

THE FEDERATIVE PRINCIPLE

[DRAFT TRANSLATION]

PART TWO

UNITARY POLITICS

A Fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos.

FIRST CHAPTER.

Jacobin tradition: Federalist Gaul, Monarchical France.

Gaul, inhabited by four different races, the Galls, the Kimris, the Vascons and the Ligurians, subdivided into more than forty peoples, formed, like its neighbor Germania, a confederation. Nature had given it its first constitution, the constitution of free peoples. Unity came to it by conquest; it was the work of the Caesars.

The limits are generally assigned to Gaul, to the north the North Sea and the English Channel; to the west the ocean; to the South the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean; to the east the Alps and the Jura; to the northeast the Rhine. I do not want to discuss here this circumscription, supposedly natural, although the basins of the Rhine, the Moselle, the Meuse and the Scheldt belong rather to Germania than to Gaul. All that I want to point out is that the territory comprised in this immense pentagon, easily agglomerated, as the Romans and the Franks proved in turn, is no less happily disposed for a Confederation. It can be compared to a truncated pyramid, whose slopes, united by their crests and pouring their waters into different seas, thus ensure the independence of the populations that inhabit them. Roman policy, which already, doing violence to nature, had unified and centralized Italy, did the same for Gaul: so that our unfortunate country, having to undergo successively the Latin conquest, the imperial unity, and soon after converting to Christianity, lost forever its language, worship, freedom, and originality.

After the fall of the Western Empire, Gaul, conquered by the Franks, resumed under Germanic influence the appearance of a federation which, rapidly denaturing, became the feudal system. The establishment of the communes could have revived the federalist spirit, especially if they had been inspired by the Flemish commune rather than the Roman municipality: they were absorbed by the monarchy.

However, the federative idea, indigenous to old Gaul, lived like a memory in the heart of the provinces, when the Revolution broke out. Federation, one can say, was the first thought of 89. Monarchical absolutism and feudal rights abolished, provincial boundaries respected, everyone felt that France was going to find itself in a confederation, under the hereditary presidency of a King. The battalions sent to Paris from all the provinces of the kingdom were called *fédérés*. The notebooks provided by the States, which hastened to regain their sovereignty, contained the elements of the new pact.

Unfortunately, in 89, we were as always, in spite of our revolutionary fever, rather an imitating people than an initiating people. No example of a federation so remotely remarkable

offered itself to us. Neither the Germanic Confederation, established in the *Holy Apostolic Empire*, nor the Swiss Confederation, steeped in aristocracy, were models to follow. The American Confederation had just been signed on March 3, 1789, the day before the opening of the States-General; and we saw in the first part how defective this draft was. As soon as we gave up developing our old principle, it was no exaggeration to expect from a constitutional monarchy, based on the Declaration of Rights, more liberty, above all more order, than from the constitution of the United States.

The National Assembly, usurping all powers and declaring itself the *Constituent Assembly*, gave the signal for reaction against federalism. From the oath of the Jeu de Paume, it was no longer a meeting of quasi-federal deputies contracting on behalf of their respective states; they were the representatives of an undivided collectivity, who began to overhaul from top to bottom French society, to which they were the first to deign to grant a charter. To make the metamorphosis irrevocable, the provinces were cut up and made unrecognizable, any vestige of provincial independence annihilated under a new geographical division, the departments. Syeyès who proposed it, who later provided the type of all the invariably unitary constitutions that for seventy-two years have governed the country, Syeyès, nourished by the spirit of the Church and the Empire, was the true author of the current unity; it was he who repressed in its germ the national confederation, ready to be reborn if only one man had been found capable of defining it. The necessities of the moment, the salvation of the Revolution, were Syeyes' excuse.

After the disaster of August 10, the abolition of royalty again brought people back to federalist ideas. They were not satisfied with the Constitution of 91, which had become impracticable. They complained of the dictatorship of the last two Assemblies, of the absorption of the departments by the capital. A new meeting of the representatives of the nation was convened, it received the significant name of *Convention*. It was an official denial of the unitary ideas of Syeyès, but one that was to raise terrible debates and lead to bloody proscriptions. As it had been at Versailles after the opening of the States-General, federalism was defeated for the second time in Paris on May 31, 1793. Since this fatal date, all vestige of federalism has disappeared from French public law; the very idea has become suspect, synonymous with counter-revolution, I almost said treason. The notion has faded from people's minds: in France we no longer know the meaning of the word *federation*, which one might believe was borrowed from the Sanskrit vocabulary.

Were the Girondins wrong to want, by virtue of their *conventional* mandate, to call for the decision of the departments of the one and indivisible republic of the Jacobins? Admitting that they were right in theory, was their policy appropriate? Undoubtedly the omnipotence of the new assembly, elected in an essentially anti-unitary spirit, the dictatorship of the committee of public safety, the triumvirate of Robespierre, Saint-Just and Couthon, the tribunician power of Marat and Hébert, the judicature of the revolutionary tribunal, all that was scarcely tolerable, and moreover justified the insurrection of the seventy-two departments against the commune of Paris. But the Girondins, unable to define their own thought and formulate another system, unable to bear the weight of public affairs and to face the danger to the fatherland that they had so well denounced, were they not guilty of a clumsy excitation, of a serious imprudence?... On the other hand, if the Jacobins, who remained alone in power, were able, to a certain extent, to boast of having saved the Revolution and defeated the coalition at Fleurus, could we not with just as much justice reproach them for having themselves created, in part, the danger in order to ward it off afterwards; of having, by their fanaticism, by a terror of fourteen months and by the reaction that it provoked, wearied the nation, broken the public conscience and discredited liberty?

Impartial history will judge this great trial, in view of the best understood principles, of the revelations of contemporaries and of the facts.

As for me, if I am permitted, while awaiting the final decision, to express a personal opinion — and what are the judgments of history made up of, if not summaries of opinions? — I will say frankly that the French nation, constituted for fourteen centuries as a monarchy by divine right, could not transform itself overnight into a republic of some kind; that the Gironde, accused of federalism, represented better than the Jacobins the thought of the Revolution, but that it was mad if it believed in the possibility of a sudden conversion; that prudence, we would say today the law of progress, governed temperaments, and that the misfortune of the Girondins was to have compromised their principle by opposing it both to the monarchy of Syeyès and Mirabeau and to the democracy of the Sans-Culottes, which have now become united. As for the Jacobins, I will add with the same frankness that by seizing power and exercising it with the fullness of monarchical attributions, they showed themselves, for the occasion, wiser than the statesmen of the Gironde; but that by re-establishing, with an increase in absolutism, the system of royalty under the name of the *one and indivisible republic*, after having crowned this republic with the blood of the last king, they sacrificed the very principle of the Revolution and gave proof of a Machiavellianism of the most sinister omen. A temporary dictatorship could be admitted; a dogma, the result of which was to consecrate all the invasions of power and to annul national sovereignty, was a veritable outrage. The one and indivisible republic of the Jacobins did more than destroy the old provincial federalism, evoked perhaps inappropriately by the Gironde; it made liberty impossible in France and the Revolution illusory. One could still hesitate, in 1830, regarding the disastrous consequences of the victory won by the Jacobins: doubt is no longer possible today.

The debate between federation and unity has just recurred with regard to Italy, in circumstances that are not without analogy to those of 93. In 93 the federative idea, confused by some with democracy, accused by others of royalism, had against it the misfortune of the times, the fury of parties, the forgetfulness and incapacity of the nation. In 1859, its adversaries were the intrigues of a minister, the fancy of a sect and the skillfully excited mistrust of the people. It is a question of knowing if the prejudice that since 89 has constantly pushed us from the paths of Revolution into those of absolutism, will hold out for a long time before the truth, finally demonstrated, and the facts.

I have tried, in the first part of this writing, to give the philosophical and historical deduction of the federative principle, and to highlight the superiority of this conception, which we can say is of our century, over all those that preceded it. I have just said by what series of events, by what combination of circumstances, the opposite theory took possession of people's minds. I am going to show what has been the conduct of the Democracy in recent years under this deplorable influence. By reducing itself to the absurd, the policy of unity denounces itself as finished and gives way to the federation.

CHAPTER II.

The Democracy since December 2.

The French democracy, at least insofar as it is represented by certain newspapers to which the imperial government has been pleased to grant or retain the privilege of publication, has reigned

for ten years, without control, over public opinion. It alone was able to speak to the masses; it told them what it wanted; it directed them according to its views and interests. What were its ideas and gestures? This is what it is not useless to recall at this time.

The democracy, by the way it judged the *coup d'état*, gave it its assent. If the undertaking of the President of the Republic was good, it can claim its share of the honor; if it was a bad thing, let it also take its share of the responsibility. What was the pretext for the *coup d'état*, and against whom was it chiefly directed? The reasons that supported the *coup d'état* in the eyes of public opinion and assured its success three years in advance were the danger to which society was exposed by the new theories and the social war with which they threatened the country. Now, who has accused socialism more than the democracy? Who hunted it more atrociously? Who pursues it, even today, with more relentlessness? In the absence of Louis-Napoleon or the Prince of Joinville, candidate designated for the Presidency for the elections of 1852, the *coup d'état* against the socialist democracy would have been made by the non-socialist democracy, in other words by the unitary republic, which is nothing other, as we have shown, than a constitutional monarchy in disguise. The newspapers of this so-called republic have maneuvered so well for ten years that a good number of workers, who in 1848 took part in all the socialist demonstrations, came to say, following the example of their bosses: Without socialism, we would have preserved the republic!... And what would this republic be, madmen, ingrates that you are? A republic of exploiters! Truly, you deserve no other, and you are worthy to serve as its wardens.

The Democracy initially refused to take the oath to the Emperor. Why? Then it took the oath, even calling those who refused to do so bad citizens. Why again? How did what was a shame in 1852 become a duty, an act of public safety, in 1857?

The Democracy rallied to the industrial movement that took place, in the opposite direction to economic reform, following the *coup d'état*. With the most edifying zeal, it entered into that financial feudalism, the invasion of which socialism had announced twenty years in advance. Not a word was uttered by it against the merger of the railway companies: that would have been an attack on the unity of the republic! It got its share of grants, it discounted its share of shares; when the scandals of the Stock Exchange were denounced by socialism, which was the first, according to the testimony of M. Oscar de Vallée, to raise the flag of public morality on this occasion, it declared that these enemies of speculation were enemies of progress. Who undertook to defend, in hatred of socialism, Malthusian morality, produced openly in the Academy? Who has taken under his patronage, effeminate literature, romantic licentiousness and all literary bohemianism, if not that retrograde democracy disdained by the *coup d'état*?

The Democracy applauded the Crimean expedition: it was natural. I do not intend here to criticize imperial policy, placed beyond the reach of my criticism. The Emperor's government did, in 1854 and 1855, what he thought was good about the Ottoman Empire: it would be too risky for me to discuss his motives. Our soldiers behaved gloriously: I do not hesitate to add my laurel leaf to their wreaths. But I am permitted to say that there was a moment when the policy of accommodation, represented by Mr. Drouin de Lhuys, then as now Minister for Foreign Affairs, nearly prevailed, and that if the powerful voice of the democracy had come to support this statesman, France would have saved 1,500 million and one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, I do not know the exact figures, spent in support of the Turkish nationality. A democracy animated by a true republican spirit, more concerned with the liberties of the country than with the exaltation of the central power, miserly above all with the blood of the people, would have seized with ardor all the chances for peace. The unitary zeal of our citizen-publicists decided otherwise. Their belligerent patriotism tipped the scales in favor of... England. War against

Russia, they said, is the Revolution! They constantly have the Revolution in their mouths: that's all they know about it. They had come to understand, in 1854, this fact, however so clear, that the day after December 2 Louis-Napoleon had become, by the force of his situation, by the inevitable significance given to the *coup d'état*, the head of European conservatism. It is as such that he has been hailed by Emperors and Kings, and shall I say so? — by the republics themselves. Oh! Let no one today accuse the French nation of frivolity. The Empire is the work of the whole of Europe. Our democrats must have noticed this when the allied powers decided that the war would remain political, that it would be limited, and that consequently the assistance of the brave men who had come from all the asylums of Europe would be refused.

The Democracy cried *bravo!* to the expedition to Lombardy: war against Austria, according to it, was still the Revolution. We will examine this presently. But I can say in advance that without the democracy, which gave, so to speak, the *exequatur* to Orsini's request, Napoleon III would very probably have been careful not to throw himself into this galley, in the service of which we have spent, for M. de Cavour's spectacles, 500 millions and forty thousand men.

The Democracy, after having blamed the intervention of the government in the affairs of Mexico, wanted the present expedition, which the imperial government would perhaps have renounced, on the motion of Jules Favre, if it had seen this orator energetically supported by newspapers. But no: the democratic press claimed that, even after admitting that it had been misled about the feelings of the Mexican people, the government could not, after a failure, deal *with honor* other than in Mexico City. Was it still the Revolution that called us to Mexico? Not at all. The Mexicans seek to constitute themselves into a federative republic; they want no prince, no more German than Spanish; and their current President Juarez happens to be the most capable, honest and popular they have had. Republicans worthy of the name would have understood that the true dignity, for a government as strong as ours, was to recognize one's mistake, even after a failure, and would have insisted on retreat. But the republic, as our democrats understand it, has a horror of federalism, and is especially touchy on the point of honor.

The Democracy, in fact, is essentially militaristic; without it it would have been Praetorian politics. Its speakers and its writers can be compared to the grumblers of the first Empire, always criticizing the undertakings of the great man, basically devoted body and soul to his designs, always ready to defend him with arm, mind and heart. In vain do you represent to them that standing armies are for the people no longer anything but instruments of oppression and subjects of mistrust; in vain do you make them see, by reasons and figures, that conquests serve absolutely nothing for the fortune of nations, that annexations cost more than they bring in; in vain do you prove to them that the law of war itself, the law of force, if it were applied in its truth, would lead to the cessation of war and to a completely different use of force. They don't hear it that way: Napoleon I, they say, was the sword of the Revolution. But the sword also has its revolutionary mandate, which is far from being fulfilled!

The Democracy has given its hands to free trade, the sudden application of which, if we counted it, would amount to one of those glorious campaigns of the first Empire which invariably crowned a new call for men and money. So, for all our swagger, we are in tow of England, sometimes for war against Russia, sometimes for free trade, sometimes for Italian unity. Could our patriots do less for the theory of Cobden, the dream of Bastiat, the *whim* of M. Jean Dolfus, the hobbyhorse of M. Chevalier, who has so fortunately already straddled the question of gold? Free trade, in fact, the war against monopolists en masse, is this not also the Revolution?... These powerful reasoners will never manage to understand that the mass of the monopolists of a

country is the mass of the nation, and that in waging war against this mass, there is always grave danger, when there is no not sovereign iniquity. [19]

What did the Democracy want by taking sides in the war in the United States in the way it did? To parade philanthropy, above all to satisfy its unitary mania. *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity!* it exclaimed: war on slavery, war on the split, it is the whole Revolution. For this it pushed the North against the South, inflamed anger, poisoned hatred, made the war ten times more atrocious. A part of the spilled blood and the miseries that in Europe are the repercussions of this fratricidal war, must weigh on it as it bears the responsibility for them before history. [20]

Oh! I hear them exclaim, these great politicians: Yes, we wanted the Crimean and Lombardy expeditions, because in themselves these expeditions were useful and revolutionary. But we protested against the way they were conducted: can we answer for a policy that was not ours? Yes, we wanted the Mexico expedition, although directed against a republican nationality; we wanted it because it is important not to let down the prestige of France, the supreme organ of the Revolution. Yes we wanted free trade for the honor of the principle, and because we cannot allow it to be said that France fears England, any more on the markets than on the battlefields. Yes, we want the Revolution to remain armed, the Republic one and indivisible, because without an army the Revolution is incapable of exercising its mandate of justice among the nations; because without unity the Republic no longer functions like a man: it is an inert and useless multitude. But we want the army to be a citizen, and for every citizen to find his freedom in unity. — Wretched talkers! If the policy followed in the East and in Italy was not yours, why did you approve the undertakings? What were you getting involved in? You speak of national honor: what is there in common between this honor and the intrigues that prepared, surprised perhaps, the intervention in Mexico? Where did you learn to practice responsible government? You support free trade in principle. Fine: but do not sacrifice to it the no less respectable principle of the solidarity of industries. You want the Revolution to remain armed: but who threatens the Revolution if not you?

CHAPTER III.

Democratic monogram, unity.

Democracy presents itself as liberal, republican, even socialist, *in the good and true sense of the word*, of course, as M. de Lamartine said.

Democracy imposes itself. It never understood the revolutionary trinomial, *Liberty-Equality-Fraternity*, which in 1848, as in 1793, it always had in its mouth, and of which it made such beautiful emblems. Its motto, definitively adopted, is a single term, Unity.

To understand *Liberty*, indeed, especially *Equality*, to feel *Fraternity* as a free man, one needs a whole philosophy, a whole jurisprudence, a whole science of man and things, of society and its economy. How many resign themselves to such studies?... Whereas with Unity, a physical, mathematical thing that can be seen, touched and counted, we know everything in an instant. We are even dispensed, in difficult cases, from reasoning. With *Unity*, politics is reduced to simple machinery, of which all you have to do is turn the wheel. So much the worse for anyone who gets caught up in the process: he wasn't really a politician; he was an intruder, justly punished for his ambitious vanity.

Whoever says *liberty*, in the language of public right, says guarantee: guarantee of inviolability of the person and the domicile; guarantee of municipal, corporate and industrial liberties; guarantee of legal forms, protectors of innocence and free defence. How can all this be reconciled with governmental majesty, with the democracy that is so costly, with Unity? It is democracy, it is its leaders and its organs that, in 1848, instituted councils of war, organized domiciliary visits, populated the prisons, decreed a state of siege, carried out the transportation without trial of white workers, as Mr. Lincoln now decrees the transportation without trial of black workers. Democracy discounts individual liberty and respect for the law, incapable of governing on any terms other than those of Unity, which is nothing but despotism.

Whoever says *republic* or *equality* of political rights, says administrative independence of the political groups of which the State is composed, says above all separation of powers. Now, democracy is above all centralizing and unitary; it has a horror of federalism; it pursued to excess, under Louis-Philippe, *the spirit of parochialism*; it regards undivided power as the great mainspring, the sheet anchor of the government: its ideal would be a dictatorship coupled with an inquisition. In 1848, when the riot rumbled in the street, it quickly hastened to unite, in the hand of General Cavaignac, all the powers. Why, it asks itself, have you changed the machinery of government? What absolute monarchy has done against us, let us do against it and against its partisans: for that we do not have to change batteries; it suffices to turn one's own guns against the enemy. The Revolution is just that.

Whoever says *socialism*, in the good and true sense of the word, naturally says freedom of trade and industry, mutuality of insurance, reciprocity of credit, equalization of taxes, balance and security of fortunes, participation of the worker in the opportunities of businesses, inviolability of the family in hereditary transmission. Now, democracy inclines strongly to communism, the economic formula of unity: it is only through communism that it conceives equality. What it needs are maximums, forced loans, progressive and lavish taxes, with the support of philanthropic institutions, hospices, asylums, crèches, tontines, national workshops, savings and relief funds, all the paraphernalia of pauperism, the whole livery of misery. It doesn't like piecemeal; it treats free credit as madness; it trembles at the thought of a nation of learned workers, who also knew how to think, write, handle the pickaxe and the plane, and whose women could do without servants in their households. She smiles at the inheritance tax, which, demolishing the family, tends to place property in the hands of the state.

In summary, who says liberty says federation, or says nothing;

Whoever says republic, says federation, or says nothing;

Whoever says socialism, says federation, or still says nothing.

But democracy, as it has manifested itself for four years, is nothing, can and wants nothing of what Federation produces, what the Contract supposes, what Right and Freedom demand. Democracy has unity as its principle; its end is unity; its means, unity; its law, always unity. Unity is its *alpha* and its *omega*, its supreme formula, its ultimate reason. It is all unity and nothing but unity, as its words and deeds demonstrate; that is to say, it does not emerge from the absolute, from the indefinite, from nothingness.

This is why Democracy, which feels its nothingness and is frightened by its weakness; which took a revolutionary accident for the very idea of the Revolution, and made a dogma of a passing form of dictatorship, this old democracy of 1830 renewed from 93, is above all for strong power, hostile to any autonomy, envious of the Empire, which it accuses of having stolen its policy, but which it promises to sing for us again, as M. Thiers said of M. Guizot, with variations and without false notes.

No principles, no organization, no guarantees; only unity and arbitrariness, all adorned with the names of *Revolution* and *Public Safety* : this is the profession of faith of the present democracy. Since 1848 I have summoned it on several occasions to produce a program, and have not obtained a word of it. A program! It is compromising, not certain. From what front would this democracy, devoid of ideas, which the day after the stroke of fortune that would bring it to power, would become, like all the governments of its predecessors, conservative, from what front, I say, would it decline today the responsibility of undertakings to which I recognize that it did not put its hand, but which it would have executed in the same way and which it has covered with her approval?

CHAPTER IV.

Unitary maneuver.

We have just seen how unity has become in democratic thought the equivalent of nothingness. Now, the characteristic of empty souls, who feel their nothingness, is to be invincibly inclined to suspicion, to violence and to bad faith. Obligated to feign principles that they lack, they become hypocrites; attacked by stronger ideas, they have only one means of defending themselves, which is to destroy their adversaries by calumny; called upon to govern, they know only how to supply reason with authority, that is to say, with the most pitiless tyranny. As a result, taking the ink bottle as a *creed*, speculating on waste, looking for dirty tricks and fishing in troubled waters, slandering those who cannot be intimidated or seduced: this has always been the policy of the democrats. It is time for the country to learn to judge a sect that for thirty years has only known how to brandish the popular torch, as if it represented the people, as if it cared about the people other than to *cast them on the fields of battle*, as I have heard it said so many times in 1848, or failing that on those of Lambessa. We must know what is under these cardboard skulls, which only seem so terrible because Diogenes has not yet taken it into his head to hold his lantern up to them. The history of Italian unity provides ample material for our observations.

Democracy pushed with all its might for war against Austria; then, the battle won, to the unification of Italy. That is why she protested against the Treaty of Villafranca; that is why she treats as a friend of Austria and of the Pope whoever takes the liberty at this moment of recalling unhappy Italy to her natural law, federation.

There is in all this an appearance of a system that deludes the simple.

Note first that these democrats, champions par excellence of unitary government, and whom you, my friend reader, might be tempted to take for political capacities, say or insinuate to whoever wants to listen to them, that the Kingdom of Italy was never more than a *tactic* on their part; that it is above all a question of wresting, by a national effort, Italy from the hands of Austria, the Pope, the King of Naples, the dukes of Tuscany, Modena and Parma; that to this end it was essential to rally the Italians under the monarchical flag of Victor-Emmanuel; but that, the foreigners expelled, the independence of the nation assured, the unity consummated, we would have *presto* rid ourselves of the gallant-man king, and the republic would have been proclaimed. That's the bottom line, if my antagonists are to be believed: as for me, my crime is to have come to thwart, by the inopportune cry of Federation! such a beautiful plan.

Thus, let us understand, it is even less my federalism that is blamed than the perfidious inopportuneness of my criticism. We are above all democrats; we are republicans: God forbid

that we ever blaspheme this sacred name of republic! God forbid that people seriously thought of embracing the cause of kings! But this republic, we wanted it to be unitary; we were sure to get there through unity; it is denied that it was realizable otherwise. And it was I who, by joining my voice to those of the reaction, made the republic impossible!

But, if such is the saying of honorable citizens, the question of good faith is becoming generalized: it is no longer just federalism that should be asked, it is also, and first of all, *unitarism*. The party that, in Italy and in France, has demanded with such loud cries the unification of the Peninsula, is this party really republican, or is it not rather monarchist? I have the right to ask the question and ask for pledges, as nothing looks more like a monarchy than a unitary republic. Why, when federation was proposed, was it rejected, when the federative principle had at least the advantage of leaving no ambiguity? The public safety is alleged. But the federation assured Italy of the perpetuity of French protection; under this protection, Italy could organize itself at leisure and later, if unity was its delight, centralize it. To republicans common sense said that with the federation the republic was more than half done; while beginning with unity, what am I saying? by the monarchy in flesh and blood, we risked burying ourselves there.

Do you see, reader, how a little thought changes things? Political schemers, embarrassed by my interrogations, undertake to doom me in public opinion by representing me as a secret trustee of Austria and the Church—what do I know? perhaps as the bearer of King Bomba's last wishes. Such was the strongest of their arguments against the federation.

In a word, I throw my adversaries on the defensive, for, I declare, neither Mazzini's reputation as a conspirator, nor Garibaldi's chivalrous humor, nor the notoriety of their friends in France, are sufficient to reassure me. When I see men denying, at least verbally, their republican faith, raising the monarchical flag, shouting *Long live the king!* with all the strength in their chests, and making signs with their eyes that all this is only a farce of which the acclaimed king must be the butt; especially when I know how weak their republic is, I confess that I am not without anxiety about the sincerity of the betrayal. Ah! *Messieurs les unitaires*, what you are doing is certainly not an act of republican virtue: With what intention do you commit the sin? Who are you betraying?

Talk about *inopportunity!* But you had three years to build your unity. During these three years you have used and abused speech almost exclusively. As far as I am concerned, I only broached the question on July 13, 1862, after Mazzini's desperate retirement; I took it up again on September 7, after Garibaldi's defeat; and I renew my entreaties, today when the Rattazzi ministry had to give way to the Farini ministry, charged by the majority of Parliament with making amends to your unity on the federative principle. Of course, this is the case or never to judge what has been done. Your policy is ruined without resource; all you have to do, if you love Italy and liberty, is to return to common sense and change the system. This is what I have taken the liberty of advising you, and you report me as an apostate from Democracy. Oh! you are the synagogue of Machiavelli; you continue tyranny, and your maxim is *Per fas et nefas*. For three years you have been desolating Italy with your unity, and you find it convenient to blame federalism for it. Back, politicians of nothingness!

CHAPTER V.

entering the campaign: federation conjured away.

On both sides of the Alps, therefore, democracy had taken at face value the word of Napoleon III that France was waging war for an *idea*; that this idea was the independence of Italy, and that our troops would only stop at the Adriatic. The principle of *nationalities*, as it is called, was thus laid down, according to commentators, in the declaration of war.

Nationalities! What is this political element? Has it been defined, analyzed? Have we determined its role and importance? No: no one in the unitary democracy knows a word about it, and she might one day hear it from me for the first time. It doesn't matter: nationalities, they assure us, are always the Revolution.

Well, so be it. It does not enter my mind to blame at all the more or less exaggerated expectations that the descent of the French army into Italy had caused to be conceived. Everyone knows how much in war events modify resolutions; it would have been wise to take this into account: I will not take advantage of this lack of reserve. It is not I, a federalist, who will quibble with independence for anyone. My observations have another purpose.

Nationality is not the same thing as unity: one does not necessarily imply the other. These are two distinct notions that, far from calling for one another, very often exclude each other. What constitutes Swiss nationality, for example, what gives it originality and character, is not the language, since three idioms are spoken in Switzerland; it is not race, since there are as many races as there are languages: it is cantonal independence. [21] But Italy, no less than Switzerland, seems to have been cut out by nature for a confederation: why then, before the start of the campaign, did you raise this question of unity? Why this extension given to the primitive and perfectly defined goal of the expedition? Was there a need, an opportunity? That's what you have to see.

When I invoked, after so many others, in favor of an Italian federation, the geographical constitution of Italy and the traditions of its history, I was told that these were exhausted platitudes, fatalities which it belonged to an intelligent and free nation, acting in the fullness of its power and for its greatest interest, to surmount. The theory that tends to explain politics and history by the influences of soil and climate has been said to be false, even immoral; I was almost called a materialist, because I thought I saw in the configuration of the Peninsula a condition of federalism, which in my opinion means a guarantee of liberty.

This singular argumentation of my opponents made revealed to me a very sad thing: ideas exist in their memory in the state of an anthill; their intelligence does not coordinate them. Hence the incoherence of their opinions and that ineffable arbitrariness that directs their policy.

The supreme goal of the state is liberty, collective and individual.

But liberty is not created out of nothing; one does not arrive there at full leap: it results, not only from the energy of the subject, but from the more or less happy conditions in the midst of which it is placed; it is the end of a series of oscillatory movements, marches and counter-marches, the whole of which composes social evolution and leads to the federative pact, to the republic.

Among the influences whose action can hasten or retard the creation of liberty, the most elementary and decisive is that of soil and climate. It is the soil that gives the first molding to the race; it is the combined influences of race and soil that then shape the genius, arouse and determine the faculties of art, legislation, literature, industry; it is all these things together, finally, that make agglomerations more or less easy. Hence the systems of institutions, laws, customs; hence the traditions, all that constitutes the life, individuality and morality of peoples. No doubt, in the midst of these influences, of which fatality is the point of departure, reason remains free, but if its glory is to subjugate fatality to itself, its power does not go so far as to

destroy it; it leads the movement, but on condition of taking into account the quality of the forces and respecting their laws.

So when I appealed to geography and history with regard to Italian unity, it was not to make a quibble on certain accidents of *fatality*; it is an organized whole, it is Italy in person, in its body, its soul, its spirit, its life, Italy in all its existence that I had in view, and which, created according to me for the federation, like the bird for the air and the fish for the waves, protested in my mind against the project of centralizing it.

Italy, I meant to say, is federal by the constitution of its territory; it is so by the diversity of its inhabitants; it is so by its genius; it is so by its mores; it is still so by its history; it is federal in its entire being and from all eternity. You speak of nationality: but nationality in Italy, as in Switzerland, is the same thing as federation; it is through federation that Italian nationality arises, asserts itself, secures itself; by federation that you will make it free as many times as it will form independent States; whereas with unity you will precisely create for it a fatalism that will suffocate it.

Why then, once again, this artificial unity, which has its roots only in Jacobinic fantasy and Piedmontese ambition, and the first and deplorable effect of which has been to hook the minds of Italians for four years on this insoluble problem: *Accord of political unity with administrative decentralization?* [22]

At least, was that which the general physiology of the States seemed to have to prohibit, authorized by the circumstances, by exception? Was there a danger of death for Italy, a reason of public safety? Here, the skill of the party will show itself to be at the height of its philosophy.

Let us consider that the cessation of Austrian influence in the Peninsula was to bring about a change of regime for all of Italy: the Dukes, the King of Naples, the Pope himself, were going to be forced to grant their peoples constitutions. The question, for an intelligent, patriotic democracy, was therefore to dominate them all, by making the reforms converge towards general freedom. It was not so. M. de Cavour conceived the project of confiscating the movement for the profit of the house of Savoy: in which he was perfectly served by the unitary democrats. Before independence was won, people were already thinking of making Italy pay for it, immersed in the Piedmontese baptismal font.

I need not concern myself with the dynastic interests interested or compromised in the expedition. Attacked by so-called liberals, democrats and republicans, it is from the point of view of the republic, of democracy and of liberty, that I have to defend myself. I therefore say that the policy to be followed was that which, setting aside Piedmontese absorption, placed the princes, the kings and the Papacy in the hands of the liberals: it was the federalist policy. On the one hand, the small Italian monarchies were going to find themselves between two perils: peril of absorption by one of them or of subalternization to a federal authority. To the principle of parliamentary representation and the separation of powers which was to result from the new constitutions, if you add that of a federative bond, what remained of the old absolutism? Nothing. In contrast, liberty profited from all that the old sovereignties were going to lose, since it is precisely the effect of the federation that liberty increases, for the citizens of each State, because of the guarantee that the federal pact brings to them. The duty of the leaders of the democracy, Garibaldi and Mazzini in the front line, was therefore to oppose the ideas of M. de Cavour, relying if necessary on the Emperor of the French. Nothing did not oblige us to bring about already the downfall of dynasties, which it was impossible to oust en masse, but which would have been dominated by their rivalry as much as by the new right.

This is what sound policy prescribed at the beginning of 1859, in accordance with the interest of the masses and common sense. The projects of Piedmont once unmasked, democracy would have had as auxiliaries, with Napoleon III who could not refuse himself, the King of Naples, the Pope and the dukes themselves, all obliged, in order to preserve their crowns, after having signed with their respective subjects a new pact, to take refuge in the confederation. Why did Garibaldi and Mazzini prefer the zigzags of their unitary tactics to this simple, sure way of driving? Strange thing! It was the men who carried the flag of democracy who took charge and responsibility for the great monarchical work; and it is the princes, formerly absolute, who invoke right and liberty.

Certainly, if the will of the Italian people is to give themselves up to Victor-Emmanuel, or, what amounts to the same thing, to form a unitary state with a president or a dictator, I have nothing to object to, and I am prepared to believe that, in spite of Emperor and Pope, Italy will end up giving itself the pastime of it. But let there be no more talk then of liberty or of a republic: Italy, bidding farewell to its federal tradition, declares itself ipso facto retrograde. Its principle is now the same as that of the old Caesars, unless it is that of the bourgeois monarchy, centralizing and corrupting, where bureaucracy replaces the union of the communes, and financial feudalism the agricultural and industrial federation.

CHAPTER VI

Villafranca: contradictory policy.

Napoleon III had promised to drive Austria back to the Adriatic: everything proves that his intention was sincere. How was he prevented from keeping his promise? Why did he stop after Solferino? We have not said everything in this regard; but it emerges from documents and facts that the real cause was the prospect of that unitary Italy that stood before him. Instead of attracting the head of the French army by federal demonstrations, which would have reassured him, nothing has been neglected that could discourage him by worrying him, by wounding him by declarations that would certainly have put off one less patient than him. I will say the thing as it appears to me: rather than accepting the emancipation of Italy up to the Adriatic on conditions that would have made the Peninsula at least a federation of constitutional monarchies, while waiting for it to become a federation of republics, it was preferred to send home the emancipator of Italy; to secure in a rival power, England, another ally; to leave Venice under the yoke of Austria; to offend the Catholic world by war on the Holy See, except then to accuse the Emperor of the French of inconsistency, of suppressed spite, of disappointed ambition. This is the origin of the Treaty of Villafranca. Did those who provoked it show intelligence, and were their tactics *opportune*?...

However, by signing the treaty of Villafranca, and by stipulating a confederation of the Italian States, Napoleon III still offered his guarantee; he imposed on Austria his victorious mediation. It was the case for democracy to recognize the fault committed, a fault that could not be irreparable. But the presumption of the tribunes remains deaf to the warnings. Mazzini, who at first had held back, took it upon himself to refuse in the name of the popular party. He exhorts Victor-Emmanuel to seize Italy; he offers him his help at this price: Dare, Sire, he writes to him, and Mazzini is yours!... Could it be better understood that, provided that it is given unity, the essence of monarchy, the so-called Democracy is satisfied; that unity takes the place of

principle, doctrine, Right and morals; that it is its whole policy? Thus it is always the republic, always liberty that is eliminated, for the benefit of the house of Savoy and in exchange for a bourgeois system. And under what pretext? Under the pretext that as long as Italy has not been unified, it will be incapable of subsisting, exposed to the incursion of the Gauls and the Germans.

It seems, however, that the army that had won at Solferino and Magenta, that the nation that declared itself sister to Italy, could pass for a respectable guarantee, and that if to the solidity of this guarantee were added a liberal and restorative policy, the existence of the Italian confederation within Europe would have become an irrevocable fact. It seems, I would say again, that the simplest propriety required a nationality so unsure of itself to abstain from all insulting mistrust towards an ally who only asked for its care to rectify the frontier on the side of the Alps. But that would have looked too much like a republic of labor and peace: Italian democracy had more grandiose projects, it was in a hurry to show its ingratitude.

It is said as an excuse that the most important thing was to drive out the princes, to dethrone the Pope and the King of Naples, whom the Treaty of Villafranca had maintained, and who, secretly in agreement with Austria, would have turned the forces of the confederation against civil liberties.

One recognizes the Jacobin tactic in this defeat. Is it a question of preventing a revolution favorable to liberty, to the positive sovereignty of nations, but contrary to its instincts of despotism? The Jacobin begins by casting suspicion on the good faith of the personages with whom it is a question of dealing, and to disguise his ill will, he denounces the ill will of others. "They won't consent," he says; "or else, if they consent, it will be with the ulterior motive of betraying." But what do you know? Who tells you that, faced with the imperious necessity of the century, these princes, born in absolutism, will not agree to abandon their chimera? And if once they consent, how can you not see that you have in their acceptance, even made in bad faith, a more precious pledge than their expulsion would be at this moment? Do you forget what it cost Louis XVI, Charles X, to have wanted to retract? Do you forget that the only royalty that does not return is that which, by clumsiness or perjury, has put itself in the necessity of abdicating? And why, in the circumstances, do you trust less in François II, Pius IX, Leopold or Robert, than in Victor-Emmanuel? Why this preference in favor of a prince whom Italian irony seems to have nicknamed *the gallant man* only in memory of the long perfidies of his ancestors? Have you made a pact, Democrats, with Piedmontese good faith?

"Italy," retort these king-eating Puritans with a disdainful air, "had seven, both emperor and pope, kings and dukes. Of these seven our plan was to throw down six first, after which we would soon have got the better of the last."

I have seen men of order, honest and timid bourgeois, whom the innocent outings of March 17, April 16 and May 15, 1848, made, fifteen years ago, fall in love, smile at this policy of corsairs. So true is it that in three quarters of mortals the touchstone of good and evil is not in the conscience, it is in the ideal!

Perhaps the calculation would be correct, and as a Republican I would have shut my mouth, if Italy, delivered from Austria and its princes, including Victor-Emmanuel, had had to remain in the status quo, that is to say, to form as before seven different states, seven governments. We would then have been in full federation. But this is precisely what is not wanted by our tribunes with the look of regicides, for whom it is above all a question of bringing Italy back to political unity. Their ideal, of which they are careful not to see the contradiction, is to couple Democracy and unity together. To this end, what do they offer? To first set aside six suitors, much as in Turkey, at the death of the sultan, the crown is assured to the eldest son by the massacre of his

brothers. That done, they add, the republic would easily have got the better of Victor-Emmanuel. But here I ask who guarantees me the success of the plot? It is clear that the monarchy, gaining in power what it will have lost in number, has nothing to fear from the conspirators. One does not come to end an eaglet like seven nightingales. And when the goal of Italian democracy had been precisely to make the six proscribed princes serve as a stepladder to Victor-Emmanuel, could it do it differently? Unity is not achieved, far from it; Victor-Emmanuel still only reigns over three quarters of Italy, and he is already much stronger than the democrats. What can Garibaldi and Mazzini do to him now? Admitting, moreover, that this well-conceived coup had succeeded, what would liberty have gained? Would unity, that is to say the monarchy, the empire, have been less established, the republic less excluded?... The truth is that the neo-Jacobins did not care any more about the Republic, which they continue to proscribe under the name of federalism, than their ancestors cared about it in 93. What they need is, according to the diversity of temperaments and the energy of ambitions, for some a monarchy with centralization and oscillation, according to the ideas of Syeyes and M. Guizot; for others a praetorian empire renewed by Caesar and Napoleon; to this one a dictatorship, to that one a caliphate. For we must not forget the case where, the seventh head of the beast being cut off, the monarchy would remain without a dynastic representative, a prey offered to the most popular, or, as Danton said, to the most villainous. Thus unity wills it: *The dead king, long live the king!*

CHAPTER VII.

The Papacy and the Religious Sects.

Shall I repeat what I have written elsewhere about the Papacy and the temporal power, that this question, which has become a stumbling block in the system of unity, does not even exist in that of federation?

Let's start from a principle. Regenerated Italy will admit, I suppose, freedom of worship, except of course submission of the clergy to the laws of the state. *The Free Church in the Free State* is a maxim received by the Unitarians; Mazzini, in his greatest anger against the Papacy, never said that he dreamed of proscribing Christianity. I am therefore reasoning on an acquired fact, that of religious liberty. Now, in whatever way the existence of the clergy is provided for in Italy: whether there is a concordat or whether there is not; whether the priests are paid from the budget, whether they live on the subscription of the faithful, or whether they retain their real estate endowments, it matters little, they will enjoy, like all citizens, their civil and political rights. Only the case of the Italian people declaring themselves deist or atheist en masse could create a threatening situation for the Church. But no one, in Italy any more than in France, is there.

This granted, I say that, by the very fact that the existence of the Church would be fully recognized, authorized, and in one way or another subsidized by the nation, the Church would have its place, large or small, in the State. There is no example of a society at once political and religious in which the government and the priesthood do not have intimate relations between them, as organs of the same body and faculties of the same mind. With all the subtlety in the world, you will no better succeed in drawing a sharp line of demarcation between religion and government than between politics and political economy. Always, whatever you do, the spiritual will insinuate itself into the temporal and the temporal will overflow onto the spiritual: the

connection of these two principles is as fatal as that of Freedom and of Authority. [23] In the Middle Ages, the relationship between Church and State was regulated by the pact of Charlemagne, which, while distinguishing the two powers, did not isolate them, but made them equal; nowadays, this same relationship is established in another way, more intimate and more dangerous, as we shall see.

The freedom of worship declared law of the State, any relationship whatsoever between the Church and the State recognized, it follows that any minister of a religion, any Catholic priest consequently, any bishop and any monk, can, in his double capacity of citizen and priest, be elected representative of the people, be appointed senator, as has been the practice in France since 1848, or even be promoted to the presidency of the republic, as in the past among Jews and Muslims, without being able to plead any incapacity or legal incompatibility. Oh what! You have a law that allows the priest to accept any kind of governmental function, of political mandate; to become a minister, Granville, Ximenes, Richelieu, Frayssinous; senator, like MM. Gousset, Morlot, Mathieu; representative, academician, like the Abbé Lacordaire, and you are surprised that in a country of religion and priesthood, in this pontifical Italy, where theocracy is fifteen centuries older than Jesus Christ, a bishop, the head of Catholic bishops, may be at the same time the prince of a small state of four million faithful! Begin then by abolishing your Concordat; begin by excluding the priest, what am I saying? — excluding any individual professing Christianity, from the electoral mandate and political office; begin by proscribing, if you dare, religion and the Church, and you may be allowed to demand, on account of incompatibility, the dismissal of the Holy Father. Because, I warn you: if the clergy want it, however little it pleases them to support their candidacies with a few demonstrations of reform and progress, in a few years they are sure to obtain by popular vote more nominations than democracy and government put together. What did I say? It is they who will become the organ of democracy. And take care, if you take the Pope from them in Rome, that they do not give him back to you in Paris. Universal suffrage works these miracles.

The evangelical precept or counsel of the separation of powers is alleged. This is a matter of theology, which concerns exclusively the clergy and does not come under public Right. I am surprised that men who claim to be brought up in the principles of '89, orators of the Revolution, should have thrown themselves into such a controversy. The law, in the system of the Revolution, is superior to faith, which has led to the rather crude saying that it was an atheist. If therefore the priest, by the vote of his fellow citizens, is invested with a political character, charged with a parliamentary or ministerial mandate, it will not be, if you like, directly and exclusively as a priest, it will be, I repeat, both as citizen and priest. The priesthood, in a State where the usefulness of religion is recognized and freedom of worship accepted, again becomes a title to political office, no more, no less than the quality of jurist, scientist, tradesman or industrialist. It will be absolutely the same if the prince of priests, in other words the Pope, is elected President of the Republic, head of the state in which he resides. Everyone remains free, in their innermost being, *Placuit Spiritui sancto et nobis*; before the civil law it results from revolutionary right, which declared all men equal before the law, admissible to all the employments and sovereign judges of the religion that it suits them to follow. That after that a scrupulous theologian comes to blame this accumulation of the temporal and the spiritual, to claim that there is a violation of the law of Christ, what does this seminary dispute do to democracy? Are we or are we not the posterity of 89?

Note that to support this argument I do not need to resort to the federative right, which is more liberal, without comparison, than unitary law; it suffices that I place myself on the ground

of the constitutional monarchy, which is that of the one and indivisible republic; on the terrain of M. de Cavour and of the whole Franco-Italian democracy, terrain cleared, planted and watered by Voltaire, Rousseau, Mirabeau, Robespierre, Talleyrand and all our authors of constitutions. This temporal power of the Holy See, which scandalizes our strong minds, against which we argue about Saint Matthew, Saint Paul, Saint Thomas, etc., well, it would be justified if necessary by philosophical tolerance, barely won by a century of debate; it would be justified by all our declarations of rights, inspired by the purest genius of incredulity; it would be justified, I say, by the very atheism of the law. Until now the clergy has not taken advantage of the right guaranteed to every ecclesiastic by the legislation of 89, but why? It is because since 89 the situation of the Church, its relations with the State, its social influence, have been regulated in another way, by the concordat.

For me, if someone asks me how I think I can get out of this frightening vicious circle, which shows us, in the eventualities of the future, among the suggestions of a society that has become mystical again through materialism, a universal caliphate emerging from a universal ballot, I declare, even if one were to tax me with monomania, that I see no escape except in the federation.

Let us first observe that in order to reason correctly in this matter, as in any other, it is appropriate first to generalize the question. Democracy sees in the Roman question only Rome and the Papacy: Rome, which it covets to complete Italian unity; the Papacy, whose spiritual authority it is no less jealous of than the temporal. We must consider in this question of Rome and the Holy See all the churches, all the synagogues, all the mystical sects, all the cults and all the temples of the universe, in their relations with public law and the morality of nations. Any other way of reasoning, being particular, is for that very reason partial. Subject to this reservation, which extends to all religious creeds what we have to say of the Roman Church, we can approach the papal question.

The Church, regardless of its dogma, is the mother of all authority and unity. It is through this unity that it has become, so to speak, the capital of mysticism. No religious society could, in this respect, be compared to it. Its motto is One God, One Faith, One Baptism, *Unus Dominus, una fides, unum baptisma*; — its maxim of government, the excommunication or cutting off of the rebels: Let him who does not listen to the Church be regarded by you as pagan and publican, *Qui non audierit Ecclesiam, sit vobis sicut ethnicus et publicanus*. It is from the Church that emperors and kings derive their policy of unity and their prestige; it is from its brilliance that they borrow their majesty. The one and indivisible Republic of the Jacobins, the *Dio e popolo* of Mazzini, are also only plagiarisms of its doctrine. Also, apart from its quarrels, modern democracy is for the Church what the emperors since Constantine and Charlemagne have been, full of deference and submission. Robespierre, at the time of his revenge, always had a weakness for priests and we saw, in 1848, with what eagerness the Republic received them into its bosom. Whether the Church, Bonapartist or Legitimist, declares itself to be democrat tomorrow, it hardly risks it, and the reconciliation will soon be made. There exists in Paris, since 1830, a fraction of the democracy that regards the French Revolution as a corollary of the Gospel; if this party is logical, it must consider democracy as a synonym of the Church. In all the countries where it has spread, the Church therefore possesses, by anteriority of prerogative, the force that unity communicates to the government: this is why, in past centuries, in the event of a misunderstanding between the spiritual and the temporal, we have seen so many times the Church withdraw all temporal authority from itself, excommunicate princes, untie peoples from the oath of fidelity, effect a revolution in the government. As in the Middle Ages, similar facts

can still occur, and perhaps before a few generations we would witness it, if, the corruption of morals pursuing its course, politics turning more and more by the exaggeration of unity and authority to despotism, the Church remained alone as moral and moderating authority.

Federation, on the contrary, is liberty par excellence, plurality, division, self-government by self. Its maxim is Right, not given by the Church, interpreter of heaven, or defined by the prince, representative of the Divinity and arm of the Holy Father; but determined by free contract. In this system, law, right, justice are the arbitral status of wills, a status therefore superior to all authority and belief, to all Church and religion, to all unity, since authority and faith, religion and the Church, being exclusively within the province of the individual conscience, place themselves by that very fact below the pact, the expression of universal consent, the highest authority there is among men. Finally, in the federation, the principle of authority being subordinated, liberty preponderant, the political order is an inverted hierarchy in which the greatest share of advice, action, wealth and power remains in the hands of the confederate multitude, without power ever passing into those of a central authority.

Suppose now, in the confederation, an extraordinary development of religious feeling, giving rise to exaggerated pretensions on the part of the ecclesiastical ministry, and ending in a conflict between the two orders, temporal and spiritual. It is possible then that the clergy, enjoying like the rest of the people civil and political rights, obtains a certain influence in the administration of the localities; possible for the bishop to become, in a canton, president of the senate, of the legislative body, of the council of state. The Church will never be able to become mistress of the Confederation; universal suffrage will never make a federal republic a pontifical state. The proportion of clerics in the electorate being naturally very limited, the principle of authority and unity completely subordinate, always, in case of conflict, the political and economic interest, that is to say temporal, anti-clerical, will prevail over the ecclesiastical interest.

But here is what is more decisive. According to what has just been said, the idea of a pact formed between individuals, towns, cantons, states, different in religion as well as language and industry, implicitly supposes that religion is not necessary to morality; that the Gospel itself has not said the last word of right; that the law of charity is incomplete, and that a justice based on adoration is an inexact justice: this is what a jurist interpreting the thought of the Revolution called the atheism of law. It follows from this that one can foresee the case where, by considerations, not of high policing as in 93, but of high public morality, the abolition of cults that have fallen into wantonness and extravagance should be decreed, the Church outlawed, its ministers excluded from all public functions and honors, and the pure religion of Justice inaugurated without symbolism and without idols. We are not at such extremes; but history is full of facts that legitimize all forecasts and politics in its constitutions does not respect creeds and persons any more than justice in its decrees. The Church has not lost the memory of the Gnostics; the empire of the Caesars saw the plebs of the praetorium, after having elected Trajans and Marcus Aurelius, cover Heliogabalus, Alexander Severus and Julien with the purple. We could, following some democratic and social orgy, have to take up again on new motives the work of the ancient persecutors. The genius of religions is not dead, ask the author of *France mystique*, Mr. Erdan. It is therefore important that we be on our guard, not only for the particular case of the Roman Papacy, which does not want to make amends or divest itself, but for that much more serious one, just as much to be expected from a recrudescence and of a coalition of all the fanaticisms, of all the superstitions and mystics of the earth.

Against this cataclysm of consciences I know, I repeat, of no remedy but the division of the masses, not only by States, communes and corporations, but by churches, synagogues,

consistories, associations, sects, schools. Here unity, far from being an obstacle to danger, would aggravate it still more. The enthusiasm of the masses, one day mad with impiety, the next day drunk with superstition, increases with all the power of the collectivity. But to the political federation join the industrial federation; to the industrial federation add that of ideas, and you can resist all the drives. The federation is the popular storm breakwater. What could be simpler, for example, than to contain papal absolutism by the very subjects of the Pope, not handed over, as is demanded, to the Piedmontese, but restored to their autonomy by the federative constitution, and protected in the exercise of their rights by all the forces of the confederation? So make it, once again, this pact of free union, it's not too late; and not only will you no longer have to worry about the Papacy having become half the power of the century, you hold the whole Church, revolutionized in its head and forced to walk with liberty; you escape the inconvenience of stirring up the Catholic universe against you.

In 1846, when the Jesuits, by their perpetual intrigues, had brought seven Swiss cantons to break with the Confederation and to form a separate alliance, the fifteen other cantons declared the pretensions of the Jesuits and the scission that followed them incompatible with the federal pact, with the very existence of the Republic. The *Sunderbund* was defeated, the Jesuits expelled. Victorious Switzerland did not then think of abusing its triumph, either to draw up a form of religious faith, or to change the federative constitution of the country into a unitary constitution. It contented itself with introducing into the federal constitution an article stating that the cantons could modify their particular constitutions only in the direction of freedom, and it brought into the pact the clericals who had wanted to deviate from it. [24]

The conduct of the Swiss in this circumstance is excellent to cite. As I said just now, we can foresee that one day it will not be only a religious corporation that the Revolution will have to deal with, but an insurrection, either of Catholicism, or of all of Christianity. So no more doubt: society would have the right to oppose its justice-bringing federations to this new *Sunderbund*; it would declare the insurgent churches, whatever they were, guilty of an attack on morals and public liberties, and it would crack down on propagandists. But the time does not seem to have arrived and such is not the concern of the unitaries. The conflagration of mystagogical ideas does not enter into their forecasts. What they are asking, protesting their deepest respect for Christ and his religion, is to remove the Pope's crown in order to pay homage to Victor-Emmanuel, and thus to violate once more the federal principle, identical in Italy to the principle of nationality itself.

If the thought of Villafranca, although proposed by an Emperor, had been supported, one of these two things would inevitably have happened: first, the stronger of the two principles, the supernaturalist principle or the rationalist principle, would have absorbed the other; the Revolution would have prevailed against the Church, or the Church would have stifled the Revolution; or else, second, the two compromising principles would have given rise by their amalgamation to a new idea, superior to at least one of its constituents if not to both; in any case the friends of progress would have had reason to rejoice in the evolution. The party of unity has none of these aspirations. Of the Revolution it knows nothing, *Nescio vos*, it said of it; from the Church it is always ready to receive the blessing: give it the patrimony of Saint Peter to compose its kingdom and it will kiss the mule of the Pope, as indifferent to the distinction between the temporal and the spiritual as to that between liberty and nationality.

CHAPTER VIII.

Danger of political and commercial rivalry between France and Italy in the system of unity.

It is a principle in the *charitable* contract that the benefit received cannot become for the beneficiary a means of harming the benefactor: a maxim written in the conscience of the people, but which does not appear to be for the use of modern democrats. Did not one of their writers reproach me, as an act of courtesy towards the Emperor and of felony towards the party, for having described the unitary policy of the Italians as ungrateful? Yet the Emperor is in this only the representative of the French people.

Much has been said of Napoleon III's secret views on Italy. It has been said that he counted on collecting from his expedition, for himself, the iron crown worn by his uncle; for his cousin Prince Napoleon, the Duchy of Tuscany; for his other cousin Murat, the throne of Naples; for his son, the title of King of Rome, and that it was the spite of a disappointed ambition which had made him retreat after Solferino. This retreat has been used as a pretext to arouse mistrust against him; we therefore declared ourselves quits towards him; it was concluded that it was not enough to arm Italy against Austria, that it was necessary to arm it equally against its magnanimous ally, and the title of benefactor that Napoleon III had just acquired with regard to them became an additional motive for the Italians to form themselves into a single state.

The secret of the Plombières interview is still unknown. I do not know what agreements were verbally made between M. de Cavour and Napoleon III; with all the more reason I can say nothing of the particular projects of the Emperor of the French. In my view, the knowledge of such secrets is perfectly useless to politics. But there is at least one thing certain: it is that Italy freed could not fail, by uniting its parts in a single political group, to become for Imperial France a cause of anxiety much more serious than had been Austria itself, and that after having provided for Italian independence Napoleon III would have to provide for the maintenance of French preponderance.

I have already said it, and in a rather forceful style, in my last publication: Nothing, not even the salvation of the fatherland, would make me sacrifice justice. Against the interest of my country I am ready to support, with my vote and my pen, the cause of the foreigner if it seems to me just and it is not possible to reconcile the two interests. I therefore admit that a nation has the right to develop according to the faculties and advantages with which it has been endowed, while respecting the rights of others, of course. If it is in the destiny of Italy to determine by its own political and economic evolution the downfall of its neighbour; if this result is fatal, well! let us resign ourselves and let the providential decree be accomplished. Humanity cannot stop by the consideration of any power. It has been said that the Revolution will go around the world: it is apparently not chained to French territory. All I ask is that we don't take the aims of ambition for orders from Providence.

I propose to demonstrate in this chapter and in the following ones:

1. That Napoleon III wanted the emancipation of Italy, but that he wanted it subject to the reservation of an Italian Confederation and the maintenance of the French prepotence, because, in the present conditions of civilization, in the data of the imperial monarchy, which are still those of all the States, it was impossible for him to act under other conditions;

2. Setting aside the question of prepotence, which it cannot be appropriate for an impartial writer to maintain despite his patriotism, and reasoning exclusively from the federative point of view, that the condition proposed to the Italians by the Emperor of the French, that is to say, Confederation, would have been more advantageous to them than Unity.

Consequently, that Unitary Democracy, in Italy and in France, has done itself a double wrong, first by opposing the measures of simple prudence of the Emperor of the French with the most ambitious and most threatening projects, then, by making Italy lose with the benefit of Unity, that of a political, economic and social revolution.

I don't want to exaggerate anything, neither the Italian potentiality, still so weak that one doubts in more than one place the regeneration of this country; nor the decadence of our nation, denounced fifteen years ago, with frightful statistical luxury, by M. Raudot. But as everything moves and changes in the life of societies, as the historical movement is composed for each people of a series of ascending and descending evolutions, as today the hearth of civilization seems fixed in one, tomorrow in the other, it is reasonable and it is only foresight to wonder what could happen for France, for Italy and for the whole of Europe, from an event as significant as the constitution of the new kingdom.

France, at the time of writing, is a tired nation, uncertain of its principles, which seems to doubt its star. Italy, on the contrary, awakened from its long numbness, seems to have all the inspiration and ardor of youth. The first aspires to repose, to peaceful reforms, to the purification of its morals, to the refreshment of its genius and its blood; the second asks only to work, no matter under what conditions, no matter under what system. Let a few men be born to her, a Richelieu, a Colbert, a Condé: in less than a generation it becomes, as a federative state, the richest and happiest of republics; as a unitary state, it takes its place among the great empires, and its influence can become, but at the expense of its internal happiness, formidable in Europe. Of these two destinies, so different from each other, the first assured if one had wanted it, the second full of perils, the Democracy has understood only the last. More eager for political glory and governmental action than for well-being for the masses, it formally announces the intention of using Italian centralization, if it succeeds in constituting it, against all odds.

Let us stand in front of a map of Europe. Italy is a bridge thrown over the Mediterranean, extending from the Alps to Greece, which forms the great route from the West to the East. With the railway line that extends from Genoa, Cuneo or Geneva to Taranto, Italy first monopolizes all the transit of travelers from Western Europe to the ports of the Levant, and soon, by the opening of the Isthmus of Suez, of those who travel to India, China, Japan, Oceania and Australia. With steam and the railway, Italy becomes once again the center of European movement: it is through her that Spain, Portugal, France, England, Belgium, Holland, the Rhine, Prussia, Germany, Switzerland, part of Austria, communicate with Sicily, the Ionian Islands, Candia, Lepanto, Athens, the Archipelago, Constantinople, Odessa and the Black Sea, Smyrna, Cyprus, Rhodes, Saint-Jean-d'Acre, Alexandria, Suez, and the whole Upper East.

From now on, this position makes itself felt. Travelers who go from London, Paris or Brussels to the Levant by the Imperial Messageries service no longer embark at Marseilles: they go by rail to take a stopover at Genoa, which saves them twenty-four sailing hours; the same thing takes place for the return. Suppose the railway line is completed from Turin to Naples and Taranto, it is at one of these two ports that embarkation and disembarkation will take place, to the great satisfaction of travelers who, by sparing themselves the fatigues of the sea, will still find a saving of time. Under these conditions, there would not be a single French traveler, either from the center or from Bordeaux, Toulouse, Bayonne or Perpignan, who, leaving for Egypt, Greece or Asia Minor, would embark at Marseilles. We would prefer, by following the line of the South or of Lyon, then that of Sète to Marseilles, Toulon and Nice, to join the Italian railroad, thus sparing four hundred leagues of navigation and four days at sea. France would lose to the clientele of its travellers.

As for the goods circulating on the same line, the French navy could, it is true, keep those sent from the country or destined for the country; but it would lose transit for Russia, Belgium and Germany: competition from Genoa and Trieste would leave it nothing. Franche-Comté, Burgundy, Alsace, Lorraine, the North, would be disputed with it. Thus would, incidentally, the principle of free trade be inscribed by the care of Anglo-unitary Saint-Simonism in our public right.

That is not all. Freed Italy cannot fail to become in its turn, like Austria and Germany, a center of manufacturing production. The raw material, brought from India or America, will naturally be worked at the point closest to the places of consumption: there is for France the outlet of the Danube, of Servia, of Bulgaria, of the Moldo-Walachia, from Roumelia, from Greece, lost; there is the Black Sea that disappears from our relations: all this motivated, no doubt not by hatred of the French name, but by an average difference of seven to eight hundred kilometers of transport, which, at ten centimes per kilometer, gives a saving of 70 at 80 fr. per thousand kilograms. More than once we have seen trade move for lesser advantage.

In this situation, how could France, isolated from the main trade routes, struck by free trade which would nullify its navigation, deforested by the enormous supply of its railways, still aspire to be a maritime power? Of what use will be, to say it in passing, the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez, undertaken *under the beard of England* with almost exclusively French capital, and become for Russia, Greece, the Danubian Republics, Austria, Turkey, and above all Italy, the source of unrivaled prosperity? The passage of Suez, if success responds to the announcements, will be a cause of decadence for Marseilles and ruin for Le Havre, since, however we consider the thing, nothing can come back to us: the more useful it will be to the foreigners, the more it will harm us. We speak of natural alliances, of communities of principles, of the sympathy of races: what are these phrases in the presence of the antagonism of interests?

It is this marvelous situation of Italy that it is a question of unitary people serving, not precisely for the prosperity of the Italian populations, which would be entirely within Right and against which I would have absolutely no nothing to say, but for the power and action of the new government, that is to say the development of a new and formidable monarchy, imperialist or constitutional, but to the humiliation of French power and the perpetuity of the unitary regime.

From the strategic point of view, the advantage of Italy over France would not be less. In this regard, those who so eloquently preach to us the brotherhood of nations will not fail to repeat that the century is repugnant to war, that the progress of mores pushes towards disarmament, that civilization now only admits peaceful struggles of industry, etc We have just seen what this industrial struggle will be for France, and with what prosperity free trade threatens us. But, without speaking of the hard condition imposed on our manufacturers and our ship-owners, the facts of each day show moreover, for whoever is neither blind nor deaf, that since 89 the state of war has not ceased to be the normal state of nations, and that if since the fall of the first Empire conflicts have diminished in importance, the cause is not in economic institutions and the softening of mores, it is in standing armies, maintained at great expense to preserve our sad equilibrium.

Since the risks of conflagration are therefore always the same, I will not say despite the interests and their solidarity, but precisely because of the interests, Italy, a central and first-rate power, one of the most interested, cannot fail to come into line: on whose side will it line up? On the side of its interests no doubt, which, as I have just demonstrated, are radically contrary to French interests. Opposed in interests to France, Italy inevitably finds itself our political rival and our antagonist; one is the consequence of the other. Cretinism and betrayal alone can deny it.

Now, let us cast our eyes on the map one last time: it seems that nature herself, after having made this maritime position for Italy, took care to fortify it further in anticipation of a struggle against France. Look at this enclosure of bastions called the Alps, which extends from Nice to Valais: against whom, I pray you, is this immense fortress turned? It is not against England, nor against Russia, nor against Germany, nor against Austria herself, no more than against Switzerland: Italy, by its maritime and continental position, is a friend of all peoples except one, which is the French people.

Five passages can give way to an invasion of the French in Italy, and reciprocally to an irruption of the Italians on France: passage from Geneva to the valley of Aosta by the Saint-Bernard; Mont-Cenis railway; passing through Mont-Genèvre; Cuneo Railway; passage of the Corniche.

Concentrate a hundred thousand men at Turin, in the center of the semi-circle: these hundred thousand men, being able to move quickly and *en masse* to the attacked point, are sufficient to guard all the passages; while to triumph over such a concentration of forces would require, as for the siege of a place, a triple or quadruple army. Where would France take this army, threatened as it would be in the North and East by England, Belgium and the Rhine? Assuming France at war with Italy alone, the game would still not be equal: the ultramontane army being able to resupply and renew itself constantly from the south of the Peninsula, while the French army, repulsed after a first effort, demoralized and diminished, would be unable to return to the charge. Italy would have renewed against us, with redoubled facilities and much more numerous chances, the tactics employed in 1796 by General Bonaparte against the Austrian generals. Thus, while we believe we are covered by the Alps, we are in reality dominated by them: it suffices, to change the relationship, to create on the other side of this immense wall a single State, instead of the six that existed before. This is precisely what French democracy, fraternizing with Italian democracy, demands today, and what we have tried in the last place to achieve by the means we will see presently.

Undoubtedly, and I am happy to repeat it, if there were for Italy, apart from Germanic or Gallic oppression, no political existence other than that of a unitary monarchy; if, to enjoy its natural advantages, it had no other means than to fire on us with all its batteries, we would have to resign ourselves. Our only chance of salvation would be to turn ourselves into an Italian province, unless we were strong enough to make Italy itself an annex of the Empire. In either case, the Democracy would not have to congratulate itself: it would have proved once more that the genius for peace and freedom is not in it; that it is much better at arming nations against each other than at organizing them, and that, like those soldiers who see only strategic positions, they can only see the forces of nature as instruments of destruction. Obligated to conquer in order to be conquered, Italy, barely liberated by France, but become formidable to France as much as to Austria, could again regard itself as lost.

CHAPTER IX

Difficulties of the situation in 1859.

France he wanted the independence of Italy, it has wanted it as a just thing: I don't ask my country to give up on it. Let liberty happen, even to our disadvantage. The Lombard-Venetian, Tuscan, Roman, Neapolitan railways, formidable instruments of exploitation with regard to the

masses, of agglomeration of forces for the power, of competition against foreigners, are executed or in the process of being executed: far be it from me to obstruct them; this incomparable line must be carried out. The interest of civilization before our own.

But we wanted more than that. We wanted the formation of all Italy in a single state; this unity is half done, and nothing, from the point of view of the liberty and well-being of the Italian people, any more than of general progress, justifies it: why was it allowed to happen? It was easy, I hope to demonstrate it presently, to reconcile the interests of Italy with the situation acquired in our country and the sensitivities of our nation: how did these same interests become antagonistic to us? That unification is consummated; let the people and the Italian government show themselves at the height of their ambition; let Europe, irritated against us, support them, and the hour has struck for France of continual abasement, in commerce, in politics and in war. In less than a generation, we can be a shadow of ourselves. We posed, through the war against Austria, as saviors of nationalities: who would save us in turn from the inexorable consequences of this expedition, which was to be so fortunate for the two nations, and which today threatens to become so fatal for us Frenchmen?

Let us go back to the eve of the start of the campaign, and consider in what position the Emperor of the French must have found himself after he had destroyed Austrian influence in Italy, if it were to be admitted that he had promised lightly what was later claimed to be demanded of him. England and the other powers, remaining spectators, had sent their notes, formulated their reservations; Napoleon III, called upon, so to speak, to explain himself, had had to declare that he acted solely for the consideration of Italy, without any motive of personal ambition or aggrandizement for his empire. While acting as a high European justice-bringer, he had obeyed a summons from the neutrals. Such an expedition, however, and for such an end had never been seen. Everyone was surprised; many were incredulous; this was the origin of the mistrust which the Emperor aroused against France and against himself. Clumsy servants having spoken of the throne of Naples for Prince Murat, of the Duchy of Tuscany for Prince Napoleon, Italian patriotism was awakened: everywhere public opinion, skilfully excited, showed itself to be contrary to the French pretenders. The imperial government, if I remember, declared itself a stranger to these candidacies: so much so that the Italian campaign, glorious for our arms, but dangerous for our power, if it were true that it was to have for conclusion the formation of a monarchy of twenty-six million souls, seemed, by the impulse given to the minds, to end for us as a mystification.

It remained, however, to settle the fate of Italy. The conqueror of Solferino, to whose arbitration the new constitution of the Peninsula was to be submitted, had to decide between a great military state and a Confederation. Granted a small increase in territory in Savoy and Nice, after declaring himself disinterested, he had no other alternative, and the world had its eyes on him. An empire? Not to mention the incompatibility between a creation of this nature and Napoleonic ideas, the dignity of France after such a service; the care of its safety in the present conditions of Europe, did not allow it. A confederation? But, in the business situation, to give Italy a federal constitution was, from another point of view, to undermine the empire, by provoking the rise of a hostile principle; it was to oppose to the France of December 2, instead of a material power capable of balancing its own, an institution which, being attached to the Swiss, Germanic, Dutch-Belgian, Danubian and Scandinavian systems, would isolate it more and more and sooner or later was bound to put an end to its prepotence.

If Napoleon III declared himself in favor of unity, as heir to the traditions and the thought of the First Empire he was duped, as Head of the French State he abdicated all claim to precedence.

If he opted for confederation, he would be accused of jealousy and bad will; thereby he made himself odious, and what was worse he organized and developed the federations of Europe against him. Finally, if he left Italy in the *status quo*, he contradicted himself and canceled the expedition.

Napoleon III decided for the federal system.

Oh! I have not received a mission to defend the policy of the Emperor any more than the cause of the Pope; I know nothing of Napoleon III's intentions in 1859 any more than of his current thoughts. But I must confess, the more I reflect on this Italian affair, the more I feel the need to believe, for the honor of my nation, that its leader was not, in 1859, the most improvident of men; that he wanted, loyally and knowingly, both the emancipation of Italy and its formation into a federative system; that he expected from this combination the happiest results for the two peoples; that he made the point of departure of a new policy, both for his domestic government, and for his diplomacy abroad; but that he was deceived in his expectation, first by Piedmontese politics, then by the suggestions of England, finally by the democratic drive; that in the presence of demonstrations, clamors, revolts and annexations, he did not think he could call on his authority, and that he relied on the action of time.

Hence the anxieties and hesitations of French politics, from Villafranca to the retirement of M. Thouvenel. What could reticence, distinctions, procrastination, subterfuge and all the skills of diplomacy do in a contradictory situation? We allowed what we had the right and the duty to do and which we did not have the courage to prevent; we left the floor to events, which means to adventures; absolutist Europe was asked to recognize a kingdom whose usurping origin was disapproved of as much as its danger was understood; public opinion has been fatigued by tugging it sometimes in the Voltairian and demagogic direction, sometimes in the royalist and clerical direction. And the contradiction has become ever more flagrant, the responsibility more intense, the situation worse.

Now admire the judgments of public opinion and its feedback. Arbiter of Europe, I say conservative Europe, in 1852 and 1856; hope of democracy in 1859, the imperial government is today denounced by both, and for what crime? If I was not mistaken in the assessment that I have just made of the Emperor's intentions with regard to the Italians, which I sincerely hope, his crime, in the eyes of opposing parties, is to have wanted: 1. To emancipate Italy; 2. to confederate it. For this idea, the healthiest and happiest, of which he will be taken into account in history, he is at the same time banished from those who sumptuously call themselves the Revolution, and from those who by much better title we call the counter-revolution. If the good man Géronte were still alive, he would say to Napoleon III: But what were you going to do, Sire, in this accursed galley? The Republic alone could free Italy because it alone could, without making itself suspect, give it, and if need be impose on it, federation.

CHAPTER X.

Garibaldi's plan: Italian unity fails by fault of the Democrats.

Fortune, therefore, during the first half of 1862, seemed to smile on the partisans of unity; it had to try someone less daring than Garibaldi. The manner in which he had conquered the kingdom of Naples, the excitement of minds, promised him an even easier success, but of incalculable significance. What was it? To wear down resistance imperceptibly, and to force

Napoleon's hand without appearing to. The tactic was indicated: if Garibaldi had a political genius equal to his hatred for France and for the Emperor, the game was lost for us, and we could date our downfall from the voluntary evacuation of Rome by our troops. The *scenario* would have been less brilliant for the general than in 1860; the result, from the point of view of unity, a hundred times greater.

This was the case, in fact, for this Democracy that had not hesitated to take as its watchword the cry of *Vive le Roi!* to follow its monarchist policy to the end. It was necessary in its turn to pose as a party of conservation and order, to put aside the insurrectionary and fantastic idea of nationalities, to seek preferably the support of organized forces and established interests, to attach governments, which all could not have asked for better; not to speak of Venetia, which would have been found later; to lull French prudence; to set aside the discussion on temporal power, by referring exclusively to the initiative of the masses the defection of the States of the Church; to finally conspire with Victor-Emmanuel, instead of conspiring against him.

But the Democracy had other commitments. Its hypocrisy was beginning to weigh on it; it longed to throw off the mask, flattering itself, as always, that it could do it alone. Besides, it was not so devoted to the cause of unity that it consented to silence its particular ambitions, personal rivalries and grudges. The Democracy, at base, has no other goal than itself, that is to say the satisfaction of its leaders and cronies, who do not form, as the vulgar imagine, a political party, but a coterie. If Italian unity is not an accomplished fact at this time, the fault lies with the democrats.

Garibaldi's plan had as its base of operations the principle of nationality, which became, as I said above, synonymous with the principle of unity. This is how the idea has been everywhere understood and its consequences formulated in popular intuition. For the Italians, who already claimed aloud old lost possessions, Corsica, Ticino, Tyrol, Trieste, Dalmatia, nationality is the re-establishment of imperial and pontifical Italy according to types more or less modified from Charlemagne and Leo III: capital, Rome. For the Greeks, who certainly believe themselves as capable as the Italians and would not have been left behind, nationality consists in the restoration of the old schismatic empire: capital, Constantinople. For the Hungarians, who consider Croatia, Transylvania, Slavonia, Galicia (why not Moravia and Bohemia yet?) as extensions of the crown, nationality is resolved in the substitution of a Magyar dynasty for that of Habsburg: capital, Vienna. For the Poles, to whom one would have first of all restored their limits of 1772, an area of 38,000 square leagues including a crowd of populations who never had anything Polish about them except the stamp, nationality was to lead to the formation of a Slavic empire, which would have included even Moscow and Petersburg. Finally, it was by virtue of the principle of nationality that a certain German party, apparently more careful of the purity of the race than avid of annexation, once proposed to form, with the help of the Emperor of French, a unitary empire, even if it meant sacrificing the left bank of the Rhine to this ally.

A certain understanding, fruit of the similarity of aspirations, had therefore been formed between the representatives of these nationalities, as far as one can judge from the harangues of Garibaldi, the revelations of Kossuth and Klapka and the entirety of events. A simultaneous uprising plan had been concerted in Italy, Greece, Montenegro, Hungary and Poland. Branches extended into the county of Nice, and even, according to what I was told, on the coast of France as far as Marseilles. Those who have traveled to Provence know that this Italian-speaking population is not yet entirely Frenchified, and the hunt for Republicans and Socialists in 1852 did not incline its feelings any more towards Paris. At the given signal, the explosion was to take place everywhere at once: the people rose up, governments were overthrown, dynasties expelled,

soon replaced as one might imagine; Venice and Trieste were returned to the Italians, the map of Europe reworked; and Garibaldi, in heroic ecstasy, after having endowed with one hand his country with that glorious unity, which was to make Italy the most central power and at the same time themore independent of Europe, restored liberty to France on the other, in compensation for her lost pre-eminence.

Did the democratic press in Paris adhere to this plan? Did it at least know of its existence? Did it take it seriously or did it only admit it on condition of inventory? Who can tell? I do not believe that it can itself shed the slightest light on the subject, so light is its conception, inattentive to facts, indiscreet in its speeches, unworthy of the confidence of its own friends. Besides, M. Guérault is a friend of the Empire; Mr. Havin a friend of the Empire; M. Peyrat was in no way considered at odds with the Empire; the *Patrie* and the *Pays* are as devoted as the *France* itself to the Empire; the *Journal des Débats*, in spite of the favor it accords to Piedmont, has more than one connection with the Empire; the *Temps* declared, when it was founded, that it belonged to no party. Then, all this journalism blamed, perhaps without understanding it, the last outcry of Garibaldi: which does not mean that it rejects the principle of nationality understood in the Garibaldian way; it only declined the general's attempt as incongruous and untimely.

Certainly, the project of a unitary Italy considered from an exclusively governmental point of view, leaving aside the economic interests and the well-being of the masses, which the federal system alone can satisfy, above all leaving aside the general liberty for which all these political units are increasingly an obstacle, this project, I say, had its plausible side, and there was a moment when one could believe that it would succeed. For that, as I said above, it was necessary to wait for everything from time and from the pressure of circumstances; to address the governments worried by the progress of French arms, to the Emperor of the French himself, who was exhausted by the affair of Rome, and who would have ended up being carried away by the Democracy, ready to sacrifice to the greatness of the new kingdom the manifest interest of the Empire.

But from the moment that Garibaldi and Mazzini separated from Victor-Emmanuel, appealed to the nationalities, that is to say, to all the factions ousted from Europe, declared war on the dynasties, on Austria, which had become constitutional, on Russia, the emancipator of her peasants, to imperial France, whose intervention had just restored liberty to Italy; from the moment that they refused to reckon with the established powers and with the necessities of the century to indulge in their demagogic outburst, the game was lost for them, and their project of unity, condemned by the Revolution and by Political Economy, appeared, from a political point of view, only as an unsustainable utopia.

The resurrections of Lazares, brought about by the virtue of popular *pronouncement*, apart from the most common prudence, here, then, is the fund and the depths of the policy of the modern democrats! Instead of pushing the peoples along the path of federations, which is that of all political and economic liberties, they are drunk on gigantic utopias, they are invited to Caesarean counterfeits, without thinking that the history of nations is not uniform, that progress does not consist in vain repetitions, and that what could be justified at one time would be a culpable chimera in an other; and when, by an unhoped-for fortune, the opportunity arises to realize these retrograde projects, everything is compromised, everything is lost, through indiscipline, personality and the extravagance of the manifestations.

Success had to respond to tactics. First, in matters of conspiracy, it is rare for the conspirators to come to an agreement. Each claims to exploit the affair for his own profit: it is to whoever will seize the initiative and make all the effort of the league converge towards his particular designs.

The battle is not engaged but already the conspirators are wary of each other and threaten each other.

The Montenegrins and the Greeks give the signal, followed by those of the Ionian Islands. But Garibaldi did not answer the call, busy as he was to ensure above all the triumph of Italian unity. The Turk, who had to be killed first, remains standing; the Ionians set in order by the English their masters, friends for the surplus of Garibaldi. Garibaldi had not thought of the difficulty of maintaining, in this conjuncture, the support of England and the cooperation of the Ionians. Also the British press is unanimous in blaming the mad enterprise of the general. The Montenegrins are crushed: the result for the Greeks is to expel, instead of the Sultan, their own king Otho, who is currently being replaced by any prince, as long as he is neither English, nor French, nor Russian, if you prefer, as the *Siècle* recently proposed, create for Greece a confederation!... Finally, Garibaldi appears on the scene and calls Hungary: but Klapka and Kossuth abandon him in their turn, reproaching him for coming too late and declaring that they do not recognize in him the voice of Italy, as soon as he does not march with Victor-Emmanuel. To which Garibaldi could very well have replied that if he, Garibaldi, had to march with Victor-Emmanuel for the service of Hungary, they, Kossuth and Klapka, had to march with Franz-Joseph for the service of Italy: which concluded to the very negation of the enterprise. Finally Garibaldi, whose only chance was in the hope he had of training the royal army, left to himself, succumbs at the first encounter, when he tries to play in Aspro-Monte the role of Napoleon I in Grenoble. The Piedmontese soldiers, his compatriots, fired on him as the enemy of their nation. And now Poland is collapsing in desperate insurrection and assassination; Germany is yawning at unity, and we Frenchmen are waiting for our deliverance!

Is all of this absurd enough? Is this what one can call an intelligent, liberal, republican policy? Is this revolution? Do you recognize, in these organizers of conspiracies, founders of States, heads of nations, real politicians?

I have rendered back to Garibaldi's private virtues, to his bravery, to his disinterestedness, a testimony that has been quoted with satisfaction by some of my adversaries. But, this sincere homage rendered to the man, can I do otherwise than condemn the agitator? Can I take Garibaldi seriously shouting *Vive Victor-Emmanuel* and working to demolish him; affirming unity and calling himself a democrat, even a republican, which apparently means a man of all rights and all liberties; accusing Minister Rattazzi of betraying unity, and reproaching him for his *municipalism* as too centralizing? Garibaldi, as quick to seize the dictatorship as to resign from it; having in him Caesar and Washington; an excellent, devoted, but undisciplined heart, which seems to be governed by an unfortunate genius, does he even suspect what monarchy and republic, unity and decentralization are? Has he ever noticed that between democracy and empire there is not the thickness of a sheet of paper? What was he doing, on February 3, 1852, in Santos-Lugares, where, at the head of 900 Italians, he decided the victory in favor of Urquiza, leader of the rebels of La Plata, supposedly armed for the confederation of the republics of the South and soon after dictator, against Rosas, leader or dictator of the Argentine Republic, who also carried on his side the flag of the confederation? Was it for a principle, or only against a tyranny that Garibaldi was fighting? Which side was the unity on, according to him, at Buenos Aires? On which side the federation? Why did Garibaldi interfere in this quarrel? And in Rome, where, in 1849, he distinguished himself by his prowess against the French army, was he for the federation or for unity? Was he with Cernuschi the federalist or with Mazzini the unitary? Or did he obey, as some claim, only his own inspirations?

We attribute to Garibaldi, speaking of Napoleon III, the following statement: *This man has a tail of straw, and it is I who will set it on fire.* The phrase would be pretty if it had been based on success. After the disaster of Aspro-Monte, it is nothing more than boastfulness, the ridicule of which falls on its author. Alas! What the Democracy took for the tail of straw of Napoleon III was the tail of the devil, which it is condemned to pull for a long time yet, if the tribunes in whom it has placed its confidence do not change tactics and maxims.

CHAPTER XI.

Hypothesis of a solution by the federative principle.

Garibaldi's defeat neither solved the problem nor improved the situation. The unification of Italy is postponed, it is true, indefinitely; Mr. Rattazzi, considered too centralizing, had to withdraw in the face of municipalist demands; at the same time, the question of the Papacy faded somewhat in the Garibaldian eclipse. But the antithesis of the two powers, Italian and French, remains threatening, irreconcilable; Italy is writhing in civil war and anarchy, France is a prey to the anguish of an immense peril.

Already there is talk of a return to the *status quo*, that is to say a division of Italy into four or five independent states, as before the war of 1859. If this solution is adopted, it will be the work of diplomacy; it will probably result in the restoration of fallen princes; the constitutional forms, the promised guarantees will be preserved: but the denial will have been given to the Democracy, and through it indirectly to the Revolution. The cause of the people, I mean of this working plebs of the cities and the countryside that must henceforth fix all the attention of the true revolutionaries, will have been sacrificed by the so-called party of action to personal speculations as ambitious as they are chimerical, and the real question for a long time adjourned.

Chauvinists, whom the prospect of a weakened France agitates to the point of terror, would like us to end it with a clap of thunder, and for the Emperor of the French, boldly resuming the policy of his uncle, trusting in the sympathy of the masses and playing double or quits, to declare the French Empire restored within the limits of 1804, and by one and the same act incorporated into France, to the north Belgium and all the Rhine, to the south Lombardy and Piedmont. Victor-Emmanuel would be offered the throne of Constantinople. Beyond that, they say, everything will only ever be palliative. France remains cancelled; it is no longer in it that the center of gravity of politics is to be found. The most moderate recommend maintaining agitation in Italy until, weary of war, tired of brigandage, the nation makes a new appeal to the liberator of 1859 and throws itself back into his arms.

These councils of despair openly accuse the error of those who, by the most detestable calculations, pushed the Italian people to this fantasy of unity. While in our country the old Democracy, at the end of its chatter, yearns for a general melee to revive itself and, without provocation, without motives, solicits new annexations; while there it redoubles its Machiavellianism and drives the masses to revolt, England, which coldly observes the crisis, is everywhere gaining ground and defying us; Germany, Austria, Prussia, Belgium, Russia stand ready. The empire blocked, everyone expects an explosion. That we will succumb in a new Waterloo, which we can take as certain if Victory, as is her habit, remains faithful to the big battalions, and, as a body politic, as a center of civilization from which philosophy, science, law, liberty radiated over the world, we will have had our day. The France of Henri IV, Richelieu and

Louis XIV, the France of 89, 93, 1802, 1814, 1830, 1848, as well as that of 1852, will have said its last word; it will be over.

How simple, easy, advantageous to all parties would this distressing situation have seemed, if one had considered it, in 1859, from the point of view of principles, from the point of view of the federation!

Consider first that what makes Italy, as a maritime and industrial power, such a formidable rival to France, disappears entirely, without any loss for the Italian people, in the federal system. It is not, in fact, the advantages of position and territory, it is not the superiority of industry and capital that makes a people dangerous to its neighbors; it is their focus. Distributed wealth is harmless and does not excite envy; only the wealth agglomerated in the hands of a strongly established feudalism, and by the latter placed at the disposal of an enterprising power, can become, in the economic order and in the political order, a force of destruction. The oppressive, dissolving influence of a financial aristocracy, the industrial and territorial influence on the people it exploits and on the State is not in doubt: this truth, thanks to 1848, can today pass for a commonplace. Well! What the agglomeration of economic forces is at home for the working class, it becomes so for the neighboring nations abroad; and reciprocally what is for the well-being of a nation and for the freedom of the citizens the equal distribution of the instruments of work and the sources of wealth, it also becomes so for the community of peoples. The cause of the proletariat and that of European balance are united; both protest with equal energy against unity and in favor of the federative system. Must it be said that the same reasoning applies to the government and the army, and that the bravest confederation, having the same number of soldiers, will never weigh on its neighbors as much as it would if it were transformed into unitary monarchy?

Let the Italians make the most of their geographical position, let them develop their navy, let them exploit their railways, that they become industrious and rich: it is their right, and we do not have, we French people, to worry about it. To each nation its heritage; we have ours, which it is up to us to assert. After all, we cannot claim to exploit any more than to conquer the globe: we must leave these ideas of industrial, commercial and maritime monopoly to the English. Let us not build our fortune on supplies from abroad: the English, our rivals, could tell us that if, at times, the privilege of exportation produces enormous profits, it is compensated for by terrible miseries. In the general economy, the main market of each nation is within itself; the outside market is an accessory: it is only exceptionally that it can take precedence over the other. The economic development that is being noticed at this moment by all Europe is a demonstration of this law, of which the Italian federation would have made a decisive application. So aristocratic England pushes with all its forces for the unity of Italy: it understands that, in any case, the pre-eminence on the Mediterranean having to escape it, it is important for it to oppose to the French bankocracy and centralization an equal centralization and bankocracy.

I admit, however, that if the industrial federation, being organized in Italy by the very fact of the political federation, does not create for unitary France a subject of legitimate concern; if Confederate Italy, having nothing in common with the French Empire either by its constitution or its aspirations, not posing itself as a rival, cannot be accused of causing us any prejudice, its industrial and commercial progress will nevertheless be for us a cause of less profit, of loss of earnings. But what consequence can we draw from this? Only one: it is that the French people, if it wants to preserve its initiative and sustain competition worthily, will have to follow the example of the Italian people: admitting that it keeps its political centralization, it will do wisely to prepare at least its economic federation.

But this is also what the French partisans of Italian unity care about, speculators in general, businessmen, hunters of industrial actions and bribes, subservient to the bankocracy. These, in order to consolidate the monopoly in France and at the same time protect themselves against competition from the Italian monopoly, will not fail to organise, if this has not already been done, a monstrous association, in which they will find themselves merged and united the capitalist bourgeoisie and all the shareholders on this side and on that side of the Alps. Let us not forget that the constitutional monarchy, bourgeois and unitary, tends, with regard to international policy, to guarantee from State to State the exploiting classes against the exploited classes, consequently to form the coalition of capital against wages, of whatever language and nationality they all may be. This is why the *Journal des Débats* finds itself in agreement with *Le Siècle*, *l'Opinion nationale*, *le Pays*, *la Patrie* and *la Presse* on the Italian question. Here the political color gives way to the conspiracy of interests. [25]

Let's finish this second part. Against the renewed project of the former Caesars of an Italian unity, there was:

The geographical constitution of the Peninsula;

Municipal traditions;

The legal, republican principle of federation;

The favorable occasion: Austria defeated, France offering its guarantee;

The Roman question to be resolved, which meant the Papacy to be secularized, the Church to be revolutionized;

The plebs to be emancipated;

The political and commercial susceptibilities of France, the self-esteem of the Emperor, to spare;

The progress of nations to serve and the European balance to reform, through the development of federations.

If what is called opportunity in politics is not an empty word, I dare say that it was there.

The Neo-Jacobin Democracy did not accept any of these considerations. Geography has been misunderstood by her; — history despised; — principles trampled upon; — the cause of the proletariat betrayed; — opportunity rejected; — the French guarantee despised; — the Roman question confused; — France threatened, compromised; — the Emperor wounded; — European progress sacrificed, under the pretext of *nationality*, to a conspiracy of adventurers and intriguers. We know the rest.

It was up to Garibaldi, at a certain moment in his career, to give Italy, with freedom and wealth, all the unity that a regime of mutual guarantees entails between independent cities, but that the we won't ever find in a system of absorption. It was up to him alone, by creating the federations of Europe in the place of those nationalities forever extinct, to make the Republic everywhere preponderant, and to inaugurate with irresistible power the economic and social revolution. Shall I say that he backed down from the task? God forbid: it would have been enough for him to see it for him to want to execute it. Garibaldi understood nothing of his time, consequently nothing of his own mission. His blindness is the crime of this retrograde democracy to which he listened too much, of these entrepreneurs of revolutions, restorers of nationalities, tacticians of adventure, statesmen *in partibus*, for which he had too much deference. May he, now that his error has broken him, never fully comprehend the truth that he misunderstood! The loss of his illusions he would bear as a philosopher, as a hero; his regrets would be too bitter for him.

I have said what my principles were, what I would have wanted to do, if I had been in the place of Garibaldi and Mazzini; what I would have advised, if I had had a voice in the matter; what I thought I had sufficiently expressed in my last publication. Could the Unitary Democrats tell me in turn what they wanted and what they want? Could they explain what they mean by *Liberty, Sovereignty of the People, Social Contract*, and give a definition of the Republic?

Working Translation by Shawn P. Wilbur.