophe?*

A. — Assuredly, since, thanks to the universal balance, it being no longer possible for the living soul to appropriate, by violence or by skill, the labor of anyone, the credit and the force of all, the pretext, the cause and the means lacking for an 18 Brumaire, a December 2, the political edifice can no longer deviate from the perpendicular: it sits level; it has achieved what it lacked before, stability.

Q. — *Humanity is above all passionate: what will its life be like when it no longer has princes to lead it into war, or priests to assist it in its piety, or great personages to maintain its admiration, or villains or the poor to excite its sensibility, or prostitutes to satisfy its lust, or street artists to make it laugh at their cacophonies and platitudes?*

A. — Humanity will do what Genesis describes, what the philosopher Martin recommends in *Candide*, it will cultivate its garden. The exploitation of the soil, formerly the portion of the slave, becoming the first of the arts as it is the first of the industries, the life of man will pass in the calm of the senses and the serenity of the spirit.

Q. — *When will this utopia be realized?*

A. — As soon as the idea is popularized.

Q. — *But how can the idea be popularized if the bourgeoisie remains hostile; if the people, brutalized by servitude, full of prejudices and bad instincts, remain plunged in indifference; if the pulpit, the academy, the press, calumniate you; if the courts are harsh; if the power mutes it? For the nation to become revolutionary, it would have to be already revolutionized. Must we not conclude from this, with the old democrats, that the Revolution must begin with the government?*

A. — Such is in fact the circle in which progress seems to turn, and which today serves as a pretext for the entrepreneurs of purely political

reforms: "Make the Revolution first," they say; after which everything will become clear. As if the Revolution itself could take place without an idea! But let us be reassured: just as the lack of ideas causes the most beautiful parties to be lost, the war on ideas only serves to push the Revolution. Don't you already see that the regime of authority, of inequality, of predestination, of eternal salvation and the reason of state becomes every day, for the wealthy classes, whose conscience and reason it tortures, more unbearable still than for the commoners whose stomachs it makes scream? From which we will conclude that the safest thing is to stick to the word of the royal jester: *What would you do, sire, if, when you said yes, everyone said no?* Bringing this *No* to the multitude is the whole work of the good citizen and the man of intelligence.

Q. — *Do you renounce insurrection, the first of rights, the holiest of duties?*

A. — I renounce nothing: I say that it is absurd to put in a political constitution a guarantee that is always lacking when it is demanded. When ideas are lifted up, the cobblestones rise of their own accord, unless the government has enough common sense not to wait for them.

Q. — *What of tyranny and tyrannicide?*

A. — We will speak of it elsewhere: it is not material for a catechism.

Q. — *But what! If so many interests threatened, so many convictions offended, so much hatred kindled, finally had the courage to resolutely expect what they desire, the extinction of revolutionary thought, could it not be that the right would be definitively vanquished by force?*

A. — Yes, if!... But this *if* is an impossible condition. For that, it would be necessary to stop the movement of the human spirit. You will find, whenever you want, four scoundrels who will organize together for a stock market scheme; I challenge you to form an assembly that decrees theft. In the same way you can, through the laws regulating the press, forbid such and such discussion: you will never decree the lie.

Against all the forces of reaction, against its metaphysics, its Machiavellianism, its religion, its tribunals, its soldiers, in desperation, the protest that it carries with it would suffice. The same humanity has produced, at different times, religious consciousness and free consciousness. Was it not emigration that in 1814 brought back liberty? All the same, if we failed in our task, the conservatives of today would be the revolutionaries of tomorrow. But we are not reduced to that; the idea is gaining ground, and the sanctioning and avenging right does not seem ready to be extinguished in the hearts of men.

## APPENDIX.

### NOTES AND CLARIFICATIONS.

#### Note (A).

REASON OF STATE. — There appeared at the beginning of this year, under the title of *Histoire de la raison d'Etat*, a remarkable work by M. FERRARI, a former professor at the University of Strasbourg, now a member of the parliament of Turin. Like everything that comes from the pen of Mr. Ferrari, this publication could not fail to first attract the eyes of the masters of publicity. But such is the dissipation of minds nowadays, even among those who make it their business to inform the public, such is the fatigue of souls, that this book, which could provide serious criticism with the most instructive lessons, does not appear to have even been understood. Contemporary curiosity skims over everything, spoils everything, thinks it knows things because it names them, and only ends up, by its impertinent babble, deepening ignorance more and more. We look like those students of the *fourteenth year*, who know the names of their professors, their anecdotal history, the titles of their works, the course syllabus and the conditions of the doctorate, but who know nothing in depth about the subject matter of the studies, and whom it would be more dangerous to consult than their porters. We cry out against the servitude of the press, and we are a thousand times right: but, among the directors of opinion whom the imperial regime has allowed to live, how many are there who are worthy to hold a pen?

M. Ferrari, whose opinions on the philosophy of history are only half ours, will tell us if we have grasped his true thought. We do not know, among contemporary writers, a man bolder in his conceptions, more revolutionary in bearing, more devoted to liberty and right than M. Ferrari; there are few writings whose reading has benefited us so much as his, and we have never felt a more sincere affection than his. How should we be embarrassed to tell him, all friendship saves us, our opinion on a book of which several passages are obviously addressed to us, and which we could even consider as having been written, in large part, with a view to ours?

M. Ferrari has seen, like us, that the capital fact of politics and of history is the *instability* of states. Like us too, he assigns the *reason of state* as the immediate cause of this instability. But there our agreement ends. What motivates the reason of state? Where does it come from? What does it express? What does it want? Is it, as we maintain, the result of a false

hypothesis that, putting the State in contradiction with itself, determines *a priori* its fall; or, as M. Ferrari wishes, does it have its principle in a natural, invincible necessity, superior to liberty and justice? The whole question is there. In the first case, the reign of the reason of state is purely transitory, a kind of preparation for the reign of pure right, which begins the day when the ancient prejudice, which alone supported the reason of state, vanishes before science. In the second case, the world is delivered to an uncontrollable agitation, as much without assignable goal as it is without remedy,

On the very principle of the reason of state, Mr. Ferrari does not explain himself. He does not go so far as Machiavelli and Aristotle, who saw the birth of this reason of state from the inequality of fortunes. On this point our author beats a retreat, and limits himself to considering the reason of state as the expression of an occult, ineluctable nature, prior to and superior to any idea of Justice, against which consequently everything that one would undertake in the name of Right would be fundamentally against Right.

“It is not,” he says, “Justice that founds kingdoms, nor virtue which distributes crowns; crime can preside over the origin of empires, imposture sometimes creates vast religions, and obvious iniquity often causes states to appear and disappear, as if evil were as necessary as good. A NATURE indifferent to God and Satan alone explains the liberties, servitudes, parties, wars and revolutions, the sects that give birth to them and those that resolve them; it alone dispenses the characters, the passions, the energy, all the forces that chain fortune to the train of its chosen ones. The drama of principles only comes *afterwards*, like a fictitious, capricious and changing work.”

In short, the starting point of Mr. Ferrari’s philosophy is a mystery, which he does not seek to explain. Above and outside the world of the idea, and prior to the idea; above and outside the world of right, and prior to right, M. Ferrari proclaims, he says so elsewhere, the world of FORCE. Following the example of his compatriots Vico and Machiavelli, following the example of Bossuet and Aristotle, of Christianity and polytheism, he begins, in the genesis of history, by positing, as the first link in the evolutions of Humanity, what is least philosophical: a divine fact, A higher power, inaccessible to observation and analysis, rules the world: call it *Destiny, Providence, Nature, Law of the spheres*, or pure *Force*, the name doesn’t matter. This power, absolute as the Absolute, exerts on Humanity a sovereign action, which comes from the miracle, and with which one does not debate. It must be so, observes the historian of the reason of state, since the phenomena that make up our history, considered as a whole and in their detail, are the most sudden, the most unforeseen, most contradictory, most free from human considerations of good and evil,

of the just and unjust, of merit and demerit, of truth and falsehood, of ideality and misery. And, like all mystics, whose philosophy consists in denying any kind of philosopheme, M. Ferrari endeavors to demonstrate, by an immense apparatus of facts, that nothing other than this *Nature*, at once all-powerful and indifferent, can account for history, which amounts to saying that in principle the facts of history are only explicable on condition of being inexplicable. Concluding with the supernatural from the misunderstood, bringing in the gods to unravel the human drama, has always been the process of poets, to whom the miracle always seems more beautiful than the simple and sometimes trivial truth. This is the philosophy, I almost said the poetry, of Mr. Ferrari's history.

Thus this historian of the reason of state does not deviate from the well-trodden path: except for the way in which he conceives of its First Cause, he is with Bossuet, Machiavelli and Aristotle; he affirms, in politics and in history, the perpetuity and invincibility of the reason of state, consequently its superiority over Justice; he is forced to distinguish, with M. Guizot, a great and a small morality in the statesman!... Has Mr. Ferrari reflected on this?

Moreover, as M. Ferrari has his predecessors in history, he has his analogues in political economy. This point is worth dwelling on for a moment.

Just as the economists of the official school attach economic phenomena to a variable but incoercible nature, which cannot be tamed by any law, and against which any rule of right would instantly become the same as non-right (see THIRD STUDY, Note (H), page [    ]); likewise, according to M. Ferrari, the revolutions of empires are due to a nature anterior and superior to right and indifferent to morality. It is only later that is born in us the idea of Justice, a principle of sociability and up to a certain point an attenuation of the outrages of Nature, but which could not go so far as to govern, and, in a sense, to create this very nature.

When we, men both of revolution and of reform, ask that right be established in the economy, and that the mercantile world be freed from chance and immorality, the economists answer us: there is no economic Right; that Economics knows no laws and rules, any more than Religion and Art. Art, Religion and Political Economy, they say, are three spheres equally apart from Justice; they go beyond the notion of it; they do not fall under its law. Justice is a secondary principle, which these eminent natures can sometimes use, but to the measure of which they cannot submit. Before the force that produces economic phenomena, as before God and before genius, there exist, strictly speaking, neither laws, nor rights, nor mores. Immorality and folly would consist precisely in denying it.

In the same way, when we ask that right be introduced into

government, and that we put an end to these continual returns to tyranny by a constitution henceforth safe from any catastrophe, M. Ferrari replies that there is at base no political right; that constitutions are essentially ephemeral creations, fictions that the Supreme Power realizes for a moment and then destroys; that everything here depends on an ante-juridical, extra-moral nature, indifferent to the reign of God and the reign of Satan, from which proceed *ex æquo* all of the energies for good and for evil, and which has its expression in the reason of state.

The historical theory, which puts right below the reason of state (the Republic below universal suffrage); that of the economists, who reject any balance of products and services in the name of *laissez faire, laissez passer*; that of the theists or religionists, who put morality below faith; that of the partisans of art for art's sake: all these theories, which at bottom are only one, therefore form the antithesis of the revolutionary doctrine that, since 1789, tends to make Justice prevail at all points and subordinates politics, political economy, religion and art to morals.

Thus classified and defined, as should be done in good criticism, the work of M. Ferrari carries in itself its justification or its condemnation, M. Ferrari is not wrong or right all by himself: in spite of his assertion of Progress and his pronounced sympathies for the Revolution; in spite of the moral feeling, which from the conscience of the writer radiates throughout the book, he is attached, as a historian-philosopher of course, not as a citizen nor as a man, to the great party of the counter-revolution, armed everywhere in the name of an alleged state necessity, of an invincible nature and of a superior Reason manifested by a long tradition, against the idea and against right.

After having disengaged the thought of M. Ferrari from the multitude of facts with which it surrounds itself, after having brought it back to its antecedents, surrounded by its analogues, we must follow it up with a few observations. Although M. Ferrari's work appeared more than eighteen months after ours, it does not contain a word of reply to the considerations of fact and right that had ruined his system in advance. We can therefore only recall here, in varying terms, what we have said, in this Study and in previous ones, regarding the sovereignty of Justice.

In principle, all nature carries within itself its law, with which it produces and develops itself, against which it withers and dies. This law is contemporaneous with being; it is immanent and adequate to it; it forms its essence; it is inseparable from it; it is through it that it takes shape and character, that it plays a role in creation; that it makes itself accessible to the understanding; finally that it enters into reality, and positively becomes something. It implies a contradiction that being, nature, or anything at all, is posited *before* its law or *without* its law; that it acts outside of it, even against it; that one conceives it as indifferent to it, and



being able on occasion to sacrifice it to the necessities of its own existence. The *fact* and the *idea* are really inseparable, the first perceived by the senses, the second by the understanding.

Now, Justice is the fundamental law of the Universe: it has its incarnation in consciousness. Immanent in humanity, it is through it that Humanity is produced and develops; through it that Humanity constitutes itself, renews itself, repairs itself; it is to define it by speech, to realize it in its institutions, that man goes from hypothesis to hypothesis and that the State oscillates from revolution to revolution; so that history is itself only an exposition of the moral law, a judicial drama. It is wrong to say, with M. Ferrari, that a nature, which is none other than Humanity itself, “indifferent to God and to Satan, posits, in the first place, liberties, servitudes, wars and revolutions, dispenses characters and energies, and that *after* the drama of forces comes that of principles.” The principle, the idea and the law are given at the same time as being itself; spirit at the same time as matter, Justice at the same time as liberty, force and character at the same time as man. (See the first installment, Program of Popular Philosophy, and the FIRST STUDY, chap. 1, Definitions.) But Humanity, reflective and free, does not at first know its entire law, or to put it better, it does not know how to make its application with certainty; for this it must reason, seek, try, go from hypothesis to hypothesis, as its discomfort reveals its errors. Hence its impatience and its anger; but hence also the progress of laws and mores, resulting from the coming and going of revolutions.

Now, among the errors that corrupt the notion of right, and that render unstable the condition of the citizen and of the state, the most inveterate and the most obstinate is that of the inequality of fortunes. The effect of this error, as we have demonstrated, is to place the State in a contradictory situation, which causes it to go constantly from one extreme to the other: the antinomy of governments, the antagonism of peoples, the opposition of political forms, noted with so much care by M. Ferrari and which form nineteen-twentieths of his work, have no other cause, no other direction. There is not there, as he believes, a mysterious nature, acting indiscriminately for an unknown end; it is Humanity itself that, out of a spirit of Justice, revolts against its own creations and brings about these interminable rearrangements, which, always governed by the reason of state, because the contradiction of inequality has not left thought, lead invariably to new catastrophes.

This, moreover, is what M. Ferrari says himself, when he makes this objection and this answer:

“Since nature is so cruel in its historical work, and its catechism gives precepts so contrary to morality, you will ask me what is the use of justice in the world? — It is used to make revolutions: every riot is a question of right, every

revolutionary is a jurist, a pontiff whom a sacred delirium revolts against all political laws (*read* the false hypotheses). It attacks property, family, society, religion; it makes reasonable men unpopular, and puts heaven itself in suspicion.”

Justice, critic of institutions, judge of governments, executor of great revolutionary works: that is what overthrows M. Ferrari’s mysticism from top to bottom. What do we need of his *indifferent Nature*, when Justice, repairer of error, gives us the key to the enigma?

Mr. Ferrari did not oppose a single word to the criticism we made of the principle of inequality of fortunes. He preferred to stick to his myth of *indifferent Nature*, than to pronounce on a theory that, by completing the system of rights, establishes the State on an unshakable foundation, gives history the only rational explanation, and puts an end to the wild dance of revolutions.

We stand by this criticism in all its data and conclusions. We maintain it with all the more confidence because, after all, the *Histoire de la Raison d’état*, as well as that of the *Guelfes et des Gibelins*, published in 1858 by the same author, forms the counterpart of the *System of Economic Contradictions*, published by us in 1845; and that after having compared all these works, it is impossible for a judicious mind to deny that the antinomies of the political world, so well unfolded by M. Ferrari, have their principle, their motive and their type, in the antinomies of the economic world.

The *Histoire de la Raison d’état* corrected according to these principles and purged of its mysticism, the work of M. Ferrari would become irrefragable in its logic and in its morality. We would no longer accuse him, as certain newspapers have done, of insulting lightheartedly, with a sort of fanaticism, the morality of nations and the justice of history. Far from his *predictions* — M. Ferrari, led by the thread of historical antinomy, daring to make himself a prophet — appearing somewhat adventurous, they would acquire, subject to the desired modifications, such evidence that there would no longer be anything to do but to change again this word of *predictions* or *prophecies*, unfortunate in a philosopher, and to give them their true name, which is conclusions.

The conclusions of history, when Justice takes hold of them, are infallible. They tell us today that the reign of the reason of state is finished, like its literature; that the contemporary agitation, so panic-stricken, in which all the contradictions meet at the same time, aims to abolish it irrevocably; that the idea of Justice, more extensive and loftier than it has ever been, no longer leaves it either pretext or refuge; that all hypotheses of postponement have been exhausted; and that there is definitely no longer any salvation for peoples and states except in pure right. Does this right demand the sacrifice of all the idols formerly invoked by the reason of state and supported by the prejudices of nations?

Note (B).

THE DEMOCRACY OF DIVINE RIGHT. — M. l'abbé Lenoir complained that the words quoted by us as being his were not in his book. The truth is that our quotation contains a sentence, eighteen words, which indeed are not textual, but which summarize a dissertation of several columns. The reader will judge this infidelity: we quote, *ipsissimis verbis*:

“Temporal power,” says M. Lenoir, “rests on a right.

“This right can only be a *divine right*, that is to say, emanating from God; for any right that did not come from God would not be a right.

“But there are several kinds of divine right: there is *immediate* divine right, or right that comes from God without intermediary; and *mediate* divine right, that comes from God through an intermediary. Each of these rights may still be conceived as *natural* and *supernatural*, that is to say, founded on the laws of nature or on some special manifestation of the Divinity.” (Col. 1536.)

Examples of these different kinds of law follow.

“That being said, continues Mr. Lenoir, one can only imagine three kinds of social states: the an-archic state, the poly-archic state, and the mon-archic state. (*ibid.*)

“In each of these states, *the people are the true sovereign, immediately established by God.*” (Col. 1537, 1538 and 1539.) The words in italics are repeated three times: it is with them that we began our quotation.

Here then, according to M. Lenoir, is democracy, like aristocracy and monarchy, founded originally on divine right. Have we said anything else?

What difference is there now, in principle, between these different states? None: the difference is only in the mediacy or immediacy of divine right. It is here that M. Lenoir, going into long and wearying detail, explains that, while in the an-archic state it is the *immediate natural divine right* that serves as the basis of society, in the mon-archic state, it is the *mediate natural divine right*, the people, in whom resides the *immediate natural divine right*, transferring, in its capacity as intermediary or mediator, its power and right to an agent, who is the monarch. The poly-archic state is a compound of the other two: that is to say, right there is both mediate natural divine right, and immediate natural divine right, mediate in the assembly of representatives, which holds its powers of election, and immediate in the people who elect their deputies. Now, as it is not possible, in the great modern states, for the people to govern themselves anarchically, as they are always forced to go through a delegation, it follows that the law that governs Europe, according to the Abbe Lenoir, is *mediate natural divine right*; which really makes the people a *mediator* between God and the government

(emperor, king or assembly), which is what we expressed in this sentence, which exempted us from quoting two or three columns: “*Universal suffrage is the means by which the collective mediator makes known the divine will.*”

After having defined, as we have just seen, the three kinds of state, and the four kinds of divine right, Father Lenoir quotes the authority of Father Lacordaire: “This is what we our Lacordaire summarized eloquently one day: *Go*, he made God say to the nations, *go and govern yourselves.*” (Col. 1539.) Here again we have to accuse ourselves of a little negligence. Quoting from memory, after a long and laborious reading, where M. Lenoir had said *our* Lacordaire, we put the *abbé* Lacordaire, which proves in a very naive way that this *our* is not ours at all. The rest is not worth remembering. Once by exception, it happens to us, in the interest of brevity, to quote an author from memory while summarizing it, and here we are made the same quarrel that doctor Arnauld made to the pope, about the five propositions of Jansenius. They are there, said the pope, because that is the meaning; they are not there, replied Arnauld, because they are not read there.

Besides, what did we want to prove by this quotation, and for what do we reproach M. Lenoir and his Catholic-democratic co-religionists? A very simple thing, which the episcopate perceived from the beginning, and from which the Church of Rome boldly drew the final conclusion: it is that, from the moment that one makes popular *Sovereignty* the basis of public right, government, whatever its title, whatever its form, is of absolutist essence, or what comes to the same thing, of divine right, the divine and the absolute being synonymous; that henceforth it is inevitable that the government, obeying its principle, should assume more and more absolute forms; that thus, supposing that it begins with democracy, it will be led to transform itself little by little into oligarchy, then into hierarchy, and finally into autocracy, after which, devoid of justice, reason, control and counter-weight, it will collapse to begin a new evolution.

What is the use of telling us here that the Church, by the breadth of her principle, both popular and divine, contains all forms of government, that if she has become over time an absolutist monarchy, she affects formerly the elective and constitutional form? — “The Church,” said M. Lenoir, “has given the example to the nations! She presented herself on earth with the election of the clergy and the faithful; she has operated for centuries, on the grandest scale, this mode of elevation of her dignities. The learned Génébrard, archbishop of Aix, wrote a theological treatise on *sacred elections*, in which he proves, in several successive chapters, that they are of *divine institution*, of *apostolic right*, of *ecclesiastical* or *canon right*, *civil* and *profane right*, *ordinary* and *perpetual right in France until Francis I, of right necessary for the integrity of religion.*” (Col. 1545.) Well!

Good God, have we ever claimed that the data of revelation differed in any way from the instinctive conceptions of the masses? The Church behaved in political matters as she did in economic matters. She takes what she finds, she adapts to everything, so that she can perceive there what makes her essence, of mystery, of the divine, of the absolute. Right itself, she accepts as an emanation from God, an expression of the absolute. We know all this as well as M. Lenoir: but is it really a question of that?

We ask what is in itself this formidable power, the State, which no nation can do without, and with which we see that no nation can live; what makes it, *a priori*, reality, or whether it is a being of reason; under what conditions it imposes itself on consciousness; under what guarantees is its power exercised: how government could be made both less overwhelming and less fragile, making it an instrument of justice and liberty. All these questions are answered: DIVINE RIGHT, natural divine right and supernatural divine right, immediate divine right, and mediate divine right. Then, as a consequence of this divine right, we begin another stream: mon-archy, poly-archy, an-archy, representation, mandate, sovereignty of the people, universal suffrage. As if to save divine right, it had only to be made democratic; as if we should no longer have to complain, have nothing more to fear, when, through the mystical work of the vote, we have made ourselves interpreters of God's designs, in solidarity with his agents, accomplices in the actions and gestures of those who govern us.

If Father Lenoir had followed the logic of his principle to the end, after having laid down the principle that all government is by divine right, which means of absolutist essence or tending invincibly towards absolutism, he would have immediately added, as a consequence of this premise, that theocracy, against which all governmentalsists today protest, is the natural, sincere, authentic, typical form of government. History would have furnished him with numerous examples in support of his thesis. What was the Hebrew monarchy? What were the ancient Eastern monarchies in general? Theocracies, at first poorly defined, but which all tended to approach their true type, as we see in the history of the mage Smerdis, of the Egyptian priest-king Sethos, of the priestly dynasty of the Maccabees, so adroitly substituted for that of David. — What was, at base, the republic in ancient Rome? A theocracy of fathers of families, which became, with time, a democracy by the admission of the people to participation in divine things. — What was the imperial government afterwards? A military theocracy, of which the emperor was the pontiff: we see it through the three centuries of persecutions that the Jews, the Christians and the philosophers endured. — What was feudalism afterwards? A half-imperial, half-pontifical theocracy. — What was the caliphate, side by side with this feudalism? A theocracy. — What does

Jacobin democracy want to be today, according to Robespierre, Buchez, Mazzini, the Abbé Lenoir and others? A theocracy, having universal suffrage as its sacrament and the people as its honorary pope. We know one of this sect who, in 1848, in a meeting of republicans, took it into his head one day to make an apology for the inquisition. — What would the government of Napoleon III like to be? Another theocracy, in which the priesthood would find itself predominated by the emperor, for the excellent reason that, in the ruin of beliefs, force has precedence over religion. This is how Constantine appeared at the Council of Nicaea. This is what the Abbé Lenoir should have recognized first, after having demonstrated that the people are the first and most truthful organ of divine right. Then he would have understood that theocracy, which no one wants, but on which all governments pivot, is the reduction to absurdity of divine right, of the principle of authority and sovereignty; he would have seen that one escapes absolutism only by pure right, and that every power coming from God, commanding in the name of God, judging in the name of God, is iniquity and instability itself.

Note (C).

THE PAPACY AND THE EMPIRE. — The spirit that animates the imperial government, as we have said in the text, is identically the same as that which animates the papal government: these two powers have nothing to reproach each other for, neither as regards the principle, nor as regards the practice. Both have as their foundation divine right, mediate or immediate, natural or supernatural, as the Abbe Lenoir says; both come under theocracy. On one side as on the other, it is the same arbitrariness, the same contempt for liberty and justice, the same horror of ideas, the same abuses, the same corruption. The solidarity of the two governments has been revealed in recent years, first by the Roman expedition, then by the retreat from Villafranca. Rome is the boulevard of Christianity; and what is the present empire? The product of Christian reaction against revolutionary thought.

It would be useful to draw, from this point of view, a parallel between the two governments of the Emperor Napoleon III and the Pope: we have laid down the principles and provided examples. Here are other samples seized as the crow flies from a pamphlet written at the request of the Imperial Government, and later suppressed at the solicitation of the Papal Nuncio, *La Question Romaine*, by M. ABOUT. We do not know which to admire the most, the madness of the government that investigated such a trial, or the naivety of the writer who thought he was serving his patrons by thus portraying them.

“Priests,” says Mr. About, page 7, “having not learned accounting,

govern finances badly; — they close all their budgets in deficit and contract debts (p. 291).” — And the empire then? Is its accounting better, its prodigality less than that of the government of the Holy Father? Has Mr. About read article 12 of the sénatus-consulte of December 25, 1862? Is he unaware that accountancy is proscribed, in fact and in law, from the finances of the empire? Has not the Emperor’s government constantly raised the budget of expenditure for eight years? Didn’t it just show the deficit of its *army fund*? Doesn’t it multiply its demands for conscripts in order to be able to multiply the millions by the same amount? Have we not noticed, for the period from 1852 to 1859, an increase in the public debt of 3 billion 600 million?

“Page 8: The population of the states of the Church is 3,114,668 people. The pope maintains an army of 15,000 men, which costs him 10 millions annually, or per head 3 fr. 20. M. About asks what is this expenditure and this army for? — In France, for a population of 88 million souls, the army is 600,000 men, and costs 500 million, or per head 14 fr. We will ask in our turn which, of the papal army or the imperial army, produces, for the nation it is supposed to serve, for the whole of Europe with which this nation is in contact, the most liberty, confidence, well-being, morality, for what it costs?

“Page 10: To whoever speaks to it of reforming the abuses, the papal government invariably replies that there is no abuse.” — It would certainly be a great impertinence on the part of His Holiness if, in denying that there are abuses in his government, he did something other than what all Catholic governments do. Does the government of Emperor Francis-Joseph, that of Emperor Napoleon III, admit that there are abuses in their midst?

Pages 15-20: M. About combats with all his might the opinion of M. Thiers on the temporal ecclesiastics. This would perhaps be conceivable, if M. About, faithful to his instructions, did not at the same time protest his respect for the spiritual. It was observed and he made no reply: What is a spiritual government, a church, an idea, an opinion, a party, a flag, a dynasty, without the temporal? The inconsistency is obvious. But, with the imperial government, inconsistency is the least thing. What makes the empire particularly odious, and places it far below the Papacy, is that basically, while it does not want the temporal for the pope, it does not want for itself the spiritual, ideas, of any kind. It does not want the Pope, head of the spiritual world, to have his own temporal, because it does not want its own temporal power, the empire it holds from the popular vote, to have a spiritual character of its own, to be governed by principles, ideas and rights. We, on the contrary, say with the Pope that the social being, like the individual, is composed of body and soul, of the material and the spiritual, indissolubly united: only we believe that this social being is

formed according to other laws, governed by other principles than those of the Church.

Mr. About expresses strong sympathy for the Italian people, in which he is certainly quite commendable. After having shown, by a somewhat loaded description, what the people are under the government of the priests, he exclaims: What would one not do with a race so well endowed under a government of liberty and order? — All of this is perfectly felt, but apart from the Emperor and the Pope, the two leaders of the Catholic world, one of whom demands the inviolability of his temporal, the other of whom does not want anything spiritual, the question is badly posed. It was necessary to say: You see these superstitious Italians, strangers to progress, impoverished in intelligence as in body. Well, there would be a way to make them a hundred times worse, which would be to make them subjects of the Emperor. The fact is that the Pope has an idea, a faith, while the Emperor has none.

Mr. About regrets, with reason, that the papal government stops the development of the middle class. But the imperial government is doing worse: it is pushing back the middle class. In 1848 the majority of the nation belonged to this class; envisioned from this side, the February Republic was intended to increase it still further. Since the coup, the middle class has been crushed; in twenty years there will only be proletarians and aristocrats in France. What is all this about? What we have just said: that the worst of religions is better than the materialism of despots, since religion speaks to the imagination and to the heart, while materialism speaks only to the senses. With the first, if one makes little progress, one remains a man; with the second, one becomes a beast.

M. About admits that pauperism is much less developed in the papal states than it is in France; he adds that the population is 76 people per kilometer, while in France it is only 67. But, he says, with a good government, the Romans could all be much richer and their population even denser. We are convinced of it: but what does Mr. About mean by a good government? Is it in the empire that he finds the model? One used to say, according to the Charter, *Forms of the government of the king*; one cannot say today, *Forms of government of the emperor*: The empire has no forms, no principles, no idea, no law. For spirit, it has only M. About. Is it with imperial *bankocracy* and the theory of Malthus, advocated by the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, that he thinks of realizing well-being and making men?

M. About deplores somewhere, if I remember, the way the Jews are treated in Rome. In this, too, he is absolutely right. — But, things having to remain everywhere, as far as the temporal is concerned, as they are, I admit that I like the Jews in the Ghetto even better than the *kings of the era*. Let the Pope borrow Rothschild's money, if he wants; let him entrust



the execution of his railways to Mires, so be it: but let him keep them at a distance. The government of the pope, which, by virtue of its spirituality, still prevails over that of the emperor, would fall immediately below it, the day when speculating, banking, usurious and materialist Jewry had taken root in its territory.

M. About points out the decadence of letters and the arts in the Roman state. — It is neither so great nor so rapid as it has been for eight years in the French Empire. I call Mr. About as a witness.

Page 79. — M. About makes a profession of faith favorable to the nobility. He thinks, with Boileau, that *nobility is not a chimera*. As it is not of the Roman nobility, of which he says little good, that he hears spoken, the fact remains that M. About's compliments are addressed to the Napoleonic nobility. What do you think, reader?

Page 123. — M. About, who is in no way repelled by the nobility, is no more repelled by the dictatorship. Now, the dictator of his choice is not Cincinnatus, it is not the Holy Father; it is, you guessed it, the Emperor Napoleon. Which just proves that M. About was not ill-treated by the imperial dictatorship.

On page 131, he accuses the nepotism of the Popes, the venality of the heads of the pontifical government; he points out that all the important places are reserved for the clergy. — But is there anyone else among the personnel of the imperial government, I mean the directing personnel, than the emperor's uncles, the emperor's brothers, the cousins, natural or legitimate, of the emperor, special friends of the Emperor, creatures of the Emperor, damned souls of the Emperor? Moreover, since 1852, hasn't France been under a regime of bribes? In 1857, the writer of these lines set out, *motu proprio*, to the applause of the Tuileries, to reveal the venality that is exercised everywhere in the shadow of imperial power. The Correctional Court understood that public morality was not at all the work of Her Majesty's government;

M. About, intoxicating himself with his prose, which is very amusing and very pretty, ended by losing his head, and no longer paying attention to what he said. He denounces the *political rigors* of the government of the Holy Father; the *prostitution* that afflicts the eternal city; the *lotteries*; the bad *education* given to the people, the suffering of the *material interests*, etc. Tired of covering the margins of his book with our observations, we ended by suspecting that M. About, *enfant terrible* or *enfant perfide*, in writing a pamphlet against the Papacy, had intended to make a satire against the imperial government. But the audience has not seen subtlety there. We were so happy to see the very-Christian emperor demolish both the apostolic emperor and the vicar of Jesus Christ! It was not foreseen, moreover, that Napoleon III, perceiving at last the contradiction of his policy, would recoil before the consequences of his work and would leave

Italy to discord, after having thrown Europe into turmoil.

The Idea of Reforming the Church: — M. About, if he had done his work conscientiously, would have begun by remarking on it — this idea is old; it has constantly failed. The reason is simple: the reform of the Church is no less than the political and social reform of Christendom as a whole. The emperors, who, from Charlemagne to Charles-Quint, lost themselves in this enterprise, all found themselves powerless. In the twelfth century the Albigenses and the Waldenses, seizing the question in its depths, attack the feudal system: the Church preaches the crusade against them, and they are exterminated by the kings, the barons and the monks, allied for this pious work. Later, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the difficulty is overcome; it is claimed that the cause of evil is in the union or confusion of the spiritual and the temporal. On all sides the feudal chiefs freed themselves from papal supervision; Philippe le Bel overthrows the papacy at Avignon. What was this violence for? Thanks to the stay of the popes, Avignon became a little Babylon; general corruption took its course, and the maxims of the reason of state became those of all governments. The Council of Constance believed it was better off attacking the luxury of the clergy and drying up the sources of ecclesiastical revenue: what did the Council of Constance achieve? Jean Huss goes further: he maintains that the evil has its root in dogma, that it is not enough to strike the Church in its temporal aspect, if one does not touch its superstitions: what was the fruit of the preaching of John Huss? Pope Pius II, Aeneas Sylvius, also recognizes the need for reforms: but he believes that, to do well, it would be necessary to begin by restoring order between the states, bringing the princes to agreement, creating a European right, saving Europe from the Ottoman invasion. They don't listen to him, they allow the Barbarians to advance, and the unfortunate pope dies of grief. Luther and Calvin take up the work of John Huss: rather than reforming itself, the Church breaks up, and here is Christendom divided. In the sixteenth century, a new attempt by Saint-Cyran, Jansenius, Arnauld, Pascal and the school, so powerful in word and deed, of Port Royal. Who then rises against the reform? The Papacy, and after it Louis XIV, who thought he saw in the distinction between *fact* and *right* a threat to his own despotism. What does the imperial government claim today, with its idea of secularization? Does it forget that its mandate is to save the old society from the Revolution, and that the old society is always the Church, it is Rome? What did I say? Rome. Is the imperial government unaware that Rome is no more than a corner in Catholicity, and that the focus of corruption and abuse, the stable that must be cleaned up, at the same time as Rome, is Paris ?

Note (D).

REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT. — The republic is the form of government towards which humanity tends. It can be defined: A government in which RIGHT and LIBERTY play the primary role, as opposed to all other forms of government, based on the preponderance of *Authority* and the *Reason of State*. The more the action of liberty and right is generalized, the more the republic improves: it would be perfect, it would have realized its ideal, if right and liberty reigned alone. From this definition we can conclude that the republic does not yet exist anywhere, and that it has never existed.

To establish republican government in its truth, five conditions are required:

1. Definition of economic right;
2. Balance of economic forces, formation of agricultural-industrial groups, organization of public utility services (credit, discount, circulation, transport, docks, etc.) according to the principle of mutuality and gratuity or cost price;
3. Political guarantees: freedom of the press and of the tribune, parliamentary initiative, control of publicity, extension of the jury, freedom of assembly and association, inviolability of the person, of the domicile, of the secrecy of letters; complete separation of Justice and government;
4. Administrative decentralization, resurrection of communal and provincial life;
5. Cessation of the state of war, demolition of fortresses, and abolition of standing armies.

Under these conditions, the principle of authority tends to disappear; the state, the public thing, *res publica*, is seated on the forever unshakeable basis of Right and local, corporate and individual liberties, from the play of which results national liberty. The government, to tell the truth, no longer exists; society goes by itself through the spontaneity of its free and balanced forces; the action of the prince or head of state appears there as little as possible: it is this impersonality, the result of liberty and right, that above all characterizes the republican government.

Now, we do not want today the conditions that make up the republic; and it is not only the successors of the first empire who reject them, it is all the old parties, liberals of the constitutional monarchy, republicans of the doctrinaire school: it is useless to name the Church. Of the five fundamental conditions outside of which the republic remains an empty word, we accept, and again with extreme reservations, only the third, that relating to political guarantees, which by themselves, in an unorganized

society, can only add to the instability of the state, and keep the door ever open to usurpation and despotism.

If our readers needed to confirm for themselves these ideas, which we believe we have made sufficiently clear, by reading some governmentalist writing, we would point them to a work that has obtained some success, *L'Individu et l'Etat*, by M. DUPONT-WHITE, Paris, 1857, Guillaumin. As much as it is permissible to classify a man politically according to a book and according to the authors he quotes, Mr. Dupont-White belongs to the constitutional liberal opinion, oscillating between the parliamentary monarchy of 1830 and the democratic and no less well-spoken republic of 1848. Within these limits, Mr. Dupont-White admits and advocates the principle of AUTHORITY, which he incessantly confuses, sometimes with the *State*, sometimes with the *Power*; and it is to reconcile, as far as it is in him, the French nation with this principle, that he composed his work.

“The State,” says Mr. Dupont-White, “cannot be denied.” — Its advent is the greatest feature of history; it is the replacement of personal domination by *law*, by *reason*.

“Now, the State is Authority. Authority cannot perish or even wither away among men; it must even develop.

“It is as natural for man to be governed as to be free. Peoples do not govern themselves: *Power can only belong*, says Hobbes (and Bossuet), *to a small number of people, or even to just one. A democracy is nothing more than an aristocracy of orators, sometimes even a monarchy of a single orator.*

“There is no antithesis between the State and liberty; for liberty is, properly understood, only the independence of the nation, which acts and expresses itself naturally through the State.

“What is government? A collective force, as old as the world.”

“Nothing perishes, in the moral order any more than in the physical order, because nothing is without cause and without end. — Authority is necessary, indestructible! — Is it not natural that it should become stronger under the same influences that make religion more holy and property more secure?”

“What is Progress? the development of the State, that is to say of the Government, that is to say of Authority, and consequently of civilization as a whole.”

This confusion of ideas reigns from one end of M. Dupont-White's work to the other; it makes up the the whole secret of his argument. What is painful in refuting the writers of this school is to be obliged to show in each line that the words have no precise meaning for them, that all the notions are blurred in their mind, and that by cultivating the turn of phrase, they no longer speak like philosophers, they chatter like parrots.

Certainly there exists in every society, by the mere fact that there is society, a positive, real thing, which it is permissible to call the *State*. It

consists, this thing, 1. in a certain force, essential to the group, and which we call the force of collectivity (see the present study, page [ ]); 2. in the solidarity that this force creates between the members of the social body; 3. in the properties and other common advantages that represent it and that result therefrom. This is what the state is, half force or power, half property, something moreover entirely objective, like matter itself. That the State develops as the social body, as the individuals and fortunes that compose it grow, that goes without saying: it is as if we were saying that the snowball increases in weight as it increases in diameter.

But authority, a subjective principle, is none of that. It is the faculty that an individual, a corporation or a caste arrogates to dispose at will, for an end known to him alone, and without guarantee or responsibility on his part, of the public power, of the general interests, that is to say, of the State itself, and up to a certain point of particular fortunes and properties, all by virtue of an alleged divine right or right of conquest, of the superiority of race, or even of a people's delegation.

We deny and reject this principle of authority, which has hitherto been the real prerogative, not of the State, but of the governing personnel (see page 127), as incompatible with the dignity of man and citizen, incompatible with Justice, incompatible with the very notion of the State. The State, in fact, results from the collective force of a country, a force produced by the relation, not of hierarchy or subordination, but of commutation that exists between citizens (see page [ ]); so that to affirm the State, that is to say the public power, the public thing, *rem publicam*, is basically to deny authority, and vice versa.

This distinction, so easy to grasp, between authority and the State once made, M. Dupont-White's work falls away entirely, devoid as it is of meaning and scope. It is a book to be redone from beginning to end, since, from beginning to end, it runs on a perpetual ambiguity.

Thus, let Mr. Dupont-White show us the prodigies accomplished in all times by the State, outside of individual action and interest; we agree with him, if by the State he means the collective force immanent in society, the instruments of protection at its disposal, the Justice of which it is the subject and the State is the organ. But let one claim to confiscate for the profit of authority the facts and deeds of the force of collectivity, we immediately protest against the confusion of these two things, which are so disparate, authority and the State.

Similarly, if we are told that the importance of the State grows with society, and that it is the most energetic agent of civilization, we affirm it ourselves: but, far from seeing here an argument in favor of authority, we maintain that the State, like the individual, will only attain its maximum power to the degree that it is more carefully separated from any form or ferment of authority, of governmentalism, of divine right.

To maintain, as Mr. Dupont-White does, against the economists of the English school, that liberty does not do everything in society, that it cannot do everything, and that there are important and indispensable services that are proper to the State, there is nothing here that shocks our reason either, since it is by virtue of this same principle, entirely from experience, that we have affirmed, above individual initiative, a superior law, which is Justice (Study I, chap. II). But to conclude from the fact that Justice is dominant in society that it needs to be constituted as an Authority and placed in the same hand as the public force in order to act, is to corrupt right and fall back into communism, against which Mr. Dupont-White protests as much as we do.

In a curious chapter, after having established by numerous facts the growing importance of governmentalism in England, Mr. Dupont-White does not fail to make of this increase in power in a country of free initiative an argument in favor of his thesis. But he does not perceive that what drives England to governmentalism is economic inequality: government, authority, reason of state, having no other end, as we have seen shows in the present study, than to compensate as well as possible for the incapacity of an antagonistic society, and to protect capitalism and the proletariat against each other. Balance the public economy, you won't have to worry about government.

Liberty and the State, says M. Dupont-White somewhere else, do not form an antithesis. This just proves that our author does not know the value of the words he uses. Everything can be in antithesis with everything. Mr. Dupont-White wanted to say that, in society, liberty and the State do not necessarily exclude each other, which is true, if by State we mean the public thing, the collective force, in the production and in the benefits of which all citizens participate; but this is no longer true if by State we mean a governmental prerogative, a right of command, an authority.

We will not pursue these remarks further. Mr. Dupont-White's book having 360 pages, we would have to repeat the same thing 360 times. Let us say, in conclusion, that the writer's intention is better than his theory: he wanted, without worrying about any form of government, to reassure contemporaries against certain *an-archic* tendencies and, by advocating the role of the State, which becomes under his pen synonymous with collective force, government, authority, Justice, national freedom, to prepare the way for the restoration of the constitutional regime. From this point of view, the work of Mr. Dupont-White, moderate in tone, elegantly written, full of interesting facts, may be considered as a sign of the times. Look for nothing more.

Note (E).

REALITY OF THE SOCIAL BEING. — We propose to give in a later publication, which will form part of the present series, a complete theory of collective force, hence a direct demonstration of the reality of the social being. One can, meanwhile, see what we have written elsewhere on the SERIAL LAW (*Creation of Order in Humanity*), and *Philosophy of Progress*, Brussels, 1853.

# NEWS OF THE REVOLUTION.

## OF THE CAUSES OF THE CONTEMPORARY AGITATION.

Among the people who do us the honor to follow us, some have found the political bulletin of our 2<sup>nd</sup> installment imbued, with regard to the Emperor Napoleon III and his ministers, with a certain virulence. The idea, still new to many people, of seeking the cause of the vices and embezzlements of a government in the moral state of the nation, which that government represents, has seemed to be only an oratorical precaution, serving to disguise the personality of the insult and save the writer from responsibility. Others, taking the opposite view of this appreciation, complain that we spare the Emperor at the expense of the honorability of the country, and almost accuse us of inciting the foreigner to contempt and hatred of our compatriots. There are some, finally, to whom our cosmopolitanism seems insufficient, and who find that we have not been able to rid ourselves of a certain *chauvinism* peculiar to our nation.

We will not undertake, for today, to justify ourselves on any of these counts. The more exact Justice is, the more the passions, in their antagonism, accuse it of showing itself partial. For our only answer, we are going to summarize our thought by applying it to the whole of Europe, and by showing that the trouble into which society has fallen is due neither to this nor to that, nor to such an event, nor to such a people, but to the failure of justice among all nations.

Confidence is not restored anywhere; business is generally bad; the Leipzig fair was mediocre. If the public funds, thanks to the efforts of the power, hold at times at a fairly high rate, it is because capital does not dare to risk itself in any enterprise, because bankruptcy is not moreover regarded as imminent, and that in the event of a claim, the loss would be even less for government annuities than for any other equity or mortgage investment. But if the financial world maintains an apparent firmness, in the political world the turmoil is serious. Italy, always tormented by its internal dissensions, nevertheless continues its work of unification; Garibaldi left for Sicily, — with the approval of Victor-Emmanuel? We do not know; — with that of the Emperor Napoleon? It is more than doubtful, — but surely with the favor of England, which perhaps repents of it. Will Garibaldi succeed in his enterprise, or else, as after Villa-franca, will Italian emancipation be again postponed? The Emperor Franz-Joseph resigning himself to the concessions demanded of Hungary, it could be, strange to say, that Austria in turn became the focus of the movement after having been the focus of the resistance for so long. But if Austria takes one



step forward, Russia takes two backwards: she postpones the emancipation of her peasants to another time, gives back to the nobility, to the old Russian party, all its influence and announces anew that the *sick one*, the Ottoman Empire, is coming to an end. The annexation of Savoy makes one dream of that of Belgium; the *Times* sounded the alarm and cried out to Germany: Beware! It is here that war threatens at this hour: hold yourselves close together; leave Denmark alone; do not draw upon you, O peoples of Germany, the Scandinavian coalition, when you are half entwined by pan-Slavism, shaking hands over your heads with the Napoleonic idea! Then we add, by way of peroration: It therefore depends on one man to keep the world on the alert, to stop work, to paralyze business, until the moment when, after having by his intrigues, his corruptions, his bragging, divided his rivals, stunned the populations, seduced, bought the vile multitudes, he descends on the power that his eye has chosen, seizes a nation unexpectedly, and adds new territories to the immensity of his states!...

All of this is very beautiful, very epic, very stirring; it is made to please poets, novelists, historiographers: but, for those who reflect, all of that is perfectly absurd. The reason for the events of humanity is no more in the thought of him who takes the initiative and who makes himself its instrument, than the reason for the facts of nature is in the thought of the philosopher who observed it. Emperors and kings play their part in the acts of nations: at bottom, their influence is very secondary; whether they are called *Napoleon the Great* or *Napoleon the Little*, they are ultimately only historical expressions, not causes. Those who aspire to make themselves causes, outside the generative current, are not slow, whatever their autocracy or their popularity, to be broken: such was, from 1804, the case of Napoleon I. However, of all the contemporary heads and ministers of state, there is not one, at the time of writing, who can boast of creating events, no more Napoleon III than François-Joseph, no more M. de Cavour or Garibaldi than Lord Palmerston.

Will it be permissible for us, in order to take into account the general situation of Europe, to employ the method that we have previously used to explain the imperial regime? The agitations of the states have their source in the storms of the universal conscience: history, to consider it well, is a psychology.

The Congress of Vienna had been charged, after the defeat of Napoleon, with regulating the public right of Europe. Ideas were in the air: it was impossible for diplomacy, despite its reluctance, its equivocations and its subterfuges, to avoid them. Two major principles, implied rather than expressed, formed the basis of the pacification of 1815: for the powers, the obligation to maintain a certain *equilibrium* between them; for the peoples, the promise, the hope of *constitutions*.

These two principles led to others, either as corollaries or consequences, or as ways and means. — What would be, for example, the rule to be followed for the delimitation of states? What part should be given to nationality, to geography, to tradition, to present necessities? A given state does not stand still; it tends to develop, to enlarge, sometimes to divide and diminish. Here is a group of small states linked by a federation: these states can merge into a unitary state. On the contrary, here is a large state made up of more or less homogeneous populations: this state can dissolve, be replaced by a federation. In both cases, there is a rupture of equilibrium: what were the forecasts of the Congress for this double occurrence? A serious attack is made by one of the powers on the equilibrium, on the security of Europe. Where will the repression come from? How will it be organized? What will happen if two or more powers unite for their common aggrandizement, at the peril and to the detriment of the others? What if a nation disagrees with its government? If the first claims the benefit of a constitution that the second refuses to grant? If there is a revolution? Will the treaty powers intervene? And for what purpose?

Such were the data of the Peace of Vienna, resulting from these four words which in 1814 and 1815 occupied all the heads: *European equilibrium*, *Political constitutions*. But a moment's reflection is enough to understand that the Congress, made up of the plenipotentiaries of the sovereigns, not of the representatives of the nations, would have taken care not to explain itself on such matters. The mores of divine right, the habits of the reason of state, regaining the upper hand, they avoided, with extreme care, speaking too much, foreseeing too much, defining too much. The division was made, more or less amicably, first between the four great victorious powers; the others had to make do with the crumbs. To France alone a constitution was guaranteed, so that the vanquished nation still found itself the most favored. England laid down its famous principle of non-intervention: absolute silence on everything else. The high and powerful signatories of the treaties apparently imagined that in matters of right what is not expressed must be considered null and void, and that, in order to annihilate the principles of which they were afraid, it was enough for them to remain silent.

As such, however, the treaties of 1815 were the outline of the constitution of Europe. It was, for the people, the only pledge of their liberties; for the interests, the only guarantee of security and order. The spirit with which they were filled, in spite of the letter, was so powerful that the Emperor Alexander could not help, in the naivety of his mysticism, from proclaiming it to the face of the world, by proposing the year following the signature of the powers a new treaty, famous under the name of *Holy Alliance*, whose object was, first, to create between them a

mutual guarantee; second, to inaugurate in international politics the era of *principles*, which was nothing less than an oath to the Revolution, in the presence of the Holy Trinity....

Those who had made the treaties of 1815 were therefore in no way disposed to respect them: the armies had not returned from their last campaign when the promises were forgotten, the pact trampled underfoot, not first regarding what concerned the divisions and the European balance, but on the far more important point of the *principles*, of the *constitutions*.

When the King of Spain Ferdinand VII began, in 1820, to pursue the Cortes who had preserved his kingdom for him, he violated, in their spirit, the treaties of Vienna. And when in 1823 the restored monarchy of the Bourbons intervened, with the consent of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, in the quarrel, and decided, against the constitutionalists of Spain, the triumph of divine right, it violated these same treaties in an even more flagrant and more odious manner. The Bourbons had returned to France only on condition of taking an oath of fidelity to the Charter; this Charter was an integral part of the treaties; the powers had pledged themselves to it and, now, hardly re-established on the throne of their ancestors, they declared war on the Charter, destroying that of the Spaniards! This is the principle of the present disturbance. What the Bourbons did or attempted to do in France, in Spain, in Italy, the other sovereigns did everywhere: the pacification of Vienna, which should have begun a period of liberty and progress, was no longer anything but an era of death.

The violation of the treaties by the heads of state had as aftereffects the mistrust and soon the horror of the peoples towards the treaties themselves. From the moment that the sovereigns rejected the demands for constitutions, the Holy Alliance was no more than a coalition of kings against the peoples, and the partition of Vienna an outrage to nationalities. There was therefore a reciprocal tendency of peoples and governments to tear up the pact, a disastrous tendency, in which the democracy everywhere took the lead, which was to have the most unfortunate consequences for the peoples.

Any convention must be religiously observed until the moment when the parties can break it without danger, by ceasing their relations and withdrawing from each other, or remake it amicably. For there is always more to lose in freeing oneself from a necessary law than in respecting even the most imperfect it in its application. Now, between concentrated populations, like those of modern Europe, a right of nations, international legislation is necessary, since relations cannot be broken: this legislation, this right of nations, had its basis in the treaties of Vienna. The true tactic, for the friends of liberty, was to constantly recall the sovereigns to the spirit of and respect for the treaties: misfortune would have it

otherwise.

The revolution of 1830, which overthrew the Bourbons, had involved nothing in itself that affected the treaties of 1815. The dynasty alone being changed, the relation of France to the other states remaining the same, one could, one should, from the point of view of the constitutions, maintain that the revolution of July was a consecration of the *principles* announced by the Holy Alliance, rather than a victory won over the Congress of Vienna. This side of the question is entirely misunderstood. We liked to see in the fall of the Bourbons, of the foreign dynasty, as it was called, a challenge to the coalition and a first act of hostility against the treaties, a monument, it was said, to the absolutism of the princes against the liberties of the people. Everywhere, following the example of France in July, irritated populations grasped this means. Instead of demanding the execution of the promises, the most mistreated availed themselves of a so-called natural principle, one that was in any case singularly equivocal, subject to a host of exceptions and contradictions, the principle of *nationality*. King William of Holland having behaved towards his Belgian subjects much like King Ferdinand towards the Spaniards, Belgium arose as one man, and the division of the kingdom of the Netherlands was consummated, with the support of France and England. I leave aside the usefulness and appropriateness, in relation to Belgium, of this separation: the Belgians are the judges. What is indisputable is that, in order to repress an attack on the liberty of the peoples, implicitly guaranteed or promised by the general pacification, a serious infraction was committed against their solidarity, which could become an unfortunate consequence. Later, with regard to Belgium, the irregularity was covered by the neutralization of the new state: but the European balance was no less compromised, the door open to dismemberments and incorporations. We see that today.

With the separation of Belgium began the demonstrations for the re-establishment of Poland, demonstrations that had no other effect than to attract to unhappy Poland an increase of disasters. Then came the separate covenants; then, with the memories of the first French empire, the projects of reorganization of the political map: to the already dubious principle of nationalities was added, in the opinion of the masses, that still much more suspicious principle of *natural frontiers*. From then on, it was no longer the treaties that governed the policy of Europe, it was the very violation of the treaties that became the law. In 1848, Hungary, pushed to the limit, it must be believed, followed the example of Belgium and pronounced its separation from Austria: the intervening Tsar brought this poor stray back to the fold, but without stipulating anything for it, which, however, would have been the legal consequence of the intervention. Italy, which was the first to give the signal, is crushed in its turn: violations respond to violations. The most outrageous of all was the recognition of

December 2: it is true that the republican government had precluded it by dethroning the Roman republic and restoring the Pope, unconditionally, to his estates. By the treaties of 1815, the constitutional regime was guaranteed to France, Bonaparte's dynasty nominally excluded from the crown. The horror of the democracy overshadowed all considerations; liberal England was not the last to applaud. From that time on it was established that the treaties had been made for princes, not for the peoples; the ignominy of the coup d'état spread throughout Europe, and Napoleon III found himself, in fact as well as in principle, the leader of the counter-revolution.

Currently, there is no longer any European public right. The treaties of Vienna were successively torn up by all who had signed them; the principal clause, that which made the inviolability of the representative and parliamentary system, in France, the keystone of the system, was abrogated by the restoration, acclaimed by all of Europe, of imperial despotism. Peoples and kings are all, with respect to one another, in an anti-juridical state, which kills business, leaves no guarantee of security, but which at the same time makes room for revolutions.

So, do not despair: if the works of diplomacy, thanks to the bad faith of diplomats, are precarious, the principles are infallible. Virtually nothing remains of what the Congress of Vienna wanted, wrote, stipulated and formulated; from what it has knowingly omitted, dissimulated, disguised, denied, all is safe and no conspiracy either of princes, or nobles, or priests, will touch it. Territorial arrangements have everywhere been ruined: what remains no longer has any legal existence. New nations arise in political life and demand to enter into the European equilibrium; grand unities are preparing, before which the old ones will diminish: there is no mistaking it, the map of 1815 is being remade. What will it be used for? That's what we can defy all makers of plans to know how to say. But, what is worth more than all the geographical divisions, the system of constitutional guarantees has spread everywhere: in the midst of so many infractions, some fatal, others Machiavellian, the unconscious thought of the Holy Alliance emerges victorious: most of the states have entered the path of *principles*, as Tsar Alexander I said. One is never a prophet except with regard to what one does not know. England, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, Baden, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Austria itself just now, all are constitutional. A little longer, none will remain outside the principles other than the two great empires, France, which owes this singular honor to the return of the Bonapartes, and Russia. Now, Russia is worked on internally by the emancipation of its peasants: it is for this reason that the old Russian party, at this moment in power, seeks the alliance of Napoleon III. As for France, we can still hope that sooner or later she will wake up. Napoleon III was able, without

raising any opposition, to lead his bands into Italy against the government of the priests and against the invading despotism of Austria: he would not dare to take up arms against the Rebellion that made him turn back at Villafranca, whose principles, more or less understood, set the Peninsula ablaze. He would no longer feel so strong against Austria, which had become an apostolic empire, a constitutional state, representative of the political liberties of which the House of Habsburg was the adversary — and, who knows, perhaps in this capacity, new to her, protector, as formerly — of the Italian republics! Then imperial and apostate France would be enclosed in a cordon of free states, and Alexander II would have nothing better to do than grant a charter to his subjects.

Certainly, if it were only a question, in order to pull Europe out of the crisis in which it is engaged, of the recognition and application, at all points in Europe, of the principles of representative government, there would be no reason to have very great anxieties for the future. A simple glance at international statistics would suffice to reassure the most alarmed, and the interests expressing themselves in the sense of constitutional ideas, first by addresses to governments, then by a general stock market movement, the powers would receive, as the theory dictates, the law of opinion, and everything would soon be back to normal. Napoleon III himself, whether he liked it or not, would follow suit.

But, as we have explained (note D, page 171), the system of political guarantees is only a cog in the vast ensemble of societies. Economic law not being defined, the agricultural-industrial organization remaining arbitrary, the State remains unstable; the maxims of public right are mingled those of the reason of state (see chap. II, page 14 and note (A), page [ ]), which always bring government back to absolutism. Each power, instead of seeking its balance within itself and its strength in its balance, works therefore to expand and to make itself independent externally, at the same time as it seeks to concentrate itself internally. Everyone is trying to falsify their influence, to round themselves off by annexations: the consequence is that, everyone feeling threatened, everyone remains in arms. The Treaties of Vienna, which alone maintained a kind of policy among the states, now torn, the European balance is everywhere compromised, and the question is to know how it will be re-established.

What is happening in Italy proves the correctness of these reflections. If the Italians had been able to confine themselves to protesting against the internal regime to which they were subjected, and to changing their government, as the Cortes did in 1820, as France did in 1830 and in 1848, whatever one might think of the principle of insurrection and popular sovereignty, it is obvious that there would have been no infringement of the treaties of Vienna, and that the signatory powers would have no

pretext for intervening. It was thus that the subjects of the Church, having shaken off the yoke of the priests and established the republic, had not abandoned the conventions of 1815; that even today Sicily, revolting against King Francis II, is not only within its rights, since it is a question for it of its public liberties, it is in the true spirit of the pacification of 1815. The constitutional system, awaited, promised for forty-six years, is refused; the nation rises: it is a matter between the prince and his nation.

But in Italy things could hardly happen that way. In 1858, as in 1848, Austria was not content, in its capacity as an Italian government, with resisting the claims of her Italian subjects; it avails itself against them of all the forces at its disposal as a German and Slavic power; consequently it abuses the sense of the treaties: hence the cry of dependence, that is to say, the negation of treaties by the Italians. This is not all: to stand up to Austria, it is not enough for the Italians to overthrow the governments refractory to liberty and of which Austria is the support; all the peoples of the Peninsula must be united into a single mass, a violation no less serious than the preceding one of the provisions of the Congress of Vienna. Political unity is, after nationality, the principal war machine of the Italians. It is to the cry of "Long live Italy! Long live Victor-Emmanuel!" that Garibaldi attempted his expedition to Sicily.

But, if Italy succeeds in establishing her unity, the conditions of equilibrium are changed for Europe. In the state of war in which she is forced to maintain herself, the annexation of Nice and Savoy, obtained in exchange for Lombardy and Tuscany, is no longer enough for France; additional compensation is required. Unity in Italy means France on the Rhine, from Basle to Dordrecht. For if the treaties no longer guarantee the equilibrium, it will reappear by itself, and no power can prevent it. The equilibrium is Justice itself: it is the right of people, despite natural borders and nationalities. Once started, the compensatory movement does not stop. France on the Rhine signifies the Russians in Constantinople, Austria in the Balkans and the Black Sea, England in Egypt or elsewhere, unitary Germany. It is the European equilibrium that is reforming — in defiance of the treaties of 1815, you will say — no, but in confirmation of these same treaties, whose whole thought is equilibrium.

Now, is such a system of compensations, and in the present state of things we cannot discover any other, going to be realized? It is here that we must admire the effect of a justice long violated, which in the end takes its revenge. The situation is such that none of the great powers can accept less than what we have just said, and yet the others cannot grant it. The Emperor of the French cannot abandon Constantinople to Russia without lying to his family tradition, and without betraying both France and Europe. Similarly, France, Austria, Greece, Russia itself, cannot leave Egypt, the passage of Suez, to England, which on its side, with Germany,

cannot at any price deliver Ostend, Antwerp and the Rhine to France. So that this reworking of the map, so easy at first sight, this division, so desired and so dreaded, of the Ottoman empire, appears, on examination, entirely impossible.

Thus, in the higher thought of 1815, the two great principles of the balance of powers and the establishment of constitutional guarantees were linked to each other and interdependent: to attack the latter was to compromise the former; to threaten a nation in its liberties was to foment universal war. And as all law tends to be realized in fact, it has happened that the delimitation of states, more or less as it was done by the Congress of Vienna, has become, forty-five years after the *fait accompli*, the express condition, on penalty of general war, of the European equilibrium.

Thus the current disturbance has its principle in the contempt for international conventions, and everyone is guilty. The violation of the Peace of Vienna came from all sides: it began, in the very acts of the Congress, with the calculated reluctance of the signatories; governments and peoples then competed in contempt for the treaties, some stubbornly refusing the expected concessions, others, in reprisal, claiming their right of nationality and calling into question the result of twenty-five years of war.

Of all the powers interested in the maintenance of the treaties, that which has most completely misunderstood their significance is France; it is also the one that suffers the most from their violation. Deceived for thirty years by the Bonapartist conspiracy, by the declamations of its tribunes and its newspapers, it saw in the peace of Vienna only its own downfall: in which it was up to a certain point excusable. It would have endured being vanquished, but it could not bear to be humiliated. But alone, on the Continent, after 1815 France enjoyed the advantages of the parliamentary system: it was more than enough to make it regain in a short time all the influence that the fall of the first empire had caused it to lose. Our statesmen, carried away, some by their retrograde instincts, others by national vanity, refused to understand it. Now, deprived of its most precious liberties by the ill will of the powers and by the return of the dynasty that they had proscribed, enclosed just now in a circle of states of the first order, engaged in perfidious and sterile alliances, today with England, tomorrow with Russia, the French nation devours its shame and, to cover its decadence, imagines nothing better than to ask Europe for compensations, sometimes on the Alps, sometimes on the Rhine. It does not dream that the most precious of compensations, in the presence of peoples who have become free, is to recapture one's own liberty; that in the presence of Austria diminished by Lombardy, but enlarged on the Danube and endowed sooner or later with a liberal constitution, the empire, with Nice, Savoy, Belgium and the Rhine provinces for annexes, would still be



in an inferior position. Oh! If the peoples who hate us because they have the madness to envy us, could themselves come to their senses; if the powers, to which the imperial government has become so bitter, were capable of a generous thought, how quickly all these dark clouds would be dissipated! Speak to France, not to her masters; speak to her of her political rights, of her dignity, of the need you have of her, of the harm her unspeakable despotism causes you. Speak reason to this people whom so many catastrophes have stunned, and be sure that soon this gloomy horizon will clear. Nothing in France produces quicker and more powerful effects than a word from the heart, and, whatever may be said, France has the religion of principles, which is the religion of order itself.

One of the best things that the treaties did, and one of which the signatory powers had thought the least, was the interbreeding of races, resulting from the irregularity of geographical divisions. It was not bad for the fraternity of nations that there should be Flemings, Germans, Italians, Basques in France; it was even better that there were Frenchmen in Belgium, in Prussia, in Switzerland, in Piedmont, in England. The division of the Slavic peoples between three or four powers, necessary moreover for European balance, could also, from the point of view of general civilization, pass for excellent. These and other exceptions to the principle of nationality were legitimized by lofty considerations. They taught the peoples that Justice is above language, worship and figure; that what makes the homeland, much more than all the accidents of the soil and the varieties of races, is Right. Success seemed bound to respond to the idea. Few people, in the countries of political liberty, complained of the homeland that the treaties had assigned to them: if there were no Frenchmen more faithful than the Alsations and the Corsicans, Switzerland had no patriots more fervent than the citizens of the cantons of Vaud, Geneva, Neuchâtel, Friborg and Valais; I suppose the Walloons haven't degenerated and make excellent Belgians; and I do not know that the islanders of the islands of Jersey and Guernsey sigh after their natural homeland. Even the Hungarians became excellent Austrians in twenty-four hours, if it pleased their young emperor not to oppose them in their traditions, which he promised them to respect. Give the people the liberties they demand; execute, princes, according to their true spirit, the treaties of 1815; do better still, prepare the definition of economic right, and I believe that you will hardly hear any more of nationalities and natural frontiers.

The reason of state, which continued to govern us, decided otherwise. Austria therefore refusing, the Pope refusing, the King of Naples refusing, Italy rose up: it was within its rights, within the very rights of 1815, as France was in 1830 and in 1848. Now Italy is doing more: she is proclaiming, against the treaties, and without worrying about the shock

that may result from them for Europe, her unity and her independence. I do not accuse her: she is not the only culprit. But see the consequence of all these violations. The government of Napoleon III, after having assisted Italy with the blood and treasures of France, suddenly frightened by the power that arises at its door, stops the work of deliverance; after having summoned the Pope, it leaves him his estates; it authorizes a French general, a former outlaw, to take service in the pontifical army; as compensation for the enlargement of the Piedmontese kingdom, it demanded the annexation to France of Savoy and Nice; tomorrow it will demand, as compensation for Italian unity, the annexation of the whole of the left bank of the Rhine, and this, in spite of the principle of nationality that one pretends to oppose to the treaties of 1815, in spite of compensations at least equivalent that the other powers will not fail to arrogate to themselves, compensations that they have taken away the right to refuse, and which, if they are granted, will only bring French vanity and inferiority into greater relief!

It is a question of getting out of this imbroglio. However, whatever the outcome of the battles, whatever the modifications introduced by the future congresses to the political map of Europe, it is obvious that the international system will always be based on these two principles, the European equilibrium and the constitutional regime, with the prospect of a transformation in the economic order. There is not a fourth idea in circulation, no other foundation on which diplomacy can build: which means that after torrents of bloodshed and immense treasures swallowed up, the powers will be forced to preserve, more or less, their proportions, and to return to the *status quo*. Any other solution, in the sense of a hierarchy of states, of French or Muscovite preponderance, of a substitution of the military regime for constitutional mores, would imply a decadence of the human race, which is inadmissible.

Let us conclude now; and since, in this criticism, our object has been above all to recognize the principles, to demonstrate their necessity and their power, let us try, in the general interest, to apply them to the present situation. It is nothing less than a program of international politics that we are going to submit to our readers.

1. Return frankly, without reluctance and without false shame, but while taking account of the facts accomplished, to the faith of the treaties of 1815, interpreted as we have done in this article, both with regard to the European equilibrium and with regard to the exercise of constitutional liberties.

2. To this end, engage, help if necessary the French nation to restore at home, at all costs, those liberties.

3. Leave Italy to itself; withdraw the French troops from Rome; start negotiations for the definitive evacuation of the Peninsula; do not oppose

the formation of Italian unity, if it pleases the Italians, and for any compensation to France and Austria, the only two powers interested in the emancipation and unity of Italy, invite the first to operate its administrative decentralization, the second to establish in all its states the regular practice of representative government. To the governmental centralization of a state, there is for the neighbors no other counterweight to oppose than their own decentralization, as we see opposed in history, from people to people, the republic to despotism, *self-government* to the principle of authority.

4. The annexation of Savoy and Nice to France, as well as the cession of Lombardy to Piedmont, which was the pretext for it, was an error. The Niçards, it must be believed for the honor of their patriotism, will make mediocre Frenchmen; as for Savoy, dismissively rejected by Piedmont after having been mediocresly treated, it would have been sound policy to make it a Swiss canton. The era of the incorporations was to be, after 1815, considered finished; they no longer serve any purpose: once this principle is accepted, strategy loses its requirements.

5. Let France, once and for all, renounce the line of the Rhine, which is not, never was and never will be French, despite all the victories and conquests. Let Russia, on her side, equally renounce Constantinople, Austria the Danubian provinces, England Egypt and Sicily; but let Germany, like Italy, work out her unity at her ease. If the shepherds of peoples have an interest in the civil list and the vanity to extend their possessions, the peoples themselves have other aims: more than ever the guarantee of their happiness is in their equivalence and in the liberalism of their institutions.

6. Constitute on the Danube, with the provinces of Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Moldo-Wallachia, Rumelia, Albania, a great state, either unitary or federative, at the choice of the populations concerned. A simple transformation of European Turkey, this state would in no way alter the balance, and the powers must not allow any of them to profit from the debris of the Ottoman Empire.

7. Moreover, no separate alliances: any separate alliance is an infringement of European law, a threat to the liberty and equilibrium of the states.

8. Lay down in principle that the law of equilibrium must receive its application at sea as well as on land, and that every state claims to have, with its navy, its share of establishments and colonies on the globe. To agree accordingly to procure for Belgium, for Switzerland, for all the states deprived of colonies, lands to be exploited in the various parts of the world. The sacrifice will be less for the transferors than for the transferees, and international trade, civilization, will benefit from the development of cultures.

Many people will be tempted to regard these proposals as the dream of a utopian. Yet these are the only ones authorized by written law, the only rational ones, the only practical ones, and there is no doubt that sooner or later the powers will refer to them.

Europe, and France in particular, will be surprised one day, and that day may not be far off, to learn that the only resource of governments and peoples, after so many protests and infidelities, is still in the thought that brought about the coalition of 1813 and the pacification of Vienna.

END OF THE FOURTH STUDY.



OF JUSTICE IN THE REVOLUTION  
AND IN THE CHURCH.

FIFTH STUDY.

EDUCATION.

MONSIGNOR,

Napoleon I said in his memoirs:

“My childhood was unremarkable; I was just a curious and obstinate child.”

This is precisely what can be said of most of the children of the people.

I had always flattered myself, in this respect, to be on the level of the multitude and of the great man, and did not expect that, under the inspiration of my archbishop, an entrepreneur of biographies would come to seek in the insignificance of my early years the symptoms of what, thirty years later, by stubbornly following the furrow of my century, I was to become.

I was wrong, of course: nothing is indifferent to the Christian. For him everything is preordained: race, condition, inclinations, first influences. Tell this Christian, regarding an individual taken at random, that this man was born poor, of parents with an enterprising, reasoning, rebellious, sarcastic spirit, as one finds today everywhere, he will answer you by shaking his head that he is a cutting from 93, that certainly God does not love him.

Born in the thickest of this revolutionary silt, I must therefore have received an education in keeping with my origins, with the rustic blood that runs in my veins, with this spirit of criticism that made my authors and relatives readers of Codes, which would soon turn the whole nation into a society of demons, if the Ignorantines did not put it in order.

“Every day (at my father’s) there was a concert of imprecations against Providence, against society, against men.”

So asserts my biographer, and I have no doubt that he drew his information from a good source.

My word, if I must tell you the truth, Monsignor, we did even worse,

thinking little more of Providence than we counted on society; and you know that indifference in matters of religion is very different from blasphemy. So I will admit it, we *practiced* at home with lukewarmness; but lukewarm as it was, this practice might still appear meritorious, so little was expected of it. But we were not what are called blasphemers, unbelievers; we had the faith of the collier; we preferred to rely on the curé rather than go and see. "Religion," said my uncle Brutus, "is as necessary to man as bread; it is as pernicious to him as poison." I don't know where he got this contradictory sentence, the value of which I was not then in a condition to appreciate. But I know very well that, while accepting the *bread*, without asking about the flour, we were very afraid of the *poison*, which held us perpetually on the verge of unbelief. The first however, and I believe the only one of the family so far, I have become really and truly an *esprit fort* and *the greatest blasphemer of the century*, as you have written somewhere. It is good that you know how it happened to me.

My first doubts about faith came to me around my sixteenth year, following the mission that was preached in 1825 at Besançon, and the reading I made of the *Démonstration de l'existence de dieu*, by Fénelon. Daniel Stern, in her *Histoire de la révolution de 1848*, relates this anecdote about me, which is true. When I learned from the Duke of Burgundy's tutor that there were *atheists* (I write this word *âthées* as it is pronounced in Besançon), men who deny God, and who explain everything by the declension of atoms, or, as La Place would say, by matter and movement, I fell into an extraordinary reverie. I would have liked to hear these men themselves defending their thesis; to read them, as I read Fénelon. A dangerous curiosity, if you like, which predicted nothing good, but which testified after all to my desire to educate myself and, I dare say it, to my sincerity: for, finally, if there was, whatever people say, no God! If there was anything other than God! or if God were nothing like what the people think and what the priests say! If the role that this mysterious being plays in the world were in the opposite direction to what our religion supposes! ... Where would that lead us? Where wouldn't that lead us?

In this regard, I will record here a fact that, despite my growing skepticism, I was unable to attribute to the *clinamen*. Being at college, I received as a prize, for five consecutive years, 1. three times the *Abrégé de l'Ancien Testament*, by Royaumont, 1 vol. in-12; 2. twice the *Vies des Saints*, extracted from Godescard, also in-12; while some of my comrades, better qualified, received good works of literature and history. If, I told myself, the *clinamen* was the law of the universe, just the opposite would happen. I, who am poor, and who cannot even buy my schoolbooks, I make a void, and the piles of prizes should fall to me because of gravity. So another force must turn them away. There is Providence here below!...

Ah! Would it like to make a Stanislas KOSTKA of the cooper's son?... This reflection, which was at the same time an explanation as such of the phenomenon, had a double advantage for me: first, to preserve me from envy, then to put me on my guard.

My biography cites another trait of the hardness of my soul:

“At the time of his first communion, Christian maxims cannot crush his pride.”

Would I be noted on the parish registers? Pest! What a policy!

I was a little over ten years old when I had my first communion, and had only read at that time the Gospel and the *Quatre Fils Aymon*. I was in the fullness of my innocence; and if the priest Sirebon, who confessed me, were in this world, he would tell you laughable stories. His prudence, of course, went faster than my thoughtlessness. The biggest sin that I remember is that at the Passion sermon that was preached to us two days before this big day, the girls, whose pews were placed opposite those of the boys, wept hot tears, and it made me want to laugh. Can you imagine those Madeleines from ten to eleven?... At that age, I could hardly understand the female heart and its precocious tenderness. Poor little ones! They are old at this hour. I would like to know how, with the ammunition of the catechism, they resisted the assaults of love, the seductions of vanity and the discouragements of misery.

Why shouldn't I own up to it? I have always had little taste for the works of the devout life: going to confession, taking communion, visiting the Blessed Sacrament, kissing the crucifix, witnessing the washing of the feet, all that displeased me; a profound antipathy for the clerks, beadles and churchwardens, all of whom I regarded as arrogant Tartuffes. I had observed early that there was no good God for his sexton; and I detested this church brood, which would have made me dislike even the most beautiful saints in paradise.

One of my friends, forced like me to make his first communion, had presented at the holy table Baron d'Holbach's *Système de la nature* on his chest, as a sign of protest. I was not of this strength, but I fought with the confessor, and I remember very well that one day when he scolded me for having eaten, in times of abstinence, potatoes cooked with pork fat, — you understand that we had nothing else, — I answered him: *My father, my Easter is not worth your Good Friday!*

While religion is lost for the people, it becomes for the rich, like music and fashions, an embellishment of existence, I would almost say an object of luxury. What could be the cause of this reversal? Is it *Voltaire's fault*? Is it *Rousseau's fault*? Or is it not rather that of the Church? We shall judge presently.

## CHAPTER ONE.

General idea of Education. — Intervention of the religious idea.

I. — After morals, the Church has always regarded education as its triumph; it is the most beautiful jewel of her crown. There is no one but her, to hear her, who knows how to bring up the youth, to train their minds and their hearts. You won't need a long speech to show that in matters of education the Church has no right to be proud, any more than in matters of morality.

First of all, what does the Church bring to the education of the subjects she nurtures? What does she provide of her own? What is her role, her specialty?

In principle, the education of the individual is homogeneous and proportional to the state of the species: it is the concentration in the soul of the young man of the rays that issue from all the points of the collectivity.

All education therefore aims to produce the man and the citizen according to a miniature image of society, by the methodical development of the physical, intellectual and moral faculties of the child.

In other words, education is the *creation of mores* in the human subject, taking this word mores in its broadest and highest sense, which includes not only rights and duties, but also all the modes of the soul, sciences, arts, industries, all the exercises of body and mind.

Now, it is obvious that ecclesiastical education does not exactly have the aim of fulfilling this program.

The Church, for example, does not meddle in the work of hands; she knows no industrial, agricultural, extractive or transport operations; running workshops, servicing offices, stores, etc. All this, however, composes the manners or forms of production, the influence of which is so great on the mind and the heart. *Apprenticeship* is none of her business.

The Church is no less foreign to the sciences. It may be that among her members she counts scholars, such, for example, as the famous Gerbert, who despite his reputation as a sorcerer was made pope under the name of Sylvester II. But it is not as priests that they are scholars; and it is a fact that for this knowledge, borrowed from elsewhere and which the Church qualifies as *profane*, they are no more esteemed. The Church, by virtue of her institution, never had the slightest initiative in science: she often persecuted it, despised it, for the services it rendered, without the privilege of the Holy Spirit, to humanity; and more than ever she is wary of it. When Gregory XIII wanted to reform the calendar, he turned to a non-ecclesiastical scholar, Lilio; when Galileo, pursuing the science of



Lilio, tried to accommodate it to the Christian faith, he was tortured by the inquisition; and when Mabillon, according to Genoude's report, prevented a Roman congregation from declaring heretical the opinion that maintains that Noah's deluge was not universal, it was certainly not as a theologian that he made himself heard, but as a scholar, and above all a prudent adviser. There would be no end to telling such stories.

However, we can say that science, like labor, also has its mores, the action of which on general morality is incalculable: it is its methods, its classifications, analyses, hypotheses, etc., the habituation of which will always make the mind balk at faith.

In what concerns the arts, the repugnance of the Church is still stronger. Inheritor of the Pharisaical tradition, she has always seen in painting and statuary aids to idolatry; and if Rome, from the fifteenth century, has relaxed, thanks to the emigration of the Greeks, the reform soon came to recall her to the severity of discipline. Moreover, modern criticism positively denies *Christian art*. The so-called Gothic architecture dates from the end of the Crusades; it was solemnly abolished by Brunelleschi and Bramante, who geometrically demonstrated its ineptitude, and never appeared in Rome. The painting begins with Giotto, a pupil of the ancients. Christianity can only become aesthetic by making itself pagan: so it absolutely condemns tragedy, comedy, opera, dance, gymnasiums; it proscribes even the novel; it would like to annihilate Greek and Latin literature. And the reason for this ostracism is obvious: the arts, auxiliaries to morals, tend to the exaltation of the human person, through the deployment of strength, talent and beauty, which is in diametrical opposition to the method of mortification and prayer that salvation requires.

What has the Church done in philosophy? Nothing: the question implies a contradiction. Philosophy, wherever it shows itself, is the extra-religious movement of the mind, the march towards science, an object foreign to faith. The Church is THEOLOGIAN; it is her specialty. She uses philosophy, but she is not a philosopher. Scholasticism, so famous in the past and so forgotten, emerged fully armed from the books of Aristotle, who came very close to being placed in the ranks of the Fathers.

Does the Church know Justice? Does it have jurisprudence? — Yes, you will say, there is canon law. Indeed, we have shown in our previous studies how the Church, by virtue of its dogma, modified the ideas of the ancients on Justice, in its relations with respect to persons, distribution of goods and government. But, without returning to the criticism we have made of this pretended reform, it suffices to observe that canon law is universally neglected and that, if the youth takes lessons in law and political economy, it is not from the Church that they demand them. The teaching of Justice, as well as its application by the courts, has always

been part of the temporal. Would you dare to treat this secularization as heresy?

The Church, in a word, is no more responsible for forming citizens than it is for forming producers and artists. This is not the object of her mission; and if we have seen subjects issued from the hands of the priests rise to a high degree of civic and human dignity, they did not derive this advantage from the Church; they were indebted to the energy of their nature and to the external influences that they received from all sides. Was it the Church or philosophy that produced this forever glorious generation of 1789?

I have just summarized in a few lines the main objects of education and teaching: labor, science, art, philosophy, justice, the latter including public and private morality.

But education also constitutes an art, the most difficult of all the arts; a science, the deepest of all the sciences. Education is the most important function of society, that which has most occupied legislators and wise men. Men need only the precept; in childhood there must be an apprenticeship in duty itself, the exercise of conscience, as well as of body and thought. The Church, as well as the university, has produced excellent teachers of youth: who denies it? It suffices to recall their master, Fénelon; and I know, without believing it, all the good that has been said of the Jesuits.

That is not the question. It is about whether education is in itself a religious and priestly profession, or a purely civil profession; if at least the Church, which claims the privilege, possesses, for the accomplishment of this great work, a method of its own, a talent, an aptitude, a genius that is her own and flows from her dogma or, to put it better, from the grace attached to her ministry. From Xenophon to Rousseau and Madame Necker de Saussure, the philosophical spirit has produced numerous treatises on education, which the Church has copied, imitated, modified or contradicted, just as others copy, modify or contradict the processes of ecclesiastical education. How is the Church essentially different from secularism and philosophy?

For me, I admit that it is impossible for me to recognize, here more than elsewhere, the slightest specialty. Ecclesiastical education differs from secular education only in the religious spirit and the habits of piety that are mixed with it: for the rest, the ecclesiastical masters proceed like the lay masters, to such an extent that in the episcopal colleges, apart from the duties of piety, of which the priest alone is the minister, the laity and the clergy are used indiscriminately for all the rest.

Thus, even in education, the Church, in order to be something, is forced to encroach on the secular domain; she possesses nothing of her own. So is the ideal that resides in her incompatible by its nature with any

practical and utilitarian element?

These eliminations made, what remains for the teaching of the Church and what does she do in education? What can be the object of her pedagogy?

II. — All practical morality rests on this first principle, common to philosophy and religion:

*Sin defiles the soul; living with it is worse than dying.*

Such is the *dictamen* of conscience, whether it expresses itself through the dagger of Lucretia, who kills herself for a defilement to which she has not consented, but whose stain remains on her; or if it breaks out with still more energy in the sacrifice of Cato, who, despairing of overcoming the tyrant, strikes himself rather than witness the rape of the republic.

It is fashionable among Christians to blame and vituperate these heroic suicides. Saint Augustine has found a way to joke about Lucretia; the troop of historiographers has rushed on Cato. Let us move on, if you like, to the very fact of suicide, which is a separate question, and let us admit that Lucretia, Cato, Brutus, all those great souls who, in the face of dishonor, did not haggle over their lives, if they had the advantage of being born in the faith of Christ, would have been able to do better than die. But is it not true that their resolution, such as it is, attests to the inner horror of the soul for sin and the essential quality of our virtue? *Potius mori quam fœdari!* Rather death than disgrace! A maxim as old as man, which bears witness to the soul's intuition of itself and its purity; a maxim that, if it is correct, creates ethics and pedagogy immediately and without further assistance; and, if it is false, involves them both. All our hygiene, and in case of sickness all our moral medication, is established on this foundation.

However, to this law, of a psychological order, Christianity adds a consideration of another order:

*Sin, it says, offends God, who forbids it, and sooner or later punishes it.*

At first glance, there does not seem to be anything here that affects the principle. On the contrary, to run away from evil and to practice good we have two motives, respect for ourselves and respect for the divinity. What harm can the second do to the first?

*Ne quid nimis:* I am wary of this dualism.

Let us not be astonished by this mysterious appearance of the divine idea; and since in matters of morality it is above all a question of ourselves, and secondarily of a so-called interested Other, let us reason about this Other, whom we do not yet know, with the dignity and coolness that befit a moral and free being.

First, what is God getting involved in? I have never heard that he

ordered me, on pain of lèse-majesté towards his person, to eat, to breathe, to sleep, to perform any of the functions that affect my animal life. Whether I enjoy or suffer, he doesn't mind; he leaves me to my own direction, under my exclusive responsibility. Why doesn't he do the same with my moral life? Are the laws of my conscience less certain than those of my organism, or more inviolable with impunity? When I do wrong, does not sin punish me instantly, with shame and remorse, as virtue, if I do well, rewards me with the opinion of my worth? *Nonne si benè egeris recipies, sin autem malè statim in foribus peccatum?* says Jehovah himself to Cain in Genesis. Do I not have enough, then, to observe my interior law, with this double sanction of joy and sadness; just as the double sanction of sickness and health is enough for me to cure my body?

From whatever side one approaches the question, either from the side of God or from the side of conscience, the motive of religion, for a soul who reflects and who respects himself, has the right to surprise. But here is what is even more vexing.

I want God to be as interested as people say in my moral life, when he cares so little for my organic life. What can this mean for my morality? For in the end it is not the profit that God can derive for himself from my virtue that is in question here, but my own perfection; it is only for my own good that God, joining his command to that of my conscience, commands me to be wise. That being so, I ask what will my obedience add to my value? Nothing at all. Before God, I am like the vassal before his suzerain. As long as I pay the tribute, I remain for this Majesty a submissive creature, a good servant if you will; I become a moral subject only insofar as, by a voluntary adhesion, I respect my self in its law: which constitutes between religion and morality an irreducible difference, which we shall soon see change into a veritable antagonism.

It is with the assent of the heart as with the adherence of the mind. Just as it is not by my faith in the revealed word that I make an act of intelligence, but by the judgment that I pass on this revelation; likewise it is not by my piety towards heaven that I perform an act of moral sense, but by my free virtue. Remove this freedom from my conscience and my reason, I am nothing more than a slave, an animal more or less docile, but devoid of morality, consequently unworthy of the esteem of its master.

I could support this analogy with a multitude of texts borrowed from theology and the Bible. Saint Paul wants our obedience to be reasoned, *rationabile sit obsequium vestrum*; he repudiates the servile faith. And the psalmist recommends that we constantly meditate on the law of God. How then can one not conclude, *a pari*, that obedience to the law being meritorious only insofar as it is free and the law is acknowledged by the conscience, religion, from the point of view of morality, is useless?

Let us observe, in passing, that the quality of God does not matter. Put

Jupiter or Allah in place of Christ; put Nature, Humanity or a figure without energy or authority: the result remains the same. Whatever the god and the feeling he inspires in me, as soon as I am no longer driven to do good by the sole inspiration of my conscience, the merit of my action is nonexistent; in the scales of justice, it is zero.

Thus religion, of whatever kind, natural or supernatural, positive or mystical, adding nothing to the morality of man, is useless for education. Far from serving it, it can only falsify it, by charging the conscience with impure motives and maintaining within it cowardice, the principle of all degradation.

III. — Thus speaks theory: what, in its turn, does experience say?

By dint of recommending piety to the gods as the fundamental point of morality, justice has imperceptibly been subordinated to it; respect for humanity and its laws has taken second place to the fear, always more or less interested, of superior natures; from this fear, by itself immoral, the priesthood has made the principle of virtue, *initium sapientiæ timor Domini*. What was at first proposed only as an auxiliary motive of attachment to good and horror of evil has become the principal and preponderant reason. Then, the intervention of the divinity in the inner life erected into an article of faith, the conscience faded; piety diminishing, morals have become corrupted; and man, for having wanted to give himself the support of an idol, has FALLEN: the so-called *original* sin has no other origin.

Such was the influence of piety during the first religious period, which embraces the twenty centuries before the Christian era.

The sequel can be guessed.

Demoralized by a first religion, the conscience seeks its salvation in a reform. It creates for itself a redemptive divinity, capable of restoring its primitive virtue, and of restoring justice within in. It is the work that Christianity, religion par excellence of the fall and of rehabilitation, was willing to undertake, by defining itself in the following proposition, which forms, with the two stated above, its pedagogy.

*Religion is the set of therapeutic and prophylactic means, taught by God himself, by which degraded man recovers his virtue and preserves his mores.*

Let us note the logic of this new system, to which all religions born and to be born tend fatally, as to their last form.

Man, though he was created in a state of innocence, not possessing in himself sufficient reason for good, could not fail to fail. It is therefore not to himself, to a virtuous reaction of his conscience, that he must ask for reparation for his sin; it is to the superior Essence, whose word has

kindled in the heart of man the torch of the law, and who alone, possessing holiness, can communicate to his servant, with the precept, the strength to practice it, to persevere in it, and if he deviates from it, to come back to it.

So that we can consider Christian education as a kind of mental allopathy, according to which man, attacked by a constitutional affection and currently prevaricating, is returned to the good, not by the energy skillfully excited by his soul, but by the application of the graces or medicinal virtues of the holy being, who is God.

This established, here is how the Church intends to combat sin, to form and support morals, to arm the conscience against its own weaknesses.

While secular education applies itself to molding man in his body, his intelligence, his social relations, by demonstrating the laws of nature and of the mind, the teaching of law and civility, the Church, by conjurations called *sacraments* of which she has the privilege, by the weekly and anniversary exorcism of her *offices*, by the practice of *mortification* and *silent prayer*, by the *direction of intention*, above all by an absolute *faith* in *revealed truths*, pretends to attack sin in its germ, to prune the will and to give to our inclinations all the morality of which they are susceptible.

Such is the object of Christian teaching properly so called: those who, intellectualizing more, have claimed to free Christianity from this ritual, and to reduce it to the pure love of God and to pure morality, have been declared quietists, atheists and, what is worse, immoral, consequently cut off from the communion of the Church and doomed to hell.

It is according to this principle that the principal founder of the Christian sect would have been, by a particular oracle, named *Iésus*, savior, liberator, healer, of the same name as the *Essenes*, in Greek *Therapeutae*, as if to say healers of consciences, by theurgic allopathy.

And it is to conform to the same thought that the said Jesus would have said to his disciples:

“Go, teach all the nations; baptize them (wash them, purify them), in the name of the Father, of the Son and of the Spirit, and communicate to them my ordinances. Those whose sins you forgive, they will be forgiven; those from whom you withhold forgiveness, forgiveness will be withheld.”

IV. — I confess, in spite of the respect that the name of Christ inspires in me, that neither my reason nor my conscience could bend to this system, the counterpart of which had been given in Upper Asia, several centuries before, by the famous Buddha.

Natural philosophy, from Bacon to Arago, has as its principle that if one wants to do good physics, good chemistry, good mathematics, I would even say, with Broussais, good medicine, one must abstain from all

ontological and religious speculation, never involving the idea of God or of the soul, the authority of revelation, the fear of Satan or the hope of eternal life. It is necessary to observe the facts attentively, to analyze them with exactitude, to define them with accuracy, to classify them with method, to generalize them with circumspection and to affirm nothing that cannot always, and at will, be confirmed by experience.

In agreement with these sages, and contrary to the doctrine of the Christian legislator, I maintain that the same must be done for morals, and that to address it through religion, as prescribed by Christ and Buddha, is to corrupt it...

Education is too vast a subject for me to be able to cover all its parts in a few pages. I will therefore confine myself to the examination of the following four questions, which seem to me to carry the rest:

How is man instituted by the Church in his conscience?

How, under this same direction, is he positioned with regard to society?

How, within nature?

How, in the face of death?

What I have to say about ecclesiastical pedagogy will allow us to judge, by way of opposition, what revolutionary pedagogy must one day be: for, alas! We must not refuse to face the fact that, even in the days of the proscription of the priests, the education of the people has not ceased to be Christian; and all of us, generations of 89, of 93, of 1809, of 1814, of 1830 and of 1848, we were made — posterity will say whether it was for our misfortune or our glory — *children of God and of the Church*.

## CHAPTER II.

The man within himself. — Symbolism of worship and prayer. — Dual  
Consciousness.

V. — The pedagogy of the Church, like its economy and its politics, therefore has as its point of departure the dogma of our innate malice, which is useful that I recall at this moment.

Man, through the infection of his nature, cannot by himself effectively will and do good.

There is not, said Luther after St. Paul, in the man not justified by Christ, moral virtue without pride and without sadness, that is to say without sin. So, we do not become righteous by doing what is just; but, having become righteous, we do what is just.

This principle admitted, the question of education is reduced for every Christian and, as we shall soon see, for every religious spirit, to teaching man, with the precepts of morality, which by themselves would remain powerless, sacramental or justifying practices, whose dispensation constitutes the proper specialty of the Church.

Well! This insulting doctrine, common to all religions up to and including deism, which makes man a subject incapable *a priori* of thinking his modes, of wanting them, of producing them, of remaining faithful to them, a subject refractory with regard to his own essence; perhaps my reason, overwhelmed by the deluge of crimes that covers the earth, would not have rejected this psychological contradiction, if at least it were true that it brought some alleviation to the tyranny of sin. But this is precisely what I deny: I maintain that, if by nature we are vicious and perverse, religion, by its method of justification, makes us worse.

VI. — Let us take our thoughts back to those nascent societies, where mores are barely taking shape, where conscience is still looking for itself. A man appears, poet, diviner, priest, master of ceremonies. He offers the astonished commoners, as supernatural powers, his unofficial mediation. First, he seizes imaginations with imposing forms: we see him bow down, get up, invoke the sky, as if he were talking to a character visible to him alone. He commands submission through terror, he captures confidence through mystery. Then, and this is the decisive, lasting part of his ministry, he endeavors to create habits of piety in the masses, to mold wills and minds by means of symbols and rites intended to constantly recall to the people, not the moral law, which he himself, priest of the Most High, knows little more than those in whose name he officiates, but the transcendental Subject of all morality and of all law. — Let us place



ourselves in the presence of God, said the priest, *Introibo ad altare Dei*: it is the summary of the ancient religion in its entirety. So that Justice, science of truth, whose name was engraved on Aaron's *rational* [pectoral]; morality, promised by the priest, and only figured in adoration, finds itself replaced by another feeling, the fear of God, works of justice by acts of *latria*, virtue by faith.

What now does Christianity, that law of reparation that was to reform and complete the ancient law, add to this? Correct me, Monsignor, if I miss one iota: because for you, as for the Revolution, it is of great interest.

Your whole religious science, like that of the good women who heal by means of secret formulas, like that of the magnetizers who act by fluidic emanations, is reduced to a repertoire of gestures and verbal formulas, in which you suppose, on the strength of your revelations, and provided that there is added a sincere intention, the property of curing the soul of sin and bringing it back to wisdom.

What a conscience is that of the Christian, with its arsenal of magic words, incantations, obsecrations and talismans, against the innumerable multitude of sins and demons! — This one, says the Evangelical Reformer somewhere, speaking of an evil spirit that his disciples had not been able to expel, this one cannot be conquered by the sole invocation of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, not even by the effective name of Jehovah: it requires prayer and fasting! — To curb the ardor of the young Tobit, the angel Raphael (the name of Raphael means medicine of God), after having smoked the nuptial chamber with the liver of a fish caught in the Euphrates, ordered the new husband to pass the first night of his wedding in prayer, kneeling on a prie-dieu, next to his wife. For some other devilry alms are advised. But see the slope! The virtue of almsgiving also has its limits: then give, give to the Church what, given to the poor, will not have been successful for you.... I abstain from any commentary.

VII. — Let us dwell for a moment on this theurgy, inseparable from any religious system.

The man who, having formed the concept of God through the activity of his understanding, then makes this concept intervene in his practical reason as the subject, motive and sanction of Justice; that man, as I said (2<sup>nd</sup> study), will be led sooner or later to put his concept in harmony with the function that his conscience assigns to him, that is to say that he will realize it in soul and in body, and finally will make an idol of it.

The substantification of the divine concept, consequently its animation, its personality, its incarnation, its history, all these mysterious concretions of which dogmatic theology is composed, have their origin in the attribution that primitive man makes to a metaphysical subject, other than himself, of judicial authority, which is his prerogative.

The same evolution, from the abstract to the concrete, is observed in the acts of worship.

God created for the imaginary need of his conscience, the believer concludes from it, he cannot not conclude from it, that a communication, a relationship, exists between his soul and the divinity. This relation, which the discreet theists enclose in the depths of the consciousness, and to which they attribute the virtuous inclinations of the soul, the man of a more radiant faith does not delay in discovering it outside of the consciousness, in the faculties of his being and the phenomena of nature. Everything is, for the true believer, a manifestation of divinity. And, as the distinction between spiritual and corporeal things is a pure fiction of dialectics, the theist, who admits the existence of relations between himself and the divinity, tends irresistibly to exteriorize these relations, to seize their trace in certain material facts, symbols, signs or vehicles of divine action, to which he therefore attributes the same efficacy as to an immediate impression of God.

Faith in the sacraments is therefore an integral part of faith in the divinity: which falls within the proposition previously demonstrated, that all *natural* religion, provided it has roots and develops a bit, will sooner or later become revealed religion; all worship in spirit will manifest itself as genuflection.

Now, what is the sacrament other than a pure fetishism? From the profession of faith of the *Savoyard Vicar* to that of the savage, there is only the distance from the principle to the consequence: by which we see that the more reasonable of the two would not be the philosopher, if it were not a law for philosophy to always begin with inconsistency.

VIII. — As water cleanses the body of its defilements, so, says the sacramentary, ablution performed according to the sacred rite, with faith or just the desired intention, purifies the soul of its original stain. What does religion teach us through this mystery? It is that in principle all nature is imbued with God; that the phenomena that surround us are relations, not only of the physical order, but also of the divine order; that, consequently, in order to obtain grace through the vehicle of phenomena, it suffices to unite ourselves in intention to the divine Mercy, at the same time that we fulfill, in body, the condition of phenomenality. This is why in the sacrament the *matter* is more than a sign or a symbol; it acquires a supernatural virtue, which makes it necessary for the accomplishment of the mystery. It is so true, for example, that water is indispensable to Christian regeneration, that if you remove the liquid infusion from the profession of faith of the neophyte, despite all the invocations, there is no baptism and sin remains. On the contrary, let an unbeliever, a Jew, a Mohammedan, baptize the newborn child, pronouncing over him the

formula: *I baptize you, in the name of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit*, and the child is a Christian, he is entered into grace; let death strike him, he will see God.

Thus religious thought, after having conceived the transcendental world, causes this world to produce, through the intermediary of visible creatures, supernatural effects. Hence the miracles wrought by the name of Jehovah, by the mantle of Elijah, the rod of Elisha, the nails of the true Cross, the bones of the saints; hence the virtue attributed to the holy chrism, to the holy oils, to the images, medals, scapulars, etc., which the whole Church considers, according to the pleasure of God, intermediaries, instruments or vehicles of the action of heaven. Hence, finally, among the ministers of worship and generally among all believers, a certain disposition to content themselves, on the part of the indifferent, with external demonstrations: they always hope that by the efficacy that it has pleased God to attach to the symbols of his worship, the material act, reacting on the will, will determine faith. A single appearance at mass, a semblance of confession, a trifle, is enough for their piety. They are accused of hypocrisy; this is wrong. What the worldly treats here with a grimace, and which on their part would be an indignity, precisely proves the sincerity of the faithful.

IX. — In 1848, when petitions rained down on the National Assembly from the four corners of France, asking that I be expelled as an *atheist*, I received a letter sent from the provinces. The writing was beautiful, the spelling impeccable; the style was rather distinctive. There was neither signature nor address; the author, however, was a woman and, moreover, she said, still young and living in the world, *who went to balls when there were balls* and who, since the Republic apparently, was only concerned with the things of God. In the fold of the letter, a medal of the Virgin, attached to a silk cord.

“You don’t want God,” she told me. “Wretch! What do you want then?... You do not know me, and probably you will never know me; but you have done me a lot of harm... I beg you as a favor, Monsieur, to wear this little medal, which is very precious to me, and our good Mother will save you in spite of yourself. I am sending it to you without my husband knowing, although no doubt he would have approved. Like you, sir, he is a man of intelligence, but with the difference that he believes in God and worships him.”

Immediately, I took off my coat, my tie, and I put the little medal under my shirt.... Now that the time is far off, I can’t help but shudder again at my imprudence. Can you imagine the atheist carrying a blessed coin?... Suppose that one evening, picked up in the street, dead or wounded, the neighborhood doctor had discovered this relic on my skin! What a scandal!

What conjectures there would have been!... I was a lost man. Well! Hard heads, as Christ said, body without souls, if I lost faith in God, I gained faith in humanity, this faith which is defined as Justice and Indulgence. What is the more or less superstitious devotion of a woman to me? What do her pretensions to sanctity and literature weigh in my eyes? I no more believe in her genius than in her miracles; but I believe in her heroism, in her devotion, in that superhuman tenderness that, despite her faith, protests in her against the damnation of the atheist; I expect everything from the virtue of her sacrifice, and I adore in her the conscience of the human race. This cord, this medal are ridiculous tidbits, but charged with the scent of a doleful and passionate soul, became for me a talisman that was to protect me from the excess of my anger toward man, and irony with regard to women. Certainly the miracle expected by my pious donor was not accomplished; she will at least know, if she reads these lines, that I have not failed in her wish, and that I will be able to boast, in the tribunal of the great Judge, of having had in my life a quarter of an hour of good will.

X. — I would not like to be accused of joking on a subject that lends itself so much to ridicule: licentiousness in matters of religion has been worn out since Voltaire. But who does not see that Christianity, the last term of paganism, of theism, is there in its entirety? Without faith in the sacraments, in relics, in images, there is no religion. And since there are no absolute limits, no distinctions between the world of nature and the world of grace, the same thought that led to this therapy of the soul being imagined suggested, for the satisfaction material interests, a multitude of practices equally authorized, if not commanded by the Church: so that we can judge by the character of the latter the value of the former.

He who has the power to save us from sin, the devotees said to themselves, can also preserve us from all illnesses and accidents. This principle established, recourse to the Divinity no longer has any limits. There are therefore formulas against the influence of the evil spirit, for all the circumstances of life: birth, puberty, engagement, marriage, pregnancy, childbirth, rest, weaning, illnesses, death; — for all actions: get up, go to bed, work, rest, visits, walks; — for all times: solstices, equinoxes, new moons, weeks, morning, noon, evening; — for all matters: when the king goes to war and when he returns from war, when a prefect is installed, when a bishop is enthroned, when a house is built, when a mine is opened, when a ship is launched, when a church is dedicated or a bell is cast; — for all accidents, bad weather and calamities, rain and drought, thunder, hail, frost, flood, fire, famine, pestilence, epizootic disease, etc. The newspapers once reported that a quarry owner, having had his work blessed by the Bishop of Viviers, witnessed by all his clergy,

detached from the mountain, at the moment of the benediction, a mass of one hundred thousand tons of stone: it is true that had taken care to set fire to a powder charge of 10,000 kilograms.

There are saints endowed, by divine permission, with special prerogatives for the preservation from plagues and diseases: shipwrecks, ferocious beasts, insects, fevers, wounds, scrofula, scabies, leprosy, malignant pustule, dysentery, epilepsy, hydrophobia; saints for sheep pox, farcin, tounil, rheumatism, hemorrhoids; patrons for all trades, corporations, parishes, cities, provinces and kingdoms. Christianity left nothing to do with politics, or economics, or insurance, or medicine, or strategy; it had provided for everything by its formulas: *Ite, docete omnes gentes.*

XI. — Is it for himself that man, this creature so beautiful in his body, so sublime in his soul, destined to become the generous type of moral life, plunges with a kind of delight into this ocean of superstitions!... Is he acting under the instigation of a jealous spirit, by a chastisement of the Divinity, or by some horrible conspiracy of the priesthood?

You would take me for some backward Voltairean, Monsignor, if, after having skimmed over your *religious instruction* with a smile, I did not give the psychological reason for it; if I did not show, even in this abasement to which man can be led by *Faith*, the grandeur of his thought and the poetry of his conscience.

Let us say it then, for the instruction of a Church ignorant of its own mysteries: there is really only one *quiproquo* to correct here. Change the address, and all this apocalyptic unreason becomes the epic of human virtue.

This source of all good and all holiness, which the religious soul calls its Lord, its Christ, its Father, it is itself that it contemplates in the ideal of its power and its beauty. Virgil puts it in his own words: God is the eternal power of mankind:

O Pater, d hominum divèmqe æterna potestas! (A)

These genii, these angels, these saints, who form the retinue of the Most High, are all the faculties of this soul, which it realizes and personifies, in order to invoke them afterwards as its patrons and protectors. This monster of ignominy that it calls Satan is still the soul, in the ideality of its ugliness. And this endless adoration, unintelligible to the priest as well as to the vulgar, is the perpetual hymn that it sings to itself to exhort itself to think well, to love well, to speak well and to do well; the *rhapsody*, always new, of its struggles, its miseries and its triumphs; the beating of wings that raises it towards the sublimities of JUSTICE.

Such a hallucination, you will say, would be more marvelous than

religion itself, the mystery of which is claimed to be explained in this way. Nothing could be more natural, however: you will be the judge.

From the moment that man, incapable at first of disentangling in himself the Justice of which he experiences the sentiment, is led by the constitution of his understanding to seek for it outside his conscience a subject in which it resides, as I have already explained (2<sup>nd</sup> *Study*, chap. 2), it is quite simple that he invokes this just Judge, both against the enemies who threaten him and against his own inclinations; let him ask his advice, let him beg him to strengthen him, to sustain him, to purify him, to raise him in virtue. It is therefore itself that the soul invokes, prays to and conjures; it is to its own conscience that it appeals; and, in whatever way the prayer is turned, it will only be the expression of the self that implores itself under the name of God; it will not even have any meaning, it will only be intelligible through this prosopopoeia.

An example, familiar to all my readers, which by itself sums up the whole of religion, the whole breviary, will make intelligible *this alienation* of the human soul, which, taking itself for an Other, calls itself, worships itself like the Eve of Milton, without knowing itself.

XII. — You who give confirmation to Christians, Monsignor, you know your *Pater*, no doubt; but, have you ever understood anything?

An appeal to sovereign perfection, an act of submission to the eternal order, of devotion to Justice, of faith in its reign, of moderation in desires, of regret for faults committed, of charity towards one's neighbor; recognition of free will, invocation to virtue, anathema to vice, affirmation of truth: the morality of forty centuries is summed up in these humble and moving words, which Christian tradition attributes to its Man-god.

What pains appeased, courage strengthened, resentments vanquished, doubts eliminated by the recitation of this prayer, more accessible to hearts than to minds! When the poor, debased, lazy liar approaches us, prayer on their lips, such is the grace of this truly evangelical word that we feel drawn, despite ourselves, to alms. *Pater noster!* Alas! with the exception of a few privileged scholars, this is all the people know of their rights and duties. After the Decalogue and the Dominical Prayer, nothing. Thirty-four lines in thirty-four centuries! Tell me, Monsignor, what are the priesthoods for?

Taken in the literal sense, as the Church takes it, the Lord's Prayer is only a web of silly, contradictory, even immoral and impious ideas. One can extract from it a dozen heresies, condemned by the Holy See; and it is perhaps by relying on the *Pater*, understood in the manner of priests, that Jérôme Lalande concludes that its author was an atheist.

But delve below the letter, always absurd when it is a question of prayer, and this same prayer will seem to you to have an incomparable

morality and rationality.

*Father!* — Father of whom, father of what? Does the Christian God engender in the manner of Jupiter, whom Homer rightly calls *father of men and gods*? This interpretation cannot be accepted. Should we take the thing in the psychic sense and say that the soul, an emanation of the divinity, here affirms its celestial origin? But the generation of souls by the Most High is no more understandable, and does not appear to be better established than that of bodies; moreover, the theory of emanation has been condemned by the Church, and I do not believe that philosophy dreams of restoring it to honor. Will it be said that Father here has the meaning of Creator? The idea, indeed, is orthodox; but there is no doubt that the religious soul, in speaking to his *Father*, means only that this father is also the author of everything. The Creator therefore does not explain the Father; and the continuation of the speech, the obvious intention of the text, demands more. What remains, if not to take the name of Father as a synonym of Sovereign, patron, master and, at the same time, model, according to what Scripture says elsewhere, *Be holy as I am holy*; it is in this way that, in the religious houses, the head is called *abbé*, or father; that in the confessional, the penitent calls the priest my father; that we speak of the Fathers of the Church, etc. Now, who is this father, protector and prototype of the soul that prays to him? According to the Church, it is God, a being apart, whom we assume to be all good, all wise and all-powerful, in whose image we are created, who is alone capable of understanding us and granting our desires. I maintain that this Father is nothing other than the soul itself, enlarged in its own eyes by the conception of the social idea or of Justice, elevated by this conception of right to be the equal of society itself, which, unable at first to recognize itself with this sublime character, calls out to itself under a cabalistic name, and prompts itself to virtue through the contemplation of its ideal. To say, after that, that it conceives of this *Father* as the creator of nature, amounts to saying that having attained through Justice the feeling of the infinite, positing itself as infinite, it brings into this infinity every cause, every idea, every power, every life, because the infinite must include everything, and infinity is one.

*Who is in the heavens.* — Someone in the heavens! The Jew, who made the heavens of metal, and lodged there as in a palace his Jehovah, could believe it; the first-century pagans and Christians as well. Nowadays, this material localization is impossible. Heaven is everywhere and nowhere; it is literally nonsense. It is therefore necessary to resort again to the figure: heaven is the summit of creation, the highest point of Olympus with several summits, as Homer says, Ἀκροτάτη κορυφή πολυδείραδος Οὐλυμποιο, all that is highest in the united kingdoms of nature. *Father who is in the heavens*, this therefore means: Sovereign essence, source of

all Justice, elevated above all creatures! — It is God, you will say again. — You go swiftly in interpretation, and you settle for very little. The soul can only believe, know and affirm what it feels or experiences; and the only thing of which it has any feeling here is itself; it is its self, which nothing equals in the visible world, and which it discovers through the telescope of transcendental contemplation. The soul acts here like the child who, learning to speak, before saying me, designates himself in the third person: will you conclude, on the naive word of this child, that he is double?

*Let your name be sanctified.* — The name, according to the energy of the oriental style, is the same thing as the definition, that is to say the essence. Now, to whom can the vow of sanctification be appropriate here? To God? It is impossible. God, despite all blasphemy and all idolatry, is inviolable. The soul therefore thinks in reality otherwise than it expresses itself; and when it says to its Father: *Let your name be sanctified*, it is as if it said to itself: Through the contemplation of my pure essence, let me sanctify myself and make myself more and more like myself, like my type, like my ideal! It is, in other words, what the oracle of Delphi recommended, with less emphasis, to the pious man, when he said to him: *Know thyself*. Whatever violence we do to words, we are no longer in heaven; the *sanctificetur* makes us descend into humanity: the Gospel and the Pythia agree.

*May your kingdom come.* — The kingdom of God is eternal, says Scripture; it does not fall in time. The proposition can therefore still only concern man, a progressive being, capable of advancing indefinitely in Justice, for whom the reign of God is nothing other than the exaltation of his own essence, and the development of his freedom. God, in this kingdom, has nothing to do.

*May your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven.* — The will of the Almighty cannot encounter any obstacle: taken in the rigor of the term, prayer would be an impertinence. On the other hand, the assimilation of the earth to the heavens is no better understood, unless the *earth* is taken in a figurative sense, as we saw earlier that *heaven* was itself taken. Let us suppose then that it is a question of the will of the just soul, a will beyond reproach like that of God, who is its figure; the thought, which just now seemed devoid of meaning, becomes sublime. May your will, O my soul, be accomplished in the lower region of my consciousness, as it occurs in the heights of my understanding! I see the good and I approve of it, says the poet, *video meliora proboque*; why must I follow evil? *deteriora sequor!* Is it chance that formed in the *Pater*, on the one hand, this incoherent series of unintelligible thoughts; on the other, this marvelous chain of moral, as well as rational, interpretations?

*Give us today our daily bread.* — The human species, bent under sin,



is a beggar: that is its whole argument in favor of Providence. But it is impossible, with the most robust faith, to admit a divinity occupied with these daily cares. God has established, from eternity and for eternity, the order of the world; he does not change it according to our desires, nor according to our merit or our demerit. We are falling therefore more and more into anthropomorphism, which is inadmissible to the orthodox faith. But this doubling, *today* and *daily*, that is to say from day to day, gradually, so shocking when addressed to God, the absolute Being, is high philosophy when applied to the being who passes, to humanity. It signifies, referring to previous propositions, that if the moral (divine) order, considered as a whole, is regulated according to eternity, in application it is only realized according to time. *Give me today my daily bread*, that is to say let me know today, and in all the circumstances of my life, what I have to do to obey the eternal order. Doesn't Christ say that he is the *bread of life*? It is the law of labor for individuals, of transition for societies, the most disciplinary, the most moral of all laws.

*And forgive us our debts.* — What account between God and man? What tenancy agreement passed between the finite and the infinite, the necessary and the contingent, the absolute and the relative? Where is this contract written? Who wrote the articles? Who signed it for me? Who will regulate the parties? What royalty is stipulated between the author of things and his tenant? I do not claim the eminent domain of this land that I plow while soaking it with my sweat: the nature that cast me there, and the labor of which it makes a law for me, are my only titles. But I don't know the proprietor... This first phrase is unintelligible: let us see what happens next.

*As we forgive our debtors.* — The correlation is flagrant. Thus my relationship with God is established because of my relationship with my fellow men. As I will have done to them, he will do to me. For the second time the order from above is declared to be the counterpart of that from below, but with this difference, that just now it was my will that had to be regulated by that of its God, its model, *sicut in coelo and in terra*; and that now it is the will of this God that announces that he must act according to mine. Who will explain this riddle to us?

Stick to the literal, and I challenge you to find the key. Return to the topical sense, and you will bow once more. The praying soul exhorts itself to good through the contemplation of its essential beauty; but at the same time it recognizes that it is subject to failing in the daily struggles of animal life. How will it recover from its falls? Through love. There is no justification for the man who does not love, that is to say who does not forgive, for it is all one; he who does not seek at the same time the realization of Justice in himself and in his brothers. Such a man is not a saint; he is a hypocrite, an apostate. *Save yourselves by charity*; this word

of the Gospel, put into song, is the principle of the new Justice, which achieves purification through forgiveness, contrary to the Justice of ancient times, which knew only how to hate and take revenge.

*And do not let us fall into temptation, but deliver us...* — This needs no further comment. That the feeling of our celestial beauty sweeps us away from the tyranny of inferior attractions: that is the meaning. It is a resumption of the first sentences of the Prayer, a ritornello in the style of the religious antiphons, and according to the rules of Hebrew versification. Theologians have built on this their theory of efficacious grace, without which man cannot do good or recover from his falls, but which never fails those who ask for it: absurd literalism, destructive of all morality, like any philosophy,

*From the Evil One.* — At the last word, the allegory shows itself uncovered. As the virtuous ideality has been personified under the name of Father, the contrary ideality is personified as the Evil One. One of the two personifications carries the other; and the prayer, going from thesis to the antithesis, but always remaining on the ground of allegory, ends as it began. Christians, following the example of the Magi, made sin a real being, created according to some, uncreated according to others, the irreconcilable enemy of the Father, all of whose faculties, passions and enjoyments are for evil, like those of the Father are for the good. It was logical. Whoever affirms God, affirms the Devil; but as the century no longer believes in the devil, and as the Church herself seems to be ashamed of it, I will be allowed to say in my turn that whoever denies the devil denies God, at least as preceptor, model and judge of our morality: as with all the rest I abandon it.

*Amen.* — A Hebrew word meaning *truly*. What! Truly, this string of mystagogical, incomprehensible ideas, I speak of the Lord's Prayer according to the Christian interpretation; this apocalypse, this gibberish, that would be the summary of my faith, the rule of my reason, the support of my virtue, the pledge of my immortality! O Father, who art in heaven! Truly, if I were a Christian, I would recite to you seven times a day the prayer that Christ, your putative son, taught us, only to obtain from you the understanding of it.

That the *Pater* is really has been composed by Jesus, as the compilers of the official Gospels wish; or that it should be seen only as an assemblage of formulas of prayer that have been current for a long time in the eucologes, as maintained by modern criticism, it matters little to my object. I look for the inspiration, not the style. Fifteen centuries later than the Decalogue in thought and date, it can be said that the Lord's Prayer is fifteen centuries earlier in form. It is morality in myth, like the speech of the serpent to Eve and the sacrifice of Abraham. Between Moses making Jehovah speak like a Roman praetor on his tribunal, *You shall not kill, You*

*shall not steal, You shall not bear false witness*, and Christ praying to his Father, there is as much distance as between the legends of Hercules, Perseus, Bellerophon, sung by poets, and the Peloponnesian War, told by Thucydides.

Is it then so difficult to understand that the man who prays to God is like the poet who invokes the muse, the latter appealing to his genius, the former to his conscience? Since old Homer, and probably long before Homer, we are no longer taken in by poetic fiction. Will we still be taken in much longer by priestly fictions? Our reason has certainly lost nothing by having begun to speak in prose. Are we afraid that our moral sense will succumb if we stop reciting paternosters?

When Sappho, in her ode to Venus, conjures the goddess of beauty to bring her unfaithful lover back to her, and she says to her: *Fight with me*; it is as if she were speaking to her own sex, whose invincible attraction is unknown in her person. When Hippocrates, in that magnificent oath which is like the hymn of medical conscience, invokes Hygieia, Aesculapius, all the divinities of medicine, it is as if he were swearing on his own life, whose mysterious powers make the object of his study. When Socrates recommends to his disciple Antisthenes to sacrifice to the Graces, it is as if he were saying to him: It is permissible for the philosopher to be poor; it is never permissible to be unpleasant and unclean. Would Christian worship be an exception to this series? But on what then do you establish the proof?

XIV. — Everyone knows, along with the *Pater*, the program of Christian devotion: *Credo, Confiteor, Benedicite, Gratias, Veni Creator, Veni Sancte, Sub tuum, Angelus, De Profundis, Gloria patri*, the parish office, hours, visits, rosaries, etc. Well! There is not one of these mystical recitations, the substance of which is common to all cults, that does not serve as a cover for some moral thought, which reflection has given a glimpse of, but of which theology causes the trace to be lost.

Everyone has heard of holy water, blessed candles, blessed branches, holy oils, holy chrism, medals, scapulars, reliquaries, crosses and signs of the cross, genuflections, prostrations, elevations of the heart, ejaculatory prayers. At this time the Church is working to bring back into force the holidays and working days, fat and lean, marriageable and unmarried; Advents, Lents, novenas, vigils or eves, morrows and octaves. As for the fasts, cilices, disciplines, abstinences, vows for a time or perpetual, they are no longer known except in the houses of profession. Well! Again, there is not one of these practices, of a fastidious or cruel devotion, that was not originally the symbol of some virtuous exercise, imagined to keep the soul in suspense, of which clerical materialism has not made, with time, an absurd superstition.

What has not been said for and against indulgences, a ridiculous conception, whichever way you take it, when you understand it in the sense of the Church; a sublime idea unworthily disguised, when we place ourselves in the point of view of the human soul, conceived as subject-object of all religion?

It is impossible for man to mingle with social life without receiving some defilement from it, and losing something of his innocence and justice. Is it necessary as a result to abstain, to go to the desert and live alone? It would be egoism, and it is impossible. We must act, fight, support the struggle against evil, with as little failure as possible, no doubt, but at the risk of the saddest falls. Honor to those who have won, and forgiveness to the fallen! But shame on the Puritans who abstain and claim, after the battle, the right to berate their brothers and command them! The first and greatest sacrifice that man owes to his fellows is that of his own sanctity: let him receive, therefore, in advance, the absolution of his faults, provided, of course, that he neglects nothing in preserving himself from evil.

Tetzel dishonored the indulgences; Luther, even more fanatical than Tetzel, misunderstood the mythology. Luther wanted to be more Christian than the pope; that is saying enough. For me, in default of other wisdom, I would prefer Rabelais and pantagruelianism to the whole Reformation.

The persons least versed in the science of the Scriptures know today what the sacrament of the Eucharist was, in its institution: a fraternal meal, a commemoration, a commitment. Among all peoples, participation at the hearth, at the table, in bread, in salt, was the symbol of hospitality, and like the seal of this first contract. Of all the ceremonies of this kind, the most solemn was the immolation of a victim, whose flesh, offered to the gods, then eaten, seemed an embodiment of the oath. Moses, having given the law to the Israelites, immolates a victim, with whose blood he sprinkles the multitude. *This is the blood of the covenant that Jehovah has made with you*, he said to them; and by this sprinkling binds them to the law. Jesus, posing as a reformer of Mosaicism, uses a similar formula; instead of the flesh and blood of animals, he takes bread and wine: This, he says, lifting up the cup, is the blood of the new covenant. He deliberately employs the expressions of Moses, so that we can understand his thought better, and so that we do not misunderstand the metaphor; he goes so far as to explain that bread and wine, flesh and blood, are only matter, signs in themselves without value; that the true food on which the faithful should feed is the word, better than that, the idea, intelligible food of the soul. There is not a word in the four gospels that does not relate to this interpretation, and not one that presents the slightest difficulty.

But such a rationalism would have been the destruction of the messianic faith. Jesus dead, they began by making him a redeeming

messiah; from this idea they passed to that of expiatory victim; as victim, he had to be eaten according to the ancient rite, according to which the victim offered for sin had to be eaten by the sinner: as if, in these bodies of Christians and Jews, Justice, morality, rehabilitation, could only have entered on condition of being eaten. And it will be the same with all consistent theism. Just as the idea of God, author and guarantor of Justice, implies that of the decay of man, it also implies the idea of sacraments: the sacrament of regeneration is baptism; the sacrament of expiation is penance; the sacrament of justification, by communion or the eating of God: it is the Eucharist. If God is the principle of our Justice, the father of our souls, the guardian of our consciences, the Eucharist is a truth. From there, this prodigious dogma of the *transubstantiation*, which we see emerging in Saint Paul, a fanatic who had not heard the master and was dogmatizing on his own account; which reached its perfection in the Council of Trent, and caused the Church and the Reformation to wander for two and a half centuries; hence, finally, that Eucharistic fetishism, for which the clergy reserves all its pomp, and which has not yet ceased to be an occasion of sacrilege, persecution and buffoonery.

I have spoken of this judgment of the court of Rouen that condemns a young man to six months in prison for unworthy communion. While I was at college, a pupil took it into his head to seal a letter with the host he had kept from his communion, and it seems that the same thing happened elsewhere more than once. This madman, whose name I could say, was punished much more severely than the one from Yvetot: he became a Jesuit! All this is nothing compared to that vicar who, unable to persuade a patient to receive the sacrament, administered it in spite of him, by infusing a host in his tisane. When will you blush, Christians, for all the blunders to which your superstition drives you?

*Lou bon Due ç'ost lou chaud*; the good Lord is the sun, said an old wine-grower of eighty, who every Sunday, while the others were at mass, took his basket and went through the streets to pick up droppings, which he then carried to his vineyard. Few people in our country of Christianity have seen idolaters: I knew this one. But was he more so than the Council of Trent, transforming consecrated bread into God; more than Luther, putting his God in the bread; more than Calvin, claiming in his turn that God was only represented by the bread?...

Humanity produces its gods, as it produces its kings and nobles; it makes its theology, as well as its economy and its politics, by a sort of infatuation with itself: it is always the story of Nebuchadnezzar, who goes into ecstasies in his glory and ends up eating grass.

If a man, among the savages, has faithfully observed during his life the rites of the jugglers, respected the *taboo*, offered sacrifices on the prescribed days, assiduously recited his prayers, he is a saint; his soul is

received in the abode of the blessed, while that of the impious is thrown into the dark abyss. The same belief reigns in India, in Tibet, in China, in countries subject to Islam, everywhere; it was that of all peoples formerly attached to polytheism, and Christianity has hardly added to it. Instead of seeing in this universality of superstition the scattered rays of a primitive revelation, is it not more judicious to grasp there the movement of the human soul, which, contemplating itself in the mirror of consciousness, first affirms itself as other, while waiting for analysis to teach it to recognize itself?

XV. — I conclude: religion, whatever its god, spirit or fetish; whatever the dogma, theism or pantheism, vitalism or socialism, resolving itself into a mythology of thought, divides the conscience: consequently it destroys morality, by substituting for the positive notion of Justice a notion that is illegitimate and introduced surreptitiously.

There would be only one case in which religion could be an exception to this rule, and that would be when it had conscience itself as its symbol or divinity, or, to put it better, Justice, in the abstract ideality of its notion; but then religion would be identical with Justice, which destroys the hypothesis.

This is why Christianity, whose God is taken as something other than consciousness, although he is a representation of consciousness; which, consequently, constitutes in us a double consciousness, the natural consciousness and the theological consciousness, possesses, in matters of morality, only the rudiments of truth, plus a symbolism or semiology, that is to say an affirmation figurative of Justice and Morality; but of true morality, none. The science of mores and the efficacy of the moral sense can be born only by the cessation of the myth, by the return of the soul to itself, which is, properly speaking, the end of the reign of God.

Thus man, insofar as he obeys his reason known as such, is moral; and he will become all the more so as, his reason extending more each day, he embraces its law with a more virile courage. His maxim of virtue is: *Works without faith.*

But insofar as the man follows his religious vision taken as a superior commandment, I say that he is immoral; and, as he can no more stop in fable than in truth, his immorality will be all the more profound as he serves his idol with a more complete abandonment of himself, with a more entire religion. The last word of his piety will be thus: *Faith without works.*

Duplicity of conscience, that is to say the annihilation of conscience, such is the fatal pitfall of any church, of any religion. What is called party spirit, spirit of sect, of caste, of corporation, of school, of system, as well as the theological spirit, leads there.

Now, conscience destroyed, Justice, the occasional cause of theological reason, damaged, religion vanishes in its turn and gives way to atheism, no longer that scientific atheism that consists, in the interest of truth and Justice, in eliminating from consciousness any consideration of the supernatural order; but this atheism, the father of crime, peculiar to subjects who have been taught that religion is the whole of morality and who, having worn out their faith, pass without hesitation from scorn for their idol to scorn for humanity.

I will not seek in the minor seminaries, the sacred hearts and other houses of education for both sexes directed by the clergy, examples in support of my thesis. Everyone knows what becomes of these runts of the Christian pedagogy, when, the time of generous outbreaks past, the failure of faith delivers them defenseless to the flames of immorality. But isn't modern society, so hypocritical, so cowardly, so desperate, a daughter of the Church? Were not our fathers brought up by her according to the principles of this sacred prophylaxis? And haven't we also, for a century, through criticism, science, liberty, exhausted what fervor we had? Now, now that indifference has invaded us all, is it not true that an incurable corruption devours us, corruption of the heart and corruption of the senses; vices that a once pious imagination alone could invent, and which the world, without religion, without the ideal that is its essence, would never have known?

XVI. — Religion and Justice are between them like the two extremities of the pendulum: when one rises, the other descends; this is inevitable. Do not cry at the paradox: it is the purest aspect of the doctrine of the mystics and ascetics that I have just summarized in this image.

It is not enough for the perfect to strive for the possession of God by the uselessness of his life and the annihilation of his will; he must prove his love by the annihilation of his own Justice, a false light, according to him, incapable of enlightening him on the way to holiness and beatitude. As he is dead to the world, to philosophy, to pleasure, to pride, the perfect must still die to consciousness; he would be unworthy of heaven, his virtue would stain the Divinity, if he preserved the least ray that was not of it. Thus, between the reprobate whom divine Justice delivers to hell and the chosen one welcomed by Mercy there is, from the point of view of morality, no difference: both have equally arrived, one by sacrifice, the other by impiety, the latter for glory, the former for shame, to moral austerity, to the annihilation of conscience.

Doubtless as long as the baptized, the redeemed, the confessed, the communed, the confirmed preserve the faith, one can hope that he will do evil only halfway: for, as for true Justice, in the faithful there is none. But what will happen presently, if this chosen vessel lacks perseverance?

Faith having passed away, Justice will return no more; and we will have in a living being what all human malice would be unable by itself to produce, an entirely gangrenous, rotten soul.

The absolute extinction of the moral sense, impossible in the man whom religion has not exhausted, is the proper evil of the devout; it is the plague of the priesthood. It is only among priests and pontiffs that these monsters are found in whom the reasoned practice of crime is an effect of atheism, itself an effect of double consciousness. The dreadful times of Alexander VI and Leo X are over: the Revolution separates us from them forever. Thanks to her, the purified Church will not return to these customs of Sodom. But let the Revolution weaken and, as the daily revelations of the Assize Courts say only too well, we would soon see multiply again that clergy, of every rank and every order, that religion, first embraced with exstasy and then lost without return, has broken in defiance of all social law, and for whom the exploitation of the multitude, the pleasures of the belly, rape, incest, adultery, pederasty, take the place of sacraments and mysteries. The secret of the Society of Jesus, disguised under its famous motto, *Ad majorem Dei gloriam*, has always seemed to me to be a pact of tyranny and debauchery, based on popular superstition and priestly atheism. (C) That I am wrong is the most ardent of my wishes, although the events that are happening at the moment in Belgium are not such as to make me reverse my judgment. The priest who believes in virtue through religion can always, as long as he believes, become a citizen and a just man; the priest whom impiety has rendered immoral is below punishment: all that remains is to suffocate him in the muck.

This sad end of religious education seems to have been foreseen by the apostles of Christianity themselves; something told them that faith is the tomb of morality. Hence the fiery dispute that arose between Peter, James and John, on the one hand, and Paul, the enlightened man of Damascus, on the other, over the preponderance of Faith and Justice. The first three, immediate disciples of Christ, witnesses of his invectives against Pharisaical hypocrisy, made good works all of religion; the apostle of the Gentiles, stronger in dialectics, maintained that faith alone gave virtue to good works and, taking his adversaries by their own maxims, he showed them that it was necessary either to abandon the law of Christ, and even of God, as useless or to recognize with him that man justified himself only by grace and that the first act of the Christian was to die to his own virtue. All of us who have received the baptism of Christ, he said, have buried ourselves with him; our baptism is the mortuary act of our soul: *Quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo, consepulti sumus cum illo per baptismum in mortem*. This is sung throughout the Church, on Easter Sunday, at the procession to the baptismal font: the Church attesting by this ceremony that she has agreed with Paul's opinion, according to which



man does not become a child of God except by renouncing his conscience.

## CHAPTER III.

Man before society. — Law of respect violated by ecclesiastical education.

XVII. — Whoever desires the end desires the means.

Do we want to form citizens or *subjects*? Workers or *paupers*? Heroes or *good men*? We have two roads to follow. If education proceeds from double consciousness, its path will be servility and hypocrisy, and none other; if it has Justice as its point of departure, without transcendental consideration, it will advance by liberty and virtue, and it will run no risk of going astray.

So which path will the Church take?

A society, as the Church can conceive it according to its dogma, requires individuals of various calibers: some cut out for servile and abject functions, which are naturally in greater number; others for average conditions; some for command, administration, fortune. All of the rest must be fashioned in such a way that, in the absence of zeal, their interests, their prejudices, even their vices, contribute to the general aim.

Ecclesiastical education will therefore have as its object:

1. The teaching of worship, that is to say the creation in souls of a second consciousness, dominating the natural consciousness: I treated this point in the first part of this study;

2. The accommodation to the spirit of the Church of all so-called profane studies and, as far as possible, their suppression, the positive and frank character of these studies making them incompatible with piety and faith. It is of this, Monsignor, that I must speak with you now.

Let us begin with primary education.

XVII. — Forty years ago, some friends of the people sought to introduce into France the method of mutual teaching, known as the Lancaster method. They understood that the *elements* of knowledge should not be limited to graphic signs; that in the child, as in the man, the reason cannot be split, and that with the reading, the writing, the grammar, the rules of calculation, it was important to add some notions of practical philosophy, all the better received in that they reached the soul of the child without the help of the master, by contact alone with his classmates.

In this regard, I would say that I am far from granting as much importance as is generally done to what the school of Fourier called the *blossoming and development of aptitudes*, and which Christian pedagogy simply calls the *search for a vocation*. I do not deny that it is useful for everyone that the individual draws from his faculties and renders to his

fellows the best possible service; but I think that, life being a fight, man a free being, it is for the fight that it is important to arm him; which will be done much less by the mind than by the character. It is therefore necessary that a man be prepared for all situations, and that he know how to show himself worthy and happy, if not triumphant, at the risk of being only an instrument in the hand of fate or, as the Christian says, of Providence.

M. de Lamartine writes in his *Cours Familial de Littérature*, February 1857 issue:

“Perhaps I would have sung an epic poem if it had been the age of the epic. But who is doing what he could have done, in this world where everything is built against nature? It is not me. We dream of pyramids, and we sketch a few molehills. Nothing exists but fragments in our destiny, and we ourselves are only a trimming of these fragments: every man, however gifted he may appear to be, is but a truncated statue.”

M. de Lamartine was brought up by the Jesuits: that would be guessed from his style, even if he did not take care to teach it to us. What a poor citizen is he who curses his century because that century has not made him a Homer! Well! What prevented you, great failed man, from being a Cincinnatus? Wouldn't that have been better for your glory and for the safety of the Republic?

“This method of teaching, I read, in connection with the mutual school, in an article in the *Moniteur* of January 30, 1853 by M. RENDU, very mediocre as regards instruction, is all-powerful for the education, *as far as character is concerned*. It is therefore the English system par excellence. As for me, said a teacher, I seek to cast iron in the souls of the children.”

Fifteen hundred mutual schools existed under the Restoration: all disappeared little by little, by the ordinance of April 8, 1824, which removed primary education from the University to give it to the bishops. I passed through this school, which had been established at Besançon by MM. Ordinaire: as Mr. Rendu remarks, the schoolchildren were not overwhelmed with lessons; none of them aspired to become president of a democracy or champion of an Iliad: they looked like little citizens.

Since 1824, the *Ignorantines* or *Brothers of Christian Doctrine* have invaded everything. I will say nothing of their teaching, where sacred history, the catechism, the exercises of piety, hold such a great place, where everything is subordinated to the meter of faith. Everyone knows that the year of first communion is lost for study; it is for the children of the people like a foretaste of conscription. But what we can affirm is that instead of this liberal and proud education promised by the method of Lancaster, the people receive, thanks to the Ignorantines, an education such as the Church and despotism demand. The child, who was held back

by the censorship of his comrades, who was so happily stimulated by their suffrage, has no motive left but a precocious superstition, the fear of humiliation, even of blows. Whisks, sticks, *genouillères*, tortures of all kinds, such is the ecclesiastical discipline, for the school and for the convent. The priest likes to chastise, correct, punish, strike; affliction of the soul at the same time as of the body, by kneeling, imprisonment, ridicule. The mores of the century put a brake on this afflictive and infamous penitentiary; but let us wait for the end.

“A judgment of the Court of Paris, handed down in 1838, notes that in the establishment of Saint-Nicolas, where more than three hundred children aged six to fifteen were brought together under Abbé Bervanger, the instruments of punishment were sharp-edged *genouillères*, and for more serious faults *improved genouillères*. The use of these *genouillères* was frequent, say the inspectors in their report.” (A. Guillard, *Elements of statistics*.)

We haven't forgotten the story of this dressed-up oaf who, in one of our establishments in Algeria, had students who had incurred a punishment tied to a horse's tail.

The Church, which teaches so little, has nothing to do with characters. Its purpose, loudly avowed, is *stupefaction*. Far from wanting to pour iron into the souls of children, she works to make a soft wax out of them. When the bishop Gaume, in his *Ver rongeur*, declaims against the classics, others, bolder, complete his thought and denounce reading. Science, they say, is bad for religion and order: what need are there for shepherds, farmhands, laborers to know how to read? The shepherd who looked after the cattle of the Roman nobility on the Apennines, the slave chained in the ergastula did not read. No one in the senate would have offered to show them letters, any more than to teach them arms. We know the saying of Pascal, the inventor of stupidity as a principle of religion: I do not find it good for the faith, he said, that we deepen the system of Copernicus. What Pascal said of astronomy can be applied to all kinds of books. We do not care that the people acquire reading habits; this is why we authorize the fewest possible newspapers, magazines, brochures, even when they are harmless and simply useful. There is talk of subjecting small literary journals to security and stamp duty. Against socialism, said M. Thiers, no doubt with more irony than hatred, I see only one remedy, war abroad and the suppression of the primary schools.

XIX. — In a certain department that it is useless to name, and I don't need to recount the era either, the prefect, being on tour, one day called together the mayors of an entire arrondissement. He congratulates them on the good performance of their fields and meadows, exhorts them to perseverance, and adds the following:

“By working well, my friends, you enrich yourselves, and, enriching yourselves, you serve the country and the State. Remain in your condition of laborers; guard yourselves, for your children, from the prestige of a useless science, proper at most to make ambitious and discontented men. A good farmer must know how to read and sign his contracts: more knowledge can only lead him to harm. It is the pretension to knowledge that makes the disturbers; that is where so many members of the opposition and revolutionaries come from. If among you there are such subjects, I urge you to let me know of them; I shall be able, in twenty-four hours, to rid your communes of them.”

The mayors look at each other, not knowing what to say. Finally, the most daring takes the floor; he thanks the prefect for his encouragement, of which he is proud:

“But,” he adds, “there is one point on which we cannot agree with you, *Monsieur le Préfet*, that of the education to be given to our children. Let me tell you the reasons.

“We cultivate better than our fathers did, we know that; but we also know that it is to the instruction they gave us that we are indebted. We therefore believe that, just as our fathers were right to want their sons to know more than they, we are not wrong ourselves to want our children to know more than us. The progress of our agriculture depends on it.

“You have noticed, Mr. Prefect, with what care our irrigation canals were built, our inheritances marked out, surrounded by ditches. However, we could not have carried out all this work if we did not have some notions of geometry, because it would be impossible for us to pay surveyors.

“You seem to fear that the education acquired will lead us to take a dislike to agriculture and to leave our fields. Think again, Mr. Prefect: it’s just the opposite that happens to us. We know how to appreciate our position and estimate at its true value the condition of the inhabitants of cities, and if we aspire to educate ourselves more, it is to attach ourselves ever more to our profession of plowmen.

“As for the spirit of opposition that you dread, we are convinced, *Monsieur le Préfet*, that a large state is governed like a small one; and our habit is to put in our municipal administration a great deal of gentleness, conciliation, above all regularity, calling, moreover, everyone to the council. It is the only way to make everyone happy, to avoid jealousies and hatred, and to live together as if we were just one family...”

Which of the two, the prefect or the peasant, do you think, Monsignor, is the moral man and the statesman?

But what am I asking you? Your opinion is not in doubt: you are one of the principal agents of the organized persecution against science. In Franche-Comté, it is under your eyes and with your authorization that this happens, the priests search the schools, remove all the books they find incompatible with the spirit of the Church, or useless. Do you deny the

fact, Monsignor?... One cites for me, among others, the arrondissement of Montbéliard, where country children are no longer received in schools after the age of fourteen. I heard it from a bourgeois friend of mine, prudent and circumspect in character, the most honest man in town... Elsewhere, a teacher assures me, it is forbidden to teach arithmetic in these primary schools; the monopoly of calculation is granted to the sons of the bourgeois. In Lombardy, under the protection of the Austrian sword, the bishops, bad citizens, but devoted to the emperor and to the holy see, do no worse. Protest then, archbishop, against these facts of which any Frenchman can draw up a list today; protest, I tell you, not only by a denial bearing your signature, your seal, and the countersignature of your Vicar General, but by a vigorous organization of education, in conformity with the rights of man and of the citizen.

It is also said that the young men of your college have great difficulty in obtaining their diplomas. It's probably because the teachers give too much time to the Christian way, and not enough to the way of man. I have known in my classes young people who have returned from the Jesuits, pretty little tartuffes, my goodness: they weren't sixteen years old, they rolled their eyes and had taken on the trick of hypocrisy. One cannot belong to science and to salvation; and I doubt whether the handsome young men sent from Paris to Chartres for the procession of the Black Virgin will become heroes or geniuses.

"In the primary school," says M. de Magnitot, "teaching must be directed in such a way as not to produce any change of class"

M. Blanc Saint-Bonnet formally asks, in order to accomplish the FRENCH RESTORATION, four things:

*Unlimited liberty for the Church;*

*Limited liberty for all the rest of the nation;*

*Superior instruction for the aristocracy, on the condition that the Church gives it;*

*Ignorance for the commoners.*

And to ensure the latter, he advises: 1. *To accomplish a seizure in France of all the bad books;* 2. *To immediately dismiss all primary teachers from the normal schools.*

This is published in a fine little volume; and there is not a Christian who protests, a priest who disapproves, a journalist whose blood rushes to the brain, and who dares to call upon the authors of such outrages the thunderbolt of public reprobation!!!

XX. — Since the Church, through the organ of M. Blanc Saint-Bonnet, recognizes that a sum of instruction is indispensable, at least for aristocrats, we must see what this instruction granted by the Church to its

predestined is. Can you believe it? It is worse than the ignorance reserved for the poor. Here is the program, collected from a series of facts made more or less public and from official acts:

*a.* Elimination of philosophy and history courses.

*b.* Application of the progressive tax to studies. Imitated from the pontifical government.

“The University of Rome, says M. A. Guillard, is affordable only to lords. To be admitted, you must have an income of... scudi; the number escapes us, what does it matter? It is enough that the desire to learn be taxed and repressed as a need for luxury.”

*c.* Forbidding lay teachers to give individual lessons.

*d.* Recommendation to teachers of mathematics to confine themselves to the teaching of arithmetic, and to avoid philosophical considerations touching certainty and method. I collected the confession of a professor and the complaints of several students from the *École polytechnique* and the *Conservatoire*.

*e.* For greater security, establishment everywhere of ecclesiastical colleges, minor seminaries, religious institutions, in competition with the lyceums and in place of lay houses. According to the *Almanach du Clergé de France* for 1856, cited by the *Siècle*, the number of colleges, institutions and boarding schools owned by the French clergy, amounted, at the beginning of last year, to one hundred and sixty-six. not including the minor seminaries or ecclesiastical secondary schools, the major seminaries, the innumerable establishments directed by religious corporations, the schools held by the brothers of Christian doctrine. In the department of Saone-et-Loire alone there are, I have been assured, sixteen Jesuit establishments.

*f.* Dismissal of teachers suspected of philosophism. In Ghent, the University was suspended by the Pope until the expulsion of two professors designated as hostile to the Church and to the faith. Among us, there will soon be no more philosophers in education; there will only be thurifers.

*g.* Emendation of history, according to the system of Loriquet.

*h.* Expurgation of the sciences, in accordance with the texts of the Bible.

*i.* Mutilation and distortion of authors. See in the *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, in an article by M. Cyprien Robert, professor at the College of France, in what way the Latin clergy devastated the monuments of Slavic literature, wherever they could reach them. And do not believe the Protestant devotion less subject to vandalism, where the interests of its faith seem compromised. A friend of mine, who visited Egypt, told me that the famous philologist Richard Lepsius, sent by His Majesty the King

of Prussia to study the hieroglyphic monuments, never failed, after taking copies of the inscriptions, to break with blows of a hammer these venerable characters: a sure means of cutting short any subsequent discussion. The hieroglyphs could be used to confirm the statement of Manetho, who, assigning to Menes more than six thousand years of date, therefore carried him well beyond the deluge and the creation itself. Mr. Lepsius has rectified this chronology, and is not afraid that another will rectify his own. Unfortunately, the fraud is known, and Mr. Lepsius can boast of having worked, as we say on this side of the Rhine, *for the King of Prussia*. (D)

*j.* Emendation of the classics; in certain small colleges, they are suppressed purely and simply, according to the system of Gaume.

*k.* Burning of books: there are societies for the repurchase of dangerous books, which are immediately delivered to the flames. The day will come when the public libraries will be sorted, and the works pointed out to religious vindictiveness will be pulped. Already, note has been taken at the Imperial Library of the nature of the books requested, for the communication of which readers are required to give their signature.

*l.* Censorship of booksellers: a bookseller, to whom a writer in distress offered his library, refused to buy Diderot, Voltaire, Volney, etc., saying that the sale of these authors was prohibited.

*m.* Policing of peddling: under the pretext of protecting morals, the circulation of any writing opposed to the system is prohibited. (See the circular of the Archbishop of Milan, December 25, 1855. See also the application of the law on peddling, throughout the French empire.) (E)

*n.* Obligation for students and teachers to fulfill the duties of worship. In Péronne, the rector requires his subordinates to go to confession and celebrate Easter. Soon the teaching profession will be placed under the regime of primary school teachers, subject to general retreats, like the one that took place recently at Lons-le-Saulnier, from which they emerge, if not better, certainly exhausted in mind and body.

*o.* Forbidden to receive in the same schools pupils of different faiths. (See the circular of the Bishop of Arras, in the *Presse* of August 8, 1856.) Renewed means of Louis XIV, after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes: No dissidence, or no school.

*p.* Proscription of distinguished subjects, unless entirely submissive to the Church. — Two students were refused in the contest for Normal School because of their *unusual ability*.

*q.* Formation of subjects devoted to the clergy to fill all the faculties, according to the vacancies, the functions of the teaching profession.

Moreover, the Church treats its shepherds like its sheep. I am told of a young ecclesiastic who was unable to obtain permission from his bishop to take his bachelor of science degree; for this he had to change dioceses.



To these means of prevention are added encouragement, I use the term honest, and, if encouragement is not enough, repression. For the masters, there are promotions, cumulations, university privileges, classic monopolies, patents and pensions; — for students, diplomas, appointments, exemptions from military service, wealthy marriages, etc.

Everything is combined to make studies at once onerous, intolerable and insufficient. On the one hand, the professors complain of the debasement of public instruction; on the other, the students cry out against the excessive conditions imposed for obtaining diplomas. The youth of the schools are treated like the hunters of Africa, subjected to a purifying gymnastics, where the middling and the weak succumb. Don't we have any left?

And note that one cannot accuse the Emperor's government exclusively of this obscurantism, rather than that of Louis-Philippe, rather than that of the Restoration. The power has its share of responsibility, which I fully intend to leave to it, but the system comes from above and carries along the country and the State. In certain departmental capitols there is a Jesuit college and an imperial high school side by side: the prefect, obeying the spirit of the time more than that of his job, a bad courtier but an excellent Christian, entrusts his son to the reverend fathers, he attends the distribution of the college prizes, and does not appear at that of the lyceum. Isn't it clear that the empire is only an instrument directed by the counter-revolution?

In Paris, institutions for young girls will soon be run exclusively by nuns. For these, no diplomas are required, no conditions of knowledge, morality or method; clothing takes the place of everything; no inspections: a young girl can be put in the *in pace* without either the family or the imperial prosecutor knowing anything about it. On the contrary, for lay teachers, repeated, formidable examinations; dearly bought diplomas; frequent, severe visits from the study room to the kitchen. The quality of secularism in education is a cause for suspicion.

XXI. — What the ancient Church did in the memorable periods of Constantine, Theodosius and Attila — destruction of books, monuments, inscriptions, pictures, statues, temples; condemnation of ideas, persecution of authors — the modern Church begins again, with as much fury and more skill than ever. And the work of darkness advances rapidly, if, however, it is permitted to judge the effects of the obscurantism by those of the education, as one judges the contrary by its contrary.

Mr. O'Moore, former Viceroy of Ireland, said in my presence that in twenty years Catholicism would have disappeared from the island. The means employed for this is simple: numerous primary schools have been founded, of a superior power, in which, because of the difference in

worship, it has been agreed that religion should not be spoken of to the children. Religious instruction forms a separate object, reserved for priests and ministers, as in our high schools for the chaplain. The school time elapsed, Protestantism appeals to these young reasons, who owe to it the ability to read and think for themselves; it distributes its Bibles, provokes the examination: for Catholic souls Protestantism is emancipation; so many readers, so many defectors. It suffices for a dogma to appeal to reason for reason to prefer it and, in the absence of philosophy, to attach itself to it. Already, in 1852, Mr. O'Moore had observed that, out of a population of a hundred thousand souls, the Catholic Church had only blessed four or five marriages, while in preceding years it was still several hundred. (F)

This system of school neutrality has been adopted in Holland: there too Catholicism encounters light and liberty as adversaries.

“In the greater part of Germany, the laws oblige parents to send their children to school, or to furnish proof of the instruction they receive at home. These laws date from the origin of Protestantism. (G) In Saxony, the Elector Maurice converted the great convents into schools, without touching their endowments; the prebend that fed idle monks, useless to the state, now maintains the functionaries who render the most useful and laborious services to it.” (A. GUILLARD, *Éléments de statistique*.)

In France we follow a diametrically opposed system.

Since the expedition to Rome in 1849, the great nation seems to have taken it upon itself to bring about the counter-revolution over the globe: to begin with, it puts on a frock, takes off its shoes, shaves itself, hoods itself, becomes Jesuitized. In the latest meetings of the medical board, it has been noticed that the number of young people who cannot read has increased. At the same time that the condition of professors and schoolmasters is diminished, the endowments and salaries of the clergy are increased; we deliver up teaching, the future, to a corporation that in 1851 numbered 82,000 subjects, and whose income, in property, *casuel*, allocations from the budget of the communes and the State, reaches at least one hundred million francs.

With a staff of 82,000 agents, which in twenty years will have doubled;

With an income of 100 million, which will triple;

With the privilege of primary instruction, the adulteration and repression of higher education, the gagging of the press, the censorship of books, the sorting of libraries, the corruption of the teaching body;

With the complicity of the bourgeoisie and the support of four hundred thousand bayonets,

The Church, in twenty years, will have done with emasculated and

tamed France what she has done with Italy, Spain, Ireland, what she is doing with Belgium, a *stupefied* nation: a society composed of proletarians, privileged people and priests, which, no longer producing either citizens or thinkers, devoid of moral sense, armed only against the liberties of the world, will end up raising against it the indignation of the dissenting races, and be dragged through the mud of history.

XXII. — What the Church strives to inculcate in minds by what she calls her teaching, she shows to the imaginations in the figures and ceremonies of her worship.

In order to raise the old world and maintain it on its basis, if ever this great enterprise is accomplished, the first thing, according to the Christian spirit, is to re-establish, along with the principle of authority, the principle of hierarchy.

“When the aristocracy of a society is lost,” says M. Blanc Saint-Bonnet, “everything is lost.

“When a people can no longer provide an aristocracy, it is because it is exhausted. And it is a sign of decadence when a people envies its aristocracy.

“It is necessary, in order to save us, that the bourgeoisie must become ennobled: it is the nobility that founded the nation.” (*De la Restauration française*, Book 3.)

And in order to make a new feudalism for the bourgeoisie, we know the procedure to follow (see the *Manuel du Spéculateur à la Bourse*): all that is missing is priestly consecration. It will not be lacking.

What is the cult? A representation of society.

The man who, according to the prescription of the Apostle, has stripped himself of his natural conscience and who has put on the theological faith like a breastplate, is no more than a puppet dancing before his idol, as David danced before the ark, much to the pity of his wife Michol.

Let us enter the church during the service, on the day of a great feast. Seats are distributed according to dignities: work bench, stalls for fabricators, churchwardens, prefects of congregations, civil and military authorities; the middle class has chairs paid by the day and by the year; the multitude, standing or crouching, crowds behind the pillars, at the back of the chapels, out of sight of the high altar and the pulpit.

At the sermon, if the lord, prelate or prince is present, the preacher, who is supposed to speak for everyone, addresses him by name.

At the offering, the luminaries each receive the incense separately; while the people are regaled en masse with the last of three strokes of the censer.

It is thus that the Church instills in souls respect for hierarchy. How

many times, but in vain, the conscience of the people has grumbled about it!

In 1830, a few days before the July revolution, the Duchess of Angoulême passing through Besançon, I witnessed the scandal caused to our wine-growers, the *Boussebots*, by Bishop Cardinal de Rohan, when he received the princess under the porch of the cathedral with the incense and the canopy: it seemed to them that such an honor should be reserved for God. The Revolution, as we saw a few weeks later, at the demolition of the mission cross, infected those heads!

Who has not observed the order of the processions? The commoners in front, by age, sex and associations; then the religious orders; then the clergy, massed near the dais, surrounded by the magistracy, the chiefs of the army, like bodyguards. Always the gradation of ranks and castes. While the youth of quality, powdered, curled, dressed in dazzling albs, girded with belts of silver and gold, carry before the Blessed Sacrament the cassolettes where the perfumes burn, little poor people caught among the charcoal burners and blacksmiths are responsible for the embers and tongs. I remember that one day, no gamin wanting the commission, I bravely offered myself with a comrade to fill this office, the procession could no more do without the stove than the monstrance. It seemed to me that, following the example of I don't know which old man to whom his fellow citizens had entrusted the cleaning of the sewers, I was going to illustrate my position. Everyone, the abbots like the others, laughed at me. What was I thinking of imagining that Christians were equal before the Blessed Sacrament? I had chosen to be despised in the house of the Lord, *Elegi abjectus esse in domo Domini*, and I was despised; it was justice.

The Corpus Christi procession provided Chateaubriand with the most beautiful of his amplifications. It was not without concentrated anger that I read, at the age of twenty, the works of this phrase-monger without conscience, without philosophy, whose whole dignity was in the eloquence. This then, I said to myself, is what one leads the nations with! Those of 89, witnesses of feudal tyranny and the corruptions of the priesthood, would not have been taken in by this tinsel; it is enough, in 1804, for a Jacobin soldier to call himself emperor, to change feelings and ideas. Those who had been emancipated by philosophical reason were seduced in their turn by literary fantasia. What genius, indeed, in Christianity! What poetry in this feudal world! What beautiful things are the chimes, the rattle, the Yule log, the bean of the Kings, the ashes of Lent! These wretched classics, for three centuries, had not thought of it; the romantics will live on it for fifteen years. O holy abodes of monks, arise! The fathers have auctioned you off in their madness; the sons will restore you in their repentance.

The hierarchical insult pursues man to the cemetery. Funerals, like

weddings, are of several classes. In a village in Picardy, the priest, in order to mark the scale of the rows, took it into his head to have the funeral processions follow two different paths: one steep, narrow, and in a straight line, for the poor; the other developed into a broad and superb curve, for the wealthy. The mayor, liberal spirit, from whom I hold the anecdote, wants to oppose this abuse of distinction; he orders that the high road be followed by everyone. Denunciation of the mayor to the prefect by the parish priest; interpellations of the prefect; explanations given by the municipal leader. The priest wins his case; and the mayor, suspected of revolutionism, is forced to resign.

XXII. — I read two volumes published by Bishop Dupanloup, Bishop of Orléans, on the *Haute Éducation intellectuelle*; and however unwilling this prelate may be to do me justice for justice, I have no hesitation in saying that I found some very good things in his book.

I agree with him on the preponderance of the *Humanities* over the sciences. I only believe that it is possible, without tiring the pupils, to melt into the Humanities, from the *seventh* year onwards, a dose of science more considerable than was done in the past. What is bad for young heads, what overwhelms and suffocates them, is not so much the multitude of things they are taught as the multiplicity of courses, faculties and divisions.

I am also grateful to Archbishop Dupanloup for wanting to repair, as far as it is in him, the wrongs of Bishop Gaume with regard to the classics, although at base Bishop Gaume seems to me to be more consistent in his way of seeing and more Christian than Bishop Dupanloup.

I applaud moreover, and without reserve, what the learned bishop says of *Authority and Respect* in education, and am in no way afraid of the name of GOD, which he places, like an epigraph, at the head of his excellent pedagogy. It is so easy to translate the name of God, to give to this sign a rational, social, psychological, even physical interpretation, that it would be necessary to be very fastidious to look for quibbles on this subject with the pious Director.

Yes, it is in the family and in the school that authority has its home: if it confines itself there, it will never be anything to be feared. And in order to explain this authority, I do not need to relate it to a mysterious, divine source; it results from the child's weakness and inexperience, from the affection of the father who represents him, from the responsibility of those to whom the father has entrusted the child, from the law of nature that has thus united the generations to each other, from the conditions of the human spirit, which always begins by believing as stated what later he will have to affirm by reason; finally, from social solidarity.

Yes, finally, I proclaim with Mgr Dupanloup that the basis of all

morality is in respect: what then is the Justice that I defend, if not respect for man?

But here I stop my author and ask him:

Do you seriously believe that respect can exist in Catholicism? And, however much trouble you take in your seminaries to inculcate its maxim, can you deny that it is constantly contradicted by your social practice, by your discipline and by your dogma?

Can there be respect in a system where conditions are declared, by divine authority, to be unequal? In a system where the education given to the multitude, with a view to hierarchy, consists of a kind of moral and intellectual castration; where the young of the people are brought up for exploitation, like the young of animals for consumption?

What is respect? Mgr Dupanloup, such a skilful Latinist, knows it better than anyone: it is equality of consideration. — *Respectus*, from *re-spicere*, is the gaze of a man who, as he walks, turns around, so as to salute the person passing by him. He who goes straight on his way, without looking at anyone, like the soldier on drill, lacks respect. The sideways glance is a sign of fatuity, of deceit, just as the downward glance, *suspicio*, is one of mistrust and hatred. Similarly, contempt, in Latin *despectio*, is inequality of consideration. *Despectio*, from *de-spicere*, looking up and down. From contempt, hatred or cunning to respect, the difference is from the oblique to the horizontal.

What respect then, I do not say from master to pupil, from father to child, since, by the nature of things, the pupil must one day be the equal of his master, the child sooner or later replace his father; — but from the individual of superior condition to that of inferior condition, if the second should never rise to the level of the first, except by the favor of the prince or the predestination of God?

What respect from the noble to the commoner?

What respect from the rich to the poor?

What respect does the bourgeois master-juror have for the proletarian whom he pays?

What respect does the officer brought up at great expense, in the special schools of the State, for rank and for glory, have for the conscript who does not know how to read and only asks for his leave?

What respect from the believer to the free-thinker, from the theologian of the Sacred Congregation to the philosopher whose writings he condemns?...

Mr. Guizot, who always has great words at his service when it comes to asserting an untruth, dared to write:

“Catholicism is the greatest and holiest school of reverence the world has had.”

Yes, if by respect you mean the salutations, genuflections, and all the grimaces of childish and Christian civility. Isn't the supreme *bon ton* for a great lord knowing how to say *hello!* in as many different ways as there are degrees on the hierarchical ladder? M. Guizot calls this science of airs and graces respect! For us, men of the Revolution, it is insolence. Alas! The dynasty of Orleans would still reign if its Prime Minister, when he ascended the tribune, had not had two ways of saluting, if M. Guizot had not stooped so low while speaking of the king, while he stood so stiff in responding to the nation.

XXIV. — But I realize that we no longer get along. What human language, with more or less accuracy, calls respect, derives, according to the priest, from *religion*, that is to say, to speak like feudalism, from the *homage-lige*, which, beginning at God, ends at the bastard of the slave girl, and necessarily implies inequality. According to us, on the contrary, respect derives from the *jus*, that is to say from the virile dignity, declared by the Revolution to be identical and adequate among all men. Sons of the Revolution, we affirm equality, which the sons of religion deny in the name of their faith. This is why they accuse us of having destroyed respect, and why they regard us as infamous, in our life, in our soul and in our body, barely worthy, after our death, to be removed by the trader in rubbish. Not a day goes by when they don't insult us.

The Revolution, by declaring liberty of conscience, made cemeteries public property. The Church, not content with leading the rich and the poor there by various paths, claims this property as holy, and claims to keep the unbelievers away from it. In Chelles (Seine-et-Marne), an old colonel refuses, on his deathbed, the help of religion. The priest had the corpse thrown into a corner reputed to be infamous since the burial of one who has been guillotined. The mayor, donning his sash, had to order a grave to be dug in a decent place, and by his official intervention saved the body of the freethinker from the insult of the priest.

It seems, however, that the Concordat having regulated, with the approval of the pope, the relations between the Revolution and the Church, the clergy should respect this law, received by them with so much joy. It is not so.

In Saint-Étienne, there is a college of Jesuits, under the invocation of Saint Michael. However, just as the Church loves processions, the Reverend Fathers love the theater. I have before me a show bulletin, the *VENDÉE MILITAIRE*, a drama in five scenes, with songs, played by young people from the college, belonging to the first families of the country. All the relatives and friends, to the number of five or six hundred people, attended the performance, which doubtless was not ignored by the police. But the power only got angry when the students, elated by their roles,

emancipated themselves to the point of breaking the bust of the Emperor and dragging him through the mud. Is not the Vendée, in fact, Cadoudal, and the Emperor the usurpation?

Thus, after a peace of more than half a century, the Church reignited war; at the same time that she ruins and transports the republicans, she forms in her colleges generals for a future Vendée. To her, all latitude, all favor is granted to attack the Revolution; to us, the proscribed, the gag and Cayenne for defending it. This is how she teaches, how she practices respect.

Every nation divided in itself will perish, says the Gospel. The aristocratic class, brought up by the priests, goes on one side; the commoners, in whom the revolutionary spirit dominates more and more, draws from the other: unless the new carries away the old, scission is inevitable.

Walking in the Luxembourg, I heard a group of kids reading and commenting among themselves on a popular little book, the *Mystères de l'Inquisition*. — What! said the most energetic of the gang, does the good Lord want people to be killed like this? — Of course, replied another, who knew his Sacred History inside out; and he quoted the famous examples of Moses, of Samuel, of the prophet Elias, of Mathathias. — Well! It doesn't matter, continued the other. I tell you that, if that time came again, my father would immediately pick up his gun!... Oh! yes, we will again have gunshots, and woe then, *woe to Jerusalem!*... The authority of the priest over the children of the people is lost, a country justice of the peace told me; the word of the father prevails, and the first communion, which for the greatest number is the last, has taken on the significance of a divorce.

XXV. — Like so many others, I have repeatedly been surprised by this ecclesiastical duplicity, which people wanted, but wrongly, to make the prerogative of the Company of Loyola. It was repugnant to me to think that a body as considerable as the Catholic clergy, in its relations with the powers of society, which are Philosophy, Science, Labor, as well as the State, would not recoil before treason. and murder, where it cannot succeed by capture and cunning. I ended up accounting for this phenomenon. It is not the individuals who must be accused: it is the Church.

In the individual, priest or layman, the natural conscience constantly comes to straighten out the aberrations of the transcendental conscience; and, apart from the rare cases of an absolute perversion, one can say that the man is always better than the believer.

But communities do not behave like individuals. They obey only their idea, their social reason, if I may say so, without allowing themselves to be distracted by any other sentiment.



The Church is a collectivity formed solely by and for faith, in which human affections disappear, and where the religious conscience remains alone, speaking and ordering in the name of God.

Now, what is God, in the order of conscience, according to the Church?

God is the absolute master of the universe, which he governs by his good pleasure and leads by roads known to him alone. Would God, who, according to theologians, could create an infinity of universes different from this one, be chained by laws? Will God make an irrevocable pact with man? One would be foolish to think so! God does what he wants, and no one has the right to hold him accountable.

From the tomb Thou canst recall us when Thou wilt!  
Thou strikest and Thou healest, Thou destroyest  
And Thou resuscitatest. We rely  
Not on our own deserts, but on Thy name,  
Invoked so frequently, and on Thy oath  
Sworn to the most devout of all our kings,  
Within this temple made Thy holy dwelling,  
And which the sun's duration is to last.

(Racine, *Athaliah*)

Now, government of God and government of the Church are the same thing.

It is at the prayer of the Church that God kills the Sennacheribs, the Balthazars, the Antiochus, the Decius, the Galeriuses, the Julians: why should the Church who curses, whose prayer brings death, not put her hand to execution?

Is the conscience of the Church, which is the very conscience of God, governed by the justice of men?

The Church has her hand on any soul lacking in faith, Arius or Jean Hus, Savonarola or Henri IV. Who then, if he is not an atheist, could call her to account for the manner in which she executes her sentences?

For nearly seventy years the Church has not ceased to raise her prayers to God against the Revolution, like the Jews during the captivity of Babylon. What do we say of the concordat? A sheet of paper, which it pleased God to use, like the edict of Cyrus, to free his people, but which could not serve as a title for a new captivity. A pope, a man, out of prudence, out of necessity, was able to lend his hands to this transaction; is the Church, whose collectivity represents God himself, not bound by his signature?

Thus the Church, in everything she does, acts conscientiously. What seems to us a crime in her is a duty. It is out of duty that she despoils and proscribes paganism, after her apologists have so often demanded pagan tolerance; out of duty she burns the philosophers, after the Apostle

declared that faith must be rational and free; out of duty she slaughters the Revolution, after Pius VII made a pact with the Revolution.

The Church is the double consciousness of humanity.

Just as civil society has the right of justice over all those who violate the laws of natural conscience, which is itself; in the same way the Church attributes to herself the right of Justice over all those who, even innocent from the point of view of the natural conscience, sin against the religious conscience, which is also her. (H)

And this is what explains to us, finally, how in the human soul the greatest villainy can unite with a deep religion: this phenomenon has no other cause than the stifling of the natural conscience by the transcendent consciousness.

Caligula, Nero, Heliogabalus, the most cowardly, the most infamous of all tyrants, were models of piety. Tiberius, without respect for the gods, is fatalistic: one superstition is worth another; it is the monster of monsters. Balthazar Gérard, Jacques Clément, Ravailac, were saints. It is this alliance of religion with crime that constitutes *hypocrisy*, from the Greek ὑποκριτής, comedian, as one would say theater conscience, the vice par excellence of Christian souls. Tartuffe is a true devotee, don't doubt it: this monster believes so well in God and in hell that he has lost his moral sense. Molière, a disciple of Gassendi, knew this, although he had given the play the *Imposter* as a subtitle; but his successors did not understand it, and that is why they no longer know how to play Tartuffe. Nor was Napoleon mistaken when, full of his ideas of religious restoration, he said: *If Tartuffe had been composed under my reign, I would not have permitted its performance.* May God forgive the great Napoleon, since he trusted him! But the head of state who, being able to raise the conscience of the people, placed it under the yoke of the Church, will reckon with posterity. (I)

XXVI. — Let us conclude this chapter.

Catholicism, which boasts of moralizing man, only succeeds, by the double consciousness that it creates in his soul, and by the factitious education that is its consequence, in making him a sly character, a hypocrite, full of gall, an enemy of society and the human race.

Now, what is true of Catholicism will be true of any other church, since the law of any church is to organize itself by virtue of a dogma, taken as the rule and sanction of law, consequently to divide the conscience and to distort the education.

Give the education of youth to Saint-Simon, to Fourier, to Cabet, to Robespierre: each of them will adapt it to his system; give it to M. Cousin, he will make eclectics for you; give it to a Marshal of France, he will make you soldiers.

It is this thought, common to all sects, that for sixty years has caused the liberty of education to be proscribed in France. As in politics we are in favor of centralization, in education we are of the *University*. The Church, scholars believe, won't last forever, and we will inherit its position. Better to wait than risk losing everything. — So what care is taken, in attacking the Church, to protect the monopoly! We do not want a pedagogy that would train man for himself, freeing him from all prejudice, all dogmatism, all transcendental hallucination. We would fear, if the spirit of youth became free, that there would no longer be employment for the geniuses who arrogate to themselves the government of the virile age. The depravity of the child is the pledge of the servility of the adult.

I will deal with industrial education in the Sixth Study.

## CHAPITRE IV.

### Man in nature.

XXVII. — Hitherto we have considered the mores of humanity as forming a separate section in the constitution of the universe.

But reason says, and this is one of the finest intuitions of modern philosophy, that human morality is an integral part of the universal order; so that, in spite of discordances, more apparent than real, which science must learn to reconcile, the laws of the one are also those of the other.

From this higher point of view, man and nature, the world of liberty and the world of fatality, form a harmonic whole: matter and spirit agree to constitute humanity and all that surrounds it from the same elements, subject to the same laws. Indissoluble monument, of which the universe provides the foundations, of which the Earth is the pedestal and Man the statue.

XXVIII. — Applied to the economy and to justice, this way of looking at things leads to solutions that are as important as they are unexpected.

Without examining whether the different races originally issued from the same stock, and how then, under the influence of the climate, they received their respective physiognomies, it is certain at least that each of them can and must be regarded as native to the soil where it was found, neither more nor less than the plants that grow there and the animals that live there.

Through this *indigeneity*, man and the earth become immanent to each other, I mean, not chained like the serf and the glebe, but endowed with the same qualities, the same energies and, if I dare say so, the same consciousness.

This is expressed by this principle of economy and law, for which there is no longer any need to exhaust the resources of controversy: *The land belongs to the race that was born there*, no other being able to give better in the manner it demands. The Caucasian was never able to survive in Egypt; our northern races do not succeed better in Algeria; the Anglo-Saxon withers in America or becomes Redskin. As for instances of interbreeding, where they can take place, far from destroying the native population, they only refresh it, give it more tone and vigor: we know today that bloods mingle, but do not *merge*, and always one of the two races ends up returning to its type and absorbing the other.

From this kinship of race and soil, the foundation of all collective territorial possession, it is easy to deduce *individual possession*, subject moreover to much more complicated conditions than national possession.

Finally, collective and individual possession leads to a third principle, glimpsed rather than defined by the ancient legislators, sacrificed by all the utopians, which modern society is in the process of losing, while making desperate efforts to retain it, *hereditary transmission*.

Thus man and earth, like Adam and Eve in Genesis, can say to each other: *Bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh!* United by marriage, united in their destiny and in their mores, they produce their generations in common; and one does not know which, children of woman or products of the soil, can be reputed more children of the earth or children of humanity.

The Revolution was to give this ancient contract solemn form; but here, as everywhere, faith begins by putting man in contradiction with morals.

Doubtless you do not think, Monsignor, that it is by chance that the Church constantly encounters the Revolution on its way, and I do not believe it either. *Et lux in tenebris lucet*, says John. If the light radiated equally from everywhere, or the bodies gave no shadow and were translucent, how would we have the sensation of light? Likewise, without the divorce of consciousness, how would we have understood liberty? Without the fictions of theology and the exhibitions of worship, how would we have discovered morality? Without the Church, how would the Revolution have happened? We will see that without Christianity we would never have understood the possession of the land, in the place of which we have put the divorce of property.

XXIX. — Christianity is the religion of universal separation, of endless division, of irreconcilable antagonism, of absolute isolation, of impossible abstractions.

After having separated spirit from matter, as the God of Genesis separates dry from wet, light from shadow; after having distinguished souls from bodies, having set the good principle against the bad, raised the sky above the earth, created in man a double consciousness, and instituted that system of hypocrisy that makes Tartuffe blessed and Socrates a reprobate, here it separates man from nature, so that, as it has made him unhappy in his consciousness, it makes him fugitive and disinherited on earth.

The earth! How would the Christian love it, this sacred land, which the ancients surrounded with a worship full of tenderness and which is for us, in itself, almost all of nature? To love the earth, to possess it, to enjoy it in a legitimate union, with that vigor of love that belongs to the human soul, the Christian is incapable of it: that would be impiety, pantheism, a return to primitive idolatry, worse than that, a relapse into chaos, into the horror of polytheism itself.

Hatred of the outside world is essential to Christianity; it stems from the very dogma of creation, and from the antinomies that it brings with it.

For the Christian instructed by the Bible, the earth, like the sun, the moon and all the spheres, is a dead thing, vile matter, an instrument of the divine manifestations, but one which has nothing in common with the divine Being, nor consequently with the soul of man, its immortal daughter.

For such is the relationship that religion establishes between God and the universe; such it will be, by the necessary progress of the idea, between man and the earth. The revelation itself took care to tell us so. Why does the Decalogue forbid worshiping anything above in heaven, or below on earth, except because heaven and earth, and everything in them, are considered creatures, works of manufacture, consequently stripped of all proper life, of will, of intelligence, of substance itself? Basically, they are nothing.

What case then could we make for a nature that God defines, not as part of himself, but as the work of his fingers?

How could we see in this nature a mother, a nanny, a sister, a wife, when he barely deigns to touch her with the tip of his foot?

The earth belongs to Jehovah, says the psalmist, and all its furnishings: *Domini est terra et plenitudo ejus*. — And what does he make of this earth, O sublime champion of the greatness of God? Admire the Jew's response: Jehovah, master of all the earth, has chosen a little corner there, Mount Moriah, to have a temple built there and to deliver his oracles there!... *Quis ascendet in montem Domini?*

Thus, between God and the visible universe, the relationship, according to the Christian, is that of an absolute master over his thing: this is the opposite of what is affirmed by fetishism, pantheism, animism and all the opinions that, without absolutely denying the Divinity, tend to make it enter into the general system of existences. There can be no question today of resuscitating these old theories, in the face of which Christianity was to appear as an antithesis; but any antithesis, being by itself only one side of the idea, must follow the fate of the thesis, escape with it or perish, which also implies that the Christian dogma is insufficient, and the morality that is deduced from it is false.

Why is man subject to death? It is, says the spiritualist, because he is composed of spirit and earth, the first destined for heaven, from whence it is drawn; the second to the inert mass from which it issued: *Revertatur pulvis ad terram suam unde erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum qui dedit illum*. The earth is the primary cause of our mortality! What metaphysics!

So the priesthood did not neglect anything to exalt the contempt of the believer towards this old mother: it felt that there was there, for its ghost, a rival to be feared.

*Let the earth be cursed, says Genesis; let it sprout brambles and thorns for you.* Those who have visited the places where biblical dogma once reigned can tell if the curse does not seem to have passed that way.

The earth is a *vale of tears*, which our most ardent desire must be to leave.

*Ecclesiastes* counts the joys with which nature fills man; it reviews the marvels of creation, and at each it repeats this lamentable cry: *Vanity!* And from vanity to vanity it concludes with this word, which gives the secret of its sadness: Remember your Creator, *Memento Creatoris tui!* He is not cheerful, the God of the Bible!

Christianity makes more of this desolation:

“Do you want to be perfect?” says Jesus, according to the first Gospel, to the rich young man. “Go, sell everything you have, give it to the poor, take up your cross, and follow me.”

The words *Take up your cross*, put in the mouth of Jesus before the cross had become the symbol of the sect, sufficiently indicate that it is not the Galilean who speaks, but the Church, the daughter of the Synagogue, of the pure race of Aaron and Ezra.

“Lay up,” he says elsewhere, “treasures in heaven, and not on earth; these fear neither rust nor thieves.”

This theory of *detachment* returns continuously. The hatred of the rich, which attracted so many miserable people to the sect, has something to do with it, as James testifies, in his Catholic epistle, chap. v. But the basis of the doctrine is the very hatred of wealth, the hatred of well-being, the hatred of territorial possession, a hatred based on the theological separation of God and nature, soul and body.

“What is death!” exclaims the *Pensez-y bien*. “It is a general separation from all the things of this world. When you have come to this fatal moment, there will no longer be for you either pleasures, or burdens, or relatives, or riches, or greatnesses, or friends. (There will only be the priest!) If you had all the goods of the world at your disposal, all that will accompany you only to the grave. A shroud and a coffin is all you will take away from this life. Consider it well!”

The missionaries do not stop returning to this funeral picture, the conclusion of which is predicted:

“If death is to deprive us forever of the passing goods of this world, which we can only enjoy for a few years, why seek them so eagerly? Why possess them with so much attachment? Wouldn't it be better to make them your sacrifice to God right now?”

That is to say, to the Church, is it not true, Monsignor? For what is bad for man is good for the Church: the first passes away like a shadow; the second neither enjoys nor dies, which is why she has received from God

power and property over the whole globe.

You have to see with what stories the *Pensez-y bien* seasons its morality!

“The great Saladin, before dying, called him who carried before him his banner in battle, and commanded him to attach to the end of a spear the sheet in which he was to be buried, to raise it like the standard of death that triumphs over so great a prince, and to shout, showing it to the people: This is all that the great Saladin takes away from his conquests.”

If the great Saladin did that, I declare that he was no longer right in the head, otherwise one would have to admit that he had been nothing but an imbecile all his life. I pass over the examples of the great Charles V, the great Saint Francis of Borgia, the great Antiochus, the great Balthazar, the great Indian prince Josaphat, and a host of others, taken from the *Comte de Valmont* and from the fathers. These pitiful rhapsodies are sold with your approval, Monsignor, and with the approval of your colleagues: these are the lessons with which you fill the minds of the people, who, moreover, take it easy, and would have soon and forever abandoned you, if, destitute of capital, of credit, of property, of science, deprived of all the guarantees of nature and of society, in this system in which they are forced to live, despair did not bring them back incessantly to the feet of your mercy.

XXX. — Is the earth, says the Church to her children, worth your quarreling for its possession? Does it deserve your love? Men of one day! What does it matter to you that during your short life this scrap is inscribed under your name or under the name of another? What is there in this mud, in this rock, in these bushes, in this gorse, that charms you? Will you eat it, this vile matter? Will you make it your mistress, your queen? Finally, what is there in common between man, a spiritual being, made to love and serve God, and this earth, fit at most to produce grass for your cattle, hard bread for your stomach, and which will one day cover your corpse?

And, with this reasoning of Seneca, man has lost the sense of nature; he has moved away from it as from an impure slime. Instead of this innate love that every living being has for the things placed in its use and habituation, artificial feelings have developed, strange mores; and for having insulted nature, we have seen intelligence and justice fail more and more in ourselves.

The intelligence first.

The Christian philosopher is incapable, as long as he remains in the faith, of rising to an exact notion of order in the universe, and consequently of science.



From the principle, in fact, that the world was created, it follows that it is created for a supernatural end, the end of being having to be in relation to the principle of being and its complementary expression. Consequently, any philosophy that would seek the end of the universe in itself would be in contradiction with the spiritualist principle, so boldly formulated by Descartes, and of which the orthodox faith is only the development.

For the theologian, the world is and cannot be anything other than a monument erected by the Supreme Being to his own glory, an incessant witness to his existence; it is a book on each page of which he reads the name of God. Such is the conception of Bossuet, of Fénelon, of Bonnet, and of all those who, starting from the idea of a Demiurge and placing the principle or the efficient cause of the world outside the world, render themselves powerless to find in the world either reason or end, and are obliged, from every point of view, to relate them to God. Whence the result that the world must be considered as a fragile and transient whole, which survives momentarily only because the breath of God nourishes it and his hand prevents it from falling. To suppose, as Laplace has demonstrated, that the universe subsists by itself, and that to produce its marvels the interplay of a small number of elements is sufficient, is to cause the Divinity to disappear, and with it religion.

From this strange idea of an ultra-worldly finality of the world, or of the non-existence in itself and for itself of the universe, came the opinion of the end of the world, which Ovid, by an ingenious fiction, makes arise for the first time in the brain of Jupiter. In fact, the Demiurge should draw the consequences of its principle itself, and use the rights guaranteed to it by its title. Jupiter, says the poet, seeing the crimes of men, prepared, in concert with the gods, to strike them down. But he reflected that he ran the risk of setting fire to the sky; that, moreover, a day would come when, destinies being accomplished, the machine of the world was to break and be delivered to the flames; consequently, instead of fire, he contented himself with using water. Those whom Providence does not know how to govern, it drowns: was it worth changing religion to turn this comical legend into an article of faith? The verses of Ovid are very beautiful:

Esse quoque in fatis reminiscitur affore tempus  
Quo mare, quo tellus correptaque regia cœli  
Ardeat, et mundi moles operosa laboret.

XXXI. — But what is only absurdity in philosophy, transported into the order of Justice, becomes depravity. With such a dogma, such a morality: as the earth is in the sight of God, it will be for the legislator.

Of all the distinctions engendered by the theological principle, perhaps the most disastrous is that which has separated possession from property

in civil right.

The *quiritarian right* of property, pursued to its last consequences, and independent of any effective possession, caused the Roman Republic to perish: it is this right that threatens to engulf modern society.

It is this *eminent domain*, imitated from the divine omnipotence, which, founded solely on the will, is preserved by the will, transmitted by the will and can only be lost through the lack of will; it is this *right to use and abuse*, which the century strives to retain and with which it can no longer live, that produces in our day the desertion of the land and the social desolation.

The metaphysics of property has devastated the French soil, decapitated the mountains, dried up the springs, changed the rivers into torrents, rendered the valleys stony: all with the authorization of the government. It has made agriculture odious to the peasant, and even more odious to the country; it drives depopulation.

Not that exploitation stops altogether: growing pauperism will always put at the mercy of the modern exploiter more workers than ancient property had slaves; and agriculture, becoming industrialized day by day, finds in the machine the means to supplement servitude.

I mean that man, rich as well as poor, owner as well as colonist, wholeheartedly detaches himself from the earth. Existences are, so to speak, in the air: we no longer cling to the ground, as before, because we inhabit it, because we cultivate it, because we breathe its emanations, because we live on its substance, because it was received from our fathers with their blood, and because it will be transmitted in our race; because we took from it our body, our temperament, our instincts, our ideas, our character, and couldn't part with it without dying. One clings to the ground as to a tool, less than that, to an inscription of rents by means of which one perceives each year, on the common mass, a certain income. As for that profound feeling for nature, that love of the soil that only rustic life gives, it has died out. A sensitivity to convention particular to blasé societies, to which nature no longer reveals itself except in the novel, the living room, the theater, has taken its place. If a few cases of nostalgia are still observed, it is among good bourgeois who, on the strength of their serials or by doctor's prescription, had gone to retire in the country. After a few weeks they find themselves exiled: the fields are odious to them; the city and death claim them.

This scission between man and the earth, whose first cause is in theological dogmatism and its interminable antinomies, is manifested by the most diverse, often even the most opposed practices: agglomeration and fragmentation, mortmain, colonization, emphyteusis, renting, sharecropping, abandonment of crops, spontaneous depopulation, common grazing, alternately authorized and prohibited, conversion of arable land

into pasture, deforestation, industrialism, mortgage, mobilization, limited partnership.

All the economists have remarked on this: the scourge that once ruined Italy, the demoralization of landed possession, rages over modern nations with an increase of malignity. Man no longer loves the earth: proprietor, he sells it, he rents it, he divides it into shares, he prostitutes it, he traffics in it, he speculates in it; — farmer, he torments it, he violates it, he exhausts it, he sacrifices it to his impatient cupidity, he never unites with it.

It is because we have lost the taste for nature: as the magpie loves the gold it steals, so our generation loves the fields and the woods. They are sought after as a cash deposit, bucolic fantasy and asylum; or else for the pride of property, to say: This is mine! But these powerful attractions, this community of life that nature has placed between itself and man, we no longer feel: the Christian sirocco, passing over our souls, has withered them.

Antaeus is dead, the giant, son of the Earth, who, each time he touched his mother, regained new strength; he was strangled by the Brigand, and his sons curse the soil to which they are attached. Who will resurrect Antaeus? Who will deliver his children?

XXXII. — And yet there is in the heart of man, for this nature that envelops him, an intimate love, the first of all; a love that I do not undertake to explain — who will explain love to me? — but a real love, and one that, like all true sentiments, also had its mythology.

What, I pray you, is this worship addressed to Heaven, to the stars, to the Earth above all, this great mother of things, *magna parens rerum*, Cybele, Tellus, Vesta, Rhée, Ops, if not a love song to Nature?

What are these nymphs of the mountains, of the forests, of the fountains, these fairies, these undines, and all this fantastic world, if they are not also love?

Personification of natural forces, you will say, idolatry! So be it; but by personifying the forces or, what amounts to the same thing, by lending a soul to each power of nature, man only manifests his own soul and expresses his love. Idolatry, the worship of forms, is precisely morality. Why is this Cybele so good, so good that she allows herself to be loved by shepherds? Why are these nymphs so beautiful, these geniuses so charming, if it is not because the human soul creates them, like the God of the Sunday prayer, from the purest of its affections?

Now, the love of nature does not pass away, believe me, with mythology, any more than the moral sense is extinguished with the prayer in the heart of the philosopher, any more than the cult of beauty withers in the presence of the corpse in the soul of the anatomist.

When M. de Humboldt measured the Chimborazo, do you believe that this figure of 6,000 meters — a league and a half, no more — destroyed in him the feeling of the infinite that he felt at the sight of the Cordilleras?

When Linnaeus, de Jussieu, by a patient analysis, invented their classifications, do you think that they remained insensitive to this imperishable beauty that, with each spring, bursts with so much profusion in the plants?

All these men, I tell you, Monsignor, are lovers, they are idolaters; and it is because they are idolaters that they are moral; it is because they began with idolatry that they carried the cult of science so high, and that grateful humanity places them in their turn among the geniuses and the gods.

But you, iconoclast by principle, insulter of eternal forms, blasphemous of ideas, burner of books, how could you recognize this consanguinity of man and nature, the necessary condition, the first degree of all morality?

For if, as I said at the beginning of this chapter, there is no community of essence between man and the world; if our soul, radically distinct from matter, is to be conceived as a simple and therefore amorphous thing, of which movement in all directions is the only attribute, it follows that man, reduced to pure liberty, must not allow himself to be conditioned by any law; that, like God himself, who, before producing by his omnipotence the matter of the universe, had produced the laws by his intelligence, he has no morality except his good pleasure; consequently that the condition of man on earth is that of a tyrant, or rather, since he cannot destroy the work of God, of a captive and fallen soul; that thus his person has no dignity save that which he receives from his religion; that, moreover, as the domination of pure spirit over inert and passive matter is absolute, there are no authentic and obligatory forms either for the economic order or for the political order, and that the natural state of societies is arbitrariness.

XXXIII. — Must it be I who give you such lessons today? Must it be that, after having shown by what law of equilibrium property is legitimized, I still have to defend, from the point of view of psychology, this possession of the earth without which the life of man is no longer, like property itself, anything but an abstraction!

Nothing metaphysical, unreal, purely abstract and nominal can form part of the practical and positive order of human things. This is clearly deduced from our axioms, and the Revolution put an end to all these fictions of transcendence.

A pure conception of the self, haughty expression of its absolutism, property, as we have said (Third STUDY, ch. vi ), is indispensable to the social economy; but it only enters into human commerce on two

conditions; one, to submit to the common balance of values and services; the other, to realize itself in an effective possession. Without this double condition, it would remain immoral.

Oh what! The social power — that power of collectivity that, under the mystical names of monarchy, aristocracy, government, authority, etc., has been taken for so long, sometimes for an action of heaven, sometimes for a fiction of the mind — has been found by us to be a real thing; Economics, we have recognized as a real science; Justice itself has appeared to us as a reality: it is only on this condition of realism that we have been able to lay the foundations of right and morals, and free ourselves from ancient corruption, and property would remain in the state of a ghost, would still be just a word, serving to express the wantonness of the heart and mind, a negation! It is inadmissible.

I therefore say that, if property is, as it ought to be, something real, it becomes so by this possession, which the Code and all the jurisprudence clearly distinguish from property; a possession that I have always defended, and which has nothing in common with the old Cainite right, born of a false regard from Jehovah. It is by possession that man puts himself in communion with nature, while by property he separates himself from it; in the same way that man and woman are in communion through domestic habit, while sensuality keeps them in isolation.

For it is not enough, for the success of the plowman and for the happiness of his life, that he has a general knowledge of his art, of the different natures of the terrain, and of the chemical elements that compose it; even this title of proprietor, so dear to pride, is not enough for him; he must know for a long time, by patrimonial tradition and daily practice, the land he cultivates; that he holds it, if I dare say so, in the manner of plants, by the root, by the heart and by the blood: just as it is not enough for a man, to live with a woman, to know the physiology of sex and to bear the title of husband or servant; it is necessary that he assimilates his wife, that he knows her by heart, that he possesses her instinctively, so that, present or absent, she thinks only of him, reflects only his action and his will. Why can't I evoke here the testimony of those millions of rustic and simple souls, who, without asking where their health and joy come from, live in the affection of nature and do not suspect that the Catechism and the Code are precisely the two enemies who constantly work to make them lose it!

You studied psychology at the seminary, Monsignor; so you know nothing about the soul of the people. You did not see it, this soul, spring from the earth, like the seed sown by the winds of autumn, which rises in the spring; you have not followed, like me, its efflorescence: for you have not lived with the people, you are not of them, you are not them. Permit me, then, to cite to you, in my person, a sample of that existence that the

Church, for eighteen centuries, has endeavored to stifle under her whitewash. It is more interesting, I assure you, than your organs, your bells, your painted windows, your vaulted arches and all your architecture.

XXXIV. — My biographer addresses me with this strange reproach:

“In college, as later in the workshop, he refuses to share his classmates’ games, stays apart, disdains friends, indulges, between working hours, in solitary walks, etc.”

No doubt I was already contemplating the destruction of the family and property. Reactionary stupidity having made of me, in 1848, an ogre, it was necessary to find me an ogre’s youth, and I would not be surprised if there were people ready to swear that they knew me as an ogre.

In fact, I may have seemed, from twelve to twenty, a little shy. The fault was not with my heart, but with the Christian system, which, perverting the notions, atrophying the instincts, disguises the man and imposes on him artificial feelings, in the place of those that nature gave him.

How easy it would be for me, by erasing what malice has put in false colors in this painting of my youth, to pose as a beardless philosopher, fleeing the corruption of cities and meditating in solitude on the miseries of humanity!

The truth is much less favorable to me; that is why it is more instructive, and why I want to reestablish it.

Until the age of twelve, my life was spent almost entirely in the fields, occupied sometimes with small rustic jobs, sometimes tending the cows. I was a herdsman for five years. I don’t know of an existence that is both more contemplative and more realistic, more opposed to that absurd spiritualism that forms the basis of education and of Christian life, than that of the man of the fields. In the city, I felt out of place. The workman is nothing like a countryman; patois aside, he does not speak the same language, he does not worship the same gods; one feels that he has gone through the polisher; he lodges between the barracks and the seminary, he touches the Academy and the town hall. What an exile for me when I had to attend college classes, where I lived only by the brain, where, among other simplicities, they claimed to initiate me into the nature I was leaving, by narrations and themes!

The peasant is the least romantic, the least idealistic of men. Immersed in reality, he is the opposite of the *dilettante*, and will never give thirty sous for the most magnificent landscape painting. He loves nature as the child loves his nurse, less concerned with her charms, the sentiment of which is not foreign to him, however, than with her

fecundity. It is not he who will fall in ecstasy in front of the countryside of Rome, its majestic lines and its superb horizon; like the prosaic Montaigne, he will see only the desert, the pestilential puddles and the *mal'aria*. He does not imagine that there is poetry and beauty where his soul discovers only famine, disease and death: in agreement in this with the cantor of the *Georgics*, who, while celebrating the richness of the countryside, doubtless did not imagine, with the lanky rhymers of our time, that it was its anti-poetic element. The peasant loves nature for its powerful breasts, for the life with which it abounds. He does not touch it with an artist's eye; he caresses it with both arms, like the lover of the Song of Songs: *Veni, et inebriemur uberibus*; he eats it. Read Michelet recounting the circuit of the peasant, on Sunday, around his land: what intimate enjoyment! What gazes!... It took me time and study, I admit, to find pleasure in these descriptions of sunrise and sunset, moonlight and the four seasons. I was twenty-five when the tutor of the *Emile*, the prototype of the genre, still seemed to me, as regards the feeling of nature, only the thin son of a watchmaker. Those who speak so well enjoy little; they resemble the tasters who, to appreciate the wine, take it in the silver and look at it through the crystal.

What a pleasure it used to be to roll in the tall grass, which I would have liked to graze like my cows; to run barefoot on level paths, along hedges; to sink my legs, while rehilling (at the third plowing) the green *turquies* (*maize*), in the deep and fresh earth! More than once, on warm June mornings, I happened to take off my clothes and take a dew bath on the lawn. What do you say to this muddy existence, Monsignor? It makes mediocre Christians, I assure you. I could barely distinguish the self from the non-self then. The self, it was everything I could touch with my hand, reach with my eyes, and which was good for me; the non-self was all that could harm or resist me. The idea of my personality was confused in my head with that of my well-being, and I was careful not to look for the unextended and immaterial substance underneath. All day I filled myself with blackberries, rampions, meadow salsify, green peas, poppy seeds, grilled corn cobs, berries of all sorts, sloes, pears, serviceberries, wild cherries, eglantines, wild grapes and other wild fruits; I gorged myself on a mass of raw vegetables that was enough to kill a nicely brought up petty bourgeois, which produced no other effect on my stomach than to give me a formidable appetite in the evening. Nature does not harm those who belong to it.

Alas! I could no longer pilfer these superb fruits today. Under the pretext of preventing damage, the administration had all the fruit trees in the forests destroyed. A hermit would no longer find his life in our civilized woods. The poor are forbidden to pick up even acorns and beechnuts; forbidden to cut the grass of the paths for their goats. Go poor

folk, go to Africa and Oregon:

... Veteres migrate coloni!

How many showers I have weathered! How many times, soaked to the skin, have I dried my clothes on my body, in the breeze or in the sun! So many baths taken at all hours, in summer in the river, in winter in the springs! I climbed trees; I stuck myself into caves; I caught frogs on the run, crayfish in their holes, at the risk of encountering a horrible salamander; then I grilled my game without hesitation on the coals. There are, from man to beast, to everything that exists, secret sympathies and hatreds of which civilization removes the feeling. I loved my cows, but with unequal affection; I had preferences for a chicken, for a tree, for a rock. I had been told that the lizard is a friend of man, and I sincerely believed it. But I have always fought hard against snakes, toads and caterpillars. — *What had they done to me? No offense.* I do not know; but the experience of humans has made me hate them more and more.

So I nearly wept while reading the farewells of Philoctetes, so well translated from Sophocles by Fénelon:

“O happy day, sweet light, you finally show yourself, after so many years! I obey you, I leave after having greeted these places. Farewell, dear lair! Farewell, nymphs of these damp meadows! I will no longer hear the dull sound of the waves of this sea. Farewell, shore, where so many times I have suffered the insults of the air! Farewell, promontory, where Echo so often repeated my moans! Farewell, sweet fountains, which were so bitter to me! Farewell, O land of Lemnos! let me go happily, since I go where the will of the gods and of my friends calls me.”

Those who, having never experienced these powerful illusions, accuse the superstition of country people, sometimes make me pity them. I was grown up and still believed in nymphs and fairies; and if I don't miss those beliefs, I have a right to complain about how I was made to lose them.

XXXV. — Certainly, in this life of complete spontaneity, I scarcely thought of the origin of the inequality of fortunes, any more than of the mysteries of faith. No starvation, no envy. In my father's house, we breakfasted in the morning on maize porridge, called *gaudes*; at noon, potatoes; in the evening, soup with bacon, and that throughout the week. Despite the economists who praise the English diet, we were, with this vegetable diet, fat and strong. Do you know why? It is because we breathe the air of our fields and because we live on the product of our cultivation. The people have the feeling of this truth when they say that the air of the country nourishes the peasant, whereas the bread that one eats in Paris *does not hold back hunger*.

Without knowing it, and despite my baptism, I was a kind of practical



pantheist. Pantheism is the religion of children and savages; it is the philosophy of all those who, held back by age, education, language, in sensitive life, have not arrived at abstraction and the ideal, two things that are, in my opinion, good to postpone as much as possible.

I am therefore not of the opinion of Rousseau, who, for fear of superstition, wanting precisely to base faith on reasoning and conscience, forbade himself to speak of God to his pupil before the twentieth year, then handed him over to theology: an excellent method for perpetuating the superstition! The notion of God, like that of substance and cause, is primitive, peculiar especially to untrained minds, and must lose its empire in proportion as they rise to true science. So let the children talk at their ease, all their fill, of God, of angels, of souls, of fairies, of griffins, of Hercules, like kings and queens; let their understanding lose its innocence, a necessary condition for the positive speculations of virility. During the first age, the conceptions of mysticism, so easily received by the imagination, serve as a supplement and as a preparation for metaphysics. Take care only that these conceptions, turning to fanaticism, do not usurp in their hearts the place that Justice alone should occupy. When the time comes, they will vanish by themselves, and your prudence will not have to fear from this side of indiscreet questions. Pierre Leroux cries out somewhere: What will you answer to your young daughter when she asks you: *What is God?* Well! Worthy philosopher, I will ask in my turn: *What is the Bogeyman?*

What is needed, in fact, to change the idolatrous conceptions of childhood into social philosophy? Show the young man, by the relation of laws and the analogy of forms, the chain of beings; imbue his intelligence with this sublime truth, that the laws of nature are the same as those of the mind and of Justice, and that, if this supreme ideal that religion calls God has its reality somewhere, it is in the heart of the honest man. This is how you will lead your pupil from the sphere of sensation into that of morals.

And what is morality, after all, in beings to whom friction with their fellows has not yet given the exact notion of relations and developed a juridical sense, if not this universal love, very unclassical, I admit it, and even less romantic, unrefined, unsentimental, but real, sovereign, fruitful; where genius is formed, where character is tempered, where personality is constituted, where superstition and mysticism are extinguished; divine love, which is not reduced to touching this mother nature with the lips, like the nun who receives the host, or like Pyramus kissing Thisbe through the garden gate.

XXXVI. — Out of school, I had reached my twentieth year. My father had lost his field; the mortgage had eaten it up. Who knows if he would

not have clung to existence with a good land credit institution and I would have remained a peasant and conservative all my life? But land credit will only work vigorously if the Revolution gets its hands on it... I was forced to take up a profession. Having become a proofreader, what did you want me to do between working hours? The day was ten hours. Sometimes I happened to read, in this interval, in first proof, eight sheets in-12 of works of theology and devotion: excessive work, to which I owe having become short-sighted. Poisoned with bad air, metallic miasmas, unhealthy emanations; my heart sated with insipid reading, I was in no hurry to do anything but get out of town to shake off this infection. Do you ever see peasants leaving high mass at the time of the sermon? So I fled, across fields, this ecclesiastical dispensary where my youth was swallowed up. To have the purest air, I *scanned*, a school term, the high mountains that border the valley of Doubs, and did not fail, when there was a storm, to take in the spectacle of it. Snuggled up in a hole in the rock, I liked to look the fulgurant Jupiter in the face, *cælo tonantem*, without defying it or fearing it. Do you believe that I was there as a scholar or as an artist? Not one more than the other. I will not decide which of the two is more worthy of my admiration, the painter who has himself tied to the mainmast of a ship in order to better grasp the hurricane, or the physicist who recognizes and chains up the thunderbolt; of the landscape painter who shows me a view of the Alps on a square meter of canvas, or of Saussure who calculates the height of Mont-Blanc to within a few fathoms. What I felt, in my solitary contemplation, was something else. The lightning, I said to myself, and its thunder, the winds, the clouds, the rain, it is still me.... In Besançon, the good women have the habit, when it lights up, of crossing themselves. I thought I found the reason for this pious practice in the feeling that I felt, that every crisis of nature is an echo of what happens in the soul of man.

This is how my education took place, the education of a child of the people. All do not enjoy, I agree, the same force of resistance, the same investigative activity; but all are of the same dispositions. It is this contrast between the real life suggested by nature, and the factitious education given by Religion, that gave birth to philosophical doubt in me and warned me against the opinions of sects and the institutions of society.

Since then, I have had to *civilize* myself. But — shall I admit it? — the little that I have taken on disgusts me. I find that in this so-called civilization, saturated with hypocrisy, life is colorless and tasteless; the passions without energy, without frankness; the narrow imagination, the affected or flat style. I hate houses with more than one floor, in which, contrary to the social hierarchy, the little ones are hoisted the top, the tall ones established near the ground; I detest, like prisons, churches, seminaries, convents, barracks, hospitals, asylums and crèches. All of this

seems demoralizing to me. And when I remember that the word pagan, *paganus*, means peasant; that paganism, the peasantry, that is to say the cult of rural divinities, rural pantheism, is the last name under which polytheism was vanquished and crushed by its rival; when I think that Christianity has condemned nature at the same time as humanity, I wonder if the Church, by dint of taking the opposite course from the fallen religions, has not ended up taking the opposite course from common sense and good morals; if her spirituality is anything other than the spontaneous combustion of souls; if Christ, who was to redeem us, did not instead find himself betraying us; if the so-called thrice-holy God is not, on the contrary, the thrice-impure God; if, while you shout to us: Head up, *Sursùm*, look to the heavens, you do not do precisely what is necessary to throw us, head down, into the well.

This is what I have been asking myself, for a long time now, and that to which I urgently call, Monsignor, your attention. Show me, from the point of view of intelligences and characters, of family and city relations, of the inner world that is consciousness and of the outer world that is nature, show me the morality and efficiency of ecclesiastical education; and not only will you have deserved well from civilization and the people, but, what is better for you and will be no less decisive, you will have snatched from unbelief its most peremptory argument.

## CHAPTER V.

### Man in the face of death.

XXXVII. — Death is the decisive proof of the value of the education and morality of a society.

Tell me the death of a man, and I will tell you his life; reciprocally, tell me the life of this man, and I will predict his death. I disregard sudden deaths, which leave the dying unaware of their state, like existences weighed down by a tyranny or an invincible fatality.

This subject is serious: we will seek its elements through history.

The ancients, religious as they were, speculated little: as befits a nascent civilization, they practiced more. No phrases regarding death, any more than on life; no disdain for the one, no boasting of the other. Just as one tried to live one's life as well as possible, one died one's death naturally, calmly, without fear or regret.

Religion, which occupied itself with so many things, said nothing, almost nothing about death; it only appeared at the funeral.

There was indeed some vague, obscure myth that spoke of the subterranean kingdom, of the abode of the shadows, of their transmigration, of their appearances, of their rebirth; but this myth, neglected, coarse, as we see in Homer, conceived at the edge of the pits, at the sight of corpses, or in front of the stakes that consumed them, does not seem to have exercised any serious influence on practice. There are in the *Iliad*, at the beginning of the first book, a few words that show how little esteem was held for the soul, how little place it held in the existence of heroes:

“Sing, Muse, that fatal anger that precipitated into Tartarus a crowd of generous souls of heroes, and delivered them themselves as food to the dogs and the birds.”

*Themselves*, αὐτοῦς, that is bodies, as opposed to souls, ψυχας! (J)

It even seems that, from the most ancient times, the belief in ghosts was despised: it is this that the Romans designated by the word superstition, formed from *superesse* or *superstare*, as one would say faith in survival, or better faith in ghosts. (K) Belief in the immortality of souls was not part of religion; it was, on the contrary, a shameful degeneration of it.

As for Mosaicism, it is notorious that the Sadducees, who represented its pure tradition, denied the distinction of the soul, and, *a fortiori*, its survival. This opinion was introduced, after the captivity of Babylon, by the *Pharisees*, a word that means, according to one or the other of the two

etymologies given to it, heretics, or followers of Parseeism, that is to say of the doctrine of Zoroaster.

XXXVIII. — Expecting nothing from religion, the good death, *euthanasia*, among the ancients, resulted from two causes: the plenitude of existence and social communion.

He died *full of days*, says the Bible, meaning by this word, not so much the number of years as the perfect order, congruity and beauty of life, in all its periods and manifestations.

Death, thus obtained, is the last of the beatitudes. Far from appearing bitter, it excludes any addition of happiness, consequently any supplement of life. This is the idea rendered by La Fontaine:

Nothing disturbs his end; it is the evening of a beautiful day.

Here, in eighteen syllables, is the whole practice of the ancients on dying well.

The second cause that made their death happy was the feeling of the social communion in which they expired.

There is a good example of this in the couplet of Simonides engraved at the passage of Thermopylae on the tomb of the three hundred Spartans: *Passer-by, go and tell Lacedaemon that we died here in order to obey its laws.*

No allusion to a subsequent life, no vain exaltation. The pure and simple fact, sublime in its simplicity: Here we are dead, but we live in Lacedaemon.

It is in this sense that we must hear the song of Harmodius: *I will carry my sword in a branch of myrtle, as Harmodius and Aristogiton did, when they struck down the tyrant Hipparchus, at the feasts of the Panathenaic... No, dear Harmodius, you are not dead; you live in the blessed islands, in the company of Achilles and Diomedes...* Here, it is the citizen who puts himself in communion with the ancient heroes, still alive in the bosom of the homeland, whom neither the iron of the enemy nor the rage of tyrants can reach.

Athens had made this idea an institution; it was the funeral oration of citizens who had died for their country, whose names were engraved on the public marbles, and whose children were brought up at the expense of the treasury. Do we believe that this was not worth our *Requiem*? What commemoration has been made, in France, of the soldiers killed at Sebastopol?

Social communion, expressed by the family, organized by the city, by the confederation or the amphictyony; a life that was prolonged beyond the tomb by participation in the life of the ancestors and that of the descendants; it was thus that death disappeared, encompassed in the

perpetuity of the homeland, and that the last sigh escaped in the rapture of fraternity.

“Among the Romans,” says M. Franz de Champagny, “man united his life with that of his ancestors and that of his descendants. Instead of prolonging his life into a dubious eternity, he prolonged it by the more intimate feeling of heredity. For him, the immortality of the family, of the tribe, of the country, replaced the immortality of the soul... The Elysium of the Roman was the future greatness of Rome. Virtue, patriotism and ancient glory come from there: they are civic virtues transformed into religious virtues. (*Les Césars*)

Family, tribe, homeland: what meager immortality for us Christians! We must believe, however, that this idea of social communion and collective life was not without some reality for the ancients, since it made them produce so many acts of heroism, which, despite our claims to holiness and our verbiage, still remain our models.

Needless to observe, moreover, that of these two conditions on which the good death depended, namely the plenitude of life and social communion, the first presupposes the second. No full life for the slave, for the condemned, for the banished, for one whose homeland was invaded by the foreigner, torn apart by civil war or enslaved by the tyrant. For that one, absolute void of existence; consequently, death with all its horrors.

XXXIX. — So, what despair gripped ancient society when, as a result of revolutions, the social bond came to be broken, and there was no longer any communion! It is one of the most striking phenomena in history, and at the same time the least understood, not to say the least perceived. As collective life dissolves, as individual life loses its fullness, we see the anguish of death increase. It seems that the desolate souls, once so calm, so alive in death, are crying out under its sting. The great Pan is dead; the souls are in consternation, and they fill the air with their groans!

Then begins the period of dissolution: the consciousness, isolated, lost, seeks a remedy for the horror that torments it, and tries in vain to distract itself. It is a rout, every man for himself! Poetry dreams of skeletons; the Freemasons of Eleusis offer their mysteries, the philosophers their abstractions. Who will deliver us from this atrocious thought of death? Because, alas! no more homeland, no more euthanasia: life and death are both absurd.

It is with Ionia that the debacle begins.

The Greeks of Ionia fell under the Persian domination. To add to their misery, between them and the great king stood native tyranny. No more communion: some wealthy men and some slaves, for whom the libidinous life replaces heroism. The poems of Anacreon are filled with this terror: nothing hurts as much to see as this octogenarian poet ceaselessly calling,

against death, for the intoxication of sensual pleasure:

They told me, the women:  
Anacreon, you are old!  
Take a mirror, and look at  
Your hair: there is no more.  
And your forehead is shaved!  
— Me, if I have any hair left  
Or if all are gone,  
I don't know; but I know well  
That it is a duty for the old man  
To lead a happy life  
The closer he approaches death.

Thus, the *inimitable life*, as Antony and Cleopatra called it, this recipe for despair, was practiced in Asia from the time of Anacreon, five centuries before Jesus Christ.

After the Great Median War, Greece was torn apart by civil war; each republic calls to the foreigner, and all liberty expires under the Macedonians. Epicurus appears, and what Anacreon had sung, his school puts into theory.

But the great republic leans in its turn towards its ruin; the emperor replaces the Latin communion: victors and vanquished become the pale subjects of death. Lucretius places his philosophy under the invocation of Venus. Horace lines up unceremoniously in the great stable, with Mecenas and his friends. All the nobility, the equestrian order, exhausted, panting, embrace the religion of pleasure. Virgil, who sang of Roman regeneration, of Caesar's messianism, called in turn to his aid the philosophy of Epicurus, the science of Archimedes and the metaphysics of Plato. He believes in patriotic virtue no more than the others, and saves himself in humanity.

Some protest in favor of ancient customs, out of hatred for the prince, disgust with the multitude, regret for their honors: they belong so well to their century that they do not even think that this old republic, if it could be reborn, would be the only and effective remedy for the fear of death.

XL. — We are approaching the transition that will soon lead to Christianity. In the absence of a communion that no longer exists, which we do not even know how to realize, we ask for faith! Stoicism brings its dogma, as impotent as that of Epicurus.

A sort of practical, severe Platonism, Stoicism takes the opposite approach to Epicurus: it tramples pleasure underfoot; it denies that pain is an evil; in virtue alone it discovers the sovereign good, in vice the sovereign misery, and it teaches us to despise death, by elevating to the

height of a metaphysical deduction the old, impure belief in ghosts, in superstition.

With what art it decorates it!

“The world is an animated, living being; God is its soul: and as the soul and the body of man form a single subject, so God and the world form an inseparable whole, which is the Absolute.

“Of this Absolute bodies and souls are the parts, whose union constitutes our life and of which our death is only the separation. After death, the soul principle returns to God, the universal soul; the body is returned to the elements.” (L)

It is thus that the Stoics try to uplift mores and restore courage.

You must see how timidly they are welcomed! Honest people, men of determined virtue, would like them to be right; they dare not indulge in it. Cicero admires them, favors them; but Carneades robs him of his faith!

Cato reads and rereads his *Phaedo* before dying, not so much to encourage himself, as has been said: he who had preserved the ancient mores was certainly no more afraid of death than a Cassius, a Petronius and so many other Epicureans who died with honor. Cato sought to console himself for the republic; he sought to see if the loss of liberty did not have some reason in the eternal order.

Thrasea does as Cato did. Before receiving his condemnation, he discusses with Demetrius the separation of soul and body. Then, when the quaestor arrives, bearer of the fatal order, the Roman bids farewell to the philosopher, orders his wife to save herself for his daughter, happy that his son-in-law does not share his torture; and entirely in that sacred communion of family and country, of which he is the last representative, he has his vein opened, and offers his blood, like a libation, — to the immortality of the soul? — no, to *Jupiter the liberator*.

Tacitus, at the end of the life of Agricola, his father-in-law, exclaims, in a movement of poetic tenderness:

“If there is a sojourn in the manes for the saints; if, as the philosophers wish it, great souls do not perish with bodies.”

We see that for Tacitus it is a question of a new opinion, which the ancients had not known, and of which their religion had not felt the need. It has been said that laws are the sign of the decadence of nations: how is it that the belief in a future life spreads among men, just in times when they are no longer worth anything in this one?

XLI. — But we have still only touched on this funereal subject.

Supposing that the theory of the dissociation of souls and bodies could have been, as well as that of Epicurus, of some relief in universal terror, it will be understood that such remedies were not within the reach of the common people, and that, the day when the masses would claim in their



turn an antidote against the boredom of death, the erotico-bachic poems of Anacreon, Alcaeus, Horace, as well as the Platonic and Stoic speculations, would have a mediocre effect.

Now, that day had come. Roman society dissolved, the plebs, as well as the patriciate, were in a vacuum; vulgar souls, like elite souls, hung in the air, open to the wind, like burst bladders; this is Virgil's picture of it:

... *Aliæ panduntur inanes*  
*Suspensæ ad ventos,*

Who would come to the aid of this multitude?

There are physicians for all fortunes.

Greece, whose glory and decadence had preceded that of Rome by several centuries, had produced, for the use of the lower classes, a peremptory philosophy. *Not everyone is allowed to go to Corinth*, said Demosthenes. — No, replied Diogenes; but everyone is permitted to not go there, and to do without Corinth.

The cynics find their employment here, in the general shipwreck and, without appearing so, it is their system that is the most fashionable. Too few people are able to take the sugar-coated pills of Epicurus, an even smaller number could digest Zeno's transcendental pills; the beggar's bag of Diogenes is accessible to everyone.

The Caesarean plebs, four to five hundred thousand *lazzaroni* sharing the empire with Caesar, nourished by the *frumentation*, that is to say almost for nothing, bathed for nothing, content with their beggary, take the heroic step of heartily scorning an existence of which they lost, by giving themselves to Caesar, the feeling, the dignity, the exercise, the object and the meaning.

To fortify themselves against death, they accustomed themselves to disregarding life: an easy thing, under the government of Caesar. Life, indeed, has become meaningless for this multitude. Instead of the plenitude of days, which made the happiness of the ancients, they have *spleen*. If, then, it is no longer anything to live, in this society in dust, how would it be something to die? Hear the Praetorian's cry to the fugitive Nero, trembling before death: *Usque adeone mori miserum est?* Your reign is over, so die: is that so difficult?

Analyze the character of the Roman people in the last days of the republic and those of the empire: at bottom, you find only cynicism; it is cynicism, in the majesty of the Capitol, that constitutes the temperament of the people-king, the moral life of Rome, the genius of Caesar.

Now, when the people meddle in something, philosophy or religion, love of God or contempt for life, they arrive at fantastic conceptions, they create giants and monsters. The sons of the wolf, taking up the beggar's bag, and getting it into their heads to fight death and its terrors, were to

give birth to a horrible idea, which would make history shudder.

Suicide was no longer new; for a long time we had learned, by noble examples, to honor it; we knew that it was the refuge of dignity against any injury from tyranny or fortune: a vulgar merit, a trifle, of which no one spoke any more. The republic dead, suicide was worn out.

What did the *ferocitas romana* discover? — Gladiatorial combats.

XLII. — Some people blame bull fighting as fostering cruelty; the stern Albion has given up its *boxing*. What would we say if the government, instead of sending those condemned to death to the scaffold, took it into its head, for the entertainment of the people, to have them beaten in the middle of the hippodrome until death ensued?

But it was not two men, two criminals, of whom Rome gave itself the treat; there were hundreds, thousands of prisoners, veritable butcheries, where blood flowed in torrents as in the fields of Pharsalus and Philip. Under the republic, it was forbidden to give more than a hundred gladiators at a time. Augustus, wanting to please the people, raised this number to sixty couples per performance. The rage for these spectacles always increasing, the figure of one hundred and twenty men was soon exceeded, on the demand of the people and by the complaisance of the senate; not to mention that these massacres took place everywhere: the smallest cities had their circus, with their barracks of gladiators. King Agrippa of Judea had fourteen hundred condemned men beaten one day. Gordian, being *aedile*, regularly gave from one hundred and fifty to five hundred pairs. Trajan, in a single day brought forth ten thousand gladiators; and in the great *naumachia* that took place, under the empire of Claudius, on Lake Fucin, there were as many as nineteen thousand combatants. At the triumph of Probe, six hundred men were destined for the circus: of this number, eighty, having escaped, attacked the spectators, spread through the city, and were finally overthrown by the legionaries, after having sold their lives dearly. It was a huge scandal.

Historians who have touched on this question, such as Châteaubriand, do not generally fail to exploit it for the benefit of Christianity: as if the combats of gladiators, in which Roman corruption satiated itself for more than five centuries, were the essence of paganism, as if the reason for this bloody phenomenon need not be sought elsewhere!

According to Cicero, Seneca, Pliny, Juvenal and the contemporary authors, we see that public opinion regarded them as a school of courage, where citizens learned to despise blood and death. Under one emperor, I believe it was Septimius Severus, as people thought of reforming mores, the jurists who formed the imperial council strongly supported the fights of the circus, necessary, they said, to maintain military courage and train the soul of the soldier.

But it is obvious that this allegation contains only half the truth: why did the soldier of the empire need this stimulant, which the warriors of the republic had done without? The real cause, I repeat, is in the universal disorganization that, leaving man without liberty, without rights, without communion, without a country, offering only Caesar as compensation for his loneliness, drove him to contempt of life at the same time as it delivered him defenseless to the pangs of death. (M)

The influence, such as it is, of the combats of gladiators on courage, manifests itself in the too vaunted martyrs of Christianity. It is the same coolness in the face of death, the same bravery or swagger, the same impassiveness. They die, these fighters of Christ, as *gladiators*. This is the praise given to them by the ecclesiastical writers: the comparison constantly recurs in the accounts of the martyrology and in the hymns. When free men, knights, senators, women, rushed into the circus, with no other goal than to show their courage in an all-out fight, like fanatics, united against the emperor by their faith in the Eternal Messiah, wouldn't they have known how to die for their Church and for their God?

XLIII. — But I am anxious to know how Christianity undertook to put an end to this panic, which more than the massacres of the circus and all the debauchery dishonored the end of pagan society.

The first word of Christianity was a cry of victory. What are you talking about, cynics, with your contempt for life? You, Stoics, with your indifference to pain and death? All of you, heirs of the ancient sages, interpreters of the gods, of the evaporation of souls and impalpable manes? What do you boast to us, band of Epicurus, with your joys in despair? And you, hungry plebs of Romulus, with your gladiator fights? Listen to these men, coming from Judea, whom Nero had covered in pitch and set alight in his gardens, as lanterns. They announce... the *resurrection of the body!*

It was here, in fact, that the new sectarians began.

Christianity, by its origins, had more than one relationship with the sects that had given themselves the mission of restoring to the Romans the calm and serenity of their ancestors. From the cynics, it had the affectation of poverty and detachment; from the Stoics it took gravity and already spiritualism; from the epicureans, it retained, for the time that would follow the return of Christ, the hope of material delights. But it surpassed them all by its prodigious dogma of the *resurrection of the body*, without which the immortality of souls would itself have appeared only a consolation prize.

Certainly, it was not the least addition that Paul and the others allowed themselves in the doctrine of the Galilean. But this is how religions are formed. A religion is a *symbol*, which means a contribution. Pharisaism had to pay its share in this: Jesus, who during his life had not ceased to

pursue it, owed to it after his death the advantage of resurrecting, without which he would not have become a god.

Could a Jewish heart taste the survival of the soul in the metaphysical way of the Stoics? What is that, a soul?... Can it eat, drink and make love? Pharisaism therefore affirmed immortality, no longer by a hollow and obscure metempsychosis, not by conservation, within the ether, of that *particle* of divinity, *divinæ particulam auræ*, as the philosophers said, that forms the quintessence of our being, but by means of a beautiful and good resurrection *in body and soul*, and, what was better, very soon.

All those who died in the faith of Christ were to rise to reign with him; the contemporary generation would not pass away before this resurrection arrived. In the second century, the writers of the Gospels, who had not yet seen anything, nevertheless believed they had to repeat the promise. Then the resurrection is postponed to the third century, then it is calculated for the fifth. From century to century, millenarianism redid its calculations. Finally, the expectation being always deceived, we decided to turn the news around. It was said at first that the Messiah, returning shortly after his ascension, would raise the dead and reign with his followers for a thousand years, after which all would end; it was now claimed that this messianic coming was to take place only at the end of the world, as the conclusion of all things.

Be that as it may, despite physics, despite Descartes, who founded the new spiritualism by his distinction of substances, the Church has preserved the dogma of the resurrection of bodies and teaches it in its catechism. It is no longer, it is true, as before, the pivot of propaganda; but it is still an article, the penultimate article of the profession of faith, *carnis resurrectionem*.

Imagine the astonishment of the Romans at this strange idea, when for the first time it appeared in the capital of the Empire, which Tacitus, precisely on this occasion, compares to a sink of human follies!

These men, who dared not believe the Stoics about the immortality of souls, what must they have thought of this incredible idea of the resurrection of bodies? Faith in the *manes* was treated by them as superstition: what would the return of corpses be? Only one thing can give an idea of the disgust they must have felt, and that is the belief in vampires, still widespread among the Slavic peoples, which has no other origin than the resurrection. *Exitiabilis superstitio*, says Tacitus, who is almost consoled, at this idea, for the atrocious torture by which Nero caused these wretches to perish.

XLIV. — Will you ask me, after that, if the cordial offered by Christianity against the fear of death produced the effect?

Alas! The disease was one of those that cannot be cured by

conjurations and acts of faith. Neither taurobolium, nor baptism, nor infusions of blood nor immersion in water could do anything about it.

With Christianity, the world seemed like a phantasmagoria.

“And I saw,” says the Apocalypse, “a pale horse, and he who rode it was called DEATH, and Hell followed him.”

A society that lived only in the hope of resurrection was indeed dead; its cities, its palaces, its theaters were cemeteries, its temples catacombs. Dead from its terror, or dead from its new religion, which do you think is more to the glory of the Christian name?

As long as the persecution lasted, the struggle sustaining courage, the Church lived the life of the ancient society: the era of the martyrs, which begins and ends at the same time as that of the gladiators, is the liveliest in ecclesiastical history.

But when Caesar was converted, when the emperors, attacked under the purple of the universal malaise, were seen to provide themselves, at their last moments, with the sacraments of the dead, all virtue vanished. On the one hand, the resurrection postponed until the end of the centuries, the souls, awaiting the hour of reunion with the body, kept in limbo; on the other hand, the terror of the judgments of God, all this, far from attenuating the evil, only made it worse. The Christian world, barely established, nearly fled, so sad was life to it, so full of trembling was death. Some, like Antony, leave at the age of eighteen for the desert, strip themselves of their life, appease God by a death of fifty or eighty years. Others, like Jérôme, without quite leaving the world, become exhausted with abstinences, are ruined by labors and vigils, pursued as they are by the trumpet of the last day.

Centuries have passed, and humanity continues to walk in its own mourning: the whole Middle Ages is one long burial. The Homer of feudal society is Dante: he sings of *Hell*, *Purgatory* and *Paradise*. Its philosopher is the author of the *Imitation*: he advocates the intimate pleasures of solitude, the pleasures of undressing, the egoism of the coffin. Surely the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, bringing back philosophy, the sciences, letters, the arts, industry and its discoveries, will, to the powerful cries of the Renaissance and the Reformation, put an end to this pilgrimage from beyond the grave, change into a joyful civilization the Church of *darkness* and its *nocturnal* feasts. Nothing of the sort: philosophy and the muses are still revenants. Draped in their shrouds and making the sign of the cross, they refine death; they teach us to savor it, to taste it, as the martyrs did not know how to do, as the Fathers of the desert never suspected.

Read our sermonaries, our ascetic and mystical authors, our books of minor and high devotions: always the terror of the other life, the dramaturgy of death. Death! Eternity! Judgment! Heaven or Hell! Have

you thought about these four last endings? There is a book, a model of the genre, that still circulates through the countryside: it is the *Trésor des âmes du Purgatoire*. Full of apparitions of the dead and the damned, one cannot imagine the harm done by this abominable work, with what pusillanimity it filled the soul of the people.

Caesar was asked which death seemed preferable to him: *The quickest and most unexpected*, he replied. All the Romans thought like him. *Hurry up*, that's the only prayer addressed to the executioners by those doomed by imperial tyranny. The guillotine would have ravished them with pleasure.

Christianity, on the contrary, has made sudden death a symptom of damnation, the greatest of misfortunes. Before expiring, shouldn't the Christian *recognize himself*? There is a prayer of Saint Bridget expressly to ward off this danger. I knew, in my early youth, a young man who, after a violent exercise, suddenly seized with vomiting blood, cried out in his distress: *Quickly, a doctor and a priest!* Not a word, either for his friends or for his family; he forgot even his mother. The fear of death, exalted by that of hell, stifled in him all human feelings. I shall never forget that cry of supreme egoism: *Quickly a doctor and a priest!*

The fear of death is a means for the Church of government and capture. She said to the young girl: Think of death! Stifle this thought of love, thought of damnation; spouse of Jesus Christ, the most beautiful of the children of men, bring him your virginity and your dowry; and you will be saved! And you will be holy! And you will be canonized! The poor girl listens: "What if I were going to damn myself!" she thinks. She feels the emptiness of her existence without love; and this emptiness, which she would triumph over so easily by marriage, causes her to bury herself in celibacy. While full of life she embraces death, like the warbler fascinated by the snake, which rushes crying into its throat.

XLV. — Review the illustrious dead among the Christians: it is there that we must see the effect of this *exitiabilis susperstitio*, as Tacitus calls it. I stick to the classic examples.

Pascal, like Saint Jerome, pursued by a deadly hallucination, renounces marriage, becomes a monk and dies in terror.

La Fontaine, affected by the contagion, wears a hair shirt in his last moments.

Racine abdicates his genius, begins to rhyme psalms, and makes small chapels with his children.

The great Condé — it is Bossuet who tells it in his funeral oration — encourages himself to leave life by the hope of seeing God "as he is, face to face," *sicuti est, facie ad faciem*. The man whose courage had astonished the bravest, touched by Christian terrors, bent before the priest and

trembled. There was nothing in that soul, which had known neither country nor justice, and which faith had bewitched.

Turenne, a convert, stands ready to die, doing his devotions every day, so well, says Madame de Sévigné, that no one, either at court, or in the city, or in the army, had the least anxiety about his salvation.

The death of Fénelon, told by Cardinal de Beausset, is lamentable. Struck in his affections, in his legitimate ambition, exiled by a despot king, condemned by the pope, betrayed by Madame de Maintenon, separated from religious society, from political society, from all society, he drags along a desolate existence in mourning. Having reached his last hour, he continues to exhort himself with texts from the Bible. After so many unjust persecutions, deceived hopes, atrocious wrenchings in heart and mind, the terror of eternal judgments still pursues him, the man of charity par excellence! The more that he has been just, pious, loving, sympathetic to all, devoted to his country and to his prince, the more his religion fills him with bitterness. Oh! If I had against Christianity only this death of Fénelon, that would be enough for my hatred: I would never forgive this God.

Bossuet, the Hercules of the priesthood, Bossuet, on his deathbed, recalls the *dying sinner* recounted by Massillon in his *Petit-Carême*. What pain in dying!... *Usque adeòne mori miserum est?* With each pain he murmurs a verse from the breviary, especially the one that the dying Jesus repeated in the Garden of Olives: "Thy will be done, not mine!" *Fiat voluntas tua!* After a glorious and full life, laden with years and labors, death is cruel to him, and he groans, like that big fat king of the Amalekites whom Judge Samuel had killed: *Siccine separat amara mors!* After having supported the Christian edifice on his robust shoulders for so long, the Gallican hero feels the emptiness of the system: no family, no social communion, not even Catholic life; the Bishop of Meaux is no more for the Church than the lowest of the faithful. *Fiat voluntas tua!* May Christ, who passed through this agony, aid him!

"The night from Thursday to Friday, April 11, was so bad, the pains were so intense during the morning until noon, that all the assistants believed that Bossuet was going to breathe his last. Father Bossuet, his nephew, then threw himself at the foot of his bed to ask for his blessing. Bossuet was full of the Spirit of God, speaking little, but always with piety. The Abbé Ledieu expressed to him at the same time his profound gratitude for all his kindness, begging him to think sometimes of the friends he left on earth, who were so devoted to his person and to his glory. At this word of *glory*, Bossuet, already entered into the tomb, already a stranger to the earth, seized with terror in the presence of the supreme judge whose judgment he was awaiting, half rising from his bed in pain, and revived by a holy indignation, regained the strength to distinctly pronounce these words: *Cease this talk, and ask forgiveness for me of God for my sins.* (*Histoire de*

*Bossuet*, by Cardinal de BEAUSSET.)

Thus died the bishop of Nîmes, Mgr Cart, another saint; and it is thus that you will die in your turn, Monsignor: for you too are a sincere Christian, devoted to the glory of the Church and prostrate before the judgments of God.

XLVI. — Let us conclude now.

The normal existence of man, considered as an individual, as head or member of a family, as citizen and patriot, as scholar, artist, industrialist or soldier, presupposes a death that is in harmony with it, that is, say calm, gentle, satisfied, rather joyful than bitter.

Now, under Christianity, from its origin down to our own day, the death of man has not been happy, any more than in the last centuries of paganism.

There is therefore an anomaly in the existence and in the education of the Christians, as in that of the pagans of the decadence; and if it happens that the bad death is essential to Christianity, to its dogma, to its faith, it must necessarily be concluded that Christianity is not a moral religion, but a religion of demoralization.



## CHAPTER VI.

### Man in the Face of Death. (continued.)

XLVII. — What does revolutionary philosophy teach us in its turn about this serious question of dying well?

I will try to present the deduction from it, maintaining the reserve required by a doctrine that is produced for the first time, and which, consequently, must content itself with laying down its foundations.

I first set aside, as foreign to the subject, the question of the immortality of the soul, which I abandon to mysticism, true science allowing me neither to reject it nor to accept it.

Whether or not there is a God, sovereign personality, soul of the universe, of whom nature is the product and humanity the daughter, science, which proceeds by observation, cannot say a thing. It neither affirms nor denies; it doesn't know, doesn't even understand, and doesn't worry about it. What does Justice, which must exist by itself and demonstrate itself to the conscience without foreign auxiliary, care about this hypothesis?

Similarly, whether or not there is a survival for humanity, a renewal of life for souls and bodies, science says nothing about it and morality cares just as little. As it exists independently of the idea of God and apart from its existence, it also exists apart from immortality; it does not need this myth any more than the other.

*Euthanasia* or dying well, being part of morality, must, like living well, do without any consideration of survival; It is in order to reject the immortality or migration of souls that it presents itself as a consolation for death.

The Revolution, by reforming the social economy and organizing equality, assures each man the fullness of his days: the first condition of a happy death. — By re-establishing Justice in the State, it ensures universal communion: the second condition of *euthanasia*.

But what is death in itself? What is it to die? Such is the question that philosophy asks itself, and whose preliminary solution is required by morality, barely leaving room for doubt on what we regard, with the wise men of all times, as the signs of the good death, the fullness of existence and social communion.

XLVIII. — Spiritualist writers, preoccupied with their dreams of immortality, do not fail to say that death is not an END, but a suspension, a transition, or a transformation of existence.

Death has been called *eternal sleep*, which promises an inactive

immortality; others make death the sister of sleep, *consanguineus leti sopor*; then we say the *sleep of death*; finally, *sleep and death* are taken as synonyms: "Sleep already closes my drowned eyes," says Virgil in Eurydice, expiring for the second time, *conditionque natantia lumina somnus*.

The moderns, borrowing their comparisons from natural history, compare the existence of man to the evolution of the insect which from caterpillar or worm becomes chrysalis, and then butterfly. Our death would thus be a rebirth, the moment when we leave this coarse envelope, to put on the wings of immortality. M. Jean Reynaud even thinks that there are worlds where the passage from one life to another takes place without an interruption of feeling, without a sudden change in the body, without a break in continuity.

"I find nothing impossible in the fact that there are happy quarters in the universe where the reigning law is to rise from one world to another, by means of a corresponding transformation of the organic apparatuses, without any act of splitting, and by marrying, so to speak, by an insensible transition, death with rebirth. It is thus that we see the insect, after having lived first in the darkness of the earth, then crawling on the ground, slowly rearranging its limbs, metamorphosing visibly, and finally springing up on its own, armed with shining wings, and full of new ardor, in the middle of the light population of the aerial world. My imagination (*his imagination!*) in no way refuses to represent, within these enormous gatherings of stars that we discover in the distance of the sky, beings acquiring during their lifetime, by the exercise of their virtues, organs of a higher nature, by the aid of which, without losing a moment's consciousness of themselves, they would successively transport themselves, with inexpressible delights, in the company of their friends, from one residence to a better residence." (*Terre et Ciel*, p. 300.)

Some call to their aid organic chemistry. They see in life and death a double phenomenon of animal composition and decomposition, under the alternately increasing and decreasing action of an unknown principle, soul, spirit or life. This principle takes hold of matter, fashions a body out of it, struggles successfully for some time against the chemical reactions that tend to dissolve it, then, overcome in the end by their accumulation, separates itself from this worn-out organism to begin again elsewhere the same exercise.

I regret disturbing all this poetry; but morality does not live on imaginations, any more than the natural sciences, and it is impossible to see anything else in all this palingenesis.

First, the kind of antithesis that is established between the chemical principle and the vitalist principle, brought back to the point of view that concerns us, says too much or not enough. Immortality, or to put it better

metempsychosis, would thus be common to man and beasts; what did I say? to the plants themselves, which is absurd. But were I to admit the transmigration of sensitive and vegetative life, what could result from it for the determination of my mores? What does it matter to my justice? What above all does it matter to the happiness of my last moments?

As for the induction drawn from the different phases of organic evolution, notably in insects, apart from the fact that it is completely gratuitous, it still seems to me to lack logic, in that these phases indicate a continuous ascent of life in the animal, while death is a general cessation, brought about by a regular decrease. Thus, the passage from the worm to the state of chrysalis, in which we see an analogue of death, is nothing other than the puberty of the animal: nature, by conferring on it with the faculty of generating new organs, or transforming the old ones, basically does nothing more for the insect than what it does for man himself, in whom virility also occurs with a deployment, not to say a supplement of organism. The phase of puberty has its very marked opposition in woman, in the cessation of the menstrual flow, which completes our demonstration that, the phenomena that bring about death being radically opposed to those that produce life, it is against all logic to assimilate them and, consequently, to draw from them an argument in favor of survival.

This observation on the puberty of insects, which I present with all the reserve that my incompetence commands of me, will put us on the road to the truth.

XLIX. — Any existence that begins to occur has an end.

I mean here by *end*, not the cessation of the vital movement, but the goal towards which this movement is directed, and which, once reached, implies in the subject the cessation of life, which has become useless.

It follows from this that, death embracing both in its definition: 1. the highest term of organic evolution, that is to say a positive phenomenon; 2. the cessation or the slowing down of the movement that is the consequence of it, that is to say a negative phenomenon, we do not know death, we only know half of it, when we consider it only under this last aspect; to have the complete idea of it, it is necessary to consider it also under the other.

Death, in a word, is not nothingness; I do not hesitate to proclaim this principle at the head of this dissertation: for, I will repeat it here with common sense, and with the inventors of immortality themselves, *nothing is made from nothing, nothing goes to nothing, nothing is nothing*. If the dogma of survival depended on the application of these axioms, nothing would be more certain.

What then, finally, is death?

In the category of organized beings, the positive, culminating term of life is reproduction.

The individual awakens to life, emerges from its seed, grows, blossoms, emits its germ; then it dies imperceptibly, naturally, normally, leaving its life little by little to this germ, to which it ends up passing entirely: this is the law, visible above all in annual plants.

Who could here mark the precise moment of the vital cessation? Who does not see that death is a full half of life, life a full half of death? First, this life is concentrated in the seed; placed in the right conditions, it develops into a stem, along which it seems to rise to accumulate in the flower. According to the circumstances, this movement is more or less rapid, subject moreover to periodic intermittences, during which life rests: sleep, for all living beings, is a momentary return to the fetal state. Then the ineffable mystery is accomplished: life, having reached its goal, seems to be divided between two beings, the father and the child. For a few days you could not say if it belongs to one more than to the other, one would believe that they are but one; but soon you see it pass entirely to the embryo, which is detached, and leaves with it the father, who is dead.

Death, in a word, is the transmigration of life from one subject to another subject, by a particular act of life itself, which is called GENERATION.

Among the insects, existence behaves in exactly the same way: it ends with generation. Many males perish in mating; females survive only as long as necessary for egg laying.

Perennial plants are no exception to this law. All produce seeds, and in all the seminiferous bud, or fruit, is extinguished at the maturity of the seed. Only, while in annual plants fruiting brings about the complete death of the plant, here the stem and the roots preserve a vitality that allows them to push out new buds the following year, as if in a first efflorescence their productive force had not been exhausted.

So it is with the great animals and with man: they survive the production of their seed and its hatching, sometimes long enough to see the children of their children up to the third and fourth generation:

Et natos natorum, et qui nascentur ab illis.

The reason for this survival is the education of the offspring. From the duration of this education results for the parent subject the faculty of multiplying its generations: something that does not take place in annual plants and insects, and which would seem an exuberance of nature, an anomaly, if considerations of another order did not explain the mystery.

L. — *To die*, understanding by this word what physiological observation indicates, that is to say the second period of vital evolution,

therefore means to reproduce; and if we grasp the phenomenon in its characteristic moment, to die is to accomplish the essential function of life, that which requires the highest degree of energy and exaltation. We feel it in the erotic spasm, rapid as lightning in vigorous individuals who know how to preserve their liberty in passion, but which in old people resembles a real passing away, from which more than one cannot recover.

Reread in the *Nouvelle Héloïse* the description of the kiss in the grove, the first pledge given by love, the first alert to death.

Is this where it ends? Yes, certainly, if you reduce existence to individuality, less than that, to the generative function, of which the two sexes form by their union the complete apparatus; no, if you consider existence in the series of generations, in their solidarity, their identity, which means, for man, in their moral life and in their works.

So whether I consider death from the point of view of nature, or whether I consider it from that of Justice, it appears to me as the consummation of my being; and the more I consult my heart, the more I perceive that, far from fleeing it with dread, I aspire to it with enthusiasm.

For life, to pass from one home to another, or from a father to become a child, is not to end; and as this passage, this *becoming*, is for every living being the solemn moment, the supreme act of existence, it follows that death, in the will of nature, is adequate to bliss: death is love.

He who loves wants to die; it is the thought of the Song: *Fortis ut mors dilectio*, says the wife. Even if it would mean dying, nothing will prevent me from loving you. This was the thought of that enthusiast who asked Cleopatra for a night, and consented to die afterwards.

And here you no longer have to distinguish between the kinds of love: the voluptuous and the chaste lover, the sensualist and the platonic, are subject to the same law. And the father, the friend, the citizen, think the same. For one as for the others, when passion has reached its paroxysm, when consciousness has risen to the pitch of heroism, dying is nothing, loving alone is something. M. Blanc-Saint-Bonnet, glimpsing this identity of death and love, encountered a beautiful thought:

“No one,” he says, “has entered further into love than he who has seen death several times.”

On the contrary, wean the heart from love and the conscience from Justice, empty the soul through contempt and egoism, and you will have cowardice, apostasy and all its shame.

A man has been seen, in our times, filled by nature, fortune and celebrity, but type of egoism and pride, dishonoring his last moments by a defection like one seldom sees in philosophy: this man is Heinrich Heine.

After having courted the Revolution for a long time, caressed Democracy, savored popularity, having sung of atheism and pleasure,

having become a cripple, having in his heart neither faith nor love, without communion either with nature or with society, he becomes a deist, he returns, he says, to religious sentiment. Logic, his misanthropy, his secret terrors, would have him go as far as Catholicism; he is ashamed: he has jeered too much, blasphemed too much against the religion of Christ! But he advocates the Bible and Judaism; he admires Moses and his legislation. Never, he says, did religion have an enemy in him. He is pleased to have married in Saint-Sulpice, and to have made the commitment to raise his children in the Christian religion. He believes that Catholicism will last many centuries yet and, like M. Cousin, he doffs his hat. It seems that, not daring out of human respect to address his prayer to Christ, he is trying by *salamalecs* to corrupt him. Protesting his esteem for the priest, after having hurled sarcasm at Hegel, at the Revolution, at the people of February, at the Protestant Reformation, at the new German exegesis, he ends with the praise of the Jesuits.

Henri Heine died as he had lived, as a whore; his place is in the charnel house of the *Filles repenties*: he would shame the Salpetriere.

Next to this shameful death, put that of a revolutionary.

*I have really liked it*, said Danton as he left the Conciergerie to go to the guillotine; then immediately, delighted at the memory of his two wives and his children, by the greater image of the homeland, he added: *I served the revolution, I overthrew royalty, I founded the republic...* He had poured out his soul, like his love: what could the guillotine do to him?

Jesus, at the decisive moment, is dying: God forbid that I accuse him, along with Celsus and Porphyry, of having lacked courage! If his religion has become, through the terror of death, the scourge of humanity; the fault was not his, he who understood life differently and preached by example. But Jesus is celibate; he has weaned himself from love, he has given everything to the sect, he has only created an equivocal generation and he does not even know if this generation, ready to deny him, to flee, will survive him! He lacks that virile courage that conscience supplies but does not replace, and he has only an imperfect notion of justice. Superior to Danton for holiness, he is inferior to him for the energy that Love, Paternity and Right give to the soul; and that is why no man in the face of death has ever equaled Danton.

LI. — On these principles we can now build a theory.

It is a fact that has been observed for a long time, that death is all the more painful as life has been deprived of enjoyment. The man who has *lived*, as we say in a sense that is not mine here, is more determined for the fight; and a great error of our imagination is to believe that the celibate is more enterprising, more devoted, more ready to sacrifice, than the man who is the lover, husband, or father of a family. The law of Moses

exempted the newly married or simply engaged Israelite from military service: it did not want a man who walked into the enemy with regret. Antiquity is full of this spirit. The famous *Ten Thousand* each had his companion; we do not see that they were more cowardly. And whatever devotion the Crimean army showed, I would venture to say that our soldiers would have felt less desolation in their hearts, if in their sufferings they had found this softening of love.

But if this principle of courage in the presence of death cannot be ignored, there is another kind of satisfaction that is no less powerful, that which springs from a duty accomplished, from an idea carried out.

Man, an intelligent, laboring being, the most industrious and the most sociable of beings, whose dominant is not love, but a law higher than love, man does not produce, does not engender only, like other animals, through sex; his generations are of several orders: he also generates by work, by intelligence, and especially by JUSTICE.

Hence those heroic devotions to science, unknown to the vulgar; those martyrdoms of labor and industry, which the novel and the theater disdain; hence the *Dying for the homeland*, so much repeated since Tyrtaeus.

Let me salute you, all of you who knew how to rise up and die, in 89, in 92 and in 1830! You are in the communion of liberty, more alive than we who have lost it.

Hence also all those repentances *in extremis*, which the priest attributes to the efficacy of his ministry, and which are only the awakening of Justice, the cry of conscience, at the approach of death.

To produce an idea, a book, a poem, a machine; in a word, to make, as the tradesmen say, one's masterpiece;

To serve his country and Humanity, to save the life of a man, to produce a good deed, to repair an injustice, to recover from crime by confession and tears:

All this is engendering; it is to reproduce oneself in social life, as to become a father is to reproduce oneself in organic life; I would almost say, if I were allowed to speak this language, it is to make oneself a participant in the Divinity.

The destiny of man is to expend himself entirely for his offspring, natural and spiritual; and that not only in the generative act, but in the initiation by work, which is its complement. And this expenditure that he makes of his being is his glory, it is his beatitude, his immortality.

This is what death is: the final act of love of the creature having reached the fullness of physical, intellectual and moral existence, and returning his soul in a paternal kiss. Moses, says the legend, after having delivered his people from the servitude of the Egyptians, after having disciplined them in the wilderness and led them victorious into the land

of Canaan, *died in Jehovah's kiss*. The psalmist expresses the same idea, *Beati qui in Domino moriuntur*, that is to say, according to the energy of the mythical language, which under the name of God understands the social collectivity: Blessed are those who die in the embrace of their people! Who wouldn't want to die like this?

LII. — In summary, human life reaches its fullness, it is *ripe for heaven*, as Massillon says, when it has satisfied the following conditions:

1. Love, paternity, family: extension and perpetuation of being by carnal generation, or reproduction of the subject in body and soul, person and will;

2. Work, or industrial generation: extension and perpetuation of being by its action on nature. Because as I said above, man also has a love for nature; he unites with it, and from this fruitful union issues a generation of a new order;

3. Social communion, or Justice: participation in collective life and in the progress of Humanity.

Love and paternity can be supplemented by consanguinity, by existence within an adopted family, especially by labor. Labor is the real substitute for love. Man, even in the affections that vitality gives birth to in him, is not so enslaved to the organism that he must inevitably fulfill all of its functions: love among elite souls has no organs.

Labor and Justice do not replace or supplement each other.

If these conditions are violated, existence is anxious; man, unable *to live or to die*, belongs to misery.

If, on the contrary, these same conditions are met, existence is full: it is a feast, a love song, a perpetual enthusiasm, an endless hymn to happiness. At whatever hour the signal is given, man is ready: for he is always in death, which means in life and in love.

LIII. — What meaning, then, could have for me, either from the point of view of morality or from the point of view of destiny, this hypothesis of despair, which has become a principle of religion in tyrannized societies: *If there is another life after death?*

I conceive that a frightened ontology, finding a contradiction in these two terms that embrace all life, to *appear* and to *disappear*, seeks the solution in an eternity of being where passing forms reproduce themselves endlessly; where, consequently, people and faces meet; where each self, exhausted by a first evolution, resurrects for another; where any specimen of our organic essence, given at such a moment of collective life by a combination of circumstances that must not return, and conceived as substantial individuality, soul or monad, reappears with its modes, its faculties, its character, its memories and the feeling of its inviolable



identity. I conceive, I say, that an unstoppable speculation agitates these psycho-theological curiosities: of what use can they be for my present destiny, for the rule of my morals, for the happiness of my life and the sweetness of my death?

By my birth, by my family, by my loves, I know that I am in organic communion with all my species; through my work, I know that I am in communion with all of nature; through my justice, I know that I am in communion with society: I am in communion with the whole universe. Thanks to this communion, there are not even little children whose lives do not have their fullness. They have hurt no one; they have filled us with joy. We collected their smiles, their looks, their pure grace, their lovely words. Unable to feel death, they have reached perfection; and if we have loved them, we have lost nothing.

What can your immortality add to my happiness and my virtue? Am I not now immortal, to speak your style, since I am in the past, in the present, in the future, in infinity? You cannot give me more than the sublime, whether I love or I produce, or whether I accomplish the works of Justice. Now, this sublime, I possess it; it depends on me and on the use I know how to make of my faculties: your immortality will never surpass it.

If that is what you call being immortal, I am; if it is a question of something else, I no longer understand you, my mind being unable to conceive, my soul not being able to desire, anything beyond the sublime.

There is a solemn act in the life of man that translates all this doctrine, an act today almost unknown to the people, but which the Roman regarded as sacred: it is the *Testament*.

What does this monument of the last will signify, by which man acts beyond the tomb?

This only, that the testator, in dying, affirms the continuation of his presence in the family and the society from the heart of which he vanishes.

Antiquity, which believed little in the survival of souls, was very religious with regard to the testament: at the moment of giving battle, all the Roman soldiers made theirs. Like the three hundred of Leonidas, like Moses, they died in the kiss of the homeland. When the Bible, recounting the death of the patriarchs, concludes with these words: *He was reunited with his fathers*, it expresses the high thought of the testament. (N) When Jesus on the cross exclaims: *My Father, I commend my soul into your hands*, by this act of communion with Humanity, designated under the mystical allegory of the *Father*, he is making his testament. The testament! It is the name given to the doctrine of Christ, as to that of Moses.

We all have a testament to make; but the perfect Christian makes no

testament, unless it is a question of disinheriting his own and leaving his property to the Church. The Christian on his deathbed has nothing to say to his brothers except this mournful farewell: *Pray for me!* It is not his soul that remains to us, it is ours that he invites to follow him: what a reversal!

Death, if I may be permitted this figure borrowed from economics and which has nothing out of place here, is the balance by which our career is liquidated. If this career is full, there is profit; it is euthanasia, death in rapture. If, on the contrary, the journey has been made by way of vice and misfortune, there is a deficit: it is death in despair, bankruptcy in existence.

Today, when the Revolution has barely done more than show itself to the world, a happy death is as rare as liberty and justice: most of us end up as criminals. No social communion, no peace for our last moments. The family would still support us: it dissolves in its turn; those who talk about it the most are those who most dishonor it, and it only appears at the last hour to season it with regrets. Labor, surrounded by everything that makes it repugnant and painful, without reciprocity for the mercenary, without dignity for the capitalist and the entrepreneur, who see in it only a means of fortune, would labor make the dying man rejoice with his skeleton face? Empty of love and virtue we come to the end of the day, empty we must fall asleep. Is it surprising that instead of the joys of plenitude we find only the agony of the end?

LIV. — Have you ever, Monsignor, witnessed a beautiful death? Listen again to this story; it is neither a hero nor a genius, but a poor artisan, a pure race of free thinkers, who ends up in revolutionary communion as never a Christian knew how to do in that of the Church.

My father, at the age of sixty-six, exhausted by work, in which the blade, as they say, had worn out the scabbard, suddenly felt that his end had come. Never, I must say, did I notice in him a word, a gesture, that testified to impiety any more than to devotion. He neither prayed nor blasphemed, entirely devoted to his business, expecting nothing but his labor, importuning neither heaven nor men with his solicitations. Sometimes at great solemnities, I have seen him do like everyone else, go to mass: he was bored there, understanding nothing, as foreign to the matter as a deaf-mute. If the priest ascended the pulpit, he couldn't stand it any longer, and without laughing or thinking, he left quickly. Surely the weight of his devotions was light.

On the day of his death, he had, something which is not uncommon, the fixed feeling of his end. So he wanted to prepare for the great journey, and gave his instructions himself. Relatives and friends are summoned; a modest supper is served, enlivened by soft conversation. At dessert, he

begins his farewells, expresses his regrets to one of his sons who died ten years earlier, who died before his time. I was absent, for the service... of the family. His youngest son, taking the cause of his emotion badly, said to him: Come on, father, drive away these sad ideas. Why do you despair? Aren't you a man? Your hour has not yet sounded. — You are mistaken, replied the old man, if you imagine that I am afraid of death. I tell you it is over; I feel it, and I wanted to die among you. Come on, let's serve the coffee!... He tastes a few spoonfuls. — I have had a lot of trouble in my life, he said; I have not succeeded in my undertakings (the innocent!); but I have loved you all, and I die without reproach. Tell your brother that I regret leaving you so poor; but let him persevere...

A relative of the family, somewhat devout, thinks he must comfort the patient, saying, like the catechism, that not everything ends with death; that it is then that we must give an account, but that God's mercy is great... Cousin Gaspard, replies my father, I don't know what's going on, and I don't think about it at all. I feel neither fear nor desire; I die surrounded by what I love, I have my paradise in my heart.

Around ten o'clock he fell asleep, murmuring a last good evening, friendship, good conscience, the hope of a better destiny for those he left behind, all coming together within him to give perfect calm to his last moments. The next day my brother wrote to me with transport: *Our father died bravely!*... The priests will not canonize him; but I, who knew him, proclaim him in my turn a *brave man*, and do not wish for myself any other funeral oration.

LV. — Compare this death with that of the Christian, surrounded by candles, crucifixes, holy water; to whom the confessor speaks of the judgments of God, who is rubbed with holy oils, who is overwhelmed with exorcisms, as if, on the threshold of the tomb, the torture of the reprobate were beginning!

Oh what! Here are men, the first in genius and glory, filled with the admiration of their contemporaries, sure of posterity, for whom death is unbearable: they are Christians.

And this poor cooper, a stranger to all greatness, dying of weariness in a cottage, smiles at his last hour; his conscience takes the place of everything; he is happy. He is not impious, the man of the people does not know impiety; but he is no more a Christian than he who, on the edge of the grave, gives a tear to the son who is no more, because the death of this son who preceded him diminishes him; who regrets his unfortunate undertakings, because they leave him a void; who does not fear the other life, but who does not need it, because he has it *in his heart!*

To look death in the face, to greet it with love, to place one's soul in the hands of one's children, and to merge into the family, leaving one's body

on the ground like a scrap, that is neither spiritualist nor mystical, nor a Christian; it is quite simply social reality, it is Justice.

Today, when we are neither with Christ nor with the Revolution, we have invented hideous ways for the dying. Around the patient, everything conspires to hide his condition from him: they amuse him, they deceive him, they chloroform him; we do it so well that he passes away without having thought of it. No last words, *novissima verba*; no transmission of the soul, no testament. He is dying like a dog: *Unus is finite hominis and jumentis*. (O)

O death! Eldest sister of the loves, always a virgin and always fruitful, you whom I recognized in the first sigh of my youth, which I felt with every surge of my civic enthusiasm, to which I can already offer thirty years and more of labor, sweet and happy Death, could you frighten me? Isn't it you that I adore in love and friendship? You on whom I meditate in eternal truth? You whom I cultivate in this nature, whose communion stifles in my heart even the feeling of my poverty? You, finally, to whom I have erected a temple in my soul, and whom I never cease to invoke, O sovereign Justice!...

If you come today, I am ready: I love my own and I am loved by them; I fought well, *bonum certamen certavi*; if I have made mistakes, at least I have not despaired of virtue, and I have always recovered. I have begun my testament, which others will complete, and I have the firm confidence that anyone who has read it will understand this strong word, that there is no servitude for one who has *made a pact with death*. If you don't come until tomorrow, I'll be even better prepared; I will have done more, I will embrace you with an effusion one degree more ardent. If you delay ten years, I will leave as if for the triumph.

O death! Calumniated for so long, but who is terrible only to the wicked, the only ones worthy of being called *immortals*, would you not be the fateful enigma whose word must make the sphinx of religions vanish, by delivering humanity from its terrors? You haven't told me everything yet; you keep more than one secret from me. Teach me, and I will repeat your word; and all the nations will confess that you are the only living and true Christ.

## APPENDIX.

### NOTES AND CLARIFICATIONS.

#### Note (A).

GOD, POWER OF HUMANITY. — “It is not permitted,” observes a critic of our friends, “to interpret this line of Virgil in this way.” — Metaphorically, no: the word *potestas*, word for word *puissance*, power, in the place quoted (Aeneid, book X, v. 18), is taken for sovereign. But if there is a poet to whom it is sometimes permissible to attribute, apart from the epic or figurative meaning, a philosophical meaning, a meaning that, in the particular case, is moreover the literal meaning, it is certainly Virgil. Virgil is the cantor of a new religion, of the religion that later became Christianity, that is to say, the most complete symbolism of the human soul and of the destinies of Humanity. According to this great poet, philosopher, hierophant and innovator, an infinite Spirit agitates matter, maintains life in the Universe, gives birth to all living beings. Our souls are seeds of it, *semina*, emanations. In other words, God, the infinite, eternal, absolute spirit, which reveals itself only by particularizing itself and uniting itself, in the form of souls, with organized bodies, God is in us, God is each of us, he is the *power* that makes us be; he is, therefore, from the epic point of view, our sovereign. The word has a double-meaning, *potestas*. This is the opposite of what Saint Paul says: *We live in God, we move, we are in God*. The doctrine of Virgil has been abandoned, although on this particular point it was perhaps nearer the truth — we are dealing here with metaphysical truth — than that of the Apostle.

Virgil, as we will show elsewhere (NINTH STUDY), in undertaking his poem, was not making a work of pure fantasy or pure nationality: under the names of the vulgar gods, it was faith in the future that he was expressing, as he sang, in the glory of Rome, of the greatness of civilization. This admitted, and no one can dispute it, the poem of Virgil, an imitation, at first glance, of those of Homer, acquires a unique originality in the splendor of poetry. The expressions that Virgil borrows from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* have in his language a significance that they did not have in the Greek. Thus the title of *father and king of men and gods* given to Zeus, does not imply his eternity: Zeus, son of Kronos, is not eternal; in good mythology, there would be a contradiction. In the Aeneid, on the contrary, a poem at once historical and philosophical, national and humanitarian, traditional and palingenesian, Jupiter, although son of Saturn, is called an eternal power, because the poet, full of his subject as much as of his model, deliberately mixes, in his thought, mythology and

metaphysics, Homer and Plato, and creates for himself a style of his own, which will gradually become the style of the new theology.

**Note (B).**

**CORRUPTION OF THE CHURCH OF ROME.** — The immorality, quite exceptional, that has at all times distinguished the Church of Rome, is one of the most significant facts of ecclesiastical history and, from the religious point of view, the most inexplicable. Neither climate, nor race, nor anything in the order of nature and society, which can excite concupiscence and weaken virtuous energy, can here be invoked as the cause of this singular and quite special dissolution. Ancient Italy was the nursery of all virtues: it was by its virtue, even more than by its arms, that the Roman republic triumphed over the nations; nowhere did the family seem more holy, marriage more chaste, morals more frugal; the first, finally, among the cities, Rome rose to the notion of universal right and made it the law of the world. What could have made papal Rome the bottomless receptacle of all filth? How did the center of Christianity become the center of corruption? To this question, those of our readers who have followed us can make the answer: it is precisely because Rome is the seat of the Papacy, the capital of Catholicism.

Once it is recognized that the religious principle, given in appearance to serve as the support and safeguard of human virtue, is the very principle of human dissolution, it follows that where we find the center of this cult, there also is the center of the immorality. It is the spectacle of Roman corruptions that, from the era of the martyrs until the present moment, has aroused against Rome the indignation of the peoples, of the reformers and of the princes, at the same time as it has brought upon it the anathema of the saints. In the 12<sup>th</sup> century, Saint Bernard declared the disease incurable. It was the sight of this intense corruption that made Luther indignant; that, two centuries later, brought the reforming enterprise of Port-Royal, exterminated by iron and fire, at the request of the Pope and the Jesuits. At that time, all Christians of note, even those whom the Papacy had canonized, Saint Francis de Sales, Saint Vincent de Paul, Saint Charles Borromeo, the Cardinal de Bérulle, the Bishop of Belley M. Camus, as well as Jansenius and Saint-Cyran, mourned the abuses and wounds of the court of Rome. Time marches on, and the dreadful canker does not lessen. What morality should be expected from people supposedly in charge of God's business? It was after seeing Rome, as Luther had seen it three hundred years before, that the Abbé de Lamennais wrote his *Paroles d'un croyant*, an act of abjuration of the Christian faith. It is the feeling of this immorality that at this moment divides the Orthodox and makes the most fervent desire the abolition of

the temporal power of the popes as a remedy for Roman infamy, and the only means of preventing the imminent destruction of Catholicism. After 1848, was it not enough for the government of the French Republic to approach this rotten trunk to infect the whole generation? The visible change in the mores of the French people, that painful enigma of contemporary history, dates from there. December 2 is the poisoned fruit that we brought back from the Roman expedition. Will Rome yield to the cries of her friends who beg her with clasped hands to grant reforms? No: the idea of reforming the Church has become more impractical than ever; abandoning the temporal power would serve no purpose. The Church of Rome can only regain a semblance of sanctity on the condition of no longer being the mother and mistress of the other churches, on the condition of returning to evangelical democracy, soon to be absorbed by social democracy. The pulpit of immorality must perish; the salvation of the human race is at stake.

Note (C).

THE SECRET OF THE JESUITS. — It is horrible to think so, but it must be said, because necessity makes it a law. Let us forget the individuals, all more or less unconscious of the thought that leads them; only see the corporation in the high points of its history. What is the Society of Jesus aiming for? For the enslavement of mankind, by the combination of ignorance, superstition, force and corruption of the heart. Above all, thinks the society of Jesus, it is necessary that man obey, that the greatest number serve the smallest: religion, like government, is given only for that. Does the Society of Jesus believe in the truth of Christianity? What does it matter to it, really? Any religion is good that fulfills the stated purpose. To tame conscience and reason, to subject the will, to make oneself master of man, this is what religious truth consists of. Christianity or paganism, a matter of time and place. The Jesuits behave accordingly: they are ready for all transactions; it is only the goal on which they do not vary. Through them the faith of Christ was continually diminished; it turns to Lamaism, to idolatry, favoring, provoking all the aberrations of the mind and the senses. The little bit of sound morality that Christianity preserved in its penitentiary institutions, thanks to the Jesuits, was everywhere corrupted. Before Molinos and Madame Guyon, they propagated the doctrine of moral annihilation, by which the soul, whatever it does, no longer sins; it is they who have most contributed to fashioning the equivocal tenderness of religious gallantry. Faced with their appalling ravages, Richelieu, according to Michelet, recoiled. It was the Jesuits who started the war against the Reformed. Why? Because the Reformation was a protest against Roman immorality, and because, with

its principle of free inquiry, it was the first step towards the emancipation of the masses. The Jesuits prepared the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Why? Because reformed France put orthodox France to shame, and from reform in the spiritual to reform in the temporal, there is only one step. Apart from orthodoxy, there is no morality, say the Jesuits; outside the communion of the Holy See, there is no government, no property. The Jesuits organized the persecution against the Jansenists and engineered the devastation of Port-Royal. Why? Because Port-Royal and the Jansenists had denounced the infamies of Jesuit morality; because, fervent Christians but pure in their morals, they dreamed of saving Christianity and the Church, and they had dared, relying on Saint Augustine, to utter the word *reform*. Saint-Cyran, Jansénius, Aroauld, Pascal and their friends, accused of rigor, judged their adversary well: they were mistaken in imagining that, to purge the Church, it was necessary to begin by demolishing the company of Jesus. The Church is the new Babylon, of which the Jesuits are the praetorians.

Others had tried to justify the murder accomplished, in extreme cases, for the salvation of the country, the demand for liberty, the safeguard of honor, the repression of triumphant crime. If the event remained equivocal, the excuse at least was honest. It was reserved for the Jesuits to organize the persecution, to sharpen the dagger, to mix the poison, to spread calumny against every species of human virtue. If liberty, if truth, if justice, they said, dared to aspire to existence apart from faith, well, perish liberty, truth and justice! Any virtue that does not pertain to the Church is abominable, and must be pursued with sword and fire. War on the independents, war on the philosophers, war to the death on the virtuous souls who do not live in faith. The regicides preached, encouraged by the Jesuits in the 16<sup>th</sup> century had no other sense.

It was the Jesuits who, in their establishments in Paraguay, where they commanded simultaneously as priests, as proprietors, as generals and as sultans, gave the first attempt at that theocratic, military and monastic communism towards which France has tended since the December 2, where the sheltered multitude — men, women, children — is no longer in the hands of the masters, but an instrument of lucre and pleasure. The *missions* of Paraguay are the crime of an atheistic priesthood, conspiring at once against liberty, against science, against right and against modesty. Today, having returned to France by permission of the Emperor and despite the law, the Jesuits are the secret directors of this counter-revolution whose thought is none other than that of Loyola: to stifle all free thought, all purely human virtue, and reorganize the exploitation of the working masses, for the greater glory of God and the enjoyment of his elect.



#### Footnote (D).

EGYPTIAN CHRONOLOGY. — According to the historian Manetho, of whom Eusebius and Syncellus have preserved some fragments, the first Egyptian dynasty was founded by Menes, 5,867 years BC (*Egypte*, by CHAMPOLLION-FIGEAC, in the collection of the *Univers pittoresque*.) From Menes to Alexander, 331 BC. BC, the number of dynasties is 31, that of kings 355, not including those of the 15<sup>th</sup> dynasty, which lasted 250 years. This whole story of Manetho was destroyed by the episcopal conspiracy, as contrary to the Bible. For a long time the Egyptian chronology was cited as an example of the vanity of peoples, inclined to forge fabulous annals. But since the discovery of Champollion, Manetho's report has become more believable, and if the decipherers of hieroglyphics do not yet admit the date of 5,867 BC for Menes, at least we have already been able to ascertain, for one of his successors, that of 4,500, which takes us far beyond the biblical flood and creation itself.

#### Footnote (E).

PEDDLING. — The *Presse* of January 27, 1859 contains the following:

“ — A curious trial has just been judged by the Criminal Court of Colmar. Jacques Bessner, resident at the civil hospice and mailroom worker or postman, gave Sieur Corneille, shoemaker, a brochure entitled *Doctrine de l'Écriture-Sainte sur le culte de Marie*, and directed mainly against the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

“The prosecution charged Jacques Bessner with having committed an offense against the law that prohibits the distribution and peddling of writings not bearing the official stamp. This is the first time that the application of the law on peddling has been called for in this case.

“The defender, M. Yves, sought to establish that article 6 of the law of July 18, 1849 only affects those who make a profession of peddling and selling books, that it subjects only those to a prior authorization, but that it is not applicable to those who, like Bessner, only take a book from their library to lend it to a neighbor or a friend; that to confuse someone who only lends his book, of which he is the owner, with those who carry on the business of peddling or selling books, would be the overthrow of sound notions of law.

“The court condemned Jacques Bessner to 50 francs fine and costs.”

Here, then, by virtue of an arbitrary interpretation of an arbitrary law, is the French magistracy at the service of the Inquisition against the despisers of the Immaculate Conception? This is what is called today, in France, protecting morality. And everything goes at the same pace:

Justice, under the empire of Napoleon III, is on the platform; the magistrates are the torturers.

Footnote (F).

ENGLAND AND IRELAND. — It should not be imagined, after to the facts reported in the text, that England takes the education of the Irish seriously to heart. Oh, no! Its philanthropy does not go that far. What it makes of it is for no other purpose than to ruin Catholicism, and thereby hasten the destruction of a nationality the does not want to surrender. To decatholicization the English add a means no less efficacious, which shows the value they place, *in petto*, on their converts: this means is *eviction*. Here is what the *Nord* of May 2, 1860, reports on this subject. To denounce English hypocrisy, Catholic corruption and imperial tyranny is always to serve the same cause and to deserve well from the Revolution.

“The *Process server*... is the *constable* who will bring notices of *eviction* to the leaseholders (tenant farmers), and his job is not a sinecure, the habit of a certain number of landlords being to send such notices regularly to their tenants, reserving the right not to follow up, and only to keep them perpetually at their mercy. — As for the *driver*, as his name indicates, it is up to him to enforce the sentences of extermination (expulsion) and to chase from their cabins and their lands (*drive*, push, chase) the tenants the landlord wants to get rid of.

“Most of the time, these agents are not enough to accomplish their task; — for it is not only a question of throwing the furniture of the poor cabin into the road, nor of taking the sick woman who is trembling with fever in her blankets and laying her on the other side of the neighboring ditch; for that, two men are enough; — but there are houses to demolish, there is above all an exasperated population to intimidate and contain.

“The constables will therefore be summoned to lend a hand to the *drivers* and, if necessary, the militia itself will take up arms at the requisition of the sheriff. The iron bars and the levers to demolish the residences of the tenants, the bayonets to impose on a multitude in despair, it is in the middle of this apparatus that the sentences of extermination are often carried out, and one understands that popular indignation has blackened with the ignominious and too deserved name of *crowbar-brigade* (lever militia) all these agents of a brutal authority. 269,253 houses or huts destroyed, such are, according to official documents and for the ten years between 1841 and 1851, the records of service of an army that — God be praised! — has no equal in the world. More than 50,000 families were evicted in 1849 alone.

“These 12,000 wreckers are spread all over Ireland. Any landlord magistrate can, in the sessions of the grand jury, obtain from the government one or more garrisons, according to the number of barracks at his disposal, which he proportions less to the extent of his lands than to the rigor with which he uses

the right of eviction. It is thus that quite recently the Protestant *bishop* of Tuam, Lord Plunket, finding the *four* barracks of constables that he had already established in the middle of his estates insufficient, asked for and obtained a fifth. If all the landlords of Ireland imitated him, there would soon be a need for the government to increase the cadre of the *crowbar-brigade*.

“*Excerpt from the session of the House of Commons of March 19, 1860.* — Mr. Maguire calls upon the First Secretary of Ireland (Mr. Cardwell) and asks him if it is true that a detachment of the 15<sup>th</sup> Hussars has been sent to Castlebar, County Mayo, to *contribute in the eviction* of more than *sixty* families of tenants representing *two hundred and fifty souls*, from the estates of Lord Plunket, *Bishop* of Tuam, at Partry, in that county. Does the Irish Secretary know that these evictions were brought about by the refusal of the exclusively Catholic tenants to *send their children* to the schools established by Lord Plunket in a *anti-Catholic* spirit?

“Mr. Cardwell. — Troops have indeed been sent to Castlebar. This measure had been made necessary by the state of *effervescence* in this part of Ireland.”

#### Footnote (G).

COMPULSORY EDUCATION. — Last year, 1859, an attempt was made in Belgium, by the young liberal party, to establish compulsory education in all the communes, following the example of what has been practiced since the origin of Protestantism in one part of Germany. This attempt failed and, in our view, it was inevitable that it would fail. Not, certainly, because the proposal was in itself bad and inopportune: it is always good and opportune to instruct the people; but it is because the partisans of the proposal, in order to make it acceptable, had thought it necessary to remove from it the socialist character, which is precisely its value. In politics, any proposal for reform is necessarily linked to a system of ideas that must first be recognized, in that the legislator, to whom the proposal is submitted, who also follows his system, judges whether it suits him to reject it or to grant it. Now, it was not difficult to understand that since the origin of Protestantism, of which the partisans of compulsory education invoked the example, the circumstances were no longer the same; that if the Reformed of the sixteenth century imposed instruction on the people, it was with a view to reform and to prevent any relapse into Catholicism; but that today, after the explosion of 1848, the question of compulsory education is indissolubly linked, no longer to religion, which has become free and consequently a secondary thing, but to the question of the right to work, that is to say to a whole economic revolution, and that to claim to separate them one from the other is at the same time to lack logic, to misunderstand their era, and, for some, to deny their flag. The conclusion was forced: since everyone, Catholics, old liberals, young liberals, speaks

out against socialism, it is best to proceed with the business of the day.

Our goal, in writing this note, was not to censure the young Belgian liberal party, but to show, with regard to education, that everything is linked in society as in nature, and that the mixture of systems, Eclecticism, or as we say *doctrinarism*, has no more chance of succeeding in politics than in physiology. In this, the young Belgian liberal party, which one could call the anti-doctrinaire party, agrees with us. How then did it not see that its proposal for compulsory education, in the circumstances in which it produced it, with the exclusion of socialist and republican ideas, was reduced to an eclecticism? To propose to conservative Belgium, in the present state of things, to make education compulsory, was to propose the transfusion of the blood of a bull into a man's body.

#### Note (H).

ECCLESIASTICAL ABUSES. — The Church, as we have said elsewhere, delights in cracking down, in killing when necessary: her genius is to martyrize. This comes to her from two causes: first, from her dogma, which condemns nature and leads to affliction; taken from the fact that she believes only in her own martyrs, and that she does not accept that philosophers, heretics, should suffer death rather than renounce their opinions. You cry, Galileo; therefore it is not true that the earth turns: this is the great argument of the Christian controversialists. Whoever does not accept their reasons is declared by them to be in bad faith, and therefore worthy of punishment. The Spanish Inquisition is too well known. But the inquisition is not only Spanish, it is even more Roman, it is of the very essence of Catholicism. The inquisition was not received in France; but the Gallican Church carried out the crusade against the Albigensians, she carried out the dragonnades, two acts of the fiercest inquisition. Those who doubt how much the Church, in matters of belief, likes to resort to force, can read the last writing of Michelet, *Louis XIV*, and the *Histoire de Port-Royal*, by Sainte-Beuve. They will see there that the French clergy was complicit in the violence and spoliation committed against the Protestants after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Bossuet, Fenelon — these two names dispense with the need of citing others — approved. The disciples of the tender Vincent de Paul lent their ministry. The Jansenists themselves, taking advantage of an hour's respite, joined forces with the Jesuits: the great Arnauld wrote from the depths of his exile to support the policy of Louis XIV, to excuse and justify his harshness. The Church pronounced; the truth was established: the Huguenots had nothing to complain of except their obstinacy. Also by what right, twenty-five years later, did the Jansenists come to complain about the devastation of

their convent and the exhumation of their saints? The Archbishop of Noailles only applied to them the measures taken against the Protestants, and gentle Fenelon, who had felt no thrill at the dragonnades, happily applauded the destruction of the Jansenists. He too had had to suffer for his dear Madame Guyon and her absurd quietism: but, once condemned by the Pope, he had submitted, he had hated his error, and it was with perfect certainty of conscience that he supported the measures of rigor against the Jansenists and the Protestants. Why don't they open their eyes to the light! To believe, in fact, for the Christian, is not only to renounce his reason, it is to renounce charity towards whoever does not believe or believes otherwise. Now, if we reflect that all these believers take communion, eat Christ, God made man, at the same time that they exterminate themselves, are we not justified in saying that Christianity is a variety of cannibalism?

Note (I).

DEVOTION AND CRIME. — In the last volume he has just published, *Louis XIV et la Révocation de l'édit de Nantes*, M. Michelet has perfectly grasped this character of Christian devotion. After having shown, in quietism, molinism, illuminism, the alliance of the highest piety with the excess of lust, he shows, with regard to the famous Madame de Brinvilliers, that illuminism went still further, and did not recoil before assassination and parricide. Madame de Brinvilliers was devout, arch-devout; her principal accomplice and seducer, the Chevalier de Sainte-Croix, was devout: both steeped in mysticism, assiduous readers of the *Imitation*, of the books of Desmarets, Bona, Malaval, Molinos. Penautier, a friend of Sainte-Croix and of Madame de Brinvilliers, whom no one wanted to find guilty, was also devout. We have the confession of Madame de Brinvilliers, written by herself before her arrest, during his retirement in a convent in Liège. "She puts there in succession," says Michelet, "on the same line, appalling crimes and puerilities, and also impossible things." She burned down a house. She poisoned her father and her brothers. She was raped at age five by her brother (who was seven). Plus, such petty little girl sins. All this jumbled together. She especially notes and accentuates more strongly what is against canon law and the commandments of the Church. In a word, the refinement of devotion has deprived her of the feeling of proportion between the peccadilloes of her youth and the crimes of her mature age. With all her poisonings and adulteries, she retains a certain ingenuity as a person who lacks the discernment of good and evil. One could say of her, figuratively,

Inguinis et capitis quæ sint discrimina nescit.

The role of Tartuffe was conceived by Molière in this spirit: Michelet shows it very well. The jargon of this wretch is entirely composed of expressions borrowed from the Jesuit writers, the quietists, from that whole impure school towards which Fenelon inclined, when he was so roughly shaken by Bossuet. *Tartuffe* has been a misunderstood masterpiece in France for 150 years. On the strength of the subtitle (Tartuffe or the *Impostor*), we have made him a crook who feigns a piety he does not have, while he is positively devout, like Brinvilliers, Sainte-Croix, Penautier, Marie Alacoque, Madame Guyon, Molinos, etc., which makes the character much more dramatic and the calamity denounced by the great actor much more frightening.

**Note (J).**

SOULS AND BODIES. — Alongside this passage from Homer, making the reality of the human being consist in the body, we can quote a no less forceful saying from Virgil. In the sixth book of the *Aeneid*, Aeneas meets in the underworld the shadow of his former pilot Palinure, who says to him:

Nunc me fluctus habet versantque in litiore venti;

now I am at the mercy of the waves, and the winds toss me against the shore.

Note that it is no longer the poet who speaks here, as in the *Iliad*; it is the soul itself. A Christian poet would only have failed to make this soul say: *My body* is at the mercy of the waves. With the pagan it is quite another thing: the soul is only the shadow of the body, an idea, a nothingness. It says, speaking in the name of the body, and as its representative in the realm of death: I am at the mercy of the waves. The famous passage from *Job*, c. XIX, 25-27, which we report below (note N), must be understood according to these data. The same sense of realism inspired this verse:

Better a lout standing than an emperor buried.

**Note (K).**

SUPERSTITION. — The etymology, or rather the interpretation that we give of this word appears bold to some people. The Latin word *superstitio*, we are told, unquestionably formed of *super-esse* or *super-stare*, corresponded, for meaning, to the Greek δεισιδαιμονία, fear of spirits, and Cicero explains it by *timor inanis deorum*, chimerical fear of the gods (*De Nat. Deor.* I, 42). Servius, commenting on verse 815 of the 12<sup>th</sup> book of the *Aeneid*, explains it in the same way: *Superstitio est superstantium*,

*id est coelestium rerum, inanis et superfluus timor*, excessive and chimerical fear of superior, that is to say heavenly, things.

I admit that these explanations, especially when brought together with the phrase of Tacitus quoted further down in the text, seem to me rather to confirm the interpretation given on page 96 than to contradict it. What are these superior, or rather *super-existent* things, that are the object of the fear of the superstitious? It is not the sun, nor the moon, nor the stars, nor the lightning, nor the clouds, objects of primitive worship: there is nothing chimerical about these things, and one could fear them without being precisely affected by superstition. But the spirits, the souls of the dead, what remains after the dissolution of the corpse, this is what people have always been afraid of, and have sometimes made the philosophers turn pale.

Others bring the word *superstitio* from the Greek ὑπερστατεῖν, the same as *superstare*, to stand on, to protect, which would relate to the belief in talismans, which protect those who wear them. There are two criticisms to make of this interpretation of a Latin word whose meaning is well known: the first is that it comes from the Greek, the second is that, by the admission of all the commentators, it carries an idea of terror, such as that caused on the souls of mortals by the appearance of spirits. *No man can see me*, said God to Moses, and *live*.

#### Note (L).

OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENTS ON DEATH AND IMMORTALITY. — It is certain that the idea of immortality, following the belief in a future life, goes back earlier than Christianity: it is only necessary to prove it by the word αθάνατος, *immortal*, an epithet given to the gods, which dates to the origin of religion itself. The fear of spirits, δεισιδαιμονία, *superstitio*, is hardly less ancient. What we wanted to say, by relating the belief in immortality or survival to Christianity, is that it is from the Christian revolution, from the times that preceded and determined it, and from those that followed it, that the immortality of the soul has taken so great a place in life, either as a motive of virtue or as a means of consolation and encouragement.

Plato makes Socrates say, in the *Phaedo*: “Be aware that I hope to meet soon with just men, without however being able to affirm it entirely. But as for finding good masters with the gods, that is what I affirm... as far as one can affirm things of this nature.” (We see that Plato is in doubt: he would like to believe, but something is missing.) — “That is why I don’t grieve at dying as one ordinarily grieves; but I have good hope that there will be a destiny for men after their death, and that it will be better for the good than for the wicked, *as the ancient traditions promise*.” — And

further on: “It is a very old opinion that souls, on leaving the world, go to hell; and from there they return to this world, thus returning from death to life.”

Now, if Socrates appeals to ancient traditions, it just proves that in his time people hardly believed in them, and that metempsychosis was an opinion of pure curiosity.

Cicero is no bolder than Plato. To support the opinion of the immortality of souls, he says (*Tuscul.*, t. 1, ch. 12): “I have strong authorities to present to you. First of all, I will cite all of antiquity. The more closely it touched the origin of things and the first productions of the gods, the more the truth was perhaps known to it. Now, the general belief of the ancients was that death did not extinguish all feeling and that man, on leaving this life, was not annihilated: *Unum illud erat insitum priscis illis... esse in morte sensum, neque excessu Vitæ sic deleri hominem ut funditus interiret.*”

Yes, one could have replied to Cicero, superstition is old: it is due to the distinction in the human being of two kinds of phenomena, intellectual and moral phenomena, and bodily or physiological phenomena. But it has decreased a great deal; and this is due to the growth of the human mind and the development of morality. Now, if you are not careful, you will become superstitious again, with a superstition worse than that of your fathers; and this return has its cause in the state of society, presently in full decadence. Everything is therefore explained, and you have no beginning of probability for your immortality. As for the idea that the ancients, being closer to the origin of things, possessed more insight, it is an illusion of your optics, similar to that which would make you believe that the first humans were more innocent, because their newer conscience would have received fewer bad examples.

Cicero, moreover, a little earlier, ch. 11, after reporting the different opinions of philosophers on the soul, adds: *Harumssentiarum quæ vera sit, Deus aliquid viderit; quæ verisimillima magna questio est;* The gods alone know exactly what it is; we cannot even, in such a matter, decide what is probable. Whereupon Mr. Victor Leclerc makes this remark. “There is, in fact, only divine revelation that can instruct us fully and infallibly on a matter so obscure in itself.” All in good time. On this M. Leclerc cites the decisions of the councils. Which amounts to saying, as we say ourselves, that Christianity is the true founder and popularizer of the belief in the immortality of the soul.

Virgil, who can be considered as a sort of precursor, is more positive; his teaching is formal, and has something threatening about it: *Discite justitiam, moniti, and non lemnere divos.*

But Virgil is only a poet: the philosophers are reserved: we have seen this though the examples of Cato, Thræsea and Tacitus. Seneca nowhere



affirms the immortality of the soul. He says of death (*Epist. CIV*): *Maximum malum judicabis mortem? Cum in illa nihil sit mali, nisi, quod ante ipsam est, timeri.* Would you regard death as evil? But the only evil that you can reproach it for, which does not belong to it, since it precedes it, is that you are afraid of it.

Obviously Christianity was needed to attest to the immortality of the soul, to make it an article of common faith, a hope for the good and a terror for the wicked.

#### Note (M).

THE GLADIATORS. — It is certain that the bravery of the Roman soldier under the emperors was not of the same species as that of the soldier of the republic. The spirit was no longer the same: although, in an action, the soldier of the praetorium did perhaps as good a service as that of Scipio, it is easy to see that the heroism of the former was not more than swagger in the latter. What makes the hero is the moral feeling: love of country and liberty, devotion to the republic and its institutions. Nothing similar existed with the praetorian, who made up for it with self-love, the lure of booty, the hope of gratifications, contempt for other peoples, above all by the little regard he had for a life limited to material enjoyments. In all these respects, the type of Roman soldier under the Empire is the gladiator.

The gladiator in his arena was as much and braver than the praetorian on the battlefield. Where did this bravery come from? From vanity, developed in the fencing halls, exalted by the applause of the circus; from *esprit de corps*, barracks or school rivalries, training skillfully practiced on degraded beings for months, even years; more than anything, from the insignificance of a life whose brutality and debauchery had soon given the last word. (See the *Gladiateur de Ravenne*, a dramatic study translated from the German, inserted in the *Revue germanique* of January and February 1858.) Many of these gladiators were freed: they did not leave their profession for that.

A similar revolution took place under the First Empire in the French army. All historians have noted the profound difference between the soldiers of the republic and those of the empire; civic virtue on the one hand, military pride on the other. Since then, the spirit of the French soldier has improved a little; we saw it in 1830 and in 1848. With an emperor who has nothing at all in him of a warrior, one can hope that in the presence of the indignant nation the French soldier would regain his patriotism.

Note (N).

EUTHANASIA, OR THE GOOD DEATH. — M. Renan, in his *Préface de la traduction de Job*, confirms all that we are saying here of the feelings of the ancients on death.

“Until about the time of Job (700 BC), the Semitic mind had held itself to a theory of human destiny of prodigious simplicity. The man, after his death, descended to the *Scheol*, an underground sojourn that it is often difficult to discern from the tomb, and where the dead preserved a vague existence analogous to that of the *manes* of Greek and Latin antiquity, and especially to that of the *shadows* of the Odyssey. The dogma of the immortality of the soul, which would have offered an immediate and easy solution to the perplexities of which we speak, does not appear for a moment, at least in the philosophical and moral sense that we give to it; the resurrection of bodies is glimpsed only in the most indecisive way. Death did not awaken any sad idea, when the man was going to rejoin his fathers and when he left many children behind him. In this respect, no difference existed between the Hebrews and the other peoples of high antiquity... But all ideas were disturbed, when catastrophes like that of Job were told under the tent hitherto pure of such scandals. All the old philosophy of the fathers was in disarray; the wise men of Theman, whose first principle was that man receives here his reward or his punishment, would find themselves backward minds; in the presence of such misfortunes, they only knew how to cry on the ground in silence, for seven days and seven nights.”

Thus the same causes that, at the beginning of our era, demoralized men, made death unbearable and circulated everywhere the hope of a reparative survival, these causes, we say, began to stir, 700 years before Christ, the society of the desert and were a prelude to the resurrectionist dogma, which was not to reach its full maturity and popularization until seven centuries later. “I know,” said Job in the exaltation of his pain, “that he who must justify me is alive, and that he will finally appear on earth. When this skin will be shredded, reduced to the state of a skeleton, I will see God. I will see him for myself; my eyes will contemplate him, not those of another: my loins are consumed with waiting within me.” Job flatters himself that he will be rehabilitated after his death by God himself, rendering his judgment in the presence of the corpse of the just calumniated. It is not a question here, as one believed, either of immortality or of resurrection; Job does not hope to come back to life. But he enjoys in advance the testimony of God, which he believes he already sees through his eyeballs without pupils. His words remind us of those of Homer, making being consist, not in the soul, but in the body; those of

Virgil, causing the shade of Palinure to say: *Nunc me fluctus habet*. Such is the meaning of this passage which has so embarrassed commentators.

Mr. Renan concludes as we do:

“The (ultramundane) future of man has not become clearer, and perhaps it is good that an eternal veil covers truths that have their value only when they are the fruit of a pure heart. But a word, which neither Job nor his friends utter, has acquired a meaning and a sublime value: Duty (why not say Justice?), with its incalculable philosophical consequences, by imposing itself on all, resolves all doubts, reconciles all oppositions and serves as a basis for rebuilding what reason destroys or allows to crumble. Thanks to this revelation without ambiguity or obscurity, we affirm that the one who will have chosen the good will have been the true sage. This one will be immortal; for his works will live in the definitive triumph of Justice, the summary of the divine work that is accomplished by humanity. Humanity makes the divine as the spider spins its web; the march of the world is enveloped in darkness, but it goes towards God. While the wicked, foolish or frivolous man will die entirely, in the sense that he will leave nothing in the general result of the work of his species, the man devoted to good and beautiful things will participate in the immortality of what he has loved. Who lives today as much as the obscure Galileo who, eighteen hundred years ago, threw into the world the sword that divides us and the word that unites us? Only the works of the man of genius and of the good man escape universal decay...”  
(*Job*, by E. RENAN, 1860).

#### Note (O).

DEATH AND FUNERALS. — On this point, as on many others, the Revolution pursues its established path, and reveals its progress by numerous symptoms. In Paris and throughout France, many people die without the assistance of the Church; a smaller number are buried unaccompanied by the clergy. One is a free thinker in the country of Voltaire; but one does not always have the courage of one's free thought. The freedom of association enjoyed in Belgium has made it possible to go one step further.

There are two societies in Brussels for the elimination of the religious service at burials: the *Société d'affranchissement*, founded on August 21, 1854, and the *Société des Solidaires*, which appears to have broken off from the preceding one, and only goes back to the month of December 1858. — The first “aims to free man from prejudices, especially with regard to the manner in which burials have been carried out up to the present day.” — “*The associates*,” adds article I of the statutes, “*recognize that they do not need the intervention of the clergy at the moment of dying.*” The second has as its object *civil burial*, *mutual assistance* and *propaganda*. To be admitted into the *Société d'affranchissement*, one must be at least 15 years

old; in the society of the *Solidaires*, 21. In both associations, all the members are required to attend funerals, on pain of a fine of 25 and 50 centimes, the proceeds of which are used in good works.

According to the documents that have been furnished to us, the *Société d'affranchissement* has received, since its establishment, more than 600 members, nearly half of whom are scattered in America, England, France and other countries. Recruitment is mainly from the working class. The *Solidaires* are 60 in number. Among the people buried by the care of the two societies we distinguish: Arnauld BATAILLE, editor of the newspaper *Le Proletaire*; J.-B. LANGLOIS, Flemish writer; J. de POTTER, former member of the provisional government of Belgium; Madame Amable LEMAITRE, wife of a French refugee.

Isn't this how Christianity began? People from all countries and all languages, mostly working people, among them a few scholars and a few bourgeois. The idea runs around the world: it is still only a germ, but everything is there. The Social Revolution, begun a long time ago in ideas, begins in practice with burials: burial outside the Church is the symbol of social resurrection.

# NEWS OF THE REVOLUTION.

## OF THE CAUSES OF HISTORY AND OF THE MUTUAL EDUCATION OF PEOPLES.

I. — The simplest glance cast over human societies is sufficient to reveal in these moving masses a relationship, not only of superior to inferior, of sovereign to subject, but also of teacher to disciple.

The State, first of all, the State that commands, fights, directs, represses, punishes, is also a teaching body. The state, with its legislative, judicial, executive powers, with its *magistracy*, is the type of the UNIVERSITY, flanked by its faculties and schools.

Below the state we find the corporations. The priest, the noble, the bourgeois, as well as the statesman and the magistrate, fulfill equally, each on their own, with regard to the layman, the peasant and the worker, the role of instructors. Such is the primitive, grandiose plan of education in humanity: where we establish rare and miserable schools, humble teachers badly paid, social spontaneity has given the CASTE. The caste! We only knew it through its insolence and prevarications. But we would do ourselves a wrong if we refused to recognize in the chief of the clan, in the lord surrounded by his servants and his pages, in the patrician followed by his clientele, in the bourgeois, honored with the mastery, leading his companions and apprentices, as in the priest, apostle, doctor and catechist, a man of teaching. Nature itself seems to have presided over this organization: education is the attribute par excellence of paternity. The word *disciple* is synonymous with son. My son, says Wisdom, listen to your father's lesson; *Fili mi, audi discipuli patris tui*. From this point of view, one can say that half of society is occupied in instructing the other.

From people to people, the same relationship is no less perceptible.

As far back as historical memories go, conquering nations and conquered nations appear. Now, among all the calamities that conquest drags in its wake, one cannot deny it this singular trait, that it is at the same time a propaganda. Asia gives birth to its religions; at the same time the great monarchies are founded, that is to say that immense conquests swallow up immense pedagogies. The Egyptians, Indians, Assyrians, Persians, were all apostles of religions; at a time nearer to us, Mahomet continues this Asiatic tradition. Vanquisher of the Persians, Alexander becomes initiator in his turn. The Jews preserved in their theology the traces of this double initiation of the Persians and the Greeks, and transmitted it to the Christians. Conquering Rome enacts universal law: *My law*, says Christ, *is a law of love; My kingdom is not of this world*. But when the empire of the Caesars has succumbed, we see the chiefs of

Barbary, as they embrace Christianity, become conquerors and converts. France, finally, publishes its *Declaration of Rights*, and immediately becomes conqueror: it would have conquered the world, if by its fantasy of a renewed empire of the Caesars it had not been unfaithful to its principle, if moreover the Revolution and the conquest were not mutually exclusive.

History, says Lessing, is the education of Humanity. Let us add that this education is a mutual teaching, given, received, until now, with great blows of spears and swords. All peoples, after having played the role of disciples, aspire to that of masters. Dogmas, laws, languages, philosophy, politics, and politics above all, pass and pass again, always fighting; they cluster, merge, incorporate, then dismember, make revolutions, fight furious battles and, through these bloody kisses, communicate their prejudices, their superstitions, their idols, their virtues and their vices, tyranny and liberty.

But where do the peoples get the material for their lessons? Ideas lead humanity: we have already had more than one opportunity in these studies to make this observation; principles are the threads from which history is woven. Without ideas, without principles, the State wavers like a drunken man and society quickly collapses. Who provides the ideas and principles? How do they arise in the spontaneity of nations? Does each race produce its own ideas, as the earth produces its vegetation, as the plant grows its flowers and its seeds?

This question raises another: How, from people to people, do ideas become accepted? What ensures the success of this teaching? Which almost amounts to saying: What is the influence of a people on another people and on civilization in general? And what, in certain cases, destroys the initiative, the preponderance of this rather than that?

To this double question, here is our answer:

II. — Ideas, expression of general facts, product of time, result of situations, have no country; they are universal, impersonal, given in the development of all peoples, whose whole merit is limited to the priority of need, which stimulates intelligence. They form the common treasure of the human race; their ownership cannot be claimed by anyone: this is why they impose themselves on everyone, by will and by force, and why they are likely to spread, even by way of arms; it is thus, finally, that they assure the superiority of those who represent them, and that they give their sanction to victory.

Such is not, however, it must be confessed, the opinion that still in our day governs peoples, governments and even philosophers. These ideas, which serve as motive and regulator of history, are almost regarded as particular creations of races, effects of temperament and climate; consequently, the facts and gestures of history are explained by a

primordial nature, by innate inclinations, by an indescribable genius prior to all reflection, a genius that constitutes the law proper to each nation, but would prove absolutely nothing for the others. Hence, it is said, the fierce resistance, hence the conquests, then the revolutions, and all the scenography of history. Far from recognizing the immanence and universality of ideas, they go so far as to bring in the Divinity and its irreconcilable antagonist, the devil. Christians are convinced that the Jewish people were chosen by God to receive the deposit of moral and religious truths, while the idolatrous nations were given over to the suggestions of demons. Muslims say the same of Muhammad; the Chinese, of Buddha. Apart from religious opinions, those who have allowed themselves to reason about the movement of civilization have done little more than transport to the soil, to the climate, to the diet, in the most materialistic sense, the honor of the first revelations. There would thus be, according to these philosophers, aristocratic races and servile races; lands that spontaneously produce polytheism, like the earth produces mushrooms and mosses, others where monotheism grows and prospers; polygamous temperaments, and monogamous temperaments, The monarchy would be native to France, like the oak and the beech; federalism to Italy; all the ideas that animate nations, finally, would have their first cause in the blood, elaborated, like globules, by the combined influences of air, water, light, food, etc. So that the movements of history would be determined *a priori* by the physiological constitution of the races, and lastly by the influences of the earth, in which one could say that they have their reservoir, with cholera, yellow fever, typhus and all kinds of miasmas.

Some authors imagine that they have laid the foundations of the philosophy of history, when they have repeated, after a thousand others, that the races of the south, for example, are distinguished by the mobility of the imagination, those of the north by the firmness of judgement; that the Frenchman is vain, inconstant, dissipative, unconcerned with liberty, while the Englishman stands out for the opposite qualities, pride, tenacity, economy, respect for right. With these fanciful portraits, it would be almost possible to trace the horoscope of the nations, as they pretend to explain their history; we have seen those physiognomists who, pushing the paradox to the limit, pronounced, with comic gravity, judgments of damnation and apotheosis. The Decembrist party, from the *Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, swore the downfall of the *Babylone britannique*; others, in retaliation, declare the French people the enemy of the human race. It is thus that pedantic impertinence, added to popular superstition, maintains between nations those homicidal contempts, those insulting prejudices and those furious hatreds that so marvelously serve political intriguers and usurpers.

Of course, we would not want to deny that history is affected by the temperament of its actors, and that we only find in the physiognomy of the masses, and consequently in their evolutions, something that is so easy to note on the faces of the individuals. The soul of a people is given, first, in its physical qualities, then in its language, in the spontaneity of its beliefs and the intimacy of its institutions. All this can, up to a point, account for the facts of local life; but, when it is a question of history, all that is nothing compared to ideas, which take on a character more and more freed from all personality, and whose impulse even sometimes seems all the more irresistible as their appearance seems more unexpected and their source more foreign.

Let us therefore repeat once again, in connection with the mutual education of nations, what we said when speaking of the reason of state (4<sup>th</sup> Study, note (A), page 158):

Nature has produced man and the earth, the first with his faculties, the second with its kingdoms; both united by the solidarity of their abilities and their lives.

But man alone, by the movement of his mind, makes his education, and the moments of this education compose his history. It is a simple and bare history at the beginning, like the life of the patriarch, but a history that becomes more complicated as the ideas appear and tend to be realized. Here nature no longer figures except as an auxiliary; it furnishes the materials and the instruments, and falls to the second rank: the initiative is left to the mind.

It follows from this that ideas, wherever they arise, are basically identical, universal, impersonal; they are not generations, but apperceptions, abstractions; they are not linked to race, they are not a product of the climate, a secretion of the blood. They are formulas of relations that, depending only on the laws of reason and the necessity of things, are the same in all men. Thus the ideas of God, of religion, of soul, of sovereignty, of property, of government, of country, of priesthood, of nobility, of mastery, etc., are present at all latitudes; being pronounced in speech, they can indeed take on a local color: this is not what constitutes their essence and their value. They are indigenious to the whole globe: that is why they direct the world, which recognizes them as its own, and why they engender events. Among these ideas, there is one that serves as a regulator for others and that takes precedence over everything: it is Justice. Well, Justice is what is most essential to humanity, and therefore least personal to races and individuals. The respect of the nations has related it to God; no one has ever dared to say: It is mine, and I claim its inheritance. Justice is the supreme motor of civilization: its consummation would be the consummation of history.

We understand from this how peoples can be educators of each other



and how they carry one another along the great road of civilization. It is because Justice, the institutions it engenders and the ideas that recall it are common to all; from the universality and impersonality of these ideas arise the tacit obligations that bind people together, and whose code forms what we call the *Right of Peoples*.

The nations, by virtue of the Justice that is immanent to them all, owe each other respect, example, advice, service and justice; as they are all independent and sovereign, they form, for their disputes, a jury, in which each figures both as a juror and as a litigant. Here, in a few words, is the whole substance of the right of nations: Take away from ideas their impersonal character, there is nothing left. If ideas were no more than a particular suggestion, a physiological effect, a manifestation of local nature, no dowry, no duty could arise from them. They would remain incommunicable; each people would separately follow its nature, like the lion, the eagle and the crocodile. Populations would flee from each other, exterminate each other; war would not be followed by any compromise, by any truce; an irreconcilable antagonism would long since have made the human race disappear.

Instead of this, we see that the nations agree, even seek one another, with all the power of their universal ideas; they do not reject each other until they meet on their individual sides. What irritates them against each other is not discipline, it is not war; the idea, when it is right, has always caused victory to be forgiven; it is the claim to autocracy, it is insolence, exploitation, arbitrariness.

Let us therefore conclude that the physical and mental dispositions of the races have little to do with history. Nations are at the service of ideas; they are not mistresses, owners, still less producers. They are valid through ideas and only through ideas: it could even be that some nation that, in history, has played the greatest role, owed it precisely to its less marked personality, to its ease in capturing ideas and implementing them. The interests come then to modify, in the application, the data of the idea; as to temperament and character, their action is the weakest of all. In a word, there are no initiating races in the strict sense of the word; no privileged races or accursed races, no sovereign nations or subject nations. There are only instruments, more or less docile, more or less devoted, according to their interests and circumstances, to Progress; more or less explicit organs of what some call Providence, others Destiny, and which for us is the idea, and above the idea, Right.

A few historical recollections, in support of these considerations, will be all the better received by our readers as they help to understand the present time.

III. — For nearly 2,000 years, the country that today forms France has lived ideas that the backlash of revolutions from outside caused its inhabitants to develop, and which one would believe were imported from abroad, so much does the series of events here produce illusion. Almost nothing is known of Gaul before the arrival of Caesar. At the time of the Roman invasion, the country was divided into a multitude of small states, corresponding to as many distinct nationalities, which are still easy to recognize today. Gaul in this resembled Germania: it was a confederation. The federative idea was common to both countries, born of the juxtaposition at the same time as the solidarity of the territories. More advanced, however, than Germania, Gaul then presented, in each of its small states, this division by classes that we find, at certain times, among all peoples: nobility, bourgeoisie, multitude, plus a clergy, the Druids, just as, much later, the Germans had, without them needing to ask their neighbors the Gauls for the seed. The generation of ideas is spontaneous; they grow everywhere the same, yellow, blue or red, according to the terrain, basically equivalent and identical; foreign influence appears there, like rain or drought, only to hasten or retard the germination.

The distinction of classes given, their antagonism follows: in this respect again, there is no distinction to be made between peoples. In the time of Caesar, Gaul had, in terms of internal divisions, nothing to envy even Rome. This was precisely what determined the conquest. In Rome the patriciate was on its decline; the plebs, or as we said a hundred years ago, the third estate had become preponderant, Caesar was its leader. The conquest of Gaul, facilitated by the alliance of the native bourgeoisie with the Roman general, decided, in both countries, the triumph of plebeian power. In all this, I do not see, on any side, the slightest vestige of invention. Rome triumphed because she carried, in the folds of her toga, the revolutionary idea, which was, in varying degrees of development, that of all peoples. Leaving aside the particular motives, which were certainly not those of complete disinterestedness on the part of the bourgeois of Gaul, this revolution was inevitable. If it had not begun with Italy, it would have begun with Gaul: in this case, the world would have received the law, not from the Romans, but from the Gallic peoples.

One consequence of this revolution was to introduce political unity into Gaul: in this, too, Rome only responded to the thought of all peoples. Unity was required first of all by the solidarity of plebeian interests, which had to defend themselves everywhere against the offensive return of the nobles. This principle will never leave Gaul: for a moment eclipsed by feudalism, it will return, but without the aid of foreigners, by the sole fact of the alliance of the communes with royalty; it will be carried to its *maximum* power by the definitive triumph of the third estate.

Thus, in the presence of the Roman, universal, legal, imperial,

plebeian idea, Gaul abdicated its federalism, got rid of its old cult, renounced its national institutions, substituted or mixed Latin with its language. Such is, in history, the interplay of ideas; such is above all the skepticism of interests. Politically, it is true, Gaul no longer belongs to itself, but it does not remain without compensation. By becoming a Roman province, it becomes one of the centers of the empire; from Diocletian, the empire of the West is really the empire of Gaul.

After the Latin influence, which released in it the bourgeois and unitary principle, Gaul underwent the Christian influence, which tore it definitively from polytheism, both Roman and indigenous. I do not need to inform my readers that Gaul received Christianity, not so much as a revelation coming from the East, as because she found it at the bottom of her own aspirations. Constantine was a deist, before rallying to the Gospel; everything in Greece, Italy, and Gaul that had any intellectual value, any energy of conscience, thought the same. Gaul did not accept the Christian dogma in its rigor; faithful to its spirit of moderation, it took a middle position between Saint Augustine and Pelagius, in which it can be said that it was followed by all of Christendom. Calvinism, which later pushed the principle of predestination and grace to the extreme, ended in a contradiction: not only did it fail to realize its dogma in practice, but it drew from it something completely unforeseen, the principle of popular sovereignty. The Gallic spirit was more logical: the same good sense that in the fifth century made it reject Augustinian rigorism, made it reject Calvinism in the sixteenth century, Jansenism in the seventeenth century. The Papacy has followed the same wanderings: basically, whatever it may say, it is semi-Pelagian. If later France, through the revolution, was democratized, it was not by a deduction from Christian dogma, but by the progress of philosophical reason that is the very negation of Christianity.

Thus, even in the order of faith, Gaul, barely baptized, becomes herself a missionary; she observes in everything that temperament that one is sure to encounter where the middle class has prevailed over the nobility and dominates the masses. Christian Gaul rejected, *ex æquo*, both the ultra-democratic consequences that some drew from the words of Christ and the theocratic pretensions of the ultramontanes. The Albigenses were treated in France as the Donatists had been in Africa by Constantine, and it was Saint Louis who declared the power of kings independent of that of Popes. Allow whoever wishes to accuse here the forced inconsistency of the human mind in insoluble questions: I defy anyone to find there either vanity of race, or inconstancy of temperament, or parochialism. It is always, following the same ideas, the same interests, the same difficulties of application, which bring back the same phenomena.

Based on what we have just said, we can account for the influences and reactions of history.

Gaul undergoes the Roman revolution of the plebs, because it finds the principle of it in its own bosom. — It loses at the same time its nationality, because the Roman movement, which was that of Humanity itself, made, for a time, any nationality, even that of Rome, impossible.

Gaul underwent the reformation of the Gospel, because it found in itself the principle and the need for it: it proved it by its mitigated interpretation of the dogma.

Gaul, which has become France, submits to the feudal system, because the givens are within it, and circumstances make it a law. — But immediately, when royalty and the bourgeoisie unite, France attacks feudalism and restores its political unity, which has become necessary again as in the time of Caesar.

At the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, France, which since the Roman conquest had played an ever-increasing, often even preponderant role, suddenly seized the initiative: was it by chance that the idea that directed it belonged to it? Not at all: for more than three centuries the French Revolution had been prepared by the ruin of feudalism, by the Renaissance, by the Reformation, by the revolutions of England and the Low Countries; by the incessant work of philosophy, literature, science, and finally by the blossoming of economic ideas. The idea of 89 is universal, impersonal: that is why it invaded Europe. If the explosion had not taken place in France, in 89, it would have taken place fifty years later, in Germany; had it not been for Germany, it would have found its ancient home in Italy, its man in Garibaldi.

Thus ideas march, thus peoples discipline each other, monitors of universal reason and executors of its decrees. Suppose that in the place of this universal reason, an arbitrary, autocratic, insolent influence arrogates the direction of things: as protests break out everywhere, populations are quivering in agitation, states take up arms, and civilization falls back into the doldrums, until the pestiferous influence is eradicated. In the principles of history, which are those of the Right of Nations, the idea will have for sanction, if need be, conquest: arbitrariness brings back coalitions and dismemberments. When Rome had exhausted her mandate, the Barbarians invaded her from all sides; the subjugated populations regained their independence, and were done with the Roman name. A similar example was given, at the beginning of this century, by the ephemeral power of Napoleon I; and if the despotism of his heir aspired to spread, France, instead of giving the lesson to other peoples, would end by receiving it again.

IV. — The France of 1789 was for fifteen years the principal organ of the movement. Its wars were propaganda wars; its ideas, much more than the courage of its soldiers, made it successful. The peoples welcomed the

revolution; the kings themselves had ended by placing themselves under its protection and asking its advice. In defending the Revolution, France was the monitor of progress. With the empire, the situation was changed; instead of the idea, there was a man. Immediately everything became hostile again: after having trampled on the nations for a long time, Imperial France was twice invaded and, as the only punishment, for all guarantee of peace towards the united Europe, invited to re-establish representative government in France, the principal work of the Revolution. In 1814 and 1815, the allies, who could not only have taken back from France all of its conquests, but dismembered it themselves, were content to do for it what Julius Caesar and his legions did, from 58 to 48 BC, for the Gallic bourgeoisie, what William of Orange did in 1688 for England. The coalition, in acting thus, obeyed a principle, the principle of European balance. So, whatever the Bonapartist literature may have said, France in 1814 thanked the allies. They believed it then cured, and France believed itself so, recovered from the seductions of false glory, reconciled with the idea. Disappointment! Ten years of despotism had made France personal, insensitive to liberty, disdainful of right. During the thirty-six years that it enjoyed representative government, it only knew how to recriminate against invasion, accuse treaties, threaten the foreigner. December 2 came to give rise to this detestable egoism: today it is no longer the ideas of 89 that govern France: avarice, national vanity, the thirst for conquest and military fantasy have taken hold and hold the Sabbath there. So, as in 1813, Europe again became hostile to it; the people withdraw from our influence; Italy itself, our freedwoman of yesterday, is wary; it would depend only on Austria that it separate itself completely from us from now on. France, always dreaded, because its army is the most formidable machine of destruction that exists, France no longer holds the head of the movement. The idea of 89, universal, impersonal, formed from all the liberal traditions spread throughout the world, a summary of the philosophy of nations, the idea of 89 continues its course apart from the French influence; it has nothing so much to fear today as this influence. While the peoples were all, one after the other, in the whirlwind of new principles, France, which no longer understands itself, is following a policy of panic. No more clarity in spirit, no more consistency in intentions; contradiction at every step, resulting in impotence.

What a singular teacher of nations was the France of 1852! What ideas it had! What a morality its morality was! What examples its examples! What initiative its initiative!

What we have been talking about in France since December 2 is, first of all, the revenge to be taken for all our defeats: revenge for Aboukir and Trafalgar, revenge for Moscow, revenge for Leipzig, revenge for Waterloo.

Revenge! And why do it? Under what principle? In the name of what idea? In what does the general civilization find itself interested, and does the progress of peoples depend on it?

Then we claim for France its natural borders: we ask to remake the political map of Europe. M. Jourdan, the acolyte, the thurifer of Father Enfantin, demands it; M. About affirms it. Men with ideas, what do you say? When Dumouriez conquered Belgium, Pichegra Holland, Bonaparte Italy, and the Directory pronounced the incorporation of these provinces into the territory of the Republic, that at least had its justification. We knew what the oath of the Jeu de Paume, the storming of the Bastille, the night of August 4, even January 21, and the abolition of worship meant. But the events of December 2, but the kidnapping of the National Assembly, but the looting of the Bank, but the massacre in the streets of Paris, but the perjury: what does all this mean? And what a lesson for Europe!

I would like to know what Napoleon III went to Baden to propose to the sovereigns of Germany assembled to receive him. The slander claimed that the sole purpose of this visit was to reassure the discontented interests by a peaceful demonstration and to facilitate a stock market coup for the benefit of the camarilla. The Bourse, in fact, went up, on the day of the interview, by 50 centimes; the next two days it fell back to 45. But let's not be slanderous.

Was it a new idea, useful to the happiness of humanity, that the Emperor of the French went to impart to the crowned guests of Baden? — But Napoleon III, like Napoleon I, everyone knows, is ideophobic.

Is it a project of perpetual peace, a new Holy Alliance, that he brought to them? — But for nothing in the world would he disarm. Conscription is still 100,000 men; the height of the conscripts has even been reduced by one or two centimeters; they announce, from the hand of the Emperor, a history of Caesar and a book on artillery.

Is it his mediation that he offers to Germany, like his uncle in the past, no longer just to divide up the secularized communities, but in order to constitute German unity, following the example of French unity? — But Napoleon III would see a case for war in this unity.

Is it a cordial entente that he seeks in order to organize Italian unity in common? — But he does not want Italian unity any more than Germanic unity.

Is it the reconstitution of the Ottoman Empire that preoccupies him? — But he is seeking the Russian alliance.

At the time of his accession to the empire, Napoleon III declared, by way of thanks to the French people, that, by the sole fact that he was restored to the throne of his uncle, the treaties of 1815 were torn up, and that, in this repeal, the country found a first satisfaction, and the pledge of

its future preponderance. Would the abrogation of treaties also, by chance, be the pledge that the Emperor offers to the united sovereigns of his peaceful intentions? — Wonderful, sire; but, the torn treaties, what principle do you substitute for them? Your idea, your right, what is it? In 1854, you made war on Russia to maintain the balance of Europe, which did not mean anything other than the treaties of 1815. Is it only a revision of these treaties that you want? But that would be to confirm them, to reverse your judgment: do you have the courage to do it?

The day before Napoleon III left for the interview in Baden-Baden, a *Te Deum* was sung in Paris for the annexation of Nice and Savoy. The annexation of these two provinces to France was the price paid by Victor-Emmanuel for Lombardy and Tuscany. Here, then, are peoples a commodity that kings and emperors traffic in, according to their particular ambition? How to accuse, after that, the division of 1815? How can one still reproach the Congress of Vienna for having distributed, corralled the nations like herds? Surely the Congress has done no worse than Napoleon III and Victor-Emmanuel? Was it the free exchange of territories and populations that the Emperor of the French went to Baden to propose?

But, we are told, you do not take universal suffrage into account, by which the annexation was confirmed, legitimized, and sanctioned. We have nothing today without the consent of the nations themselves.

Universal suffrage! Here, then, is the idea that Napoleon III went to submit to the acceptance of the princes in Baden-Baden!

In 1848 universal suffrage passed, in fact, for a principle. It was seen as the realization of the sovereignty of the people, a progress on the electoral system of 1830. Put to the test, universal suffrage gave the saddest opinion of its political capacity. In France, it served, for the second time, to establish and consolidate despotism. It has been proven that the property-owning bourgeoisie of 1830 was much more liberal than universal suffrage, before and after the *coup d'état*. In Savoy and Nice, the same suffrage, exercised under the supervision of the Franco-Piedmontese authorities, led the people to the abjuration of the homeland, to the abdication of nationality, of sovereignty, of everything that constitutes the dignity of a race, the glory of man and citizen. Universal suffrage, under the conditions of December 2, is suicide. — Is this the benefit that Napoleon III dreams of making the peoples of Europe enjoy?

The masses, which made the empire, care little about these contradictions. The more waste there is, the more they find their emperor a clever man. After all, they think, Napoleon III came from our bosom: he is the man of the Revolution. Why then, if the Emperor is the man of the Revolution, does he not allow the Romans, as he allowed those of Tuscany, to appoint, by universal suffrage, the sovereign of their choice?

Garibaldi leaves for his Sicily expedition. M. de Cavour having delivered Nice, the native town of Garibaldi, to the Emperor, the Niçard hero, who does not wish to be a subject of the Empire, not even a member of the Legislative Body, has gone to seek another country. On the first day, the newspapers of the imperial government called him a buccaneer. But we realize that this produces a bad effect among the people, and on the third day we proclaim Garibaldi a great man. What, with regard to Garibaldi, is the true thought of His Imperial Majesty? As for this brave multitude, whose admiration determined the reversal of the press, we would like to know, in the case where Garibaldi, conqueror of the King of Naples, should come with his army to ask the Emperor of the French for his dear Nice, which M. de Cavour has unfortunately cut off from the Italian homeland, how he would be received.

If Napoleon III was able, at the request of Victor-Emmanuel, to intervene against Austria, Garibaldi was also able, at the request of the Sicilians, to intervene against King Francis; and the English, summoned by Garibaldi and the Sicilians, can intervene in their turn, all the better because it is always for the same cause. Why then, in Paris, do they show themselves so touchy about this possible intervention of England, contrary even to the wishes of the Sicilians, in the event that they should choose for their king Victor-Emmanuel? — The unity of Italy, we are told, would harm French unity. — So much the worse for France. Why should Italy not have the right to constitute itself in the image of France? Isn't it its protege, its daughter? Does the French people intend to be surrounded only by nations of the second order? That would betray bad intentions. — But the Treaty of Zurich!... — Ah! Then, you come back to the treaties; or to put it better, you affirm the treaties when it is you who make them, and as long as they are suitable; you tear them as soon as they bother you. Will you tell us, finally, how you intend to reconcile all these formulas: Intervention and non-intervention, unity and federation, violation of treaties and respect for treaties, imperial government and constitutional government, respect for nationalities and natural frontiers?

Oh! Let the enemies of the *great nation* hiss. We will cover our faces, but we will ask in our turn if there is more intelligence, more morality around France than in France itself; whether it would be prudent to trust Russia and Austria when they invoke treaties or engage in liberal demonstrations; if we can believe England when she speaks of the liberty of peoples; if universal suffrage, as stupid in Savoy and Nice, where it abjures the homeland, as in Paris where it gives itself an autocrat, would be wiser in Belgium; if the Magyar nobles, who never ceased to count on Napoleon III, are as democratic as the ex-dictator Kossuth asserts; if this Italy itself, whose dazzling patriotism is today the only virtue that consoles Europe, is not already tormented on all sides by its age-old vices



and its incurable machiavellianism?

We have said it: ideas alone make history, and through them people serve each other as teachers. But today there are no more ideas; contemporary history is nothing but a history of our intrigues and our corruptions. The Revolution is marching, yes, and *Progress* is being accomplished; but by force of circumstance and without anyone's initiative. *Il mondo va da se.*

END OF THE FIFTH STUDY.





OF JUSTICE IN THE REVOLUTION  
AND IN THE CHURCH.

SIXTH STUDY.

LABOR.

To His Eminence Monsignor Matthieu, Cardinal-Archbishop of  
Besançon.

MONSIGNOR,

In dealing, in my third study, with the *reciprocity of services* as a principle of the distribution of goods, I promised myself to return to service itself, in other words LABOR: I had more than one reason for that.

In the first place, it is in the question of labor that the proudest aspect of the age that is beginning is revealed, at the same time as the age that is ending is revealed in its ugliest face: a significant contrast, which I could not permit myself to neglect.

I also realize that there are those who are trying to bury this question of labor, muting it, smothering it under the bandages of philanthropy. In this, of course, our speculative society clearly shows what spirit animates it, but this is also one more reason for me to ring the alarm.

Finally, it is in relation to labor, to its rights and its duties, that I constantly intend to accuse the working class, within which it is necessary, by reason of my birth, my education and my whole life, to rank myself.

Isn't that three times more than enough for me to cling, tooth and nail, to this debate, which every Christian soul would just as much like to see resolved rapidly, by rope or by lead?

Christianity is indeed the religion of condemnation! Condemnation of man in his person, declared iniquitous by nature, incapable even of a good movement; condemnation in the earth, of which he is the soul and the sovereign, and which, because of him, has been cursed; condemnation in the social economy, the law of which, according to the Church, is inequality, and the last word poverty; condemnation in the State, incompatible with liberty; condemnation in labor, emblem of all servitude.

And we will see later: Condemnation of man in his ideas, condemnation in his history, condemnation in his love and his generation, condemnation even in his Justice.

And what Christianity has pronounced against man, every spiritualist philosophy repeats, the economist affirms it, the statesman confirms it, the writer, as if his muse lived in the third heaven, sings of it in his verses and in his prose.

My biographer, a man of yours, Monsignor, shown me as a schoolboy; he will show me journeyman.

I was, according to his account, an irascible subject, murmuring against the task, dissatisfied with my condition as an employee. As a child, the mallet my father was repugnant to me; as a young man, I gave the example of insubordination, and did not cease rebelling against my bourgeois. How did he know them, my bourgeois? I still have my workman's book bearing their signatures; several are alive, and I could invoke their testimony if necessary... All this, concludes my historian, because I am a disobedient spirit, rebellious against religion and an enemy of society.

Laziness, misconduct, spirit of revolt: this is my portrait. Now, apply the formula to the mass of workers, and you will have the word of the apologue. Under the name of only one, it is the portrait of the whole category.

It is not my plan to eulogize the working classes; I would much rather engage in their critique. Nor do I want to sing a dithyramb on labor and its magnificence; I leave that to our advertisers. We had in quick succession the English Exhibition and the French Exhibition; the world resounded with the glories of industry and agriculture. What truth could emerge from these hackneyed amplifications?

By labor, much more than by war, man has shown his bravery; by labor, much more than by piety, works Justice; and if some day our active species achieves happiness, it will again be through labor. These few words are enough. Let us pass, without further compliments, to the real question, which I formulate in these terms:

The condition of the worker, in religious society, is a condition of inferiority; labor itself is the sign of inferiority, the seal of degradation.

Why is this the case? It is because, just as the law of justice has never received its application, neither in the economic order, nor in the political order, nor in pedagogy, it has also never received it in labor.

Otherwise, if justice were done to labor, the condition of the worker would be inverted: from inferior he would become master; from poor he would be made rich; from one condemned he would come to be noble.

Thus, *to determine the principles of the application of Justice — instead and in place of chance, fraud and violence — to all the facts of social life*

*that interest man as an agent of production or laborer,*

Such is the question for me. What previous studies have revealed to us about the effects of Justice, in its application to human affairs, allows us to already glimpse in this way of posing the question a scope and a certainty not entailed by the famous formula of the RIGHT TO WORK.

And since we have taken it as a method, in our legal investigations, to follow the thread of history, we will divide the question according to our habit:

1. What has religion done for the worker, in antiquity and down to modern times? What was it in its nature to do? What else could it do? Is a religion of labor possible?
2. What is the thought of the Revolution?

# FIRST CHAPTER.

Of the dignity of labor. — Contrary conclusions of the fatalist or providentialist school and of the revolutionary school.

I. — Studied in its essence, and independent of all moral and legal considerations, labor is in the same case as its division: it is a double-edged principle, producing, in the present condition of society, as much harm as good, which reduces its utility to the multitude to zero, or even converts it into real loss.

Let us explain. As a principle of utility and a force of production, labor is the primary source of wealth. All other conditions being equal, we can say that the more society labors, the richer it becomes; and reciprocally that the more labor decreases, the more production decreases and wealth with it.

But labor is not accomplished without fatigue: just as a steam engine needs to be fed, maintained and repaired until the moment when, through natural wear and tear, it no longer involves any service or repair, and must be scrapped; thus the strength of the man, each day spent, requires a daily repair, until the day when the worker, out of service, enters the hospital or the grave.

In economic language: No work without wages; no production without costs.

For the industrial entrepreneur, who employs machines and men in his operation, the problem is therefore this: *To obtain, with the least cost and wages possible, the greatest amount of labor, and consequently of wealth, that is possible.*

Every entrepreneur tends to solve the problem for the benefit of production, that is to say of his own fortune, without worrying about what becomes of the worker he pays, who is for him only a machine, the service of which he buys on a flat-rate basis. It is thus that the same entrepreneur, applying the division of labor, pushes it as far as his interest commands, without worrying about the unfortunate consequences it can have for the worker, alone charged, with his wages, with the care of his person. To know what can result for this worker, for his health, his intelligence, his well-being, his mores, from excessive, unhealthy, repugnant, piecemeal, poorly paid work; that is another matter, about which psychology and hygiene may inquire, which could well also interest political economy and government, but which does not concern the entrepreneur, which imposes no responsibility on him, which does not affect in any way his religion or arouse in him either scruple or regret; in which at most this exploiter, absolved by custom, absolved by the ignorance of the masses as much as

by his own, absolved by the negligence of Power, the silence of the legislator, the pedantry of scholars and the quietism of religion, will perceive, if he condescends to cast his eyes upon it, a sad necessity, but one that neither he nor anyone else can change, and for which consequently they do not have to answer.

It is to this supposedly inescapable situation that our judiciary must be applied.

II. — We have already seen what has become on analysis of that other so-called necessity, which ancient wisdom had concluded from the inequality of nature (Third Study) and of which it had made, under the name of predestination or the reason of state, a law taking precedence over Justice itself. The kind of fatalism that we have to examine at this time resembles that one. So that I will not be accused of misrepresenting it, let us summarize it in a few firm propositions:

1. “All labor, say the partisans of the *status quo*, supposes an *effort*: that is inevitable. — No objection to that; opinions are unanimous.

2. “Every effort deserves a *wage*: that is a matter of right. In the primitive state, wages are given to each by nature; in the industrial state, the greatest number receive it from the entrepreneur, proprietor or master, who has commissioned the labor.” — These are facts: there is nothing to say.

3. “Every wage is regulated by express or tacit agreement, according to the state and according to the law of the market; so that the rate of wages, like the wage itself, has as its principle both the necessity of the effort and the right that results from it.” — That is indisputable, and we willingly grant it.

4. “Now, *effort* and *wages* constitute for the worker a relation of inferiority, on the one hand with regard to the nature that imposes labor and effort, on the other with regard to the entrepreneur who buys labor and pays for it.” — Against this new proposal, it must be admitted, it is impossible to disagree. It is only a question of knowing whether the distinction of the individuals who compose civilized society into entrepreneurs, proprietors or masters, and workers or wage-earners, is inevitable.

5. “As it happens, this distinction is inevitable: it is in no way arbitrary and you will find it within any association. It has its cause in the division of labor, that is to say, in the development of industry, consequently, in the inequality of capacity of the producers.” — Well, what do you claim to conclude from this?”

6. “If you agree with these five propositions, the inevitability of the effort, the *salarimat* that is its natural consequence; the settlement of the wage by an express or tacit agreement, the inferiority that results for the

employee, with regard to the employer, from the very fact of the salariat; finally the impossibility of escaping a distinction resulting from necessity itself and from the laws of labor, if, we say, you grant these premises, you cannot reject the consequences, namely, that labor creates between men a natural and legal hierarchy, which develops in proportion to population and industry, so that the gap between the condition of the worker and that of the entrepreneur or master grows more each day.”

We agree on all of these things. It is indeed from this deduction that the practice of wage labor was established and developed; this is indeed what constitutes the economy of present-day society and there would be nothing to reply if the exposition were complete and there was nothing to add. For it is not enough to state only true propositions; it is necessary, as Descartes said, to make complete enumerations. One element more or less in the data of a problem changes the solution at all or all.

I therefore take up the series of the above-mentioned propositions after No. 5, and I say, changing the conclusion:

6. “Things thus stated, society constituted in its natural, economic and legal hierarchy, two questions present themselves, which, if they were resolved in the affirmative, would change the relation of conditions and fortunes, and from a hierarchical society would make an egalitarian society:

a) “As for the *effort*, inherent in work, nothing proves that, by the way of working, by the education to be given to the worker, by the organization of the workshop, it cannot be reduced in proportion to the industrial development, therefore in an unlimited proportion, a circumstance that, by steadily reducing human servitude with regard to nature, would bring workers and entrepreneurs closer together;

b) “As for the relationship of *employer* to *wage-earner*, or better, of worker to the proprietor or master, if it is true that these two qualities cannot exist at the same time and from the same point of view in the same subject, nothing yet proves that by virtue of the same causes they cannot and should not belong, either at different times or from different points of view, to each subject, so as to balance in all human life and, in the last analysis, render conditions equal.

7. “Let us now suppose these two hypotheses resolved in the affirmative, the conclusion will be that the inferiority alleged above does not exist, being able at least to be indefinitely reduced by the resources of industrial education and economic organization, it would be possible to reform agricultural and manufacturing operations on a new plan, so that the malfeasance of labor yielded little by little under the influence of Justice, science and freedom.

Otherwise, admitting, on the one hand, that the effort inherent in labor was absolutely inescapable and degrading; on the other, that the



progressive elevation of each worker from the quality of wage-earner to that of master or participant was incompatible with the requirements of production, in that case, I say, we would fall back under the predestinarian law; the theory of original sin would prevail over that of immanent Justice and the Church would win its case against the Revolution.

This is the question that we have to solve.

III. — Until the French Revolution, the examination of these two hypotheses was impossible: they were simply not thought of, an order of things whose absence had only been observed among the most savage tribes, and outside of which neither society nor wealth could be conceived. From time to time, at long intervals, public commiseration, aided by the policy of princes, had intervened to lessen the rigors of noble and bourgeois exploitation. But it was unprecedented that labor, that the service of production had anywhere been left to the initiative of the workers, so that one could judge what would happen in a society where everyone, enjoying a developed professional education, would be in a position to become, by the change of service and the ascent through the ranks, worker-entrepreneurs, and proletarian proprietors.

Christianity, let us grant it this glory, was the principal agent of this mercy — weak and tardy, freed moreover from any philosophical element — towards the working man. The emperors, by their edicts in favor of the slaves, having given the impulse, Christianity generalized the movement; or, to put it better, the movement, under the action of circumstances, having become general, was called Christianity. Everywhere, in the name of the Gospel, servitude was softened, transformed: tax settler, sharecropper or mercenary, the worker began to participate in the possession of himself. Until then he had been a thing. He became a person.

But that was all. Justice went no further. Labor, abandoned by the Church, as it had been by the praetor, to the good pleasure of the privileged, became again as murderous for the Christian plebs as it had been under paganism for the slave. The abolition of the ancient servitude was not finished when another replaced it: it lasted twelve centuries. Alongside the feudal exploitation established on the soil, the industrial wage-earning system was organized, the prerogative of the bourgeois. So that, finally, in the city as in the country, in industry as in agriculture, there reappeared, with religious sanction and more flourishing than ever, *the exploitation of man by man*. Too much has been said about it lately for me to dwell on it.

Things thus settled, the Revolution arrives. At the same time that it abolishes the feudal regime and corporative privilege, it lays the foundations of a new education, proclaims free industry and commerce; in a word, it promises to the laborer, by the fact of equal instruction and

universal competition, the entire disposition of his capacities and his person. Moreover, the Revolution has not had time to explain its thought and to organize anything; it confined itself to making a clean sweep of the old regime and to making the new institution possible.

Now, in the seventy years since the square has been cleared, what has occurred?

In fact, nothing but the negative: first an extreme anarchy, the beginnings of which, thanks to the regime that had preceded, could appear fortunate, but which soon gave the most bitter fruits; then an imperceptible return to the corporative regime, strongly expressed by the development of public limited companies.

In the realm of ideas, many theories, utopias and systems, which it is permissible to reduce to three main groups, corresponding to the words *before, during, after*, depending on whether the authors are attached to the feudal tradition, or whether they claim to consecrate the revolutionary *status quo*, or, finally, if they affirm the need for an egalitarian and liberal reconstruction. Already these three groups tend to be resolved into two, one of which represents the *future*, the other the *past*, or, what amounts to the same thing, the Revolution and the counter-Revolution.

IV. — According to the economists of the school of Say, the first who spoke after 89, the Revolution, by abolishing the corporative and feudal system, did something right, from which society was not slow to reap the inestimable fruits. But, they add, by this abolition the Revolution has completed its work; there is nothing more to do, no other organization to look for. As regards labor in particular, its condition is what it ought to be when, freed from all legal privilege and all hindrance, it recognizes no other law than that of *supply and demand*.

“Thus,” say these economists, “does there remain here and there, on the face of the country, some trade constituted as a monopoly, some privileged industry, some specialty of production prohibited or reserved for one category of citizens? On all these points the Revolution is to be made; and as long as it is not done, the law of production being partly violated, labor incompletely freed, economic science can give only half of its benefits. Seek no other remedy for the evil complained of by the worker. Above all, beware, under any pretext, of intervening arbitrarily in the play of economic forces and of thwarting their laws with yours: *laissez faire, laissez passer*.”

This theory, which tends to resolve the whole economic system into the principle of a purely negative liberty, as M. DUNOYER has done in his book *De la Liberté du Travail*; which consequently makes mercantile and industrial practice a matter of pure arbitrariness, resolves itself, by the contradiction that is inherent in it, and despite its manifestations in favor of liberty, into a pure fatalism. (*See* the First Study, Ch. II, and the Third

Study, Note (H), page 167.)

With regard to the condition of the worker, it implies:

That labor is not of a human order, that is to say moral and legal, but only of external necessity, imposed by the inclemency of nature and the scarcity of subsistence;

That consequently, labor has nothing spontaneous about it, and that all the liberty of which it is susceptible consists in the fact that it must neither be imposed nor prevented by any order;

That in these conditions labor, even voluntary and free, not being given *a priori* in consciousness, is repugnant by its nature and painful;

That by the force of things, and by the combined effect of human wills, to which all fatalism is unbearable, labor, all the more repelled as it is accompanied by more repugnance and pain, tends to separate itself, as an economic force, from capital and property;

That this irresistible tendency results in the division of economic personnel into two categories: the capitalists, entrepreneurs and proprietors, and the workers or wage-earners;

That this is doubtless unfortunate for the latter, and worthy of the attention of the sovereign, who in certain cases may find in it the motive for an extraordinary tax in favor of the disinherited of fortune, or for a police regulation on manufacturing; but that it in no way follows that labor can be the object of a positive law, of any guarantee granted to workers by the State or, what amounts to the same thing, by capitalists and proprietors.

Thus reason the economists of the so-called liberal school, sworn enemies of feudalism, but no less hostile to any idea of bringing about reform in a chaotic society, where privilege and wage labor are perpetually at odds, without hope of conciliation and stability. They claim that we must stick to the five propositions which we have previously reported, and to the conclusion that results from them, propositions and conclusions that today make up the whole philosophy of labor, and which serve marvelously, as we have seen, to consecrate the inequality of fortunes.

And why this limitation imposed on the combinations of labor? By what right do the Malthusian economists say to social spontaneity: You will come so far, but you will go no further? One would not believe it, if the confession were not recorded on each of their pages. It is because political economy, when it inaugurated itself in the world of the sciences, about a century ago, found things in this state, and having thus found them, it judges them alone *natural*, hence immutable, above any innovation resulting from the acts of man, and against which economic wisdom thinks it has the right to protest. As if labor were not a human fact, a fact outside nature, against which the savage, the primitive man, protests! As if wages were not a human fact, a social fact, against which

slave owners protested for a long time! As if the division of labor was not again a human fact, the fruit of an already advanced civilization! As if, finally, the social hierarchy, in other words the inequality of conditions, and the religious dogma that consecrates it, were not human facts!...

V. — The partisans of the old order of things have had no difficulty in showing the inconsistency of this theory. They have said :

“If, by fatality, or to say it better, by the providentiality of its essence, labor is repugnant to man, if it tires him, kills him, and if from this pain of labor results an invincible principle of inequality, we must conclude that the Revolution, by abolishing the hierarchical regime, only confirmed its wisdom. It must be admitted at the same time that Christianity has deserved the recognition of the human race and far exceeded the forecasts of science, by spreading on this regime — so slandered, which experience today shows necessary — the balm of divine charity.

“Isn't the height of political reason to conform to the laws of nature and destiny? Why then reject with so much hatred this feudal order, guilty of having guessed, many centuries before the economists, these laws of nature, and of having taken them for a rule?

“And is it not the sign of a revealed religion to soften, by the outpouring of grace, what is inexorable in the law? Why, then, accuse Christianity of having disregarded the rights of humanity and of reason, by consecrating feudal customs and modifying them by its precept of almsgiving and all its charitable institutions?

“Who now believes in this unfortunate equality preached by the Revolution? Is it the Republicans, fanatical or temperate, of all the most implacable adversaries of socialism? Is it the Saint-Simonians, promoters and beneficiaries of the new feudalism? Is it the Phalansterians themselves, who, despite their theory of attractive labor, nonetheless make pay high for the individuals responsible for hard work, and who, moreover, have never ceased to protest with all their might against equality? Is it the deists, the eclectics, the pantheists, the positivists, the Owenists, the Icarians, the mystics of every kind, who all, denying *a priori* the equality of natures, and consequently equality of conditions and fortunes, recognizing moreover the repugnance of labor and its inferiority, affirm, willy-nilly, the necessity of staggered classifications, or escape it only through communism?

“Let the Revolution confess its chimera and humble itself. After having destroyed the monarchy by divine right, it was able to replace it only by an unstable organism, with a power of absorption a hundred times worse than that of the feudal *fasces*; after having abolished class distinction, it recreates it in a form and with mores a hundred times more atrocious; after having killed respect, obedience, charity, it makes up for

them by parliamentary struggle, insurrection, proscription, and fatalism.

“Charity, say the followers, is not given in the economy. Consequently, no tax for the poor, any more than the right to work; no hospitals, no refuges, no asylums, no crèches, no foundlings’ homes! Let the proletarian with his offspring die in his hole without uttering a complaint: so wills the economic law, expression of the force of things. — Isn’t that a fine philosophy, a touching morality, a profound science? And it is the last word of the Revolution!”

Such is the discourse of the Conservatives.

VI. — It is certain that to stick to the exhibitions of principles and the professions of faith of the parties, schools, sects or churches that emerged from the movement of 89, it is impossible to find in this movement a shadow of logic and morality. The style has changed, the substance of things has been carefully preserved. To divine right has succeeded the sovereignty of the people; to the feudal nobility, the stockholder and tax-paying bourgeoisie. What is the benefit for equality? There remains the Church, whose budget and influence, after being stripped of its possessions, are coveted. What a progress for mores, for ideas, when the mystics of the day have shared this prey! What triumph over superstition, when, instead of the Jesuits, religion will have for priests Jacobins, Saint-Simonians, eclectics? For the rest, the ancient tradition has not even been called into doubt for a moment. Monarchical centralization has been increasing; the police flourish even more; Machiavellianism is rejuvenated. The multitude remain in the same vileness and contempt. Equality, finally, watchword in 93, equality, which was never in hearts, is disavowed by all mouths: it has become seditious talk and a sign of reprobation.

With respect to labor, the mystification would be no less complete.

The theory of negative liberty, or *laissez faire, laissez passer*, which forms the whole academic philosophy, inevitably leads to a contradiction. It is clear, in fact, and the facts that are happening before our eyes demonstrate it, that if labor, if the entire economic organism, after having been delivered from its shackles, is then delivered, as the disciples of Smith and Say wish, to the attractions of its nature, labor, having begun with liberty, will end with subjection. Sooner or later, the caste of capitalists and entrepreneurs, emerging from the ranks of inorganic labor, will form an aristocracy: then the system of corporations will be succeeded by that of limited companies; after noble feudalism, industrial feudalism. Even that is no longer to be done; it is done. Society, instead of following an ascending line, would thus have traversed a circle; the Revolution would have lied: instead of a reform, instead of progress, we would have a contradiction, a pastiche, a folly.

VII. — The economists who emerged from the Revolution protest against this nonsense. They maintain:

That labor is of a moral and human order, given in consciousness, before necessity imposes it;

That consequently it is free by nature, with a positive and subjective liberty, and that it is because of this liberty that it has the right to claim its negative and objective liberty, in other words, the destruction of all the impediments, obstacles and fetters that government and privilege may cause it;

That, if labor is free, as has just been expressed, it implies in its notion that of right and duty;

That if, on its fatal side and as external nature makes it a necessity for us, it is repugnant and painful, on its free side and as it is a manifestation of our spontaneity, it must be attractive and joyful;

That, moreover, the repugnance and pain, which in the present state of human industry accompany labor in such high doses, are the effect of the servile organization that has been given to it, but that they can and must be reduced indefinitely by a liberal organization;

That it is therefore not true to say that the system of inequality and privilege that the Revolution wanted to abolish results from the repugnant and painful fatality of labor; but that, on the contrary, it is privilege itself that has disproportionately aggravated the worker's repugnance and pain;

That thus there is reason to hope that, by a new emission of the principles of Justice and morals, by another system of professional education, by a reorganization of the workshop, labor, losing its servile and mercenary character, will at the same time be freed from the fatigue and the disgust that fatality confers on it;

That, if it is permissible to maintain, with the old economists, that labor, a fatal thing, cannot form against the proprietary class and for the benefit of the working class the object of a natural, primitive right, necessarily guaranteed by state, it would be against all truth and justice to claim that this same labor, a spontaneous and free thing, cannot become the object of a mutual insurance contract, which is precisely the goal that the Revolution wishes to attain;

That it is with labor, from the point of view of fatality, as with appetite, health, respiration, light, the enjoyment of which no human power can assure; and, from the point of view of liberty, as with all the things that can be made the object of a transaction;

That thus labor, reconciled by its free nature with capital and property, from which its objectivity distanced it, can no longer give rise to a class distinction, which breaks the vicious circle and sets society, as well as science, free from all contradiction.

Then, add the innovators, the ideal dreamed of by the old economists

can be realized:

The land to the one who cultivates it;

The trade to the one who exercises it;

Capital to the one who employs it;

The product to the producer;

The benefit of the collective force to all those who contribute to it, and the wage system modified by participation;

Piecemeal work combined with the plurality of apprenticeships in a series of promotions;

The parcelling out of the soil abolished by the constitution of inheritance;

In short, the fatality of nature tamed by the liberty of man:

Such is the program of the economists of the Revolution. It is a whole moral world that arises, a new civilization, another humanity. Malouet from 1789, Babeuf in 1796, the representative of the bourgeoisie and the tribune of the people, affirmed it. Postponed by the wars of the empire, the idea returns to the discussion with the legitimate royalty; it exploded in 1848 with the decree of February 25 on the *Right to work*.

Either fatality and privilege, or liberty and equality: that is the dilemma. On one side is paganism, despotism, the routine of peoples, and all their history; on the other, science, right, the future, infinity. You have to choose, and first you have to judge. In favor of which of these two schools will the Church pronounce itself?

VIII. — The Church, during these eighteen centuries that she loves so much to recall, has not suspected the first word of all these things. She didn't wonder if labor was free or fatal, if it came from both; in the first as in the second case, as in the hypothesis of their reconciliation, what could result from it for the confirmation of the Gospel and the destiny of the human race.

The Church, delivering the worker to the feudal yoke after having broken its ancient chains, continued in another form the work of polytheism. It has replaced fatality with predestination; it has seen the birth and death of the physiocrats without suspecting that these theoreticians of the *net product* carried in their mercantilist speculations a whole brood of terrible heresies; for thirty years she had witnessed, dozing in her pulpit, the economic debates, when the lightning of 1848 came to wake her with a start.

Then she understood that underneath there was something stirring that her Scriptures had not spoken of, which her Fathers had not known, about which her councils and her popes had defined nothing: it was the right of man and citizen, equality before the law, economic justice, free labor, immanent and disinterested virtue, the education of humanity by

itself, progress. She said to herself that gates of hell were going to prevail, and provisionally she condemned, she struck. Since then, she has given us as a tranquilizer the sovereign dogma of the Immaculate Conception, in whose honor has been burned a million francs worth of candles in all the churches in France.

But error or ignorance does not count; and frankly, Monsignor, the democratic and social Revolution, falling on the Church *ex abrupto* and *in promptu*, was wrong to seize you thus unexpectedly. So recover your mind and after having invoked the Spirit, tell us here, in unequivocal terms, without circumlocutions or ambiguities, whether you are for free labor or for fatality; whether, according to the Church, work is of a human nature, or only a necessity of misery; consequently, if you consider revolutionary theory as admissible in theology, or if you hold the vicious circle of the old economist school as an article of faith?

Alas! Must what has been established on Providence crumble through improvisation? The Church, although she has formulated nothing precise and positive regarding the social economy, apart from the anathemas to usury that she would like to withdraw, is nonetheless committed by her dogma, by her tradition, by the whole system of her faith. She could not, for a question as petty as that of labor, retract, change all her doctrine, sing the *Marseillaise* and the *Chant des travailleurs*. Besides, she is accustomed to these disappointments. What happens to her with economic science is only the repetition of what has happened to her so many times with the other branches of human knowledge, one more contradiction that stands before her, a new redoubt of reason against faith. She has seen many others! One day, it is astronomy that disturbs her Heaven; the next day, it is geology that upsets her Genesis; afterwards, linguistics gives the lie to her story of Babelic dispersion. Here it is economy that continues the trench, and presently Justice will attack. — Well! says the Church, let it come, that political and social economy which pretends to ask nothing of charity; let it appear, this Justice that has no need of faith! I will come out of it as before, and get rid of it: *Egrediar sicut ante feci, et me excutiam*. She does not know, this poor tonsured woman, that Justice, withdrawing from her, had deprived her of her strength: *Nesciens quod recessisset ab eo Dominus*.

We have seen philosophers, marvelous intelligences, heroic consciences, recognize their error, to make the sacrifice of their self-love to truth, and pronounce this always sublime phrase: I was mistaken!

The Church does not admit that she is mistaken; she does not turn back from a false opinion. To whomever she demonstrates her fault, she responds with anathema. Rather than reaching out to Justice, she will embrace Fatality. It is for this reason that no grace will be granted to her, and that she will drink to the dregs the chalice of her ignorance and her



adulteries.

## CHAPTER II.

Discussion. — Principle of transcendence: That work is a divine curse, and consequently the bondage of a religious institution. — Spiritualist theory.

IX. — We know the antipathy that savage peoples have for labor: this well-known fact suffices, up to a certain point, to explain why all mythologies, which are the forms of reason in the savage, have condemned it.

But that this condemnation should be maintained in a scholarly, polished theology, that it has become the secret principle of the enslavement of the working classes, is what the inclinations of the animal man and the history of worship no longer suffice to account for.

Now, the principle of this systematic antipathy, a principle that is one of the characteristics of the religious age, of which the laziness of the savage is itself only the crude expression, is found in spiritualism, from which it has passed into religion.

Any speculation of the mind in the realm of transcendence brings in its wake an iniquity.

Why is slavery unique to our species, one of the things that best distinguish us from animals? Wolves do not devour each other, says the proverb: why is it that men eat each other? We never saw a lion forcing another lion to hunt for him: how does man make of man a beast of burden, a slave? Obviously, slavery does not have its principle in nature, as recognized by the Fathers. Where then can it be found?

Seek in good faith, and you will discover that this anomaly, this monstrous prerogative that man assumes over his fellow man, which characterizes our species, comes from the fact that, alone among animals, man is capable through his thought of separating his self from his non-self, of distinguishing within himself matter and spirit, body and soul; by this fundamental abstraction, he is capable of creating for himself two kinds of lives: a superior or psychic life, and an inferior or material life, from which results the division of society into two categories, that of the spiritual, made for command, and that of the carnal, doomed to labor and obedience.

Man, say the spiritualists, is composed of two substances. By his soul he belongs to God, his creator, his sovereign, his judge, his end; — by his body, he belongs to the earth, abode and instrument of his trials. This is the distinction that Saint Paul makes between the terrestrial Adam, *Adam terrenus*, and the celestial Adam, *Adam coelestis*, and elsewhere, between the spiritual man and the carnal man, *animalis homo*, *spiritualalis homo*. And it is by virtue of this distinction of the Apostle that from the first

century the Christians, who were already overly meticulous regarding religion, tended to form two groups, not to say two castes, in the Church: that of the *psychics*, corresponding to the *animalis homo*, and which included the multitude; and that of the *pneumatics*, corresponding to the *spiritalis homo*, also called *gnostics*.

Everything that turns man away from God, inclining him towards the earth, is for him infirmity, misery. Hence the disfavor that has attached itself to labor from the beginning, and which all cults have never ceased to aggravate. It is therefore to spiritualist speculation that we must refer the condemnation of labor. I dare say that this philosophy has never been used for anything else.

X. — One of the greatest spiritualists and religionists of the time, M. Jean Reynaud, whose conscientious testimony I have quoted in favor of the dogma of the fall, thought he should also give us, with the best intention in the world, the theodicy of servitude. If this pious institution were to disappear among men, one could find it again in the last work of the learned druid, *Terre et Ciel*.

According to Mr. Reynaud,

“Labor is the consequence of the *lack of harmony* that exists by DIVINE ORDINANCE between the organization of man and the organization of the earth; and for this defect to cease, one or the other of these two organizations would have to change... — By the progress of association and industry, adds the learned theologian, labor can become less continuous, less unpleasant; but you will always have to resign yourself to it: it is a punishment without end.” (Page 94.)

This declaration is grave.

Others were pleased to gather on the face of the planet the proofs of a Providence full of concern for us; M. Reynaud discovers everywhere there the traces of a general disarray, accomplished with premeditation, with the aim of grieving our poor humanity, of vexing it, of *punishing* it. What thanks, O holy man, will the Church owe you for a discovery of this importance! We knew from the scriptures that the devil had passed through this earth; it was reserved for you to show us everywhere the imprint of his cloven foot.

M. Jean Reynaud, incapable, it seems, of understanding the fundamental law of the universe, and carried by the turn of his genius to see mystery everywhere, takes the antinomies of nature for so many *sataneries*, contrarieties caused by our first transgression. For one cannot, according to him, impute to Providence such negligence or wickedness.

“Contrarieties caused by the law of gravitation, which obliges us, in order to overcome it, to invent all sorts of machines, and exposes us, in falling, to breaking our necks;

“Contrarities caused by the size of the earth, which forces us to use systems of extraordinary locomotion, by land, by water, by iron, by air;

“Contrarities caused by the interposition of seas and mountains, the inconvenience of which is to push men to form themselves into political groups, rivals of each other, and often bent on destroying each other;

“Contrarities caused by the laws of solar heat, of which a few degrees more or less make us pass from abundance to scarcity, from health to disease;

“Contrarities caused by the presence of harmful animals and useless plants, which entails on our part a continual hunting and weeding;

“Contrarities arising from the infirmities of our nature...”

Let us translate this lament. M. Jean Reynaud finds it bad that the fire that warms us burns us; that light never reaches us except in a straight line, whereas it would be useful for us to receive it at will in a curved line; that gravitation, which attaches us to the ground, does not cease at the command of the workman who lets himself fall from a scaffolding; that the earth, by stretching out before us, invites us to walk, and that by making use of our legs, we fatigue our muscles, which causes perspiration and the *sweat of the brow*. He complains that we are in any case badly accommodated; that there is no hill without a valley, meat without bone, harvest without marc, flour without bran, production without expense, strength without organ, stick with only one end, height without depth; in a word, he regrets that nature is nature, that mind is mind, and that it not a power of our will to make them absurd.

M. Jean Reynaud is very unfortunate. He aspires to nothing less than the state of the absolute; his body, this *old rag*, is holding him back! What a displeasure to be obliged, like the vilest of animals, to eat and drink, to begin again every day, and what mortification for a philosopher in all that follows!

This is, however, the nonsense to which the sacramental distinction between *soul* and *body* leads; this is the object of the wishes and the cause of the regrets of this silly spirituality, the last word of which is the suppression of the universe and, in the meantime, the horror of labor, the damnation of the worker, and the deification of the aristocrat.

You have to see M. Jean Reynaud deduce, without blinking an eye, the consequences of his marvelous principle; it is not the word that he is lacking:

“To see the greatness of man, it is much better to look at the general results than at his manual activity. Is not this, by the monotony and puerility of the operations, by the mediocrity of the effects, by the displeasure and weariness with which it is almost always accompanied, worthy of pity? We cannot help but get a very poor idea of the creative virtue of man... when we follow him at work, when we see him picking, digging, carrying loads, turning cranks, panting, ill at

ease, longing for the hour when he will rest, soaking the earth with his sweat for a whole day in order to do so little there in the end, that it is enough to take a few steps away for it to no longer appear... He does not operate differently than an ant... What a miserable thing is his body, if one sought there an instrument of creation!" (Page 86)

M. Jean Reynaud judges the greatest of a man by the number of square meters he can plow in a day. For a spiritualist philosopher, an angel-lover, what do you say to this reasoning? I who, seeing in the soul and the body only a general division of phenomena, do not have the happiness of possessing the faculties of transcendence, I judge industrial action quite differently.

Man is a force imbued with intelligence, which can only be happy if it is exercised. Small as this force is, it is capable of producing the vastest and most incalculable effects by the manner in which it is directed, and by its grouping. The magnitude of the results being therefore on his part only a matter of multiplication, it is not by this objective, geometric, material magnitude, in a word, it is not according to the *quantity* of the product that the human action must be philosophically appreciated, it is by the *quality* of this product. Let's take an example. The first plowman, Triptolemus, Osiris, Cain, brings in a sheaf of wheat: it is civilization, the reign of the mind over nature, that begins. What expenditure of force was needed to make this sheaf grow, which nature alone does not give us? Less than running, wrestling, dancing, riding, and all leisure exercises require. No doubt if, instead of one sheaf, the same individual wants to harvest ten thousand, the operation will be beyond his strength, and for him will become fatigue and pain. But it is only a problem of association and industry, the solution of which, without worsening the service, can on the contrary double, for all those who take part in it, the pleasure and the profit. You who dare to say, without knowing who or what you are talking about: *Show me a grain of sand, and I will demonstrate God to you*, allow me in retort the argument: Show me a grain of wheat, and I will demonstrate the greatness of man.

But, they say, the man who feels a soul can well condescend to invent wheat, the plow, the mill, fermented bread: manifestations of his intelligence, testimonies of his ethereal and immortal nature; will he stoop to start over all his life, not the same inventions, what is invented is only invented once, but the same operations? In the judgment of M. Jean Reynaud, it would be a pain, an intolerable servitude:

"No profession," he says, "can be agreeable..."

So what to do? M. Jean Reynaud does not back down one step:

"It is good," he tells us, "that in our societies there is always some physical labor to accomplish, *the superior souls being the only ones who can without*

*danger abstain from taking part in it*, because they have enough attachment to thought to keep themselves from the numbness and aberrations to which leisure leads... Order would also suffer, whether labor was diminished without souls being elevated, or if souls were elevated without labor diminishing...”

Whoever thinks ill of labor is ill-disposed towards the laborer. M. Jean Reynaud, whatever friend he claims to be of the Revolution, is of the hierarchical and feudal school; he does not believe in equality; he is with the Church, to which he came, after the fall of the Republic, to offer the help of his druidic, magical and Pythagorean philosophy. What is he telling us here? “The common people must labor, and the predestined must govern.”

Thus, it is now known, this secret full of horror! [Voltaire]

And you call yourself revolutionary, republican, democrat, even socialist! You deny original sin!... No, no: you have too much of a genius for things divine to understand anything of human affairs; too much feeling for the Divinity, to preserve the moral sense. You are too convinced of the devilry of this world to believe in its justice. Labor, indeed, for you is the devil. You believe in the devil: your metaphysics, as old as the stones, leads you there. Look at it more closely: it is this that creates the inertia of the savage, this that, glorifying idleness, the *far niente*, has inspired the biblical myth of labor and presided over the institution of slaves.

XI. — Any religion, by virtue of the spiritualism that constitutes it, whether it be called Christianity, Buddhism, Druidism, or whatever one likes, is anti-practical; it pushes man to contemplation, to inaction, to quietism. (A)

In the beginning, says Genesis, when man had not yet corrupted his nature by sin, God placed him in the garden of pleasure so that he should shape it and care for it, *ut operaretur et custodiret illum*. Bishop SIBOUR of Paris, wanting to flatter the industrial trend of the time, said one day, commenting on this text, that God had made man the *foreman of creation*. The phrase is pretty, and has earned the good archbishop many compliments. You can find everything you want in the Bible. But beware of going deeper; otherwise the word of grace will change into a word of reprobation; the dove will become a serpent.

This was, let us not forget, BEFORE THE FALL. In that time of happiness, man living in perfect union with the Creator, and undoubtedly also with himself; labor did not have for him anything repugnant and painful. The *contrariedades* reported by Mr. Jean Reynaud did not exist. Nature, which in order to produce man seems to you to have ranged all the beings, had suppressed the harmful and useless species; it was only later that it completed its series. Ormuzd, according to the ideas of the ancient

Persians, the principle of good, first produced all beautiful and good things; Ahriman, contradiction of Ormuzd, produced in turn the ugly and the bad. The Bible has somewhat modified this myth. All animals, according to it, were created first, and they were all good and beautiful, and subject to man. It was only after Adam's sin that they revolted, that most became hideous and ferocious, that the earth refused them, that thistles appeared, that labor became a painful chore, etc.

Be that as it may, the state of happiness did not last long. Man having infected himself by an act that Genesis only reveals to us under the veil of allegory, but the gravity of which M. Reynaud has described to us with redoubled eloquence, labor, from the pleasure that God had made it, turned into a chastisement.

"The earth will be cursed for you: you will eat of it in fatigue every day of your life. It will sprout thorns and thistles; and you will eat the grass of the field; you shall eat your bread by the sweat of your brow, until you return to the earth from which you came: for dust you are and to dust you will return." (*Gen.*, iii.)

Such is the decree that, after the period of innocence, regulated the condition of the worker and formed the basis of the social economy throughout the duration of the religious age. This curse, the tenor of which has been preserved for us in the sacred book of the Hebrews, has resounded through all the earth. Virgil, in the 6<sup>th</sup> book of the *Aeneid*, places Labor at the gates of hell, in the company of horrible monsters, Mourning, vengeful Worries, pale Diseases, hoary Old Age, Fear, and Hunger, a bad counselor, and shameful Poverty, and War, and Death, and criminal Pleasures.

Christianity thickens this darkness more and more. According to M. Blanc Saint-Bonnet, one of the most remarkable mystics of our time, labor is the regularization of pain, without which, he says, there is no genius, no heroism, no sanctification.

"Pain needed to be regulated and calibrated in a law: it is LABOR.

"Pain is a substitute for Labor...

"Labor, Pain, Death, providential trilogy.

"Hunger (which forces man to labor), admirable invention for a being. The theory of the absolute is all there..." (*De la Douleur*, passim.)

From this elementary, but misunderstood fact, that pain is antinomically attached to pleasure, that it is nothing other than excess in pleasure, just as burning is an excess of calefaction, fatigue an excess of action, M Blanc Saint-Bonnet pulled a whole volume of mystic insights, which may seem interesting to a spiritualist, to a Christian, but in which common sense can only see the dumbing down of reason by religious thought. This is the procedure of M. Jean Reynaud, in the *contrariedades* for which he reproaches nature: the philosopher and the Christian, starting

from the same principle, are in agreement.

XII. — Is it then so difficult to penetrate the meaning of this double allegory?

*a) Labor before sin.*

Man, by virtue of his own activity and his relations with the world, is a worker; his labor is spontaneous and free, consequently subject to a law of justice and morality, the practice of which assures his happiness, the violation of which, on the contrary, plunges him into misery. This is the subjective point of view, affirmed today by the Revolution, which the sacred writer presents as an earlier era, an era of innocence, spontaneity, liberty and wealth.

*b) Labor after sin.*

Now, to this law of labor, which can be in no way distressing, since it results from our constitution, nature adds the sanction of its passivity. Man must act, labor, first because he is man. But, so that his action is not in vain, he will only subsist from what he will have produced, with the help of this inexhaustible instrument that is the Earth. This is the objective point of view, the only one discovered by the old economic school. Thus are united in Labor, according to the higher thought of the myth, liberty and fatality, the first having, through the development of human faculties, to increasingly subordinate the second.

How, then, instead of this subordination of fatality, have we had the oppression of liberty itself; in other words, how has the objective point of view struck above all the imaginations, dominated the consciences, and ended up governing alone the humanitarian economy? Spiritualism, explained through the mouth of M. Jean Reynaud, comes to teach us.

The *superior souls*, says this great mythologist, are naturally inclined to contemplation. They reject labor, the monotony of which offends their delicacy; they tend to unload it on *inferior souls*, for whom thought has less attraction, and whose morality requires sustained bodily occupation.

What does that mean?

Of all contemplatives, the most intrepid are those whose intelligence is most empty, and who think the least. Orientals and savages spend days, weeks, legs crossed, smoking their pipes, without uttering a word. With them, the inertia of the soul and that of the body are in reciprocal ratio: should I consider them *superior souls*?

The truth is that man, by the spontaneity of his ego, tends to distinguish himself, like Descartes, into body and soul, to abstract himself, as much as he can, from the first and from its requirements; to concentrate in thought; to create everything through it, like Fichte's self; to live, in a word, the life of the Divinity. The more he slides down this slope, the more it seems to him that his soul grows, that he adds to his dignity, that he



soars over the world and over his fellows. In this respect, the savage knows as much as the theologian and the ascetic, whose dogma and all whose metaphysics he can boast of constantly recreating by his reverie. In this state, labor, reduced to pure objectivity, becomes for idealist thought an enigma of Providence, a satanic utopia, of which slavery, serfdom or wage labor is the faithful translation.

If the God who had once made his word heard by Moses, who had previously made himself known to Abraham, who had taught Noah after saving him from the flood, had been moved with true devotion for our species, he had a beautiful opportunity to do it a favor by explaining the myth of labor to it. It would have been better for the edification of humanity than the abrasion of the foreskin and the prohibition of pork. — “Be attentive to the parable,” he would have said to Noah; “don’t lose yourself in quintessential abstractions, and take the age of happiness and the age of labor for two consecutive periods of history. This is just a correlation. Well-being and labor are twins: you will have no slaves among you; everyone will have his share, and pleasure will chase away pain.”

Instead of this simple advice, the over-prompt Jehovah takes his own parable at face value. He allows the curse carried by Noah against his son Ham to subsist; among the riches with which he showers Abraham, he does not forget the slaves, male and female; and on Sinai, his chief care is to consecrate servitude by regulating it. Trust then to the revelations, and take the gods for directors of your consciences!

### XIII. — What is the slave?

M. de Bonald, starting, like M. Jean Reynaud, from Cartesian dualism, defines man as *an intelligence SERVED by organs*.

Now, it should be noted that the notion of the slave, according to the etymology, amounts exactly to this definition: *Ser-vus, serv-are, serv-ire, ser-ere* (French *serrer*) *inser-ere, ser-a*; Greek *θεραπων, θυρα, θυρω*, etc. *Servus* is therefore the caretaker, guardian, porter, assistant, manual laborer, in charge of *tightening*, caring for, preserving everything in the house, in the garden, in the stable, to do the *service* of the fields, the herds, the harem. It is he who, not thinking for himself, serves as an instrument, an additional organ and, so to speak, as a second body to another man, who reserves for himself the command as master or thinking and superior soul.

Some, following the example of Saint Augustine, make *servus* come from *servatus*, by a contraction. They allege that prisoners of war were *reserved* for work. The fact is true; but it would only follow that it is *servatus* that comes from *servus*: *servus*, slave; *servatus*, made a slave. Who does not see in fact that the idea of service existed first, and that of

applying it to the prisoner of war only came later? But these two words do not have between them the relation that is assigned to them, although their radical is the same. The deduction is the one that I have indicated: *ser-o*, to tighten, to keep; *serv-us*, the watchman; *serv-ire*, neuter verb, to be *serv*, that is to be of service or on duty; *servs-are*, active verb, to make serv, that is to destine to service, to usage, to preserve, etc. Between these two verbs there is the same relation and the same difference as between *jac-eo*, neuter, I am *jac*, that is to say, extended, lying, thrown; and *jac-io*, active, I make *jac*, that is to say, I launch, I throw.

So many SOULS, plus so many *slaves*, says the Pentateuch, in the enumerations it makes of the people after the exodus from Egypt. It is impossible to better express the spiritualistic thought that produced slavery.

“Why,” asks Saint Augustine, “does God command man, the soul the body, reason passion and the other lower parts of the soul? Does not this example clearly show that, as it is useful for some men to serve others, so it is useful for all men to serve God?” (*De la Cité de Dieu*, bk. xix, chap. 21.)

God, Saint Augustine could have said, following the example of M. de Bonald, is the sovereign intelligence served by the Universe and by Humanity; and it is by the example of this subordination between him and his creatures that one part of the human race, predestined to command, had to be served by the other, predestined to labor.

Saint Thomas, Bossuet, the entire Church, agree wholeheartedly.

Minister Jurieu had dared to say:

“There is no relationship in the world that is not founded on an express or tacit mutual pact, except slavery as it was among the pagans, which gave a master power of life and death over his slave, without any knowledge of the cause. This right was false, tyrannical, purely usurped and contrary to all the rights of nature.”

Bossuet replies (5<sup>th</sup> Notice):

“However specious this discourse may be in general, if we take a close look at it, we find there as much ignorance as there are words. If the Minister had given it some thought, he would have thought that the origin of servitude comes from the laws of a just war, where the victor having all rights over the vanquished, to the point of being able to take his life, he preserves it, which even, as we know, gave rise to the word served, etc.”

Bossuet’s argument is not what it should be, because of the restricted sense that he gives to the word *servus*, which he makes synonymous with *servatus*, following the example of Saint Augustine, and which literally means man of drudgery, laborer, etc. Servitude consists in *laboring gratuitously for others*, which takes place whenever the wages are less than the product. In antiquity, work was imposed by a master; today, it is

imposed only by poverty: that is the whole difference. Accordingly, Bossuet should have said to Jurieu: Your theory tends to nothing less than to suppress the distinction of ranks and fortunes, to shake up all powers, to create equality and anarchy, to render religion useless: all things that you, like the Church, reject energetically.

Aristotle understood servitude better than Bossuet when he said:

“When one is inferior to his fellows as much as the body is to the soul, the brute to the man — and this is the condition of all those in whom the use of bodily forces is the best advantage to hope for for their being — one is a slave by nature.”

This is the pure Christian doctrine, the *pneumatism* of Saint Paul, of the Gnostics, of M. Jean Reynaud: to which the so-called law of war only adds its odious practice, by assimilating the prisoner of war to the slave.

XIV. — Whoever wants the end wants the means.

Slave hunting is still practiced in much of Africa, America and Oceania.

Is this violating justice? No, says the spiritualist, it is fulfilling the order of Providence, which wants the blacks, the yellows, the reds, and all the inferior races unable to devote themselves to meditation, to labor for the white race.

We make ourselves masters of the savage, as of other animals, by force, by skill, by the traps which its instinct sets for it; it is tamed by a system of good and bad treatment, by the obsolescence of liberty, by continuous labor, by the attraction of a woman, by the prohibition of all liberal exercise and of all thought. Even castration has been employed on man, as on horses and oxen, with success. It is perhaps not so much marital jealousy that suggested this barbarism of the privileged castes, as the needs of domestication. A consequence of servitude was first to exclude the slave from common law, which meant from religion. To receive him into the communion of penates and sacrifices, to raise him to the contemplative life, to remake him a soul, by giving him the sacrament of Justice, would have been to emancipate him; it was to put on the same rank the superior souls and the inferior souls, the spiritual and the carnal, to return to the general confusion of souls and bodies: an impossible thing. Spiritualism does not backslide.

“I asked what sort of moral and religious instruction the negroes in the colony received, and I learned that this instruction was nonexistent. — They are baptized, I was told; they are married if they wish. When they die, we sometimes look for the priest to confess them; but he lives rather far away, and we don't like to disturb him... But neither catechism nor sermon for the blacks; there is no way for the notion of good and evil to reach their intelligence: they are excluded

from any moral idea.” (J.-J. Ampère, “Promenade en Amérique,” article in the *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, July 15, 1853.)

Thus paganism used them, thus Christianity uses them: all religions are alike. A law of the Revolution says that any slave who sets foot on the territory of the republic is, by the fact, free. In the Church, on the contrary, the priest baptizes the slave, marries the slave, gives extreme unction to the slave; and neither baptism, nor marriage, nor extreme unction frees the slave. The sacrament has nothing in common with liberty. It is a mark that the priest impresses on the body of the Christian, like that which the stockbreeders make on the back of their sheep; a sign of ecclesiastical property, not of the equality and liberty of persons.

However, the exclusion of morality would soon appear, by its absurdity and its consequences, to be a dangerous practice. Whatever we do, the man always finds himself in the slave. To deny him all dignity, all morality, is to want to make him the most abominable of beasts; and as the conscience in him revolts, to deny him any kind of right is to push him to revenge. In the interest of servile exploitation, and for the security of the masters, it was therefore necessary to devise a means of making the cult serve the consolidation of servitude: this is what religion lent itself to with a wonderful complacency and ease. A little piety, a little education, a little morality, all arranged in such a way that the slave will be more submissive, more gentle, more industrious and less demanding: what a problem! The Jesuit conspiracy was not born yesterday. So there were gods and sacrifices for the slaves, saturnalia to remind them of the equality of the golden age; there was even, which passes all insolence, a right of the slave: as if patronage and mastery were something other than a temporary concession to general imbecility; as if the right of the slave were not, if necessary, to kill his owner and leave!

## CHAPTER III.

Right of the man of labor or of the slave, according to Moses. — Law of egoism.

XV. — Last year the Archbishop of Paris, Mgr. SIBOUR, proposed the following subject for competition:

*That the sincere and intelligent practice of the Gospel maxims satisfies at the same time all the instincts of the human heart and the great laws of social conservation;*

*That the Christian precept of CHARITY fulfills the providential purpose of the unequal distribution among men of the gifts of intelligence and fortune.*

I do not know if the prize, which was 1,500 francs, was awarded, or if the competition was postponed to the following year. Be that as it may, what was Bishop Sibour asking for?

He proposed to demonstrate, by a thorough examination of human nature and the constitution of society, that, the unequal distribution of the gifts of intelligence and fortune being the effect of a providential will, if not of the very fatality of things, there was no reason to protest against this fatality or Providence in the name of any law of Justice; that all that Humanity demanded was that the privileged should soften, by voluntary beneficence, the rigor of the decree, and that the precept of Christian charity fully satisfied it.

So, this is what is clear; Bishop Sibour, in agreement with spiritualist philosophy, ancient and modern, denies the possibility of a juridical solution of the problem of equality: he affirms, as I have said, the inferiority of labor, the eternity, the necessity, the providentiality of misery. — What do you say, he says, socialists and malthusians, about economic science, the abolition of pauperism, the problem of credit, the balance of wages, equality of functions, the fusion of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and of a hundred other chimeras that have disturbed society for a quarter of a century, and which the Revolution has spewed upon the world? Don't you know, blind men, that divine Goodness has left you nothing to do; that it refuted you in advance, eighteen hundred years ago. You talk about science, like Pilate asking Jesus: *What is truth?* without even deigning to listen. But the science is in front of you; it has revealed itself to the world and your darkness did not understand it. There is no other science than that which is manifested in the Gospel: *Et verbum caro factum est.*

Well! Monsignor, I maintain precisely that the Gospel is itself the proof that there is still something else to expect than the Gospel; I

maintain, I say, that the precept of charity has the necessary consequence of producing the precept of Justice, and I will prove it, first by the series of ideas, then by your whole tradition.

After the inorganic and legendary period, of which I spoke in the preceding chapter, a first legislation was given to consecrate slavery, the distinction of castes: this was the *law of egoism*, of which Moses will presently provide us with an example.

The *law of love*, expressed by the Gospel, came next, antithesis of the law of egoism, and supposing a third term, a synthesis, which can only be the LAW OF JUSTICE.

The extremes first, incomplete, fruitless; the synthesis in the last place, alone rational and moral: such is the invariable march of the human mind. Would revelation have changed this order? Does reason in God proceed by laws other than ours? Your spiritualism does not go that far: Since Providence wanted Justice to arise in Humanity in three stages, two movements: first movement, passage from the law of egoism to the law of love; second movement, passage from the law of love to the law of equality, we have nothing better to do than to examine one after the other these two terms, Egoism, Charity, whose synthesis, announced by the Revolution, will be Justice.

Ah! Monsignor, it is cruel to be betrayed by one's own; yet we are consoled. Man is subject to passion, fragile friendship; after all, the defection of a brother, of a child, of a wife, with whatever affliction it saddens the heart, contains nothing that astonishes the philosopher. But to be betrayed by one's own thought, by one's religion, by one's faith, is what is intolerable; and if I were one such as you, do you know what I would do presently? I would take for myself the advice Job's wife gave him about his wretched condition: *Benedic Deo, et morere!* I would curse my God, and then I would await death, like the philosopher, without either desiring or fearing it.

XVI. — Mosaicism, which neo-Christian democracy would like to pass off as a model of liberal legislation, seldom psychologizes; it even leans, but only in expression, towards materialism. For the Hebrew, Jehovah is a fire that shines in the bush and devours the ungodly. It is hardly a question of soul and spirit; *rouach* is the breath; *nepesch*, which corresponds to *anima*, ψυχή, is sometimes taken for corpse.

But what language is powerless to express, the legislator has put into things: spiritualism, which founds the caste, is just as energetic in Moses as in the Brachmanes. It is Brahma, say the sacred books of India, who created from his head the priestly caste; from his bosom, the noble caste; from his arms and thighs, the laborers and the merchants; the dust of his feet produced the pariahs. The equivalent of this genealogy is found in the

Pentateuch: the priesthood is consecrated especially to Jehovah, for the service of worship; the nobility owns the lands, governs and judges; the people and the slaves labor and beg. Where did Mr. Ott see that “it is in the institutions of Moses that the protest against the caste system manifests itself with the greatest brilliance”?

What I say about it, moreover, is not by way of reproach. Moses did very much what his time and race required; it would be perfectly ridiculous to blame him for it. All I want is to show, by his example, how from the idea of spiritualism arises the subalternization of labor, and to catch, so to speak, religion in the act.

Of all the laws of Moses, the first, according to the time of their promulgation and the importance of their object, seem to have been those that concern the servile class; and among these laws the most considerable was the weekly unemployment, a kind of truce, during which the operations of labor remained generally suspended...

By the way, wasn't it at your request, Monsignor, that in 1852 the Court of Cassation, reversing a judgment of the Court of Besançon, which was however rather devout, declared that a law of 1814 concerning the observance of Sunday, fallen into disuse for more than a quarter of a century, was not repealed? Well! Your Sunday is just one monument of the renewed servitude of the Jews; and when, to compel us to practice, you invoke the health and rights of the worker, you are in reality only consecrating the privilege of the master and the inferiority of the hireling.

I have formerly, in a discourse made public, dealt with this question of Sunday. I hoped to be able, with the approval of an academy, to turn to the direction of Justice this institution of slavery, which in time and under the influence of the clergy had become a ceremony of pure religion. The Church, which reigns at the Academy as everywhere, showed me that I was mistaken. She called me back to the text, and if today I seem to be going back on my proposals, it is not you, at least, who will deny the perfect accuracy of my new commentary. Eighteen years ago, I proposed to democratize Sunday: you dismissed my idea as chimerical and contrary to the true meaning of the Bible. So don't find it bad that I show at this hour what the Bible says, and where you claim to bring us back with it.

XVII. — To fully understand the Law of Rest and all that concerns the religious organization of slavery, it is necessary to refer to the legislation of the desert, such as it results from chapters XX, XXI and XXII of Exodus, and from the interpretation provided by Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy.

The author of the law, JEHOVAH, after a declaration of principles that has become famous under the name of the Decalogue, and of which the *Sabbath* forms the third article, deals first and at some length with the

rights of slaves, both foreign and Hebrew; then successively, and with a method that has not been sufficiently noticed, with free persons, properties, marriage, the police, justice, and finally the relations of the nation with its neighbors.

One wonders how, speaking to a proud race, whose nationality it was above all a question of establishing in the midst of thirty pell-mell tribes, Moses begins, as if it were for him the capital point, by regulating the right of the lowest class of the people, servants for life or for a time, colonists, hirelings, slaves. The Bible has only one word for all these nuances, *èbed*, laborer, man who works for his food, in Latin *servus*. Where does this singular attention come from in the legislator?

Permit me, Monsignor, to enter here into some detail: the fact is worth the trouble, and the traditions of the Church, its spirit, its monuments, are so little known themselves, that you will be grateful to me for this dissertation, which, moreover, will not be long.

XVIII. — Like all the inhabitants of the desert, the Israelites, *Beni-Israel*, formed an aristocratic society similar in every way to that described so well by General Daumas, in his interesting work on the *Mœurs et coutumes de l'Algérie*. His story can serve as a commentary on the book of Numbers, where, in the form of a census, the social constitution of the Hebrews is faithfully described.

Moreover, when I assimilate the state of the Israelites in the desert to that of the Arabs, I do not mean to say that they were themselves of Arab blood or, if you prefer, of Semitic stock: in this regard, I make my reservations. The starting point of the Abrahamid colony; its avowed purpose, an essentially agricultural and sedentary purpose; the promptness with which this object was attained under Joshua; the mixture of local religions in Israel, a mixture that shows the foreignness of the tribe, and the weakness or forgetfulness of its own beliefs; the frequent infidelities to Jehovah, the native god, not of the race nor of the country of Abraham; the belated rallying of the nation to monotheism, I mean to the exclusive worship of Jehovah, following the example of the Persians, exclusive worshipers of Ormuzd; the renunciation of images that followed; its distaste for nomadic anarchy and its tendency to the monarchical constitution; the resemblance of the Jewish type and the Persian type; the color, frequently blond of the hair, the pink of the skin: all these features and others seem to me to denote an Indo-Germanic origin. Transported from the southern valleys of the Caucasus into Canaan, having inhabited in turn the mount of Ephraim, the Sinai peninsula, and the land of Gessen, the race of Abraham took on the language, and for a time the manners of their new country; this can be seen in the name *Hebrewo* (stranger) alone, given to it by the Canaanites. But it could never get used



to the customs and religion of the desert; in spite of its *fornications*, it was also never quite subjugated by Syrian mores; the blood of Japheth, which flowed in the veins of the Jew, reacted against the infamy and the horrors of the cult of Baal, of Moloch, of Astarte, and it was without the slightest difficulty that after the return from Babylon Jehovism, long neglected, now saturated with Arian ideas, one might say national ideas, became once and for all the faith, the unique faith of Israel.

Whatever may be the origin of the nation, it is evident that its first legislator Moses (was he Egyptian or Arab? no one knows; certainly he was not of the blood of Abraham) did not dream of giving it any ideas other than those of the desert. It is the Arab constitution that Moses applies to the children of Israel: his political horizon does not go beyond that.

The element of this society is the tent, *ohel* (Vulgate, *tentorium*), as we would say the fire. It is the dwelling of the individual Israelite, with his wife or wives, his children, his slaves, etc.

Above the tent comes the house or family, Hebrew *beth ab*, that is to say father's house (Vulgate, *domus, familia*), corresponding to the Algerian *douar*.

"Any head of a family," says General Daumas, owner of land, who gathers around his tent those of his children, of his close relatives or allies, of his farmers, etc., thus forms a *douar*, a round of tents, of which he is the representative and the natural chief, *sheikh*, and which bears his name."

If we go up another degree, we find, still according to the book of Numbers, the kinship (Hebrew, *mischphachah*; Vulgate, *cognatio*), whose composition is as follows:

"Different douars put together, says the author of the *Mœurs algériennes*, form a center of population which receives the name of *farka*. This meeting takes place mainly when the heads of douars recognize a relationship among them; it often takes a proper name, under which all the individuals who compose it are designated."

Finally, above the kinship, or *farka*, exists the tribe (Hebrew, *matteh*, rod or scepter; Vulgate, *tribes*), which is formed of several kinships, as the kinship itself is formed of several families.

The reunion of tribes, relatives, families, with their slaves, valets, farmers, clients; the jugglers, fortune-tellers, butchers, barbers, priests, doctors, the whole body of the *Levites* finally, who did not form, properly speaking, a tribe, but were scattered in the mass, constituted the body of the nation or the people (Hebrew, *àm*). The gender of this word, which is feminine, explains the allegory, so frequent in the Bible, of the marriage contract between the god Jehovah and the *àm* of Israel, who became so early and so many times adulterous. Tacitus and Josephus follow the same

idea, common moreover to all the ancient peoples, when, among the prodigies that preceded the fall of Jerusalem, they relate that a human voice, stronger than nature, was heard in the sanctuary saying: LET US GO OUT; *audita major humanâ vox*, EXCEDERE DEOS. It was the divorce between God and the city that was taking place.

Considered as a religious society formed under the invocation of a special divinity, the people, *àm*, took the name of *àdah* (Vulgate, *congregatio*): it was the synagogue of the Septuagint, which became the *ecclesia*, the assembly, or better *vocation*, that is to say the reunion of the called, *vocati*, later the Christians. Every new society, among the ancients, supposing a new god, we can say that the god and his *Company*, *àdah*, were born at the same time as each other: this is what this verse expresses, of which the clergy makes such a strange application to its small congregations: *Memor esto, Domine, congregationis tuae, quam possedisti ab initio*; Remember, Jehovah, your Company, which you have possessed from the beginning. Isn't that what we said in reporting the words of Saint Augustine, that God is intelligence, and the society that worships him is the body that serves as his organ? Now, as Jehovah was the soul of the Hebrew body, so it was a soul for the herd of serfs who followed it: this is what we are going to see at this very moment.

When the *Beni-Israel*, driven by Moses, left Egypt, marching in order of battle, that is to say by tribes, kindreds and families, they drew with them an immense and mixed multitude, *ééreb rab* (Vulgate, *vulgus promiscuum and innumerabile*); ignoble plebs, vile multitude, composed of all who were of foreign blood or who, although of Israelite race, possessing neither wealth nor dignity, had fallen back into the servile condition.

Naturally, it was not with this tiny mass of commoners that Jehovah, *Don Jehovah*, as the Bible says, formed an alliance: at all times the Church was the great lady, and her god, her husband, the high and powerful lord. However, to engage this multitude, whose service, especially in the desert, was indispensable to the subsistence of the tribes, it was necessary to promise them some advantages, to create guarantees and rights for them, since, according to the mores of the time, which are still those of the modern Arabs, they could not share in the promised territory.

From this need arises a series of ordinances that testify at the same time, to the state of legal inferiority of these commoners and to the particular advantages that they enjoyed, compared to what passed among other nations. In principle, among the ancients, everyone was free, that is to say proprietor and noble, or a slave: there was no middle ground. Anyone who could not justify his nobility by his property was, *ipso facto*, deemed a slave; poverty was the sign of servitude. The legislation of the desert created, in favor of the Israelite masses, a middle condition, as it results from the following provisions:

XIX. — *Exod.*, xx , 2-4, and *Deut.*, xv , 12. — The Hebrew slave is free of right after six years of service. Anything he earns will belong to him and his wife, unless she was given to him by the master, in which case she remains the property of the master. If, at the expiration of the sixth year, the slave asks to continue his service, he will be dedicated to the domestic gods, *offeret eum diis*; his master will pierce his ear, and he will serve all his life.

*Exod.*, xx , 20, 21. — It is forbidden to mistreat the Hebrew slave: if he dies under the blows, the master will be punished; but if the beaten survives a day or two, the master will not be subject to any penalty: *it is his money*.

*Exod.*, xx , 16, and *Deut.*, xxiv , 7. — Prohibition, under pain of death, for a Hebrew nobleman to carry off a plebeian and sell him; slave hunting is authorized only in the case of foreigners: for, says the law (*Levit.*, xxv , 42-45), in principle, the Israelite of inferior condition is a slave only of Jehovah: he cannot be sold by a man. — The story of Joseph, *sold by his brothers*, is a famous example of the fact that the slave law came to repeal.

The poor Israelite therefore has guarantees against irons; the allophyl has none. The jehovic congregation is a degree less ferocious than that of the negroes of the Sudan.

According to the same principle it is commanded (*Deut.*, xv , 13; xxiv , 14; *Levit.*, xix , 13) to pay the wages of servants, laborers and Hebrew slaves; the noble does not have the right to retain their wages, which is no longer the case with regard to the other slaves, who do not belong to themselves. The prophets are full of allusions to this law, which under the monarchy was broken with impunity by the rich and the landlords, who, says Jehovah, devour my plebs like a mouthful of bread, *qui devorunt plebem meam sicut eseam panis*.

*Exod.*, xx , 7-11. — Every father of a poor family has the right to sell his daughter to a Hebrew as a slave; and the purchaser enjoys, with regard to the young girl thus sold, the *droit du seigneur*. Only he is obliged to keep her, to provide for her needs, to render her duty, even when he takes a wife; otherwise, she will regain her freedom *gratis*.

*Exod.*, xxii 16. — If a girl (of the plebs) is abducted by an individual (noble), and he sleeps with her, he will constitute a dowry for her and keep her as his wife. With respect to noble girls, seduction was punishable by death.

Thus, the misalliance imposed as a punishment on the Israelite of free blood, who, being able, for a price, to legitimately take a plebeian woman for concubine, violates her: this is the guarantee given by Moses to the honor of poor girls!

How did the Church, in the Middle Ages, not remember this law?

*Levit.*, xix, 20. — It is forbidden for any individual to sleep with a

servant who is not his: the offender will be punished with caning, not for the affront made to the young girl, but for the attack made on the right of the owner.

To these privileges, already considerable, in favor of the Hebrew plebs or servile class, the legislator adds others, no less precious, if they do not remain a dead letter.

The ordinary slave could not sue his master; but it was otherwise with the Hebrew serf: for this one, the judge must receive the complaint, make no *respect of persons*, and treat the parties according to equality (*Exod.* xxiii , 3).

The plebs having neither patrimony nor income, Jehovah recommends to the rich, owners of the soil by privilege, to lend to the poor in his need, and without interest (*Exod.*, xxii , 25; *Deut.*, xv , 7-10; xxiii, 19, 20). Such is the meaning of this famous precept: Thou shalt not lend at interest to thy neighbor, but to the stranger, *Non foeneraberis proximo tuo, sed alieno*, which has made the doctors spout so much nonsense. It is a compensation for the territorial privilege granted to the nobles, which must be put on the same line as the recommendation to give largesse (*Levit.*, xix , 20) in connection with gleaning and gathering.

The crowning achievement of this system, which did not fail to bring about an important modification in Oriental manners, is the rest on the seventh day and of the seventh year (*Exod.*, xx and xxxi , and *Deut.*, v).

In order to ensure a rest for the workers, Moses establishes on each seventh day and each seventh year a kind of *taboo*. He consecrates it. "Remember," says Jehovah, "to keep the day of rest holy. On that day you shall do no work, neither you, nor your son, nor your daughter, nor your manservant, nor your maidservant, nor your cattle, nor the stranger who lives with you." And so there should be no doubt as to the motive of the law, he is careful to recall that they too, the nobles, to whom Jehovah particularly addresses himself, bore the Egyptian yoke, and that it was as a result of this bondage that Jehovah, their deliverer, instituted the Sabbath; *Idcirco precepit tibi ut observares diem sabbati*.

The same causes lead everywhere to the same effects. We see from a passage in Virgil's Georgics that in ancient Italy there were also days devoted to unemployment; the poet goes so far as to observe that devotion should not, however, prevent one from attending to work of public necessity:

*Quippe etiam festis quædam exercere diebus  
Fas et jura sinunt ; rivos deducere nulla  
Relligio vetuit, segeti prætereundere sæpem,  
Insidias avibus moliri, incendere vepres,  
Balantùmque gregem fluvio mersare salubri.  
Sæpe oleo tardi costas agitator aselli*

*Vilibus aut onerat pomis, lapidemque revertens  
Incusum aut atræ massam picis urbe reportat.*

(*Georg.*, lib. I, v. 268-275.)

Everyone knows that in Russia the *corvée* still exists, but it has been mitigated by an intercalation of holidays which, with Sundays, make a total of eighty days of unemployment per year, that is to say approximately seven Sundays a month, or, if you prefer, one Sunday, one Sabbath, every four days. Such is the right of the serf on both sides of the Urals. The imperial administration never deviates from this rule; it takes great care to indicate the non-working days in its calendar, a sort of *bonus* for the exploited. (LE PLAY, *Les Ouvriers Européens*.)

Here, Monsignor, allow me to interrupt the discussion for a personal matter.

XIX. — I read in my biography:

“The book of *The Celebration of Sunday*, sent by Pierre-Joseph to the Franche-Comté academicians, was received by them quite coldly. From beneath the lamb’s fleece (gospel style!) was already piercing the wolf’s ear. Proudhon, while concluding on the rest of the seventh day, as hygiene and as *duty* (this word is inexact), declared that equality of conditions alone could decide peoples to the exact observance of the divine law. Without preaching riot, he invoked the republic, and this book was quite simply the preface to the famous memoir: *What is Property?*”

The fact is that the recorder of the Academy, Father Doney, now Bishop of Montauban, in a long reasoned report, maintained that I had attributed to Moses views that had not been his, and that consequently the Academy could not, in crowning my work, accept responsibility for an interpretation that tended to nothing less than to distort the tradition of the Church and the spirit of such a respectable institution.

To this observation of the reporter I answered: That it was much less a question today of the intentions of Moses than of the needs of our time; that the Academy, in putting to competition the question of the observance of *Sunday*, under the quadruple aspect of *public hygiene, morality, family* and *civic* relations, had had in view to know, no longer the Judaic, narrow sense of the Sabbath, but the practical universality of Sunday.

This is what made me say in my preface:

“Sunday, the Christian Sabbath, respect for which seems to have diminished, will revive in its splendor when the guarantee of labor has been won, with the well-being that is its price. The working classes will be too interested in the maintenance of the institution for it ever to perish. So all will celebrate the feast, although not one goes to mass; and the people will understand, by this example, how it can be that a religion is false, and the content of this religion true, etc.”

This is what I said, and what the Church, represented by M. The Abbot Doney, as it is today by Messieurs Mathieu and Sibour, refused to hear. What, at base, was the disagreement about? It is that the Revolution, which I evoked under the name of Moses and in connection with the law of egoism, tends to Justice; while the Church, attached to the sacrament and to the letter, remains in the law of love, in charity.

Could I therefore, logically, treat the question from another point of view than the one I had adopted, and stick to the letter of the Pentateuch? The beautiful lesson to be offered to the contemporary bourgeoisie is to tell it, according to Moses: That it is not permitted for him to knock out the worker, nor to sell him as a slave; that every bourgeois has the *droit de seigneur* over his maid, and even over every daughter of the people, provided he pays; that the Sunday rest, having been established out of charity, and as an alleviation of servitude, is obligatory for the employer only in relation to his workmen; that property has as a compensatory condition gleaning in the fields, raking in the meadows, grazing in the vineyards, the loan of money without interest, etc., etc.

It was then that the Academy would have protested against the impertinence of my texts, and that instead of granting me, as a matter of esteem, the bronze medal, it would have denounced me, as it did later, to the indignation of honest people.

Let us leave the Besançon Academy and my discourse, and come back to the question.

XXI. — Oh! The question is very simple: it is reduced to saying that after the period of cannibalism, the first glimmers of morality having put an end to the massacre of people and the eating of corpses, experience having also revealed the portion that one could draw from the earth by labor, the strongest applied the weakest to it, and that religion consecrated this first servitude, by giving, at the same time, to the master guarantees against the slave, to the slave guarantees against the master. Such was the law of egoism, by which man, making another man his servant, his organ, attributed to himself by divine and human authority all that this man was capable of producing, leaving to him, as to a beast of burden, only what was essential to subsist.

In the religion instituted by Moses, where the unity of God was a dogma, there does not appear to have been a particular divinity for the slaves: it was always Jehovah, but under another name, *Shaddai*.

Schaddai, that is to say the Breaker of Clods, is the Hebrew Siva, the ancient god of the Israelites, under whose power they had lived in Egypt. So when Jehovah sends Moses to deliver his people, he says to them: Hitherto they have known only Schaddai, the clod-breaker, that is, bondage; now they will know Jehovah, which meant wealth and liberty.

Throughout the Bible, Schaddai is the god of misfortune, the one who afflicts men, like slaves tied to the soil. It is only a question of him in Job, the Weeper, innocent victim of Schaddai. We must see, in Deuteronomy, chap. 32, with what contempt Jehovah treats the gods of the nations: he calls them *Shedim*, plural of Schaddai, that is to say gods of slaves, *clod-breakers*, *dying of hunger*, *bause-terre*, *bousse-bots*, as we say in our Besançon patois to designate those who spend their lives digging the earth, living in company with toads, such as winegrowers (*bausser*, *rebausser*, to stir, to labor with the snout; *bousser*, to push, to chase; *bot*, toad); *nothings at all*. We find here the eternal anthropomorphism: the slave makes his god in his image, like the nobleman, the merchant, the financier, the woman in love, the poet, the doctor.

The same hierarchy of gods remained in Rome: there were the gods of the nobility, *dii magnarum gentium*, and the gods of the plebs, *dii minorum gentium*. When the same gods, the same sacraments, were used by everyone, when religion became common, then there was confusion in the state, and so it was with society. Curious result: spiritualism falling into the public domain, civilization had to be remade!

We are going to see how this reconstitution took place, how the law of egoism came to an end and was replaced by another less severe one, which, without realizing Justice, still in the state of utopia, nevertheless served as its route.

## CHAPTER IV.

**Right of the serf or wage earner, according to the Church: law of love.**

XXII. — We still dispute today the question of whether the abolition of slavery is truly due to Christianity. M. Moreau-Christophe, M. Wallon and others protest against this sentiment.

I admit, after a last and careful examination, that this discussion seems to me a pure quibble. No doubt, if we were to judge Christianity only by its authors and to take the Church by its writings, there would be reason to conceive some suspicion. But, short of denying the evidence and distorting history, one cannot limit the meaning of the Christian movement to the terms of the ecclesiastical writers; I would say more, in the circumstances in which the evangelical reform was posed, and with it the question of slavery, there is reason to be surprised that the Church knew how to evade the perilous responsibility that this question placed on her, rather than to wonder who is its author.

The causes that from the first to the sixth century of our era determined the abolition of slavery, causes that were associated with the messianic idea and formed in the long run one single unity with Christianity, were:

1. The reaction of the vanquished nations, served up to the Roman plebs and the servants of the Caesars;
2. The imperial unity, which on the ruins of the old patrician constitution imperceptibly brought about the fusion of cults, conditions and castes;
3. The progressive admission of the provinces to citizenship, imposed with increasing necessity by the lack of men and the pressure of events;
4. The profits that the owners of slaves had found, in the end, in their liberation. — They know as well as the modern economists that the slave is a chancy property, difficult to exploit, and that the best advantage to be derived from him is to make him, in some way, a farmer himself. From the time of Augustus, this practice had multiplied to the point that he thought it necessary to hold back the torrent of emancipations;
5. The invasion of the Barbarians.

In all this, I agree, there does not seem to be a shadow of mysticism. But, as we have already observed, such a revolution could not be accomplished without assuming a religious form, and this religious form was Christianity.

Yes, and this is why the authors whom I am fighting are right. Before the messianic propaganda was begun, the extinction of the homelands or nationalities, and their absorption into a great and common homeland



which was the empire, had given rise in minds to the superior idea of HUMANITY. Horace, son of a freedman; Virgil, son of a colonist from Transpadane Gaul; Terence, former slave, originally from Carthage; Seneca, a Spaniard, so well placed to follow the progress of the idea; Epictetus, long a slave, like Terence; the whole legion of philosophers who filled Rome, Italy and Greece celebrated universal fraternity, while Christianity had hardly begun to stammer out its myths. (Consult on this whole matter of slavery, labor and charity among the pagans, the Jews and the Christians, the scholarly work of M. Moreau-Christophe, *Du problème de la misère*, 3 vol. in-8 o, Paris, Guillaumin). And certainly, the little that the Gospels and the Fathers of the primitive Church contain on the subject of slavery is found, with more breadth of philosophy, with a deeper feeling of Justice, in the letters of Seneca, for example.

But, and it is here that I separate myself from the critical scholars, if we consider that these lofty thoughts, descending into the heart of the masses, were to be transfigured there, we will recognize that it is much less in the letter of the Scriptures that the solution of the problem must be sought than in the dogmas.

What, after all, is this messianic agitation, which, born in the depths of the East, spreads like a storm over Egypt, Asia Minor, Greece, and soon invades the West, if not the revolution of the slaves? In principle, the promoters of the movement are the Caesars; and it is not without reason that the Jew Josephus, and many others following his example, looked on the emperor as the messiah. But precisely because some found the messiah in Caesar, the messiah symbolized the idea: what did the choice of the person matter after that?

What, moreover, ensured to Judaism, and to the sect that detached itself from it, the preponderance in the new order of ideas was its history.

XXIII. — Judaism had been a religion of emancipation. The Jewish books are full of the memory of the bondage of Egypt; everything in the institutions speaks of it, everything recalls it. The bondage of Babylon had left an even deeper impression; and now, after the death of Agrippa, the last of the blood of the Maccabees, Judea, reduced to a Roman province, groaned with the whole world under an oppression that never seemed to end.

There was a day, however, when the world could believe itself free. At the same time, the Jews revolted in Palestine, the Numidians in the Atlas, the Bagaudes in Belgium; Spain is shaken. To make matters worse, three pretenders to the empire rose up at the same time; civil war devours Italy, vast fires consume cities and temples, an earthquake brings down the Capitol.

The frightened peoples believed it was the end of the world: this fright

saved the empire. Traditions were lost. Neither faith nor patriotism; nothing but the sorrow of servitude: it was too little for liberty. Everywhere the bourgeois expected his safety only from the favor of Caesar; left to themselves, the plebs remained powerless. The insurrection, promptly repressed in Gaul and Africa, was finally crushed in the terrible Judean war. And those who for a moment had believed in the end of the empire, who had perhaps desired it, had to resign themselves to expecting a respite only from the empire itself.

Thrice tamed, under the Pharaohs, the Nebuchadnezzars and the Caesars, the Jews seemed the living myth of servitude. Their story, from one end to the other, became an allegory, a type. The allusion was eagerly grasped, dug up, developed: the messianic idea, which, moreover, met with analogs everywhere, served as a watchword. The most respectable and the most unfortunate of all these representatives of the messianic idea, whom Roman policy had sent one after another to execution, one named Jesus — a new Moses, new Joshua, new David, new Zerubbabel, new Maccabee — was declared Savior, perhaps because less than any other he had shown himself hostile to the Romans. He never spoke of emancipating the slaves or freeing his country; and never, however, was the innovator so well understood instinctively, surrounded by such popularity. With him dead, his disciples, faithful to the order, escape the persecution of the zealots; the hatred of the Jews saves them from the animadversion of the Romans, and Christianity is founded on the ruins of Jerusalem, in the blood and fat of one million three hundred and forty thousand Jews of every age and sex, last burnt offering to Jehovah.

XXIV. — The role of the Christians, during the war of Titus and that of Adrian, was not the most heroic. One word excuses them: liberty could no longer be claimed by arms; the fight had to be delivered to the institutions. When the war of nationality, combined with the civil war, brought only disaster, who could dream of a slave insurrection?

The apostles were careful, by untimely proclamations, not to draw upon them the wrath of the emperors: they recommended patience, dissimulated their hopes, disguised their principles, affected a rigorous submission to the established order and, being unable to attack reform head on, in the interests, enveloped themselves in the veils of religion. Religion, in the mores of the time, was the most to obtain the least. What an appearance, in fact, to go and argue against the Caesars, and their praetorians, and their plebs, that every man living in the empire should be recognized as a citizen of the empire, which involved the immediate emancipation of all slaves, and that every citizen of the empire was, *pro sua virili*, the sovereign, which implied the re-establishment of the republic? Instead, Christians called themselves all sons of God, brothers of

Christ, equal by grace; and to celebrate this equality they met in fraternal banquets, a saturnalia of each week and of the whole year. Was this not, in fact as in right, to abolish slavery?

“My kingdom is not of this world,” they make their Christ say, thus protesting loudly that the messianism represented by them has ceased to be Caesar’s competitor. Accused by the Jews, Paul exclaims: I appeal to Caesar; which meant: I recognize the Emperor, and I protest against the insurrection. So Caesar — it was Nero, if you don’t mind — did not at first treat the Apostle badly; he authorized him to preach in Rome and everywhere against Jewish messianism, the only thing the Romans dreaded.

In their preaching, the apostles constantly recommend resignation and obedience to the slaves. “Slaves,” said Peter, “be subject to your masters in all fear, not only of the good and the moderate, but even of the wicked.” And as a motive he presents to them the example of Christ, poor, persecuted all his life, and at the end crucified, although innocent. Paul, with his familiar hyperbole, goes even further; he says: “Let each one remain in the condition in which he was called (to the faith). Were you called a slave, don’t worry; even if you could recover liberty, rather keep your servitude.” And the reason for this strange advice? It is, let us note this: “that the Christian is no longer the slave of man; he is the servant only of God!” Besides, it won’t be long: “The crisis is imminent,” said Paul; “The end of all things is near,” replies Pierre. (*Paul*, I *Cor.*, VII, 21-26; *Ephes.*, VI, 58; *Titus*, II, 9; I *Peter*, II, 18; IV, 7.)

The most curious monument in this respect is Paul’s epistle to Philemon. It makes no sense, or it shows, with the utmost evidence, that the abolition of slavery is so fundamental to Christianity that the Apostle is forced to make his excuses, so to speak!

“I implore you,” he said to his friend Philemon, after great praise for his *charity*, his *faith*, his good *works*, his *holiness*; “I implore you for my dear son Onesimus, whom I fathered in irons... Think that, if he left you for a moment, it was to join you in eternity, no longer as a slave, but as a brother... I would have liked to make him a minister of the Gospel; I preferred to send him back to you, for I want nothing without your consent. Forgive him then, if you love me; and if he has wronged you, impute it to me.”

So all ties are broken. In the very passages where the apostles recommend submission, affirm by mouth the duty of servitude, they warn the slaves that they depend only on God, and they postpone deliverance until the *final crisis*, which, they assure, will not be long in coming. The idea is on everyone’s mind; it is there so much that among themselves the Christians find themselves embarrassed by it, that a Saint Paul dares not ask a Saint Philemon for the freedom of a Saint Onesimus, and that the key issue with regard to the pagans is not to compromise.

Later, under Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, Septimius Severus, Decius and Aurelian, the Church persisted in this tortuous tactic, which had always been that of the oppressed. When the proconsuls interrogate the Christians and ask them what they do in their nocturnal assemblies: We pray, they reply, for the salvation of Caesar and the prosperity of the empire, *Domine, salvum fac imperatorem*; which does not prevent them from writing atrocious pamphlets against the emperor and the empire, in the style of the Apocalypse. Never, certainly, were they reproached with inciting the slaves against the masters, harboring them, procuring them means of escape and asylums; they did better: they denied the religion of the state, the basis of the empire and of society; they destroyed in souls the law of egoism, replacing it by that which they themselves called the law of love.

What now was this law? This is what we have to determine.

XXV. — Christ had said: *Love one another*. Beautiful words, from which nothing was, it seems, easier than to deduce this corollary: *Serve one another*. From the reciprocity of love to the reciprocity of service, it was no further than from the principle to the consequence. How was this consequence not drawn?

Oh how! It is because Christ, messenger of love, expiatory victim, did not recognize the Right of man, and that right alone, the respect for human dignity, opposing itself to human servitude, the exploitation of some by others, can overcome the reason of egoism.

“There are only two laws in the world,” says M. Blanc-Saint-Bonnet on this subject: “the law of nature, in which the superior species devour the inferior; and divine law, in which the higher beings succor the weaker ones. Outside of Christianity, man is still a cannibal. If the law of charity is dried up in your hearts, the law of animality will take you back.”

But, you object, it is not a question here of charity or assistance; it is a question of reciprocity. We ask that the salary be regulated in proportion to the product; that the oscillation of value be regulated, limited by the market-price list; that the provision of capital and the discount of trade be organized as a public service, at the lowest possible cost; that sufficient instruction be given to the worker, and that it not be separated from apprenticeship; that the farmer share in the rent and the worker in the profit, etc.

The mystic does not hear you: charity is ringing in his ears; he answers, indiscriminately:

“To adjust wages to needs would be such a beautiful thing that it would hit the mark. Unfortunately the man’s needs exceed by two or three times his salary. (*De la Restauration française*, p. 90 and 112.)

Conclusion: Since need can never be satisfied, since pauperism is the law of nature, there is only one thing left to do, and that is to maintain the working classes in dependence, to remove their interference and property, to restrain concupiscence by discipline and egoism by love.

In matters of reform, it is not usually the notion of the end that is lacking, nor the good intention. It is the means. The Convention was able one day to decree the emancipation of the blacks; as it did not know how to make workers of them, it did not make free men of them either. All the same, the Gospel could well also announce the redemption of the human race, the freedom of the slaves, the equality of all men before God; as it did not know how to convert into a proposition of law what, in his thought, should only be the triumph of charity, as it was even repugnant to evangelical thought that such a conversion should take place, it succeeded no better than the Convention: there was never less equality than among the *brethren in Jesus Christ*.

In principle, baptism had settled the question of slavery as regards the coercion of persons; but it remained to overcome the inevitability of labor, to balance wages, to organize the workshop: a triple problem, which Christian dogma, as well as pagan and Mosaic dogma, presumed insoluble, which inevitably brought back servitude.

The more one delves into the situation, the more one discovers that Christianity, on this formidable question of labor, as on all the others, was condemned to impotence.

Labor, according to ancient dogma, was reputed to be afflictive and infamous: would Christianity try to distribute the burden and the shame? This would have been to admit in man a right prior to the fall, superior to redemption, involving in its application a whole system of relations incompatible with the episcopal discipline and the autocracy of Caesar. It was impossible. "Labor," says M. Saint-Bonnet, "is not only a punishment, it is also a brake." Nor does M. Guizot see it otherwise. However, the brake is used in proportion to the intractability of the animal: the egalitarian division of labor, of the brake, of blows, of punishment, cannot be accepted.

Labor raised the question of property: would Christianity proceed to the division of land? Would it make an agrarian law? That would have been to deny predestination, Providence, the distinction between rich and poor, and finally the original fall. M. Blanc Saint-Bonnet adds another reason: *Property*, that is to say feudal property, large-scale property, *is the reservoir of capital*. Distribute the property, and the source of capital is dried up. Indeed, capital is only formed in two ways: by the savings of the rentier, entrepreneur, proprietor; or by the organization of services, identical and adequate to the organization of exchanges and to the development of labor itself. This second mode of capital formation being

discarded as contrary to the spirit of religion, the first remained, rent, which, through the division of lands, would become nonexistent. Impossible.

Labor presupposed, from the boss to the worker, a relationship of subordination: would Christianity undertake to fuse interests, by equalizing profits and wages? It would have been to overthrow the social hierarchy, to introduce anarchy into the Church: all things since condemned as heretical and atheistic. Impossible.

By its theology, Christianity was forbidden to enter this road. But then what was it for? What did redemption amount to? What did the slave gain on being freed? Was it necessary to make so much noise for a liberty whose sole privilege was to be able to die of hunger without exposing oneself to the master's vengeance?

These were no small difficulties; and I imagine that more than once the bishops, embarked on this bottomless ocean without shores, grappling with daily reality, felt their zeal cool. From all sides the hungry multitude, demanding wealth, rest, pleasures, arrived screaming: would they still be paid for with sermons and promises? The time had come to begin the crusade against the devourers of the earth and to devour them in turn, following the word of Christ: *Blessed are the hungry, for they shall be satisfied! Woe to those who enjoy!...*

For a moment there was hesitation: it was when the Gnostic sects shaped the Church. Almost all of them had taken Christianity in the sense of the temporal: it was all over for the new religion if this tendency had prevailed. The emperors would have been abandoned for a new servile war, and the reformer of Nazareth would hold less place in history today than Spartacus.

Finally, religion made concupiscence recoil. Gnosis itself, that is to say spirituality, was the means used by the bishops to react against the ardor of the gnostics; the conversion of Constantine, which unites with the conservatives, dealt the last blow to the revolutionaries. Slavery won its case; but that of labor was postponed for fifteen centuries.

XXVI. — What Christianity, under the name of the abolition of slavery, has done for the worker, everyone knows.

Previously, under the law of egoism, the Laborer, kidnapped in the hunt, conquered in war, or handed over by misery, an instrument of exploitation, a piece of furniture, a thing, did not count as a person, as a soul, in the family or in the city. He was not part of the nation; he was without interest there, as in the family he was without will and without patrimony.

Under the law of love, all this will change. The Laborer will be part of the family, he may even have a family; he will dispose, up to a certain

point, of his person; his wife and daughter will be respected (8); he will have a nest egg, a domicile, a possession, even an inheritance.

He will figure in his place in the nation and in the state. Religion will surround him with the same graces as the noble and the emperor, and will make him their equal before God. Only, by the feudal constitution, by the ecclesiastical tithe, by the mortmain, the corvée, the tax, the masterships, the more or less great inequality of wages and product, things will be arranged in such a way that he will remain eternally, and by privilege, devoted to labor, attached to the soil, and that this sad prerogative will become the very law of the Church and of the empire. In short, the working class will always be the sacrificed class, that which nature and Providence, prince and priest, philosopher and speculator, with unanimous consent, have condemned to do the service of the civilization from which it is excluded, and without other compensation for it than heaven.

Moreover, the same faith that made labor a reason for resignation for the most numerous class, making alms at the same time a condition of salvation for the rich, charitable establishments, serving as palliatives for pauperism, will not be lacking; there will be, as M. Moreau-Christophe says, a hospice for every kind of misery. Add work and life in common in religious houses, and all those attempts at social organization, repeated from the Greeks, that the nineteenth century, after the cenobite institutions, believed it had invented: communism, Saint-Simonism, phalansterianism, etc. Right alone is discarded, as it has been by contemporary utopians, right, which leaves nothing to fantasy, romance and melodrama.

I say then, first, that the problem of labor thus treated remains intact; that the law of love has no more solved it than the law of egoism. And my reason is simple: it is that they both only consecrate, without discussion, the fatalism of labor and its inevitable consequence, namely the division of Humanity into two classes: one superior which enjoys and commands, the other inferior, which serves and abstains.

I add, second, that the problem thus posed and posed again by the two great religious phases, it is inevitable that the solution will come about. And my reason is again that, these two phases being in progress, the first having recognized the slave's right to LIFE and protecting him against ill-treatment, but without granting him personality, the second having recognized his PERSONALITY, but without granting it any *property*, it is now necessary, and absolutely necessary, that personal right bring about real right, that the law of love become the law of Justice, on pain of inconsistency and regression.

XXVII. — Consider indeed that religion, which we have just

followed twice at work, and of which we have seen the birth, has in no way furnished the proof of the hypothesis on which it rests. Religion, by its nature, does not argue; it neither analyses, reasons, nor compares; it does not verify, observe or demonstrate anything whatsoever. It does not set itself up as judge and interpreter of any question. It only repeats problems; it is itself a problem. Religion takes hold of prejudice as it presents itself, of routine as it exists; then it makes allegories of them, it depicts them through rites, with which it amuses believers, as if it only wanted to grease, oil and butter creaking springs, but which it does not know.

Here is slavery, established, by the effect of primitive barbarism, in the habit of nations and even in the consciousness of slaves: religion will not discuss slavery; it accepts it as divine, or, what comes to the same thing, as a natural, fatal institution. Its spiritualism will go no further; it commands it, on the contrary, to stop there. Only it will say to the master of the slave, as among us the legislator says to the master of the horse: You will not mistreat him, you will not kill him without cause, and you will let him rest one day a week. If his daughter pleases your eyes, you can use her, but on condition of feeding her, etc.

With the lapse of time and the revolutions of empires, slavery has weakened in opinion and in mores; its practice has become inconvenient, onerous, impossible, religion abdicates its old dogma, presents itself with other formulas, and exclaims: No more slaves! But it was not enlightened through this about labor: in this respect, its faith has not changed. And since it tells itself that labor is miserable, that the only happy people are those who make others labor, that there will therefore always be servants and masters, poor and rich, it makes sure that the man of service is free, with all the freedom that can extend from the center of the consciousness to the periphery of the body; it denies him all justice and authority over things.

At base, religion does not change: like the spiritualism of which it is the expression, it is immutable. But there is something that progresses and changes, under it and in spite of it: it is Humanity. A day therefore comes when Humanity, reasoning on its own progress, casts doubt on the very hypothesis that has hitherto served as the foundation and motive for its faith, and asks itself:

What is labor?

What is Justice in labor?

Are those who labor less spiritual, those who do not labor more so?

This is precisely what is happening at this hour. A new spirit stirs the world. As before, the people aspire to liberty; the laboring masses demand guarantees, the end of selfish exploitation, justice in work, as in property and in exchange. And, as before, there also reappear, to combat these new



pretensions, superannuated privileges, the arbitrariness of fortunes, the traditions of the academy, the bad will of the State. It is no longer the Hebrew tribe with its two categories of slaves, nor the Roman patriciate with its system of clientele, nor the feudalism of the Middle Ages with its learned and theological hierarchy. It is the capitalist sponsorship, with the concession of the prince and State subsidy, built up on the worker's shoulders like Mount Etna on Typhon's back. Here revelation has nothing more to say; the mystical formulas are themselves called into question. Nothing but science is capable of making humanity cross this decisive pass. If a last and more brilliant manifestation of Justice does not come to enlighten the reason of the people, labor succumbs, new chains are forged for it for centuries, and no one can say when or if liberty will ever appear.

XXVIII. — In the presence of this new movement, what is the attitude of the Church?

From all sides, in 1846, 1847, 1848, the people stretched out their arms towards her: Be with us, we are the generation of Christ. Bless our pikes, bless our liberty trees. — Be with us, repeated the pure democrats, unofficial representatives of the Revolution. Curse neither 89 nor 93. Here is reborn the Constituent and Legislative assemblies; with them the Convention, the Club of the Jacobins, the holy Mountain. Our fathers sent atheists to the scaffold: make an alliance with the Revolution. — Be with us, cried the sons of Voltaire: let reason and faith each have their domain. The war of free inquiry is over; philosophy, having become conciliatory, asks only to raise you to a throne of light. — Be with us, shouted the chorus of socialists, Saint-Simonians, phalansterians, communitarians. And we too, we depend on charity. Will you let this flower dry up, which is your glory, as it was the strength of Christ and the prophets?

A sad mistake, and one that proves how much Europe, in 1848, was beneath its own thought. Labor no longer has anything to do with love: it is Justice, it is science, that it demands. Now, science is the evacuation of dogma, as the Apostle says.

The Church replied:

If you are children of Christ, lay down your arms! Respect to the princes! All authority is established from above, and the reign of Christ is not of this world.

If you recognize a Supreme Being, kneel before the Crucified. God is nothing if he does not reveal himself; and this revelation, it is I who am its organ. Revolutionaries, God tells you through my mouth: do penance for the crime of your fathers.

If you admit the legitimacy of faith, produce its acts. To confession, philosophers; you will then reason *de omni scibili*, your ticket of absolution in your pocket.

If you make a profession of charity, what do you claim? Why these cries against what you like to call *Exploitation of man by man, mercantile feudalism, privilege?* What does this so-called *Right to Work* mean? Socialists, I do not know you.

It must be admitted, with agents who began by imploring the enemy, the cause of the Revolution was lost in advance. What an idea, when it comes to labor, to claim Christ, to appeal to God and to the Church! As if slavery, serfdom, wage labor, the exploitation of man by man, were not, as much as the government of man by man, a divine institution!

It is in the name of spiritualism that some claim today to establish equality: as if spiritualism were not, by itself, the decay of the flesh, just like materialism, as we have seen through M. Enfantin, is the decay of the spirit; as if therefore the aim of all religion, of any principle that it emanates, was not to preach resignation to subordinates, clemency to superiors, faith to all!

## CHAPTER V.

Right of the Laborer after the Revolution. — Charter Labor: Law of Justice.

### Freemasonry.

On January 8, 1847, I was received as a Freemason with the rank of apprentice, in the Lodge of *Sincerity, Perfect Union and Constant Friendship*, Orient of Besançon.

Like any neophyte, before receiving the light, I had to answer the three usual questions:

“What does man owe to his fellows?”

“What does he owe his country?”

“What does he owe to God?”

On the first two questions, my answer was, more or less, as might be expected; on the third I answered with this word: WAR.

Justice to all men.

Dedication to his country,

War to God, that is the say to the Absolute:

Such was my profession of faith.

I apologize to my respectable brothers for the surprise that this proud word caused them, a sort of denial thrown at the Masonic motto, which I recall here without mockery: TO THE GLORY OF THE GREAT ARCHITECT OF THE UNIVERSE.

Introduced blindfolded into the sanctuary, I was invited to explain before the brethren what I meant by war against the Divinity. A long talk followed, which Masonic propriety forbids me from reporting. Those who are familiar with my *Economic Contradictions*, and who will read these Studies, will be able to get an idea of the serious considerations on which I then based and still affirm my opinion today. Antitheism is not atheism: the time will come, I hope, when knowledge of the laws of the human soul, of the principles of justice and of reason, will justify this distinction, so profound that it may appear peurile.

In the session of January 8, 1847, it was impossible for the recipient and the initiates to understand each other.

I could not penetrate the high thought of Freemasonry, not having seen its emblems; nor could my new brothers recognize their fundamental dogma under a blasphemous expression, which overthrew the habits of common language and all religious symbolism.

It was the feeling that remained in people's minds, and that dominated the ceremony.

After undergoing the trials, the blindfold finally fell from my eyes, and I saw myself surrounded by my brothers, wearing their regalia, holding their swords pointed at my chest; I recognized the sacred emblems; I was seated in my rank among the adepts, and the orator of the lodge, the venerable brother P\*\*, today (May 1860) ninety-four year old, dean of all masons on the globe, delivered the speech of my reception. May he receive here the public testimony of my gratitude and my respect.

Well! exclaims the reader, what have you seen in this famous masonry, with such terrible mysteries, against which the Abbé Barruel barked so many insults in his *History of Jacobinism*, and which the Abbé Proyart and others then accused of having made the Revolution?

What I saw there, I will tell you. The masonic societies, placed under the gaze of power and the patronage of high dignitaries, have no more secrets. Their passwords, their cabalistic terms, their signs and touches, all this is known, printed, published, and in the streets. As for the doctrine, since tolerance has become throughout the globe a principle of public right, and deism a temporary basis for all those who have renounced the religion of their fathers, we can say that it has entered general circulation. The silence recommended to the brethren, formerly of the highest importance under a regime of divine right, in reality only relates to the administrative affairs of the society, the recommendations, the works of beneficence and to personal questions.

But beyond deism and toleration, which the lodges concealed so carefully seventy-five or eighty years ago, and which still today form the substance of their official teaching; beyond this ceremonial that no longer even has the merit of arousing the curiosity of the profane, there is a superior philosophy that cannot be communicated, since it has remained a closed letter for everyone, which I can consequently reveal, without failing in the Masonic oath, since I owe the understanding of it only to myself, although it constitutes in my opinion the true mystery, the glorious and fundamental dogma of Freemasonry.

I dare to hope that this rapid exposition will be received with kindness, without approval or disapproval, by all the lodges in France and abroad. Our Venerables will understand that as much as the teaching of such ideas, if it were secret, could be dangerous for the society they represent, so much it is useful to this society that the public be seized with principles that there will always be time to disavow if they are judged to be false, but of which all the honor rightfully belongs to it, if the universal conscience calls for them.

### Masonic anti-conceptualism. — Idea of God.

XXX. — Any religious doctrine or doctrine claiming to be such is characterized by the metaphysical concept that serves as its basis.

The most ancient theology rested on the idea of *substance*; it ended, like the philosophy of Spinoza, in pantheism. Now, let us note this point: What is substance? What the understanding conceives as the support or *substratum* of phenomena, but which, escaping the senses, impenetrable to knowledge, remains for reason as a simple hypothesis of logic, a conception.

Jewish theology was dominated by the notion of cause, force, power, virtuality. Its God, *rouach elohim*, divine breath or spirit of forces, in other words *Jehovah*, power, is a principle different from matter, which it creates, animates, shapes, by its sovereign action. But what is the cause, or the force, in itself? Another hypothesis of the understanding, something ultra-phenomenal, a conception. As a counterpart to Spinoza's substantialism, we have Leibnitz's dynamism.

Christian theology elevates on these two concepts, substance and cause, that of Intelligence or *Word*. Hence the government of Providence and the reign of souls, with the religious and social economy that flows from it. But what is a soul? What is this entity, which Descartes defines, by a contradictory expression, as *immaterial substance*? A fiction of thought, that is to say still a conception.

Conceptualism, the negation of all phenomenality, in other words, the affirmation of the Absolute: such is therefore the fundamental character of all ancient religious doctrines, let us say right away, the *sine qua non* of all theology.

Quite different is the theology of the Freemasons, and consequently their theodicy. It departs from ontological conceptions, and takes as its foundation a positive, phenomenal, synthetic, highly intelligible idea: this is the idea of relation; and as this word *relation*, by its generality, seems to participate in the conceptualist nature of the preceding notions, Masonic Reason removes all doubt in this regard by concretizing and defining its principle under the expression of EQUILIBRIUM. (C)

This is what the triple emblem, which later became that of the Revolution, indicates to anyone who wants to hear it: *Plumb, Level, Square* .

Equilibrium: here is an idea that creates an image, that can be seen, that can be understood, that can be analyzed, that leaves no mystery behind. Any relation implies two terms in equation: relation and equilibrium are thus synonyms, there is no mistaking that fact.

From the idea of relation or equilibrium freemasonry deduces its

notion of the divine being.

The God of the masons is neither Substance, nor Cause, nor Soul, nor Monad, nor Creator, nor Father, nor Word, nor Love, nor Paraclete, nor Redeemer, nor Satan, nor anything that corresponds to a transcendental concept: all metaphysics is ruled out here. He is the personification of the Universal Equilibrium: God is the *Architect*; he holds the compass, the level, the square, the hammer, all the instruments of work and of measurement. In the moral order he is Justice. This is the whole masonic theology.

For the rest, there is no altar, no simulacra, no sacrifices, no prayer, no sacraments, no graces, no mystery, no priesthood, no profession of faith, no worship. The society of freemasonry is not a church; it is not based on dogma and worship; it affirms nothing that reason cannot clearly understand, and respects only Humanity. Anyone is capable, therefore, of being received as a Freemason, of whatever religion, who practices Justice and serves his fellows, of whatever religion they themselves are.

One would have to be strangely *poor in spirit*, it seems to me, not to see that this tolerant rationalism, founded on disdain for all theology and the substitution of the metaphysical concept for the positive idea, real and formal, replaced in the consciousness of the freemason by Justice.

The theology of the lodge, in a nutshell, is the opposite of theology. This is indicated by the opposition of the Masonic motto, *To the Glory of the great Architect of the Universe*, to that of the Jesuits, *Ad Majorem Dei gloriam*, for the greater glory of God, that is to say of the Absolute, that is to say of Absolutism. (D)

So I do not need to insist more on this anti-conceptualism of Masonic teaching to show how much, by declaring war, according to my perhaps unfortunate expression, on all the substantial, causative, verbal, justifying and redeeming gods, *Elohim, Jehovah, Allah, Christos, Zeus, Mithras*, etc., I was, without knowing it, in agreement with the unconscious thought of Freemasonry.

And I too, I could have said to the respectable audience, I affirm, as a sovereign and regulative idea in future ages, Relation, Equilibrium, Right. I regard as pure dialectical instruments, subordinate to this idea, the concepts of substance, cause, spirit, matter, soul, life; I profess gratuitous Justice without reward. Under the benefit of this explanation, and as I do not want to sadden anyone, I agree to give glory with you, my brothers, to the great ARCHITECT, immanent in Humanity, whose luminous triangle, more precious for me than the name of Jehovah, which you have written there, has revealed all these things to me.

So much for the *theology*, or speculative philosophy, of the Freemasons. It is summed up, as we see, in the preponderance of the sensible and intelligible idea over the metaphysical and unintelligible concept, an idea

whose most complete representation is equilibrium. It follows the old theologies, polytheist, Judaic and Christian, just as the idea from which it emanates follows the concepts of substance, cause, spirit, which served to found its predecessors; and this sequel, which recalls the historical progression of Auguste Comte, — theology, metaphysics, science — announces to us that we are touching the law of Justice, synthesis of the law of egoism and the law of love.

It remains to be seen now what is the *theodicy* or practical philosophy of the Freemasons; which brings us back to the question that we have specially proposed to ourselves in this Study, the victory of liberty over fatality in labor.

### **The origin of philosophy and science discovered in the industrious spontaneity of man. — Industrial alphabet.**

XXXI. — A singular thing, which it was impossible to suspect before the revolutionary pressure had put us on the track, the problem of the emancipation of labor is linked to that of the origin of the sciences, in such a way that the solution of the one is absolutely necessary to that of the other, and that both are reduced to one single theory, that of the supremacy of the industrial order over all the other orders of knowledge and art.

This is what results from the following proposition, the proof of which will be the subject of this chapter:

*The idea, with its categories, arises from action and must return to action, on pain of forfeiture for the agent.*

This means that all knowledge, said to be *a priori*, including metaphysics, has emerged from labor and must serve as an instrument of labor, contrary to what is taught by philosophical pride and religious spiritualism, which make of the idea a gratuitous revelation, arriving no one knows how, of which industry is then no more than an application.

The initiative of the idea, and the privilege of thought: such is the double title that spiritualism arrogates to itself and on which it bases its disdain for labor and its claim to command. But this is also what belies the significant emblems of Freemasonry, which has become almost ridiculous since, its thought no longer advancing, it no longer seems to understand its own secrets.

Who has not repeatedly asked this question: How did man, suddenly rising above instinct, enter the intellectual sphere? What was the first step, in what did the first act of his reason consist? Or, to put it better, how, in primitive man, did instinct, following its own destiny, become intelligence? Because everyone is in agreement here: intelligence is none other than instinct itself occurring in a new form; it is instinct in

evolution, which recognizes itself, reflects itself, analyzes itself, measures itself and, proceeding with a more and more perfect consciousness, unfolds itself in reasoning and creates its dialectic.

Nothing is more attractive in general than the search for origins; but among so many things of which we would like to know the beginnings, there is none that interests us more keenly than reason.

If we ask science about its beginnings, it answers us by showing us its *elements*, vocal sounds, letters, numbers, figures, in a word, SIGNS; Its method does not go beyond that; its memories do not reach back any farther.

Logic adds to it its conceptions or categories, with its genera and its species, general formulas of spoken thought, yet more signs.

It is with this that man approaches the external phenomenality and his own essence; that he observes, calculates, reduces everything to more and more general laws, and raises the forever unfinished edifice of his knowledge.

But how did man invent the sign?

Whoever says sign already says abstraction, concept, and we are still only at the sensation. The sign supposes the pre-existence of a general idea, which itself supposes the pre-existence of a sign; it is thus at least that we are forced to judge of it, we who learn nothing otherwise. So that, as Rousseau remarked of speech, we turn in an impassable circle. *Did the egg come out of the hen, or did the hen come out of the egg!* Who will unravel this mystery?

Proponents of primitive revelation, Christians and neo-Platonists or eclectics, are not embarrassed. Man, formed of clay by the hand of the Creator, has been instructed by the angels, who communicated to him, with the word, the first elements of knowledge. Prisoner of the body and bent towards the earth, the spirit of man would know nothing of its own laws, if it had not been informed of them by intercourse with the gods. At the very least, if he did not receive positive information from the gods, which it is impossible to say today, he received from them all the means to inform himself, to develop his intelligence and to provide for his well-being by his industry: these means are ideas, language, and according to some writing itself; in a word, as we said earlier, signs. This was the philosophy of M. de Bonald; it is that of MM. Jean Reynaud and Lamartine

If the fact were proven historically, it would be something so enormous that, out of respect for the Creator and for creation, reason would still refuse to admit it: how could it receive it when it is only allowed to see in it a vain induction of ignorance?

Whatever may be the case with this primitive revelation, and whatever idea one has of it today, things have nonetheless been settled in



all times, relative to work and industry, as if this revelation had been a constant fact. The philosopher and the statesman, as well as the priest, have taken it as the starting point of their considerations, and the social economy has been instituted accordingly. Just as man was reputed to be originally empty of justice, receiving the law from God, and virtue from his grace, so the worker was reputed to be originally devoid of ideas, and receiving his first notions by a special communication from the Word. One can guess what the effects of this double decline must have been for the laboring man. It was much like declaring him immediately a beast of burden or, as Descartes, the founder of modern spiritualism, said of animals, a machine.

It is thus that there is not an abuse in society that does not have its principle in an error of speculation. We were far from suspecting, in the last century, that by agitating the question of the origin of ideas, we were raising that of slavery.

XXXII. — If man thinks for himself, if he produces his ideas as his right, he is free; wage labor is a violation of human dignity, inequality of conditions an anomaly. Let us go further: if, as we said earlier, reflection, and consequently the idea, is born in man from action, not action from reflection, it is labor that must take precedence over speculation, the man of industry over philosophy, which is the overthrow of prejudice and of the present social state.

The question of origins takes us back to that moment of civilization when the human mind, devoid of scientific machinery, acts like the latent spirit that animates nature; where intelligence, ready to spring forth, has not stripped off the forms of instinct; where consequently the metaphysical concept, without which there is no reasoning, remains enveloped in the image; where the relation, finally, which in order to be perceived in its plenitude requires that the intuition that furnishes it be analyzed in its concepts, is still engaged through the image.

At that moment, what can we expect from man, who already thinks without a doubt, since to feel and to see is to think, but who, for lack of signs, is incapable of releasing his notions, starting from analyzing his thought? — Only one thing, actions.

Spontaneous, thoughtless activity, which does not await, in the intimate certainty it has of itself, the confirmations of a professed science: this is what, for primitive man, the movement of the mind is reduced to. Do the partisans of revelation deny that animals, the humble insect like the superb quadruped, act, and that in this action there is thought, a divine thought if you will, which the animal does not realize, and which we call its *instinct*? We ask no more for man. The first acts of his existence are of pure instinct; some will retain this character throughout his life.

The whole question now is whether this activity can provide the impetus for philosophical reason; in other words, if the facts that man produces under the sole instigation of his instinct can become signs for his own mind, in such a way that he is all at once, from himself to himself, through the call of his spontaneity and the response of his intelligence, initiator and initiate?

Now, there will be no doubt that things should happen in this way, if we reflect that activity, imbued, saturated with instinct, if I may express myself in this way, is what most resembles intelligence, to such an extent that children do not distinguish instinctive acts from reflective acts, and it is for the savage a permanent source of fetishism. Under these conditions, activity appears as the first cause of the excitation of ideas, like the primitive Word that suddenly illuminates human consciousness, it suffices, for the miracle to occur, that this activity manifests itself, that it spreads — I ask pardon for all these metaphors — in visible acts, the invisible ideas it contains; in a word, that it speaks.

A familiar comparison will make this clearer. Do the partisans of primitive revelation deny that a man who has received the idea can communicate it to another man? No, since, according to them, the difficulty is not in the transmission, but in the discovery, apperception or first reception. How does this transmission take place? By signs. This is how the nurse teaches her child. Well, the passage from instinctive thought to philosophical thought consists in the fact that man, by his spontaneous activity, makes a sign to himself, excites, by the acts of his instinct, the reflection of his intelligence, and becomes his own Word.

This is the fact, in its simplicity. Man, gifted both with spontaneity and the faculty of receiving ideas through a signification addressed to his intelligence, plays here a double character: he is master, through the actions and gestures that his instinct makes him produce, and which are so many expressions of his ideas; he is a disciple, by the attention he gives to these acts emanating from an intelligent cause. The communication thus established from him to himself, he will not delay in establishing it from himself to his fellow man; he will even seek to establish it between external objects, in whose movements he will be inclined to see warnings, appeals, signs. It is thus that in the lightning he will see a sign, *nutum*, of Jupiter, which he will want to interpret.

This overturns spiritualist philosophy from top to bottom, and threatens to make the laborer, the degraded serf of civilization, the author and sovereign of thought, the arbiter of philosophy and theology.

XXXIII. — I therefore say that there is in the archives of the human mind something prior to all the signs that, from time immemorial, have served as vehicles and instruments of knowledge; something from which

these signs have been imitated, even if they are not a simple copy; something therefore which, produced by instinct, served as the first theme of intelligence and determined its movement.

These are the first engines of industry, which we may well call equally the *Elements of knowledge* and the *Elements of labor*.

Man, the highest being of the animal series, is also the one who for his subsistence must ask the most of nature: how will he come to grips with it?

For him, everything is contained in this *how*. Depending on whether he knows how to do it, his punishment will be stronger or lighter; he will triumph over the fatality of labor, or he will succumb to it. What is he taught by this organic light, instinct, which illuminates any animal coming into the world, as reason must one day illuminate any man who has achieved intelligence?

Freemasonry will tell us.

His God is called ARCHITECT. I observed that this name implied the negation of all theologism, and the substitution for the transcendental concepts of substance, cause, life, spirit, etc., of the scientific idea of *relation*, more explicitly, of EQUILIBRIUM.

But all this also means that the internal vision that primitive man obeys in the acts of his spontaneity, the dream that leads him, as Cuvier says, before he has learned to enjoy, through abstraction and analysis, the plenitude of his intelligence, is none of those metaphysical conceptions that will one day make the martyrdom of his understanding; it is a sensible and intelligible idea, synthetic, consequently susceptible of analysis, such finally as was necessary for the circumstance: relation of things among themselves, equality or inequality, grouping, series, cohesion, division, equation, balance, etc., that is to say precisely what makes the reality, the phenomenality, the intelligibility and the value of being.

Thus, the first thought of man, that which precedes in him all reflection and analysis, is the same, but in the state of image, as that to which the philosophical elaboration brings him back: it could not be otherwise. The principle of being immediately gives its end: *Ego sum alpha et omega, primus et novissimus, principium et finis*.

How is this view of equilibrium produced in the facts of spontaneous activity?

Of all the instruments of human labor, the most elementary, therefore the most universal, the one to which all the others are reduced, is the *lever*, the bar. It is the stick that the orangutan uses to lean on and defend itself, but with this difference between it and man, that the orang will never see in its stick anything other than a stick; while man, through the evolving power of his instinct, discovers infinity there.

Everything that man does, undertakes, imagines, can be defined, from an industrial point of view, as a creation of equilibrium or disruption of equilibrium. The lever he uses fulfills this double object indifferently; according to the way he uses it, the material of which he makes it, the modifications he makes it undergo, he makes it an instrument for all purposes:

Instrument of coercion, arrest, support, closure;

Gripping instrument;

Percussion instrument;

Puncture instrument;

Instrument of division or section;

Instrument of locomotion;

Instrument of direction, etc.

Naturally, these first rudiments of human tools were very few in number and of a coarseness worthy of the time; but however few they were, the idea was there, one in its principle, variable in its applications; through it these instruments formed a series, and spoke to the mind.

I do not pretend to draw up an exact table of them: it would be something as difficult as determining the natural elements of the alphabet or the categories of the understanding.

But since all literature begins with letters, all mathematics with numbers, all music with the scale, does it not seem that all professional education should also begin with a reasoned table of the most rudimentary instruments of labor, with their theoretical and practical explanation, their identity or similarity, their derivatives and their equivalents? And wouldn't that be laying the foundations of a new form of philosophy, for the use of minds over which ordinary teaching, which begins with abstraction, has no hold?

#### ALPHABET OF THE LABORER.

A. BAR or LEVER (*pile, rod, column, pole, picket*);

B. HOOK, CURVED BAR (*hook, clasp, key, sergeant, valet, anchor, tenon, harpoon*);

C. CLAMP (*pincer, vise, combination of two hooks*);

D. LINK (originally consisting of a flexible rod, curved around the object; — *thread, cord, chain*);

E. HAMMER (*mace, mallet, pestle, flail, grindstone*);

F. POINT (*spear, pike, javelin, arrow, dart, needle, etc.*);

G. CORNER;

H. AXE;

I. BLADE (*knife, chisel, saber, sword*);

J. SAW (*file*);

K. SHOVEL (*spade, hoe, trowel, spoon*);  
 L. PICK (*pickaxe*);  
 M. FORK (*trident, rake, comb*; double, triple, multiple point);  
 N. RAMP or *inclined plane*;  
 O. ROLLER, giving by its section the *wheel*, which is also the *pulley*;  
 P. PIPE (*tube, channel, siphon, channel, chimney*);  
 Q. OAR and RUDDER;  
 R. BOW or *spring*;  
 S. RULE;  
 T. LEVEL;  
 U. SQUARE;  
 V. COMPASS;  
 X. PENDULUM or *plumb line*;  
 Y. BALANCE;  
 Z. CIRCLE (*loop, knot*).

XXXIV. — Let us reason a little about this alphabet, which everyone is free to remake as they please, but to which one would perhaps find less to add than to reduce.

Man creates nothing, rightly say the economists; he shapes. — What is shaping? you ask. Answer: it is movement. — I repeat: Movement alone, imprinted on matter, does not give it the desired form, does not constitute labor: this movement must be in *relation* to the goal to be reached, in equation with its object, that is, in equilibrium. That is what the alphabet of the laborer shows us at the first view.

What are all our instruments after that, from the rustic chariot to the powerful locomotive, from the canoe of the savage to the three-deck ship, from the simple pulley to the Schwilgué clock, if not assemblies of levers of all kinds, of hooks, points, blades, wheels, chains, springs, serving to produce movement, division, approach, cohesion, etc., sometimes by a production, sometimes by a destruction of equilibrium?

And the products of this work, what are they in turn, if not constructions and arrangements of materials cut, forged, turned, spun, assembled, stacked, braced, meshed, crossed, woven, intertwined, etc., always according to the same law?

The principle that governs industry is therefore one and the same; it has at first sight nothing to do with metaphysics; it makes an image: it is the principle, sensible and intelligible, of the mechanics of the universe.

Now, given this universal idea of equilibrium in the dream of thought, and the operations of work being only its application, we see, by this very fact, how man has passed from synthetic and spontaneous intuition to the thoughtful and abstract idea; how he has broken down the object of his vision, invented the signs of speech and calculation, created pure

mathematics, identified by naming them the categories of his understanding.

It is because the power that directs the hand of the worker is the same at bottom as that which makes the brain of the philosopher reflect, and because, intelligence not being able to awaken to the idea, to the life; because, on a sign from the intelligence, it was absolutely necessary, so that man enters this intellectual career, that he was carried there by a series of operations emanating from himself, analysis through the multiplicity of terms, synthesis through their whole, which was for him like a manifestation of intelligence itself. Man, in short, could have no other revealer, no other Word than himself; he could only receive his ideas of nature, in which the mind sleeps, and only makes itself seen, for the philosopher only, by its effects, not by signs; man, his dreamy intelligence, needed the stimulation of an awakening intelligence: an insurmountable difficulty for the old psychology, over which religion triumphs by means of its revelation, but which the mere inspection of the industrial alphabet, with characters that are both spontaneous and significant, instantly removes.

Let us explain this in a still more precise manner, if possible.

XXXV. — What is characteristic of instinct, the first form of thought, is to contemplate things synthetically; the characteristic of intelligence, to consider them analytically. In other words, instinct having acquired the power to contemplate itself, to reflect on itself, to analyze its intuitions, and consequently to evolve in its operations, constitutes intelligence. Alone among animals, man seems to enjoy this prerogative, which means that he alone has the faculty of conceiving the abstract idea, released by analysis itself. But intelligence is not given from the outset like instinct: it is at first only a dormant faculty, which only arrives at possession of itself by a long exercise, on an energetic appeal from the spontaneity that precedes it: for man also has the instinct of his intelligence. For the mind to become capable of analysis, it is necessary, in addition to the secret feeling that pushes it to it, that it be led step by step, that on each of the terms of which the totality of the intuition is composed, it must be invited to stop, that it recognize them one after the other, and name them. Now, this can only be done on the condition of an initiation from outside, or of a particular circumstance that takes its place. What will this circumstance be for primitive man? As I said, it is his own industry. The fingers act, moved by instinct; intelligence observes, it cannot not observe, and here is why.

The beaver raises its masonry, the bird builds its nest, the bee builds its comb, the spider stretches its web, all animals exercise their industry according to an internal type, from which they never deviate. What they

will know for all their life, they know from birth; they learn nothing from each other; their experience does not accumulate; their knowledge can neither increase nor decrease, and all their generations are alike. Having nothing to communicate to each other, they do not need signs; they have no need to analyze their operations, to express their analysis in words, to form concepts, to speak, to reason, to trace effects to causes, and to seek the reason of phenomena.

The same thing takes place in man, at the beginning, but with this difference: he has no predetermined industry, limited to a unique and immutable construction. His genius is not specialized, it is universal. He acts according to a simple, unique, but synthetic, positive, experimental intuition, from such a vast understanding that his creations can have nothing uniform, nothing traditional about them; from then on he ceases to get along with his fellows, and he would not get along with himself, if, infinitely varying the application of his inner idea, he did not learn at the same time to account for it, if he did not analyze it. Now, this intuition, which forms the basis of human genius, which presently will form the basis of its philosophy, is the very idea of relation, agreement, equation, equality, accord, equilibrium; and the resulting industrial variety is the spur that awakens intelligence from its slumber, and gives birth to philosophy.

This is clearly revealed in language, which a too despised philosopher, Condillac, said was an *analytical method*; especially in primitive language, where we see analysis always start from the primary idea of equality, agreement, equilibrium, and where, to say that a man is incapable of doing a thing, that whether he has or does not have the strength, the genius, the talent, the science, we simply say that he is *equal* or *unequal* to that thing, *par*, *impar oneri*; whether he is or is not *weighty*, *minus habens*, etc. According to the fundamental intuition that originally constitutes all human genius, any action to which this intuition gives rise implies both, and necessarily, the production of equilibrium and the destruction of equilibrium. It is even under this last aspect that the action of man manifests itself by preference, in the state of nature, consisting above all in attacking and defending himself.

It follows that the first instruments of human industry, offensive or defensive weapons, are analytical instruments. And this is also what the native language expresses, for which to destroy (*de-struere*, to deconstruct) is the same thing as to decompose, to divide, to untie, to disjoin, to dissolve, to unstitch, to separate, to balance, to remove, to ANALYZE, finally; just as to create, or to construct is to join, bind, unite, equalize, erect, *in-struere*, or *indu-struere*, whence *indu-stria*, *indu-strumentum*, to organize, to engineer within oneself, ἑνθὸν, by a internal contemplation, like the bee, the ant, etc., which, without lessons from

anyone, seem to draw their ideas and their art from their depths. All the words of the languages, and all the compositions of words, have been created according to this process: where the process has been imperfectly applied, as among the Semitic peoples, the abstract terms are lacking, the philosophy is weak, not to say that it is nonexistent.

A math teacher who is a friend of mine teaches geometry to his students starting with the sphere; it is from the empirical consideration of the sphere that he starts to arrive at the abstract notion of the plane, the line and the point. Such is precisely the course that labor has followed in the determination of categories and the discovery of the primitive signs or elements of the sciences. These transcendental concepts of substance, cause, space, time, soul, life, matter, spirit, which we place like divinities at the summit of our intelligence, are the products of the analysis that we have made of our mother intuition, of the hypotheses or postulates of our experience, as I put forward in 1842 (*Creation of Order in Humanity*). Here, I dare say that doubt has become impossible. Nature is grasped by us starting with the fact: the metaphysical idea is born for the mind from the decomposition of the sensible image, brought about by spontaneous activity, and we can boldly posit this axiom, that all intelligence begins with destruction: *Destruam and œdificabo*.

This is what explains how writing, numbers, even speech required for their invention the prior production of facts and organs that serve as their prototypes; how these organs, instruments of our first industry, were furnished by spontaneous activity; how the mind has been impelled by them into the path of analysis; this is why the letters of the alphabet, the names of numbers, the figures of geometry, were, for the most part, named after these instruments, as the etymology testifies; why the radicals of languages all have a family resemblance that has long made us believe in a primitive language, while they are the expression of the industrial practice, identical everywhere, within which they originated. In short, human intelligence makes its beginning in the spontaneity of its industry; and it is by contemplating itself in its work that it finds itself. (E)

### **Encyclopedia or polytechnic of apprenticeship.**

XXXVI. — The first part of our proposition is therefore established: *The idea, with its categories, arises from action*; in other words, industry is the mother of philosophy and science.

The second remains to be demonstrated: *The idea must return to action*; which means that philosophy and the sciences must return to industry, on pain of degradation for Humanity. This demonstration made, the problem of the liberation of labor is solved.

Let us first recall in what terms this problem was posed.



Labor presents two opposite aspects, one subjective, the other objective, fatal. Under the first aspect, it is spontaneous and free, the principle of happiness: it is activity in its legitimate exercise, indispensable to the health of soul and body. Under the second aspect, labor is repugnant and painful, a principle of servitude and brutalization.

These two aspects of labor are inherent in each other, like the soul and the body: whence it follows, *a priori*, that all the fatigue and displeasure in labor cannot absolutely disappear. Only, while under the regime of religions, fatality takes precedence over liberty, and repugnance and pain are excessive, one asks if, under the regime inaugurated by the Revolution, liberty taking precedence over fatality, the distaste for labor cannot diminish to the point that man prefers it to all the amusing exercises invented, as remedies for boredom and compensation for labor itself?

A question of life or death for the Revolution, like all the questions raised by social destiny.

From man to man, the balance must always be kept equal: thus Justice wills it, and we have demonstrated it four times when dealing with *persons, goods, government and education*.

From man to nature, or, as we said earlier, from liberty to fatality, this equality is not enough; on pain of forfeiture, the balance must become more and more favorable for liberty.

Equality in the condition of persons, save for those slight differences that nature has thrown between beings and which liberty neglects, but assured predominance of man over things, by the growing influence of his industry: such is the double proposition, supported by the Revolution, speaking for all the workers, on the one hand, against the Church, protesting in the name of all the mystical and aristocratic sects, on the other.

It is a matter, I repeat, of the well-being of humanity, of the glory of its reason, of the dignity of its character, of the nobility of its affections, of the satisfaction of its Justice. It is the whole of human life once again brought into play by the mysterious necessity of labor.

XXXVII. — The workers have, in general, a very strong sense of a possible improvement of their lot, not only from the point of view of political liberties and of property, but from that of the very conditions of labor.

But they are not in a position to say what they lack, and consequently to formulate their petition.

They imagine that everything could be repaired by means of a raise in wages and a reduction in working hours; some go so far as to stammer the word *association*. That is all they understood of the republic of 1848, all that was known to be said in their name at the Luxembourg.

Hence the more or less unfortunate rearrangements of prices, the war waged against the laborers, the community associations and this last resort of the dissatisfied worker, the strike.

Critics have long since done justice to these pitiful expedients.

The increase in wages, joined to the reduction of labor, and combined with the employment of machines and the fragmented separation of industries, constitutes, in the present state, a fourfold contradiction.

The more labor is divided and machines are perfected, the less the worker is worth; consequently the less he is paid; therefore, the more, for the same salary, his task increases. This is a fatal logic, the effect of which no legislation, no dictatorship can prevent. There is therefore a forced drop in wages, despite strikes, regulations, tariffs, the intervention of power: the entrepreneur has a thousand ways of escaping this pressure of violence and authority.

As for the workers' association, it has hardly been anything else up until now, and with very rare exceptions, than an imitation of the bourgeois sponsorship or of the Moravian community, a poor resource, the practice of which would soon have demonstrated its powerlessness.

It is therefore necessary to change tactics; it is necessary, in order to raise the condition of the worker, to begin by raising his value: outside of that, no salvation, let the workers take it for granted.

However, independent of the conditions of commutative justice, the principles of which have been laid down in previous studies, with regard to Persons, Goods, Public Power and Education, there are still two essential guarantees for the worker to achieve:

In his person, an encyclopedic knowledge of the industry;

In the workshop, an organization of functions on the principle of Masonic graduation.

XXXVIII. — Everything is absurd in the present conditions of labor, and seems to have been combined for the perpetual enslavement of the worker.

After having, in the interest of production, divided and sub-divided labor *ad infinitum*, each of its fragments has been made the object of a particular profession from which the worker, bewildered, stupefied, no longer escapes. Politically emancipated by the Revolution, he is again made a serf of the soil, in his body, in his soul, in his family, in all his generations, by the vicious, but inveterate distribution of labor.

This is not all: as if the exercise of a function thus limited should exhaust all the forces of his intelligence, all the aptitudes of his hand, all his theoretical and practical education has been limited to the apprenticeship of this fragment. And for this apprenticeship one has demanded of the proletarian, as a first investment, long years of free

service, the flower of his youth, the cream of his vigor. The finest and best of life is taken from the worker by the boss who, after that, cannot even guarantee him employment.

Moreover, as everything is established on this footing, the bosses do not generally become much richer: the sweat of the hireling rises and will feed the parasitism from above, through the thousand channels and pipes of the system.

What an ordinary mind would have exhausted in three days, often in a few hours, what an otherwise trained hand would learn to execute in a few weeks, consumes years. Then, this ridiculous apprenticeship over, what do we get?

I assume that the instruction was given in good faith, and that the subject benefited from the lessons.

Man has been molded by an operation that, far from initiating him into the general principles and secrets of human industry, closes the door to any other profession; after having mutilated his intelligence, he has been stereotyped, petrified; apart from *what concerns his state*, which he flatters himself to know, but of which he has only a faint idea and a narrow habit, his soul has been paralyzed like his arm.

During the first years that follow the apprenticeship, the imagination, supported by youth, still has some golden dreams: it is then that the worker takes a wife, and creates for the system that devours him offspring that the same system will devour.

But soon the monotony of labor with all its aversions makes itself felt: the so-called worker becomes aware of his degradation; he tells himself that he is only a cog in society; despair slowly seizes him; reason, lacking a positive science, loses its balance; the heart is depraved, and man ends up in the dreams of utopia, the follies of illuminism and the rages of impotence.

We wanted to mechanize the worker; we did worse, we made him penniless and mean.

Will it therefore be a dreadful paradox to maintain that it must be from industry, the mother of the sciences, as from the sciences themselves; that his teaching must be given in full, according to a method that embraces the whole circle, so that the choice of trade or specialty arrives for the worker, as for the student of the polytechnic, after the completion of the complete course of studies?

Certainly, industry demands more time from the pupil than grammar, arithmetic, geometry, even physics: for the workman has not only to exercise his intelligence and furnish his memory; he must execute with his hand what his head has understood: it is an education both of the organs and of the understanding.

But it is clear that industry cannot be fragmented, any more than the

sciences, without perishing: the man whose genius, confined to one profession, knows nothing of the others, who moreover is incapable of reducing his trade to elementary notions and giving the theory of it, is like someone who, having learned to sign his name by initials, knows nothing of the rest of the alphabet.

All by method and together or nothing: it is the law of labor as of knowledge. Industry is the concrete form of this positive philosophy which it is a today question of pouring into souls in place of extinct beliefs, a philosophy prophesied and invoked a century ago, by the greatest genius of modern times, the father and hierophant of the *Encyclopedia*, DIDEROT.

Here, I repeat, there is no middle ground: either we will return to the system of castes, to which an idiotic spiritualism pushes us with all its might; or the Revolution will prevail on this point as on the others. One does not split the idea of the Revolution, one does not prune its system, any more than one can split the dogma of the Church, take part of its theodicy and reject the rest.

XXXIX. — Let us collect our thoughts.

What is the primordial intuition of human genius?

The idea of equilibrium. All the rudimentary instruments of labor are varieties of the lever; it is the immutable point to which all industrial operation is reduced. *Detur mihi punctum, and terram movebo.*

How, under the provocation of spontaneity, was intelligence awakened?

By the inevitable practice of analysis. All the instruments of work are analytical instruments; any industrial operation resolves itself into a production or disruption of equilibrium.

The abstract idea came out of the necessary analysis of labor: with it the sign, metaphysics, poetry, religion and finally science, which is only the return of the mind to the industrial mechanism.

Science, in fact, considered in itself, is only an instrument for the industrious. This reduction to simple signs, to a few abstract formulas, of so many observations, experiences, enterprises, efforts, which constitutes the reflected knowledge of humanity, aims to accommodate in a brain of three or four cubic decimeters a sum of ideas that would otherwise not fit in a head as big as the globe. Who would use this mass of knowledge if not the man of action? Our schools of *application*, so foolishly imagined as a follow-up to schools of pure theory, prove this moreover.

Well! Don't you see that, if man possesses no native industry, like the bee, the ant, the beaver, if nature has confined itself to inspiring him, for all his genius, with the intuition of equality, of equilibrium, harmony, image of Justice, which possesses his consciousness, it is because it predestined him to a universal industry, as high above animal instinct as

the Universe is above of the monad?

This is what phrenology has not seen, or what it has not been able to take into account, measuring genius by the dimensions of the skull: it does not hold that intelligence is essentially analytical; that it makes and keeps all its conquests by means of analysis; that consequently the volume of the brain is in no way related to the multitude of ideas, genera, species, groups, series, that it must accommodate: it is enough that the analytical faculty be very sharp, just as to cut down a forest there is no need for an ax as big as a mountain, it is enough that it cuts.

XL. — Let us draw the consequences.

If industrial education is reformed according to the principles that I have just established, I say that the condition of the worker changes completely; that the pain and repugnance inherent in toil in the present state are gradually effaced by the delight that results for the mind and the heart from the labor itself, not to mention the benefit of production, guaranteed on the other hand by the economic and social balance.

With a rope the size of a little finger, a child, if he manages to wrap it just once around a stake or shrub, will stop a bull; with a stone fitted at the end of a stick, he will knock it down; with an arrow, winged like his thought, he will strike the bird on the tree from which it seems to defy him; with a lever the size of his body, he will uproot a rock, and hurl it down the mountain.

The first to try it must have experienced unspeakable joy. It is Apollo conquering the serpent: all fatigue has disappeared; the body of the god barely touches the earth, disdain swells his nostrils and genius shines in his face. The universe flees before his gesture; but he seizes it with his gaze, he holds it at the end of his arrow; had he lost his weapons, he would find them in the palm of his hand.

The next day, the day after, every day, a new invention, a new victory. He walks from enchantment to enchantment, and the more he multiplies his works, the more he extends his domain and adds to his happiness.

The births of industry are the feasts of humanity. The longest life, devoting an hour to the repetition of each discovery, would not exhaust its nomenclature.

Oh! If social communion, if human solidarity, are not empty words, what can be the education of the worker, what will be his daily labor, his whole life, if not to constantly remake on his own, adding to it what comes to him from his own inspiration, that which his fathers made? They sow in enthusiasm; he reaps in happiness.

I therefore ask why, the apprenticeship necessarily being the theoretical and practical demonstration of industrial progress, from the simplest elements to the most complicated constructions, and the labor of

the worker, journeyman or master, having only to continue, on a larger scale, what the apprenticeship will have begun; I ask why the whole life of the worker would not be a perpetual rejoicing, a triumphal procession?

Here it is no longer that passionate attraction that, according to Fourier, should burst forth like fireworks from the midst of the *series of contrasting groups*, the intrigues of the *cabalist* and the evolutions of the *papillon*.

It is an intimate pleasure, to which the recollection of solitude is no less favorable than the excitements of the workshop, which results for the working man from the full exercise of his faculties: strength of body, skill of hands, quickness of mind, power of idea, pride of soul in the feeling of difficulty overcome, of nature enslaved, of knowledge acquired, of independence assured; communion with the human race through the memory of ancient struggles, the solidarity of the work and the participation in well-being.

The laborer, in these conditions, whatever link connects him to creation, whatever his relations with his fellows, enjoys the highest prerogative of which a being can be proud: he exists BY HIMSELF. There is nothing in common between him and the multitude of beasts, consuming without producing, *fruges consumere natae*. He receives nothing from nature that he does not metamorphose; by exploiting it, he purges it, fertilizes it, embellishes it; he returns to it more than he borrows from it. Were he taken from the midst of his brothers, transported with his wife and children to solitude, he would find in himself the elements of all wealth, and would instantly form a new humanity.

Why, therefore, would not labor, developed and maintained according to the principles of industrial genesis, fulfilling all the conditions of variety, salubrity, intelligence, art, dignity, passion, legitimate benefit, which it takes from its essence, become, even from the point of view of pleasure, preferable to all the games, dances, fencing matches, gymnasiums, amusements and other see-saws that poor Humanity has invented in order to recover, through a light exercise of body and soul, from the fatigue and the ineptitude that the servitude of toil causes him? Wouldn't we then have conquered fatality in labor, as we previously conquered it in politics and economics?

### Organization of the Workshop.

XLI. — An objection is raised:

The life of the savage, when it is not tormented by famine, disease, and war, passes, it is true, in perpetual intoxication. He is free; to the extent of his intelligence he can call himself the king of creation, and one can imagine that his instinct refuses to change state.

The delights of the civilized, each time he steals one of the secrets of nature or he triumphs over the inertia of matter by the spontaneity of his industry, are greater still. Comparing the advantages and disadvantages of savage life and civilized life, the balance is unquestionably in favor of the latter.

The idea of making the worker enjoy, in full civilization, Edenic independence and the benefits of labor, by a simultaneous education of the intelligence and the organs, which, endowing him with the totality of acquired industry, would thereby ensure the fullness of his liberty, this idea is certainly irrefragable as a conception, and is of immense scope.

All the specialties of human labor are functions of one another, which makes the industrial totality a regular system and makes from all these divergent industries, heterogeneous, with no apparent connection, from this innumerable multitude of trades and professions, a single industry, a single trade, a single profession, a single estate.

Labor, one and identical in its plan, is infinite in its applications, like creation itself.

There is therefore nothing to prevent the worker's apprenticeship from being directed in such a way that it embraces the totality of the industrial system, instead of grasping only a fragmentary case of it.

The consequences of such a pedagogy would be incalculable. Leaving aside the economic result, it would profoundly modify souls and change the face of humanity. Every vestige of the ancient decadence would be effaced; transcendental vampirism would be killed, the mind would take on a new physiognomy, civilization would rise up a sphere. Labor would be divine, it would be religion.

But what are the means of carrying out such a vast plan? How can this polytechnic of apprenticeship — of which it is a question of making enjoy, no longer as today a few privileged young people, but the entire mass of generations — be reconciled with the service of the workshops and the fields?

This objection leads us to the second part of the problem, the organization of the workshop.

XLII. — The difficulty does not come from the teaching in itself, to which it is easy everywhere to give the character of encyclopedic generality that alone can ensure the dignity of man and citizen in the civilized state.

Nor does it come from the subjects to be raised, which it will always be easy to group, according to the requirements of the places and with as much less expense for the families, as the study being mixed with actual labor is likely to pay.

The difficulty comes from the division of labor, a division that

constitutes most industries and therefore seems incompatible with the variety of operations required; which itself seems all the more precious because by exempting the worker from all science, it would seem to accommodate the inequalities that nature has placed between men.

What would be the use of this general education, if the apprentice, having become a journeyman, having chosen a profession, had to spend the rest of his life in the languor of a mechanical labor, of an industrial sub-division? Raised for glory, he would have found only martyrdom.

Let us note first that the objection falls for the farmer.

Agriculture, the center and pivot of all industry, presupposes as much variety in knowledge as it requires, and can require, in labor; destined to become the first of the arts, it offers to the imagination as many attractions as the most artistic soul can wish for.

Add that, being generally operated by families, it gives the highest possible guarantee of independence.

However, the great majority of the populations belong to agriculture. Consult them: they will tell you that what they require in order to be happy is, along with sufficient education, property, credit, economic balance, communal liberty, tax reduction and abolition of military service.

The small industries do not present any more difficulties. They are easily combined, either with each other or with agricultural work; far from showing themselves to be refractory to the great teaching, they call upon it, so that the worker can change jobs at will, and circulate in the system of collective production, like a coin in the market.

There therefore remain the factories, mills, plants, workshops and construction sites, all that is today called *large-scale industry*, and which is none other than the industrial group, formed from the combination of fragmented functions. There, manual skill being replaced by the perfection of the tools, the roles between man and matter are reversed: the mind is no longer in the worker, it has passed into the machine; what was to bring glory to the worker has become for him an assassination. Spiritualism, by thus demonstrating the separation of soul and body, can boast of having produced its masterpiece.

It is therefore a question of bringing about a resurrection.

XLIII. — The masonic initiation includes three degrees: *apprentice, journeyman, master*.

All are called to mastery, because all are brothers: there is no privilege for anyone. At the Masonic banquet, revived from the ancient agape, symbol of universal brotherhood, reigns the most perfect equality.

I count as nothing the thirty higher degrees of which the *Thuilleur de l'Écossisme* (Paris, 4843, Delaunay) gives the details and the formulas. *Vain speculations*, says the author himself, imagined for the pleasure of a



few narrow-hearted, hollow-brained rich people. "All the principles of Masonic doctrine are expressed in the first three grades," which are conferred indiscriminately on any member of society, under the sole condition of *age* and *hardship*.

Transport this principle of progressive equality of Masonic initiation ceremonies into industrial reality, and what do you find?

This, which is the very charter of labor:

1. That, since workers' instruction must be given in full to all, both from the point of view of each industrial specialty and from that of the community of industries, any establishment of large production where the functions are divided is at the same time, for individuals in the process of learning or not yet associated, a workshop and a school of theory and application;

2. That, thus, every citizen devoted to industry has the duty, as apprentice and journeyman, and independent of public service, of which he must provide his share, to pay his debt to labor by executing one after the other, for a given time, and for a proportional salary, all the operations that make up the specialty of the establishment; and later the right, as partner or master, to participate in the management and in the profits;

3. That, under the benefit of the ability acquired in a first apprenticeship and the remuneration to which it entitles him, the young laborer has every interest in increasing his knowledge and perfecting his talent by further studies in other kinds of industry, and that he is invited to do so until such time as he can settle himself, with honor and advantage, in a definitive position.

In short, polytechnic apprenticeship and the ascent to all grades, that is what the emancipation of the laborer consists of. APPRENTICE, JOURNEYMAN, MASTER: this is our whole vocation. Beyond that, there are only lies and verbiage; you inevitably fall back, through the servitude of piecemeal labor, repugnant and painful, into the proletariat; you recreate the caste; you return, through the insufficiency of positive instruction, to the mystical dream; you destroy Justice.

XLIV. — I don't know if in what precedes there is a single idea that is specific to me: what I can say is that I believe that I have done nothing more than comment on the thought of the Revolution and bring out its philosophy.

Was it for nothing that all these brotherhoods of Freemasons, Good Cousins, Carbonaris, Companions of Duty, etc., have served as a prelude to the Revolution, and in this symbolism that is common to them was there no germ?

Was it for nothing that the *Encyclopaedia* was the capital monument of the eighteenth century, erected against Christian and Cartesian

spiritualism?

Was it for nothing that the Constituent Assembly abolished industrial privileges in the same way as noble privileges, declared industry free, and uttered the enigmatic but terrible phrase *Right to Work*?

Was it for nothing that the Convention made the insignia of intelligent and free labor the emblem of equality, and set up these central schools, always suspect, as the cornerstone of the new industrial organization?

Finally, was it for nothing that from this revolutionary inspiration has arisen before our eyes the systems of Saint-Simon and Fourier, dazzling allegories of a more positive science?

Certainly, revolutions are not improvised, we feel it today only too much. To convert a society, to turn a long-enslaved multitude into an intelligent, free, and just nation, requires a little more than political reshuffles; education itself is not enough: a regeneration of flesh and blood is necessary.

So I grant all the transitions that one might desire.

I would even go so far as to suppose, for a moment, that our species, physically and morally, is fundamentally incorrigible, and that it will always retain this malice of mind and heart that man bore at birth and which social servitude has so well developed.

But since in the end we have done as much as giving ourselves governments, a police force, laws; since we keep talking about Justice, public and civil right; since the philanthropy of power goes so far as to take care of the child of manufacture and unhealthy industries, I ask that we lay down once and for all the principles of industrial education and the rights of the worker. We know what the Church thinks, supported by the adhesion of all the mystical sects; and I have just said what the Revolution wants. Come on, let the question be brought, in all its grandeur, to the Council of State and to the Legislative Body, debated in the schools, proposed, by order of the bishops, in all the pulpits. Let at least, if the moral and intellectual misery of the worker is incurable, the wisdom of the legislator be beyond reproach. Because the situation is no longer tenable; for any pretext for adjournment would be odious, and I don't know what fury of indignation seized me just thinking about it. Against the execrable theories of the status quo I feel at my wit's end; and if I could forget before whom I am speaking, it would no longer be, Monsignor, human words that you would have to hear, it would be the roars of a ferocious beast.

## CHAPTER VI.

### Will Labor free itself, or will it not free itself?

XLV. — The question of the liberation of labor, from which the old world can no longer escape, creates for our time a completely dramatic situation.

If justice became for everyone, no longer an empty idea or a divine commandment, but the greatest reality of existence;

If, in consequence of this principle, the balance of services and values were established;

If the collective forces, alienated for the benefit of a few exploiters, returned to their legitimate proprietors;

If the Social Power, the pretext for so many upheavals, were to complete its constitution on its certain foundations;

If education were equal for all and founded in Justice, not in mysticism;

If labor, finally, were freed by the double law of integral apprenticeship and admission to mastery,

In less than two generations, any vestige of inequality would have disappeared. We would no longer know what a noble, bourgeois, proletarian, magistrate or priest was; and we would wonder how such distinctions, such ministries, could have existed among men.

What a reversal of ideas! And for the followers of the old faith, what a subversion!

Let us develop these remarks.

Inequality would no longer even have a pretext in the difference of minds; manual labor, in conditions that the new mode of learning would create for it, assuring the workman a real superiority over the man of pure science.

Science is, in fact, essentially speculative and requires the exercise of no faculty other than the understanding. Industry, on the contrary, is at once speculative and plastic: it supposes in the hand a skill of execution adequate to the idea conceived by the brain. We can say that in this respect the intelligence of the workman is not only in his head, it is also in his hand. It is this *double spirit* of prophecy and miracle about the survival of which Elisha asked his master Elijah. The scientist who is only a scientist is an isolated intelligence, or rather a mutilated intelligence, a powerful faculty of generalization and deduction, if you will, but without organic value; while the duly instructed worker represents intelligence in its entirety, intelligence served by organs, as M. de Bonald said. The industrial worker, so long disdained, becomes superior to the classical

scientist, what a paradox!

XLVII. — That is not all.

The characteristic of false institutions is to obscure ideas and pose insoluble problems; then, when the veil that covered all this nonsense is torn away, to raise against the immaculate truth the calumny of traditions.

What is the *right to work*? Is there a *right to work*? asked the Constituents of 1848, in the best faith and with the best will in the world. In a despotic state where all wealth and all industry depended on the prince, a sort of pact was conceived between the latter and his subjects, by which he guaranteed them at the very least labor and wages. But the means, in a democracy, of decreeing that I must provide work to an individual whose services are useless to me and, if I cannot occupy him, that I will pay a tax to the State, which will occupy him? Such a principle is a recourse to despotism, to communism, the negation of the Republic.

And here is how the Revolution answering them: — In the economic condition of the old regime, the right to work implies a contradiction, that is true; under the new order of things, it is nothing but nonsense. With the balance of services and values, the equilibrium of forces, the integral organization of apprenticeship, there will always be more work demanded than work offered: the question falls into the absurd. What a revelation!

What else, said these poor people, is the *right to assistance*? Those who cannot even be made to work, should we assist them for free? Why not also the right to repose, the right to idleness? We understand insurance, or mutuality of the risk arising from *force majeure*. But assistance is pure charity: how are we to decree that charity forms an obligation for one, a right for the other?

Am absurdity indeed, says the Revolution, like forced love, indemnified justice, virtue rewarded, or labor owed; but nonsense that falls on you. In the mutualist society, every kind of risk is covered by insurance, except that which arises from laziness and misconduct. No more pauperism, assistance has nothing to do. What a shame to the Gospel! What a scandal!

XLVIII. — Everything languishes, they continued, for lack of sufficient remuneration, agriculture, industry, science and arts. The clergy, the magistracy, education, the administration, the army, even the police, there is not a class of society that does not claim *aid, subsidies, encouragements*. Everyone should be subsidized with everyone's money: how to get out of this circle?

Well! Don't you see that this circle is your work? replies the Revolution. Labor no more needs to be encouraged than guaranteed; all it needs is the free circulation of products, the balance of values and

services, the abolition of speculative parasitism, reciprocal and free credit, integral education, the emulation of talent, fair wages, cheap prices. Do this, and your agriculture, your industry, will flourish within, and they will have no competition to fear from without. Encouragements to labor! It is as ridiculous as encouragements to love.

What a blight on routine!

XLVIII. — Someone insisted: The flesh is weak; the spirit needs to be supported, sometimes by praise, sometimes by the lure of rewards. This is the object of our *academies*, our *athenaeums*, our *societies of emulation*, *societies of temperance*, *exhibitions*, *shows*, *competitions*, *prizes for virtue*, etc. From time immemorial the exhortations of science, like the munificences of power, have come to the aid of study, of work, of virtue. It is true — and this is what discourages even the institutions of encouragement — that the results obtained do not even cover the expenses. Agricultural societies have never produced a kilogram of bread or meat. The 1855 exhibition cost ten times more than it brought in. The academies seem to be hotbeds of stupefaction and intrigue: at the French Academy, the counter-revolution is in the majority; the Academy of Fine Arts is incapable of giving a theory of art; the Academy of Moral Sciences teaches Malthus. Then it is with all these solemnities as with sermons; one preaches in vain, the peasant remains a creature of habit, the shopgirl of easy virtue, the man of letters salacious, the workman idle and drunken. What are we to do? Many people would like the academies to be abolished.

Do better, continues the Revolution: let every citizen in the future exercise, at least as an elector, his academic rights. An academy, and all that resembles it, is a representative body, the representation of a scientific, artistic, or industrial specialty. There must therefore exist in each department as many of these bodies as there are specialties in work and knowledge; which amounts to saying that every citizen is part of an electoral body that nominates to an academy, as he is part of an electoral body that nominates to the Legislative Body. And as the distribution of prizes, honorable mentions, medals, etc. are nothing other than the annual report of the work of each functional category, it will then happen that these academies, which believe they are giving the impulse to the masses, will themselves receive it from the masses. Don't you see that it is your academicians who need oats and bran? How ironic!

XLIX. — Make way for the GENIUS! It is always our constituents who speak. Aristotle formally excepts the genius from the principle of equality! The law, he says, is not made for him. And as it would be unjust to proscribe him, the only course to take, in Aristotle's opinion, is to offer

him the command in perpetuity, in a word to make him king. Nowadays, the cult of genius is no less, if at least we are to believe both those who claim it, and those who advocate it. For a moment, after the 16<sup>th</sup> of April, the honorable M. de Lamartine thought he had won the prize for genius proposed by Aristotle; another will get it, without a doubt. — One cannot, you will say, satisfy such and such lofty ambitions. But France clings to her geniuses, who are her glories; and she intends to give them all an ample existence. So what is genius? How is the man of genius recognized? The thing deserves to be examined, especially today when genius abounds and affects government.

You are to be pitied! continues the Revolution. You have too much genius; you will not live. To save yourself, you would have to be convinced of one thing: it is that before analytical reason, the only authority recognized by labor, genius does not exist. What you call genius is none other than spontaneous intuition, prior to reflection, which antiquity worshipped under a mystical name, *Genius*, familiar demon, guardian angel, spirit of divination sometimes, more often spirit of madness and immorality. Sustained by education, reflection and labor, genius sometimes seems to acquire a singular power: it is because it then unites to its own attributes those of science and talent, by which alone it becomes appreciable. In general, genius escapes appreciation; it is an immeasurable quantity, which can no more figure in a cost-price than the size of your conscripts or the faces of your young girls. Why bother with it?

As for intelligence properly so called, as for science and talent, as they are acquired by study and developed by labor, they are measured and rewarded by labor. So make education and science for all; raise, through the polytechnic of learning and the ascent by grades, the level of abilities; let there no longer be any blind people among you: and you will then see, — enlightened by analysis, purged of all aristocratic, spiritualist and predestinate fascination, — you will see that genius has been given to you all in equal measure, and that in this respect you have no reason to envy one another.

Here, I think I hear all the so-called geniuses crying out against the profanation, against the indignity. Well! Since they take themselves for beings apart, let them live apart! Workers, you can and must do without their assistance. (F)

L. — At the opposite extremity from genius appears *domesticity*. As for the latter, our legislators admit that it is in great need of reform. The new spirit has corrupted it; there are no longer any real servants; it is a race that is being lost, whose extinction compromises the very existence of society. But how to regenerate domesticity? What is the domestic? Does he have political rights? Depending on the will of others, can he call

himself a citizen? Servant soul, subaltern, is he only a man? The perfect servant should have a conscience and no self: what are the means of reconciling these two terms?

As the woman, answers the oracle, is the most beautiful half of the human race, domestic service is the most beautiful half of the family. You will have no servants other than your mothers, your wives, your sisters or your daughters, your close relative, your protégée or your friend, who wishes to live with you. Beyond that, remember, there are no servants. There are scrubbers, scrapers, grooms, cowherds, cooks, sweepers, industrialists, in short, who specialize in household functions, with whom you will count as with your tailor, your shoemaker, your baker, your suppliers. (G)

What a lesson for these ladies!...

LI. — These are the ideas, and I pass over some of them, that the progress of time and the underground work of the Revolution have caused to germinate in people's heads, and which flow, like a torrent vomited up by Etna, from the nib of my pen.

This is what, all of us, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, believers and skeptics, feel coming; what worries the aristocracy and inflames the proletariat.

Since the world has existed the worker is damned. After twenty centuries of slavery, religion had only one word of pity for him: from a slave it made him a serf. It is the law of *love!* And now it engages him more lovingly than ever to serve again, the only way, it says, to free his soul for eternity.

Against the worker the philosopher gives his hand to the theologian. From the height of his spirituality he accuses the new economic faith of materialism, sensualism, utilitarianism. In his eyes the working man is inevitably a coarse being, unpleasant to see, repulsive to approach: he digs, he files, he pants, he sweats, he stinks. M. Jean Reynaud speaks of him only with pangs of nausea. So he undertook to remake the ENCYCLOPEDIA, conceived in a malicious spirit. "The laborer will free himself," said Diderot. "He will not free himself," replies the author of the *Encyclopédie nouvelle*, in agreement with the *Encyclopédie catholique*.

Oh! Monsignor, this hard-working mass that I defend, first out of family spirit, but above all out of justice, they are not very advanced in their education, and everyone knows that I have never exaggeratedly praised their virtues. It is stupidity, ingratitude, violence, all that you can imagine that is most reckless. Its political conceptions have seriously undermined its consideration; its virtues,... alas! For six years we can no longer say that the impulse comes from below, and the people follow the impulse. And yet the moral sense of this people is higher, more upright,

than that of all the doctors.

You say, with Bishop Sibour, and the temperate, platonic and druidic republic repeats with you, that *the Christian precept of charity fulfills the providential purpose of the unequal distribution among men of the gifts of intelligence and fortune*. Which means in good French that equality is a chimera, and that equality being chimerical, things must remain as they have always been; that any attempt to change the affairs of society and the State would be criminal, and that the promoters of political and social improvements, whoever they may be, must be sent to Cayenne. *Sint ut sunt, aut non sint*, as the Jesuits said.

The people, on the contrary, are convinced that on this question of work, which is today all their hope and all their wealth, there is something better to do than to harp on the *supply and demand* of the economists, the *laissez faire, laissez passer* of the magistrates, the *charity* of the Gospel, and then to hunt down the workers who go on strike.

The people, first of all, do not believe in the reality of what you call *vocation*. They think that any subject who is sound in mind and body, and duly taught, can and should be, with a few exceptions that are self-evident, suitable for everything: such, according to them, is the privilege of intelligence. As for genius, with all that is reported of the innateness and blossoming of aptitudes, they would be more inclined to see in it a judgment of nature than the index of a talent. *It is necessary*, they say, *that children get used to eating everything*: it is the first lesson that the child of the people receives from his parents.

The people claim, moreover, that labor would be a pleasure for them if they labored for themselves, if they were masters of their operations, if the scale of the work and its variety took away their disgust. — “I know of no greater pleasure,” said a philosophical peasant to me, “than to plow; when I turn my furrows, it seems to me that I am king. Cultivating the land is man’s function par excellence; just as taking care of the household is what best suits women. Hunting, which has so many attractions for distinguished youth, is a ferocious exercise that brings us closer to carnivores.”

The people affirm joyful labor and demand the right, without being able to realize what produces the joy of labor and what constitutes its charter. They ask for this charter from Louis-Philippe; they asked the republic for it; they expect it from the Emperor: fear that they will end up giving it to themselves. The transition could be abrupt, and if you don’t see miracles, you run the risk of seeing disasters. I can answer you for what smolders under these smocks, I who lived their life, who shared their prejudices and their vices. Listen to this anecdote.

I was not always as strong as today on the economic balance, the question of State, the double conscience and the interpretation of



emblems; and since I led a worker's life, it is enough to say that I had my period of spontaneity, before reaching my period of reflection. I still remember with delight that great day when my composing stick became for me the symbol and the instrument of my liberty. No, you have no idea of this immense pleasure in which swims the heart of a man of twenty who says to himself: "I have a trade! I can go everywhere; I do not need anyone!" How overwhelmed Christianity is by this enthusiasm for labor, so strangely misunderstood by our men of the Church and our statesmen! Honor, friendship, love, well-being, independence, sovereignty, labor promises everything to the worker, guarantees him everything; the organization of privilege alone makes the promise lie. I spent two years of this incomparable existence in different cities in France and abroad. More than once, for love of it, I rejected literature, of which some friends opened the door to me, preferring to practice the profession. Why couldn't this dream of my youth last forever? Believe me, Monsignor, it was not entirely out of a literary vocation that I became a writer.

LII. — It was in 1832, at the time of the first invasion of cholera, between the funeral of Casimir Périer and that of General Lamarque. I had left the capital, where out of ninety printing works not one had been able to hire me. The revolution of July had stopped the ecclesiastical book trade, which provided typography with its main source of food, and the authorities had not the sense to supplement it with a philosophical and social library. To provide for the distress of commerce, the chambers had voted a credit of *thirty millions!* The system of peace at all costs was unable to understand that it was not thirty million that was needed, but three billion, and that by indebting the country for this sum, applied to a reproductive work, it would have made an excellent investment.

Judging that Paris was the abode of great miseries as well as great fortunes, I resolved to return to the provinces. After a few weeks of work in Lyons, then in Marseilles, the work still lacking, I headed for Toulon, where I arrived with 3 fr. 50 c., my last resource. I have never been more cheerful, more confident, than at this critical moment. I had not yet learned to calculate the *debit* and the *credit* of life; I was young. In Toulon, no work: I arrived too late, I had missed the twenty-four-hour *window*. An idea came to me, the true inspiration of the time: while in Paris the unemployed workers were attacking the government, I resolved for my part to address a summons to the authorities.

I went to the town hall, and asked to speak to M. le Mayor. Introduced into the magistrate's study, I pulled out my passport in front of him: — "Here, sir," I said to him, "is a paper that cost me 2 francs, and which, after information furnished on my person by the police in my neighborhood, assisted by two known witnesses, promised me, enjoined the civil and

military authorities, to grant me assistance and protection in case of need. Now, you will know, Monsieur Mayor, that I am a printer's composer, that from Paris I have been looking for work without finding any, and that I am at the end of my savings. Theft is punished, begging forbidden. There remains labor, the guarantee of which alone seems to me capable of fulfilling the object of my passport. Consequently, Mr. Mayor, I come to place myself at your disposal."

I belonged to the race of those who, a little later, took as their motto: *Live by working, or die by fighting!* who, in 1848, granted *three months of misery* to the Republic; who, in June, wrote on their flag: *Bread or lead!* I was wrong, I admit it today: let my example instruct my fellow men.

The one I was talking to was a short, round, pudgy, satisfied man, wearing glasses with gold arms, who was certainly not prepared for this formal notice. I took note of his name. I like to know those I like. He was a M. GUIEU, called *Tripette* or *Tripatte*, a former lawyer, a new man, discovered by the dynasty of July, who, although rich, did not disdain a college scholarship for his children. He must have taken me for one who had escaped from the insurrection that had just shaken Paris at the general's funeral. — Sir, he said, bouncing in his chair, your complaint is unusual, and you are misinterpreting your passport. It means that if you are attacked, if you are robbed, authority will come to your defence: that is all. — Excuse me, Mayor; the law, in France, protects everyone, even the culprits whom it represses. The gendarme does not have the right to hit the assassin he seizes, except in the case of self-defense. If a man is imprisoned, the director cannot appropriate his effects. The passport, as well as the paybook, for I have both, implies something more for the worker, or it means nothing. — Monsieur, I am going to have you issued 15 centimes per league to return to your country. That's all I can do for you. My powers extend no further. — This, Monsieur Mayor, is alms, and I don't want it. Then, when I am at home, where I just learned there's no work to do, I will go and find the mayor of my commune as I have come to find you today; so that my return will have cost 18 fr. to the state, useless to anyone. — Sir, that is not my business... He didn't budge from there.

Pushed back with loss on the ground of legality, I wanted to try another line. Perhaps, I said to myself, the man is worth more than the functionary: placid air, Christian figure, minus the mortification; but the best fed are still the best. — Sir, I resumed, since your powers do not allow you to grant my request, give me some advice. If need be, I can make myself useful elsewhere than in a printing press and I am not averse to anything. You know the locality: what do you recommend? — Sir, please leave.

I eyed the character. The blood of old Tournési rose to my brain. — "That's fine, Monsieur Mayor," I told him through gritted teeth. "I

promise to remember this audience.” And leaving the town hall, I left Toulon by the Porte d’Italie.

LIII. — I can’t help but think that when I was leaving Paris, bag on my back, to look for a job that was always slipping away, Hégésippe Moreau was staying there, confined with misery. Wretch! It is not I who will throw a stone at him, and who will accuse him of having disregarded the law of labor. Like him, and longer than him, I passed through the tribulations of laboring life, and I can render to the slandered poet this posthumous testimony: he was not tempered for such a struggle. He was too much of his time; his verses betray a precocity of talent, a delicacy of organization, a sensitivity of heart, a power of the ideal, a need for elegance and also for voluptuousness, which, from the womb of his mother, fortune lacking, doomed him to death. His *Myosotis* is a funeral lament. Poetry held him like a tuberculosis in the lungs: despite all his efforts, and he made heroic ones, he had to succumb. There is no courage against the consumption of the soul, any more than against that of the body. If I had known him then, I could have said to him: “Friend, I am your senior in age, but in spirit you surpass me by ten years. Believe me, however, that you are spending yourself too soon; too fast; you are not on your way, you are losing it. There is something else to do besides poetize and bay at the shopgirls, and liberty will not be based on the sound of aeolian harps. Come with me for a *tour de France*, soak your soul in the Styx, take the measure of this old society which I don’t want any more than you. In ten years we will be back: I’ll be the reasoner and you the cantor...” Who knows if I wouldn’t have saved a great poet? All he needed was a strong friend: I would have loved him with passion, and I would have had strength for two. Hégésippe Moreau belonged to that artistic and chivalrous democracy that was to abort in 1848; I followed from then on my line of realistic experimenter, which was to carry my thought beyond all the inventions of the ideal. I was, I dare say, in the true current of the Revolution.

What was I doing in Toulon in 1832, when in the name of order and justice I demanded labor, and with the best will in the world and my twenty-three years, with my classical education and my job as typographer, I found myself *fit for nothing*, and put out of society, so to speak, like a useless member? Interpreter of popular sentiment, I protested, as the people themselves protested in 1848 and as they protest every day; I protested against this system of nameless absurdity, which, while allocating to the masters the net product of the working class, does not allow them, however, to guarantee a labor that enriches them.

And who was I to blame for this monstrous anomaly? It was not this mayor, who after all was only confining himself to his duties and his

egoism, and who had the right to do so; it was not the Revolution of 1830, which had also only brought into relief the badly cured vice of the previous regime; nor was it the Revolution of 1789, which, being the first to reveal it, had not had time to indicate the remedy.

What I had to accuse, Monsignor, was this mania for spiritualism and transcendence, which, in an interest from beyond the grave, seems to have taken on the task of turning everything upside down on this earth; which has made labor in general a curse and every trade an incapacity, as it has made of property a privilege, of almsgiving a virtue, of science a pride, of wealth a temptation, of servitude a duty, of Justice a fiction, of equality a blasphemy and of liberty a revolt.

So the people are no longer mistaken, and although it is impossible for them to follow by reasoning the chain of ideas and facts, and although the ecclesiastical and feudal power has fall far from what we once saw, their instinct tells them that the only thing that prevents them from being happy and rich through work is theology, and at heart they are no longer Christian.

But privilege is no more mistaken; and, by a just inversion of roles, he who gloated in licentiousness when the people full of faith went about in prayer, now that the veil has fallen before all eyes, he has understood that the Church was his cornerstone; he becomes a Jesuit, he envelops in evangelical words, in philosophical, economic and statistical jumble his projects of perpetual exploitation. He doesn't want labor to free itself, he doesn't want that at all.

Listen to this speech, a summary of five hundred volumes published since February, and a hundred thousand newspaper articles. This is how the exploiting caste intends to organize work.

LIV. — “The Revolution,” say the conservatives, “has shaken the social order to the very base. And as the abyss calls to the abyss, from a first attack on the principle of authority came all that legion of mad ideas that today threaten to engulf us. It is no longer enough for the people that they have been declared sovereign; here they are claiming equality of goods, equality of education, equality of genius!... They want labor to be enjoyed, and this land, which wisdom enlightened from above has called a *vale of tears*, to be a PARADISE! — We are being deceived, exclaims this furious multitude, when we are shown the golden age in the past: it is before us. March, march, emperor!... March, departments; march, commons; march, private companies; march, leaders of industry!... Quarry stone, smelt iron, build machines, vessels, wagons, bridges, ports, roads, railways, palaces, churches, theaters, boulevards!... Borrow, get into debt, make yourself furniture for use, housing and luxury, which exceeds ten times the proportion of your income and your outlets. And when you run

out of cash, bankruptcy. But we must work and eat: *Bread or lead!*...

“Let the power and the bourgeoisie therefore know it; let the magistracy and the Church, let the educators and the army, let all who feel value and have something to lose think of it! Time is running out, and since the Revolution always speaks of science, it is up to science to deliver us from it.

“Yes, we will say it again with the wisdom of the centuries, it is necessary that the multitude serve, that it work in humility and obedience, and that its life be regulated in all things. Without that, there is no salvation for civilization, founded from all eternity on the inequality of persons and, consequently, of fortunes. But this multitude must also eat and be able to feed its offspring. These two principles laid down, the need for a privileged class and the need to ensure the subsistence of the working class, how are we to restore between them this balance that slavery among the ancients, that serfdom in feudal times, had achieved to a certain extent, and whose conditions were suddenly changed by the French Revolution?

“Christianity had brought a new thing into the world: it was charity, the principle of all our charitable institutions. But charity needs to be enlightened, above all to be concealed, on pain of debasing itself as alms and remaining powerless. Let us therefore make a science of charity: this will not deprive it of its religious character.

“How much does it take, on average, for the worker to live? What does his subsistence consist of? What is his household inventory? At what rate of wages does he become miserable? At what figure can he pass for well-off? To what extent do the wife, and later the child, contribute to this salary? Too much ease corrupts him; too much misery kills him. How are we to maintain the balance? For what share of contribution should the solvent workman strike? What supplement, against payment or free, can the commune, the corporation, the parish provide to the unfortunate? It is important to know, with accuracy, this first part of the balance sheet of the working classes.

“The constitution of the human being does not allow us to demand an equal amount of labor from it at all times of its life, any more than that of the animal. First of all, at what age can the individual, male or female, be judged fit for service? Then, according to age, sex, profession, how many hours of work per day can the individual devoted to wage labor provide? How much per month and per year? How much for a career of ten, twenty, thirty and fifty years? What is the era of the greatest value of the worker? When does he become unable to work? Man being considered as an instrument of labor, what is the most advantageous way to use this instrument? Is it better, from the point of view of the product and of public safety, to aggravate the drudgery of each day and reduce the wages,

at the risk of shortening the life of the subject? Is it better to lighten the burden, so as to extend the service? Finally, what deduction should be made from wages, so that the disabled worker does not fall under the charge of society?

“Too much stupidity in the worker overwhelms him, too much knowledge is harmful. The social order, the safety of the masters, their fortune, are equally compromised by both excesses. In this respect, the division of industries is both the most powerful aid that Providence has provided to the heads of state and the pitfall where their prudence fails. What is the measure and the specialization of knowledge with which it would be appropriate, in each industrial part, to equip the hireling, in order to make him as intelligent as his service requires and at the same time as impenetrable to any idea of ambition and change as his position requires? The extension of apprenticeship is all the more valuable as a means of taming the proletarian, as the interest of the journeymen agrees with that of the masters in delaying the delivery of the booklet to the apprentice. What rule are we to follow in this regard ?

“The movement of the population must especially attract the attention of the statesman. Under what conditions of age, effective service, savings made, etc., will it be permissible for persons of both sexes, in the working class, to enter into marriage? How to prevent illegitimate offspring? What means of cooling, physical and moral, could be usefully employed?

“Man, given over to the suggestions of free will, to all the whims of his personality, tends incessantly to emerge from the condition imposed on him by the interests of society. He needs to be held, like the soldier, by a discipline that constantly reminds him of his dependence. Religion first: under the pretext of liberty of thought, will the worker be allowed to disdain its practices? Many heads of industry and manufacture require of their employees and workers the fulfillment of religious duties: would it not be desirable that this example should be followed everywhere? How does religion operate on the will and the reason of the proletarian? What dose of it does he need for him to take his destiny in good part and resign himself to it? It has been claimed that the corruption of morals is favorable to the enslavement of the working classes, while virtue is an incessant provocation to liberty. A comparative, in-depth study of these two systems would have its price. What will be the spectacles to be given to the people? What will their readings be? How far will travel be allowed? We are not talking about secret meetings, correspondence, journals, rallying signs, watchwords, which cannot be pursued with too much severity. As for the hours of meals, getting up and going to bed, they are indicated by those of the labor itself. What can be the influence of the uniform?

“A well-done inquiry into all these questions, collected from all points of the globe, would be of extreme importance: it would form the positive

basis of the new order of things. The authors would deserve the rewards and encouragement of the academies, the blessings of the Church, and the distinctions of the State.

“For the salvation of society is at stake, established since the beginning of the world on these two great principles of the condemnation of the multitude to labor and of the inequality of faculties and fortunes. It is the latter above all, badly defended up to now and kept in the shadows by the false prudence of the legislators, as if they had seen in it only a fatal exception to justice; it is this sacred law of subordination and hierarchy that must be instilled in the masses, no longer as a derogation from common law, but as the sovereign formula of the providential economy and the necessity of things. And this is what will be achieved, not by scientific demonstrations, which the intelligence of the people is and must remain unable to follow, but by a vigorous organization and a practice of detail that make it an article of faith and an invincible prejudice.” (H)

LV. — Am I slandering or exaggerating? What then has been taught, for centuries, on these questions of *labor, charity, pauperism, public benevolence, misery, the poor tax, begging*, etc., by this political economy, Christian and Malthusian, of which the Church carries the philanthropic flag, and which one can define as a crusade against labor and Justice, in the name of God?

We follow it, this crusade, in the administrative constraints imposed on the worker, *booklets, passports, birth certificates, certifications*, etc.; in the appalling severities deployed against coalitions and strikes; in the hiring of congregations; in the increasingly draconian regulations of large companies, where the worker, numbered, subject to uniform, orders, instructions, silence, bodily inspection, oath, not even having the disposition of his beard leaves nothing to envy to the soldier, who at least has his hospital, his Invalides, his ten o'clock leave, and, on days of jubilation, the little glass of brandy. (I)

My hands are full of abominable details that show how far, in certain companies, the contempt for the man and the citizen in the person of the worker has come. Oh! Gentlemen administrators, be sure that nothing is forgotten: you are marked for the holocaust.

LVI. — The same spirit of contempt and hatred is found in so-called charitable institutions. I have before me the *Manuel des commissaires et dames de charité*, with the *Règlement sur le service intérieur de santé* and the *Traitement à domicile*, preceded by this invocation, drawn from the ampules of M. de Gérando:

“You whom the speculative view of the evils of your fellow man leads to accuse providence, let yourself be moved! Go console, support that unfortunate;

let his gaze and your gaze meet, and Providence is justified. You only accused her of your own fault: *she had confided in you* the accomplishment of her plans. The *intention of Providence* is manifest: she wanted misfortune to be placed under the tutelage, under the patronage of prosperity... It is not properly alms, it is charity, that is the goal of Providence, the vocation of the well-to-do man, the complement of the harmony of the moral world. (*Le visiteur du pauvre*, crowned by the Academy of Lyon, Paris, 1820.)

What is painful to see, in this organization of *Providential Charity*, is this continual, outrageous inquisition of the true needs of the poor, which scares away all those whom charity has not yet branded with a hot iron; it is this *classification*, this *registration*, this *numbering*, this policing, these conditions to be fulfilled in order to be entitled to the *pot of the poor*, to the *free passport*, to the *subsidy of fifteen centimes*, to *participation in public works*, to the *permission to sell goods in the streets*, to the *return of belongings of relatives deceased in hospital*, to *free burial*, etc. No respect for man in this system: the religion of Providence has killed it. I am told that it is impossible to do otherwise. *Pardieu!* I know it anyway: it is precisely because public beneficence cannot be exercised without this secret police, which I curse. No respect, no charity: your assistance is the pillory.

LVII. — And now, what the police do, as the organ of society, what the great industrial companies and charitable establishments do, official science has undertaken to justify by its maxims.

Antiquity and the Middle Ages have been searched; the balance sheet of modern societies has been drawn up; figures and facts have been piled up, and then people say with an air of triumph: “See, workers, we have examined everything, consulted everything, questioned everything; never such an inquiry, since the existence of the world, has been undertaken and brought to a close. There is nothing new in all your utopias; all the palliatives, since Solomon, have been proposed, tried, reworked, and finally rejected. There is no remedy for the evil...” This is what we are told, and among all these men of God, messengers of despair, there is not one who asks himself this fruitful question: What is labor in itself? What are its relations with intelligence? What are its mental and moral conditions? Consequently, and in a word, what is its RIGHT?

The Right, I say, between the apprentice and the corporation, representative for him of society, between the worker and the boss, between the employee and the company with millions, the right, what is it? Where is it? Who has defined it? How is it that the question of right, with regard to Labor, is the only one that philosophy forgets to ask, as if it was afraid of it?

M. MOREAU-CHRISTOPHE, remarkable among all for his patient and



conscientious studies on misery among ancient and modern peoples; who discovered among the Romans, the Greeks, the Hebrews, everywhere, the right to work, and the right to assistance, and the right to idleness, which simply proves that the question has been on the agenda for centuries; Mr. Moreau-Christophe, whom I would gladly praise, if he did not conclude against the emancipation of the worker by a combination of servile labor and charity, did he even approach this question: What is labor and what is its *right*? No. M. Moreau-Christophe affirms with the Gospel the eternity of servitude: that is his entire philosophy.

And M. LE PLAY, author of the *Trente-six monographies* which have obtained, with the suffrage of all the Catholic, aristocratic and counter-revolutionary factions, the praise of the Academy of Moral Sciences, did he not naively confess: "His research has had the object of determining the maxima and minima of the worker's existence." As for the possibility of emancipation, he does not admit it; a philosopher of Providence, he does not concern himself with Right.

And M. de MARBEAU, the founder of the *crèches*, whose tenderness of soul proposes transportation against every recidivist beggar;

And M. de MAGNITOT, who combines assistance with repression, as M. Moreau-Christophe combines servile labor with charity;

And M. Alexandre MONNIER, who rejects the right to assistance, temporarily introduced, after the Revolution, in place of the right to work, and who substitutes for it the *duty of assistance*, according to the philosophy of MM. Oudot and Jules Simon;

And M. GRANIER DE CASSAGNAC, who discovered, after all the ancient and modern religionists, that slavery is an institution prior to and superior to society, and who therefore demands that socialism be *suppressed*;

And this congress of charity, held in Belgium, which, after having twisted and turned the question of pauperism, adopted by way of conclusion the *right to beg*;

And the author of this project to send foundlings to Algeria;

And so many others whom I refrain from quoting, of which a hundred pages would not exhaust the nomenclature; has this whole world of philanthropic economists ever concerned itself with the physiology or, to put it better, with the psychology of labor? Does it know what the balance of services, the mutuality of credit, the collective force, the polytechnic of learning are? Does it suspect, alongside the political, civil and criminal rights, beside the right of war and the right of peoples, the existence of an economic right? Does it even possess a moral sense?

LVIII. — Thus society is divided in its deep layers.

The worker cries out with the Revolution: Justice, balance,

emancipation.

The old world answers: Fatality, necessity, predestination, hierarchy!  
What will be the outcome of the debate?

For me it is not doubtful: *Credo in Revolutionem*. But a specific question requires a specific response, and here is my conclusion:

The worker will not engage in the conflict on the personal question: he still feels too little of his dignity as a man and as a citizen.

He will not revolt for the economic balance: *debit* and *credit* are too obscure terms for him, and speculation, like the lottery, displeases him only moderately.

He will not take up arms for his political sovereignty: indifference in matters of government has won him over like everyone else.

Even less will he protest against the bad education given to him: it implies that nothingness protests against itself. Only one who has learned much is hungry for knowledge.

The laborer will rise up for labor: this question for him implies all the others.

Because to demand that labor be freed is to demand *ipso facto*:

That individual liberty be respected;

That the balance of services and values be achieved;

That the provision of capital becomes reciprocal;

That the alienation of collective forces cease;

That the government, established on the democratization and mutuality of industrial groups, centers of collective forces, be reformed according to the law of their ponderation;

That primary instruction be taken away from the clergy;

That vocational education be organized;

That public oversight is ensured;

All things without which the liberation of labor is impossible, but which are repugnant to the interests of privilege as much as to Christian thought.

What could hold back the insurrection?

In feudal times, the worker was convinced of his inferiority; he believed in the providential nature of his condition, he carried in his heart respect for nobility, love for royalty, the religion of the priesthood. These feelings, which made him take his fate patiently, today no longer exist. The worker hates or suspects everything he accuses of *exploiting* him, that is, everyone who is not a worker like him.

Unless there is an amicable settlement, the battle is forced. And victor or vanquished, labor will impose the law on capital: for what is in the logic of facts always arrives; against right, there is nothing in the world more useless than victory.

# APPENDIX.

## NOTES AND CLARIFICATIONS.

### Note (A).

QUIETISM. — “Quietism is essential to religion, to any religion. It is the consequence of spiritualism, of the contemplation that is proper to it, and of the passivity of spirit that this contemplation invincibly engenders. After having depraved the reason through the inertia of the understanding, it depraves the heart and leads to the last degree of immorality through the laziness of the body and the inertia of the will. This is what results from its definition and its history.

“By *quietism* we mean the doctrine of some mystical theologians, whose fundamental principle is that one must annihilate oneself in order to unite oneself with God; that the perfection of love for God consists in keeping oneself in a state of *passive contemplation*, without making any *reflection* or *any use of the faculties of our soul*, and in regarding as indifferent all that can happen to us in this state. They call this absolute repose *quietude*; from this came to them the name of *quietists*.” (BERGIER, *Dictionnaire de théologie*).

Quietism has been condemned by the Church, Calvinism as much as Jansenism, both of which may be regarded as being in some way opposed: in this the Church has shown more practical sense than logic. Quietism, in fact, has its source in the distinction between the two substances, spiritual and corporeal, the first celestial and sovereign, the second terrestrial, impure and condemned to servitude. From this distinction of the human being into soul and body, spirit and matter, results, as M. Jean Reynaud has revealed to us, the tendency of man to act by thought alone, by will and command; to abstain from all laborious action, consequently to create for himself instruments of those of his fellows whom he considers not to be endowed to the same degree as himself with the faculty of contemplation. The Church has judged quietism only within the limits of religious practice: we must judge it in the full extent of human life, collective and individual.

“We can find,” continues the ecclesiastical writer whom we have just quoted, “the cradle of quietism in the spiritual origenism that spread in the fourth century, whose followers, according to the testimony of Saint Epiphanius, were irreproachable on the side of mores. Evagre, deacon of Constantinople, confined in a desert and given over to contemplation, published, in relation to Saint Jerome, a book of *Maxims*, in which he claimed to deprive man of all feeling for the passions, which very much

resembles the claim of the quietists. In the eleventh and sixteenth centuries, the Hesychasts, another species of quietists among the Greeks, renewed the same illusion and gave rise to the wildest visions; they are not accused of having involved licentiousness in it. At the close of the thirteenth and at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Beggards taught that the *perfect* had no longer any need to pray, to do good works, to fulfill any law, and that they could, without offending God, grant to their body all it asked for.”

The cradle of quietism, we repeat, is in spiritualist contemplation: the proof, once again, is that it is found in all religions; it forms the basis of the religion of Buddha. The facts reported by Bergier, including everything relating to Molinos, Madame Guyon and Fénelon, are only a particular case of quietism, just as the belief in purgatory and the practice of indulgences are a particular case of the doctrine that places the moral sanction in another life. The Sabbath of the Jews was already quietism. Any prayer addressed to the Divinity, in order to obtain help and protection, is a beginning of quietism. Quietism can exist, to a very high degree, in a society that has no religion or no longer has a religion: it suffices for this that, through the effect of prejudice, habits, or any other cause, the work of pure speculation is more esteemed than the work of the hands, art more than industry, politics more than right. Society then finds itself exactly under the conditions defined by Molinos; it will not be long in reaching the last limits of dissolution.

“Perfect contemplation, says Molinos, is a state in which the soul does not reason; it reflects neither on God nor on itself, but it passively receives the impression of celestial light, without exercising any act, and in complete inaction. In this state the soul desires nothing, not even its own salvation; it fears nothing, not even hell; then the use of the sacraments and the practice of good works become indifferent; the most criminal representations and impressions that occur in the sensitive part of the soul are not sins.” (*Ibid.*)

Let us translate this, and apply it to contemporary society.

France, for example, entered on December 2 into an era that can be called, using the expression of Molinos, an era of political and social *contemplation*. France, in fact, *no longer reasons*. It distrusts logicians and it is afraid of ideologues. The slightest opposition is painful to it; it asks only to live in silence and tranquility. Its thought falls with a continuous fall, and sinks into a complete flattening. *It reflects on nothing, neither on God nor on itself*. It no longer understands its old religion; it practices it even less, although it pays for it. It has no concern for its Revolution, now checked, abjured, shouted down. Don't talk to it about its mission in history, about the future of civilization, about improving the lot of the masses: these ideas disturb it, trouble it; it dismisses them, devoutly, as a

suggestion of the devil. Labor, of which it spoke so much after February, had lost all consideration in its eyes. The real producers, in its eyes, are not the workers, miserable laborers, inferior souls, a kind of living tools, incapable of rising to the sublimities of contemplation: they are the speculators, the sponsors, the jobbers, the inventors, all those who act through pure thought, through credit, through mechanical, chemical, financial combinations, through administration and command. Any other practice is unbearable to it, reduces it. It suffices for it, to believe itself beautiful, rich, virtuous, happy, to *passively receive the impression of the official light*, to read the communications of its government, to savor the messages of its emperor, the amplifications of its journalists, the descriptions of its novelists. *In this state*, the French nation desires nothing, not even its own progress; *it fears nothing*, not even its own downfall; the exercise of its rights, the practice of liberty, are matters of *indifference* to it. It dreams, it enjoys; *the most criminal representations and impressions* no longer affect it; it no longer discerns honor from shame, virtue from vice; it has become *insensitive to sin*; it can boast of having reached the pinnacle of holiness, because it has lost its moral sense. So it gives itself up, and without remorse, to all the impulses of the sensitive part, to all the delights of sensuality. Drinking, eating, gloating, making love, all kinds of love, isn't this the privilege of the pure? After having begun like Sparta, the France of the Revolution ends like Babylon: such is contemporary quietism.

#### Note (B).

DROIT DU SEIGNEUR. — It seems henceforth established in history by numerous and authentic testimonies, that the *droit de seigneur* was exercised in the Middle Ages in France, in Italy, in Spain, in Germany, in England. Dom Jacobus (*L'Église et la morale*, Volume II, pages 62 to 67) cites the following extracts from various customs:

In Picardy: "When any of the subjects, male or female, of the said place of Drucat marries, the groom cannot sleep the first night with his lady bride without the leave, license and authority of the said lord, or unless the said lord has lain with the said bride. (*Coutumes en faveur du seigneur de Rumbure*, September 28, 1507.)

"And I, as Sire de Mareuil, can and must have the right to poach young women and girls, in my said lordship, if they marry; and, if not poached, fall due for two sous towards the said seigniory." (1288)

Dom Carpentier, who relates this text to a feudal recognition of Jean, lord of Mareuil, adds:

"Poaching is therefore using this right. It is also mentioned in the local handwritten custom of Auxe-le-Château, whose men were freed by

Guillaume III, Count of Ponthieu.”

And in Normandy: “In said place (of the Bourdet river) I also have the right,” says the lord, “to take from my men and others, who marry on my land, ten tournois sous, etc.; or I can and must, if I please, go to bed with the wife, in case her husband or someone acting for him does not pay... one of the things above specified.” (1429).

Same custom in Italy. Father Ghilini relates that in 1235 the vassals of Acquesana, irritated by this right, called *fodero* or *cazzagia*, rose up, killed the count, demolished the castle, and took refuge in the forest of Nice where they founded a city.

Dom Jacobus cites still other testimonies, all of which are to be understood in the same sense. It even seems that when the lord happened to be an ecclesiastic, the priestly dignity did not prevent him from claiming his right. Among other facts in support, we cite the revolt of the villains against the abbey of Montauriol, in the diocese of Montauban, a revolt caused by the scandalous custom, passed into law, of taking the bride to the monastery, so that she submits to the right of the lord, *jus cunni*.

Despite all these charters, printed or handwritten, we do not think less that, if the *fact*, in a sufficiently large number of localities, is materially proven, the right is a pure fiction, for the reason that it is historically incomprehensible.

Among the Asians, the owner of the female slave had a right over her: Moses recognizes this formally, since, in the case where the slave was of Jewish blood, he stipulated in her favor guarantees, damages. This right derived from polygamy, the subordination of the sexes and slavery.

The Greeks and Romans, by virtue of the laws of war in force among them, also exercised it: however, we doubt that, except in the case of war, this right was recognized and even less practiced, the Greeks and Romans being monogamous, honoring, more than other peoples, their wives.

After the establishment of Christianity, concubinage, legalized by the emperors, was first preserved in the Church, and even confused with solemn marriage. Later, it was equated with simple fornication, and became sin. At whatever time we flatter ourselves, concubinage carrying for concubinaires, like marriage for married couples, the prohibition of all foreign trade, conjugal fidelity became obligatory, fornication and what follows was deemed a crime or misdemeanor. There was thus restriction in the relations of the sexes, exclusion of certain acts formerly reputed licit, which no privilege, no distinction of classes could have been able to exonerate. The *droit de seigneur*, in a word, is essentially repugnant to the Christian spirit, to Christian society. We believe in an abuse, in an insolence of feudalism, in an outrageous extortion, which put the climax to all the snubs and plunders of the feudal lords, but nothing more. The

documents cited in support of the alleged *droit de seigneur* confirm this assessment: they show everywhere the alternative posed by the lord between the payment of a royalty and the prelibation of the bride; they prove moreover that where the lord wanted to take seriously his right of prelibation, the villains revolted and manhandled the lord.

The lords, as we know, established dues for their benefit on everything. There was milling duty, cooking duty, toll duty; right to birth, right to funeral (retained as inheritance law); lock law, door and window law, cornette law, bolster law, etc. The idea of putting a right on marriage could not fail to come in its turn: the precept or advice to spend the first three nights in continence furnishes one more pretext. From there, to the usurpation by the lord of the *droit de seigneur*, there was only one step. In Russia, the boyars sometimes allow themselves to do the same with their servants. They claim that having the property of the peasant, they have by that very fact that of virginity. But this privilege is not recognized; it is a pure abuse of authority and force, which it often costs lords dearly to allow themselves.

#### Note (C).

FREEMASONRY. — It has happened to Freemasonry as it happens to any sect which, having begun with a symbolism, does not know how to understand and philosophically develop the meaning of its emblems: it has lost its way in false speculations, and has been corrupted by doctrines that are diametrically opposed to it. At this moment the confusion is at its height in Freemasonry, as can be seen from the *MONDE MAÇONNIQUE, Revue des Loges de tous les rites*, issue for September and October 1859. The emptiness of the Masonic initiation has become for all the brothers so evident, so palpable, that many withdraw and cease to frequent the lodges; the others publish their separation resoundingly. Freemasonry, if it believes it can still play a role in the world, needs a reform, not a reform that would bear only on the rite, as we have already tried so many times, but on a reform that, getting to the bottom of things, would highlight the thought, the true Masonic thought.

For nearly a century, the vast majority of lodges have professed the deism of J.-J. Rousseau, which suddenly became, in the year 11 of the Republic, so famous, and so odious, through Robespierre's enactment of it. This vogue for a deism is conceivable: for weak souls who, while renouncing the Christian faith and giving themselves an air of rationalism, nevertheless wish to preserve a fund of religion, nothing is more convenient than this profession of faith in two articles, to the Muslim, the *Existence of God* and the *Immortality of the Soul*. With that, one considers oneself duly informed, one no longer examines: is there

anything better assured in matters of opinion than what one does not examine? One would perhaps not find, from the double point of view of religion and philosophy, a doctrine more inconsistent, more narrow, more foolish than this reduction of Christianity: it is precisely what makes its fortune. We no longer want to be confused in the peat of believers who admit without discussion everything that the priests say; but we are incapable at the same time of following philosophical criticism to the end. Just as the pure idea is above the average reach of minds, justice for itself is above most consciences; and one keeps to a silly eclecticism that equally satisfies presumption and impotence. *I believe in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul!* This Masonic confession, which since Rousseau has delighted the brothers, has always seemed to me the equivalent of this one: I am an imbecile and a coward.

Some however, having more capacity or more leisure, allow themselves to seek beyond. *Le Thuilleur de l'Écossisme*, published in 1812, and intended above all for masons of high grades, professes, under the name of the *Système de la génération universelle*, a sort of pantheism analogous to that which was formerly taught in the mysteries, which enters into the ideas of Volney and Dupuis.

“The aspect of the Universe,” says this anonymous writer, “offers to the eyes of the observer a perpetual rotation of *Creations, Destructions* and *Regenerations*. To be born, to die, to reproduce, such is the law imposed on all that exists. MOVEMENT or, if you will, God, Spirit, Atoms, subtle Matter, is the efficient cause of these various states of matter. it alone gives life, and it alone causes death. It is the beneficent Osiris; it is the formidable Typhon. These gods are brothers, or rather they are one God.

“In symbolic language, we say that *Death is the Gate of Life*, a truth little known to those who possess the rank of *Master*, although the emblems, placed before their eyes, should have instructed them. We understand by this figure that fermentation precedes birth and gives birth; that in a word, for generation to take place, the generative principles must die, so to speak, they must be dissolved by putrefaction. Indeed, without an internal and fermentative movement, without the separation, without the disgregation of the surrounding parts, how could the germ come to light through the envelopes that hold it captive?

“The phenomenon of universal generation can be considered under a multitude of varied aspects... Hence, this immense variety of fables, rites, symbols, which, all relating to the same end, nevertheless have more than once embarrassed the mythographic commentators. For THE RELIGIONS, ancient and modern, ARE all equally PHYSICAL and IT IS NOT AMONG THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURE THAT ONE SHOULD SEEK THE GODS OF NATIONS. *Eos qui dii appellantur rerum naturas esse, non figuras deorum.*”

There is a long way, as we see, from this doctrine to that of Jean-



Jacques: also it seems to have been reserved for the highest initiation. But, whatever mystery we have made of it, it does not belong to Masonry any more than Deism: it is only one more testimony in support of what we have said of the nothingness of doctrine that afflicts at this time the Lodges.

In recent times, some brothers, more indiscreet than wise, having proposed to use the Lodges for a religious renovation, they were answered, with great good sense, by the *Monde maçonnique*, that the principles of *free examination* and *tolerance* that form the foundation of Freemasonry opposed its becoming the agent and organ of any religious thought; that any profession of faith, becoming obligatory, implied, with regard to those who reject it, excommunication, and consequently was in contradiction with the principle of *universal brotherhood* that is the true object of the Masonic societies.

“We are told,” adds the editor, “that the religious bond is essential to modern societies. Religion appears to us, on the contrary, as an individual sentiment quite independent of the existence, progress and well-being of societies. In the collective state, it almost always appears to us as a danger.”

Here, then, is religion well and duly excluded from Freemasonry, not in the sense that it excludes from its bosom either Jew, or Christian, or Mohammedan, and that it shows itself intolerant of any religious opinion; but in the sense that it is, like the Revolution, Justice, free reason, above all religion. To accept a profession of faith, for Freemasonry, would be to derogate, to descend: it does not want it. What does this mean except that the Freemason, as a Freemason, recognizes only one law, which is Justice, and, in the Architect of the Universe affirms, not the substance or the cause, but the reason, the relation, the harmony of things?

#### Note (D).

ELIMINATION OF THE ABSOLUTE. — See, for the perfect understanding of this passage, the following study, on *Ideas*, chapters I and II.

#### Note (E).

SIGNS. — We greatly admired the young Pascal inventing geometry, without the help of any master, with *bars* and *rounds*. To give concrete names to the ideal figures of geometry seemed both the height of genius and naiveté. But the human mind began exactly the same way: the line, *linea*, from *linum*, *lin*, is a *thread*; the circle, ΚΥΚΛΟΣ, is a *round*; the angle, γωνία, a *corner* (γόνη knee?); the cone, ΚΩΝΟΣ, a *spinning top*, a pine cone; the sphere, σφαίρα, a *ball*, a *bullet*; the square, *quadratus*, a

*four-sided*; the trapezoid, τραπέζα, a kind of figure with four faces, a *table*, etc.

The names for numbers were formed similarly; their etymology still lets itself be seen in Hebrew: one, *éhad*, is a *point*; two, *schnaim*, the pair, pair of *horns*, a *pitchfork*; six, *schesch*, a *lily*, six-petalled flower; ten, *aschar*, complete, that is to say the two full hands, the ten fingers; hundred, *maha*, the *big* ten, etc.

The successive invention of alphabetic writing, after the manner of our rebuses, is now explained: A, *aleph*, or *alpha*, is an ox, an elephant; B, *beth* or *beta*, a house; D, *daleth* or *delta*, a gate; G, *ghimel* or *gamma*, a camel; I, *iod* or *iôta*, a hand; K, *kaph* or *kappa*, a curve, an arc; — L, *lamed* or *lambda*, a pin, a crankshaft; M, *mem* or *mu*, water, sea; — O, *âin*, an eye; — PH, *phe* or *phi*, face; R, *resch* or *rho*, head, etc. Most of these letters have preserved in the old alphabets a remote resemblance to the objects of which they gave the sketch. At first writing was only a simple representation of objects; then it was agreed that the object represented would be indicative of the sound or of the articulation that served to designate the object phonetically; that thus the sign A would serve to designate, not an ox or an elephant, but the sound *a*; that the sign B would no longer be indicative of a house, but of the sound *b*; that I would no longer represent a hand, but the sound *i*: so that A followed by B, pronounced *ab*, plus I, pronounced *ab-i*, would mean father to me, my father.

This is how we can trace the analytical work of primitive humanity, which, starting from sensible images and a synthetic conception, that of equality, relationship, convenience, balance; needing therefore, in order to recognize itself in the infinite variety of its ideas and attempts, to put order in its memory, it broke down the very objects of its intuition, and from their fragments created, at the same time, concepts and signs.

#### Note (F).

GENIUS. — This word has been abused so much, the claims of those who assume the prerogative of it are so exorbitant, and what we say about it in the text could appear so brutally paradoxical that we cannot think of entering here into a more thorough explanation, which races to every objection.

In principle, genius is to man what instinct is to animals. Every human individual is therefore endowed with genius, just as every animal is endowed with the instinct proper to its species: in this respect, there is no opposition. The whole difficulty hinges on the more or the less, that is to say on the very power of the genius, consequently on its quality.

In principle again, one can say that the power of genius, like that of

instinct, is due to the organism, that consequently it is proportional to the organic power, of which it is the expression. By organic power we mean not the absolute force of action, which would amount to measuring organic power by the dimensions of the organized body and its mass; but the relative force of action, that is to say with regard to a given weight of matter, It is thus that there is more motive force, organic power, in the swallow than in the whale, in the rhinoceros or in the ostrich.

From this, we already see that in each animal species taken separately, the power of instinct, just like the organic power, between individuals belonging to this species, is sensibly equal. There are differences, no doubt; but they are for us, most of the time, indeterminable.

It is the same with man, whose organism is so complicated, subject to so many accidents, consequently to so many inequalities. First, the organic power varies within fairly narrow limits. Suppose that the muscular force of the average individual is 10 kilograms raised to the height of one meter per second during 12 hours of daily work: a force of 20 kilograms would already be a very rare thing; a force of 30 kilograms would hardly be found any more. From the point of view of muscular action, there is no man who is really worth three.

This formula can be applied to genius, which we assume, in the state of nature of course, to be proportional to organic power:  $x$  being the average value of genius in the human subject, there will perhaps be elite individuals whose genius equals  $x \times 2$ ; there is none whose genius equals  $x \times 3$ .

But it is a question of civilized man, in whom genius has taken the form of intelligence, and who is incessantly fortified, by memory, by the experience of the whole species. We ask if the *minima* and the *maxima* will always be the same.

In what, first, does human genius consist?

In a general faculty of industry, without special object, and of an extreme poverty at the beginning; but which, by reflection and analysis, becomes capable of indefinite development and in all directions. It is this reasoned evolution of genius that engenders among us trades, arts, sciences, philosophy, religion, politics, and which constitutes, properly speaking, intelligence, Reason.

It follows from this that if the power of the natural genius is very nearly the same in all men, if it does not go in its greatest deviation, from simple to fourfold, the evolutionary power of this same genius, intelligence, must maintain the same relationship: the differences between man and man, much greater in the civilized state than in the state of nature, come above all from education, given to some, refused to others, and from the specification, which, instead of giving each individual genius its integral development, confines the multitude of souls

to the uniformity and the fragmentary nature of the work, where they become stupefied and end up petrifying.

Those whom, in our admiration and gratitude, we call men of genius par excellence, are subjects in whom education and practice, reasoned work, philosophy, have developed and strengthened natural genius, while the mass, left to itself, muzzled by misery and menial labor, stagnates in inertia and ignorance.

Facts and testimonials back up what we say. A proof, first of all, that human genius has nothing special in its nature, is that men of true genius, of true intelligence, for it is, as we see, much the same, are proper to everything; the great artists, such as a Michelangelo, a Leonardo da Vinci, cultivate all the arts indiscriminately, and who would dare to doubt that they did not succeed equally well in industry? The great thinkers, Descartes, Leibniz, Pascal, Kant, as well as Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, are mathematicians, moralists, historians, theologians, orators, poets, naturalists, etc.

Then we see that genius, extremely simple at first, since it is reduced to the perception of a relation, develops its power and universality through exercise. Genius, say some, is *attention*; according to others, it is *patience*. — “How did you make your discoveries?” one asked a genius scientist. *By always thinking about it*. — Now, this power of genius, which increases indefinitely through the continuity and intensity of action, has its source in the power of the organism, as the men of genius themselves suggest. “What is the first quality of the orator?” Demosthenes was asked. *Action*. — The second? *Action*. — The third? *Action*. — “To accomplish the Revolution,” said Danton, “what do we need?” *Audacity*, more *audacity*, and always *audacity*. What made the military genius of a Condé, a Villars, a Marshal of Saxe, a Masséna, a Bonaparte? The vital energy that, applying itself to the struggle, gave them those *sudden illuminations*, transformed little by little into RULES in the thought of the Turennes, the Frederic IIs, and the Napoleons. The latter boasted of knowing everything that can be useful to a man of war: industry, science, history; geometry, algebra, chemistry, metallurgy, mechanics, saddlery, wheelwrighting, building, etc.

Here an objection arises. By admitting integral education for all citizens, equality would still not be achieved. Suppose that the difference of natural or raw genius goes, in its greatest difference, from 1 to 4, its evolutionary power will also vary from 1 to 4, since this power of evolution is none other than the genius itself, considered in the second of its attributes. So that these two elements, the native genius or simple intuition, and the power of evolution of the genius, multiplied one by the other, would give for highest degree 16, the lowest degree remaining 1.

Let us accept this estimate, however exaggerated it may seem. What

will be the consequence? In the political, artistic, literary order, in science, war, etc., it will be that the man who is worth 16 will obtain everywhere the first place; his dignity will be the highest in the Republic; he will be president of all the academies, head of the government, commander of the land and sea armies, decorated with all the orders, enjoying all the honors. In the economic order, where the law is that services are exchanged for services, products for products, this citizen prodigy, supposed the equal of 16, but who can always be replaced by 16, will have a salary of 16 times as considerable as the income of the ordinary citizen, that is, supposing the average income for each producer of 5 fr., 80 fr. per day, and per year 29,200. In this there will be no injustice, since by virtue of the law of exchange this exceptional man, appointed at 80 fr. per day, receiving only the equivalent of his product, frustrated no one. If this same man, the equal of 16 by the power of his faculties, produced only as one, he would only be remunerated as one. We see by this how little there is to fear, for the balance of conditions and fortunes, from what are called natural inequalities. Not accounting for the fact that these inequalities are confined within narrow limits, they cannot, by themselves, engender any ill-being, the income of each must be equal to his product.

But this is not how things happen, and the inequality of talent and genius, so warmly invoked, is only a pretext which serves to palliate the most shameless spoliations. There is not, in all of Europe, a single man whose power and services are really worth, according to the calculation we have just made, 80 fr. per day; on the other hand, there is not one who, apart from cases of idiocy or illness, cannot easily succeed in earning half of the supposed average, that is 2 fr. 50. Now, the workers everywhere are far from earning 2 fr. 60; it is necessary that the so-called notabilities of genius, to whom must be added those of property, monopoly, finance, administration, the army, since it is in favor of the genius that one claims to legitimize all inequalities, it is necessary, we say, that all these superiorities are satisfied, at most, with 29,200 fr. of income. Here is how the distribution is established.

The genius, say the advocates of inequality, is recognized by his works, *Opere probatur opifex*. But this in no way means that he should be remunerated, like ordinary producers, in proportion to his labor, the cost of his production, the quantity of his works, which would debase him. The merit of genius goes beyond the sphere of mercantile transactions; his rights are not regulated according to utility alone, the common measure of products and services: account must also be taken of the pre-eminence of the subject. This amounts to saying that the man of genius, rising by the qualities of his mind above the general level, is entitled, by that alone, by reason of its rarity, and independently of the effective service that he renders by the productions of his genius, to a high salary, the price of

which follows a geometric progression which raises it much above above proportionality.

Let's translate that into figures. You can equate genius with diamonds. Everyone knows that the value of a diamond is obtained by multiplying the square of its weight, expressed in karats, by 48 if it is a rough diamond, and by 192 if it is a cut diamond. Thus a cut diamond of the weight of one karat (the karat is equal to very nearly one five-thousandth of a kilogram) is worth 192 francs. The diamond of the weight of two karats will be worth 768 francs; that of three karats 3072, and so on. It would be the same, according to our adversaries, for the man of genius. The work of the dauber or house painter, raw genius, is it estimated, per day, 5 francs, that of an artist of the immediately higher degree will be worth 20 francs; at the 3<sup>rd</sup> degree, it will be worth 45 francs; to the 4<sup>th</sup>, 80 francs; to the 5<sup>th</sup>, 125. A genius of the 16<sup>th</sup> degree, if there were such, would be worth 1280 francs per day, that is, per year, 467,200 francs of income. M. de Lamartine, commending himself to the generosity of the French people, asked for nothing less than that. The Emperor Napoleon III, by setting his civil list at 25 million francs, excluding the other profits, considered himself a genius of the 118<sup>th</sup> degree, which comes close to the famous diamond, the Regent, whose the weight is 136 karats. There are larger diamonds than the Regent, and we have seen potentates more highly paid than the Emperor Napoleon III, who can thus still be considered modest.

The consequence can be seen coming. By a law of balance as admirable as it is severe, society only produces just what it consumes. What is not consumed, remaining without value, does not produce. The objects of first necessity giving the measure of the others, it follows that, all things considered, the production of a country like France is not — far from it, including the production of the men of genius and intelligence — 1 fr. per day and per capita. Consequently, the consumption, per day and per head, is far from being 1 fr. Whence it is easy to conclude that the 36 million Frenchmen earning and spending, year after year, only their necessities, it is necessary, in order to provide genius with its high pay, to take from the subsistence of the others; it is necessary, I say, in order to maintain the fine minds, the national exemplars, the great individualities which make the glory of the empire, that the mass deprives itself of a part of its legitimate salary. This is why there are so many people whose average expenditure per day is barely 25 cents.

Have we at least, wretched hirelings that we are, have we the satisfaction, by taking the morsel out of our mouths, of giving ourselves geniuses? Are we rewarded for our dedication? Well, no: since this imbecile adoration of genius developed among us — it dates from the romantic school — genius has been eclipsed day by day. Each aspiring to

genius, with a view to honors and emoluments, the modest sphere of the useful has been abandoned for that of the ideal; then, instead of developing genius in all of its manifestations, we began to specialize it; the processes of Malthusian industrialism, the division of labor, have been applied to it; and we have all these specialties, very numerous today, of verse, prose, novel, drama, music, dance, declamation, singing, piano, violin, of painting, of sculpture, of engraving, of fashion, etc., which all take themselves for the manifestation of genius, and which are only its mutilation. The impossibility of subsidizing this whole world of capacities brings misery there, which results in venality and prostitution.

Scorn for labor, mutilation of intelligences, misery, prostitution, a bohemian life: this is what the fetishism of genius produced in France, under the poisonous influence of romanticism and the imperial regime.

For us, who do not want to idolize or belittle genius, we will conclude from this discussion two things, which equally satisfy the law of economics and the law of the ideal: the first is that the man of genius, like the hardworking man, should be remunerated according to his works, nothing more, nothing less; the second is that the pre-eminence of talent and genius can only be recognized by honorary distinctions, not by a deduction from the common product. The exhibition of genius, apart from the product, is free by its nature, like that of beauty and virtue; it is degrading it to claim for it, in addition to its honors, fees.

#### Note (G).

DOMESTICITY. — The present state of domesticity is one of the things that most deeply show social disorganization. Domesticity once had its honor: it has lost it. The egalitarian spirit, proper to the Revolution, being unable to create either worthy masters or faithful servants, the result was to be, as long as the equality that is in the laws had not passed into conditions and fortunes, that while the upper class exploits the working class, it would itself be exploited by the domesticity. The servants, in the impossible situation that the Revolution made for them, have become insolent, unfaithful, without probity, without mores. Never was it more true to say that the servant is the enemy of the master, the valet a being with a human face but below the man, *a fortiori* below the citizen.

The well-to-do, in order to procure good servants, have found no secret but the lure of wages. From there, a distressing anomaly: the servant is paid above his value, the servant is more wealthy than the worker, which is the reversal of all social, political and economic relations. The masters are not better served: domesticity being on the rise, the exploitation of the rich class by the domesticity only increases, and this will be one of the causes of the destruction of the bourgeoisie.

For the void left by a depraved domesticity, there is only one remedy: that is, for women and young girls, courageously returning to the care of the household, to become their own servants again; it is that families are reformed, that the son does not leave the paternal house, that the unmarried sister does not separate from the established sister, that mothers remain with their children, uncles and aunts with their nephews. There exists in Germany a happy custom, which is the exchange that families make between themselves of their children, in order to train them for industrial work, family habits and household cares. I would not recommend it in France: in the current state of mores, there is no security for the young girl, not even for the young man, to move away from the paternal home. But it is certain that if anything can one day replace feudal domesticity, which had nothing humiliating about it, it is, after the reform of feminine mores, mutual domesticity.

Note (H).

SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATION OF SERVITUDE. — It is said in the text that the work of M. LE PLAY, *Les Ouvriers européens*, a very large folio of 800 pages, printed by order of His Majesty the Emperor of the French at the the Imperial Printing Office, and covered with the applause of all the academies, has no other aim than to give the method to be followed for the enslavement of the workers. The entire §LIII, page 128 to 197 of this study, is the development of M. Le Play's thought. So that we are not accused of slander, we will give an overview of the alleged method of Mr. Le Play.

M. Le Play belongs to the conservative bourgeois party, more or less rallied, by the necessity of circumstances, to the Empire. Like many others, the revolution of 1848 made this economic engineer realize that there was something to be done about the working classes. But what to do?

M. Le Play does not believe in the equality of conditions and fortunes; he does not believe, if he is a logician, in equality before the law; consequently, he does not believe in Justice. On the other hand, he does not doubt the necessity of a social hierarchy; he therefore wants, and with all the strength of his convictions, the maintenance of what makes up this hierarchy, property and its privileges, industrial mastery and its prerogatives, capitalism and its dividends, the Church and its endowments, centralization and its world of officials, the army and conscription; the worker, finally, but the disciplined, classed, fixed, obedient worker. As for a political, economic and social revolution, M. Le Play vigorously rejects it.

But, as we observe in the text, to contain the worker, it is necessary, at the very least, that his needs be satisfied; one must, if one wants him to do



without the superfluous, provide him with the necessary. The great point, the essential question, the real social problem, according to M. Le Play, is therefore to settle that minimum portion of the worker, with which, his day done, he must no longer think of anything but drinking, eating, sleep, but without which it is always to be feared that he will revolt.

How are we to achieve this settlement?

M. Le Play believed that the first thing to do was to note, on a large number of different points, the situation of the workers. He thought that the competition of the masters among themselves, then of the masters with the workmen, must have had the effect of determining, in an approximately exact manner, the quantum of the remuneration, consequently of the normal existence of the workman. What universal spontaneity, M. Le Play said to himself, what tacit consent, the force of things, the law of competition, etc., have established, must be considered, very approximately, as the expression of the truth. This is what he calls applying the method of observation to political economy. According to this principle, M. Le Play has made a monograph of thirty-six different categories of workers, observed in Sweden, Russia, Turkey, Germany, England, France, etc. Let us cite an example.

*Foundry worker, in the iron factories (in the woods) of Nivernais.* — This workman is married, the father of three children aged 6 to 10: so that the family is made up of five persons in all.

*Budgeted income.*

Worker's wages: 351 days	675.30 fr.
Income in kind, coming mainly from the domestic occupations of the wife and the eldest son; grants and relief	190.69.
Interest at 5 percent on savings, and bonuses during unemployment	<u>18.00</u>
Total revenue	883.99

*Budgeted expenses.*

Cash expenses	645.60
In-kind expenses	<u>190.69</u>
Total of expenses	836.29
Remaining for savings	47.10

The budget, of which we reproduce here only the totals, is drawn up by M. Le Play in the most meticulous detail, and forms no less than two pages of his immense folio. It is also preceded and followed by

considerations and remarks on the locality inhabited by the worker, on his mores, his religion, the education of the children, the relationship between the boss and the worker, food, clothing, etc., etc. Thus exhibited, the monograph of each worker comprises six pages in-fol., that is to say approximately 32 pages in-8. The 36 monographs, made with equal care, are all similar in *method* and *content*: they only differ in details of mores, country, climate, which have their interest, but which do not furnish the economist with any further idea.

Now what can we conclude from this statistic? We see well, by the example of the foundry worker of Nivernais, that a family of five people subsists with an income of 883 fr. 99 c., i.e. Fr. 0.48 cent. per day and per head; we even see that, out of this income, the family finds means of realizing a saving of 47 fr. 70 c. Also the situation of this foundry worker is it one of the best: the weaver of Sarthe, in charge, like the preceding one, of a wife and three children, has to live on only revenue, in wages and in kind, of 543 fr. 90 cents, or about 80 cents. per head per day. So he is obliged to have recourse to public beneficence: Well, once again, what does M. Le Play resolve to do? Because you have to make a decision. Does he first find that these two families earn too much, or enough, or not enough? Does he see the possibility of improving their position? Let him indicate the means. Does he believe, for example, that the owner of the factory can be expected, in conscience, to raise the wages of his workmen? He wouldn't dare say so; he certainly doesn't think so. Provided the worker's livelihood and health are not too compromised, he asks for nothing more. As for a reduction in salary, it is not necessary to think about it: it is not moreover Mr. Le Play who would take care of this odious proposal. So, in the final analysis, our statistician concludes with the status quo, I mean the status quo of receipts: because, for the rest, he is of the opinion that nothing should be neglected that can contribute to the learning of the workman, by the practice and temperance, of domestic economy, religious virtues, provident institutions, to be content with his lot, and even to economize on his small budget.

But, in good faith, is this all the questions that the worker's budget, so painstakingly analyzed by M. Le Play, raise for the economist, the philosopher and the statesman?

a) Here is a worker, founder, miner, weaver, watchmaker, launderer, etc. The first question that arises is to know how far his professional instruction should extend. For it is evident that the division of labor tends to restrict the horizon of the worker; it mechanizes him, and makes him a slave. What will be his education? What is his learning? A member of a civilized society, he cannot be treated like a lost child of savagery, a beast of service with a human face, from which one extracts the most useful part before it dies. He is a member of the republic, to whom the social pact

recognizes rights, to whom the State, consequently, owes guarantees. On what will these guarantees bear? On work, or on assistance? The question cannot be eluded; and yet the aim of M. Le Play and of all his fellow philanthropists is to elude it. No right to education, no right to work, no right to assistance: this is what they declare. The *method* of M. Le Play would be disastrous, revolutionary, if it led to the recognition of such rights.

b) At least the worker who works has the right to wages: this is granted. We even go so far as to recognize that the wage rate must be regulated freely, by mutual agreement, according to the law of supply and demand, But, if the salary is debatable, it necessarily implies that there is a point above or below which the salary is not true: hence, necessarily, a question of the highest gravity, but one that Mr. Le Play deliberately suppresses. What is, in general thesis, the normal wage rate? What, at base, constitutes the price of the service? What is value? What is its law? Regarding all of these things there must exist principles and formulas for application, the knowledge of which is essential for the determination of the *Debit* and the *Credit* of the worker.

c) The worker lives on his wages; consequently, he can, with the same wages, be at ease or in difficulty: that depends on the price of the foodstuffs of which the worker's consumption is composed. But the price of the foodstuffs is affected in a thousand ways by taxes, by rent, by interest on capital, by monopoly, by agiotage, by customs protections, etc. Hence the result that the wage paid to the worker, unrelated to the current price of foodstuffs, is reduced to a leonine transaction to his detriment. As employee and as citizen, the worker therefore has the right to ask himself these questions: What is tax? What should be the *maximum* rate? How and on what should it be levied? What is interest on capital? What is the best credit and discount organization? How to escape the maneuvers of speculation? What should protection, an expression of industrial solidarity, consist of?... These questions are of public order, as much as of economic right: their solution is essential for the liquidation of wages. M. Le Play says nothing about them.

d) Among the products of human industry, there is none, in an agglomerated and politically constituted population, that does not result from the cooperation, direct or indirect, of a large number of men. Thus, apart from the special and salaried workers, there is the owner of buildings, the capitalist, the supplier of raw materials, the entrepreneur; then there is the state that protects, the society that opens its markets, the whole system of industries, all of which, living off one another, are closely or remotely attached to each one. The result of all this is a collectivity in which the co-operators can and should be considered, to varying degrees, as partners, and therefore as subject to mutual obligations. Any worker

who participates in a business can and must, in principle, regard himself as being associated with it; as such, he is entitled to a share of the property and the profit, just like the owner, the entrepreneur, the capitalist and the state. The state exercises its right to tax and by the manner in which it regulates, by means of customs, the price of products; the capitalist exercises his through the dividend; the owner, by the rent; the entrepreneur by a levy that represents his salary. How will the worker exercise his? In some countries it is accepted that the farmer acquires a right in the property he cultivates and improves; nowadays the principle of association and worker participation has been laid down: in all this, what are the principles, what is the right? — M. Le Play dismisses all these questions, against which one can say that he protests. He does not want to hear about the rights that arise from labor any more than the right to work: in his eyes, it is utopia, socialism, disorder. His philanthropy admits benevolence, foresight, encouragement, primary school; it rejects the right. Isn't this like the usurer who, on his deathbed, pressed by the confessor, consented to bequeath to the unfortunates whom he had robbed something to prevent them from starving, but who rose up at the idea of a RESTITUTION?

Note (I).

THE WORKERS UNDER THE IMPERIAL REGIME. — The administration worker is subject to the regime of the barracks. Here are specimen agendas, borrowed from the railroads:

*Service Order*, No. 8.

“From May 1 to September 1, the installers are on the road continuously from five in the morning until seven in the evening; the rest of the year, from sunrise to sunset. They take their meals there at the times fixed by a special service order. The duration of meals does not exceed two hours; during hot weather, it can be increased to three hours.

“The workers are present on the road continuously, even during meals and bad weather.

“A. SIMON, Chief Engineer.

“Any dismissed worker and employee will never be admitted to the Company's worksites.”

All workers must present a certificate stating that they have never been mixed up in politics. In 1848, after the June Days, the Compagnie du Nord denounced its workers as socialists and insurgents.

The workers come to visit like the conscripts arriving at the corps; those who refuse are not approved.

A measure taken by the railway companies restricts them from accepting employees over 30 years of age. We could cite some who were fired for the sole reason that they had passed their forties.

Bordeaux, April 7, 1857.

“Please prevent workers from smoking while working. The care of filling the pipe, of lighting it, of not breaking it, of maintaining the fire, wastes a lot of time and causes disturbances harmful to the work.

“It is of the greatest importance to ascertain very closely and frequently the quantity and quality of the work done. It is necessary to make war on softness and nonchalance, a too common defect of men whose salary is assured and who are not supported by a sense of duty.”

“J. CHARLET.”

The principle of the enterprise by workers' association and of piecework would remove all the embarrassments of nonchalance, pipe and bell; but that would be independence, and better yet a deficit on labor. We could cite a workshop that has seventeen supervisors for a hundred workers.

The regulators know no bounds. In the form of fines, they do not hesitate to get their hands on the salary, a property as sacred as any other. This is the house rule: take it or leave it. As for the claimants, they are denounced as instigators or accomplices of coalitions.

This regime, decorated with the name *administrative*, prevails everywhere, in the factories, in the forges, even in the printing works. The police are organized in the workshops as in the cities: no more trust between employees, no more communication. The walls have ears! Under this regime, the French worker turns into the *lazzarone*, and has no more to concern him than to do as little as possible. So the administrators praise the English worker.

As a final courtesy, the worker in the big cities who wants to go to the suburbs on Sunday enjoys the privilege of paying a quarter on top of the fare on most railways: *Sic vos non vobis*.

# NEWS OF THE REVOLUTION.

## BOURGEOISIE AND PLEBS.

One of the most significant influences in history is that of corporations and castes.

Nature has multiplied the human races, so that the species is constantly improving by their mixing. This law is demonstrated at the same time by the generations of mixed blood, more vigorous and more beautiful than those of pure blood; and by the decay and extinction of princely families, which, intermarrying only among themselves, are rapidly being destroyed. The crossing of races can be considered as the condition of the physical improvement and the perennial character of the species.

An analogous phenomenon takes place in the moral order.

Society, seeking its law, creates within itself, first, castes and corporate bodies, then simple categories of arts and crafts. The object of these social distinctions, some purely arbitrary and transitory, others founded on the economic principle of the division of labor, is to constantly raise the intellectual and moral level of the mass by the fusion of the parts. Hereditary professions, separate marriages, are for nations a cause of immobility and death. The fusion of classes, like the crossing of races, is one of the conditions of progress.

Humanity is truly beautiful, it has life and power only in the aggregate and the plenitude of its faculties: any split is fatal to it. It is therefore in the image of collective, synthetic humanity that we must work incessantly to form ourselves, either as individuals or as corporations and nations. The right of peoples and economic right have no other object. Among the means that economic law employs to bring about this continual fusion, the most powerful are, in the first place, the abolition of castes and privileges, then the freedom of industries, their reciprocal permeability and integral apprenticeship. Apart from these, the individual confined in his specialty, the corporation in its privileges, the caste in its insolence, will soon fall below themselves; as fractions of humanity and organs of society, they will be worth less than if they had preserved their primitive mores. Hence this contradiction which for 2,000 years has embarrassed historians: universal Justice, it cannot be denied, has grown; virtue, in individuals, corporations and castes, has remained stationary; it has often, and we are witness to this, even shown itself to retreat.

The appearance of the Bourgeoisie is a fact common to all peoples. Russia at the moment provides us with an example of this: there is in the process of forming, as in France in the Middle Ages, as in Gaul before

Julius Caesar, an intermediate class, between the nobility, in decadence, on the one hand, and the peasant, still a serf, on the other. This intermediate class, whose attribute is commerce, industry and banking, received in French the name of *bourgeoisie*, from *bourg*, town, because in the Middle Ages, while the nobility remained in their castles, the clergy in its convents and churches, the peasant in his cottage, the middle class, which consisted of the industrious and the merchants, entrenched itself in its walled towns, in its cities.

The clergy, the nobility and the serfdom today no longer forming castes, we mean by bourgeois all individuals living above all from the rent of their lands, the rent of their houses, the interest on their capital, the profits of their businesses; by plebeian or proletarian any individual having to subsist only by his labor. However, it is customary to add to the bourgeoisie the small industrialists, craftsmen, manufacturers, shopkeepers, farmers, etc., established on their own account, plus, among the employees or workers, those whose income surpasses by a certain amount the average income of all members of the nation. As a result, the bourgeoisie is subdivided into *high* and *low*: the latter constitutes nowadays, strictly speaking, the *middle class*.

Nature does not create more bourgeois than nobles, but, the distinction of classes once made by the interplay of interests and the evolutions of society, the bourgeois tends to constitute, as formerly the noble and the priest did, a type apart, a race within the race, as easy to recognize, by its language, its sentiments and its habits, as the Chinese, the Jew, the Bohemian, the Scandinavian, the Tartar, the Arab are by their physiognomy.

The bourgeois is a villein who has left the soil for commerce and trade, and who has made a more or less rapid and considerable fortune through business. Anyone who has lived in a provincial town has seen these transformations: they happen every day.

The character of the bourgeois, the turn and range of his mind, the temper of his soul, the energy of his conscience, everything in him is explained by his origin. We are not talking about virtues: the bourgeoisie, let it be said without slander, has no virtues peculiar to it, any more than the nobility or the clergy. Virtue belongs to human nature; it manifests itself in all situations; it does not appear anywhere as a *grâce d'état*. The corporation and the caste, departing from universality, can only warp human dignity, make it more or less equivocal and unsightly.

What separates the bourgeois from the soil from which he emerged is the desire to procure more well-being with less trouble, more security with less dependence. So far this is nothing reprehensible: we have only to note a tendency to economize labor and to escape general servitude. How did the bourgeois solve the problem?

The peasant, dedicated to the exploitation of the soil, produces wealth by labor itself, by labor applied to the arrangement of the harvests and the care of the animals. The country worker, when he is not himself a farmer, earns his living in the same way, by manual labor. The bourgeois, on the contrary, seeks his fortune in traffic: that is where all those who abandon the fields to retire to the city begin. First, he becomes a stall-holding merchant, then a domiciled merchant, wholesale and retail, commission agent, money lender, banker, etc. Each of these functions no doubt has its utility: but it can be said that the bourgeois, by giving himself up to them by preference, by making himself the intermediary of exchanges, shuns labor and separates himself from the category of true producers. If he undertakes an industry, it is still less as an industrialist than as a merchant, in order to hold his goods at first hand and to ensure, with the profit of the sale, the profit of manufacture. All his effort, in developing his business and increasing his clientele, is to have himself replaced in the workshop by paid workers: as for him, he stays in his shop, at his counter, presiding over the sale, talking with the regulars and tending to his paperwork. New index of the antipathy of the bourgeois for any laborious profession. Many industries are exercised by people who do not know the first word of the trade: they are only the sponsors; they are not, strictly speaking, industrialists, they are speculators.

On this observation alone, we can pronounce that the bourgeoisie is, like the nobility and the clergy, only a preparatory institution, which sooner or later must disappear. Two things suffice for this: the discipline of transactions, the conversion of warehouse, transport, banking, and credit services into public services, and the application of workers' association to factories and manufactures. By this double measure the bourgeoisie is attacked in its essence, and condemned irrevocably. It gave itself, without knowing it, the signal for this revolution, through its companies for railroads, mining, armaments, bazaars, etc., which are so easy to transform into workers' establishments, under state supervision. Already the petty bourgeoisie, this middle class, so precious to the doctrinaires, has begun to give way to the big sponsors; it returns to the proletariat. A little longer, there will remain only the upper middle class, already stigmatized by the name of *industrial feudalism*. The nobility, arrogating to themselves the privilege of land and command, disappeared; the Church, to which belonged the direction of teaching and morals, is in the process of perdition; the magistracy, which formerly was the owner of its offices, attacked by the jury, has become a functionary of the State. A similar fate awaits the bourgeoisie, which no longer has a reason to exist.

Thus the true, the sole aim of bourgeois creation is to collect, as an intermediary, this kind of profit to which the rudimentary state of transactions gives rise: profit on exchange, *agio*, interest, usury: all things



of which the farmer and worker have only a weak idea, and the practice of which becomes so easily fraudulent, odious. By the spirit and the tendency of his constitution, the bourgeois is a speculator, monopolist, counterfeiter, falsifier, fraudster. One of Louis-Philippe's most distinguished ministers, M. Humann, had notoriously made his fortune by smuggling. For a long time, the most lucrative industry of the bourgeoisie was the farming of taxes: the story of Fouquet, the mores of the Turcaret, are famous. Today, they bid for loans and railways, they are stockbrokers, and in every way they put pressure on the nation and the state.

Any man who is not sovereignly governed by Justice is dominated by an idol, to which he sacrifices everything else. One is subjugated by love, another by gambling; this one speaks through poetry, eloquence, this other through painting or music. The turbulent choose arms, the intriguers prefer politics. The coarsest indulge in the *far niente* and good food. Some have a passion for horses, dogs, birds, mechanics, etc. There is no lack of them that mysticism seizes, and who give themselves to God, without loving justice and humanity any the more. The idea that absorbs the intellect of the bourgeois, to which he brings back all his feelings, all his speculations, by the meter of which he judges men and things, is WEALTH. His fundamental category is that of the *useful*; it alone illuminates and makes visible to him the objects placed under his horizon.

The bourgeois appreciates the good, the beautiful, the just, the true, the holy, according to the market value of objects: what he admires in the products of art is what they cost; what he esteems of science and philosophy is what they can yield. His reason does not bend to the idea that one can be a man of merit and not have known how to make a fortune. It was not the musician who discovered the laws of acoustics, nor the painter who created the theory of light: such discoveries presupposed a genius for universalization incompatible with the idolatry of the artist. It is thus with the bourgeois: speculator, seeker of profits, collector of differences, he invented bookkeeping; he did not know how to generalize the principle of his own accounting, to follow his business philosophy: economic science does not exist. The same influence of the bourgeois spirit manifests itself in morality. What pleases the bourgeoisie in the mouth of the moralist is that probity is nothing else, at bottom, than self-interest. *L'Art d'être heureux*, inspired in large part by this utilitarian morality, brought its author, M. Droz, to the academy. This ethic is that of entire nations, bourgeois, merchant nations, of course, not agricultural nations or nations with mediocre business skills. There is not an act of English politics that does not explain the mercantilist principle of well (or badly) understood interest; and everyone can see today that the more the aristocratic influence declines in England and the House of Commons acquires preponderance, the more also English politics becomes diffused

by the fervor of its egoism and the shamelessness of its contradictions.

The bourgeois has invented the aphorism, *Virtue is needed, but not too much*. He also has his high morals and his low morals. What holds him back is not the fear of doing wrong, it is the fear of being seen. As he is sure of nothing, except his deadlines, in everything that does not directly affect his interests, the *qu'en dire-t-on*, the opinion of others, dominates his numb conscience. The loss of his consideration, of his credit, of his clientele, affects him to the highest degree; indelicacy, by itself, very little. He will never die of his remorse; he could die of grief. It is not the bourgeoisie that provides the most subjects for criminal justice; but it is on that class that the fear of the fine, of prison, of the penal colony exerts the most influence.

In politics, the bourgeois has only one maxim to which he shows himself constantly faithful: *Protect the interests, whatever the cost*. That is to say, preserve property, capital, income, privileges, whatever it may cost to Justice, to honor, to the homeland. The title of *conservatives*, with which the bourgeois of Louis-Philippe had adorned themselves, signifies only that. It is quite the opposite of what the nation of 93 thought, when the Revolution, agitating the negligible layers of the plebs, seemed on the eve of the great leveling: *Perish the colonies rather than the principles!* That is to say: Let us save liberty, right, the homeland, the Revolution, whatever the cost to the interests.

According to this maxim of the protection of interests, substituted for that of public safety, the bourgeois is a bad patriot. The revolution that brought Gaul under Roman domination in the time of Julius Caesar was necessary, as we have said elsewhere. But it is also necessary to remark that this revolution had for its principal agent the bourgeoisie, who, not having confidence in the government of the country by itself, did not hesitate to call in the foreigner. Already the Roman bourgeoisie, giving victory to Caesar over his competitor Pompey, sacrificing liberty, the republic, to interest, had given the example to Gaul. This is how we teach today to the nations, our neighbors, the practice of universal suffrage. Interests first! Did we not hear, in 1848, the conservatives say: Let the Cossacks come rather than the Republicans?

Who erects an altar to Augustus, at Ainay, near Lyon? The bourgeois party.

Who aborted the attempts at insurrection in Gaul, in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries? the bourgeois party. He was a bourgeois, this Tétric, who, in 275, after taking the purple at Boreaux, as successor to Victorinus and Marion, exchanged his imperial cloak for a curule chair, and played against Aurelian the role of Monk.

Who supported in turn, a few years apart, and with equal zeal, Constantius, Constantine and Julian, the pagan, the Christian and the

apostate? — Again the bourgeois. Indifference in matters of religion, tolerance is a bourgeois quality: it must be recognized by its praise. It was this tolerance that created, in the sixteenth century, the party of the *politicians*, one might as well say of the indifferent; who inspired the satire *Ménippée*, and determined the accession of Henry IV. A great principle, for which Voltaire fought for sixty years, and which the Revolution brought into our laws; but which too often, for the landlord, trafficker and conservative caste, is reduced to pure prostitution of the conscience.

Under feudalism, the Bourgeoisie, shutting itself up in its cities, founded the communes: therein lay its glory. But immediately the bourgeois commune becomes an appendage of feudalism, a third order in the Christian hierarchy, from which the rural and urban plebs are carefully excluded. The idea will not occur to the bourgeois to say: *The State is us; and we are everyone*; that would be the democratic and social revolution. The establishment of the communes, in the spirit of the bourgeois, has nothing patriotic, nothing national, nothing humanitarian about it: it is a way of safeguarding interests. The interests protected, it is enough for the men of the Third Estate to march in the wake of the nobles, to be confused with them sometimes, to be counted for something, as Sieyès said.

It was not from the bourgeoisie that Joan of Arc emerged: the bourgeoisie would have taken the side of the annexation of France to England: the English sentiment, still alive in Guienne, proves it. Who determined the annexation of Lombardy to Piedmont? Not the peasant, of course, but the bourgeois. If the bourgeoisie of Nice and Chambéry had taken an energetic initiative against France, the annexation would not have taken place: but it made its calculations, it found that it would gain something, perhaps, by letting itself denationalize, not counting the risks of a protest. How many bourgeois in Belgium, on the Rhine, would resign themselves to the same sacrifice, some for an increase in traffic, some for an increase in pay! The plebs follow this example: pushed to the limit by misery, they are also ready to peddle their nationality. But make them all understand that these beautiful advantages of annexation are only a delusion, and that it would mean for the masses, bourgeoisie and plebs, with the exception of a few privileged people, for their liberty and their shame, and immediately you will see them become patriots again, and shout louder than the others against this abomination of annexation. This is how we have seen, in Brussels itself, people of all walks of life change in twenty-four hours from white to black, without suspecting at all that there was a terrible crime underneath, which the penal code of all countries punishes with death. The sale of the homeland is not a crime peculiar to our century; it is peculiar to the bourgeois ages: the whole of

history demonstrates it.

Vendidit hic auro patriam, dominiumque potentem  
Imposuit.... (*Aeneid*. Bk. VI.)

Indifferently patriotic, the bourgeoisie is even less democratic. In 89, it saw only with concern the fusion of the orders: the estates general were not assembled when there already appeared, with regard to the plebs, the bourgeois reaction, which brought the fire of the Reveillon factory.

The bourgeoisie made 18 Brumaire,

The bourgeoisie made December 2.

The plebs also had their *coups d'état*, but those of the bourgeoisie are always in the same direction: *Protect the interests, whatever the cost.*

The bourgeoisie, by its industrialism, by its mercantilism, naturally conceives the State as a great business concern. It cares little for form; it would have come to an agreement, in 1789, with the two superior orders, nobility and clergy, if they had condescended to admit it to a share of the government or at least of the profits. Under the last republic, a friend of the prefect of police, M. Carlier, said to him: Ah! I do hope that you are not neglecting your interests. — *There is nothing to be done*, he replied with disgust. One of the grievances of the bourgeoisie against the republican government, after 1848, was certainly this saying of Carlier: *Nothing to do!* The bourgeoisie is the nursery of the upstarts: the government exists only to open up their careers. What folly in the nobles and the priests, in 1788, to have wanted to bar their way! And how the bourgeois compensated themselves later!

What the bourgeois demands is wealth: his ambition does not extend to government. He will put up with despotism, if the despot takes care of his interests, lavishes him with resources, lets him speak a little and, above all, does not frighten him. But he will complain and murmur if the prince threatens transactions, rents, money with his taxation; if he embarks on expeditions that stop business and put the interests on hold. "Ah!" he said during the War of the Spanish Succession, "what became of Colbert's years?"

Until the continental blockade, the bourgeoisie found no fault with Bonaparte's dictatorship. How could it not have been satisfied? The conquest permanently created so many jobs, in the administration, in the judiciary, in the police, in the army! There were so many supplies, so many good things to do!... The same satisfaction was felt after December 2<sup>nd</sup>. The concessions raining down, the bourgeoisie, with the exception of those mystified by the *coup d'état*, found that everything was for the best: Napoleon III, for a year or two, was a great prince.

However, it is true to say that the bourgeoisie, obeying its middle-ground inclinations, prefers parliamentary government to despotic power;

not because it seems to it more moral, more just, not because it sets great store by liberalism; but because it finds in the constitutional guarantees more security for its interests. This is why, in 1814 and 1830, it showed itself so quick to abandon the Emperor and Charles X to join the Charter. But the parliamentary system, widening the electoral framework, confers on the plebs the exercise of political rights: the bourgeoisie, judging its interests compromised, will bring back despotism, except to impute despotism to demagoguery: this is what we have seen on 18 Brumaire and on December 2. Despotism is not too displeasing to the German bourgeoisie, and we know that if the Prince Regent of Prussia were to defer to its wishes, he would be emperor. What is stopping the return to the principles of 89 in France at this time is not so much Napoleon III's personal opposition as the apprehensions of the Orléanist or bourgeois party, telling itself that it is not enough to deliver the country from this stupid comedy of the empire, that it is still necessary to prevent the return of the demonstrations of February. If England, whose centralization is advancing rapidly, which one day or another, threatened by the armies of the Continent, may see itself forced to establish at home conscription and standing armies, if England falls one day under despotism, it will be through fear of universal suffrage and bourgeois reaction.

Called upon to discuss and vote on taxes, the bourgeoisie has never made more than a semblance of opposition to the dissipating tendencies of power. The growth of the budget and of the debt proceeded at the same pace under the constitutional regime as under that of good pleasure. It is because the bourgeoisie has taken the place of the old nobility in the distribution of favors and sinecures; because what is levied on the mass as a contribution comes back to it in the form of salary, wages and fees; and because the tax itself, by the way in which it is everywhere established, falling on the working multitude, leaves the revenue of the bourgeois almost intact. It would be something else, assuredly, if the tax directly attacked ground rent, discount profits, partnership dividends, in a word, the *net* product.

The bourgeois is a friend of order, in the sense that it he afraid of noise, of agitation, of demonstrations, of overturned omnibuses, of unearthed cobblestones, of the breaking of street lamps. But the arbitrariness in government, the confusion of powers, parliamentary intrigues, the jumble of ideas, the infringement of laws, the abuse of majorities, the chaos in accounts, general corruption, hardly move him. His soul is like the Stock Exchange: the slightest uproar alarms him; the annihilation of moral life does not affect him. Let him make money, let his stocks rise, he finds himself: let him lose or let his capital fail, and the world, in his eyes, is upside down.

In philosophy, the bourgeois would be skeptical, if skepticism did not

require a certain effort of intelligence; he is content with eclecticism, which exempts him from reasoning and going deeper. The bourgeois has a horror of systems; he mistrusts men with principles, people all of a piece, whom he puts on the same line as the fanatics and the radicals. By choice, by taste, by calculation, as much as by indifference and impotence, he is a *juste-milieu*, a doctrinaire. Isn't his job to haggle, to speculate, to overrate? Cutting through difficulties, settling problems, sharing differences, compromising on everything, reconciling God and the devil: such is his method, his philosophy, his policy. The same spirit that has produced the teetering statesmen of our day has given birth to that race of functionaries to whom all government is good, provided they are a part of it and draw their pay. By following this line, the bourgeois found himself, for the first time, and to his great surprise, a patriot. It was a bourgeois by race, M. Portalis, who, serving the Restoration with the same zeal as he had served the Empire, found this famous excuse: *I serve my country, UNDER ALL GOVERNMENTS*. So the Academy, a bourgeois institution, both of genius and of style, has made, through the organ of M. Mignet, a magnificent eulogy for M. Portalis.

The bourgeois is Christian, and Voltairean. He admires the Gospel, and he reads *La Pucelle*. If he confesses, he will prefer the Jesuit to the Jansenist as director: the *Constitutionnel* is an illustrious example. The bourgeois does not know the inner life; he is neither contemplative nor mystical: he is sensualist. His happiness he finds at table and in bed. Hell worries him; he does not have the same faith in Paradise. He would rather not die, able as he feels to enjoy without getting tired of happiness, as he understands it, for the duration of eternity.

The bourgeoisie has little taste for the power of the priests, while giving them profound greetings. In Italy, the bourgeois, formerly Guelf, rejected the temporal authority of the Holy Father, but he redoubled its devotion to the Gospel and its tenderness for the clergy: see the proclamations of Garibaldi. It generally has no religion, but it does not doubt the necessity of religion: such is its view. This is how it uses it with authority, of which it has no sentiment, but which it defends with his citizen's bayonet and vote.

The bourgeois is not a bad family man: but what seems to him above all admirable in the conjugal union is the dowry; in paternity, it is succession. The civil code expressed this sentiment of the bourgeoisie: the father cannot entirely disinherit the son; and we see, by the precautions with which the law surrounds wills, that it generally favors natural succession.

The bourgeois, lecherous, nevertheless prefers his wife to his mistress; likewise the sensitive bourgeoisie prefers her husband to her lover.

Before 89, the bourgeoisie, forming one of the higher orders of the

nation, placed between the clergy and the nobility, on the one hand, and the rustic and urban multitude on the other, was distinguished by a certain gravity; it had traditions, a spirit, a style of its own; it even, apart from the vices inherent in its nature, had mores. The comparison of literary works, in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, allows us to judge. The seventeenth century feels its nobility, the eighteenth its bourgeoisie; and one would not dare to say that from one to the other there is decadence. It is this old bourgeois spirit that, after having inspired the great writers of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and suggested the *Encyclopaedia*, created the Constituent Assembly, the Legislative Assembly, the Convention; later, after the fall of the empire, the two chambers. Since 1830, there has been in the bourgeoisie, as in literature, a marked decadence. The old bourgeois honor has disappeared; a filthy rabble, with the mud barely scraped from them, has burst into the caste; and we have this mixed generation, ignoble, shameless as without principles, which is neither bourgeoisie nor plebs, and which cannot be defined otherwise than as the manure that must fatten a new seed.

The bourgeoisie is definitively condemned: we are witnessing its moral death. Under the Roman emperors, it tried to rise again, producing a *nobilitas*, as it were, an industrial aristocracy. This so-called nobility, plebs arrived by usury, speculation, bribes, by all the extortionary practices of Caesarism, could neither reform a society, nor support the nationality, nor avert the fall of the empire. Everything perished: to regenerate the old world, the transfusion of barbarian blood and the fearful penitentiary of Christianity were necessary. The current crisis is absolutely the same: the bourgeoisie is collapsing, in its turn, on the ruins of monarchy and feudalism. December 2 revealed its turpitude: the restoration of the constitutional monarchy would not redeem it. Its existence hangs by a thread that wears out every day, the Napoleonic autocracy, a mistake of the plebs. With the ideas that have erupted since 1848, it is impossible that a reversal will not occur: the bourgeoisie can then be executed at a single blow, instantaneously and irrevocably. Moreover, this execution will only be the consequence of the judgment rendered by itself against the royalty of July. The bourgeoisie had crowned itself in the person of Louis-Philippe: it let him perish, accusing its government of corruption, without realizing that it was itself that it was condemning. There is not, whatever has been said, there cannot be, a government of the middle classes; the reason is in their very joint ownership, they have the spirit of traffic, they do not have the spirit of government. Outside the aristocracy and the monarchy there is no government possible except that of the whole nation, after the economic revolution has erased the distinction between bourgeoisie and proletariat.

Comedy, since Molière, has infinitely multiplied the types of the bourgeois. We know the Dandins, the Chrysales, the Orgons, the

Arnolpbes, the Jourdain. The latest, and funniest, is M. Prudhomme. Beyond that type, one falls into the Goriots, the Vautrins, the Macaires. The bourgeoisie has lived; let us draw the curtain on the dead.

In a forthcoming installment, we will give the monograph of the *Plebs*.<sup>1</sup>

END OF THE SIXTH STUDY.

---

<sup>1</sup>The continuation of this study, which originally appeared in the Appendix to the EIGHTH STUDY, follows on the next page.



## NEWS OF THE REVOLUTION.

### BOURGEOISIE AND PLEBES. — CONTINUED.

We are witnessing a sort of dance of the dead. Like a man poisoned by ergot of rye, the old world is going to pieces. All the parts come off one after the other. The priesthood is long over: is the Protestant minister a priest? Are the Anglican clergy, who are so well paid, and the Catholic clergy, public functionaries, state employees, semi-rationalists, infected with the spirit of Voltaire and the Revolution, a priesthood?... The nobility is over: apart from Russia, where moreover the emancipation of the serf is imminent, nobility no longer exists anywhere, in the political and feudal sense of the word. The bourgeoisie is finished, and lacking this last refuge for royalty, royalty ends in its turn. What remains after that?

Hooray! cry the Democrats; our kingdom is coming, at last!...

Poor friends! I wish I could leave you with this last illusion. But I see you pale as death and already covered with the shroud. The plebs are also over, and that is fortunate for them. The sovereignty of the people was never anything but a myth: the fatal myth must in its turn vanish before reality. So let's sing, let's celebrate this last funeral. No more democracy, no more ochlocracy, no more demagoguery: this has never had a real political life, it will never live, not even in the United States. There is no other reign than that of law and science, *Despotès ho nomos*: which is not the same thing, believe me, as universal suffrage.

What are the Plebs?

In the beginning, all men being equal, each one obliged to go about his business on his own account in domestic labor, hunting, fishing, gathering, grazing, all could equally be called INDUSTRIALISTS or PRODUCERS. When the secret was found of making the prisoner, kidnapped in the hunt or in war, an instrument of exploitation, society was divided into two classes: one of the *privileged*, priests and nobles, especially devoted to the service of the altar and the profession of arms; the other *slaves, servants or serfs*, responsible for the care of the household, the provision of supplies, in a word, of all that concerns industry and production.

Later, the bourgeois having formed between the privileged class and the servile class, a distinction analogous to that of the lords and the slaves was established between the industrialists: it was that of the *capitalists-proprietors-entrepreneurs*, or BOURGEOISIE, on the one hand, and *workers, laborers, wage-earners, proletarians*, on the other. Then, the former serfs, having gradually improved their condition, merged with the wage-workers of the bourgeois: this is what we will call by the generic

name of PLEBS.

Just as the bourgeoisie, in other words the third estate, had its *raison d'être* in the existence of the old orders, clergy, nobility and serfs, between which it placed itself as an intermediate class, so the modern plebs, the wage-earning class or proletariat, which is no longer the same thing as serfdom, has its *raison d'être* in the bourgeoisie.

Observe first that this distinction of bourgeois and plebeian is no better founded in nature, no more rational and legitimate than that of lord and serf. This had its principle in a double prejudice, worship and war; the second rests on the no less arbitrary separation of labor and capital. The state of *worship* or of *war* — it is all one — drawing to an end, the abolition of the clergy and the nobility could not fail to occur; likewise, the separation of *labor* and *capital*, imagined only for theory, disappearing from practice, the social distinction of bourgeoisie and plebs disappearing like the other; a single category of citizens henceforth embraces the totality of the people, that of the producers. After a huge gap, civilization, as regards the rights of persons, returns to its principle, which is to say to its destiny.

The bourgeoisie being able at any moment, through the considerations that we have previously developed, to break down, as the priesthood and the nobility did before it, it follows that the plebs, antithesis of the bourgeoisie, is on the verge of its ruin; the same catastrophe awaits them both. We could stick, with regard to the plebs, to this simple prognosis: however, since it is a question of rebuilding society on other principles, and since it seems natural at first sight to regard the plebeians as the natural successors and the heirs of the bourgeois, it is appropriate, before proceeding further, to show what are the causes of dissolution which trouble the last and most numerous of the classes of society, and what contradiction condemns it. When dissolution takes hold of a company, it attacks everything: the head, the trunk, the limbs, the whole body is under attack. *Non est in eo sanitas*, said Isaiah of the Jewish people, Thus wills the law of revolutions.

The plebeian, substitute or knock-off of the ancient slave, is always, at bottom, this vivacious savage, who, whether in town or in the fields, preserves himself by his very savagery, and from whom the upper classes are constantly recruited, decimated by luxury, softness, pleasures and all the diseases of civilization. The plebeian thus represents to us primitive man, more or less domesticated, I mean denatured by the law of labor and bourgeois exploitation, but retained in his crudeness by the economic and political constitution of society, a constitution made, in large part, against him. What distinguishes the plebeian from the serf and the slave is that the condition of the latter was entirely one of constraint, his labor forced, his misfortune imposed; depending exclusively on a foreign will, he lived

in a perpetual state of revolt and hatred. The plebeian, wage earner, master of his person, enjoying civil rights, sometimes exercising certain political rights, is in a completely different position. His labor is a kind of exchange; he accepts his condition, at least he is more or less convinced of its necessity, and he submits to it without complaining too much. Little inclined to revolt, he asks only to earn his bread and his pittance by labor and to live in peace. From slavery to wage labor the improvement was above all moral; as for comfort, things have remained more or less the same: one can even say that in a thousand circumstances the fate of the wage earner is worse than that of the slave. But for the operator the advantage of this so-called emancipation of the worker has been enormous: in reality it is he, rather than the worker, who was freed. The upkeep of the slave was a far more inconvenient burden than wage-earning; it cost more, returned less, left little profit: it was not really until the day when serfdom was converted into wage labor that we knew what labor, production and wealth were.

From this fact, which may be regarded as constitutive, are derived the character, the mores, and the ideas of the plebeian.

As he possesses neither territorial property nor industrial funds, he works for others: master, boss, bourgeois, entrepreneur, this is the name he gives to the individual who buys his service from him. A mercenary worker, he has initiative, no genius for combination, no disposition to change his fortune. If he reasoned, speculated, combined, realized, he would no longer be himself; he would pass, *ipso facto*, into the bourgeois category. He would possess a beginning of capital, the most precious of all capitals, invention, autonomy; he would no longer truly belong to the plebs.

The proletarian understands one thing: it is that manual labor is his lot; that its function is; purely mechanical, that he obeys a higher direction, that in exchange for his labor he receives almost enough to subsist, and that it is so, because it has always been so, and it cannot be otherwise. He does not wonder if his salary really represents the value of his labor; why there are proletarians and proprietors; why, among the latter, there are some larger than the others: all that is speculation, philosophy, and exceeds the average range of mind of the plebs. Imagine the beast of burden, not reasoning about his position, as in the fables, but simply being aware of his position and giving his assent to it in good faith: there you have the plebeian.

Man, then, or beast of burden, as he appears in the condition which the nobility and the bourgeoisie have made for him by wage-earning, the worker is generally of a gentle nature, resigned, peaceful, patient, full of long-suffering, supporting the insults of the master, forgetting them at the first caress, difficult, in a word, to push to the limit. Liberty and

independence alone can sustain resentment, and lead man to revenge. In this respect the plebeian is far below the barbarian: he does not have the dignity, the pride; and many times the bourgeoisie itself has been able to regret having succeeded too well, by its harsh discipline, in transforming the lion into a sheep. The people rarely resent the despot who mistreats them. Robespierre had more sans-culottes guillotined than aristocrats, and the people religiously preserve the memory of Robespierre. Napoleon I caused the death on the battlefield of more than two million men taken from the plebs, and Napoleon remained for them a great man. Napoleon III uses the same with the *Marianne*; not only did he not respond to socialist hopes, he suppressed socialism, made the condition of the people harder, and Napoleon III had his popularity.

Like the child and the woman, like all weak or ignorant creatures, the people seek protection and patronage; they have the instinct of obedience; they find it quite simple, therefore, that there are masters and servants, employers and wage-earners, rich and poor, sovereigns and subjects. The first article of their political and social faith is the inequality of conditions and fortunes. How could they be republican? Provided they do not endure too much misery, subordination does not shock them, does not weigh on them at all. They must be badly abused, or some frenzy, some extraordinary idea must have taken hold of them and disturbed their brains, for them to rebel, for them to cry out. Like the horse, the donkey, the dog and all tamed animals, the plebeian naturally attaches himself to his boss, the servant to his master, the workman to his bourgeois. It is not popular bonhomie that inspired these two verses:

Our enemy is our master;  
I say it to you in good French.

On the contrary, the man of the people thinks, in his wisdom, that his master is his true friend; he wholeheartedly believes in this friendship, he doesn't understand how it would happen. Let a leader of industry show himself, a little more than the others, benevolent and gentle; let him not flay the worker until they bleed: he is the *father of the people*, the *father of the workers*; a civic crown is braided for him. How many times, in 1848, did we hear these poor people say to us: Well! Good God, what would become of us if no one made us work? Certainly, it was worth the effort to spare such a benign, useful subject, and it would have cost little. The author of *Les Ouvriers Européens*, M. le Play, understood this well when he began to find out at what price the worker, married, father of six children, would agree to keep quiet. Work, more work and always work, from morning until evening, Monday until Sunday, from New Year until New Year's Eve, and that, at the price of 35 centimes per day and per head, here is the Eldorado of the worker. If the Legislature, which made a law

in the interest of animals, had had the idea of extending it to workers, it would have been extolled. Instead of that, we made rigor, summonings, cannon, and business has been spoiled. What a pity!

The people, laborers by birth and by destination, so they believe, identify themselves so well with their position, with their leader, that they do not envy the wealth they create and of which they barely attain the crumbs. They enjoy, AS AN IDEA, all that they do not have, and that is enough for them. The imagination, among the people, is a prodigious faculty, which makes it happy with all the felicities which it witnesses. M. Jean Reynaud, who treats the common people as *inferior souls*, never approached, with all his metaphysics, this idealism. The man of the plebs says *chez nous*, to say, my country, a country where he does not own a plot, not an inch of land. He says *chez nous*, to say, with my master; *nos enfants*, our children, for the children of the master, little ones who will show him one day that they do not regard him as their father or their brother; *our* house, *our* fields, *our* vineyards, etc., for the master's house, fields, vineyards. This *us*, he brings to the army: his regiment is still *chez nous*. Don't you want to cry with tenderness? What did the French plebeian gain from Napoleon's conquests? A *Te Deum*, fireworks. But he identified himself with the conqueror, and that is why the fall of the empire was so painful to him. So, he said, Belgium was *ours*, the Rhine was *ours*, Italy was *ours*, Holland, up to Hamburg, was *ours*. It does not enter his brain that the effect of this immense possession was quite simply to make despotism, exploitation, conscription, war and misery common to Belgians, Italians, Dutch, Germans and French. It was *ours!* See the English proletarian, gloriously proud of the riches of his country, his navy, his colonies, his docks, his mines, his railways. For him too all this is ours; and he has no money to drink a glass of ale to the health of merry Albion. I imagine these two men, the Frenchman and the Englishman, disputing among themselves the pre-eminence of their country and forgetting nothing in their inventory, except to take the measure of their own poverty. It would be a scene of high comedy... To enjoy as an idea the richness of the master; to associate oneself, in thought, with their pleasures; eating his dry bread in the smoke of his kitchen: this is the life of the people, a true Pythagorean life. And it must be said that, provided that this frugality does not lead to exhaustion, it is sufficient for his happiness. He works hard, but he gains therein that strength of body and that health, the feeling of which constitutes for the people a positive liberty, a liberty that makes them forget all the others. He knows nothing, but his soul is sound; he lives on little, but to such a well-disposed nature everything is excellent, everything profits; his pleasures are rare, but they are only the keener; he does not know boredom, his passions are chained, and his sleep so deep, so restorative!... I say it without hyperbole: the

poverty of the plebs, unless it becomes misery, is better than the luxury of its masters: this consideration singularly lightens, in the eyes of philosophy, the weight of bourgeois and feudal iniquity. Ah! if priests, nobles, bourgeois, and kings had ever been able to come to an understanding; if, coming to an agreement among themselves on the vanities of hierarchy and politics, they had been moved, for the people, by charitable sentiments, there would never have been any revolutions. One would never have seen these jacqueries, these *septembrisades*, these massacres that above all inspire horror in the democracy; the people would have served their masters, kissing their hands, until the end of time.

Human dignity, the progress of civilization, did not want it. The system was unfair: it was not to last. But the initiative for the movement did not come from the people, friends by nature of the *status quo*; it came from the upper classes, more and more greedy, and fatally divided. Every popular insurrection has had its Gracchi, privileged people calling on the people to witness against other privileged people and calling them to arms. The French Revolution began with the assemblies of *notables*, with the remonstrances of Parliament, with the notebooks of the bourgeoisie: the people did not set themselves in motion until the fire at the Réveillon factory. And it will always be the same: when iniquity has risen to the limit, when indignation sets fire to privilege, there is no reason for prudence, it is necessary to come to the assizes of the people. This is what a bourgeois, a great writer, once said, in words quoted by the *Constitutionnel*: Rather terror, rather the permanent guillotine, than the infamy of your imperial regime!

Here begins the political role of the multitude, a role full of the unexpected, which has constantly turned into mystification for it. While the nobles, priests, bourgeois and kings compete for the support of the masses, lavishing flattery and promises on them, the more determined come forward, who say to them: Why, people, would you do other people's business? Aren't you the ruler? Is not the king your representative; are not the public officials, magistrates, nobles and priests your servants? Arise, and reign. Long live democracy!

There is thus formed a party of the plebs, a party of the proletarians, as there was before a noble party, a clerical party, a bourgeois party. Naturally, this party of the plebs, for so long exploited, takes liberty for its sign, and announces itself as having to make the *Revolution*. And certainly, if all that was needed for that was arms and bulletins, the thing would soon be done. But as much as the Church and despotism have a horror of philosophy, so little are the people made for political dissension; let us add, as much the so-called *men of action* who lead it, and who also aspire to become its masters, are wary of *men of ideas*. Affecting to take literally the dogma of the sovereignty of the people, it is from the people

alone, from their *instincts*, that they claim to receive their inspirations; it is from their infallibility that they seek counsel; it is their virtue that they judge. So much so that the last analysis of the Briarée with millions of arms, who was to do such great things, after having broken a few windows and having given himself, with his powerful hand, a superb boss, returns bewildered to his stable.

To account for this inevitable denouement, it is necessary to place oneself in the true point of view of the plebeian, to penetrate into his intimate sense, to recognize his ideal, to see closely in what circle his reason turns.

From what we have already said of the mores, habits and prejudices of the working man, it is easy to understand that this plebs, of whom we want to make a sovereign, — and more than that, a power of revolution, — does not in any way posit itself as a disinherited class, which must be reintegrated into its rights, and whose condition, role, must be quite different from what it has been to this point. Such a thought does not enter the heart of the plebeian, and there are bare reasons why it does not enter there. It is because it is not in the mind of anyone; it is because the question is not even raised, and because, if it were raised, it would immediately appear insoluble. The people, incapable, as it is commonly said, of seeing further than their nose, of conceiving anything beyond their sphere, therefore affirms itself as a people, that is to say, working class, wage-earning, proletarian, without capital or property, without initiative or leadership. In principle, as we have said, it accepts its traditional condition, does not ask to escape it and, like the dog without a master, seeks with its eyes to whom it will belong. Ask the donkey to become a miller; he won't agree. But give it sound and not too many blows, and it is satisfied. So with the people: they think little of becoming landlords, entrepreneurs, capitalists, bankers, merchants; all they want is for their wages to be increased, for their working hours to be reduced, for the price of bread and rent to be lowered, for the rich to be made to pay taxes: as for the rest, they leave it to you.

Starting from this principle, you have the secret of popular movements; you know the politics, the political economy and the whole philosophy of the plebs.

In times of agitation, the maxim of the bourgeois is, as we have said: *Save the interests*. That of the people responds to it, but as an antithesis: *War to the castles, peace to the cottages!* That is to say, war on the bourgeois, war on the bosses, war on the proprietors, war on the rich! Not, note this well, that the people dream of abolishing the privileged castes; they only want to make them contribute. And that is conceivable: all political debate basically covers an economic interest; now, every economic question is reduced, for the people, to a question of wages and

subsistence. It is their subsistence, it is their labor, their wages that they intend to safeguard by this vulgar phrase: *War to the castles, peace to the cottages.*

The people have a confused sense of the difference of spirit that exists between them and the bourgeois. Working with his own hands, the man of the people works for his own consumption, a little more, a little less: in this he follows the law of nature, which has regulated the consumption and well-being of nations according to their labor. Disinterestedness is a natural, even easy virtue for the proletariat. The bourgeois, on the contrary, who uses the laborer's fat to produce himself, labors not only for his own consumption, but for his fortune: he is parsimonious, a hoarder, avaricious; his interest is never completely identical to the general interest. In times of trouble, bourgeoisie and plebs find themselves in antagonism: one can predict, according to the known character of one and the other, how the debate will arise and what will be the solution.

Thus, just as he is instinctively attached to his boss, to his master, the man of the people is attached to his labor, to his tool, to his place. It is his own heritage, his privilege; he does not want it to be taken from him, and with all the more reason since, his work lost, no one gives him bread. The people therefore hate the machine, quite simply because it competes with them, because it takes away their work, because for them it is a supplanter. It will never make this argument: That the machine should benefit the one it replaces, as well as the one who bears the cost of it; that consequently, when a machine is established, replacing fifty, a hundred men, two hundred, three hundred women, the workman has the right, in good social justice, to obtain not only another employment, but a small salary increase, or else a reduction in the hours of labor, or a reduction in the price of commodities, in a word, a share in the profit that the machine brings with it. No, the proletarian doesn't know enough to reason like this in any realm: all that is politics, metaphysics; he knows nothing about business. He does not know society; for him, it is a word. The government he could not know better; for him, it is the policeman. He cannot change his profession, learn another skill, downgrade himself: one might as well tell the rabbit to become a hare, the goat to become a sheep. What he knows is his labor, his trade, the trade that he was made to learn and that is taken away from him. He clings to his packsaddle, his yoke, his ride; he doesn't want to be pulled out, unless it's to go to the rack. Claiming guarantees, invoking social solidarity, claiming compensation, a share of profit: this is not part of his jurisprudence. Hey what, he says, doesn't the boss earn enough with his workers? Did they refuse to serve him? Do they ask him to account for his profits? Can't he be satisfied with a fortune already so round, so pretty? Couldn't he at least wait?... We can guess the master's answer: I am free to do what I please; I use my right; I could close my



establishment, I prefer to set up a machine there: that's nobody's business, etc. Obtaining nothing, the ousted consult each other, and break the machine. How they would like, by destroying this fatal tool, to procure for the master a profit double that which they had given him before! For it is not him, it is not his fortune that they are after: it is this accursed machine that takes away their work. *Our enemy*, they say to themselves, parodying the verses of Lafontaine that they have not read, *is the machine, I say it to you in good French*.

Another example. A pay cut occurs, an effect of free competition, internal and external. So, an economist worker would observe, if political economy were the work of the workers, the price of bread, rent, coffee, candles, soap, meat, sugar, beer, etc. must also be reduced. For if the competition comes from abroad, it is right that the whole nation supports it; and if it comes from within, as it can normally only result from two causes, either from the insufficiency of outlet, or from a progress natural to domestic industry, it is still fair to carry out compensation. This is what a wise worker would say, who had learned to relate facts to their causes. But the logic of the people does not go so far, it does not cast its probe so low. There's too much abstraction in there, too much clutter. The workers coalesce and go on strike. They refuse the labor; that is to say, they further reduce both the national wealth and their own income: a double absurdity, which only serves to make the situation worse and the people more unhappy. This is so palpable that in several countries the legislator has been unable to refrain from severely repressing the coalitions of workers: the only satisfaction that the liberal economists demand for them is to make the law equal for the masters. What an effect, however, would be produced by petitions strongly reasoned and presented to power, one after the other, by thousands of men! What would one have to say to intelligent masses, invoking economic science and the law? The people will do no such thing. In England, where workers have the right to assemble, coalitions against lower wages are organized regularly. By means of slowly accumulated contributions, the workmen form reserve funds, and when the reduction of wages arrives, they retire to their tents, live on their reserve, until it pleases the heads of the factories to pay the asking price. Is it clear from this example that the worker is not claiming his release? He was born a worker, a worker he wants to die: that the masters manage among themselves, that the government do its job, that is their business. But let's not reduce his *wage*, otherwise...! he goes on strike. The strike, supported by a reserve fund, is the *ultima ratio* of popular politics.

The people are for maintaining the categories. The man of the people does not want to rise or change; he would protest against a transformation that, in his mind, would annihilate him. We have seen the Modaires in Lyons, the porters in Marseilles, more attached to the privileges of their

corporations than ever were the nobles and the priests before August 4<sup>th</sup>. The people, Napoleon said very well, do not ask that there be no more nobles; they only want those among the people who will have the merit to be able to become noble. Likewise, they do not ask that there be no bourgeois either, they are just very happy to see sometimes one worker, sometimes another, become bourgeois. This makes him proud, but not jealous. Provided that the upstart does not show himself too forgetful of the caste from which he came, it will be one of the glories of the plebs.

Also see how logical the people are in their system.

The people do not dream of the abolition of wage labor, of the extinction of pauperism and misery; they simply believe, according to the Gospel, that, as there have always been poor people, there always will be. Establish hospitals, crèches, asylums, retirement funds; that we draw lotteries for the poor, that we give largesse: they are happy.

The people are not egalitarian, they are philanthropists. They do not dream of Justice, but of love and charity.

The people understand nothing of thrift, a bourgeois virtue, which it is very fortunate for their masters that they do not practice. They adore luxury and magnificence. Louis XIV with his prodigalities will always be dearer to them than a Sully, a Colbert, with their savings. Like Louis XIV, they are convinced that the more a king spends, the more good he does.

The people are in favor of the *maximum*, of the progressive tax, of the sumptuary tax, why? Because they regard, in their heart of hearts, the maximum, the progressive tax, the sumptuary tax, and all the measures of this kind, as corollaries of wage-earning. Just as the tribe of Levi, among the Hebrews, having had no share in the soil, subsisted on the tithe, so the people, having neither capital, nor property, nor mastery, nor power, subsisting exclusively on wages, must keep their wages: in the thought of the proletarian, the laws of the *maximum*, the progressive tax, are the consecration of the rights of his caste. They will never understand that the tax is necessarily paid by the producer, and that it implies a contradiction that it should be otherwise; that consequently every producer is condemned, by political economy and by justice, to become a landlord, capitalist, entrepreneur, in a word, master and bourgeois, barely paying the tax alone and seeing his wage reduced still further, which means that all these old distinctions of bourgeoisie and plebs, entrepreneur and wage earner, are absurd and must perish. I repeat: for the proletarian, such conclusions, as certain as the theorems of geometry, represent chaos, emptiness, death.

The politics of the people is modeled on its economy.

First, the man of the people was in no way an admirer of *self-government* and direct legislation. His liberty, as we have said, is in his blood, in his muscles, in the strength of his temperament, in that health

of a working man, so well intertwined with good sleep and good appetite. He seems, it is true, to have taken his sovereignty seriously: but it is only an honorary sovereignty, a trinket. The people, idealistic, love honors; they care little about realities. It pleases them to put their ballot in the ballot box, to act, it seems to them, as sovereign. This innocent pride came to them from the *Social Contract* and from 93. Of course, moreover, that in naming their deputies, their president, their emperor, they will not choose among their equals; they will address the luminaries of property, industry, commerce, finance, the army, of the clergy itself. In 1848, the people named pell-mell MM. Thiers, Berryer, O. Barrot, V. Hugo, Lamoricière, Lamartine, Fould, Montalembert, Béranger, Father Lacordaire, Dupin, Lamennais, Monsignor Parisis, etc. Out of nine hundred representatives, we were not thirty proletarians. You speak of universal suffrage: it is ready made, the elected are designated in advance. The workman will name his boss, the servant his master, the farmer his landlord, the shopkeeper his banker, the soldier his general, the parishioner his priest. Get the women to vote, as Pierre Leroux wanted, each one will name her husband, unless she cuckolds him; make the children vote, they will name their papas; make the horses and oxen vote, they will nominate their coachmen and their herdsmen. It is nature's instinct, which the voting ceremony only highlighted. The most flagrant bad faith alone could claim that Louis-Philippe or Charles X were not elected by the people, because this ceremony, a thousand times more stupid than that of the Sainte-Ampoule, failed in their installation. Until then, everything goes smoothly: the lords appointed by their servants, the patricians by their clientele, we are not breaking the ancient order. But the two classes, bourgeoisie and plebs, placed, by the very fact of the election, facing each other, a divergence was bound to break out sooner or later, resulting from the opposition of their ideas much more than from their interests.

The bourgeois, according to the study we have made of it, inclines to parliamentarism; it is doubtful, skeptical, suspicious; it seeks guarantees, at the same time as it lends itself to transactions, compositions and accommodations. It rejects extreme parties, swears by no one and by nothing, adapts to things and men as long as they suit its interest, this infallible and pitiless criterion, which makes it constantly control and judge the acts of power, without distinction of friend or foe.

The plebs, having become anti-bourgeois, take the opposite view of the caste that exploits them. It therefore rejects federalism moderation, middle ground; parliamentarianism overwhelms it; without fire or place, it is perfectly exempt from parochialism. No respect for legality and form: the people, like Petitjean of the *Plaideurs*, do not understand that to do good justice and govern well so many ways are needed; — no concern for the interests of the state: that, thinks the people, concerns the bourgeoisie,

not the proletarians. On the other hand, it is all about fantasy, brilliance, noise, fame.

The people have no idea of municipal, departmental or corporate liberties, of individual guarantees of liberty, of domicile, any more than of procedure: that is outside their sphere and feels to them like a labyrinth. They like big pieces: centralization, the indivisible republic, the unitary empire. For the same reason, collectively, they are communist. French unity, Italian unity, Germanic unity, Scandinavian unity: unity everywhere goes to the people, and even better, as you might imagine, to the governments. Switzerland, a confederation made up of twenty-two small states, all sovereign: that does not exist. Tell me about France, with its 40,000 communes and its ninety prefects! Thus reason of all the people. The pyramid of Cheops will seem more marvelous to him than Notre-Dame de Paris, and that more beautiful than the Parthenon. He won't look at a cameo, he raves about the colossi. The people, I borrow this picturesque expression from them, have eyes bigger than their stomachs: in this respect again they are the opposite of the bourgeois, meticulous at first, but whose appetite grows constantly as they eat.

The people have never known the first thing about the representative system. Two chambers, ministers acting in the name of a king who himself does not act, ponderations, incompatibilities, etc.: the people do not see in this anything more than in troubled water, and are wary of it. But an emperor, who wants everything, who can do everything, who does everything, whom the law does not restrain, whom no opposition stops: that is what is clear. A state is worthy only by its extent, says the people; a power only by its strength. M. Thiers, who in his academicism has preserved the instinct of the proletarian, recounting the *coup d'état* of 18 Brumaire, smiles at the words of General Bonaparte, who did not want, he said to Sieyès, *to be a pig in the shit*. M. Louis Blanc applauded this gross impertinence of the warrior. What do you want the multitude to think, when its leaders give it such lessons? The people, who because of their inferior condition, their low horizon, their subordinate interests, dream ceaselessly of a *good master*, a *good patron*, a *good bourgeois*, of a *good lord*, a *good prince*, a *good sovereign*; the people who in the sixth century before our era dreamed throughout Greece of a *good tyrant*, this people whom three thousand years of civilization have modified so little, because their servitude has remained more or less the same, has therefore made the empire. In this they followed their instinct; on top of that, they displeased the bourgeoisie. *Shout "Long live the Emperor,"* said a workman to his comrade; *it enrages the bourgeois*. And the emperor responded, as far as he was in him, to plebeian thought. Neither parliamentarian nor ideologist, just at the level of the ideas of the people: such is Napoleon III. It has not been sufficiently remarked that the principal cause of the

success of Louis Bonaparte is that he personally showed himself to be in perfect conformity of ideas, sentiments, style, with his people. It may be that in the end this modesty of talent will turn out badly for him: on the day when the multitude will take him for a fool, he is lost.

In the meantime, see how they understand each other.

In political economy, Napoleon III and the people are of the same opinion. Above all, the people want wages to be maintained. The Emperor, through his unofficial communications to the heads of establishments, insisted that wages should not be reduced. In vain the bosses alleged the distress of business, their penury: His Majesty did not trouble himself with that. It was necessary to make people work and pay: there was imperial blame at stake.

In 1854 and 1855 supplies were scarce. — The Emperor established a maximum on bread, even if it meant having the bakers compensated at the expense of the city of Paris.

The meat was overpriced: the Emperor had soup kitchens established at 5 centimes, of which some poor people took advantage; if the mass did not become fatter, at least the intention was good.

Rents were expensive: a police bureau was responsible for resolving the rents of insolvents evicted by their landlords, and for raising their hands to them. At the same time the *cités ouvrières*, workers' housing estates were founded, a sort of barracks, from which the workers who valued their dignity moved away in terror.

While the government purveyors were causing a shortage of cattle and vegetables for the supplies of the army of Crimea, some merchants who dared to compete with them were accused of monopolizing them. The people do not like hoarders. The Emperor gained a new title to esteem by condemning these hoarders.

Business being worse and worse, trade stagnating, the Emperor himself undertook to give labor to the workers. It was then that he began to demolish and rebuild the capital. Then also began at all points of the empire this system of unproductive expenditure, the result of which was, it is true, to give bread to a hundred thousand men, but which put the city of Paris, the departments and the communes, perhaps a billion in debt. *A king courts his subjects*, said Louis XIV, *by spending a lot*. Our political economy is that of Louis XIV.

In order to bring back the good market, the Emperor made a commercial treaty with England. It reduces customs duties on English goods; then, to cover the deficit which this reduction causes to the budget, it raises 25 fr. per hectolitre the duties on the spirits consumed in the interior, so that the French proletarian, thanks to the paternal solicitude of his emperor, pays for the spirits of his country double what it costs abroad. This is called *free trade*. What does it matter, if Mr. Bright and

Mr. Cobden applaud?

The people counted on the Emperor to wage war: the genius of one had guessed that of the other. The *Napoleonic idea* came from the bowels of the people; Napoleon III was only the editor: *Cantabam quidem ego, scribebat Homerus*. But here is where the disappointment begins.

The people, who change so little, do not imagine that the world is moving, while they themselves remain motionless. Why, on both sides of the Channel, is the antipathy between plebeians the same as in the time of Du Guesclin and Joan of Arc, if it is not because on both sides of the Channel John Bull is always John Bull, and Jacques Bonhomme always Jacques Bonhomme? Between bourgeois, it is something else. The interests became almost solidary, almost common: also, from 1815, the *entente* was more and more cordial.

In the thought of the people, a thought immutable like its fortune, history is a kind of myth. There the antagonisms drag on, the relationships remain the same; events always retain the same meaning. Only the names change; because, alas! men are mortal.

Does the people suspect that the *coup d'état* of Brumaire, the acts of 1804, 1814, 1830, 1848, 1851 and 1852, have changed the situation of France, and consequently its relations with Europe? Not at all. Napoleon I, II or III, whatever the number, it is always, for the people, the Revolution. Now, the Revolution has the Coalition as its natural enemy; and that is why Napoleon had to make war, why he made it and why he will make it. But the Coalition must be defeated, and the tricolor cockade, as predicted by its author, go around the world; that is why the people admit without the slightest difficulty that the Empire is conquest, why they are ready to follow their leader in all his undertakings.

The bourgeois, homebody, has furnished the type of M. Prudhomme; the proletarian, conqueror, gave that of Jean Chauvin.

The people rejoiced, with Barbès, in the Crimean expedition. But their amazement was great when they saw the war end in a return to the *status quo*. They do not understand these wanderings of balance, purely political, like the Antwerp expedition; it is no longer there. Of course the Counter-Revolution, which has agents even in the Emperor's cabinet, had tied its arms to Napoleon.

The people applauded the Italian campaign: but they have been even more surprised, after Solferino, when they saw the affair reduced to a simple displacement of provinces in favor of Victor-Emmanuel. They awaited the Coalition.

One of the great astonishments of the people was to see the principle of *nationality*, eminently revolutionary, according to them, turn against the emperor. They had become accustomed to the idea that the peoples, being friends of the Revolution, should enter into the French family. Italy,

they said to themselves, is calling us; Poland and Hungary await our signal; Belgium is reaching out to us. And now they hear it said that Italy, by virtue of the principle of nationality, does not want to join France; that Belgium, by virtue of the same principle of nationality, protests against any thought of incorporation; much better, that they accuse them, the people of the Revolution, of being unfaithful to their principles, and of sacrificing liberty to glory!...

Nothing does more harm to a head of state, to a dynasty, than these disappointments of the plebs, suddenly torn from their legend, from their ideal. Napoleon I had himself crowned emperor at Notre-Dame by the Pope. It was no less than the restoration of divine right. But the people do not look so closely at it. For them, this strange ceremony, which caused the crown of the guillotined king to pass over the brow of a Jacobin soldier, was the Revolution. Today, nothing like it. Napoleon III attends mass in his chapel, like Charles X; he stinks of coronation, like Louis-Philippe, whose wanderings he is even forced to follow, by making campaigns without conquests, by protecting the Jews, the bancocrats and the priests, by policing France for the count of Europe and muzzling the Revolution.

Napoleon I had surrounded himself with a court of kings: Napoleon III was reduced to a few rare handshakes. What a difference between the interview at Erfurt and that at Baden!

Napoleon I had had an archduchess given in marriage. The bourgeoisie augured ill of this Austrian nuptials: but the people clapped their hands when they saw their hero in the bed of a princess. It was magical, a real romance of chivalry. In 1853, Napoleon III conquered Mademoiselle de Téba. I have nothing to say about the person, one of the prettiest women, they say, who have captivated an emperor. But the marriages of princes are above all political marriages, and it must be admitted that Napoleon III was even more unfortunate, more misguided than the Duke of Orleans. So the people are silent: the people, who adore upstart emperors, have little taste for upstart empresses.

On the side of the masses, Napoleon III has nothing to fear from conspiracy; he will only perish through disappointment. The people, whose life is up in the air, care little for guarantees and political liberties; it is not they who will ever discuss the budget, nor who will speak of refusing the tax. Neither extravagance nor loans cause them anxiety. The questions of finance, they consider them under quite another aspect than the bourgeois. At the time of the first national loan, seeing the crowd of subscribers thronging to the door of the Treasury, they said, rubbing their hands: *The republic would not have given us an income like that!*... What does it matter to them that the debt grows? To produce the wherewithal to pay the tax, and the rent, and the dividends of the companies, and the discount of the banks, and the commissions of brokers and stockbrokers,

and insurance premiums, it will always be necessary to resort to the fathom of the people. It will therefore always be necessary to pay it beforehand, since without it we would have nothing. Now, with their emperor, the people are counting on their salaries not to fall any further: for them, that is the whole question. Let the State, the owners, the capitalists, the bankocrats, dispute the rest: that is none of their business. It is up to them. In the meantime, the money is rolling, spending goes well: bravo! A bankruptcy of the State, a universal, social bankruptcy, would make the people laugh and would not shake the government. With the support of 600,000 bayonets, the applause of the multitude, the silent adherence of part of the bourgeois, the resignation of the others, the heroic remedy, which the Republic of 1848 rejected with virtuous indignation, would pass. Those who, according to the poorly applied memories of 89, count on the deficit to shake the empire, are on the wrong track.

In the matter of government, the people have their own idea and their ideal, which keep them in submission. The idea is that the prince should be the protector of the people against the abuses of bourgeois exploitation: the ideal, that this same prince should unite in his person the conditions of power, greatness and glory, without which the people cannot conceive supreme power. Caesar and Napoleon I realized to the highest degree this popular conception of the sovereign.

According to this principle, one can predict, with sufficient certainty, that the present empire, so far as it rests on the suffrage of the multitude, will not be sustained. And it is not so much the man who is lacking in the situation, as the situation which is lacking in the man. As an idea, Napoleon III did his best; savior of bourgeois interests, proscriber of socialism, social reason for contemporary reaction, friend of the Jesuits, accomplice of stockbrokers and bankocrats, he is a living contradiction. His seesaw policy is already seen through, even in the eyes of the last. His diplomacy can be summed up in one threat: 600,000 soldiers! This can make the people clap their hands once, twice: at the third performance they will find it stupid. As an ideal, Napoleon III, by the effect of the same causes, is devoid of prestige. First of all, he was neither a general nor even a soldier: Mac-Mahon, Bosquet, Pellissier, Canrobert, the first Zouave to come along, if he had been to Malakoff or Solferino, were more popular than him. Then his government, devoted all the same to bourgeois politics, badly disguised under the rigidity of the uniform, drags itself along in vulgarity and prosaism; his harangues, his epistles, too often repeated, in which imitation is betrayed, become insipid; the last letter to Persigny, written after drinking, would have produced a frightful scandal, if the silence imposed on the press had not protected the august missive from all criticism. Dominated by a superior law, forced to renounce conquests, to let the plebs struggle in their pauperism, to lie to the *Napoleonic Idea*,



Napoleon III is in all his existence only a crowned *Master Jacques*, both coachman and cook. His reign was defined from day one, the *empire without the emperor*.

Under the influence of these disappointments, the feeling of which, mingled with shame, is very strong among the people, what was bound to happen does happen. The rapprochement is gradually taking place between the proletariat and the class of craftsmen, small industrialists, small landowners, petty bourgeois, the most mistreated portion of the present regime, and the healthiest of the social body. Around this nucleus, already so powerful, the remnants of the old parties will come to be grouped; and the ideas of 1789, of 1830, of 1848, causing the whole mass to ferment, we will only have to wait for one of those occasions which never fail friends of right and liberty.

It is in vain that the empire, making common cause with the Church, will have undertaken to uplift, by religion, the monarchical faith, and to support, as we used to say, the throne on the altar. It is in vain that, delivering the instruction of the people to the clergy, it will have claimed to remake its education, and to bring it back to feudal manners. This double restoration will only have served to accelerate the dissolution of the multitude.

In matters of religion, the plebeian, even in centuries of fervor, is unsound, his faith being founded neither in the idea nor, *a fortiori*, in the ideal. Of dogma he does not know the first word; as for supernatural things, revelations and miracles, they just slip through his mind, by the very ease with which he lends himself to them. Since he has no knowledge of the laws of nature and of the mind and of the limits of the possible, it is equally true to say that he is surprised at everything and that he is surprised at nothing. He believes in prophets and thaumaturges, for the same reason that he believes in sorcerers. A miracle, said J.-J. Rousseau, if I were to witness it, would drive me mad: the people, whose life is full of nothing but miracles, are not moved by it. Let them witness the resurrection of a dead person today, tomorrow they will no longer think about it. As for inner worship, adoration in spirit and in truth, in mental prayer, the people know even less. They are *psychic*, as the Gnostics said; they do not rise to spirituality: their work is their prayer, they do not go beyond it.

The people, foreign to theology, incapable of any spiritual exercise, to whom the catechism is unintelligible, are open to all novelties, accessible to all influences. In 93, in Paris, under the Terror, we saw them one day parading the shrine of Saint Geneviève to obtain good weather, and the next day following the procession of the Goddess of Liberty. It is the pearl created by this inextricable Greek mythology, the shame of the human spirit, if, by a unique prodigy, it were not as full of poetry as of unreason.

When religious Greece wished to give satisfaction to her piety, she hid herself from the people, and founded the mysteries. To speak of religion to the people is to provoke the explosion of all superstitious follies. We saw it, after the *coup d'état*, in the multitude of miracles and apparitions which were talked about on all sides.

The religion of the people revealed itself one day, however, by a happy saying, which has remained: It was they who invented the *Good God*. The well-educated man, noble or bourgeois, simply says GOD, or the *Lord God* (*Adonai lehovah*), or even the *Lord*: this is the principle of Authority. That God, the God of the masters, is not the true God of the people; it is even the bad God. In the centuries of servitude, the slave did not worship the same God as his master; he had his divinity, his particular idol: we see this in Roman history and in the Bible, which names *Schaddai* the god of the Hebrew slaves in Egypt. The slave transformed into a proletarian, become free, if you like, but remaining poor, his god is still a bad god: who to turn to then?... The *Good God* is he who feeds the multitude in the desert; who said, *Blessed are the poor*, and *woe to the rich*; who taught *charity*, commanded *alms*, ordered his disciples to sell their goods and distribute the price to the poor; who forgave the sinner, because she had loved very much, who, finally, was crucified by the Pharisees and the Sadducees, that is to say, the false devotees and the *bad rich*. This is the God of the people, this is their whole theology. Now they have lost their God; the priests took it from them; they made him the God of the privileged, of the rich, of the bourgeois, an exploitative and reactionary god. Add that the people have come to protest against the perpetuity of their proletariat, that consequently there is no longer any good God possible for them. They call for Justice, no longer mercy. What good God can forge citizens, independent by law, enjoying civil and political rights, and forced, by needless poverty, arbitrary pauperism, chance poverty, to load and carry by hand, at a distance of 150 meters, a cubic meter of earth, for a salary of 24 centimes?... The nobility, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, annulled, degraded by despotism, fell into irreligion and licentiousness; the bourgeoisie, from 89, became Voltairean; the people followed the example of their masters. The man of the people is the *perverted peasant*, without religion or conscience, hence without a reason for existence.

As for the education of the people, limited, as much as it depends on the Church and the power, to apprenticeship and the elements of human knowledge, it has taken, in recent years, a singular direction.

The *vulgar* have always been odious to poets, *Odi profanum vulgus et arceo*, to philosophers, scholars, politicians, men of letters and artists, to all who pride themselves on genius, talent, wit, distinction, elegance. *Vulgarity*, a word that serves to designate the essence of the plebeian, as *humanity* serves to designate the quality of man, is synonymous with

coarseness, triviality, banality, vileness, stupid reality, flat, ridiculous, worn, threadbare, everything as little ideal one can imagine, in this respect, something below barbarism itself. The Mode, which has its temple in Paris, as everyone knows, *bon ton, fashion*, what is it other than war on vulgarity? But here's what happens. On the one hand vulgarity, scourge of letters and arts, shameful stigma of the vile multitude, ascending from bottom to top as the bourgeoisie supplants the nobility, invades power, whence it then falls with all its heaviness upon civilization which it withers and crushes. Such is the immediate cause of the decadence of letters and the arts among all peoples. Under the Caesars, Latin tragedy and comedy quickly disappeared, driven out by the boredom of the people, who preferred gladiator fights. The same movement in France: the seventeenth century delighted in tragedy and comedy; the 18<sup>th</sup> century replaced it with bourgeois drama, now abandoned for plays that everyone knows.

During this time, the man of the people, who will not be able to descend, who on the contrary aspires to ascend, has become a thinker, freed from prejudice, displaying pretensions to dilettantism, fleeing vulgarity, that is to say, fleeing himself, strives to make a new skin, and succeeds only in refining his depravity. An unequivocal symptom of the decadence of a people, when the working classes, bent under despotism, set about *cultivating the muses* instead of claiming their rights. The workman becoming a man of letters, the man of labor seeking the life of an *artist*, the workshop producing in droves poor poets, amateur painters, choreographers, playwrights; the bulk of the proletariat only asking for bread and spectacles; the plebs, finally, once dignified, not vulgar, now mimicking the aristocracy, fleeing labor, degenerating into bohemianism, idleness, dereliction and rabble: what to expect from such a metamorphosis? We are told about the *initiation through art to liberty*. Turn the sentence around, if you please, — *Initiation through liberty to art* — and you will be right. Strange initiators, really, these Zouaves who have returned from the Crimea and are playing their little comedy around the world! Those orpheonists, who last month went, to the number of 3,000, to give England a monstrous serenade, and did not even have the courage to sing the *Marseillaise!*

*Keep to your rank*, said a Burgundy winegrower to his son, whom he saw with displeasure keeping company with petty clerks. To leave the hoe for the pen, in the judgment of this rough old man, was a breach. *He who drinks well, sings well and dances well*, says a national proverb, *does a trade that advances little*. The fashionable arts put on the same level as drunkenness and debauchery: this is the true Gallic spirit. These mores made the Revolution: they are no longer our own. The heads of State give the signal for the *gaudriole*. Didn't the Emperor attend the performance of

*Mimi Bamboche* the other day, gloating and giving the signal for applause. It is asserted that this piece, first discarded by the modesty of the censor, was performed by order of His Majesty. The excitement of debauchery coming from so high and so publicly, what do you expect of the unfortunate plebs? Flattered in his vanity, the French worker devotes himself to luxury items, abandons useful professions, which are *less well off*. The number of workmen of all nations who practice in Paris the trades of bootmaker, shoemaker, tailor, carpenter, etc., reaches 80,000. Desertion begins in the countryside: the class of day laborers disappearing, through the effect of luxury and high prices, the owner converts wheat land into meadows. Instead of grain, the land will produce meat, and the population, important to the security of rent and of the empire, will thin out. The daughters of the people, disgusted with the needle which gives them nothing to talk about, disgusted with the workers, their fellows, drunks, lazy and rude, fornicate with the sons of the bourgeois, who much prefer them, for love, to the bourgeoises. It happened thus on the eve of the Deluge: *Videntes filii Dei filias hominum quid essent pulchræ...* Since the end of the old wars, in 1815, these mores have been those of Europe: is it not that the cataclysm is approaching?

The empire, believing itself to be eternal, has sown hypocrisy and corruption; it will reawaken indignation and the pillory. The decadence, of which the triumph of the plebs once gave the signal, cannot be sustained today. The conditions of Caesarism, of the physical and moral death of nations, no longer exist. Napoleon III, whatever he does, has nothing to put in the teeth of the proletariat. Should he become a conqueror, should he possess half of Europe, but as each nation ultimately produces only what is necessary, the imperial shortage would be the same. Caesarism is driven to labor: now, labor is economic right, political liberty, the parliamentary system, industrial association, international mutuality. The world cannot see the funeral of a great people again.

Until 1789, society being established on the principle of inequality of conditions, politics was reduced to the best way to exploit and contain the plebs. The latter, admitting itself the principle of its inferiority, seeking in times of crisis only an alleviation of its misery, the subalternization of the working classes could seem eternal. More than once, in dynastic quarrels, the people had been called as arbiter, a democratic party had been formed in opposition to the patriciate, and it had been thought that, with the plebs politically emancipated, society would find its definitive constitution and would walk in righteousness. But we had always seen this democracy, after a whirlwind of short duration, end in a Caesarism worse than the previous feudalism; then society collapsing and perishing. It resulted from this that the problem of civilization, linked to the constitution of economic right and consequently to the emancipation of the plebs, presented itself

as a sort of impassable vicious circle.

Now the fatal circle is broken, demagoguery thrown off course, tyranny in despair. Conditions of government are imposed that make democratic fantasy and Caesarism impossible. Ideas hitherto unheard of have begun to penetrate the masses and change the turn of their intelligence. Modern society will owe its salvation, and the people its emancipation, at the same time to the constitutional mores that a dictatorship, whatever it may be, is no longer allowed to wipe out; to the principles of international right that have governed Europe since the treaties of Vienna, and to the economic and social problems posed by the February Revolution.

# ADDITIONAL APPENDIX

## EXCERPTS FROM THE 1858 EDITION

### XIV Questions.

*Question.* — Economic equilibrium is the necessary condition of morality, consequently of the stability of governments: this principle is indisputable. Without a balance of forces, services, values and interests, the state, as perfectly organized as you wish, is heading towards certain ruin; with this balance, on the contrary, whatever be its constitution, it can be modified and never perish.

Does it not seem then that one can regard as indifferent and useless these questions that have filled the world with so much tumult, brought glory to so many writers, orators and statesmen, served as a pretext for so many revolutions: monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; mixed, representative, parliamentary government; distinction of powers into temporal and spiritual; division of powers, legislative, executive, judicial; distinction of ruler or prince; unity or duality of chambers; centralization or federalism, prefectural and municipal administration, public ministry, jury, universal, restricted, direct, two-tier suffrage; incompatibilities; nobility, bourgeoisie, middle class, etc.?

What becomes of all these things in the society regulated by the balance? What is their value now? Or, to put it more bluntly, what becomes of politics?

*Answer.* — It is a law of the subject that in everything it begins by spontaneously producing its forms, which are its mores, before knowing, by reflection, the faculty or the principle that makes it produce them. We have seen it for Justice, property, contracts, judicial forms; we will see it for marriage. But this does not prevent the forms of the subject from acquiring firmness and becoming invulnerable only after reason has recognized and determined the principle: the present dissolution, the effect of moral skepticism, is proof of this.

Now, what happens for all the categories of the moral order must also happen for the government. The State produced its forms before philosophy had recognized and analyzed the social principle of which it is the expression, which is none other than the economic balance. But the state remained in a precarious condition until it understood and affirmed this balance; moreover, it has tended constantly to destroy its natural forms and to return to inorganism, which is, for a government, immorality. This reaction of power against its forms is now explained: it

is the consequence of the privilege, tacit or avowed, of which general prejudice makes a law.

So suppress privilege, make the balance, and the government, by organizing itself in conformity with the idea of Justice that animates it, will reproduce, under the most favorable conditions, all those forms whose prudence has at all times and with good reason occupied the legislators; politics will become the first and largest division of Justice.

In short, the government, incarnation of the social subject, organ of Justice, cannot do without forms; and these forms are the sign and pledge of its morality.

But government, resting on privilege, is repugnant to the juridical forms assigned to it by the conscience of nations; and this is what makes the return of government to inorganism, to despotism, the most certain symptom of the decadence of societies and the prelude to their ruin.

As for the choice to be made between these forms, several of which are opposed but nevertheless not mutually exclusive, and their organization, it is hardly necessary to recall that the system must result from the physical constitution of each country and be the product of the time: all that authors are unanimous on this point.

*Q. Privilege* is, according to the etymology of the word, a legal preference. According to this definition, many privileges seem in conformity with Justice and therefore respectable: such is, for example, the privilege of exploitation granted for a certain time to inventors. However, we see public opinion incessantly attacking privilege and making of it a grievance against the government. What, then, distinguishes lawful privilege from unlawful privilege? Where does the right end? Where does the abuse start?

A. In political language, by privilege is meant a derogation from justice, made for reasons of state, with a view to supporting social inequality.

The example cited of patents of invention will serve to make us understand.

Any service, any discovery, can be assimilated to a product of a particular kind, of which a grant of land, a privilege of exploitation, is the price. The question is therefore to know what the service rendered or the discovery made is worth, in order to apply to it the law of exchange, which is the equality of values.

Now, government, insofar as it proceeds from an alleged necessity, from which arises the inequality of conditions and fortunes, does not understand it in this way; its principle is to award rewards out of proportion to the services, to create gratuitous benefits, perpetual privileges.

Such were the feudal rights abolished by the Revolution, which for

sixty years we have endeavored to restore. Such are the concessions, subsidies, dispensations and endowments made by the state, in perpetuity, to great companies, to high personages; such again are the ministerial offices, and all those little monopolies that escaped the great raid of August 4<sup>th</sup>.

What is intended by these derogations from common law is to reform and maintain the hierarchy of classes: we admit it. It is an old maxim of monarchy that a royalty needs nobility, the nobility of a third estate, and this latter the masses; that to have nobles one must have large estates, rights of primogeniture, majorats; to support a bourgeoisie, corporations, masterships and jurandes. The common people do not need to be supported: they come alone, like the savages. Government, which could stop this feudal vegetation, which could at least sway it, by giving rise to institutions of mutualism, government promotes inequality; it allows privilege to prevail; it suppresses the Revolution. Thus, thanks to this high connivance, while Justice reigns, privilege governs: society is entwined in a vast network of monopolies. Never has equality, daughter of Justice, been seen so closely as since 1789; but, as no one knows what would happen to this unheard-of regime, the government, faithful to conservative ideas, fell back on tradition.

*Q.* Specify the meaning of these words: *Suspension of the law, suspension of liberty, suspension of justice?*

*A.* Liberty, law and right are suspended whenever their consideration yields to reasons of state. According to what has just been said of privilege, all the acts of power are hardly anything other than a series of suspensions of right. But politicians reserve this expression for cases where the suspension is more dazzling, more ruthless. Then power affects solemnity; it drapes itself and the multitude applaud to a power that prevails over Justice itself.

*Q.* How has the democracy, which since 89 has held power more than once, not seized the opportunity to establish forever the supremacy of law and abolish the reason of state?

*A.* It is because the democracy has never believed in equality, because it understands nothing of economic balance and aspires only to moderation in servitude. But a moderate servitude needs the reason of state just as much as a rigorous servitude: which puts democracy on a par with absolutism and immediately kills it by contradiction.

*Q.* What do you call *tyranny*?

*A.* A bitter, outrageous manner, personal to the prince, of applying the reason of state. Basically, all governments established on the basis of economico-political fatalism are tyrannical. They are distinguished from each other only by the greater or lesser rigor or concealment they use in the application of the system.



*Q.* What distinguishes *usurpation* from *legitimacy*?

*A.* At the beginning, among a people who have not experienced political revolutions, the difference seems enormous: legitimacy presupposes popular acquiescence, often also priestly consecration, while usurpation dispenses with both. But with time this difference vanishes: the last word of the reason of state being to turn against its own representative, so that the possession of power ends up no longer being, in men as in wild horses, anything but a matter of strength. It is the triumph of justice that the reason of state reduces itself to the absurd.



#### XLIV

Those who make revolutions, and those who witness them, usually discover only their negative side. Too close to events to grasp all of them, they do not see the historical reason, the affirmation that legitimizes them.

Thus Christianity, by denying destiny, implicitly affirmed providence; by denying slavery, without affirming equality, it posited predestination; by overthrowing the pagan state, it was a prelude to ecclesiastical government. These affirmations, however insufficient, however false in themselves, were the consequence of the religious state combined with the universality of imperial power; the transition was necessary and, in this respect, legitimate.

But none of this could be understood by the emperors; it was hardly understood, during the first four centuries, by the Christians themselves. Christianity, affirmative as it was, appeared as the negation of society; its followers were treated at first as enemies of the human race.

The Revolution, by denying in its turn, in morality the transcendental theory of right, in economy the predestination of conditions and fortunes, with it the fatalism of *laissez faire, laissez passer*; in politics the double principle of previous governments, providence and necessity, reason of salvation and reason of state; the Revolution, I say, by denying all these things, thereby affirms the reality of justice, economy and politics; it affirms the application of Justice in the order of power as well as in that of interests, hence the end of antagonism, fatalism and privilege; in their place, balance, stability.

At the conclusion of the movement accomplished during a period of thirty-six to forty centuries, the Revolution, by denying ancient metaphysics, gives reality to things; it does more than replace, it creates.

But, in this regenerative crisis, minds could only perceive at first what it took away from them. The more general the negation, the more terrifying it must have seemed; Similar to Christianity, which had defined

itself as the *end of the world*, the Revolution appeared to contemporary conservatives as the final dissolution. But I dare to say that already public reason is no longer taken in by it. Not thirty years ago, the worst insult for a man was to call him a revolutionary; today, despite the cries of a reaction without good faith, we laugh at the epithet, everyone is for the Revolution.

I therefore had the right, in 1845, to take as an epigraph to the Economic Contradictions these two words from Deuteronomy: *Destruam and ædificabo*. It was a question of putting the finishing touch on denial, with a thorough critique of the social economy. I could today, without more pride, take up this motto by transposing the terms, *Ædificabo and destruam*. The exposure of the revolutionary idea will in fact be the last blow dealt to the old regime.

The principle with the help of which we are going to give force to society, a body to the State, morals to government and, finally, are going to found real politics, is the principle of collective force indicated by me in several publications, of which I propose to later give the complete exposition.

With this necessary complement, the serial method, from which I have never departed for a moment, becomes more than a logic; it is an ontology.

For the rest, I will stick here, as always, to the generality of the subject. What my readers expect from me regarding the different parts of ethics, are principles, not treatises. The principles first, in their fruitful simplicity; the development will then take place: the teachers will not be lacking.

In accordance with this thought, I have summed up in a small number of elementary propositions, and in the simplest style, what I regard as the substance of all politics, that is, of that part of social economy that has for its object the origin of States, their foundation at the same time real and rational, their organization, their evolutions, their object and their end. Of all my studies, begun almost twenty years ago, it is, with the theory of liberty, the one that has cost me the most: may the reader find that it does not yield to others for clarity and certainty.





