


EUGENICS OF A FREE SOCIETY:  
Thoughts on Roads to Anarchism



By Max Nettlau

1927

[The following work is the minimally edited transcription of a handwritten manuscript (No. 1863) in the Max Nettlau Papers at the International Institute for Social History, consisting of a book by Nettlau, unpublished in English, but available in several other languages. In the interest of readability, some minor changes in spelling and punctuation have been made, particularly where the sense of the text seemed to be obscured.

The work makes up part of a series of texts written by Nettlau in an attempt to steer anarchist practice into more productive channels. The use of the term “eugenics” here simply means providing the most promising conditions for the spread of libertarian thought. Other texts in this series, and some commentary, can be found at <http://panarchy.libertarian-labyrinth.org/>]

Section A (chapters I-VII). Present position of socialism and progressive elements.  
Section B. (chapters VIII-XIV). Present position of capitalist society.  
Section C. (chapters XV-XVII). Essential conditions of efficient realizations of Socialism.  
Section D. (chapters XVIII-XX). Present situation of anarchism; methods, prospects, possibilities.  
Section E. (chapters XXI-XXII). The best possible initial stages of a Free Society.

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These might be the headlines of the five groups of chapters.

The headlines are provisional, because considered less important, as this is not so much a series of chapters but a unique and continuing argument which ought to be read as unbroken as possible; it stands not on the right or wrong of single chapters, but on the spirit of the whole.

May 2, 1927.

The headlines of chapters are not definitive. The following indications are more of a guide to an eventual reader of the Ms. than definite titles.

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1—Introductory Remark.

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2—I. Everyman's Utopia. Private Life. Diversity of Man.

5—II. The professional classes.

11—III. Workers, peasants and proletarian socialism

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143—XXIII. Conclusion. It was necessary to show the great obstacles, the sometimes one-sided and inefficient use made of our small means. Hence to succeed a greater effort is necessary; and the means suggested in this essay or others which others should set to work to find, try to make such an effort possible and successful.

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Eugenics of a Free Society: Thoughts on Roads to Anarchism  
By M. Nettleau

Introductory Remark.

Capitalism may last some time longer and produce mechanization and uniformity on a hitherto unknown scale. Bolshevism and Fascism may have their spell as inefficient episodes. All that will not prevent very many men and women to hope for an age when freedom and happiness will be realized for all, and to prepare and work for it. Anarchism, defined and outlined in many a good book all over the earth, is considered by many the best expression of the free and harmonious life to which they aspire. The nobler and loftier the aim is, the graver becomes the problem, how to reach it, how to approach to it, how even to be sure to march always in its direction. An aim of such delicate structure, relying on the mutual good will of very many people, can neither be imposed in a preconcerted way, nor reach by one jump, nor be expected to become a tangible fact in some quite spontaneous way. Theoretically the realization is nearest, when the greatest possible number of people work for it by the most efficient methods. In practice, notwithstanding the great quantity of anarchist literature, old and new, the roads to anarchism appear to me to require serious practical discussion, based on the study of the exact situation under which we have got to live at present, and of all the forces and tendencies which can possibly help to trace roads to freedom out of the dark authoritarian wilderness in which we grope our way, trying and hoping to reach light and fresh air.

For this purpose the following chapters are written, being my contribution to what is surely the aim of all of us: to create the clearest understanding and the best possible conditions for the great social change aspires and expected, and to what I therefore describe by the words: Eugenics of a Free Society—as essential a necessity in society, certainly, as eugenics are in man.

April, 1927.

M. N.

## I.

Are not all men who are even moderately open-minded and disinterested, indulging at times in dreams of a happy future of free and easy fellowship of all? Almost everyone feels himself possessed of some faculties and often of some inclination and will to lead such a life, but he lacks confidence in the corresponding faculties and strength of character of most others. So he keeps such feelings to himself, is absorbed by the routine of everyday's life, but not infrequently he will try to create a small sphere of ease and happiness privately around himself: a harmonious little family, a circle of friends, specialization in work, study or hobbies which brings him in close and loyal contact with others similarly disposed, enjoyment of nature's and art's marvelous productions, etc. The private life of all who are not downright victims of vulgarity or greed, of domination and profiteering, nor quite broken in spirit by drudgery, misery and hopeless despair, is always a utopia on a diminutive scale, a small anticipated portion of that large, general happiness which is unobtainable now and which lack of confidence makes most people believe to be unobtainable forever. So many excellent people, feeling nearly alike on such matter, live side by side, never talking of all this, or, if they do, usually confirming each other's distrust and pessimism, as it is an ordinary measure of self-protection to appear diffident and suspicious and by no means naïve and candid. The same diffidence brings about that nine tenths if not ninety-nine hundredths of all that is expressed in public by the thinkers and speakers, in books or by any method of propaganda is wasted; it appeals to a few who may possess a favorable predisposition, but most others remain callous and indifferent from that want of confidence described. They feel that they are surrounded by powers, parties and men who will take advantage of them, if they possibly can, so seclusion in private life, protected by loosely formed associations of similar interests is the course of most people's life today.

Nor was this ordinary course of life much different in earlier times, unless it was still worse. Private life is already a very great achievement of civilization, and is, indeed, the foundation-stone of coming general freedom. If ever in a very [3] primitive gregarious state of men equality and solidarity existed within the tribe in a conscious state—for a mere absence of private appropriation, whilst land to roam in and food existing in such profusion that it was not worth while to enclose or apportion them, does not necessarily imply conscious solidarity—, equality and solidarity were radically destroyed at some very early time by the strong and the clever, authority and property were established and as jealously, zealously, and brutally guarded in those early days as they are to-day. This disruption of mankind in rulers and subjects, rich and poor, at all known periods of history prevented mutual confidence and, just as conspicuous, yet unprotected animals in the course of very many ages acquired thickness of skin, scales and other exterior features increasing endurance, resistance and survival, so men acquired an inner crust formed of distrust, inaccessibility and the faculties of dissimulation and hypocrisy. So cruel was and is the struggle for life that these excrescences often overgrow, infect and destroy the better inner feelings which, in any case, are mostly stunted or very irregularly developed. But even under all these unfavorable conditions the creation and the gradual softening of private life, of conduct between man to man, took place and it would be extraordinary indeed, if these evolutions should come to a standstill, which in all such cases must imply decline and fall, as a real standstill is impossible.

A continued evolution, a gradual awakening of mankind to a conscious desire for freedom and happiness and to conscious efforts to realize these on the largest possible scale, must then be expected in the teeth of all difficulties. What separates men more than castes and classes, traditions and ideas, is the degree and the rhythm of the possibilities of evolution proper to every person. This

differentiates evidently the nearest neighbors, fellow-workers, friends of members of the same family and this difference can be bridged over, smoothed down in very many cases, no doubt, but it can never be fundamentally wiped out. This explains why all attempts at instruction, from outside and above, the most striking arguments, the best oratory, the best organizing efforts, flowing appeals against so much wrong done, are as a rule appallingly ineffective, touching vibrating chords in some, in many sometimes, but never in all, and the depth and duration of the impression caused are similarly different.

It is, then, not advisable to look out for means to prevent such relative waste of good effort, to try to spread the seed of ideas with a smaller quota of loss? This may appear useless to those who consider man a gregarious animal that may be easily induced to go to the manger or to the [4] shambles; the stronger lead the way, the weaker will follow and an average result will always be obtained. This is done to-day and ambition and imitation create the illusion of progress arrived at in common. Yet this is not so; people may join a move which some lead on, but they remain strangers and diffident at heart as before. I am the last one who would object to wholesale and public propaganda of every reasonable description, but it requires to be seconded by every kind of individual effort in a larger degree, perhaps than is now usually done.

For a selection of the most easily accessible to our ideas is rapidly made, skimming of the most gifted, devoted, disinterested, often also the most ambitious who may lack in deepness and constancy. But far too many are given up as hopeless wrecks indeed, as cruel life played havoc with all their finer feelings, but many others may only have felt repulsion for the often rigid and overmuch emphasized statements of some lecturer, article or pamphlet which left them, in their opinions, no choice between complete adherence or as complete [ ]. I am certainly not advocating slackness and trimming, but I feel that, if some become anarchists by "love at first sight," others do not and it may happen that their slowness meets with impatience or scorn and that they may withdraw altogether. Hence insipient sympathizers should be made better welcome than they often are; otherwise some of them, meeting by chance with comrades of broad views and patient disposition, will be won by and by, whilst others, met it a "take it or leave it" spirit, will be lost, and we cannot spare many losses.

For mankind is deeply divided into those who know but domination and submission, riches and poverty, and who still believe that the oppressed and the exploited, be they ever so weak and poor, have only this legitimate goal before them: to cringe and crave for any particle, however small, of authority and means to exploit;-and into those who wish that all who work, should be free and united, ensuring thus each other's happiness, and the effort to increase the number of the second is beset with difficulties of every description, some of which will be discussed later. I feel, personally, that the libertarian ideas, under the influence, very often, of courageous defiance of the enemy, are put forward in too rigid, too absolute and often abstract form and appear thus estranged from real life. It ought to be possible to lay all these all important problems before me in a much more palatable way, giving them a chance to think things out for themselves and [5] this is not done, at least not in the opinion of incipient sympathizers who are still outsiders, if, together with the large principles of freedom and solidarity, about which there can be no question, economical, organisatory and other forecasts of future anarchism are produced not in a hypothetical, but in a strongly affirmative form. These are, in my opinion, subjects quite open for discussion, until practical experience will have laid safer foundations. At present the primary task would be the creation of a large milieu of general sympathizers which, as we well know, are greatly lacking. Green specks in a stony, arid desert are scarcely likely to expand, to cover the whole desert with green, fertile soil. Rather the desert, if it is to change, will have to acquire moisture by climate and other influences, and then only the scanty oases may be able to spread all over the desert.

This means that progress and prosperity of the most advanced movements are quite inseparably linked up with general progress and that, consequently, every manifestation of such progress is of vital value to us. It will not do to hold up such progress to shame, because it is insufficient, or to try to goad and lash it to greater quickness by scorn; it will be right always to welcome and to greet it. Mens sana, in corpore sano, a healthy mind in a healthy body, operates in society as it does in men and the coming free society certainly has the same claim to the most eugenic gestation and birth as every other organism has.

## II.

Looking backward in history we observe that, in spite of all efforts toward emancipation, social and political subjection, marital thralldom, baleful ignorance and prejudice were so systematically force on the enslaved masses by their conquerors that the present state of things is fully comprehensible. If man has really evolved from an animal stage only from 150,000 to 200,000 years ago, the earliest historical testimony hails back only to about the twentieth part of this time and it shows the societies of oriental despotism governed and managed, kept in order and in submission by the [ ] of those who enjoy wealth and power. There must have been a gradual rise of power and property and hired tools to defend them within the tribes, their wars which enslaved the weaker tribes, expanded the domination, laws and customs, language and traditions of the [6] victorious tribes, until successful despots in favorably situated centers, like the Euphrates and Tigris and the Nile regions, welded together huge kingdoms which often changed masters and frontiers or were conquered altogether. Then sea power colonized and controlled the Mediterranean basin, Rome conquered all the older countries and great parts of the interior of Europe, becoming the outshining incarnation of authority in every form, military by permanent war and conquest, political by Caesarism, to-day revived as Fascism, economical and legal by the iron Roman law of sacred property, spiritual by the Pope's rule which every other Christian denomination is openly or silently craving to imitate within her own sphere. All this forms a block of statist and patriotic doctrines and sentiments which are inoculated by education and enforced by every form of State power in every corner of the globe to-day as they were in the days of Babylon and of Rome.

Discontent and revolt have been powerless to shake off this iron yoke that dates back from prehistoric times. Progress was only made by the individual activity of thinkers, inventors and artists, whose intellect was of course fed by the intellectual accumulations and experience of their communities, but who added a happy final touch to such raw materials. But whatever they produced and discovered was always quickly put to use by the governing and exploiting classes to enlarge their riches, whilst the poor scarcely received the dregs of it. Mechanical inventions became the means of producing objects for exchange, hence trade and commercial wealth and monopolies began. Intellectual activities elaborated and coordinated knowledge, restricted by education to the rich and often handled and transmitted in their interest by educated slaves, later by priests, still later by teachers who, but a few generations ago, in many countries were little better than slaves and who still dole out but the smallest crumbs possible of knowledge to the poor people.

Even art was thus monopolized. It may have arisen as an expression of the mere joy to live, expressed by gifted people in particularly attractive form, when intervals of peace and occasional bodily comfort made local communities or groups feel happy. But very soon religion put it to its own use, increasing the abstraction of their fetishes and god fictions by having them presented by artists; sacred poetry and sculpture, sacred architecture, sacred music and dance (the ritual of the churches is such dance) were created in dim prehistoric days and last to this [7] very day. The people kept but

scanty remains—some popular songs and ballads, fairy tales, dances and paltry ornamental work and local peasant dresses, but, according to one learned hypothesis at least, most of all this is not ancient traditional lore and craft of the people, but is a pale and tardy reflex of similar things which the rich had enjoyed in full and were about to discard—simply like stale goods of a dying fashion planted in out of the way localities to-day.

I do not carelessly confound early and modern times; the more one looks into these matters, the more every age resembles the other. Is not to-day also every invention at once pressed into the service of capital? Is not every branch of art in an increasing degree capitalistically organized and exploited? What do the people know of the scientific life of our times? Popular lectures and all that are no compensation for the absolute exclusions of the great majority of mankind from intellectual progress, whilst religious is showered on them by the bushel in almost every street and in the smallest village. I wonder whether statistics have ever been gathered showing the approximate numbers of priests and of teachers in all centuries and in the most enlightened modern countries; the results might be perplexing to some.

From all this will be seen that to the political monopoly, the State, and the economic monopoly, private property, the governing classes at all times added the equally sacred intellectual monopoly, by enlisting all intellectual workers (and the artists in the bargain, to amuse them) in this service and rigidly excluding the people from real education, just as they excluded them from State power and from property of real value. Up till now, unfortunately, only a small part of the intelligentsia realized the part they have to play in the interest of their masters and patrons and how infinitely little the role of the modern civil servant, technical engineer, teacher, journalist, judge, politician, artist, etc. differs from that of the Greek educated slave who belonged to the household of the rich Roman patrician.

It is a task of prime important to wrest these indispensable auxiliaries from the capitalistic system and the State, at least the living portion of them; for a very considerable other portion of them are hopelessly tied up with the State in all its present and possible future forms. I refer to the bureaucracy, lawyers, politicians, journalists, the clergy and other âmes damnées of every authoritarian system, all those who live by any legalized form of chicanery, make-belief and fraud and loathe useful work. [8] They cherish the well founded hope that every State will want to employ them and they are quite right; all the changes of system in Europe in the years 1917-1918, Russian included, showed that no one is more eager to change his cockade than the bureaucracy and they had the right flair to understand quickly that the more States there are, the more functionaries are employed and so nearly everyone of them changed the cockade with delight. Anarchists are the only people who would not know what to do with them on the morrow of a popular victory and they might roam about in despair as Justice Nupkins does in William Morris' interlude The Table Turned or Nupkins Awakened (1887); they would come in by and by as Nupkins does and try to do some work, or they would be left to their own devices. Bakunin supposed that many oppressors and exploiters would be killed by an impulse of popular vengeance in the first moment, but to those remaining whose property would be seized—he meant the capitalist owners of productive capital and precious metals—the Commune would give wherewith to live and they might later on increase this income by work, if they wish so (1868).

It is not worthwhile bothering now with such details; only one thing is certain: that a system of coercion would not be reinstalled to deal with unsocial elements. And another thing ought to be quite as certain: that the more attractive the new system would be, the easier even such elements would be attracted by it and such problems become extinct.



The great number of really useful technical and scientific auxiliaries of the present system or, in the case of medical men, teachers, scientists, authors of value, real artists, etc., of humanity in general, is in quite another position: before all they do real work and know the value of work; being intelligent they understand the unity and interdependence of all real work, manual and mechanical, intellectual and artistic. Another important factor is that in very many cases, these men do no routine work which blunts the faculties and kills the interest in work. They must be up-to-date in every progress in their special domain and many, many ideas to simplify production or to make it more efficient may repose in their brains, worthless perhaps at present from the capitalist standpoint as cheap labor pays still better, but useful in a socialist society.

In general many of these men are not overhappy under the present system, since they see very clearly the futility of many of their best efforts. The doctor knows quite well that most of his poor patients do not require a bottle of medicine, but good food and healthy air which he cannot give to them. The teacher feels that starved children with wretched homes are hopeless material of education. The architect, the artists, the author must very often dance to the tune of their rich clients. The scientists is well aware, to what extent disinterested research, not subservient to State, capitalist or similar purposes, frequently stands alone, unaided, unable to proceed further, as the interest of real science would require. Under present [9] circumstances many of these men, idealists when young, are later on victims of routine, of resignation, many also manage to become capitalists themselves, in purse and in heart. Still they are so numerous that real prosperity is scarce among them and social discontent is ripe in their ranks in an increasing proportion. Two qualities are frequent with them: they are skeptical and they are cautious. Education, knowledge, experience naturally breeds critical spirit, skepticism, and as the capitalists place these men necessarily in positions of trust, yet do not trust them—knowing that thought and intelligence must see through the capitalist game and despise it—, they watch them and this makes these intellectual men in exposed positions usually very cautious. Skeptical and cautious, then, also with regard to socialist schemes. Only the most incompetent of them would prefer safe employment by a socialist State to their present, often precarious position. The intelligent ones who safeguard their personal independence even under the present commercial system, mistrust a socialist bureaucracy; State socialism to them is a technically defective system, a machinery with clogged wheels and too much friction, too small output. A technically perfected, anarchically inspired system would be really attractive to many of them and from some later chapters of this essay it may perhaps become evident that the fullest co-operation of technical competence and anarchist spirit and will might best lay the foundations of a free society.

This is, of course, quite different from any government by scientists which, as Bakunin declared, would be the worst of all governments. But a free society neither means an entirely fresh start under primitive and chaotic conditions of production, nor does it mean a continuation of the old order under “entirely new management” which assumes what the bolshevists did. The technical and other useful professional classes would on the contrary be given new tasks requiring their greatest effort and skill and inspiring them with the desire to do their best, since for the first time in their lives they may coincide with their wishes and feelings as men and not be products of anxious hope and fear, made to please those who employ them. The architect who is a man, would feel free when he gets other work to do than to construct tenements and factories on the most economic plan, prisons and villas in the style which the whim of the owner or fashion prescribe. The chemist might feel relieved when useful work is expected from him and not new poison gases, methods to adulterate products and worthless drugs. The artist would retake his independence which he long since, with the smallest exceptions possible, abandoned to those who pay him. And what prospects of new and useful work

would not doctors, hygienicists, teachers and every man of good will and of some special efficiency see before them!

The capitalists know of course the value of the [10] intellectual workers who, with land and machinery and with the manual workers, form the inseparable trinity producing all human necessities and wealth—at present for the benefit of parasitic monopolists, the capitalists and the State. They try to bribe and cajole the intellectual workers; of late they organize them as scabs for emergency help against the general strike of the manual workers, along with the sons of the capitalists. By all this they just show them that they hold key positions and coming events might see them on the right side, if such events were not fouled beforehand by bolshevist arrogance and autocracy, to which every person of finer feelings will always instinctively oppose active and passive resistance. Such a new system would be reduced to material want by disorganization and this would provoke still more authoritarian measures, again frustrated by the sullen sabotage of those who could give real help. All this happened in Russia since 1917 and everything must be done to avoid a repetition of this cruel experience and waste of splendid opportunities.

These men, therefore, ought to be made thoroughly familiar with the possibilities of free socialism which differ so absolutely from the now obvious and palpable insufficiency of fettered socialism. They merit no more the reproach to uphold the capitalist system, individually, than every worker does, individually: a ship is kept sailing by the captain and by the poorest of the stokers alike and all are equally responsible. For no worker on any part of the globe can pretend in our days that the claims of labor, the voice of social justice are things of which he never heard. Everyone has heard of them, only the very great majority still lack confidence and choose to remain on the safe side—and so do the professional classes, from the ranks of whom by the way, very many of the best revolutionists have always come. The same can be said about educated youth, students and others. If two or three generations ago the youth was more attracted by socialism than to-day, socialism for the greater part was more attractive then, not utterly authoritarian and rigidly proletarian, predominant qualities which isolated it, lowered it from its large humanitarian pedestal of yore.

The task before socialism is so immense that only the willing concurrence of all the living forces of humanity can expect to overcome the initial and future difficulties. Some anarchists understand this; syndicalists already are prone to exclusivism and once proclaimed the proud, but vainglorious dogma: syndicalism is self-sufficient. Perhaps anarcho-syndicalism sees clearer now in this matter. Authoritarian socialists scorn humanity and place their faith in the dictatorship of their leaders, which they funnily call their own dictatorship, that of the proletariat. [11] every narrowness is unsatisfactory and leads to shriveling and shrinking or mist be widened. There is ample scope for the widening of socialism, for which is preferable: splendid isolation on the bedrock of class or incipient and growing solidarity with all the living intellectual forces of mankind?

### III.

Class exclusiveness is the more a shortsighted policy and a mistake, in my opinion, because within classes real homogeneity of position, much less of tendencies and dispositions never exists. Let us consider the non-capitalist classes,—workers and the minor categories of clerks and assistants, then small peasants or the smallest of farmers and, in European countries at least, many categories of small artisans, independent home workers, very small dealers and agents, also petty State officials, etc. This is a much varied world with many ups and downs, places in sunshine and in darkest shadow, in which the real masses of the people have moved for ever so many ages and which to very many offers such a variety of chances of relative advancement, “bettering” his position or

finding a haven of rest for old age, that their life and energy is filled up with this scheming and shifting and that "class consciousness," solidarity, socialism mean nothing to them. Even if they call themselves socialists and are organized, their socialism is but skin deep; real faith and confidence are absent.

The "concentration of capital," affirmed and theoretically constructed by Marx, is a dogma which has been challenged and which has not held out against criticism. Kropotkin's The small industries of Britain (1900), a part of Fields, Factories and Workshops (1901) and Tsherkzesoff's examination of this dogma will be remembered. Kropotkin used to tell also how relatively small the quantity of really productive workers was which he found to exist in England, compared to great quantities of people in dependent, non-productive situations, connected with the rich classes and the State and who, socially, were only consumers. I conclude that, to use this way of expressing my standpoint, the concentration of the spirit of the non-capitalists into one general feeling of class consciousness is also a dogma requiring to be scrutinized. There is certainly and always has been a general feeling of discontent, also a readiness to use almost any means for social betterment of the individual's position—but here the roads divide: solidarity is recognized by very many, but "everybody for himself and the devil take the hindmost" is by no means yet an extinct [12] feeling and as tenacious of life as small capitalism, holding out and constantly created afresh on the side of huge concentrations.

Is it not necessary for me to dwell on all the social reforms, improvements, educational, organisatory and other efforts, voluntary and imposed by the community, the social and political struggles, etc. which, however slow, incomplete and beset with many drawbacks have so immensely changed the daily life and work of the people. Changes which any comparison between a state of things in 1927 and 1827 makes evident, welcome changes which did incalculable good, created and developed social feeling and a widespread faith in progress—yet my impression is that from various reasons—the secular accumulations of misery, want of education and prejudice, the accompanying vigor of capitalism which minimized the effect of most reforms, etc.—the effect of all these reforms and improvements was reduced to a bare minimum and will remain so as long as capitalism lasts, for supremacy and authority are units, unique at a time and their apparent or alleged division, repartition among several factors, is a mockery and a delusion.

Socialist insight and revolutionary will, be they ever so widely spread, are no real forces since capitalism retains its power before our eyes; otherwise a real collision and a social change would happen at once, but they simply do not happen, since the oppressed and exploited classes have not yet become conscious of that overwhelming strength which as producers of everything, as victims of shameless usurpation and parasitism, is theirs by every human right.

For too many of the working classes are indeed very lukewarm, if not negative elements of the great social struggle; vulgarity, routine, narrowness, empty amusements make them such and, whatever effort is made by socialists and honest reformers, it would be a self delusion to underrate the paralyzing effect of this great mass of indifferent, if not downright contemptuous and hostile people. Their ideal remains a snug berth in later age, personal advancement by any means, scrupulous with some, unscrupulous with very many others. They may be members of organizations and cast a socialist vote, but there is no reliance upon them. By far too many workers in really every country, I feel sure, remain in this unsatisfactory state and intense individual propaganda ought to give them a moral and intellectual lift. Otherwise even if by the initiative of really socialist minorities socialist victories were won, the new societies would be burdened with the dead weight of these unsocial people, a situation which would provoke and breed authoritarian measures from above, bolshevism of some sort....

All this applies in a still larger degree to the small artisans and others with strongly developed [13] egoist tendencies and still more to the great mass, if not the immense majority of the peasants in all countries.

The agricultural producers (peasants, tenants, laborers and, in most cases, almost all members of their families for some part of their lives) have at all times nourished themselves, the industrious (working) and the parasitic (privileged and monopolist) population of the globe and their families. This immense burden is somewhat stifled from locality to locality, from country to country, from continent to continent, as transport and navigations are developing, but it remains the same as a whole: everybody has to be fed and only agriculture can efficiently provide for this. In reward the peasant formerly reaped a bare living, a minimum of industrial goods and a maximum of serfdom and exploitation by the parasitic class, landlords and the State. Naturally the peasant feels discontent, being domineered over and fleeced on all sides, he hates landlords and merchants, soldiers and lawyers and passive resistance, abstention from general social life is almost his only defense; his rebellions were cruelly crushed and priest rule and less than a minimum of educational opportunities kept his mental development in the narrowest limits and did a good deal to pervert it. So the peasant hardened and is hard to-day a stranger at the banquet of intellectual life which is not for the likes of him, distrustful and contemptuous brimful. In the long course of history nobody was ever good to him and he feels no inclination to be good to anybody. The words:

“...the simple plan

That they should take who have the power

And they should keep who can”

Resume what was done to the peasant and alas, what the peasant does when he feels that his turn has come. So when they saw and heard of signs of a general stir against the incapacity of ministers and the threatening financial breakdown in France they began to burn castles and when the Revolution had taken root in Paris and other town, they took what they could of land and after this they supported the strongest autocrat as the man who would best prevent a restoration of the old land system, involving their serfdom; they were thus a powerful factor to make the French Revolution end in military dictatorship, the Empire of Napoleon I, and they gave the same end to the Revolution of 1848 in France by their votes cast in favor of Louis Bonaparte in 1848, who became President and, in December 1851, helped himself soon to become the Emperor Napoleon III.

In Russia, in spite of their miserable position before and after the emancipation of February 19, 1861, and all revolutionary efforts of propaganda and revival of the memory of large peasant insurrections in previous centuries, the peasants did not stir until they saw tsarism completely collapsed in the spring of 1917. Then they took local revenge by destructions and seized what land they could get hold of and apportioned it more or less according to the “good old rule,” the “simple plan” just quoted in Rob Roy’s words in Wordsworth’s famous poem. The further drift [14] of the Russian Revolution interests them mainly in its attitude to their agricultural produce and they understood to show their teeth, to resist force and flattery and to maintain the old buying and selling principle. Solidarity is certainly practiced among themselves in narrow or larger circles, as this is one among almost every category of men who know each other, but it is not extended outside those spheres—the criterium of real socialist feeling.

The Mexican agrarian rebellions of about twenty years ago and which still smolder and will break out again, some Italian and Spanish agrarian revolts also, were more socially inspired, whilst the secular Irish tenants’ revolt ended in peasant proprietorship. Co-operative arrangements are sometimes willingly adopted by peasants and operate practically and on a large scale, as in Denmark, Switzerland, Ireland and, no doubt, in parts of the United States. But this is strictly business, the

most expedient way for collection and transport of rapidly perishable products, and if immense companies undertake to do this work, it will be all the same to the peasant who thinks only of the best market.

Now, as the populations increased in all countries, this fact inevitably had the strongest repercussion on agricultural production. Emigration, the opening of new continents was but a temporary remedy. The new territories began to feel saturated with immigrants and refuse their unlimited augmentation, but even so the population problem is also facing them by and by and birth control is still in a stage of benevolent persuasion which cannot be relied upon. In any case, as things were for the last one or two generations and as they are now, especially after the disastrous war, the agrarian monopoly is in an always stronger position; food is scarce, therefore it is able to dictate the price.

I refer to this here only as to an all-powerful factor intensifying the non-socialist mentality of the peasants which in an age of agrarian ascendancy is unlikely to change. The peasant remembers what hard bargains were driven with him for ages back, and he now chooses to drive the hard bargains himself. He needs not to be told about solidarity,—he acts instinctively in solidarity with the agrarian interest—nor about organization—his agrarian syndicates or defense leagues are excellently organized,—nor about State socialist protective measures—he leaves the State a free hand in general reaction and, in reward, has the State at his beck and call for measures favorable to agrarian monopoly. He may be occasionally under the thumb of some railroad, mortgage or other large companies, but he will find means to wriggle out. He is bent on holding his own—and he considers the land his own; he tills it and claims the harvest his own. But as the whole of humanity has to live of this harvest, there is a collision of interest which former ages solved by an iron dictatorship over the peasant and which in those time of large populations is at present solved by inclining before the agrarian dictatorship.

How socialists will solve this immense problem, [15] remains to be seen. Gigantic general upheavals like the Russian Revolution did not prompt the peasant to solidarity. Appeals to self-help, “everybody his own peasant” by the combination of intellectual, industrial and agricultural work by everybody, an excellent ideas, is yet in its infancy as to political and widespread realization.

For the present, then, the peasant class remains an anti-socialist stronghold and it could not well be different after its continuous separation from progressive life. The peasant usually is a diminutive edition of the lord of the manor, the German Junker, of the petty tradesman, of the speculator and his constant disposing over land, animals, tools and machinery, products, all his own, hammered the property principle in his mind. He also knows that one season requires excessive work of him, while another season will permit a good rest; he does not mind all this, feeling that it is necessary. What can socialism give to him, he reasons, and he is little inclined to plunge into the unknown.

Very many workers constantly come up from the country and possess the peasant mentality and distrust is one of their nearest means of self-defense. They are induced to join organizations and to vote for socialists, but that is about all they will do and they often resent bitterly the payment of contributions. They are quite satisfied to leave everything in the hands of the accepted leaders and the inner circle.

Within these millions there are certainly hundreds of thousands of convinced socialists, doing the real local work, but content to leave larger decisions to higher spheres whom they imagine to control, because their votes made them their superiors in the organization. These excellent men are absorbed by the local doings of their party and feel hardly how the years pass by and precious little is changed.

These hundreds of thousands are disinterested, not ambitious, indulging occasionally in small vanities, perhaps, but ten thousands, thousands or hundreds aside of them are ambitious and become

professionals; these will put themselves forward, gather adherents and be themselves in the wake of greater leaders; they will accentuate divisions or become useful to majorities, in short they will look out for all means of advancement, until someday an elite of them arrives at real power. Those in power are constantly forced to foil the intrigues of those aspiring power, to cultivate their personal prestige, to keep the party in good humor and silence impatience. In short the large parties and organizations are, the smaller is the progress made and the greater the waste of effort to keep these unwieldy organisms together. And to this the influence of indolence and apathy in various degrees, by which most things drift into the hands of a very few and it becomes obvious that these are methods by which socialism must become and has become immobilized, stagnant, socialist feeling lingering and flickering and action a thing out of question.

If the many Communist parties display greater activity and often eagerness for action, they are such thoroughly artificial creations and so little their [16] own masters, that secondary moves in the large primary Moscow game can only be expected of them and not real socialist action shaping the social future of a country.

The antiauthoritarian socialist movements, syndicalism and anarchism, are more homogeneously composed than the authoritarian movements, because they do not enroll millions. This makes them look small, whilst they big movements, despoiled of their nominal adherents, would not look very much larger than the libertarians. I do not wish to diminish the importance of any of these movement and I value their efforts, only it would be an illusion to believe that any of them is in a flourishing condition and need but proceed on the old lines. This seems to me to be a mistake, neither in the undisturbed pre-war times, nor on the occasion of the war, nor under the impression of the Russian Revolution and of all that happened since 1918 has anything been done which carried the people along with rebellious initiative. The Barcelona and Romagna revolts before the war, the German and Hungarian revolts after the war, the Italian situation of extreme tension in 1920, up til now also the present events in China—all these revolutionary initiatives reach a certain expansion and then failed from lack of real response by the people.

This made me think for a long time already that perhaps the existing revolutionary elements of all descriptions represent already the by far greater part of the revolutionary energies and capacities slumbering in the people. So very many others are really indifferent, depressed or, as I described above, striving for individual solutions, that, if the free socialism which we desire, depended on some help to be given by them, we should forever be disappointed in our hopes. The capitalist system by its specializations, the small subsidiary industries, the many categories of overseers and other underlings, provides for minor advancement of all sorts and, of course, is on the lookout for men of intelligence and energy—though not of character—to fill these positions. The socialist parties and great workers' organizations also drain the rank and file of the most capable men who, in their superior positions, are eliminated as agents of revolution. Maybe by all this the self-seekers and ambitious men are eliminated from the rank and file and so much the better; but, I fear, many capacities are also thus eliminated, except the really disinterested men who remain in the ranks and give all their heart to the cause.

I may see too black on this particular point, but it make me feel so much more than socialism, as we wish to realize it, is the cause of the whole of mankind, which will be fought for by the elements capable of free and solidary feeling of all classes and which will be resisted by the elements which, at that moment at least, are not capable of such feelings, to whatever class they may belong. This being so, it is from now essential to widen our appeal, to broaden our ranks, to call for the co-operation of mankind at large and not to cultivate dogmatic proletarian exclusivism. [17]



#### IV.

Real socialism would mean the emancipation of the whole of mankind from the material and mental serfdom which very early causes have forced upon it, an infliction which under changed forms still lasts. In origin and the earliest stage—which we ignore—this infliction may not have been an outrage or may not have been meant to be an outrage, but it rapidly degenerated into an outrage and lasted as such. This is the utmost concession one may make on the basis of agnosticism about the unknown. There is a matter-of-fact superiority of a mother over a helpless newborn infant, of a teacher over an incipient ignorant pupil, and on such grounds wise men, the most expert with sharpened senses may have acquired authority over the less gifted. Or is authority's origin found in the brutal instincts of the strongest and greediest brutes? Who can know? Property also can have originated both by brutal greed and avarice or by a reasonable care for objects of personal use which even the primitive savage might wish to exclude from promiscuous use (favorite tools, weapons, wives, etc.) be this as it may be, in both domains the wildest abuse overgrew soon any relatively sensible use and this situation, always more advantageous to the usurpers, has lasted and this usurpation and concomitant parasitism must be overthrown.

From this will be seen, that partial solutions are insufficient and ineffective, though, as they seem to give immediate partial relief, it cannot be astonishing that much effort was and is spent upon them. This has caused a terrible disorientation under which we all suffer. There is a fundamental difference between the modest initial stages which final real socialism may have to go through and the alleged practical mutilations and abatements of socialism from which nothing good can ever evolve. We must admit, in reason, that an incipient stage cannot be as perfect as a more mature stage and that patience is necessary, but if something incipient, say a germ or an egg, is cut into pieces in the expectation that from such installments a whole new organism will grow up, we know that the incipient organism is simply destroyed by this absurd procedure. This is about what social democrats have done to socialism; they mutilated it to such an extent that it will never grow, if they have their way. And this mutilated socialism attracts always more backward categories of people and becomes a hybrid organism, chumming with the present system and bitterly hostile to all real socialism and revolutionary methods.

It would have been so simple and easy, to say openly that every honest reform is obviously welcome to every worker, every humanitarian and every socialist, authoritarian or anarchist, as it [18] gives some relief of overgreat suffering, but that reforms of this description have nothing whatever to do with socialism and are matters of common humanity for which no thanks are due to anybody, not to the capitalists from whom they have to be wrung, nor to the socialist who mostly do hard and useful work to obtain them for the more or less silent and passive masses. But in the interest of the expansion of authoritarian socialism an equivocal attitude welded together reforms and the authoritarian socialists, called now parliamentary or legalitarian or moderate or practical and State socialists, who thus stole a march over all other socialists, pretending to be the unique representative of the workers' interests. This led to the mushroom aggrandizement of these parties, but also to the extinction of their socialist feeling; they recognize only a social evolution completely managed by them—an absurd and ridiculous pretention, as if the evolution of society was going to be managed from the office of the Executive of a party or was laid down already in the writings of Marx, provided the experts in Marxist studies could every agree on their correct interpretation!

This state of things resembles the blunt groping of early rationalists, skeptics, heretics, scholastics, mystics and others in the absence of real science and it is regrettable to see a repetition of all such deviations rather than a new start made, for which the final solution of religious unrest



and doubt by the growth of science is such a wonderful precedent and example. That socialist science has still to come and obviously is not called into life, when some not over modest socialists like the Marxists dub this party creed "scientific socialism." At present some anarchists, in my opinion, come nearest to this socialist science, not those who believe to be in possession of a finished anarchist doctrine, but those who proposed and discussed the fullest conditions and the broadest roads towards the freest development of mankind.

Socialism was first expressed in interpretations of religious doctrines, efforts to realize the Celestial utopias (Sermon on the Mount), in philosophical systems (Zeno), in Utopian constructions (Plato, More), in social communities, in open social revolts; it participated as a left wing in trade union, agrarian, radical political, freethought and many other struggles, in conspirations and secret societies; it left vestiges in poetry and art, popular lore, customs, etc. All these efforts were spasmodic, non-dogmatical, though often fanatically sectarian, locally colored and adapted—in short [19] corresponding to these ages of cruelty and persecution, a congeries of most varied character, rudimentary, primitive, one-sided to a large degree, but still real, spontaneous life of the idea of emancipation and of solidarity, favorably comparing with very many routine, cast-iron, intentionally incomplete and otherwise defective expressions of this idea in our age.

This concatenation of the socialist idea with real life inevitably influenced also the first great theoretical expositions of socialism which originated under the impression of the first great movements since the time of Cromwell (when democratic and religious sentiment had obscured the social issues), the American and the French Revolutions, the upsetting of most European continental States by the Empire of Napoleon and the possibilities of rearrangement after the downfall of that Empire. Godwin wrote under the influence of the American and the beginning French Revolutions, Fourier under that of the French Empire, whilst Saint-Simon was greatly inspired by the new possibilities which seemed opened in 1814 and by the impulse to production given by the new factory system. The latter, with its terrible consequences to the workers, prompted Robert Owen's lifelong socialist effort.

Only a somewhat later group of early socialists despaired of immediately influencing their age and promoted socialist activities more or less aside of the present system which they felt powerless to change directly. Of these William Thompson and Cabet are representatives, whilst with Pierre Leroux socialism took somewhat philosophical airs. But the pathetic appeals of Lamennais, the determined radicalism of Raspail and the renewal and intensification of Babeuf's dictatorial will by Blanqui made socialism an active revolutionary factor.

Then Proudhon's intellect penetrated the fallacies of authoritarianism in the present and in all hitherto outlined socialist systems—(he ignored those of Godwin, Warren and Max Stirner)—and boldly proclaimed the liquidation of every form of Statism and an anarchist reconstruction on an equitable, reciprocal basis. The idea to reduce and minimize State power was represented in England in the fifties by Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Buckle and inspired by the free trade policy of Cobden, the early peace movements, etc.

But meanwhile authoritarian socialism had looked out for a stronger grasp on the people to practice authority—the passion of authority always supersedes very soon the socialist tendencies—than Blanqui's aspirations of dictatorship then offered which had sent him to prison for life, as they had sent Babeuf to the scaffold: Louis Blanc straightforwardly created State socialism, labor organized by the State. And this at a time when associationism on a voluntary basis was splendidly defended by Pecqueur, when Considerant explained the social Commune and federation, etc. [20]

Unfortunately all these socialist varieties, instead of gladly acknowledging their hypothetical and provisional character and benefitting by mutual friendly discussion and criticism, became cast-iron

dogmas, defended by fanatical sectarians who despised their opponents. Acrimony and intolerance pervaded socialist polemics then as now. The political revolution of February 1848 not only witnessed complete socialist disunion, but the bourgeois felt encouraged to have the Paris workers massacred by the army in the June insurrection and the peasants reinstated the Empire by their votes; almost all known socialist from Blanqui to Proudhon were sent to prison by and by or driven into exile and the dreary fifties saw the triumph of the empire and that intensification of nationalism which was and is at the root of the present European and world crisis.

Marx appears to me as the truest continuator of Blanqui. He recognized the disparition [disappearance] of State power after the abolition of classes, admitting at the same time the change of governmental functions into "simply administrative functions" (1872), a rider which paves the way for the maintenance or reestablishment of authority. He tries to construct the almost automatic tumbling over of concentrated capital and the coming into power of the proletariat, but he equally, and rightly so, recommends every means to hasten and bring about this collapse and destruction of the system. Either by revolutionary means, in the Blanquist dictatorial sense, or by parliamentary methods in the social democratic sense, either as a separate party or as a left wing group within democratic or socialist ranks—but always with the firm determination to rise above all others, to brush aside all other socialists and to establish a nominal proletarian dictatorship, practically exercised by the Marxian Party, by Marx himself or by the most authorized of his successors. Thus every means and method are to be used to exclude every chance of realization for every other variety of socialism and the more, they can be made use of to give a lift to the Marxian Party, but will be cast off and destroyed the moment they can be of no further use to that party. Everything is sacrificed to the ambition of this one party. The proofs of this can be found in the writings and letters of Marx, but they are also before us in the bolshevist agitation all over the globe since the autumn of 1917.

The unsocial fanaticism of so many socialists brought indeed about that the four Congresses of the International held from 1866 to 1869 are the only gatherings of importance where authoritarian and antiauthoritarian socialists met and discussed on equal terms up to the present day. The Congress held in 1877 in Ghent and a few other meetings here and there, are very paltry exceptions to this statement and do not [21] invalidate it; but these merely illustrative details need not further to be discussed here. Whether four or forty or four hundred such friendly discussions were held—how little is this for a period of over a hundred years! In forty eight-forty nine the divided socialists resorted to action or, at least, courageous protests against the new bourgeois regime, one after the other, each man or group being defeated in their turn and also the June insurrection was unable to induce all socialists to join it. But after the period of relative cessation of internal strife in the sixties, when the union of all workers in the International, founded in 1864, the union of all popular forces for the overthrow of the Empire and the establishment of a social republic were the main factors inspiring popular feeling, then—under conditions determined by the situation which the war had created—at least the Commune of Paris (March-May 1871) was proclaimed, maintained defended and died fighting: a splendid insurrection supported by authoritarians, antiauthoritarians and by the people itself. All the prosperous, numerous, powerful (in their opinion) socialist parties from 1871 to 1914 never produced the like of it. Only the particular Russian effort of over a century's duration against tsarism, seconded by all shades of liberal, radical and socialist opinion, triumphed in 1917—again under conditions determined by a great war—and a period of co-operation of all in the immense task before them, seemed to open. But, true to Marxian principles, the party which was disposed to carry these out by the letter, lifted itself above the shoulders of all the others, reduced these by force to impotency and usurped the rich spoils, the government of an immense country.

The same was virtually done by Marx himself on the only field then open to him, in the International, by usurping the administrative power and by imposing his personal tenets as obligatory for all the members (1871-72). The French socialists were at that time scattered and silenced by the defeat of the Commune, English socialism had not serious existence and the trade unions were indifferent as to what Marx did, the German socialists, indoctrined by Lassalle, Liebknecht, Bebel in the Marxian spirit, raised no objection; so Marx and Engels had a free hand to break up the International which the antiauthoritarian federations (Spain, Italy, a part of Switzerland, Belgium) continued, but which in this regenerated form met with the strictest boycott of the authoritarian socialists.

Under such conditions which cannot be fuller explained here, but which have been thoroughly investigated and about which an abundance of documentary evidence exists, the modern socialist parties began to be formed, preferring, each of them, the conquest of electoral power, numerical expansion thanks to always more [22] attenuated platforms, to real socialist propaganda and following action. Gradually real socialism was considered a thing of the past, dead and gone, the dream of some naïf and forlorn old eccentrics, old Robert Owen, old Fourier and others. The early socialists, always respected and honored by anarchists who kept up the unbroken tradition of socialism, were considered of less importance than scrap iron and waste paper by the Marxists. Marx and Engels had tried already by their writings in the forties and the résumé of their ideas in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (February 1848) to make a clean sweep of all early and contemporary socialism other than theirs, but had attracted little notice at that time or were considered one type more of intolerant sectarianism of which so many existed already. Only the prestige won by Marx by his determined revolutionary attitude, opposing and exposing all moderates, in 1848-49, by a similar attitude against the many moderates who would have emasculated the International in the sixties, if they had had their way, and by his great work of intellect and of erudition on Capital (1867),—only that prestige, earned and well-earned, be it observed, by co-operation with all the revolutionary currents in 1848-49, with all thorough socialists in the early years of the International, with all true science in his great work as an economic investigator,—made many good people overlook the personal qualities and peculiar party tenets of Marx which were worse than sectarian, being usurpating and monopolistic and which had already cause his moral isolation since the forties among those who really knew him very few blind satellites excepted.

In the seventies and later Marx (+1883) and Engels (+1895) become the tutelary gods of the social democratic parties which under their theoretical aegis became reformist organizations striving for immediate political power like all other parties; this was a profitable bargain on both sides. All the compromises and trimmings of these parties were somehow condoned as emanations of the true Marxist spirit as interpreted by a rising phalanx of high priests, the Kautsky, Bernstein, Guesde, Lafargue, Plechanoff and so many others in most countries—and the triumph of Marxism over every other conception of socialism was so sedulously proclaimed that the new generation of workers had, indeed, no possibility to learn anything about other contemporary socialism, including syndicalism and anarchism, and earlier socialism, except from contemptuous and in most cases ignorant descriptions by Marxist authors. They were kept in the fold, as religious people are kept in folds by their priests.

Today it is already difficult to imagine these times of Marxist spiritual dictatorship from the eighties to 1914, but it might be described by the comparison that the bolshevists in power since 1917 have probably committed [23] no greater quantity and variety of acts of physical violence against all other Russian socialists, than the Marxists in theoretical power committed by word, the press and

the power of organizations against the contemporary socialist of the period. Kautsky could but write, Lenin could give orders to act: that was all the difference; in spirit they were and are all alike.

One man only succeeded to hold his own against them in those years—Jean Jaurès, and as they could not crush him, they circumvented him by amalgamating their party with his, laming his initiative and sailing in the wake of his popularity. They did their best to paralyze syndicalism by trying to make it subservient to politics. Reformism and an uncompromising attitude were equally justified by the different schools of interpreters of Marxism. They praised parliamentary action for fifty years and created immense electoral parties which still exist, and then they kicked the Russian Constitutional Assembly to pieces and established their own dictatorial rule. They had and have no scruples to rend to shreds socialism, the working class, humanity, if it suits their purpose to be on the top of everything, to domineer over human and social evolution. They have the puritan fanaticism of believing themselves the elect, predestinated to guide the ignorant multitude.

It is clear that the aims of real socialism, as described above, mental, physical, social emancipation, have been frustrated by this terrible degeneration of authoritarian socialism, called Marxism, which perpetuates what socialism wishes to destroy, keeping man in spiritual leading strings and physically and socially in thrall of a dictatorial organism, the State with a socialist label. Where a bolshevist State is not available, the ordinary State will do almost as well in the opinion of social democratic reformers who, in many countries, are part and parcel already with governmentalism in general.

This state of things explains the present impotency of socialism in general, since too large portions of the workers are under this spell, trusting in leaders who are infinitely more attracted by the chances of their gradual insinuation and infiltration in the present governmental apparatus, than by unpleasant revolutionary eventualities which might not always land them so snugly into power as the bolshevist usurpation did.

Socialism is really in a very awkward position and it is not sufficient, if we as anarchists, put this on record and wash our hands of it. We must dig deep to arrive at the roots of this situation and look out for remedies. For it concerns all of us as well; in a poisonous and stifled atmosphere no one can breathe and we are all welded together as contemporary humans in this unhappy age. [24]

## V.

I am far from underrating, much farther from rejecting social reforms. I did this a long time ago, repeating with many others that something which has got to fall, must not be propped up, and: the worse, the better. Every progress means some work done and room made for further progress and a more solid basis is a better start than one of increasing rottenness.

Thus endless evils, cruelties and absurdities of earlier centuries had to be mended in the nineteenth century as well as the terrible conditions of labor of the incipient capitalist age. Hygienics, sanitation, prophylaxis were almost unknown before and had to overcome ignorance and selfishness to an extraordinary degree, before even a beginning could be made. Very often the initiative of philanthropists, even the recommendation of factory inspectors preceded direct wishes of the workers, later on voiced by their trade unions and by their delegates in consulting or elective bodies. It would have been fine thing if direct action by the workers had made delegations, deliberations, regulations unnecessary, but it did not come forth, not in the most vital matters when the mass of the workers lived and worked under conditions which today have become almost inconceivable in their squalor and degradation, and it did not come forth in minor matters, about which those who suffered so much and did seldom remonstrate or revolt against, were quite ignorant

and indifferent. Progress was very slow against capitalist greed and callousness and the work was done by plenty of humanitarian initiative, seconded by and by on the workers' side by trusted delegates and in this way and, of course, by the careful selection of trusted men who managed the trade unions, conducted strikes and were otherwise useful and devoted, the idea of a representative of labor made headway. The next step, taken already by the British Chartists, was the demand for political representation and by and by labor members, trade unionists elected in industrial districts, usually with the tacit consent of the liberal party, entered the British parliament where they did neither good nor harm, but this is not the point here.

It was and is a cruel fraud on the workers and on the cause of socialism to weld together the obvious call for reforms and the promotion of socialism as the social democratic and labor parties do everywhere. This pledges the mass of the people to this one party without which, they are persuaded by all means, they can neither get reforms, nor socialism. The people must support this party and has no other choice, though obviously only reforms, not socialism, can be obtained by parliamentary methods. And the elected, even if they wished to work for real socialism, cannot do it to any [25] extent, because they and their party must have the support of very great numbers of voters and must therefore by moderation and opportunism cater for the votes of the more or less indifferent and backward voters who do not like very advanced views and who want representatives of labor only, not of socialism.

The very large labor organizations are in the same position; they must take into consideration the bulk of moderate members and must satisfy these somehow by tangible advantages. A socialist member will understand that the unions cannot always be victorious and reap benefits; but the fluctuating mass of lukewarm supporters wants to see something for their money or they will drop out.

The larger these parties and organizations become, the more they are swelled by such nominal supporters and the more difficult it also becomes to them, to obtain advantages. For most of the easier successes are skimmed off and new ground can only be won by hard struggles which the immense unwieldy organisms are loath to undertake; the fighting energy of younger days is gone.

So there is very often a deadlock, hands are tied, a compromise is preferred and socialist advance is impossible—and under such conditions to fall back on the State is the most practical way out. The State is always more represented as the arbiter between capital and labor, between the classes and the masses and it often plays up to that role. It will do anything for “national labor” and here are links between capital, the State and “national labor” which are satisfactory to capital, strengthen the State and knock the bottom out of internationalism and the solidarity of labor, the very fundamentals of socialist feeling and eventual socialist realization.

For here is a domain where labor in some countries, in the strongest and most important ones, can still reap success—at the cost, it is true, of the betrayal of socialism, and their weaker and poorer fellow-workers in other countries. The general crisis makes unemployment chronic and reduces trade expansion and profits. This can be shifted from the stronger on the weaker countries by every kind of pressure which the State, national finance, industries, trade and transports, can exercise, the army and navy, patriotic outcries, antidumping, antibolshevism, etc. being ultimate resources and pretexts. The capitalists dictate such a policy to the State and labor, as represented by the huge parties and organizations, dares not offer serious resistance or the cry would be raised that it refuses to accept methods by which unemployment could be diminished, wages might rise, etc.

In this way internationalism has been [26] undermined and well nigh destroyed systematically. National prosperity takes precedence of international solidarity. Protests may be made, but they remain words—the millions of electors and of members of unions would not permit any other attitude.

In some countries free trade is still demanded, in most others protection is accepted unabashed and in no country, as far as I am aware, have the always more stringent measures for reducing immigration met with opposition by organized workers. I will not speak of the world war when everybody's passion was up, but the respectable number of wars and warlike expeditions since then (the Greek war, the Ruhr occupations, Syria, the Riff, China just now...) brought forth only quite nominal protests, the production of war materials is flourishing, its transport is nowhere interfered by transport workers, nor did these and the miners of other countries give serious help to the British miners on strike (1926), etc. In the smaller European countries, created since 1918, the nationalist bourgeoisie, the ambitious new State and the patriotic workers and peasants form solid blocs, unassailable by the communists who in these countries absorbed all remaining real socialists.

In this and similar ways the solidarity of the workers of all countries, proclaimed by the International Working Men's Association of 1964 has materially lapsed into desuetude. National labor parties and the immense apparatus of organized national labor cannot at the same time keep millions of electors and members in a state of satisfaction and good cheer and work for real socialism—so socialism has gone to the wall and the machinery of party and of organization remains, good for labor reforms and small advantages which, as has been shown, are always more a mockery, that is profitable to the workers of one country at the cost of the workers of other countries, thus adding nothing to the real international power of labor, but destroying the solidarity of labor and perpetuating, prompting even, war and national hatred.

The result is visible by the continuous defeats of authoritarian socialism of late years. Labor may prosper under such conditions, if it leaves a free hand to capital and seconds its efforts; a kind of profit sharing is then admitted and the prosperity of many categories of highly skilled labor in the United States may be an example of this; here not only the workers of other countries, but the great masses of less fortunate workers in the country itself are disregarded. In impoverished countries with almost ruined [27] industries labor may enforce many concessions and the socialist party may apparently flourish; but both ends will never meet in this way and a general breakdown may follow—this is the position in present Austria. Labor's situation in Germany is terrible, in spite of millions of organized workers, millions of social democratic and communist workers. Hungarian labor sighs under cruel repression after the revolt of 1919, inspired by despair, but exploited and misled by bolshevists. Italy is literally fettered by Fascism and Spanish labor is not in a much better position. Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Portugal in Europe, Cuba, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil in America are more or less under the heels of military dictators or governments of brutal capitalists, practically fascist mentality. The power of organized labor is small in France and even British trade unionism is threatened now with anti-general strike, anti-picketing and similar coercive legislation.

Some are consoled by the thought that this recrudescence of State and capitalist rule presages the coming of the social revolution. I do not think so. Struggles of despair may occur, ending, if victorious, in local bolshevism, if defeated, in fascism; nothing else can happen among the millions of each country as they are now, most of them barely touched by an utterly nominal socialism, hand and feet bound under the command of their leaders, a class which is degenerating by excess and power and growing personal prosperity. I have through all my life wished the social revolution to come and do so still; but I claim the right to say that the present socialist parties and their leaders cannot and will not bring about such a revolution in any of the prosperous countries, whilst, if in any of the ruined countries a general breakdown happened and they had but to pick up the power—this was the situation in Central Europe in 1918-19—they would not be able today and in the next coming years to make more of the situation than they did then, very much less even—for passions are

stronger now, nerves are gone and, as I said, all would end in bolshevism or fascism of increasingly cruel and incompetent type and this game, to me, is not worth the candle!

Will this convince some that any happy issue must really be preceded by a good deal of mental regeneration [?]: to me this is the most urgent problem before us. Many seem to prefer the old routine; they are all absorbed by the events happening within a very narrow circle, by discussions on thrashed out subjects, for and against organization, for and against individualism, the exact degree of repudiation or conditional condonation of the doings of the bolshevists in Russia, personal matters as the levities and inconsistencies of other comrades, etc. and [28] every quarrel is fought to the bitter end and then started afresh. This is like the microcosm of life in a drop of water with all the world on fire around us. It is really disproportionate to the demands of our time. I cannot imagine that initiative of worldwide importance which are needed to cope with the present situation, will somehow arise of this in some respects active and busy, but in other respects rather placid milieu.

No one could foresee the depth and extent of the present evil though Proudhon and Bakunin emphatically warned, whilst the generation following them was, I fear, overconfident. No one may have expected that history would march so quick. The fatal career of authoritarian socialism contributed to this, for it did practically everything to obstruct the development of real socialism and to lead the workers back to the national State and under the wings of national capitalism. At all times anarchism, revolutionary syndicalism, revolutionary hopes and tactics in general, early non-marxist socialism, in short everything outside the party organizations were treated with utter contempt, insults and sneers. Party discipline was the paramount virtue; independent talents were either eliminated or corrupted by elevation in the party bureaucracy. Important questions were very gingerly treated, when the prejudices of the enormous mass of electors might be hurt, which explains the perplexity in July 1914 when the imminency of war was recognized too late and popular opinion, even socialist and syndicalist, was quite unprepared. Antimilitarism also was one of the subjects which a socialist deputy would admit in private and occasionally in speeches, but which he would always be careful to present to the electors in the most attenuated forms, lest his patriotism be suspected and freethought was also usually shelved on such occasions. The State was attacked not as an oppressive and parasitic organism, but because it did not do this or that for the workers, which meant implicitly that the State could be a very good and useful institution, if it did these things, and notably, if socialists got hold of the State and became the government. Voluntary institutions (which I shall discuss in another chapter) were discouraged; party institutions and State or municipal institutions were alone approved of and if the latter were placed under socialist management, the wishes of the socialist bureaucracy and leading hierarchy at least would have been almost fulfilled and the ordinary member who would have wished for something more, would have been called an anarchist and expelled....

What can be expected from this kind of socialism? Real socialism will never evolve from it and its greatest virtue seems to be that it is not virulent bolshevism, just as old fashioned capitalist might be praised for not being bestial fascism. But there is small merit in this and every surprise is possible. Capitalism driven in a corner will become ferocious as fascism all at once, and a social democratic majority in an elective body has "the law" on its side and will enforce it as merciless[ly] as bolshevist decrees [29] are enforced.

Will the two present authoritarian parties, social democrats and communists, professing the dictatorship of parliamentary majorities and the dictatorship of commissaries elected by soviets,—in both cases practically the dictatorship of the party leaders,—will they take a lesson from the fact that if two parties strive for dictatorship—social democrats and communists—one has to go to the wall, submit or be crushed? Will the organized social democrats learn from the lessons of Russia and the

Caucasus or will they thrive on the hope of revenge that some day they will rule and the bolshevists be under their heel? The same question might be asked of the bolshevists, if it were not quite hopeless. As long as both sections pretend to be the unique representatives of socialism, infallible in doctrine as the Pope is recognized to be by those who believe in the Catholic doctrine, there is no hope for socialism, unless the workers desert these parties and leave the leaders alone: if they had the common sense to do this and also to cease to support the capitalists by their work, their emancipation would be there. It is regrettable that it has come to this, that the emancipation from authoritarian socialist should be felt to be a liberation on a level with that from capitalism, the State, priestcraft and other fetters, but it is really so. I respect the efforts, sacrifice and good faith of very many authoritarian socialists, especially earlier ones, whom I may know in one way or the other, and I have no right to question the good faith of those whom I do not know, but objectively they are an absolute failure and they have misused the great trust which the people placed in them notwithstanding so many libertarian warnings.

In the chapters of this essay I try to point out possible means by which the living elements of authoritarian socialism might find a way out of the quandary where their doctrinary arrogance, domineering tendency and intolerance have placed them. If they prefer to indulge in these, of course, every discussion with them is useless. But again I say, I have no right to consider them without exception as absolutely inaccessible to reason. In this sense I refer to them in these pages.

## VI.

Fortunately the great awakening of mankind in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries bore other fruit than modern capitalism, Statism, nationalism and the unfree varieties of socialism which could but degenerate into social democracy and bolshevism. Progress was first realized on a smaller scale, in [30] special spheres, in minor degrees, but on sound foundations. It could not have been otherwise; generalizations are always wrong, when they are made at the beginning and not at the conclusion of some development. The general capitalists principle: increase of production by machinery, cheapest labor, hardest competition, new markets by all means led to the present chaos of an overabundance of conflicting interests all over the globe. The authoritarian socialist principle, disregarding freedom, could only lead to constructions on paper or, when wanting to be practical, to the acceptance of the trite old despotic machinery of State support, lawmaking or dictatorship. Nationalism, very fine it is abstract beginnings, had to lead to the splitting up of humanity into hostile nationalities.

Science and the inventive and imaginative spirit which gave to humanity the impulse of this treat awakening, permitted the growth of smaller voluntary movements of the greatest importance and upon these the future society will be shaped, when the above mentioned great hostile factors are overcome or kept in check.

Such are co-operation, the attempts at free organization known as syndicalism and experimental socialism, the progressive tendencies in education, freethought, so many humanitarian, international, peace-loving, anti-force and anti-cruelty efforts, the recognition of personality and human rights, everything that is free and social in art and science and the spread of real knowledge among mankind which has been and still is to a large degree intellectually stunted and starved. Solidarity extended to nature and all other living being, animals and plants and their greatest possible protection against destruction for mere profit and greed. The fight against moral enslavement, side by side with woman, the victim of secular sex and domestic slavery. The exposure of so-called justice which is barbarian vindictiveness. The awakening of the feelings of responsibility, sympathy,



readiness to help and solidarity in every sphere of life, of the spirit of initiative, of gentleness of conduct, etc.—all these are manifestations of the urge for an equitable combination of freedom and solidarity and in their progress and gradual perfection the future of humanity reposes.

It appears to me now that Anarchism which is indeed the fullest possible of synthesis of all these and similar approaches towards fair, gentle and equitable conduct of man, as a generalization online before the component parts existed and the great obstacles were removed, could not possibly have been realized until now under these circumstances and is still dependent as to a realization not only on the force, quality and will of its direct adherents, but on the progress of all the tendencies, activities and feelings mentioned. If these make no satisfactory progress, what will be [31] left? Capitalist or bolshevist dictatorship to which every human function will be subordinate and those who resist will be enslaved or crushed. Our hope lies in the growth of all liberal forces, in the elimination by them of authority and parasitism and in their gradual or rapid concretion to one or several syntheses which will—as we hope—correspond to the anarchist forecasts of a free society.

We observe the stiff attitude of authoritarian socialism to all these free and humane tendencies. They cannot be disavowed altogether, but they are either minimized in social democratic opinion or imitated within the parties under the control of party spirit and in the course of party tactics. Or the big gun of the “materialist conception of history,” mechanically applied by the average writer or speaker, silences every consideration, and high-sounding economic talk does the rest. On our own side we must be careful lest the word revolutionary plays not similar tricks with us, as the word economic does with the Marxists. It is as easy to say: all this is not revolutionary, than: nothing whatever can be done, unless the economic system is changed. Both sweeping reasonings lead only to one certain end: that nothing is done, a result very easy to obtain and which is not necessarily a triumph. I do not overrate all these more or less incomplete efforts in their present state; I wish only that the libertarians should endeavor to penetrate them with their spirit, the more so because authoritarian attempts to pervert them, to attract them by State support and covert them into inferior parts of the State apparatus are not missing. And this milieu of people with an open sense and a desire for personal voluntary activities may be a more promising harvesting ground for new converts to anarchism than the two other milieus, indifferent people and discontented authoritarians.

Co-operation, historically, is due to the old practice of peasant or large family communities of centuries ago, to careful socialist advice formulated since at least the seventeenth century and in the last line to the splendid socialist ardor of Robert Owen’s and William Thompson’s time. Their complete community attempts and schemes, combining production and consumption in common, failed, it is true, but distributive co-operation, the elimination of the middleman, has lived since that time and greatly expanded; it is strongest in England, Scotland, the Scandinavian countries, Germany and Switzerland. Even the large figures of goods, food and necessary commodities of life, distributed by this medium may be small in comparison to distribution by private trade, still they prove that millions of families have broken with the early system, dating from prehistoric times, of distribution by a non-producing merchant class which is as great a burden as it possible can on the producer and on the consumer and wishes to influence the whole social life, centering in [32] production and consumption for its own personal profit.

Productive co-operation is very much behind, from several reasons, among which event of capital is, in my opinion, not the most prominent; for the disproportion between the growth of the distributive store and the near absence of the co-operative workshop and factory is larger than mere want of funds can explain. There is before all lack of confidence and of initiative that fundamental hesitation of the workers to give up on even the most precarious existence guaranteed by capitalism

for a new existence based on their own solidarity. How often has a close alliance between trade unions and co-operators been proposed; here funds and men are to hand, but trust and initiative are always missing. Guild socialism, a recent suggestion of self-producing trade unionism, seems not to make any appreciable progress. Somehow, it appears to me, the worker feels more free in face of a capitalist employer whose affairs are quite indifferent to him and to him he gives as a rule as little of real work as he possibly can. If he worked for himself alone, he would put all his soul in his work to reap the profits of it. But to work for a collectivity of comrades is a novelty mid-between; to do this conscientiously he must not work slothfully as for the employer and would feel no inducement to work very briskly as for himself. Finer developed natures will find the right way, but to average people all this means a break of routine, an innovation which has no special definite attraction.

Would not a new society in its incipient stages be confronted by a similar problem? Can it be expected that enthusiasm, spontaneity, solidarity will overcome it forthwith? It would be useful, therefore, if the practice of co-operative production were extended, to make the habits and rhythm of such work a definitive part of the general mentality of workers. Then they would not fail in anything, when suddenly the control of the capitalist taskmaster was taken from them and they would the keener appreciate and relish the greater freedom and ease of production in superior conditions than productive co-operation within a capitalist society can offer them now.

Syndicalism is uncompromising, full-blown, fighting trade unionism. The early unions, a century ago, had to be fighting organisms, more or less secret, proscribed and persecuted. When, by dint of tenacious effort, many obstacles were removed and the unions became large and general, they contained masses of moderate or indifferent members, just as the mass of the socialist electors, the larger it becomes, is adding to itself a greater portion of moderates than of advanced voters. This is quite inevitable and produces from time to time strong efforts of regeneration, a new unionism, just as the socialist parties also at times produce more advanced elements, called social revolutionists, independents, etc. who try to regenerate the movement, but always fail and disappear, rejoining the old [33] parties, retiring disappointed or evolving into anarchists.

Thus the English trade unions rejuvenated in the 'sixties and again about 1890 by the then so-called New Unionism, the German localists beginning in the eighties, the I. W. W., the French collectivists in the later sixties against the earlier Proudhonists, the socialist syndicates of the later seventies against the very pale or uncolored syndicates of the years following the fall of the Commune, 1871,—all these represent new starts made in a more advanced direction. Also about the middle of the nineties anarchists and relatively, though not completely anti-parliamentarian socialists (the so-called Allemanists) inspired in France a syndicalist revolt against the mainly political tendencies imported into the syndicates by the Guesdists (French Marxists) and succeeded thanks to the splendid tactics and assiduity of a young intellectual of thoroughly anarchist convictions, Fernand Pelloutier.

They were very soon greatly supported by the most popular anarchist journalist in France, Emile Pouget, the editor of the famous Père Peinard (1889-1900) and by very many anarchists who, when the great repression of 1894 had, for about a year scattered and suspended most other possibilities of propaganda, were glad to fall back upon very direct contact with the workers in the syndicates. This method had up till then been somewhat neglected by anarchists, as they had so many more direct means of propaganda and, if they wished to take part in the direct labor struggle, they had rather formed small fighting syndicates of their own which permitted entire independence and thoroughness of labor activities, then join existing syndicates where plurality of opinions, organisatory ties, etc. hindered direct militancy in the anarchist spirit. Since the years 1895-96, from the reasons given, a certain feeling of isolation in one word, many anarchists joined the

syndicates and work in harmony with Pelloutier and Pouget, whilst others remained skeptic. But the then arising revolutionary syndicalism was by no means exclusively inspired by anarchists; the thorough socialist elements disgusted with electoral socialism of the authoritarian parties, Blanquists, Guesdists even, and Allemanists joined and gave valuable help. But although for years the anarchist and the former authoritarian co-operated in hard organizing work, a united front against the politicians and against the reformists, and proclaimed always more a purely syndicalist doctrine—the often repeated word: syndicalism is self-sufficient, that is, it requires no other socialists' help and advice and recognizes no other coming society but the one which it is going to create by its own means, dates from that time,—although, then, a syndicalist theory and policy were formulated and agreed upon, real intimate harmony can never have existed among elements of different socialist convictions. And as it is for an authoritarian simply impossible, to act as a liberal, whilst libertarians, [34] constantly surrounded by an authoritarian world, understand the backwardness of authoritarian and can think it practical to make a concession in the interest of working together for a common purpose, it is not likely that the syndicalist theory and policy evolved in the anarchist direction, rather the contrary. This resulted in outside anarchist criticism and skepticism and within the syndicalist ranks of France also in much disappointment and finally in the establishing of a routine doctrine and policy with fading and waning revolutionarism and growing opportunism—the Jouhaux period of the once formidable C. G. T., leading to a secession of the more advanced, the C. G. T. U., an organization which became sectarian communist and this led to the rallying of a yet smaller number of anarcho-syndicalists forming the C. G. T. S. R.; these three organizations exist in bitter enmity with each other and some communists excommunicated by Moscow begin to for the S. L. (The initials mean General—General Unitaire—General Socialist Revolutionary—Confederation Labor and Socialist League.)

This is an outline of the evolution of syndicalism in a large country where it had the most favorable conditions of development—no other labor organization and a plethora of socialist elements and feeling of all shades. The impulse given by the flourishing French syndicalism of the period from 1895 to 1905 or even up to 1914, was immense, but all similar movements in other countries were and remain confronted by large organizations under the absolute guidance of moderates, trades unionists or social democrats. Everywhere the syndicalist organizations were built up from the root on the side of the large organizations and there was never a moment's peace between them. Neither was syndicalism able to become a really large organized movement, driving the large unions however backward and inefficient they were, out of the field, nor were the old unions able to crush the syndicalist elements and silence their constant and sharp criticism.

Does this not convey two lessons? First, that really large and unique syndicalist organizations like the C. G. T., the larger they become, the more evolve backward to ordinary unionism with opportunist and reformist tendencies. Even when the C. G. T. was at the height of revolutionary will as expressed at the great annual conventions, the really large syndicates—the building trade, the staunchest revolutionists, excepted—were moderates and the revolutionary policy was supported by a great number of practically very small syndicates. Second, that syndicalist organizations on the side of an old unionism have no chance to expand. Their time is absorbed by criticism and polemics, they remain propaganda organizations in favor of syndicalism, but cannot build up a powerful syndicalism itself. They may even succeed in doing this to some degree as in Holland, Sweden, Italy before fascism, but the older moderate unions remain all the same and usually paralyze syndicalist action as 1920 in Italy. There remarks refer to syndicalism formed under the [35] direct influence of French self-sufficient syndicalism of the nineties. The theoretical contents of this syndicalism were largely taken from the ideas and traditions of revolutionary collectivism in the International in Bakunin's

time. In the years up to 1870 in fact these ideas had such ascendancy in the continental International, the German-speaking countries, excepted, that those who formulated them in Switzerland, Belgium, France principally, Bakunin, De Paepe, James Guillaume, Varlin and others could well claim to speak in the name of the main socialist current of these countries, surpassing by far the Proudhonist, the State socialists and the reformists. These ideas were fully accepted by the Internationalists of Italy and of Spain. Whilst in Italy the movement of those years, the militants of which mostly had grown up in the fighting and conspirative milieu of the Garibalidans and the Mazzinists, rapidly took very acute forms and then was driven underground by persecutions—always more strained situations under which organization for direct labor struggle was more or less out of the question,—things were different in Spain. There, in industrial Catalonia at least, labor organizations and associationist feelings existed long since, the State was utterly abhorred, federalism was popular and the collectivist ideas as formulated by Bakunin in the autumn of 1868 were unconditionally accepted since that time and the International, the collectivist anarchist movement with an inner circle of militants, the Alliance, and labor organization of a very precise and deliberate type practically coincided, were on and the same body; the sections of the International, some mixed sections (various professions) excepted were syndicates and were also, as all members professed collectivist anarchism, the anarchist propagandist groups. This lasted for very many years and is still unforgotten and whenever circumstances permit a short spell of open organizing and propagandist life, it is mutatis mutandis revived or springing up again on a very large scale.

These ideas and methods were and are continued, also under persecution and other great difficulties, by the Spanish-speaking anarchist in the Argentine Republic and the more recent Mexican organization has a similar basis, as far as I know.

The syndicalism of Spanish-speaking countries, then, does not profess a special “self-sufficient” syndicalist doctrine, but, being composed of anarchists, it is anarchist. The syndicalism of France and other countries, Germany also, being composed of syndicalists of various socialist origins, is an autonomous movement, in which in France, reformists and communists predominate, whilst the anarcho-syndicalist minority has just been organized as C.G.T.S.R. in November 1926; in Germany the old localist social democrats mostly became anarcho-syndicalists, in Sweden and Norway a very methodical syndicalism prevails, etc. [36]

Syndicalist activities vary greatly in different countries; in general the organizations, the Scandinavian countries probably excepted, expand more by propaganda than by the labor struggle, in which by their small number—compared to the moderate or rather conservative large unions—they are mostly placed in the defensive. In this way the theoretical insight, the homogeneity and solidarity of the members are on the increase, whilst their power as fighting labor organisms is not on the increase or may increase at a much slower rate. This can hardly be different; for ideas spread less quickly than organizations often swell by the prestige won by some victory of labor. Swelled in this way they lose their homogeneous composition and when they reach a certain expansion, it becomes advantageous or obligatory, in short a matter of course, for workers to join them and this makes them almost colorless as the large unions are.

Therefore if syndicalism keeps true to its principles, it cannot at the same time acquire the force to put them into practice, and if it become large in numbers, the principles are fading away. I am not alarmed by this dilemma; it could not be otherwise. I welcome syndicalism as a permanent propagandist factor of greatest intensity, hammering plain truths on the actual situation of labor and on the acute character of the daily labor struggle in the minds of the workers—truths and methods of action which no one else tells them with so much care and competence,—but I welcome also that syndicalism by itself cannot become so large as to be the unique and all-powerful factor and lever in

the coming great social change. I have heard thirty years ago too much of the haughtiness of “self-sufficient” syndicalism, that I should not like to see it in power. Nor anybody else, for the great social change can never be a “one party’s” job. Of this more anon.

In any case syndicalism is the keenest and most devoted friend of modern labor and it is a great asset for libertarians that it is so deeply penetrated with anti-authoritarian sympathies.

Experimental socialism ranges also on the anti-authoritarian side by its method—the method of science, experimentation—evidently not by its contents which may be of every description, as everybody has the right to try to live according to his ideas within the sphere of an experiment which imposes no obligation upon non-participants.

We notice that the authoritarian experiment, so frequent in the former days of socialist communities, is becoming scarce in our time, whilst anarchist experimentation is greatly on the increase. It might be objected that organized socialists founded any number of local social institutions for their members or the workers in general. Very well, but this is not quite the thing. Marxism, ever sapient, scorned experiment, but its parliamentary and municipal [37] representatives dabble in legislation and regulations and as bolshevists, after sweeping away all the other socialists, they experiment for nearly ten years now on the body of the Russian people.

Anarchists—and syndicalists, combining with co-operators—might have done more in this field. Proudhon’s ‘People’s Bank’ (1848) and Gustav Landauer’s ‘Sozialistischer Bund’ (1908) are the only experiments planned on a large scale and both could not even begin the direct exchange of products and the anarchist home colonization proposed. Garden Cities and town planning were welcomed by anarchists, but have glided into the hands of the middle classes, benevolent great employers, building societies and municipalities—just as Fourier’s Phalanstère could not be constructed by the real Fourierists, but found a pale reflection in Godin’s Familistère, a capitalist enterprise with an admixture of profit-sharing.

What is still missing, is the determination of large number of workers to carry on production not in newly started small and primitive communities, but on the place and with the tools and material of their everyday’s toil. This the metal workers of Milan and other Italian cities set about to do in the summer of 1920 staying in the factories and locking out the capitalists—a great initiative, then frustrated after a while by authoritarian trimmers, but a memorable event, showing experiment almost coalescing with action. It will certainly be well remembered as a starting point in coming action.

## VII.

Every progress is a step higher above ignorance and authority and such steps, so rare in earlier centuries, are continuously made possible since about a century by the rising efficiency of science and her instruments and methods and by a relative recognitions of progress even by those who for many centuries ruthlessly crushed it, if it did not suit them—the State, the clergy and all vested interests. This recognition is very relative indeed and may be challenged at any moment, such a challenge and revocation meeting certainly the steadfast condemnation of very many, but being also acquiesced in by large masses of people in dumb obedience or callous indifference. The events of the last twelve years gave a cruel spectacle of this and we are still in the midst of the whirlpool of reaction let loose.

Nothing in education is safe from clericalism nowadays. The most elementary human rights are trampled in the mud by fascism and would-be fascists everywhere make notes of this for home use. National hatred has been rekindled to an extent unheard of before and is fondly cultivated as one of the

most valuable assets of every reaction. The [38] more locomotion and transports by earth, water and air are facilitated and quickened by splendid inventions, fulfilling the most phantastic dreams of earlier times, the more travelling and traffic are obstructed by the passport system, immigration laws and prohibitive tariffs. The moment aircraft masters the air, it is destined to be the prime vehicle for the destruction of everybody and everything by bombing and poison gas, and chemical science which did such immense good to mankind in the nineteenth century and which owes every possibility of development to those who worked for general progress and rescued that science from the holes and corners where the alchemist had to hide, often in danger of his life—this modern twentieth century chemical science has not character enough to vomit from its midst the poison gas field, nor pluck and disinterest enough, to work at its hardest to invent protective remedies. Torture and prison horrors, once considered to be a matter of the dark past, are applied with renewed vigour and we have got quite used to hear of this from many countries. The nineteenth century tendencies to protect the civil population always more efficiently in case of war have been reverted in exactly the contrary direction; so the bill of March 1927 in France enlists absolutely everybody, men and women, in the service and bondage of national defence. The disarmament conferences have become a sinister farce. The rights of organized labor are challenged everywhere by legislation, injunctions and direct terror. There is really no domain of human activities and social life where the achievements of progress in the nineteenth century are not assailed, reduced and almost or quite destroyed and all this is made plausible, smoothed over or covered by silence and misrepresentations by the great press and by the politicians who have the ear of the general public, the “man in the street” who will swallow anything and feel thankful for it.

In spite of all this progressive currents make their way and it is our vital interesting, never to underrate them and always to give them every possible support. Education and instruction, withheld from the people for ages and now doled out to them in minute portions, just to make them fitted to work, are a most urgent problem, fully understood by the humanitarian teachers of the latter eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Feibel and others, by Robert Owen in New Lanark and a century later by Francisco Ferrer in Spain, a martyr for his cause (1909). What has not been said and written on Escuelas Modernas, Modern Schools, and how little has been done!—Ferrer’s School in Barcelona, the Modern School of Stelton, N. J., and one or two dozen scattered other attempts are not overmuch indeed. There has been plenty of adult instruction work done by evening classes, lectures, libraries, etc. in working class social institutions, promoted by socialists of all shades. But real large initiatives to secure efficient instruction for all are absent; at the outmost clerical influence is eliminated here and [39] there, but patriotic and State influence never are. The problem of authority is constantly before the teacher in that delicate form developing from one of its roots, superior experience and protection of the weaker, the other root, as observed already above, is brutal exploitation of a state of superiority. The teacher is the superior of the pupil in knowledge and he can impart this knowledge in the equitable, solidary, not overreaching way, in which a mother gives every assistance to her helpless baby—or the can cram that knowledge down the throat of the pupil, by authority, as geese are stifled to fatten them. In the first case he helps to produce a free human being; in the second he creates an authoritarian who will be an authoritarian brute himself in time. No wonder that authoritarian socialists who want discipline, make no serious effort to eliminate authority from education and the more libertarian should enter in contact with the liberal minded part of the teachers. These would be as unhappy under an authoritarian socialist system as they are now, being in both cases ordered to subordinate instruction to the State interests; only a free society can make possible real freedom in education.

Freethought represents the struggle of all ages against fictions imposed by priestcraft for interested purposes or out of sheer ignorance, and sanctioned by authority. More martyrs fell in the cause of freethought than the Christian martyrology of Saints ever counted, and almost everybody wears the handmark of the priest by the retardation of his intellectual development, the time wasted to free himself from impositions pressed upon his infant brain even if he is not a fanatic and ceases to believe himself, he is seldom fully emancipated and routine and insidious advice makes him say, that religion—just as authority and laws,—unnecessary for himself, may be useful and needed for the others, and so he lets things drift their old way.

Freethought also is not very seriously cultivated by the authoritarian socialists; they want votes and members and, pretending toleration (which in other domains is very little practiced by them), they leave religion seriously alone or limit their opposition to anti-clericalism, tactics which usually lead to the strengthening of State power—a shifting of authority from one pocket to the other, so to speak.

Libertarians are often chary of partaking in freethought movements, because they see men of very different social and political opinions work together in the organized freethought propaganda. This I hold to be a mistake; men are indeed of very different disposition and if to some the whole of an idea, the all embracing generalization is a striking and charming ensemble which they accept enthusiastically,—anarchism, for instance,—to others parts only of the large total become visible, tangible, convincing and are accepted for the present. Every milieu which is open to [40] any part of our ideas is welcome and may permit the enlargement of the limited sphere. Freethought is an excellent starting point for the most complete human emancipation, for all political, economic, social, moral institutions and routine doctrines of the present day are based on the enforced or voluntary acquiescence of the enslaved masses, and religious fictions have as much a share in this as direct material oppression.

For the same reasons every humanitarian effort, however small and specialized in appearance, merits our unconditional support, and it is repugnant to meet with the argument—very frequent, before all, in authoritarian socialist propaganda,—that, as long as the economic wrongs are not righted, humanitarian work is useless trifling with details, a mockery on those who suffer great wrong and all that. No, whatever relieves the smallest suffering and adds to the quantity of kindness and comity already evoked in mankind, is precious and welcome. The amount of hard, cruel, callous, vulgar, selfish, brutal and vile feeling existing in man and created, fostered, strengthened by the struggle for life, mutual distrust, is so enormous that kindness and comity outside of the private sphere (s. chapter I) are yet in very early stages of development and need every support which those who may happen to look further ahead in politics and in economics should not think it beneath our dignity to give them. As I said before, realizations of advanced ideas like ours, must lay their foundations from both sides, the full conceptions of the ideal particular to limited numbers and the partial approaches to it, open to very many: this alone will prepare the soil for their harmonious growth.

The protection of animals may look a small matter in comparison to the immense social problem, but what to think of men who are indifferent to the suffering of animals; are these men in whom the spirit of freedom and solidarity might be kindled or are they not of those who have the fascist spirit or who, as mercenaries, will do anything for which they are paid? The protection of natural beauty, forests and scenery may appear a paltry thing to those who have no means to travel themselves and who, therefore, argue that such preservation is useless to them. Or the engineers and builders will, at the capitalist owner's bidding, raze to the ground every natural beauty and erect hideous barracks in their place. Are these ignorant and selfish and these mercenary spirits possible elements of a free

society, conceivable as worker's for freedom's sake? No, they are—victims no doubt, as we are all—in their present state part and parcel of the old society or its possible bolshevist or fascist continuations and have as yet no glimmering of real humanity. We must be thankful for the smallest possible approach to anything in our line of evolution; for the forces of the past [41] are ceaselessly hard at work against it.

The voice of Tolstoi could not avert the catastrophe of 1914, nor could it break the tenfold evil of the time since then, but it was a comfort to live, when it was often heard up to 1910 and there is great and oppressive silence since then. We disagreed with Tolstoi ever so much, but we knew there lived in him a friend of humanity from whom humane influence emanated. Even this plank of hope has gone now and with one possible exception—Romain Rolland—no similar voice is appealing to mankind now. There is so much to do in this age of poison gas and of fascism, no party will and can do anything, our own effort is so small—not even strong enough to secure in six years elementary justice to Sacco and Vanzetti—that, I say it again, the mentality of modern average mankind requires remodeling from the beginning, before they will even look at freedom and under these circumstances all humanitarian activities work in our direction, and ought to get our fullest support.

What is called personality is shriveled up in modern man, the victim of so many powers working, in their own interest, for uniformity—the State as well as the tailor, the food provider or the manufacturer of public opinion, the politician and the journalist. Individualism is an inevitable self-defense and revolt against this and it leads also away from social feelings and doctrines, if they tend to impose new yokes of social uniformity which authoritarian socialism undoubtedly does. Anarchist socialism does not, but needs, in my opinion, to be much more outspoken and broadminded on this important subject as it often is. As I see it, the individualist and the social disposition in men and women are developed in different proportion in each case and are also in different degrees capable of further development in one or the other direction. A satisfactory type of society, therefore, must permit the greatest latitude in this domain, compatible with the smallest loss to the general weal by differences and frictions. A thoroughly broadminded form of anarchism would be the ideal type of such a society and therefore the harmonious convivance of men will be what we call Anarchism.

This means that every sincere individualist aspiration is a manifestation of progress as well as every sincere social aspiration: both lead away from authority and obedience, uniformity and indifference. If individualism is rejected by socialists, it will seek expression by authority and egoism; if it is made welcome by socialists, it may lose possible unsocial features and understand how much better it may thrive on a broad social than on a narrow individual basis. The many individualist currents greatly need to distinguish between authoritarian socialism which they must abhor and free socialism which they [42] would consider their true home, if they only know it. If they are simply bluntly confronted with rigid affirmations of communist anarchism and repudiations of what Nietzsche or Tucker once said, they will leave us severely alone, as they mostly do as things are now and for a considerable time back. It is easy to bring about splendid doctrinary isolation; it is more difficult, but it would be the right thing to be in sympathetic touch with all the currents of modern life what are, be it in every so small a degree, opposed to authority, uniformity, cruelty, narrowness and privilege.

The authoritarian currents are masked under less brutal colors often than those of outspoken Statism and Monopoly and their bolshevist and fascist intensifications. Ambition, the cultivation of records and other features of modern sport, the puffing up of celebrities in present-day surrogates of art—all this not only breeds greed by betting, but it breeds also authority-worship, permanent prostration before idols, rivalry and fanaticism, in short it breeds the fascist mentality—besides emptiness of brain, snobbishness, general indifference and ignorance. If anything can be done against



this rapidly growing mental deterioration of a considerable portion of the young generation, neither theoretical propaganda, nor moral appeals can do it. Only to help to build up quite a new world of greater non-brutal, non-vulgar, non-authoritarian attractions could do it. There are still elements loving unpretentious recreation, real enjoyment of personal bodily exercise, of nature in mountain and forest, of beauty in every form without any thought of records, winnings and possession. Again, so many people are in relations of friendly co-operation and emulation in all sorts of research, collecting, specialized local and international work—a network of groups which is no mean precursor, let us hope, of the productive and other groups composing the social organism of a free society. Fairness in all dealings and reciprocity, confidence originating on this basis—these are the leading features of such voluntary organisms. Ambition, rivalry, wish for precedence and power are also at work in them, no doubt, perhaps even at an increasing rate under present circumstances—it ought to be one of the tasks of the libertarians to avert such degradation, to expand solidarity and to open the eyes of the best men of this milieu, not to lose and bury themselves in specialization, but to expand the sphere of their friendly intercourse all over the world in social and liberal directions. [43]

Of spontaneous movement to combat the inevitable consequence of the existence of State: war, the Peace, Antimilitarist and Antiforce (Tolstoian) and Passive Resistance (Gandhi) movements and efforts are the most important, but, unfortunately, not only are these movement, to which Federalist currents might be added, usually somewhat illogical and consequently inefficient in themselves, but anarchist have, in my opinion at least, a good deal to learn on these subjects themselves before they can expect to act in these matters true to the real spirit of their ideas. I shall have to enter upon these matters in other chapters; here I will only say that there is on all sides an uncertainty on the real claims and rights of nationalism and of internationalism, and a mutual absence of closer understanding and sympathies between the various nations, which prevent that national ambitions and animosities, wars in preparation and actual wars met with clear attitude and action by well-informed people, however well-intentioned these people might be. Up till now, in my opinion, only Proudhon in the years 1859 to 1963 saw clear in these matter and spoke up. Since then anarchists like all others are drifting in the wake of State and nationalist ambitions and, the declaration of the Congress of the International held at Berne, 1878, excepted, make no real stand against these ambitions. At least the history of all these years is for all concerned rather a list of missed opportunities than a list of active doings.

Under these conditions the many immediate sacrifices by individual in the cause of antimilitarism did not fully weigh in the balance; in these question it is essential to dig deeper.

The anti-force and passive resistance movements do not present panaceas, unique methods, but are valuable contributions, adding new strength to the totality of means and methods which must remain unlimited.

The nineteenth century saw the unfolding of the movements of emancipation of women from a position forced upon them by authority in an active, and by custom in a passive way. In very many respects women always had the quantity of freedom which she understood to take and maintain; in others she had been made a slave in the earliest ages and still remains this to a great extent. Socialism can remove the economic fetters; every other emancipation depends on the existence of general freedom and is therefore a part of the realization of the free society. Authoritarian socialism can only give to women the same enslavement which it gives to men and present-day emancipation makes women State-slaves like men. Free society has no concern with proletarians nor with women, only with humans. It will ignore the present bars, as it ignores deeds, frontiers and all other claims of the past, but what will otherwise be done, can only be a matter of conjecture. Much effort should be taken to make women clearly understand to what complete extent they would thus be enabled to

[44] shape their own destinies, which is, I imagine, what they want best, and what impresses them more than to be told about the sex question and free love, subjects which they at all times were and are perfectly capable to manage themselves individually in their own way.

These cursory remarks may show that very many men and women, smaller and larger collectivities everywhere work voluntarily on their own lines for rather progressive and certainly important aims, outside of the State and of authoritarian socialism alike, sometimes helped by anarchists, but not to the extent which might be desirable. In the way rapidly suggested here by me or in a more practical way, a fuller understanding, a more intensive and conscious manner of activity could perhaps be obtained by and by, and even where this is not possible, at least knowledge and sympathies could spread, an unwritten solidarity against every form of authority and privilege be created. Co-operation wants equitable dealings, syndicalism repudiates exploitation, education is the opposite of dictation and coercion, peace is incompatible with the State, humanitarians want free development and gentleness, women want their own freedom above everything—all these are excellent causes which are hampered and frustrated by the present system and which would be equally bungled and mismanaged by authoritarian socialists. They are a world by themselves and if they evolve forwards more conscious and complete freedom and solidarity in each case, our own cause is well underway. They may then federate and always attract the living part of mankind.

I am very far from believing that this will be anarchism, but it would be that milieu of sympathy, of fertile soil, which would facilitate the growth of anarchism. Such a milieu is otherwise not existing—at least despair and indignation, the present springs of most anarchist development, ought not to remain the only ones. Therefore I recommend all these voluntary movements to the closest attention of anarchists, not to swarm them push by some blind hope, but to study them to examine and improve their own capacities and inclinations and to do what they can to enlarge the oversmall sphere of friendly relations of anarchists with other upholders of good causes.

## VIII.

The strongest confirmation, however, of the irresistible trend of evolution towards a free society lies in the conscious and subconscious conduct of people in every sphere which they feel to be a friendly and confidential milieu. If they are personally perverted by outside [45] influence, they cannot behave otherwise even in this trusted milieu and the families of authoritarians are a State or a hell in miniature. But most people, even those coated in a rough shell in the outside world, do their best in their inner friendly circle and enjoy this as a compensation. No law has anything to say in such groups of families, friends and good neighbors and ever law is, indeed, averted, evaded, bilked, whenever fairness and commonsense demand this, by solidary efforts, here straightforward honesty, reciprocity, helpfulness, gentleness and delicacy are the guiding principles and loss of confidence, break of intimacy, are the whole code of punishments and penalties; who is unwilling to conform to the conduct which such a milieu by and by shapes for itself by experience and mutual agreement is free to leave; he may find a milieu more fitted for him or remain isolated, as he may wish. Could it be otherwise in anarchist society?

Even, as everybody knows, in business life, as hard as it is, usage, formed by experience and based on the presumption of mutual good faith, supersedes cast iron law and alone makes possible the rapidity and multiplicity of transactions. The State apparatus, carried on by no end of regulations and red tape, is ponderous, slow and hopelessly costly and inefficient and State bolshevism possesses every one of these qualities, being the paradise of the official and a hell for the public. In tsarist Russia an empress wanted a candle, it is said, and in the accounts, passing from one official to the

other, the candle finally because a hundredweight of tallow which the people had to pay. In bolshevist Russian with State production they would rather begin with a hundredweight of tallow from older stores and, passing from office to office, the public at the other end may get a candle out of it—for the State is incorrigible, a nuisance when disporting itself on paper, detrimental when it gets hold of economic and social life.

We really ought to mark very much stronger our utter separation from authoritarian socialism than is usually done. It belongs to a primitive stage of mankind and life evolves away from it. Even the hardships under which labor suffers and which they try to alleviate and to do away with, as we do, cannot keep us together except at the cost of the loss of our future and, certainly, at no cost whatever to the authoritarians. They can absorb us, because they are determined to crush everybody who does not ply before them; we cannot absorb them, because they do not wish to lead our life and we do not wish to degrade ourselves by coercing them. The cause of freedom is as incompatible with any authoritarian cause whatever, as science is incompatible with religion, anarchism with the State, socialism with private or State capitalism and internationalism and peace with nationalism and war. To make humanity see this is our great task; only widespread mentality evolving in this direction can create a milieu favorable to the growth of a free society. Everything else [46] is but a rearrangement of the old order under new labels.

I am not overlooking that in the dim past also authority may have had a very natural origin. As I observed already, it cannot be decided whether relative usefulness or brute force was the stronger factor in implanting authority. Danger—wild animals, want of food, natural phenomena, rain and cold, hostile neighbors—surrounded primitive man, as they surrounded animals, imposition caution and wariness and giving natural preeminence to the strongest, the wisest, the keenest eyed, just as animals rally around the strongest and are waned by the most alert of the herd. Also in council, at work in common, everywhere a few rise above the average level and gain ascendancy. How this natural superiority degenerated into permanent authority, usurping and perpetuating privilege, transmitting this to descendants by heredity, enlisting hirelings to protect usurpation and privilege, this we do not know in detail, as it happened in prehistoric times, but the proof that it did take place lies in the system under which we are still found to live.

Animals, though they usually establish distinctions of precedence based on physical superiority within a herd, otherwise preserved equality and fight only, impulses of sex excepted, animals outside their own species, though, this hunting for food excepted, they usually keep friends with, or hardly look at other animals. The very few animals that gave up this equality, arrived at authoritarian systems of the highest perfection—the kingdom or rather the queendom of the bees is the best known example. Is mankind really doomed to evolve in such a direction? As the bees work and die to feed and protect a queen, is mankind dung to permit the breeding of the superman of Nietzsche, the prophet like Mazzini, the duce called Mussolini? We cannot know it, but we feel the will to resist. Such resistance in history was revolt; it was also mutual aid; it is anarchism and every antiauthoritarian current in our time. Mutual aid, like passive resistance, was mainly a defensive factor, preventing utter ruin; revolt was too weak to triumph, it gathered only defeats, but it kept the spirit of resistance awake.

Thus since the earliest times exist unlimited State power, exploitation and intellectual starvation of the masses, a trinity kept up by the hireling class doing the bidding of the privileged. Also men were cut up into hostile groups amalgamated into the States of oriental despotism, from China to Egypt, then the Roman Empire, then the present States and new Empires—an unbroken series of tyranny and wars which still continues.

The continuity of this oppression is not always felt by people living in sheltered localities, enjoying a few years peace, prosperous trade, art and good books and all that. But it is hideous and overwhelming when looked at closer. Roman despotism left the universal spiritual despotism of the Roman Church, intensified in the Protestant Churches, fossilized in the Roman Catholic and Greek Churches. [47] It left to every State the ambition to become a second Rome with sacred property protect by the iron Roman law, with military power to secure expansion and enforce the "right of conquest." this was the dream of the Kings of the Goths and of the Asiatic nomad chiefs, from Attila to Tamerlane, the dream of Germany and France, of England and Russia, of sixteenth century Spain and of modern Italy of Mazzini and Mussolini. In fact, European history since 476 is still the struggle for the succession of Rome, for the reestablishment of a World Despotism. The British Empire, the coming American Empire, the Bolshevist Empire from Russia to Siberia, China and India, the French Empire, France and Africa, the Terza Roma, the Third Rome of as yet unknown proportions, dreamed and praised by Mazzini, prepared by Mussolini—all these are very tangible facts or projects with boundless military and financial support, and the whole resources of the globe, men and materials and work, are impressed in the service of one or the other of these causes.

We boast in reading modern history that invasions by Asiatic hordes which devastated Europe in the middle ages are a matter of the past (with bolshevist and Japanese armies near enough to us!)—we boast that the conquistadores, enslaving Mexico and Peru is over (with American armies and warships near enough for another conquest!)—we boast that the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth century are over (they had very much to do with the rich property of the Church and anti-bolshevist wars in the interest of capitalist property are always in preparation!)—we boast that Cabinet Wars (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) are over (with secret diplomacy more at work than ever before!)—we once boasted that modern war was less ferocious than the early wars and we impress the civil population into war support and exposed everything to airbombs and poison gases. We talk of disarmament and there are more numerous armies, more armaments, more warships than ever before.

To be able to support this terrible intensification of the age old horrors of war and anxiety and suspense in the periods before war when everyone feels that war is coming, modern humanity—so keen in scientific intellect, organizing skill, scrutinizing criticism—must be fascinated by some great power, like the small animal is when the serpent's eyes immobilize it spellbound. This great power is the fiendish feeling of nationalism, into which the very legitimate and natural national feelings of but a few generations ago have degenerated under the influence of fanaticism on one side, of capitalist and imperialist greed on the other side.

I do not drag in this subject; I see if before me obstructing every progress, having ruined Europe and continuing to spread ruin, to prevent recovery, if it were possible. To close our eyes to this subject or to imagine that a few commonplaces on internationalism or [48] economic causes will do away with it, would be suicidal. If we are real anarchists, such a discussion cannot divide us; if some are nationalists at heart, let them say this openly. I will reconsider here this subject from the root, as it is the real nightmare incubating on general mentality all the world over and a propaganda overlooking or bagatellizing it, must remain inefficient.

## IX.

The settlement of the globe by the first small groups and tribes of men, selecting the most favorable habitats, led to their gradual differentiation—provided they came of common stocks—in language and customs. Migrations, superiority in warfare, in industry, in natural wealth led to the

hegemony of certain tribes and to the wider spreading of their language which had become a more general means of communication than the local dialect of minor tribes. This, then, led at all beginning to the co-existence of, to use this expression, larger and smaller languages and, if political conquest or great commercial superiority, etc. operated, nations originated, States or Federations, where one language was more or less generally understood and usually by and by normalized and refined in centers of culture, by bards or writers, official, legal and commercial use, etc., whilst many dialects of this language were spoken locally and, maybe, other languages, viz, dialects, were spoken in old enclosures or newly acquired territories.

Quite the same happened to the many early political units which were sacrificed to make up larger countries. Every country, from England to China, is composed of many early autonomous States, territories which in most cases are quite resigned to these more or less forcible amalgamations—we never hear that the people of England claims the restoration of the seven Kingdoms, the Saxon Heptarchy, established at various dates running from 419 to 582,—whilst in other cases they remain irreconcilable and use every chance of a restoration. Whether this irreconcilable feeling is the product of a real love for a lost independence or of conservative immobility or is suggest to them by third parties, etc., must be examined in each case and cannot be known beforehand. These ancient territories themselves mostly are amalgamations of still older small units and, as a rule, the more violent these amalgamations took place, the firer the old territory enforced its own authority, the better this is remembered by patriotic tradition and the more a resuscitation is planned by all means. Such claims, therefore, are usually made in the name of early combative and authoritarian units and not in that of early peaceful and relatively free communities. The latter had more social spirit and made the best of friendly intercourse with their new neighbors within a larger territory. [49]

Hundreds of nations were swallowed by the oriental despotic States and by ancient Rome, their languages, mythology, customs remain unknown in most cases and often their names in their Greek or Latin transcription do not even permit to ascertain their race. Besides fragments of a Bible in Eastern Gothic (fourth century) only a very limited number of inscriptions in Italic, Celtic, earliest Teutonic, Etrurian and some unknown, unexplained languages and a few words mentioned by classical authors have been preserved and the nivelling [leveling] influence of Greek and Latin even after the political downfall of Rome remained so great that not before about the year 800 some text of the spoken literature of Teutonic and Celtic peoples, presenting historical events combined with the old accumulations of mythological fictions, were put down in writing and were sufficiently taken care of to survive. The turmoil of the long period of migrations from the east and the north to the south and the west of Europe, the forcible herding together of peoples in the age of Charlemagne, the raids and invasions by seafaring nations, the Jutes, Angles and Saxons, the Danes, the Norsemen or Normans, the Islamitic invasions in the South, Moors and Saracens, the Asiatic nomad invasions, Huns, Avars, Mongolians, Tartars, the Turks taking Byzantium (1453) and then gaining ground westward until in 1683 they laid for the second time siege to Vienna and their power was confined to the Balkans by constant Austrian effort only in the first half of the eighteenth century. From that time, relieved of Turkish pressure with the exception of the Balkans, the Slavonic peoples headed by Russia began to stir; Poland succumbed to the rapidly growing power of Russia which from that time until 1914 exercised pressure on her western and southern neighbors, from Finland to the Caucasus. Meanwhile the interior of Europe was torn by secular struggles between English and French, French and Germans, Germans and Italians, Germans and neighboring Slavs, Spaniards and French and English, Scandinavians and Baltic peoples. Then also seaports, trade centers, industrial regions acquired wealth and power, far-reaching supremacy,—Venice and Genoa, Flanders, the Hausa towns

and Baltic ports, Florence and London. The Crusades were raids for booty, to plunder the rich Orient and efforts of the Church to rally the European nations against beginning heresies and rationalist doubt. The Orient retaliated and the Turks marched westward with exactly the same purpose as the Crusaders—loot, conquest and the spreading of their religion by the force of the sword. This induced the west to look for routes to the Orient by sea, meeting no Turks on the way, and the far East, from India to China, the coast of Africa, such rich ground for the slave trade, and America were made accessible. This opened the scramble for colonial occupation of immense territories and their very unequal division exclusively between the Atlantic powers, Spain, Portugal, France, the Netherlands and England which, very often at war among themselves, by which most valuable colonies drifted in the hands of England or were later separated from Europe more or less in consent with English politics [50] (the Spanish-American Republics—a policy continued by the United States from the Louisiana purchase, California and Texas to Cuba and the Philippines and present-day Central American expansion and Mexican tension.) the German, Scandinavian, Italian and Slav peoples were rigidly excluded from this first partition of the other continents from the latter part of the fifteenth to the latter part of the nineteenth century—the Russians excepted who expanded eastward by Siberia to the Pacific and southward towards Western Asia.

The secular wars of England against Spain and France for their rich colonies and similar considerations, hopes and fears, influencing the Dutch and others, had the most direct repercussions on the inner continental politics and wars of Europe which has no chance to be regulated by agreements or fought out to the bitter end up on their merits, but were made subservient to the high political game or gambling and scheming of the sea powers. The so-called Barbarians formed also a part of this game; not before the years 1782 to 1786 was Spain in a position to make peace treaties with Turkey, Tripolis, Algeria and Tunis—so long English influence had kept the Turkish and Barbary States pirates as thorns in the side of Spain. When the Turks laid the second siege to Vienna in 1683, they were helped by French engineers in the interest of Louis XIV. The Buccaneers did England's work in the West Indies. The Red Indians were impressed on both sides in the Anglo-French wars. Cardinal Richelieu who crushed the French protestants (siege of La Rochelle) supported the German protestants in the War of Thirty Years, the great German war of the seventeenth century. The English political will to let no strong power have possession of the present Dutch and Belgian seacoast had the strongest possible repercussion on continental politics from the sixteenth century to 1914 and to this day.

France in the early days an agglomeration of ancient races and later Celtic immigrants, with Greek colonial influence in the South, thoroughly conquered, unified in government and permanently influence in language and customs by the Romans—with the loss of every old language, some Basques excepted,—then traversed and in part settled by Western Goths and Burgundians, conquered in her Northern half by the Franks and this becoming a component of the Franco-Germanic-Italian Empire, partly realized, partly planned by Charlemagne, after the partition of that Empire became an independent unit in the West, striving from that time for expansion in the independent and largely Romanized South (Provence), in the Celtic West (Bretagne) and eastward, at the cost of the large median territory running from the North Sea to the Mediterranean (Netherlands, Lorraine, Alsace, Burgundy and farther south) which became the source of wars and bone of contention between France and Germany from that time,—decided in favor of France by the destruction of Burgundy in the latter fifteenth century (when also the policy of Switzerland was definitely cemented with that of France), and [51] by the aggregation of Alsace and Lorraine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whilst the conquests in the North on Flanders territory were only partial, the incorporation of Belgium and

Holland in the Napoleonic Empire only temporary and England remains opposed to French expansion in this direction. Occupations of Italian territory and a hold on Spain were also only temporary.

German historical development was determined by the disproportionate expansion of ancient Rome which chose to make the Danube and the Rhine or even farther east the limes (a fortified frontier line) to be the limit of Roman territory in these parts, a limit imposed by the German defense against further Roman encroachments. Under these circumstances Roman civilization was not acceptable to the German barbarians who, giving way themselves to pressure by migrant peoples in the east, started somewhere in inner Asia, by and by exercised pressure themselves on their Roman would-be conquerors and ended by upsetting that Empire; then some Teutonic peoples advanced as far as Italy and Spain, but were absorbed by the local populations (Langobards, Visigoths.) Northern Teutons, the Jutes, Angles and Saxons in the fifth and sixth centuries settled in present England, at the cost of the Celts of Britain who had lived for four centuries, until 410, under Roman rule and who became now soon reduced to the Welsh mountains. Scandinavian invasions followed, in the South by the Danes, in the North (Shetland and Orkney Islands, Scotland) by the Norsemen, from Norway. The latter raided the who western continental seacoast, especially France, up the river as far as Paris, settled in Normandy, conquered England (1066) and even got a grip on Southern Italy. The Scandinavians had further possibilities of expansion by sea (Greenland, even America), northward (Laps and Fins), on the Baltic shores and by trade and as warriors all over Russia and as far as Byzantium.

But the Germans south of present Denmark, a large inland population, had not these means of expansion of the seafaring North. Covered with forests. Living in a territory of increasingly insufficient agricultural area, bordered in the west by the rich and settled French territory inaccessible to them—the linguistic frontier there remained stationary or the German language lost ground,—in the east by the Slavs, beyond the Elbe, in the south by the Alpine territories thinly settled with Celtic, Gothic and Slav populations, they were then, as now, confronted on all sides by hostile fronts. The time of migrations was past; conquest of territory by Christians or Pagans was the temporary form of expansion, ineffective when the Pagans retorted by accepting Christianity on their own account and placing themselves under the protection of the Church of Rome, as for instance the Poles did. These were mainly political moves, [52] as the Church, jealous of the power and claims of the emperors, was quite content to become friend with their Slav and other enemies. Under such intricate circumstances a German settlement between the rivers Elbe and Oder took place and later expansion in Eastern Prussia and on the Baltic shores northward. The alpine regions were mainly colonized by feudal lords and convents and the peasant whom they induced to make clearances and introduce agriculture. These parts were constantly exposed to raids and invasions, also temporary complete domination, by the former Nomad peoples settled on the great Hungarian plain, the Avars, then the Magyars and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Turks. This welded together the peaceful settlers, Germans and Slavs, from the Adriatic to Slovakia, Moravia and Bohemia: the front against Asia, so to speak, was formed for many centuries by the eastern declivities of the Alps and the Carpathian mountains.

The Slavs had been late comers in the wake of the Germans who had formed the barrier against Rome. The main body of the Germans, as I have just said, had come to a standstill, arrested by the new national barriers on the Italian and the French side. The east, beyond the Elbe, and the mountainous south, from Bohemia to the Adriatic, were there only resources for expansion and the history of a thousand years, European civilization, every feature of the present crisis would present another and a much happier aspect, if the Western Slavs had recognized the existing deadlock, the exhaustion of the trend to the South and to the West, provoked by the aggressivity of Rome and other

reasons. The problem now was neither to press westward, nor to sit still pretending to permanent possession of land in ages when Europe was in the melting pot, but to proceed eastward where the enormous Russian plains were open for cultivation and civilizations—an immense problem which, as history has show, the Russians themselves, confronted by enormous difficulties of climate, distance, scarcity of town centers, etc., were not able to solve—the hundred millions of Russian peasants remain still one of the hardest problems of modern progress. If a thousand years ago the Western Slavs, the most advanced, had moved eastward, they could have imparted normal development to the Eastern Slavs who, instead, were swayed by Mongols and Tartars and landed from the Scylla of tsarism in the Charybdis of bolshevism.

This inertia of the Western Slavs, from ten to twelve centuries ago, Bohemian, Moravian, Polabian (between the rivers Elbe and Oder) and Polish Slavs mainly, their determination to expand at the cost of the Germans who could not make place for them, as the West and the South were barred to them, instead of spreading over the vast and little populated eastern plains, is [53] at the root of every conflict, confusion and catastrophe in central Europe. The configuration of Europe points towards an eastern solution—the narrowing of Europe from east to west makes Spain, France, Germany-Austria but peninsulas attached to the enormous Russian block and even the latter is but a larger peninsula attached to the immense bulk of Asia.

It would be a mistake to consider the Slavs of these countries peaceful agricultural peoples merely who wished but to remain where they were. They were full of ambition and formed several extensive, though short-lived medieval agglomerations of territories, Slav and others, and in the case of Poland even a very large and durable kingdom. The Magyars, an Eastern nation arriving after the Slavs and settling in the great Danubian plain, the Roman Pannonia, present Hungary, were in a still more ambiguous position than the Slavs. For the real facts for Western and Southern Slavs and Magyars, also for the Transylvanians, Moldavians and Walachians, (the present Rumanians whose neolatin language originated farther South in territories which had been under Roman domination) have always been these: these populations mid-between East and West clung to the West for protection against Eastern contact and domination (Asiatic nomad invaders, Russians, Turks), yet somehow they felt no real solidarity with the West and played out their Eastern neighborhood and close relationship against the West, when it suited them. At times medieval Austria was in their hands—King Otokar of Bohemia in the thirteenth and King Mathias Corvinus of Hungary in the fifteenth century both made themselves masters of Vienna. The kings of Bohemia, of Luxemburg origin, like Charles IV, were emperors of Germany.

Finally the increasing Turkish danger, their successful invasions of Hungary and first siege of Vienna, after the first quarter of the sixteenth century, led to the co-ordination of the Austrian Alpine territories and Vienna, the Bohemian and the Hungarian Kingdoms, a combination which lasted for nearly four centuries, until October 1918. It came about by mutual arrangements, endorsed by the representative bodies of that time (landed aristocracy and clergy) and not by conquest or coercion. It was the natural thing to happen with the Turks at the door, and as only two hundred years later, in the first half of the eighteenth century the Turkish danger was definitely conjured and the Balkan frontier which lasted until the year 1878 was secured in the main—it is extremely likely that without this co-ordination of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary in the sixteenth century the Turks would have conquered the isolated territories one after the other and it is not generally believed that Turkish rule was a blessing for the conquered countries... All this would have happened the more probably, since the Turkish [54] assault of territories in the sphere of the German Empire and Spain (then both governed by the emperor Charles V) was an asset of France, at bitter enmity and wars with the German-Spanish powers.



Poland furnished another proof of my affirmation under discussion here. This country was left alone in possession of complete independence and a far-reaching domination over Ruthenians, Bielorrussians and Lithuanians. She did not care to make friends with her western neighbor, Germany. So Poland became by and by the prey of Russia and would have been absorbed completely by this great power in the eighteenth century had not Prussia and Austria, to prevent this enormous western advance of Russia, by diplomatic means secured parts of Poland for themselves, mainly Posen and Galacia; the Poles in Silesia were then for centuries already englobed in the Bohemian kingdom and with the main part of Silesia were surrendered by Austria to Prussia in the forties of the eighteenth century.

The Alpine Slavs (Slovenians) had never formed a State and the Slav and Italian population of the northern and eastern Adriatic littoral, exposed alike to Turkish pressure from inland and to near Venetian domination, a very hard rule, in a small proportion understood to maintain a precarious, constantly threatened independence (Montenegro; Republic of Ragusa), otherwise it was quite content to come under Austrian protection, guaranteeing immunity from Turks and Venetians alike. Even Trieste joined Austria under such conditions in 1282, being threatened with ruin as a seaport by the Venetian monopoly.

These are but very desultory remarks, with no room nor ambition to be in any way complete omitting the thousands of facts which require to be known to understand the character of even one of the many European national problems. Their enchainment [linkage] with the great currents of contemporary life at each period, with the policy of all the great countries at any given time, the character of their temporary solutions determined by ever so many factors in each case—all that must be known to anyone who does not wish—if he handles this subject at all—to suggest unfair solution, based on his own want of knowledge mainly and on the suggestions made by interested parties, and as usually two or more parties present plausible cases on the same subject, opinions will always be divided and force, interest, passion, caprice and chance will dictate the solutions, satisfactory to the winners and unacceptable to the losers.

It is obvious that in the two thousand years and more since the Roman conquest and all that followed whirled the European nations about and do so still, some corns were trampled on, infinite wrong was and is done, blunders were made and that [55] under an immense quantity of disguise, hypocritic or of good faith—from the condescension of Rome or England to take every people within their grasp under their protection to self-determination in the Wilsonian sense—the principle: might is right, has presided over every change of the poor, constantly torn and patched up map of Europe. Not a single European nation has ever enjoyed for any length of time real independence, security and peace. What looked like peace and prosperity, was the gorgeous repose of tyrants who were not unaware, however, that their victims brooded over revenge, or it was the becalmed slumber of the resigned, submitting to the will of a stronger power, but these were worried by anxiety how to continue to please their master, how not to excite his covetousness by overgreat comfort, etc. In short the large countries never ceased to look for new prey and the small countries perfected the mimicry of effacement and humility in order not to become the next prey.

Was there and is there a way out of this labyrinth of insoluble questions of thousands of years' inveteration—this I will discuss next.

## X.

There is a way out of the national and nationalist turmoil of thousands of years' duration and historical evolution worked this way out and began to march along... Until the treaties of 1919

intervened, decreed that evolution was wrong and that the status quo of about a thousand years ago had to be restored in parts of the continent of Europe, whilst the rest of the globe was permitted to continue a twentieth century life.

The evolution referred to demonstrated equally the inadequacy, inefficiency and non-vitality of immense, universal agglomerations—the Kingdoms of Oriental despots, the Roman Empire, the ambitions of Charlemagne, Charles V, Napoleon I—and universal Bolshevism would share a similar fate—and the equal inadequacy, inefficiency and appalling perniciousness, never-ending scandal and nuisance of large quantities of vicious national States. As a proof of the latter fact, outside of Europe, I call attention to several well recorded examples the main part of Central Africa and the American Indians in the United States of two or three centuries ago and before, in the interior of Brazil, Columbia, etc. probably up to the present time, the native of Polynesian islands, etc. contained and partly contain still hundreds of tribes under very authoritarian local rule, very neatly separated from their neighbors, [56] small State unit in the full sense. They may live quite happy lives, though great cruelty often prevails among them and they may remain physically strong or at least enduring races. But the point here is that progress is near to nil among all of them, that stagnation and domination by tradition prevail. Science is unknown and mechanical improvements keep within the smallest sphere of household work, armaments and decorations. As this happened in four continents and many islands, there ought to be a common cause for it.

The cause is, in my opinion, the absence of a higher degree of sociability. Any quantity of social institution and habits within the tribe is merely a factor of self-preservation, not necessarily—and very seldom indeed—a factor of progress. As progress requires a wider intellectual outlook, it requires also a wider social communion, a field for comparison, emulation, experiment and a milieu of security, immediate and future, as far as possible. Then only those faculties will evolve which in too narrow milieus are stunted. It ten more or less hostile tribes dwell along the course of a river, the ravages by inundations will be extreme and detrimental to all or to all with the exception of the strongest. For protection by dams constructed by some would expose others to even greater loss and be a cause of conflict, or, even if it benefitted also other who had not directly worked for it, this “unearned increment” benefitting rivals, would be unwelcome equally. In any case no practical work on broad lines would be done under such conditions. Progress really requires the just described latitude, adequate elbowroom, else the impulses, conditions and material possibilities will all be wanting.

This was the inner motive power of the formation of the European large States in the second part of the middle age. The contrast between the splendor of ancient Greek life in an extensive Federation of mainland, islands and colonial towns, the power and wealth of the immense Roman State and even the remaining rest of Rome, the Byzantine Empire, also the States and Western Asia—and the poverty and hardships of life in all the many small, unstable and rival new States after the fall of Rome, the failure also of new pretensions of universal rule (Charlemagne), the evident usefulness of concentration for resistance against raiders: all this, supported no doubt by beginning economical insight acquired by trade centers which brought wealth, necessary for military defense, and which required protection and understood how far their influence reached and where the spheres of other centers began,—all this combined to make the factors and forces which at that time determined the immediate efforts of the peoples, strive for the foundation of large State units which guaranteed the development of economical and social life [57] on a large and stable basis. Such territories were mapped out by the geographical structure of Europe which presents a number of great territories separated by mountains, mostly connected with the sea by great rivers, peninsulas, etc. These were the British Islands where unions with Wales, Scotland and Ireland were the inevitable result; the

Iberian Peninsula; France; Germany; the Scandinavian Peninsula; the Danubian Basin (Austria-Hungary until October 1910); Italy; the Balkan Peninsula; Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia, Finland, etc., however they choose to divide the immense European East.

The efforts to combine the very many independent territorial units within these large boundaries and to prevent their eventual plans of secession, then, were one of the main guiding principles of European historical evolution for the last ten or twelve centuries. But, as States, be they small or large, are incorrigibly antisocial, the other main principle was the expansion of each State beyond the natural and economical frontiers which I have described, and, if ever possible to arrest or obstruct the constitution of other large States on equally reasonable lines—permit me to use the word “reasonable” as a summary of the conditions mentioned—and, in general, to tear to pieces, loot and ruin every other State which is the profession of States, as the profession of wolves is to look for prey and to kill their victims. This combination of the two efforts created the inextricable entanglements described in the previous chapter and as every State can play the same game, the inner composition of no State remained unchallenged and the local discontented were always countenanced, if not supported, egged on and provoked by interested hostile States.

History abounds in every variety of such support which, however idealized and in many cases objectively useful, is never disinterested. It is here that ideal sentiments and motives, very often inspiring those immediately concerned, and calculations, speculations and intrigues, devised by those directing State power are entangled and involved to an incredible extent. Usually the States hold their cards in firm hands and play fast and loose with general sentiment, diverting it in the direction which suits them; they see below the surface, the public does not. Was ever sincere public sentiment the stronger factor and did it carry only the State leaders? I cannot say, because history is so misstated in the interest of governments and the inner history is so often inaccessible or lost that scarcely any of the affirmations of a triumph of popular sentiment, fair play and real sympathies had ever been sifted to the bottom.

The right of asylum, this most noble claim of persecuted humanity, one of the earliest products of [58] creative sociability, limiting the sphere of conflicts and combining reciprocity and solidarity—this right consecrating hospitality, inviolability of the home, respect of the weak and the persecuted, was, when States were founded, subordinated like everything else to their interest, granted willingly or charity, discouraged, refused or even violated and it is more or less being eliminated now in really serious matters. When England and France were bitter enemies, France gave shelter to the Cavaliers, Jacobites, up to the Irish rebels and England to every enemy of the political system of France, to royalists during a republic, to republicans during a monarchy. In later periods the asylum granted to anarchists became very precarious, but the nationalist of obnoxious countries were not only safe, but their cause was supported in many ways, if they were of nationalities which might be useful in coming political constellations. By giving safe shelter to Mazzini, the most persecuted of nationalists of the nineteenth century—an awkward incident in the forties excepted, when his letters were opened,—England won the friendship of United Italy. A similar protection was extended to Russians. France harbored Egyptians, Indians and other enemy of British Imperialism and the most enthusiastic meeting which I attended in all my life was a Paris meeting welcoming Dewet, Delarey and Botha after the Boer war and defeat. In the years become 1914 every Slav enemy of Germany and Austria-Hungary was made welcome in France, whilst enemies of Russian Imperialism, like the Fins, were given the cold shoulder.

I am glad of every human action of kindness and solidarity, efficient or inefficient, because it increases in any case the balance which good ought to strike some day over evil, but I should close my eyes to what I see, if I were not speaking plainly on these matters. For the consequences of the

policy described—a policy inevitable for States which cannot but seek their own advantage before everything—are before us. In this way it must happen that each people, by personal contact and public opinion, becomes in the first line acquainted with all that is wrong in other countries, according to the opinion of the exiled representatives of oppositions, and seldom takes real notice of the state of things which is acceptable to or accepted by the main part of the population of foreign countries. Their case is not laid before foreign opinion, simply because it is not usual to trouble other people with our own matters. Now, if every exiled cause was absolute justice, every not-exiled system absolute wrong and if the governments really gave to every exiled party full countenance and opportunity, to lay its case before foreign peoples and to appeal for help—then only this method would be theoretically correct, though the other, absent parties ought also be listened to or at least summoned, to state their defense, if they have any. Evidently this cannot be done and is not done and the exposures [59] by exiles—very legitimate means in their hands which I do not grudge them—do not create that relative degree of precision and certitude which full and impartial inquiries might produce, but heap up bias and prejudice concerning foreign peoples exactly of the character which is considered useful by the governments. Whatever the royalist refugees published in London about the French Revolution, helped to form that mass of hatred and contempt for the French regicides which, very suitable to the English aristocratic and capitalist oligarchy's interests, prevented English popular sympathies with the Revolution—large as they were—to ripen and helped to make the long wars, up to 1815, supportable and to many almost welcome. The British support to the exiled Italian cause meant at the same time a grip of the British government on Austria, on France and on the Pope and arrangements of German and Slav matters, a French hold on Italy, Catholic support to Ireland, a friendly nation on the sea route to India, etc. were thereby prevented or secured. The results of the war of the years 1814-18 were prepared by many years' exposures on matters within Germany and Austria-Hungary in the great Western States, just as the British Empire was exposed to similar strictures on Egyptian, South African, Indian, Irish and other matters in Germany and in France.

The European peoples, then, did not learn to know each other better, much less to respect one the other's individuality, characteristic qualities and also different rate or rhythm of progress, different habits of exuberance or of reservedness, etc., even when the most distinguished—and personally the most sincere—exiles and their champions—chivalrous and generous in very many cases—explained foreign politics to them. Animosity and excitement were a much clearer outcome of all this than acquisition of knowledge, sifted in a critical spirit. We know all that is wrong in most foreign countries and very little of what is in a relatively normal state, possible even right in them—and many people, at least the illustrious “man in the street,” are informed about their own country in exactly the opposite sense: they know all her rights and do not wish to be told of her wrongs.

In this way—and all these conceptions have constant repercussion in the press and in public life and leave a residue in every class book of history in all degrees of education—the gradual coalescence of the European large States, this involved mass of events which the most patient historian can only sift to the bottom to a very limited degree, looks to the inhabitants a most natural matter, of which they learn to know the mainsprings [60] by conscious and subconscious accumulation of experience throughout their lives, provided they keep their eyes open, whilst to foreign critics the growth of a country which they do not particularly like, usually presents a hideous sight and they have a sharp eye for factors of decomposition and, when conflicts arise, will favor and support decomposition. Continentals would take to pieces in dream the British Empire, British critics dismantled Russia, every tore Germany and Austria-Hungary to shreds and so on, until currents of opinion were created which permitted to let loose the dogs of war and after the war the final decisions were prompted by this spirit engendered and fostered in the way described during generations.

I cannot help feeling that, if it was the lamentable, but inevitable and almost forgotten fate of the Saxon Heptarchy to be molded into modern England, if Burgundy and Brittany and Provence and Navarra and Lorraine and other parts had to form the French Republic, proclaimed "one and indivisible" by the French Revolution, if the United States preferred a four years' Civil War to the Confederate States' claim of the right of secession, etc., if all this is considered legitimate historical evolution—the coalescence of States like Germany and Austria-Hungary should be considered an outrage to humanity and their unmaking dictated to a complete extent in the second, to a considerable extent in the first case, as was done by the treaties of 1919. If States are unmade from anarchist motives, I wish to see nothing better; but to kill or maim two States in order to order to let henceforth twelve States occupy the same territories: this is a multiplication and intensification of Statism which, I hope, one might dare to criticize. (The twelve States are: Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark, Poland, Lithuania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Italy, Hungary.)

The making of the great European States during all the period since the fall of the Western Roman Empire (476) took place, evidently, under different circumstances, etc. and, necessarily, at different times and it is also obvious, that the existing States opposed a newcomer as long as they could. Of the short-lived continental block of Charlemagne's time, after the division in three, the eastern, German, part kept together and was enlarged to the east by the Slav territories, but it formed never a concentrated, unique State, though several medieval emperors and Charles V wielded great power. The hundreds of separate units, reduced to some dozens in the beginning of the nineteenth century formed a loose and powerless Confederacy which acquired international importance only in 1866 by Prussia's initiative and was reorganized in 1871 as the German Empire, still a federation of many autonomous States. This country only in the [61] early eighties acquired some colonies and still later only its industrial, commercial and naval development took considerable proportions, whilst its military efficiency dated from the sixties.

The second of the post-Charlemagne countries, the long strip west of the Rhine from the Northern Sea to the south of present France, was soon frittering away and after a last ephemeral concentration by Charles-the-Temeraire [Bold], end of the fifteenth century, it collapsed and was by and by absorbed by France.

France, then, the third part of Charlemagne's empire, greatly interfered with for centuries by the Normans, then by the English Kings, became at last a large kingdom after the collapse of Burgundy, end of the fifteenth century, and from that time onward, having views of further expansion in the direction of Flanders, the Rhine, Italy, also Spain, was in centenary conflicts with Spain and the German Empire.

Spain, after the long occupation by the Western Goths, then by the African Moors, consisted of several independent kingdoms, united at the close of the fifteenth century to a large monarchy which very soon, in the early sixteenth century formed the first great Colonial Empire and then had for centuries France and England as bitter enemies.

Austria was an independent empire only from 1804 to 1815 and from 1866 to 1918. Occupied in Charlemagne's time, then conquered by the Avars, nomads of Asiatic descent, re-occupied several centuries later and settled by immigrants from Bavaria and Franconia, a duchy, dependent on the German empire in the twelfth century (under the Babenberg dynasty), occupied by the King of Bohemia in the thirteenth century and after his defeat under the Habsburg dynasty, this territory—as indicated already—when the Turkish advance to the West began, was united with the Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary in a voluntary way and remained a part of the old German empire, as long as this empire lasted and of the German Confederacy, until this was broken up by the war of 1866 between Austria and Prussia.

The situation of the Slavs was determined by the very early adherence of Bohemia to the German empire, by the advance of the Turks who conquered the Balkan Slavs, by the eastward expansion of the Germans between the rivers Elbe and Oder, by the great expansion of the kingdom of Poland which suspended the continuation of States for Lithuania and the Belarussian territory. The Ukraine also, between Russians and Poles, lost her independence, whilst the Great Russian tsardom took really enormous proportions, reaching from Finland to the Caucasus, from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean, and [62] still aspiring further expansion towards Constantinople, Persia, China and other parts of Asia, besides gathering the Ruthenians in Galicia, the Tcheks and Slovaks, the Serbs and the Montenegrins under its protective wings—a policy which provoked the catastrophe of 1914, as it gave the strongest encouragement to the Slavs within the old Austro-Hungarian territory to consider this country vowed to destruction, as Turkey had been.

Italy dearly paid for the supreme imperiousness and tyrannic sway of ancient Rome, continued by the subtle intellectual despotism of the Roman Church, recoined, by the way, into much material wealth and power in every corner of Christianity. This seed brought a harvest of revenge and covetousness. Italian territory was coveted by other States as a testimony of the fall of Roman power and the transmission of some portion of it to the new owner, then for its wealth and remnant or renescent ancient splendor, and almost all States understood the usefulness of the Church for keeping their subjects in mental infancy and liege obedience, but they were also envious of the growing wealth of the Church and jealous and irritated at the Roman pretensions of superiority of the spiritual over the secular power. Thus, notwithstanding the efforts of the Popes to rekindle Christian fanaticism by the Crusades—also a raid on the overrated riches of the Orient which in the end turned out an unprofitable speculation and only provoked the Turks to retaliate and to invade Europe,—notwithstanding this a Reformation, producing National Churches, controlled by secular power was breeding for centuries before it was achieved in the sixteenth century.

This event, by the way, did as little impair the intensity of religious sway over people's minds, as the late war, destroying or maintaining large States, diminished Statism. Quite the reverse happened in both cases—a multiplication of religions and of States, an intensification of religious and authoritarian fanaticism,—the bolshevist fanaticism of the Anabaptists at Münster, 1534-35, and of Russia, 1917...,—the foundation of the Order of Jesuits, 1535, of Fascism, 1919... Both periods of terrible recrudescence of authority and of disregard of freethought then, of the libertarian ideas now...

The Italian population, then, itself formerly the victim of Rome, suffered from Goths and Langobards, Normans and Saracens, Germans, Spaniards and French invasions, occupations or lengthy possessions, besides extensive secular priest-rule in the Pope's territory. It tasted alternately the yoke of the Renaissance tyrants, of City oligarchies, of Bourbon, Habsburg and Savoyan and other dynasties, of republics and [63] Kingdoms founded by France, etc. until in September 1870 the territory of Italy became completely united under the Piedmontese Kings, a new State created by much nationalist effort and Garibaldian fighting, but very much more by Piedmontese diplomacy (Cavour) and the wars of 1859, 1866 and the situation created by the war in France, 1870. Most people considered the Italian State definitely completed by the seizure of Rome, 1870, but the nationalists continued to covet Trieste, Austrian territory since 1282, and Southern Tyrol, and official Italy in 1915, promised these and other territories by the treaty of London, 1915, entered the war. In March 1919 the Fascio was founded, in October 1922 the Fascists entered Rome and Mussolini now endeavors to realize Dante's and Mazzini's dream of the Terza Roma, the Third Rome, Roman world power restored after the first Rome of the Caesars and the second Rome of the Popes.

From all this may be seen that the reasonable efforts to constitute large economic units in place of the early medieval class of quantities of inefficient, yet vicious smaller units, has been carried out in spite of every resistance and made Europe until the autumn of 1918 a normally developed, thriving and prosperous continent where—as also among the European emigrants settled in other continents—science and every kind of progress were developing better than in any other part of the globe or at any period before the beginning of this constitution of the large units. I consider this more important than the parking or pigeonholing of European mankind in national States.

Of this more anon. Here I will but refer to the Scandinavian countries, of which Sweden was until 1815 a very combative country, seeking expansion on the opposite shores of the Baltic, in the North of Germany and in Finland. It seems to be a little noticed fact that of all European countries—I except minimal territories like Andorra or Luxemburg or San Marino or Monaco—Sweden alone has not been at war since 1815, and admitted the secession of Norway in 1905 without any armed conflict. Nor was there, as far as I know, any streetfighting in 1848, nor, I believe, any strike massacres or other repression by murder. It is very likely that no American country either holds a similar clean record. Thus official violence is so generally distributed over all countries that only one country practically managed to get along without its murderous acts for above a hundred years; as to other authoritarian methods they are at work in Sweden as well as anywhere else.

Before libertarians can expect to get a hold on people's minds, they must consider all these facts and help to create a humane mentality which is so alarmingly absent today. [64]

## XI.

If progress was at work in making impossible as well the herding together of peoples by Oriental or Roman universal despotism, as their impotent and ferocious mingling in a chaos of nationalities, and in promoting the co-existence of nationalities in property proportioned economic units, the large European countries discussed in the previous chapter, it operated probably guided by the earlier similar evolution of village and town life. This evolution was indeed one of the most beneficial steps of human progress, as it brought people together under conditions when it was in their common interest to arrange their lives in view of permanent peaceable co-existence under their own mutual protection, instead of the state of personal aggressiveness or self-defense, inseparable from life in isolation or in quite small units.

I see no functional difference between towns, be they freest of the so-called free cities of the middle ages, and States. Both are administrative and governing organisms, inspired by the general or local mentality of their time and their very rivalry shows that they are of the same character. In fact they are interdependent and cannot eliminate or replace each other. A prosperous town may have a large sphere of influence around it, but its real prosperity will depend on the security of the whole territory which forms the State. Else it will have to create a State itself, as Venice did, subjugating the whole of Venitia and the Dalmatian coast and islands. The German Hansa towns, the largest Federation of cities in the middle age, declined as soon as German power declined, and London grew, as English power increased.

The towns and cities, however, had the great merit to elaborate and practice peaceful social life and, by trade, to create international relations between men others than intrigue and war, and to found thus a human communion which, however interested, monopolizing and divided it may be, however when it provokes war unscrupulously, is yet—or has been—at least before it is entirely penetrated by nationalism as in our day—a factor which very often decided against war and is not in

all cases antisocial. We must be modest in our expectations when looking at past history—and more modest still, alas, when looking at what happens around us!

Small States have survived under quite exceptional circumstances only, namely when their situation and economic life permitted an independent, sometimes frugal, sometimes very prosperous life and when the jealousy of the large States prevented their absorption and their continuation was the best solution which could be arrived at without continuous war. Thus a union of Portugal and Spain was always prevented by England, the secular [age-old] enemy of Spain and protector of Portugal [65] by the treaty of mutual friendship of four centuries' duration. Switzerland is in a similar way, though no written treaties may exist, in the sphere of French interest, against Germany, a friendship of the same duration in time, if not longer, than the Portuguese protection by England. Flandres and the Netherlands (Belgium and Holland), the embouchure of the Rhine and Maas rivers, the sea shore rich in ports facing the English coast, the rich agricultural plain, the early textile manufacture, exports from the large inland territories up the Rhine and the Maas, all this combined to make this territory Europe's most advantageously disposed parts, but also lasting bones of contention when Romans, the Batavians themselves, Germans, Spagnards, French alternatively held power. England's determination, not to let either France or Germany become master of these countries, which in a state of independence and neutrality are smaller rivals and of less military danger to England than they would be under any other arrangement—this secular determination rules the destinies of these two countries. Denmark, controlling the entrance to the Baltic sea, till the second half of the nineteenth century also a check on the naval development of Germany, was considered by large States (England and Russia) to be their last placeholder in these important straits, securing Russian exports and British imports from the Baltic, in preference to the large countries Sweden and Germany.

In this way every European small state up to 1914 owed its continued existence to well-known reasons affecting the interest of the large States. The small Balkan States, Servia, Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, ancient Montenegro and, the latest of all, Albania, represented territory wrestled from the Turks and forming pack and parcel of the political game of Russia. To keep them in check and to prevent attempts of asserting a real independence as Bulgaria dared to try in the days of Prince Alexander (kidnapped) and Stambuloff (murdered), the Macedonian question was left open, a permanent object of strife between Bulgaria, Servia and Greece. These States were also pawns of Russia in the long game against Austria-Hungary, and Italy also had her fingers in the Albanian and Montenegrin pies and has so in 1927 more than ever. These small countries, then, were above all highly political creations, conscious, at the same time, of their dependence on Russia and feeling bent themselves on a restoration of their vanished medieval splendor for prolonged or mostly very short periods. But the frontiers at the time of their largest momentary expansion, many centuries ago, forma bout the minimum of their present claims,—claims not formally presented, evidently, but proclaimed by an indefatigable propaganda and, by systematic education in these traditions, becoming the patriotic aims of the young generations. Greece thus ambitioned Byzantium, Constantinople, and Asia Minor, Bulgaria,—which succeeded in 1885 to win Eastern Rumelia—dreamed of the whole of Macedonia, Servia inspired her youth with the [66] firm will of a struggle by all means for a territory as large as present Yugoslavia (or larger still), Rumania craved for all the territory where some Rumanian speaking inhabitants lived Hungary, Austria and Russia, etc.

In a word, whilst the old small States, from Portugal to Denmark and Finland up to 1914 were models of peaceful countries, or nearly so, with no claims for expansion at other countries' cost, the nineteenth century Balkan States and old Montenegro were quite the opposite: to them nothing in the world was of any interest but their national expansion. They were seconded in this by the



nationalists of extinct States who wished by all means to turn back the wheels of history to revive an age of past glory. The Poles, Ukrainians, Tcheks, Slovaks were foremost in this, the Lithuanians, Letts, Georgians and others were much less in evidence. Their policy was necessarily Anti-German, Anti-Austrian, Anti-Hungary, Anti-Turkish in a far greater number of cases than it was Anti-Russian and also Anti-Italian; they filled thus in with the pre-war Entente—combination of powers and became a valuable asset to Russia and the great Western countries. How was it possible that all these nationalist matters, affecting remote parts of Europe, involving little known peoples, primed European politics for years before 1914 in an increasingly intense degree and set fire to the world in 1914? This question is worth discussing, because the war solved none of these problems, but provoked numerous new ones, which again make for war... Shall we libertarians always be impassive onlookers, expecting that, somehow, from an excess of evil, freedom and happiness will arise? This would be Messianic faith, not the action of intelligent observation, study and criticism which alone can teach us, how to find remedies. We must look back at the origin of modern nationalism.

Nations defending their independence were always admired by later generations—the Spartans of Leonidas, the Gauls of Vercingetorix, the Germans of Arminius, the Batavians of Julius Civilis, later the Swiss, the sixteenth century Dutch, the Americans with Washington, Lafayette and Steuben, the Spanish Americans with Bolivar and San Martin, the Greeks and others in rebellion against the Turks, etc. These sentiments expressed respect for human freedom, worship of boldness and courage, and were not felt as contradictory to the widespread cosmopolitan and humanitarian feelings of the second half of the eighteenth century—a belief in a general regeneration of mankind, so vividly inaugurated in 1789 by the storming of the Bastille and other events, presaging a democratic, humanitarian and socially equitable revival everywhere. To this corresponded the renewed interest in the literary and traditional past of nations, their early languages, tales and folklore, etc.

Two factors were underrated in these years of enthusiasm: the ferocious reactionary will of the privileged classes and the deteriorating effect of power [67] on the new revolutionary authorities. From all this resulted the Napoleonic despotism, threatening or destroying the independency of all European continental countries and strengthening the aristocratic regime in England. This terrible disappointment scattered the generous cosmopolitan hopes and transformed the Europeans into accomplices, tools and slaves of Napoleon I or national patriots, working for liberation and henceforth losing all faith in nations other than their own; for the resistance to despotism showed many ups and downs and only the years 1813-15 saw a general upheaval, but then also the diplomatic haggling and reactionary tendencies of the Vienna Congress (1814-15) marked a deep depression.

The result was, indeed, that in the period from 1815 to 1848 unauthorized nationalism was detested and persecuted by the governments, including until the revolution of 1830 that of France. German and Italian efforts of uniting their countries, divide into many kingdoms, duchies, etc., were strongest then and both had a sound economic basis—realized to some degree by the German Zollverein (Custom Union of a number of German States) in the forties. In both cases the problem, first raised by young idealists, students and conspirators, was taken up by the politicians and economists, by statesmen and governments, mainly Prussia and Piedmont and the final realizations were the outcome of large wars, 1859, 1866, 1870-71, aided on one occasion efficiently by Garibaldi's military action, unofficially aided and countenanced by the government of Piedmont.

These two large unionist movements then, welded together two large modern States, Germany (1871) and Italy (1870) and moreover indirectly created modern Austria-Hungary, the dualist monarchy of 1867. There were several other currents, tendencies and influences, of which the very little developed federalist and the mostly unitarian socialist tendencies need no discussion here; others were the liberal or democratic current, the Slav nationalist efforts and the influence of foreign

States, France and England. By all this the questions became entangled and got several aspects and, evidently, solutions which would give full satisfaction to all claims and expectations, could not be found, nor do such solutions exist anywhere else in similar cases. Only time silences the less important disappointments and produces a level of adaptation, habit and relative, if not total, indifference. This time, many centuries had passed over the inner changes of England and France, where the Saxon Heptarchy and the Wars of the Roses, the Burgundian war and the conquest of territory in the North from Spanish Flanders [68] are matters of ancient history and national territorial unity and integrity are considered as definite acquisitions. From this experience of their own these countries might have taken the lesson that inner national rearrangement should be left to the nations concerned themselves. This was not done, every move became an affair of general politics, that is, claims of compensation were raised, obstacles were otherwise thrown in the way, in short friendly feeling was absent and friendly actions, if they happened, were based on interested motives.

The liberals and democrats of Germany, and the republicans so much more, were sincere admirers of liberal France since the revolution of July 1830, of constitutional England, of the first French Republic. They idealized these nations and forgot the period of the Napoleonic yoke, but in the end they could not fail to notice that France always pursued Napoleonic politics and expected, by democratic support, to recover the republican and Napoleonic conquests in the German West, the Rhine, efforts revived before our eyes by the separatist movements of 1923 under French protection. They also saw that England, by supporting Denmark wished to sap from the beginning German naval development and increasing trade by sea, and that England also inspired the Hanoverian and the Coburg policies, obstructing or minimizing the unionist movements.

The Italian unionists had a similar experience. They also idolized France, but the French Republican army, carrying out the policy of the President Louis Bonaparte, bombarded Rome, defended by Garibaldi, and destroy the Roman Republic, of which Mazzini was the most prominent figure. France occupied Rome from that time until after the fall of Napoleon III (September 1870). Napoleon III was the ally of Piedmont in the war of 1859, but cut this war short by the peace of Villafranca, before the Italian aims against Austria were attained and Italy reached these only as the ally of Prussia in the war of 1866, much to the disappointment of Napoleon III who worked for a smaller Italy, without Rome, under French influence, and a possible restoration of the principalities of the Napoleonic period (the Naples kingdom of Murat, etc.) This corresponded exactly to the Rhenan policy of Napoleon III and to certain projects about separating Hungary from Austria. Napoleon III's cousin, the prince usually called Plon Plon, who cultivated relations with so many democrats, was always read to accept an Italian Kingdom, Tuscany or so—he married for political purposes a Peimontese princess—to accept the Hungarian throne or to be King of a new Poland, and as son of the King of Westphalia, Napoleon I's brother Jérôme, if the Rhenan [69] projects of Napoleon III had been realized, he would not have refused a German throne in these parts.

Princes are figureheads, no doubt, but these plans meant French influence paramount in important parts of the center and the South of Europe, and these plans have virtually been realized under the equally figurehead form of the treaties of 1919 and the network of treaties and ententes since then. France is at home in essential parts of Germany and former Austria-Hungary by the completely French orientation, very materially cemented [cemented] by finance and armaments, of Poland, Tchecoslovakia and Yugoslavia; she occupies large parts of Western German territory and it was not her fault, if the separatist movements on the Rhine and in the Palatinate failed. She is also in that state of tension with Italy which is the normal state of these relations, unless Italy give way in everything.

These obviously very cursory remarks ought to show to distant readers, how very complicated the subject is and how nationalism is far from being a straightforward solution of a vital demand, but is something which, however simple and ideal in the beginning, is inevitably gradually tainted by every so many contacts with all that is government, finance, military, etc., with all vested interests and privileges in one word.

How can it be otherwise, since nationalism wishes to create something which ordinary evolution has not or not yet brought about. It comes thus in touch and very often in conflict with everything that exists and the result is war or compromise, enmities overcome by force or smoothed over by concessions, often by a subservience to strong protectors which creates but nominal independence. From the latter state either complete subordination will arise, or intrigue, betrayal and new conflicts.

The Western and Southern Slav populations remained for a thousand years in the ambiguous state described in a previous chapter (IX), neither definitely acquired to Western civilization, nor really associated with Eastern life. It may have been their wish, to side with the West, but, somehow, to increase their reputation or prestige, they emphasized their parentship with the powerful Slav East, where the immense Russian Empire began to be formed, a colossus threatening expansive moves westward and southward, from the Baltic to the Caucasus and Persia. This was felt a permanent threatening of Europe, a repetition of the Eastern invasions which, after the check upon Turkish advance (seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries) were believed to have come to a standstill. Russia had such enormous room for expansion in Siberia and the Amur region opened only in the middle of the nineteenth century, and as far as the Pacific Ocean. But tsarist Russia had also her hands in every European question and was the "big brother" who would right every grievance of the Western and Southern Slavs: the latter pointed out this to Europe and subordinated themselves completely to the Russian [70] interest or, if they agreed to co-operate with their neighbors, this had to be paid for in every instance by compensations, an attitude rather unique in European national relations and resumed [summarized] by the words of Austrian bitter irony: "patriotism on notice" (Patriotismus auf Kündigung), temporarily patriotic attitude which might be changed at any time, when sufficient compensation was not forthcoming. What tsarist Russia really meant to the Slavs—complete absorption—is evident from the history of Poland, of the Ukraine, of the Beilarussians and as well from the vendetta against Bulgaria since 1885 and even few years before, when the Bulgarians began to refuse complete obedience to Russian guidance. These examples made the Tcheks, the Slovaks, the several Yugoslav branches very careful, very submissive to Russia. All these nations may have had at the bottom of their heart a craving for complete national independence, combined with revenge on those whom they considered their oppressors, Germans, Magyars and Turks—something like what the Allies gave them by the treaties of 1919,—but they hid these plans from their Russian tsarist and panslavist protectors and from their Austrian and Hungarian fellow-citizens for four centuries until the close of 1918. So they had several irons in the fire—advantages by Russian protection, more subtle plans to get rid of Russia later on and form national States and present-day political cunning to get any quantity of concessions out of their Austrian and other neighbors who constantly tried to arrive at definite agreements, a bona fide modus vivendi, yet always experienced disappointment, new demands, new compensations being always presented and exacted.

This is a slight attempt to describe the want of sincerity and dark threatenings, which always characterized the Slav policy, visible to those to those who were somewhat familiar with these questions, incomprehensible to those who live far away and know these matters only by the literature spread plentifully in Western countries before and since and after the War. I had the doubtful privilege to become more familiar with these matters by observing them almost from day to

day for forty years extending from 1878 (Berlin Congress) to 1918 (end of the War) and to some extent, historically, for the time before, and again for the unhappy years since 1918. I began to read papers when I was a boy, there was in insurrection in the Herzegovina and a Servian War against Turkey—and when I open the papers in April 1927, fifty-two years later, there is extreme tension, there are preparations and threatenings of war between Albania, Italy and Servia (Yugoslavia). When Eastern Rumelia joined Bulgaria (1885), there was a Servian War against Bulgaria; when Austria declared the temporary occupation of Bosnia a definite one (1908), Servian, Russian and World's War were quite near. When Italy had opened the raids on Turkey by the [71] Tripolitan War (1911), the Servian and other Balkan and Greek allies' raid of 1912 soon followed; 1913 saw the Servian and Greek War to crush Bulgaria; the winter of 1913-14 brought Servian threats of war against Austria for Albanian frontier matters and the case of Skutare—and then the Sarajevo assassinations of June 28, 1914, at last unloosened general war. After 1918 the Macedonian problems, Saloniki, etc. create tension between Servia, Bulgaria and Greece,—the Fiume, Dalmatian, Albanian and other problems much more still disturb the relations between Yugoslavia and Italy,—the Croats and Macedonians, also, in part, the Bosnians and Slovenians are dissatisfied and the Montenegrins whose old independent country was simply effaced from the map of Europe and incorporated neck and crop into Yugoslavia, feel deeply unhappy.

Such impressions of five wars and at least three great war alarms within fifty years, combined with the expansion of Servia from very small dimensions in 1876 to the present huge Yugoslavian kingdom, make me hesitate to admire the generous aloofness of many excellent people who might not all have been able to find Servia on the map of Europe offhand, but who with a charming "poor little Servia" condoned about anything that might happen in these parts, who graciously overlooked as well local weaknesses like the assassinations of Helen Markovic, Queen Draga and the Duchess of Hohenburg (Sarajevo) and infractions of sociability shown by the frequent wars and threats of war.

As long as people in different countries, according to the papers they read and others sources of public information, all dependent on national political, trade, financial and similar interests or inspired by some special nationalist cause, see everything in so very different colors, it is inevitable, that most socialists and anarchists do the same and this makes them as unsufficiently informed as the ordinary reader—and often much more so, because the cliché: "economic causes," the other cliché: "let the bourgeois among themselves quarrel as much as they wish; we are internationalists," a third cliché: "every popular action must be supported," etc.,—because such general opinions and a contempt for political detail, hinder them from seeing clearly and make them unwilling, to study these subjects. So the bourgeois and the States have all their way; they play fast and loose with nationalism, being certain that if something faraway is presented to the people in Paris, London and New York as a generous, patriotic, national rebellion, they will endorse it chivalrously, call for intervention and will not mind the eventually ensuing [72] wars and other complications. Of course, if such rebellions or affirmations of independence even, are considered hostile to the bourgeois and State interest, they will be presented in dark colors and have "une mauvaise presse"—the Boer Republics, Morocco, Syria, China are example of this and Persia, Finland, India, Egypt etc. had and have not chance of large popular sympathies.

Socialists and anarchists have been and are next to passive in these matters and thereby give support to the present system and sap the very roots of their own cause, in my opinion. This is why I do not glide over this subject and must give it some further attention in the next chapter.

## XII.

Within nineteenth century Europe then, frontiers established by the Vienna congress of 1814-15, at which the influence of England, Russia and Talleyrand's France were strongest and the German influence, split between antagonistic Austria and Prussia, was small and the Italian influence was naught, a United Italy (1870) and a United Germany (1876) were created, natural concentrations of scattered territories in a century when England and France, united for centuries, increased by colonial expansion, and Russia also, extending her vast Asiatic territory. Moreover, Germany's territorial increase (Schleswig and Holstein, 1864 and Alsace and a part of Lorraine, 1871) was balanced by the complete separation of Austria (1866) from the German Confederacy which then ceased to exist—and French also increased her territory by Nice and Savoy (1860). Italy lost these French speaking districts and acquired the Lombardy and Venetia from Austria (1859, 1860), outlaying parts, whose loss was expected to end tension with Italy and permitted the consolidation of Austria-Hungary in 1867, liquidating the rupture of 1849. Austria occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina by a mandate conferred by the Berlin Congress, 1878, and declared this occupation definitive in 1908, owing to previous arrangements with Russia (1872), the Turkish and Servian situation, etc.; in fact, when England will have left Egypt and France will have left Tunis, the question of temporary and permanent occupations, protectorates, etc. will be worth discussing; there may be ample time till then. [73]

Thus these problems of many ages affecting Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary were fully settled, not without very much effort and several wars of short duration, but at least with relatively minimal changes of the map of Europe, and, it was believed and expected at the time, with no vital detriment to any large population. For in each case (Lombardy and Venetia, Nice and Savoy, Schleswig and Holstein, Alsace and a portion of Lorrain, also Bosnia and Herzegovina) the new country was as large and relatively prosperous as the old one, had a population totally or in part (Croatians) of the same language (small Danish minorities in Schleswig and French speaking minorities in Lorrain and Alsace excepted). If the territorial changes of 1918-19 had been made under similar conditions, Europe would not be in her present miserable situation.

The Slav nationalism, beginning as a linguistic and literary revival about a century ago, welcomed then, as new peoples, hitherto silent, seemed to enter the European communion of nations, dreamed in general a restoration of medieval Slav glory, as traceable in early chronicles, but its practical efforts were necessarily of the most diverse character.

The Slavs in Turkey felt the impossibility of any arrangement with the Turks and to them Russia was the great protector; their rebellions were inspired by the hope, if not certainty, of Russian intervention, and when the Berlin Congress (1878) had consolidated the results of the Russo-Turkish War, practically only the situation of Macedonia remained unsettled, a problem which provoked the Servians, Greeks and Bulgarians to make war among themselves (1913) and which the present arrangements after the great war have not settled either, since the Bulgarians and before all the Macedonians themselves are extremely dissatisfied and look forward to coming events. An independent Macedonia would have baffled the territorial expectations of the three neighboring countries, Bulgaria, Greece and Servia—and any division of the Macedonian territory gives dissatisfaction to at least one of the three neighbors and to the Macedonians themselves. So the underground nationalist war continues, till the flames will break out again in the wake or, maybe, as the original pretext of new wars. Is not this open sore a striking example of the impossibility of nationalism to arrive at equitable and durable solutions, since Statism will always interfere and no question will be locally decided upon its own merits? Because great European powers countenanced each of the neighboring States and even the Turks and to none the Macedonians were of any account. They were "small change," bribes today promised to Bulgaria, another day guaranteed to Turkey, then

held out to Serbia and autonomy, that none should get the coveted territory, remained a threat to every party. [74]

In Austria-Hungary, in appearance at least, the situation of the Slavs was somewhat different. They abstained from proclaiming openly their wish to destroy these two States as a large political and economic unit. Bakunin expressed such opinions in 1848 and ever since, but was most completely disavowed in public by the Slavs of this country. They were great in dissimulating their real intentions and, in fact, had no definite plans except the one principle: to take all that came their way, to remain irreconcilable and to run the minimum of risk. Tsarist agents were always active among them; this made their acquiescence, in appearance at least, to the prevailing Austrian and Hungarian systems valuable to these governments and they bought it at the price of continuous concessions. All popular efforts, in representative bodies, etc. to create real bona fide co-operation in matters concerning the whole country, were frustrated in the end, though the real aims of the Slav nationalities were never quite openly stated. They always united conservatives, clericals, liberals, radicals and their social democrats also were national patriots, whilst the German speaking Austrians were rigidly separated into the usual political parties. Thus a combination of all the Slavs and the German speaking conservatives (landed proprietors) and clericals usually supported government for the by far greater period of the forty years preceding 1918. In Austria, then, there cannot have been any oppression of the Slavs during above thirty years before the war of 1914, since nearly all the time the governments were kept in power by Slav parliamentary support and this support was constantly bought and paid for by national concessions, not only in language and educational matter, but also in economic measures, increasing the prosperity of the Slav districts, and in measures favorable to the growth of a large, one might say, an over-large Slav intelligentsia, professional classes and bureaucracy, all brimful replete with nationalist ambition.

The latter, then exerted overwhelming influence in the whole of Austria, they promoted by all means the particular welfare of the Slav districts and they understood how to obstruct and frustrate every attempt at definite and sincere reconciliation, good neighborhood and friendship with the German-speaking population. For they watched keenly European politics and saw that the enmity of France, Russia and England against the Central European powers must end in conflict and then their time would come. Whilst in former years they would have been satisfied with Russian rule over them, expecting to play an important role in backward Russia, of late they intimately preferred national States of their own, but never spoke up in these matters. One will gather from these few remarks that those bitter inner enemies of Austria, never outspoken, never running risks, always advancing, never saturating, obstructing every peaceful settlement, conspiring in fact or sympathizing in spirit with all enemies of Austria, were the real cause of [75] Austria's backwardness in so many matters. The German speaking population made the Revolution of March 13, 1848, overthrowing the central figure of continental reaction, Prince Metternich. A democratic development was frustrated by the connivance of the Slavs with the Austrian court, by their unloosening of nationalism, by their military help given to the counterrevolution, to crush Vienna (October 1848), etc. And when the absolutist system broke down a second time, 1859, the Slavs again for twenty years obstructed, undermined and wore out every effort of the German-speaking liberal and radical population to regenerate the country until, in 1879, liberalism was exhausted and henceforth powerless, and the Slavs and the German-speaking clericals and great landed proprietors were masters of Austria for nearly all the years up to 1914. This example of giving way in everything to the Slavs without reaping—not thanks, but simply a minimum of good will, of fellowship which usually welds together the citizens of a large country, did not inspire the political chiefs of Hungary and of Prussia to imitate it in relation to the local Slavs. The Magyar people had seen, in 1848-49, the Hungarian Servians, the

Croatians, Slovaks and the Transylvanian Rumanians harass it on all sides in league with the absolutist court, until the Russian army, sent by the Emperor Nicolaus I, crushed the Hungarian revolution which had deposed the Habsburg dynasty and proclaimed Kossuth governor of Hungary. This experience induced the renascent governments of 1867 and all the years following to make no concessions to the Slavs, save that Croatia had an autonomous administration. In Prussia for very many years, since about 1847, the fact became patent that the Poles of Posen and other then Prussian parts of ancient Poland were as much conspiring, ready to revolt and unwilling to be pacified by any means, against Prussia, than the Poles under Russian rule were irreconcilable enemies of Russia. This finally caused the coercive and, of course, abortive Prussian efforts, to weaken the position of the Poles by settling German peasants among them and by reducing the use of the Polish language in education, measures which were so much criticized in other countries where, as these countries were cultivating the friendship of Russia, the hardships of the Poles in Russia were passed over in silence as a rule. The Austrian Poles, in Galicia, were under the same law as the whole population of Austria, but as the administration, in the Polish language, was in their hands, as they lorded it over the Ruthenian peasants and their own peasants, as the Polish block formed an essential part of every governmental majority in parliament, and as the other nations of Austria, meanly the Germans and the Tcheks, always paid up the local Galician deficits,—these Poles in Galicia were indeed pampered and wished for nothing better at the time. They were also the conspirative center against Russia and were considered the military mainstay of Austria in her most exposed [76] frontier territory where, moreover, the Ruthenian population, attracted towards Russia by language and the orthodox religion and smarting under Polish aristocratic rule, was honeycombed with Russian agents and had forfeited every confidence.

This is about the situation under which for many years before 1914 and with rapidly growing intensity, as this fatal year approached, the Slav nationalities strove for aims of a varied character, as I have explained—national advancement by installment within the present States, but without any intention of reconciliation, subordination under the will of Russia, or national States of extremely expansive tendencies. All this policy fitted in with the hostile policies of Russia, France, England, Italy against Turkey, Austria-Hungary and Germany. It fitted in so well that the assassination of the Austrian archduke and his wife at Sarajevo, June 28, 1914, set the ball rolling. From that date every effort to keep Russia in check failed and the inevitable war between great powers automatically extended by the system of alliances; public opinion was prepared by many years' campaigns, the role of the United States was also unswerving from the very beginning—so peace went to the dogs and by and by much of modern Europe as well. The triumph of nationalism could not have been greater, provided the nationalist had been careful to be on the side of the stronger party. The map of Europe in 1919 resembles more to the map of a thousand years ago than to the map of 1914. Is this really progress and whom does it benefit?

It was to “liberate” the Slavs and to benefit Russia, France, England, Italy and other States by destroying Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Destruction, spoliation, ruin, annexations of German and Hungarian-speaking populations happened in never imagined proportion and none of these wounds is closing, much less healing; so the cup of revenge was drained to the dregs.

The positive results are a number of supremely nationalist new States, large aggrandizement of several existing States, at the cost of **annected** German and Magyar, Macedonian and other populations. This opened the problems of minorities to an extent unknown ever before, up til now with no other result than to make the triumphant nationalists always more thorough oppressors.

The economic life, subordinate now to the nationalist will of the leaders of small States, will not prosper and this and their bad conscience, uncertainty whether their present splendor will last,

drags the new States into financial bondage under international capitalism, military allegiance to large powers as watchdogs against the Germans, the Magyars, the Bulgarians, the Turks and the bolshevists, and—as they have the natural wish to escape from these politely imposed, but nonetheless smarting obligations—to intricate political scheming and intriguing of their own with no other outcome than a perpetuation and intensification of all-round uneasiness and unrest. [77]

The manifesto which even many international financiers and bankers published in London, October 19, 1926—reproduced in the New York Nation of November 30—the proposed international conference on the economic state of Europe, to be held in Geneva (1927), the so-called Paneuropean movement for a European federation—fallacious from the beginning, because it expressly recognizes the treaties of 1919—and ever so much other criticism testifies of the insupportable crisis and deadlock in Europe, nearly eight years after the end of the war.

Will libertarians, then, take notice of all this, examining for instance, whether they are not frustrating their own aims which I take to be the international friendly co-existence of men all over the globe, by bowing unconditionally before the fetish of nationalists out-of-power: self-determination of the nations?

I submit that this right can only be properly exercised, when all nations resort to it at the same time and in a friendly spirit, admitting neither exceptions nor limitations, but also giving full compensation, in reciprocal solidarity, for all hardships and damages which separations may involve. And I further submit that, as in personal relations among men and women, separation is not necessarily the highest ideal; among sociable beings like men, as among collectivities like nations, friendly co-existence is the higher aim—the unsocial man, the eremit [hermit], the quarrelsome mates who must divorce every other day are exceptions. The fanatic who must have his own State for his own language, the politician and the official who will always welcome a new parliament, a new government, a new bureaucracy, the industrialist and speculator who sees a way to quick profits in such a new starts—all these are the true inspirators of present-day ferocious nationalism. They are not, to me at least, individuals of a higher type. The real people would prefer social co-existence with others in large economic units guaranteeing personal freedom to all. People of many languages have always lived together in large towns, in old countries and in the best developed newer countries like the United States—why should, what was and is possible and the natural thing everywhere, be denied to the nations of Central Europe since 1918-19, diving them by postwar-force against men who had deposed their weapons in the guarantees of fair treatment laid down in President Wilson's 14 points, 1918-19, and by treaties dictated without listening to their pleas, 1919,—dividing them thus into nationalist victors (who had never rebelled and most of whom had never fought) and pariah peoples, ruined in their own countries or annexed minorities?—These are consequences of defeat which these peoples must and will bear, as the Jews had to bear their dispersion after the fall of Jerusalem, as every other cruelty had to be supported and was supported in history, but they cannot be considered to be the result of the application of any principle. [78]

When was self-determination of nations ever applied before? Is see before all that every country always bitterly opposed it. American Independence was dearly bought by eight campaigns; Irish independence is unobtainable, Egypt's also. Switzerland repressed the federated catholic cantons by war (Sonderbund, 1847). The United States preferred the Civil War (1861-65) to permitting the Southern States to secede. The Spanish Republic of 1873 fought the Southern autonomists ("cantonalists"). The first French Republic, "one and indivisible," considered "federalism" the greatest of crimes and ruthless destruction (Lyons) and the guillotine were the reply of the centralist patriots. Holland made bitter war on the seceding Belgians in the thirties. Are these and other similar



events indications of self-determination of nations as a recognized more right among civilized nations?

Which are recorded instances of self-determination of nations? I can but remember three instances—England, indeed in the sixties, abandoned the occupation of the Ionian islands which then joined Greece; when in 1885 Eastern Rumelia by the Philippote pronunciamento broke her connection with Turkey, stipulated by the Berlin Congress, and joined Bulgaria, Turkey did not resort to force (that “poor little Servia” did, by the way, making war on Bulgaria immediately, being beaten at Slivnica and saved in that great plight by an Austrian veto on further Bulgarian advance.)—And, the very memorable acceptance by Sweden, 1905, of the secession of Norway.

Self-determination of nations is equally rare, or rather, a myth—for the three cases recorded here will be open to quite other interpretations when looked into by closer scrutiny—since the year of unlimited revenge, 1918-19. Macedonia and Montenegro in vain called for it, as did the annexed Styrian town Marburg, the German-speaking peasants in Southern Hungary and Transylvania, the annexed large Tyrolese districts south of the Breuner divide (Bozen, Meran, Brixen, etc. German-speaking valleys since the early middle ages.) Nor was the vaunted principle applied to the millions of German-speaking Austrians in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, to the Germans annexed by Poland, even to the German majorities of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia and this by decision of the League of Nations. A Polish general seized the Lithuanian Vilna territory. The Lithuanians seize the German Memel. D’Annunzio seized Fiume, etc.

In other parts of the globe, where no possible revenge of German oppression can be the moral motive power, Japan is quite at home in Korea, the United States in Haiti and some Central American Republics. The Syrians, the natives of the Moroccan Rif, the Abyssinians, Egyptians, Albanians, Bessarabians, the Indians of Asia, the whole Chinese people—all have European armies and fleets and airships at their doors or their affairs are arranged over their heads (Abyssinia, etc.), everything in the way of destruction and bondage rather, than the smallest respect for their own will or so-called “self-determination.” Not even the old Tacna and Arica question [79] touching Peru, Bolivia and Chile has been equitably settled. Nor is the League of Nations in the smallest degree concerned about the claims of minorities and only devises perfect bureaucratic methods to shelve them. And, again, the Flemings in Belgium, the Bretons in France, the Catalans in Spain and other national minorities have linguistic and other wishes of their own which the governments and public opinion of the French- and Castilian-speaking majorities satisfy but little and least of all they dream of splitting up their countries on such reasons.

It would be tiresome to resume [summarize] here what I know from almost daily observation of public life in Austria from 1878 to 1914 and 1918, on the patient, painstaking efforts to give satisfaction to the Slav nationalities by every possible practical measure. A State language (German) never existed in former Austria, but the new Tchechoslovak State proclaimed that language as the State language, though by the annexed millions of German Austrians, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenes and by the slight difference of the Slovak language—a difference, however, dear to the Slovak people, which for a thousand years almost had had no political connection with the Tchek people—the Tchechoslovak State possesses six written languages; whilst former Austria possessed eight such languages and a scarce old Rheto-roman dialect in Tyrolese valleys which has not to give way to official Italian. In former Austria the cultural and, wherever possible, the administrative autonomy of nationalities was the aim of constant efforts—the so-called national cadastre in Moravia was a specimen of this, acceptable even to the less fanatical Moravian Tcheks, lists in which the inhabitants were entered according to their declarations of nationality and which served for recording their votes on all public institutions which could in reason be either divided or duplicated. It is not always

reasonable to divide a library in two, but two libraries, two technical schools, two hospitals instead of one, are useful. It is not practical to have measures against epidemics or inundations deliberated by two boards and applicable by and to a portion of the local population only in each case: so such boards would in reason be unique, etc. In short, I cannot imagine from my experience that any country in the world would have applied a fraction of the patience and care to give satisfaction to the several nationalities which it contained not by some late conquest, but for centuries—the last arrivals, in the latter part of the eighteenth century being the Poles, Ruthenians and Rumanians of Galicia and Bukovina, relatively the most moderate in national requisitions.

Therefore, if these people had to go—and in October 1918, to conform to President Wilsons' 14 points they were declared free to go, as they liked, but the last Vienna government and no one opposed their secession (but up to October 1921 116 German Austrians in Bohemia had been killed by Tchek gendarmes and legionists when demonstrating, not fighting, against the Tchek occupation of German-speaking parts of Bohemia)— [80] if they wished to go, they might have gone in a fair and decent way, not doing from that instant the greatest injury and heaping the greatest insults on a people with whom they had passed centuries in fellow-countryship, friendly and equitable, where the politician, the speculator and profiteer in national hatred, had not sown discord broadcast. Allowing any discount for patriotic elation, it cannot be denied that at that time, between the armistices and the treaties of 1919, the leading personalities of all these nations instigated the display of vindictive brutality largely to fawn upon public opinion in Paris, London and New York and the leading statesmen gathering in Paris, to bring about the consecration of their grasping of territories by the treaties then under discussion. It is known from documents now that inexact statistics, etc. were supplied, also to what extent the leading statesmen were ignorant and indifferent about the details of all the nationalist claims, were or said they were under the obligation of promises and secret treaties, disposed of territories as compensations for the abandonment of other claims, etc. and before all, how categorically discussions and explanations were scorned. The Vienna Congress of 1814-15, discussing the future map of Europe after the immense territorial change of over twenty years of European wars and Napoleonic regime, was certainly no ideal assembly, but its tendencies were about these: it was neither vindictive nor punitive, it did not wish to ruin nor to humiliate vanquished France, it endeavored to bring about the greatest possible balance of power and to eliminate the causes of contest and superannuated State organisms, and it discussed matters on equal terms with the representative of the new French regime, Talleyrand. Of all this the Paris Conference of 1919 did about the contrary. It was vindictive, punitive, contemptuous in the extreme, it shoveled ruin and humiliation on the vanquished, it created a maximum of power for the winners exclusively, it multiplied the causes of contest and discontent and created new States in abundance, States, too small to live and too large to die and which must expect to thrive on intrigue and on war, and it refused to discuss matters with the representatives of the new republican regimes in Germany, Austria, etc.

Economic chaos, fascism, raving national hatred, ruin and threatening wars are the fruit of eight years' nationalism by virtue of the treaties of 1919. Is it of no concern to anarchists to discuss these problems: for, if this is a moribund society, we are part of it, and who can hope ever to regenerate it, if we all go down with it?

### XIII.

To be quite outspoken on this serious subject socialists, anarchists included are in general attracted by both internationalism and nationalism and [81] and by both peace and war. I except

Proudhon and Tolstoi and am not looking for other exceptions just now, but in the main the very natural and commendable sympathy with humanity, the solidarity with suffering and rebellion leads a warm heart from theoretical internationalism to practical sympathy with national grievances, and if these provoke insurrections, the socialist sympathizer will call for help, for intervention, for war in the cause of right and freedom—and thus contribute to produce wars and then fight such wars to the bitter end. And as the socialist is in almost every case under the influence of the patriotic ideology of his own country, or, if, on principle he mistrusts the official cause of his own country, he is nonetheless fascinated by the ideology, tradition or reputation of some other country, he is most likely to fall in with this or that romantic fiction on the war and be its most sincere, but very naïf upholder—like so many other good people who are not socialists, but who men to act as fair as they can in every matter and who are yet mostly brought to see things in the light of the interested leaders.

All this is inevitable, since we are brought up as worshippers of heroic deeds, rebellions and wars for liberty, and so wee all the previous generations. The Greek and Roman historians and the Bible are ultrapatriotic and teeming with heroes and wars, above all they exercise detrimental influence by their naked, brutal, absolute partiality, teaching their readers to respect only the cause of Israel and Judah and Christianity, of Greeks and Romans, and to feel supreme contempt for all other peoples—Pagans and Barbarians—who are always wrong and must be defeated. This systematic denial of impartiality, seconded by the total absence of easily accessible testimony on the other dies—I am speaking here of the ordinary, antique sources met with in the course of education and private reading, not of the remains of opposite testimony available to specialists,—left a mark on everybody's brain; this method is applied to modern causes as well and always more systematically.

Then the socialist generations of the nineteenth century heard of the American and French Revolutions and revolutionary wars, the Spanish-American wars for independence, the Greek, Polish, Italian, German patriotic insurrections, rebellions, wars, and so on—unbroken continuities often. In fact, the aim of insurgents is always to be recognized as belligerents by friendly States and to help them, their sympathizers call for intervention and this means everything from diplomatic pressure, armed demonstrations, blockade, etc. to war. Both sides operated thus in the nineteenth century; the Italian insurrections and revolutions (Naples) were repressed by Austrian intervention, the Spanish liberal revolution was crushed by the French army, as twenty-five years later, [82] in 1849, the Roman Republic. Liberal and popular cries went up for the intervention of France in the first years of Louis Philippe's regime, since 1830, in Belgium, Poland, Italy and Spain, etc. and the very International founded in London, September 28, 1864, arose out of efforts to call for intervention in favor of the Polish insurrection by England and France. Six years later, 1870, members of the International were active on all sides to help France in the Franco-German war, directly or by calling for English intervention or an expansion of the war by England's and Turkey's declaration of war on Russia. Bakunin and Marx were equally eager in all this and it would be difficult to say who was not. Some years later the Oriental War inspired the most active Russian revolutionists. In every succeeding war socialist sympathies with one of the combatants made them endorse and enjoy the war, if it ended well, witness the Cuban and Filipinos sympathies in the Spanish-American war, the Greek sympathies in the Turco-Grecian War of 1897, the universal Boer sympathies in the South African War, the Japanese sympathies in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the sympathies for the Allied "Crusaders" in the raid of the Balkan States on Turkey, 1912-13, the Entente sympathies in the World War against Germany, Austria and Turkey, etc. In this way the enthusiasm of partisanship smoothed over most of the horror of the dastardly interkilling of men, reciprocal murder, which war never ceases to be. Chivalrous sentiment in favor of one of the parties, considered the more

meritorious, the innocent victim, the wronged hero was stronger than reflection. Will it always be like that among men?

In one sense it will be: sympathies will always be with the weaker side, and rightly so. Only knowledge and intelligence will grow, let us hope so, to be able to determine which is really the weaker side, whether it is not also wrong in many ways, and whether discussion and arrangements cannot better dispose of a quarrel than brute force. In this direction not even the first bona fide steps have been taken in spite of all arbitration treaties and the League of Nations, since all this machinery disposes but of unimportant dissensions which are not worth a war to either party and are ineffective in serious cases, because public sentiment in a serious crisis always craves for war. If public sentiment had its way, wars would be infinitely more frequent than even the most intriguing and blundering statesmen and diplomatists make them, and public sentiment would be led by the nose by the pushful papers. I remember well how in the first months of 1897 the London "Daily Chronicle" egged on the Greeks to make war on Turkey in such an extraordinary way that the war of the spring of 1897 in Thessaly, disastrous to Greece, was called at the time "the Daily Chronicle's War"...

Very seldom advanced public opinion rose in protest against war. A memorable instance was the French radical republicans' (Montagne) and [83] socialists' demonstration of June 13, 1949, in Paris against the war made by the French army on Mazzini and Garibaldi's Roman Republic. This was perhaps the most international demonstration ever held in Paris. I know of course that it was to be a decisive blow at the President Louis Napoleon, the inspirer of the repressive policy in Italy; it failed by lack of popular support, owing to hatred and distrust caused by the slaughter of the proletariat in June 1848, but also, as has been said, because international sympathies demanding the recall of a French army were not understood by the people. Never since that experience have French republicans crossed the national war policy of their country, Proudhon's independent attitude in the years 1859-63 always excepted.

Not before the nineties perhaps another large scale protest against war occurred—I refer to the Italian popular movement against continuing the disastrous war in Abyssinia after the defeat of Adis Abeba [Addis Ababa]; Crispi, the leading statesman, was driven from public life and the war was discontinued. Gladstone's decision not to seek revenge after the Boer victory on Majuba Hill (February 1881), but to wind up the war somehow, was an act of moral courage; twenty years later Joseph Chamberlain had revenged Majuba Hill all the same. The Barcelona workers rose in the summer of 1909 to fight against the departure of troops for Morocco, the Red Week which was followed by Francisco Ferrer's martyrdom—and just now whilst I write this, in April 1927, Spanish fighting in Morocco is still going on. The Tripolitan War of Italy, 1911, produced a few spirited protests by anarchists, sacrificing their freedom, but no real popular antiwar movement. I might refer to strong socialist and radical protests in England during the South African War, to the widespread indifference or hostility of Irish nationalists against England's wars, etc., but on the whole active opposition to war—individual conscientious objectors excepted, as rare in proportion among the peoples, as peaceful Quaker feeling is among the religionists—is yet in a quite incipient stage. Formal socialist protests are printed in papers to "save the face," but very few have the courage to hold out against the popular war current swelled by fanaticism, soothed by grumbling, but unswerving all the same.

Socialist mentality, to use this expression, has three or four very different sources. The first great socialist thinkers, Godwin, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Robert Owen understood socialism to be a universal change of such dimensions and intensity that all must co-operate to bring it about. These men, then, disregarded actions and classes, they knew only humanity and appealed to the best and most willing to set to work. No doubt they underrated the bitter opposition of privilege and authority

against their proposed eviction. [84] In any case they worked for peace and disliked and distrusted the merely political and nationalist upheavals, however popular they were.

A second stratum of socialists came straight from the upheavals just mentioned and were supremely elated revolutionary patriots and advanced democrats and this spirit operated in them when social feeling and insight of the machinery of exploitation made them devoted socialists. Such men were Babeuf and Buonarroti, Blanqui and Marx, Barbès and Louis Blanc, and unquestionably also Bakunin, Reclus, Kropokin and very many other anarchists are, in various degrees, of the same type. They see clearer than the first mentioned that privilege and authority will only cede to force and they welcome the popular awakening expressed by every movement arising from local discontent, be it democratic, national or social. This associates them at important stages of history with the general currents of their country or their nationality. I do not criticize their attitude; I simply state it as a fact. A really international and antiwar attitude throughout their career was impossible to every one of them and they were the intellectual inspirers of nineteenth and twentieth century socialism.

The third stratum is evidently formed by the working classes themselves which are socialist by their position and feel this the moment they begin to reason. Individuals and small sections of them may feel thoroughly international, brothers of their fellow-workers abroad and united by no bond whatever with their exploiters at home. But the vast majority has permitted that their affairs should be managed by the two superstructures of elected political leaders and appointed professional trade organizers, and these, bound by their own interests to give the greatest possible expansion to their parties and organizations, are quite tied up with local, national and State interests and politics, and have always, under all circumstances, endorsed the general currents which lead to the increase of State power, if necessary at the cost of war. The working classes keep up the principle that the worker is not responsible for what he is hired to do and so the preparation of war implements in time of peace and the intensification of this production in time of war is legitimate work in their opinion. What are occasional speeches and articles against war in the face of this incessant work to produce everything, but which ware can alone be carried on? Internationalist professions under such circumstances are not of greater value than professions by capitalists in church, on Sunday mornings, of their fraternity and their good will to all; for bunkum is bunkum, whoever utters it! [85]

Only a fourth very thin stratum of socialists has somehow overcome the sympathies, leanings or indifference to war, proper to the second and third categories and feels by intellect and heart that humanity is superior to nationality, that no power has the right to imprison men into nations, when they want to be citizens of humanity. They are strong enough to admit, when necessary that their country or the country of their predilection is wrong and they really look out for means to constitute humanity. Proudhon, devising the federalist grouping of human units, was one of them; Coeurderoy did the best he could to approach them; Elisée Reclus in his later life, penetrated by an immense understanding of the diversity, yet equivalence of mankind all over the earth, may have been one of them, Leo Tolstoi also. We ignore [do not know(?)] what Proudhon would have done, had he lived in 1870, and Reclus and Tolstoi, had they lived in 1914, but all three had wonderful periods of the most complete solidarity with mankind. Such ideas are men with in many excellent, but less known or more or less private comrades, whilst as many others must always range in the second category above described, more akin to nationality than to humanity.

Thus socialism has up till now done very little to disassociate itself thoroughly from war and by this, as I indicated already in previous chapters, it cut the very roots of its possible future realization. If the earth is the collective property of humanity, it cannot be the individual territory of independent States—just as if the means of production belong to the whole community, they cannot be

the individual property of capitalists, or just as, if you can recognize no God at all, you cannot recognize the personal God proclaimed by this or that religion.

Nationalities have the fullest claim to be respected in their real individualities, which means every attribute, activity, inclination proper and dear to them and not interfering with the same rights of others, but it stands to reason—above all for us who are socialists—that all these qualities will best be developed in social communion with others in the largest possible milieu. The present nationalities have in fact before all survived, because they lived within large States where in former times under ordinary circumstances nobody interfered with them; conflicts arose when they set up claims to break up these countries and to establish independent units. If this is considered to have been and to be the right thing and a liberal and progressive action under all circumstances, then socialists, who admit this, could not object if under a socialist system capitalism were reestablished locally or if any other local appropriation of collective property took place. [86]

Such action is, however, in my opinion, what is usually known as legitimism and which consists in the affirmation of a formal right contradictory to existing progressive evolution. Nationalism as enforced since 1918 is above everything legitimism, the reinforcement of ancient claims, generally considered to be lapsed. I always believe that socialists who want to create a new world, who must pass of the claims of every government and every capitalists to do this, were anything but legitimists, sticklers for historical rights, admitting that because a Roman two thousand years ago put his foot down in this place, a Roman must be reinstalled in power in this place again. This is the Terza Roma,—the Mazzini—and the Mussolini—way of arguing—if what has happened since 1918 in large parts of Europe is recognized as definite solutions by socialists. I cannot see in what they differ from the legitimists and the Third Rome—and I wonder that they should not be still more attracted by a map of Central Europe brought back to the enlightened age of cave dwellers and lacustrian settlers.

Internationalism looks ahead towards a free humanity, nationalism leads back into the dark past and fascism is a foretaste of this retro-evolution. Socialists cannot endorse both, hunt with the huntsman and run with the hare. Indecision on this question means stagnation; partiality, partisanship means complicity, coalescence with the present system. Where collectivism is to prosper, individual Statist appropriation of the earth cannot exist. The roads really divide here and it is time to realize this fully.

#### XIV.

At the present time even the capitalists begin to feel that they made some mistake in permitting Europe to drift into a regime of unfettered nationalism. The bankers' and financiers' Manifesto, A Plea for the Removal of Restrictions upon European Trade (London, October 19, 1926) says in very plain words:

“... It is very difficult to view without dismay the extent to which tariff barriers, special licenses and prohibitions since the war have been allowed to interfere with international trade and to prevent it from flowing in its natural channels. At no period in recent history has freedom from such restrictions been more needed to enable traders to adapt themselves to new and difficult conditions. And at no period have impediments to trading been more perilously multiplied without a true appreciation of the economic consequence involved.” [87]

“The breakup of great political units in Europe dealt a heavy blow to international trade. Across large areas in which the Inhabitants had been allowed to exchange their products freely, a number of new frontiers were erected and jealously guarded by customs barriers. Old markets disappeared. Racial animosities were permitted to divide communities whose interests were inseparably

connected. The situation is not unlike that which would be created if a confederation of states were to dissolve the ties which bind them and to proceed to penalize and hamper, instead of encouraging, each other's trade. Few will doubt that under such conditions the prosperity of such a country would rapidly decline.

"To mark and defend these new frontiers in Europe, licenses, tariff and prohibitions were imposed, with results which experience shows already to have been unfortunate for all concerned. One state lost its supplies of cheap food, and another its supplies of cheap manufactures. Industries suffered for want of coal, factories for want of raw materials. Behind the customs barriers new local industries were started, with no real economic foundation, which could only be kept alive in the face of competition by raising the barriers higher still. Railway rates, dictated by political considerations, have made transit and freight difficult and costly. Prices have risen, artificial dearness has been created. Production as a whole has been diminished. Credit has contracted and currencies have depreciated. Too many states, in pursuit of false ideals of national interest, have imperiled their own welfare and lost sight of the common interests of the world by basing their commercial relations on the economic folly which treats all trading as a form of war."

.....

Every word of these cool constations [observations] of these rich men is true and the consequences which they describe in their effect upon international trade, had he effect of utter ruin and despair, physical and moral depression on the many millions of men, women and children, who are victims and the effect of brutal hardening and callousness on the millions who pass as post-war victors and who, still enjoying their nationalist triumph, see the economic crisis approaching their nationalist paradises. The "substitution of good-will for ill-will, of cooperation for exclusiveness" are other expressions of this Manifesto, among the signatories of which—as printed in The Nation, New York, Nov. 3, 1926—we find four London and Vienna Rothschilds, the governor of New York and no end of prominent men of international capital and finance.

If the tenth part of these men had raised their voice in 1918-19, when the harm was done, and every month or day since, when it constantly increase, they could have saved Europe. Their present constataion [observation], followed by no action on their part, has only the formal value of the enumeration of the causes of death in a postmortem certificate, a document which, as a rule, possesses no power to heal and to revive the dead. [88]

But a lengthy complicity between international (Entente, American and neutral) capitalism and nationalism preceded already the outbreak of the War in 1914 and alone made that War possible. The stakes were the great territories between Western Europe and India, comprising Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Asia Minor, Persia and the Caucasus, indirectly also Russia. These Central and Eastern territories held their own against Anglo-Saxon and allied capital and political power and it was considered a profitable venture to break them up into powerless minor States, a gigantic operation of which Russia, rich in men and in unexploited natural wealth, poor in capital would do her share, crippling herself financially and then also falling under the control of international capitalism. The raids on Turkey by Italy and the Balkan Allies, the Russian and British encroachments on Persia, the resuscitation of the Armenian and Georgian question, the recrudescence of Servian and Austria-Hungarian Slav nationalisms, of Ruthenian Russophilism in Galicia and Northern Hungary, of Italian and Rumanian irredentism, the intensification of Alsatian and Polish opposition on German territory, etc., all these were first skirmishes in the great conflict and financial support by loans, etc. of precisely the most anti-German, anti-Austrian, etc. territories and elements (local national industries, etc.) played not a mean role in all this. In those years the political maxim was definitely formulated in France, and silently endorsed by international capital,

that foreign loans should only be given to friends of the Western cause; this meant the enlistment of capital in the cause of the Western concern.

Conform to these tactics, no national question in these parts was allowed to be settled by mutual arrangement; every question remained open and became a greater sore; there were spikes in every wheel of the German-Austrian-Hungarian-Turkish State machinery. Consequently also the nationalist assassination of the Austrian archduke and his wife by Bosnians on June 28, 1914, became a public matter upon which Austria was under no condition to receive the usual satisfaction; she must be humbled. Every party in this was, so to speak, covered by re-insurance and felt safe. The murderers were backed by the Servian nationalist organization, Russia by the French Alliance, France by the Entente with England, and England, most probably, by informal ties of solidarity with the United States. This phalanx was impregnable and when this became visible after four long weeks of negotiations, Austria-Hungary, seeing that the will to come to an equitable arrangement was absent, nailed her flag to the mast and began to make war on Servia, and Germany, seeing that this did not shake the determination of Russia to fight, declared war on Russia—acts of defense against threatening aggression which were [89] constructed into deliberate assaults upon peace-loving nations....

I hold no brief for archdukes and I may say that there happened no act of violence from social or political motives with which I did not feel sympathy and often solidarity. I have gone farther in this than quite a number of comrades. But I have a repulsion against two types of violent acts—those from mercenary motives (by hirelings or for personal enrichment) and those from purely nationalist motives. I also do not think that irresponsible fanatics always hit the right thing and reserve my right of criticism.

Man stands higher to me than nation or race and to kill a man for his nationality is savagery in any case. How about pogroms? They express nationalist and religious disagreement of Russians, Ukrainians, Rumanians and others with the Jewish race—are they a legitimate expression of nationalism? Not in my opinion. Opinions have differed on this, for the first Russian pogroms in the year 1881 were considered by the foremost militant Russian revolutionists of that time as hopeful signs of social revolt, expected to expand into a general social revolt, and were almost welcomed. I have seen from the documents kept by Paul Axelrod, published in Russian in 1924 (Iz Archive P. B. Axelroda) that at that time he, a Jew, almost alone of the militant revolutionists stood up in protest against the endorsement of the pogroms of 1881. These pogroms, isolated then, led to the widespread black hundred of a generation later, demonstrating that brutality always breeds further brutality, unless stamped out in the beginning. Fascism, of small beginnings, attributed to patriotic elation, in 1919, spread similarly.

Therefore I could not understand in the summer of 1914 and I cannot understand now, that the local incident, the murder of a man and a woman for the sake of their nationality, though it was an unpopular one in the West, was a meritorious act of inviolable sacredness and that the whole Slav East, the Latin South and West Anglo-Saxon and American Universe had to rise to give it protection. I am a German myself and do not feel to have merited for this to be outlawed and killed on sight. This destiny the universal protection given to the nationalist murderers seemed to indicate to the German, Hungarian and Turkish nations and they preferred to this a desperate and hopeless war against overwhelming forces.

Industrial and financial support of the United States before all was from the beginning dispensed to the Allies in such gigantic proportions that, when the war lasted much longer than expected, it became necessary in the interest of these huge investments, to decide it by direct American military intervention, which was done in the summer of 1918. American [90] economic supremacy dates from



these years, but if prosperity in the interior got a very great lift, the European branch of business did not equally succeed. Too much ruin was spread and real business will not thrive under such conditions. America has to invest still more funds in Europe, to keep things going here; whether Europe will revive and these investments ever be profitable, remains to be seen....

Before all the Russian market was lost to a large degree and however we might regret bolshevism as libertarians, we can admit that State capitalism, upheld by dictatorship and a strong army and feeding on the immense natural resources of Russia and Siberia, can show the teeth to international capitalism, drive hard bargains with it and often pull its nose. It can also spread unrest in India, China and other British and international markets and spheres of domination or influence.

Against the bolshevist front international capitalism has to maintain at no small cost a thin front of new States or war-expanded States, Finland, Estland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Greece, Palestine, Syria, the Arabian countries, Mesopotamia—galvanizations or improvisation of States mostly with little other good purpose (from the standpoint of capitalism, not that of nationalism) than to wall off Russia from the sea (Baltic), to engage also Turkey and to separate Russian from Germany, further to be a “military frontier” against Russia and a landing stage for armies and war material from oversea. The political life of these States presents every variety of open or veiled dictatorship, military rule and fascist proclivities or subservience to foreign dictation. Their economic life is characterized by extreme protect and a hothouse forcing of national industries which will not thrive. But these States understand very well that they are considered to be of some use to capitalism in the way described and they and their leading businessmen are experts in securing foreign loans, long credits, investments of capital, and so they keep all going as satellites of international capital.

In the same way the countries Tchecoslovakia and Yugoslavia and the wicked countries Austria and Hungary absorb foreign loans and investments, and Italy and France are not in too great a hurry about the settlement of their war debts, etc. The economically normal countries Switzerland, Holland, the Scandinavian States and Spain are indeed an oversmall remnant of European markets and England with so much and chronic unemployment, Germany with poverty and overpopulation, and [91] so many other European countries are rivaling with American exporters everywhere.

Italy even beings to set up the fascist economic system, of which the compulsory organization of all strata of society and the Chart of Labor, resolved upon by they Great Fascist Council on April 21, 1927 give a foretaste. The Fascist State would realize the economic ideal of medieval clericalism, a society in which every one under strictest discipline fulfills a certain social function and is kept in passive obedience to a supervising class. The Jesuits organized the Indians in their Paraguayan mission in this way and a similar tendency perverted the Russian Revolution into the Bolshevist State. This is a queer disappointment for Italian capitalism, much more so for international capital which this system wishes to drive out of business in Italy (loans excepted). The Jesuit Fathers and the Paraguayan Indians, the Bolshevist Commissaries and the Russian people, the Fascist State and the Italians will indeed be on a par....

Germany in spite of all disasters and the complete ruin of all who, in 1923, after the Ruhr invasion by the French army, could not transform their money into real property, when the money standard sank to 1/1000,000,000,000 of its value, is not reduced to absolute submission in the complete way which would give satisfaction and full profits to international capitalism. Somehow it is not thrown into one of the melting pots, that of dismemberment, that of bolshevism, that of fascism, that of complete foreign control. Somehow, it weathers all storms, though undergoing immense physical and moral deterioration by continued undernormal conditions of life for the great portion of the population. Somehow this suffering means perhaps a hardening and training, advantageous as it

promotes efficiency, destructive, alas, of the feeling of human solidarity, as no people—the Jews in times of hardest persecutions perhaps excepted—has ever stood alone and stands alone to this degree confronted by universal enmity. This tragedy is by no means over and its further stages cannot be foreseen. Foreign capital, then, finds that an old rival is not yet quite extinct, though the German inner markets lost their buying power for imports.

International capitalism meets also with the novel disappointment that the subject races of other continents wish to throw off its yoke and that of colonial and similar costly and tyrannical administrations. The oppressed native races gave voice to their opinion at their Congress held in Brussels in February 1927. The Syrian, Rif and Javan revolts, Egyptian sweltering unrest, Indian and Cambodian discontent are light breezes compared to the storm gathering in China and it is curious that when the Chinese crisis may still be in an initial stage, just now, in April 1927, the collapse of [92] the banks in imperialist Japan, a country now governed in the most reactionary spirit, takes such proportions.

This struggle for independence in these faraway countries and colonies has for its strongest basis nationalism, the desire for national States where national capitalism would be developed on the harsh, exclusive principles in vogue in European nationalist States of 1918-19. This tendency prevails also in China, since socialism is known only in its least attractive, the bolshevist form. These developments, then, mean another setback to international capitalism—unless, as it is doing up til now, it keeps its ground by the bloodiest slaughter by armies and bombardment by warships and aircraft—but they mean also a loss for socialism which has been too late, which had nothing to tell to these poor peoples, which may produce parliamentary parties in new States, but can give no help, as it is helpless itself.

So international capitalism by the alliance with nationalism since about the middle of nineties, the Cecil Rhodes period, has—as far as my impression goes—not reaped all the profits expected. It smashed up four large countries refractory to Anglo-American control—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey,—but it killed its own markets and installed unsolid concerns in their place with minimal buying power and great want of capital. It may go on lending this capital, but situations like that in Russia and China may confront it someday everywhere. This perpetuates armaments and creates unemployment, chronic even in England. American capitalism looks already in other directions—Asia beyond the Pacific where Japan, China and Russia call out: hands off,—and Spanish speaking America which, I believe, is no so capable of capitalist development and profitable exploitation as appearances lead to expect. In any case a unique all-powerful capitalism, that of the United States obtaining supremacy, has not much greater chances to continue, than the multiple capitalisms developing in the years up to 1914 would have had, if the war had not scattered and enfeebled them. But humanity would have quite other chances of progress, if the useless disaster of 1914 had not been made inevitable.

At present capitalism makes desperate efforts by military coercion, by grasping the scattered accumulations of mineral wealth and valuable raw material in the outlying weak countries, oil and caoutchouc, coal and the water power of the Nile in the Sudan. It organizes international trusts, at least locally in Europe, it intensifies production by the organization of manual work (the Taylor system, team work, chainwork, etc.) and by systematic simplification of the whole machinery of production and distribution (rationalization) and, as it has the pick of the workers who organizations are [93] awakened everywhere, it eliminates the weak and trains the strong to higher efficiency. The hand of the State is heavier too; the old liberal claims for personal freedom are a matter of the past—war autocracy, fascism and the bolshevist example given by socialists themselves have made freedom an empty word today.

Will international capitalism by and by resort to yet another means to keep its ground? I refer to the rationalization methods in industry and trade which often imply the shutting up of unprofitable concerns, preferring to write off a loss to seeing it constantly increase. Some day the new European States might be rationalized too, when after a settlement of some sort with Russia, possibly even with Germany, the present advisability to maintain a costly row of bullies and bogies will no longer be recognized. Then the axe may wield [weed?] out the less viable nationalist States. Then also capitalism may have learned to deal on equal terms with Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, Mexican and other foreign capitalisms.

By these anticipations I mean to demonstrate that capitalism is not necessarily played out by its own decline and incapacity, as many socialist think. It is in possession and can hold out and recover, if the State remains there to defend it and labor is willing to nourish and to increase it.

What has labor done, indeed, since 1914 to shake and overthrow capitalism? It has in absolutely every country supported the course of the State and of Capital to the bitter end—for a few thousand who protested, weigh nothing against the many millions who acted as ordinary patriots. It has permitted the general Russian Revolution to glide into the hands of usurpators who introduced the most authoritarian, incompetent and repulsive form of socialism, discrediting the noble idea in Russia and by their propaganda in every other country—very tardily met by efficient criticism which, in fact, social democrats, authoritarians themselves, are unable to produce and which libertarians, led away by generous fascination, also too long abstained from expressing openly. Socialism has, in the new countries, endorsed nationalism to an incredible degree; it excelled in place-hunting and government-mongering in the ruined countries, where local capitalism was in straits. It missed the wonderful Italian opportunities of the years 1919 and 1920 and overlooked the growth of Fascism at its side, since 1919, until it was too late to crush the head of the viper. Today in Europe the socialist parliamentary parties are afraid of the communists and feel at home among the bourgeois and officialdom. The communists, comprising what is left of the old real socialists, are hopelessly under the sway and spell of Moscow. The large labor organizations are mostly placed in a defensive position by the chronic crisis and are led by a bureaucracy of moderates. Not one of these parties and organizations is a serious [94] threat to capitalism today and for one organization of defying tendency like that the English miners in 1926, there are ten or more bent on extinguishing the sparks of revolt, on moderation and on compromise.

Every worker, all socialists have passed through or been contemporaries of tremendous events since 1914, in general they saw that things moved quicker, passions rose higher, changes were large, States collapsed and others were created, tsarism went down and a socialist regime seemed to spring up as if by magic, then personal freedom went down and Fascism rose sky high—self-preservation, of ducking under to let the storm pass, of intellectual and moral exhaustion, wishing only to return to the old routine, of indifference also and a turn of vulgarity.

This may have been inevitable. Easy achievements are imitated and spread; from grave events people turn away. The French events of 1789-1791, of 1830, or 1848 met with sympathy and imitation; from the grave events of 1792-94, 1848 after June, 1871 most people turned away. Great events remain solitary, simply because great local causes determine their size and intensity and such exceptional propulsion does not exist elsewhere and cannot be improvised. So also in European and mondial [worldwide] socialism the quickest possible return to routine was the rule, efforts of action, in Germany, in Hungary remained isolated and failed, and in Italy and Spain where the greatest fervor existed, they did not even begin.

Elsewhere to an incredible extent socialists plunged into party routine and party polemics. In these quick moving times, indeed, socialist and syndicalist inner polemics are the only stable point,

although this point is not exactly acquiring importance in the Archimedian sense; the present system will not be overturned by resting the lever on these accumulations of conservative spirit! Immortal discussions for and against individualism, organization, proletarian dictatorship, Marxism or Leninism and the past and present life, doings, misdoings, shortcomings, etc. of increasing quantities of prominent leaders—all this is the quintessence of socialist life in time like ours.... I cannot except anarchists and syndicalists from this charge. Men like Proudhon, Bakunin, Reclus, Kropotkin would have spoken up in such a time, feeling the necessity of new studies, new criticism, new counsel to take place before their comrades and the world at large; Bakunin would have been indefatigable in plans of action and in bringing people together for such purposes. The present generation possesses no such men; it does not much care to look the situation in the face, it is content with clichés, routine criticism, routine polemics, routine theories work out many years ago. If there are exceptions, so much the better; they are not very conspicuous anywhere, as far as [95] my vision reaches. I respect and admire the quiet patience of many who work under great difficulties, but they feel themselves that this is not enough. Somehow we have failed to establish that contact with modern life which had existed in previous times when the movements were ever so much smaller. What was written then, struck the people of that time and its mere repetition must not necessarily also strike the people of our time. We must touch resounding chords in the people of our time and this is insufficiently done, in my opinion at least, because we are ourselves somewhat reluctant to take position on the most market problems of our age.

For that reason I have dwelled so much on the actual state of things in Europe, as I see it, and on the origins and causes of the crises (chapters VIII-XIV). If others see all this in quite another light, let them say so. In that case we must also arrive at quite other conclusions on many matters. I may have been too bitter in my remarks, though I weighed my words and some of my statements may appear abrupt, as space does not permit to give chapter and verse for every detail. Besides we are all brought up in different milieus, mentally fed by different books and papers and personal impressions. But on the whole it will be seen, that I hold nationalism—the State—war and internationalism—Free Society—peace to be irreconcilably opposed to each other and evolving in opposite directions, the former backward, the latter forward, and all my sympathies are with the latter. In consequence the present triumph of nationalism is to me not something which I welcome or to which I might become resigned at least: it is something which I consider a detrimental set-back, an absolutely reactionary event. I should cease to be a socialist in my own estimation, if I welcomed an increase of the number of capitalists, an intensification of capitalist appropriation—I should equally cease to be an anarchist, if I welcomed an increase of the number of States, an intensification of Statism, of authority. This has been the direct result of every arrangement made since the end of the War, 1918,—arrangements which were and are inspired by the spirit of the War. I cannot welcome, accept, endorse, tacitly admit anything of this. I have no sympathy with the financial profiteers of the war and not a whit more with the nationalist and Statist profiteers of the War, the new politicians, the new bureaucracies. I recognize that the harm done cannot be undone immediately, but there is a wide difference between considering this harm and blessing and a progress, between acquiescing to it with equanimity and indifference and between declining to give it any countenance whatever and striving for internationalism, anarchism [96] and peace as I am doing.

The words of Henri Barbusse at the Brussels Congress of oppressed nationalities in colonies and other continents are recorded thus: “Nonetheless it is a fact that national independence is the first stage of human independence.” This is the glittering outside, the fallacious appeal to sentiment, equal in my opinion in fallacy to affirmation like: private property is the first stage of collective property, or: the State is the first stage of Anarchy, or: a single God is the first stage of Atheism. No, these two

things are direct opposites in each case. Social co-existence and federation—these are really the first stages of human independence, and the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Switzerland, the small country where four nations live in peaceful communion, and even former Austria where eight or nine nationalities lived side by side for centuries—these are or were the first installments of national sociability, the root of coming internationalism. Institutions realizing social solidarity—these are the forerunner of collective property, and scientific knowledge and methods—these show the way to the complete elimination of the God-fiction.

Therefore as we decline State socialism and bolshevism, as we decline Fascism, Capitalism and all that—do we decline or endorse Nationalism? That is the question which will decide whether we, as anarchists, have a real message to give to the world, telling it, how by mutual respect of freedom, federation and solidarity it might evolve in the direction of a free society—as Proudhon did—or whether we will be content to drift in the wake of every nationalist current: these poor people cry for a national State! Let us help them! Perish everything, lest they be deprived of their cherished independent State! .... In that case we really need not call ourselves anarchists, if we give our moral countenance to every foundation of a new State and we should only look foolish, if afterwards we established the fact that we are disappointed, that the new States are not better than the old ones.... So I say once more: are we with Proudhon and federalism and internationalism or are we with Mazzini and the national State of unlimited ambitions and expansiveness of the Third Rome type, an ideology admirably incarnated in Benito Mussolini? Are we, then, Federalists, Internationalists, Men of Peace and Goodwill to all—or are we countenancing those nationalist currents that lead under many disguises to Fascism, Imperialism and the perpetuation of national hatred and of war? Let everyone go his own way, but let him understand at least that he cannot go both ways and that it is only fair to his comrades to speak up on this important matter and make the decision known openly. Otherwise there remains the present indecision, vagueness and stagnation of opinions which threatens to make the effects of the splendid libertarian idea on mankind a negligible quantity. [97]

## XV.

If I attribute vital importance to the clear understanding of the anti-human character of nationalism, I do this also because its anti-social character is the most direct obstacle to the realization of any socialism worth that name. For Statism implies the enforcement of the principle that all the natural resources and advantages within the State boundaries belong to their individual owners, local or foreign, unless the State, by legislation, stipulates some rights of its own. Socialism demands that these resources should become collective property, but it does not expressly say of whom?—of the particular workers who make this natural wealth available for ready consumption—of the collectivity of the particular workers in all countries—or of humanity, the inhabitants of all countries, as a whole? Of course I have in view the exceeding quantities of products which cannot possibly be locally consumed—the coal, the iron, the oil, the wheat of countries where such commodities of general necessity are extracted or harvested in superabundance.

The capitalist, the Statist, the nationalist thesis is evidently that such wealth strictly belongs to the territory where it is extracted or produced, and since socialism of the electioneering and trade-unionist type is dependent on the votes or membership of large local masses, it evidently adheres to this thesis, since it would risk to lose voters or members, if it did not always give preference to local and national claims over international and human claims.

But which is the position of real socialist, anarchist, syndicalists on this question?

Mineral wealth, fertile soil, tropical products, coal and oil, advantages for navigations (seaports, navigable rivers), climatic advantages, etc., all constitute smaller or larger local monopolies and their distribution, always unequal, has been completely upset since 1918. Everybody knows that e.g. Austria-Hungary never possessed colonies and that Germany, the latest comer in this respect, only possessed a few African and Indonesian colonies from the early eighties to the beginning of the war, when communication with them became impossible, and that they were all formally taken away by the peace treaty of 1919. Also, that the new frontiers of 1918-19, said to be determined by national "self-determination," also determined by historical claims and strategical considerations, were also largely determined by such economic interests, being meant to include all that was valuable from nationalist, historical, strategical and economic reason, besides including compensations for not taking more, recompenses, etc. In this way agricultural [98] terrain was taken, rocks were left, mines and access to the sea were taken, territory without mineral wealth was left, etc. The League of Nations divided German Upper Silesia from such considerations, disregarding the results of the plebiscite between Germans and Poles. Then again in those years when all German property in most oversea countries had been seized and the industrial buying power of that country was at the lowest possible ebb, the natural wealth scattered in all quarters of the globe was largely secured by American, English, Dutch and other international capital, buying up the oil deposits, the caoutchouc forests, everything of value in Mexico, Columbia, etc., bringing all under the control of international finance, protected by the army and navy of their powerful States, always ready for punitive expeditions and occupation of unlimited durations, as many of the small American States know by large experience. All this means that these natural resources, indispensable to all civilized countries in an ever increasing degree—or the rich countries would not scramble for their possession—are not distributed and redistributed not only in the old haphazard way, but in a distinctly vindictive and spoliating way, excluding the vanquished European States from absolutely everything abroad and taking as much as possible of natural wealth situated on their own territory from them. Inequality, existing at all times in this domain, has thus been tremendously increased and if it is the characteristic of the proletarian that the raw materials and the instruments of production do not belong to and are inaccessible to him, the vanquished European State have been made semi-proletarian countries as a whole, since the raw materials are taken from them to a very large degree and only the tools to work on such raw materials, dearly bought abroad, are left to them. This increases the price of their product and excludes exports or, if the prices are lowered for the sake of competition, it reduces the workers' wages and imposes a permanent lower standard of living on them. What is the worth of international solidarity-professions, if the socialists of the richer countries have nothing to say to this, except—what is usually done—to grumble that prohibitive measures are not taken to exclude this dearly paid competition of the poor countries altogether?

The origins of this problem date from the most remote past. The little numerous earliest tribes could select their hunting and fishing territories, grazing grounds and agricultural land with relative ease; rearrangements by force relegated the weaker tribes to forests and mountains. Mineral wealth was inaccessible except where it lay quite open or near the surface; gold and precious stones and ore and other minerals of such deposits, worked into ornaments, weapons, implements and tools, were [99] circulated by trade routes and exchanges for local produce. No doubt some time later the value of such deposits, including also salt, was fully recognized and influenced territorial politics, but their real value was not known, and the land was mainly settled according to the distribution of agricultural land, forests, rivers and ports, trade-routes, the exigencies of defense, etc. America was first occupied with regard to centers where gold and silver could best be exacted from the aborigines; then tropical products, plantations, the fur trade, then the northern European peasants' craving for

farm lands were the dominant distributive factors of settlements. Only steam navigation and railroads, Californian gold (1849), machinery and Pennsylvanian coal intensified the economic development and then, within the very last one, two or three generations, transport facilities, inland and for exports, made the rapid exploitation of all natural resources possible—then wheat and minerals, machinery and raw materials of every kind and finished commodities, produced under the most favorable conditions, disposing of the immense inner market and of every transport facility for export, founded America's unique wealth and raised the standard of living incommensurably. This permits successful competition for natural resources in other parts of America and on other continents. British colonial expansion took such gigantic proportions since the seventeenth century that immense natural resources are under British control, others are under that of Russia, of the Latin American States and of France, etc.

This natural wealth is exploited on purely capitalist principles, for the private profit of individuals and with hardly any regard for its inevitable rapid exhaustion. The afforestation problem is a reminder of this and even the coal mining industry of England begins to suffer by the smaller or more costly output of the old mines; this was at the bottom of the long strike of 1926 and fresh difficulties may arise in the summer of 1927. This question took already a social aspect, as the State was called upon to make up the loss of the unprofitable old mines. So the rich countries will also be confronted by this great problem, since their resources, if they sell them in the greatest possible quantities, are evidently diminishing and a time must come when they would prefer to husband these resources to scattering them for mere profit. But what will be the fate of the poor countries when this prohibition or reduction of such exports will necessarily happen? Central Europe had this experience during the famine blockade beginning in 1914 and scarcely over by 1922-23.

The sooner this question is under full discussion, the better; for if solidarity is absent in a time when no acute crisis threatens, how can it be expected to originate in a later period when threatened exhaustion will promote greed and ruthless selfishness? The problem for socialists will be: [100] will they side with the local capitalists and the State or with the producers and consumers of all other countries, with humanity? Will they increase inequality and perpetuate it or will they lay the foundations of real equality and make genuine socialism possible? If they protect local privilege, they must wish for a strong State, to protect monopolies and this implies the perpetuation of States, armies and wars, the establishment of a hierarchy of strong and weak, rich and poor States and the negation of solidarity, of free socialist co-operation all over the globe, of coming Anarchy.

I am very far from raising this question from the standpoint of an unlimited communism. I am ready to admit and, in fact, to proclaim the incompatibility of communism with the distribution of products of which no clear abundance exists. This need not interfere with minor inner distributive arrangements agreeable to local units, but materials existing in limited quantities like every old natural accumulation, cannot be wasted indiscriminately as capitalism is wasting them for profit's sake. So the most equitable distributive arrangements would of course be made.

One memorable effort to give another solution to this problem has been made; I refer to Peter Kropotkin's Nineteenth Century articles from 1888 to 1890 and 1900, printed in book form as Fields, Factories and Workshops (London, 1901), to his French articles on Agriculture (1890-91), etc. He advocated the decentralization of industry and of agriculture, the spreadth of industrial production to every part of the globe and similarly the general distribution of agriculture. The Industrial Village of the Future and Brain Work and Manual Work, the titles of two of the articles, present his aims which comprise of course that exercise of both intellectual and manual work by the harmoniously developed man and worker of a free society which Bakunin and other socialists equally advocated,

with the exception of those early authoritarians and more recent positivists who wished to see the common herd governed by a superior class of the wisest!

It appear to me that, whilst it may be mechanically possible, to convey machinery, proper earth, manure, shelter and fuel to almost every place and to create, like in a laboratory, conditions necessary for production, the quantities of effort and cost and output will be so different that inequality is inevitable and in most cases must remain permanent. Such inequality and incertitude would be supported by a limited number of devoted socialists and, if this happened at the end of a long period of socialist solidarity, almost by everybody, but I cannot imagine that after a revolutionary victory a free society could be started [101] on the basis of such inequality. For during all the preparatory stage and when production begins as well, the local effort required would always differ, consequently the standard of life would vary and true social life could not unfold itself. Most likely products produced under more favorable conditions, agricultural produce of the southern fertile soil, heated by the real sun, would penetrate all the same in the territories of local small machinery and hothouse or glass-covered vegetation and discourage the painful local efforts. So I cannot consider this proposal as dispending socialists from grappling with the problem under discussion in this chapter.

A partial solution, and in general a measure which socialists, if they claim to be internationalists, must accept unconditionally, would consist in unlimited immigration which naturally would be directed to the most favorable territories. This would reduce the quantities of raw materials which have to be transported.

The right of all to adequate portions of all localized and limited natural resources ought to be the common demand of socialists of all shades; for whichever variety of socialism will be more generally realized some day, it will always need the greatest possible accessibility of all scattered natural wealth, its greatest possible preservation from capitalist waste and rooted solidarist feelings which the emphatic affirmation of such a demand would rouse. If socialists prefer local interests to these claims of human solidarity, they are in my opinion akin to the local monopolists and fit in with the nationalist, later on fascist State ready to defend these local monopolies. Here, as on the subject of nationalism, the roads divide—nation or humanity, local monopoly or nature's wealth to all. It may be unwelcome to many to face this problem, but there is no way out.

## XVI.

One of the most fatal qualities of the authoritarian socialist is the craving for dictatorship. Common sense tells us that an unprecedented, untried idea may well circumscribe her principles and propose a number of demands and suggest means and methods, but that it cannot claim to know and to lay down the royal road to realization. On the all-important subject of socialism any number of proposals exist, of which some have been eliminated as quite worthless by discussion or [102] have been abandoned, whilst no amount of discussion could convince one of the two great groups, the authoritarian and the anti-authoritarian that it is wrong. The former, socialism dictate and superintended from above, comprehends Blanquists and Marxists (bolshevists and social democrats) —the latter, socialism built up from its composing parts and remaining under their control, Anarchism, Syndicalism, Co-operation and every form of voluntary socialist association, are irreconcilable as such, and experience will decide which of the two principles will most generally prevail and to what extent.

The Russian Revolution of March 1917, the result of a hundred years' revolutionary effort by all shades of radical opinion and of the extraordinary situation created by a long war which continued to



last for nearly a year longer, was the first revolution in history during which the different socialist parties rapidly gained an ascendancy over the bourgeois democrats and in which great masses of workers were actively determined not to recognize further the capitalist appropriation of almost everything, whilst the peasants in enormous masses took the land of the great landowners for their own use. For the first time all socialist, the workers and the peasants had an immense territory all to themselves; the soldiers wished only to disband and to return home, and the bourgeois and officers were powerless, reduced to intrigue for foreign interventions, to emigrate or to make armed invasions from abroad which popular armies, cheerfully defending their liberated country, repelled. The situation was complicated by the determination of very many socialists, anarchists also, to continue the war. The bolshevists, in power since November 1917, ended the war in the early months of 1918 by the peace treaty concluded at Brest-Litovsk. On this subject we are, or I am, at least, insufficiently informed, namely, to what extent the belief or the rumor that the bolshevists were willing to end the war by all means, whilst all other parties and groups, Keranski, Plekhanoff, the Social Revolutionists (S. R.), Kropotkin, etc. were for the continuation of the war,—that what extent, then, this belief or expectation had weight with the less warlike rank and file of the parties and the people in general, to permit the bolshevists to usurp dictatorial power and to be thus the first socialist party which used physical, governmental coercion against all other parties.

For the present subject the immediate circumstances of their rise to power are indifferent; the fact is uncontestable that one fraction of socialists interpreted by successful force the realization of socialism as the realization of their own personal opinions on socialism and employed, as a right of conquest or as a duty to their opinions [103] every means of coercion, including the worst types of persecution, ending in physical ruin by prison, or in death, against all other socialists who do not retract their opinions or linger on in some corner in dumb silence as outcasts.

Very likely a triumphant social democracy would do the same thing; if they control 100 votes in an assembly and other parties but 99, by this one vote they assume full governmental power and the 99, even if all of them were communists or other socialists, would be powerless.

Is, then, socialism in its forms of realizations, upon which everything is yet quite absent, doomed to take exactly the form which a dictatorial party by a coup d'Etat or the momentary majority of voters or of elected wish and are able to give it?..... This monstrous absurdity is the fine flour of scientific Marxism, the culmination of authoritarian socialism. In reality it is a rehash of the oldest and, in fact, the unique method of governing: the will of the government is the law before which all must incline, be this government a tsar, a parliamentary majority or a sovietish hierarchy.

Socialism was better advised at the time of the Commune of Paris, 1871. There were sovietish dictatorial forces hard at work then; the Central Committee of the National Guard which seized power on March 18, was essentially such an organization and would have liked nothing better than to keep that power. It had however to admit the election of the Commune (March 26), comprising socialists and advanced republicans of all shades, soon ranged as majority and minority, but still working together to the bitter end and inaccessible to dictatorial intrigues which the jealousy of the Comité central fomented. Commonsense and mutual loyalty made these manifold socialists triumph over every authoritarian intrigue and meet death with the same courage, Delescluze and Rigault, and Vermorel and Varlin... From 1871 to 1917, what a moral and intellectual downfall!

After these two great experiences it is time for all socialists, the authoritarians included, to say what they really wish to do: is socialism a mere party matter to them, enforced by one party that happens to snatch power somehow and that henceforth represses and crushes all other socialists outside its own ranks, or is it the greatest task imaginable before all of us, to which we all, and the great world outside our socialist milieus, can expect to contribute but mites in most cases? In the

latter case a method ought to be devised, to make social revolutions differ from pandemoniums of socialist parties out of which the most brutal or the most canny emerge as victorious usurpers, just as Bonaparte by the coup d'Etat of the second of December 1851, strangled the Republic of 1848 and founded the second Empire, just as Mussolini by the march on Rome, November 1922, usurped supreme power in Italy, etc.—Is this [104] usual method of Greek tyrants, medieval Italian condottieres, political generals in recent times, the method of socialists or is it not?

Is the morrow of a social revolution again to see the deadly rivalries and struggles of socialists among themselves, ending in usurpation by one party? In that case either such revolutions will no more happen, because commonsense of the people will shrink from them: today already the communist appeals meet with apathy or indignation, because almost everybody prefers even the present misery to their social autocracy. Or, if revolutions by a concurrence of circumstances do happen, all socialist parties, today separated and fighting each other on paper, would then be militant organisms of aggression and defense, distrustful and rivaling, a sullen, cheerless, hateful milieu, mildew on socialist enthusiasm, and a new society would start life under conditions exactly opposite to commonsense, much less to eugenics (the best possible conditions.) Who dares to admit that he wishes for this? And yet, nobody seems willing to give a thought, to lift a finger, to prevent it!

I have several times raised this question and suggested a way out, in English, French, Spanish and Swedish anarchist or syndicalist publications, never meeting with a reply. I can but propose my ideas once more here, in independent form. I suggest that socialists of all shades, organized labor, associates for any socially progressive purpose, intellectuals and humanitarians, all should agree upon a modus vivendi in the case of revolutionary events and after these on the basis of their common firm determination: no more dictatorship.

The means to carry this in practice would be: mutual tolerance between all not aggressive and invading tendencies and mutual solidarity against aggressive and invading tendencies and elements.

As two things cannot be in the same place at the same time, and as everybody holds to his own opinions, the monopoly of one section would be detrimental to all others. Such an enforced monopoly proves nothing for the value of an idea or does anybody pretend that, because in November 1917 the then local situation permitted the bolshevists to usurp power,—granting even, purely for argument's sake, that in that month they were the most efficient party available then—this proves anything for the value of their ideas in 1918, 1919 and every succeeding year? Power may be transmitted from year to year or by heredity, as it is void of contents, the mere mechanism of force; is wisdom also transmissible, hereditary? A satirical German proverb has it so: “to whom God gives an office, to him he also gives intelligence.” Governmentalism knows nothing better [105] than this; socialism ought to, if it is worth its mettle.

Mutual tolerance would require that every social section should beforehand be sure to obtain an adequate portion and sphere of action—aside of all other sections—of land, raw materials, means of production within the socially emancipated parts of the globe. There it would realize its own ideal of social life, no more disturbed by other social organisms, than the study or laboratory of a scientist today is by the studies and laboratories of all other scientists. Or as I, as a freethinker, take no notice today of church and chapel in neighboring streets, nor do they take notice of me. I am equally conscious of being surrounded by conservatives and liberals, social democrats and communists, and though they enforce their will on the community by their votes, they really leave me and each other alone on such matters in daily life and in most cases their relations are regulated by many other motives—friendship, personal respect, interest, etc.—than party feeling. Almost everybody regulates his conduct on the basis of sociability, good humor or strict reserve and non-interfering privacy—very few parade through life as fighting cocks and these are ultimately considered a nuisance by

everybody of good sense and good taste. The idea suggested is therefore within the normal human current of sociability and opposes anti-social tendencies, which can never be those of real socialists.

Of course it will be objected that the repartition of social resources and spheres of action will be very difficult, and also that many institutions and functions of general use cannot either be divided or multiplied. All this is quite right, but could be overcome by commonsense and fairness. I suggest that such institutions and functions be neutralized, at least in the beginning, and that, as a general principle, debatable questions should be adjourned by the consent of all, to be discussed and settled or adjourned again at later dates, when experience, tranquilization of passions and increasing prosperity and solidarity will promote better solutions, than rapid decisions in the incipient stages of a free society.

This also is not a novelty. It is true that the present years rather narrow the spheres of humanization and of neutralization, and the recent memoire of the United States to the preparatory commission (Geneva) of the Conference on Disarmament, refusing any interference with chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare and the fabrication of such products, is an example of it. But there was a time when the international Red Cross was founded to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded, there are general strikes, during which hospitals, the water service, etc. are [106] not interfered with, the ponies in mines are usually rescued during even the most embittered strikes, in short tendencies to exempt or protect the weakest in hard conflicts exist and socialists would never be so callous to disregard or disavow them, but would wish to extend this sphere. The Society of Friends relieving famine in the stricken regions of Central Europe in the first post-war years, when the strongest forces and influences were active in continuing virtually the blockade, is the finest example of such effort.

After a social revolutions, then, many objects of general utility, neutral by their very essence, the product of past and present, the property of municipalities or of collectivities of shareholders, as a rule, therefore seldom identified with any particular capitalists,—objects like roads, sewers, water works, water power and other works producing force for lighting, machinery, etc., means of transport, the hygienic department, the mines, libraries and secular educational establishments, parks and preserved forests, etc.—all these would well be neutralized, that is conducted on the line of the greatest technical efficiency under the best conditions of labor.

For these are objects of vital importance, requiring permanent technical perfection and punctuality and it is absolutely everybody's interest to see them in fit condition, uninterrupted. Their normal function is hardly noticed, whilst their interruption produces at once discomfort and damage. It will be a serious matter to provide against a degeneration of these technical organisms into objects under the influence of Statist, municipal, bureaucratic, monopolist and other anti-social tendencies, but such means ought to be found and will be found, when the purpose will not be, as today or under dictatorship, to capture them, but, on the contrary, to protect them against capture. The technical staff will best enjoy independence and the workers will share the social life of the diverse communities where they choose to live and feel as men ready to do their share of very useful work and not as gasworkers or petty officials in a permanent state of discontent and trying to make their collective power felt or to be trampled upon and be ruthlessly fleeced, if they remain passive. This state of excitement will cease and the free worker of the future will be a normal man again.

The incipient state of a free society would consist of large or small associations, continuing previous trade unions and syndicates, socialist bodies, anarchist groups, co-operative societies, etc. or started afresh by people agreeing on similar lines of activity, all federated or autonomous, as they desire. By and by all would find a milieu attractive [107] to them. The indifferent, the backward, the sceptik, the former bourgeois, the least social elements, those whom dictatorial methods keep in

bitter enmity, would live by themselves in little advanced communities, unable to do harm to the free communities at their side; at least their children would probably join the more social life around them. Socialist fanatics, the high priests of Marx and Lenin, would worship their gods in chamber; the main parts of the free society would enjoy such freedom and comfort that invitations to establish dictatorial rule would be met with smiles. If the affirmations by Marx and all others that dictatorship is to be provisional only and that society, not the State, will follow next, are sincere, the fanatics would see that this state of things has precisely been realized with no need for their "provisional" period of purgatory. This may transform some of them into social beings again; about the others we need not care—the common wish "no dictatorship" will take the sting out of them.

Will anything of all this ever happen? Some day it will, for it is the only way out, but whether during the next revolutionary developments or only after terrible experiences, of which bolshevism and fascism may only be the initial stages, who can tell?

Religion always practiced spiritual dictatorship—the unconditional submission to the faith and customs, to sacrifice and taboo within the tribe were succeeded in more skeptical ages by the regime of the stake, the inquisition, the religious crusades and wars up to the seventeenth century and as late as 1766 the young Chevalier de la Barre was burned on the stake in Paris, at a time when Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau flourished already. But still the middle of the eighteenth century saw the expansion of earlier freethought and the priests were since that time unable to assert their previous power in many parts of Europe. Their influence on peoples' minds is not gone—this is quite another subject. But their claws are cut, their vindictiveness must look for subtler means now than the dungeons of the Inquisition. Freethought is not universal—the more the pity!—but the priests have learned to behave just a little. Whatever they say or write is nothing to those outside their flocks. Things are certainly still very bad and not improving in these authoritarian times, but in comparison to two, three, four centuries ago there is progress; religious people, skeptics, freethinkers do live side by side, which formerly was considered sacrilegious or impossible.

Socialism evolved in a somewhat similar way to Christianity. The early great socialists, Saint-Simon and Fourier, Godwin and Robert Owen correspond to the ideal age of primitive Christianity with humanitarian and communitarian tendencies. The hierarchic period of the great Councils, the fixation of dogmas, the organization of Popedom, and the scholastic period of the middle ages have a parallel [108] in later authoritarian and dogmatic socialism, Marxism, followed by the scholastic period of the Kautskys and the Bernsteins and so many others, until a very militant period set in with Lenin and the bolshevists, against whom the social democrats held their own in other countries by using more subtle methods—just as militant Catholicism of the Jesuits and the religious wars was accompanied by suaver and in appearance milder, but not less cunning and despotic Protestantism. Anarchism developed side by side with them a small section of socialism, bitterly persecuted by everybody, just as freethought was and is. But freethought is one incarnation of the human evolution towards freedom and anarchism is a more complete one, and both, if little numerous yet by themselves, have at their side as one of their practical manifestations research and science, and science has already developed wonderfully and freethought is its friend and so is anarchism, whilst religion and the authoritarian socialist dogma its enemies. Science may be frantically impressed in the service of bolshevism, as is done in Russia, but it cannot retrieve a lost cause. Dogma is stationary and so are Religion and Marxism.—Science is progressive and so are the up-to-date knowledge of the ways of nature which we call freethought and the efforts to enable the most suitable harmonious grouping of mankind which we call anarchism.

If this proposed agreement between socialists on the no more dictatorship, mutual toleration, neutralization of functions of general utility and adjournment of controversial subjects basis is ever

to take a tangible form, those interested in it and humanitarians outside of parties and organizations ought to discuss it in round table conferences. I expect that all public representations of parties and organizations and groups will pooh pooh the idea, as it saps the ground under their feet. For evidently such discussions might, if successful, also lead to a taming down of the acerb and uncompromising polemics which are so dear to many of us. But commonsense may survive in the rank and file of syndicalists and unionists before all, those who are still workers and stand shoulder to shoulder with other workers in the shop and the factory, well aware by daily practice that they can do the most efficient team work with men whom for their ideas, divergent from theirs, they consider blockheads or knaves. They see the common enemy, the capitalist, and they understand to what degree divisions paralyze every effort. They might just invite their leaders to be less self-seeking, punctilious, cantankerous and quarrelsome by all means. They hold these leaders in the hollow of their hands by their votes and contributions; what if they struck work against them, [109] abstaining from voting, paying up and supporting the papers for a time? They could make the new hierarchy climb down from their high perches and learn again to see matters from the worker's point of view who is sure of one thing: that he is the underdog in the capitalist State and that he will be the underdog in the State of social dictatorship.

Co-existence of all forms of socialist life in the way suggested, properly prepared by friendly agreements on a technically sound basis, would relieve socialists of many of the cares which the morrow of the Revolution is expected to bring. Those who refuse to co-operate will be known as working for their own exclusive domination, not for socialism for all and might find themselves isolated and powerless by and by, if the idea gets a hold on the socialist mind. I will not dwell on possible further stages in a free society; beginning by local affirmations of various types of socialism, all starting from a sound economic basis (land, materials, tools) and probably relieved of many difficulties by the competent technical management of various matters of general necessity (neutralization), relieved of controversial questions by their adjournment, these associations will have a free field before them. People may change from one type to the other or co-operate with several and be friends with all, by and by some types may be abandoned, others modified, others may prove to be the most attractive; it will be the sake of the then anarchists to see that their type prevails the most—I ought to say their types, because anarchism will be of many shades and forms. The neutralized functions may be abandoned as such, when prosperity, security and mutual confidence make such precautions unnecessary—or this may not be done for a long time. We have no means to form an opinion, how quick people will evolve always finer social feelings when security and confidence increase: this is a subject upon which the tragedy of past and present history tells us very, very little!

In the manner suggested socialism of all shades would form a clear front against present capitalist and coming State bolshevist dictatorship, it would possess guarantees of autonomous development before and after the Revolution, it would be relieved of interminable and fruitless polemics now and of inevitable fratricidal intersocialist war later on, where each section has but the choice to become a murderous usurper, hunting down all other socialists by a fiendish tche-ka, or a dumb slave to a dictatorship of other socialists or an outlaw and permanent rebel against so-called brother-socialists, the dictators. If 2, 3, 5, 10 shades of socialists exist, this must be the fate of all but one, the winner, the dictator. Can people be so callous to consider socialist dictatorship a stake, a booty? Against these all other socialists ought to rally under the cry: no more dictatorship! [110]

## XVII.

Will it be possible for modern socialists to recover the socialist, solidarist spirit which alone can give real life to socialist progress, or not? If every section only works for itself, conflict is inevitable after a victory and the usual form remarks: then the groups or syndicates will send delegates, make agreements, exchange their products, etc., are meaningless; for they presuppose that universal enthusiasm, disinteressement, commonsense will immediately make their appearance and arrange everything for the best.

Disinterested, reasonable, equitable, practical, well informed and quick action will indeed be necessary on this momentous occasion, but where is our training to enable us to act in this way?

If today and for many years past labor organizations have transactions between themselves, the negotiations have rather an opposite character, resembling diplomatic actions, where increase of power and prestige, compensations, intercatenation of questions (junctive) and among other factors influence decisions and punctiliousness, dilatoriness, obstruction, sabotage, petty malice are legitimate weapons. Businessmen, dominated exclusively by self-interest, usually arrive quicker at an understanding than either States or Labor. It is painful to see how much nearer organized labor acquires the bureaucratic, then even the business mentality and how promptly it learned to turn its back on solidarity. Strikes by sympathy form a rare exception; I witnessed the rising tide of such strikes in England in the years 1889-90, after the great strike of the London dockers, when the great sums of money cabled by the Australian workers and the unexpected organisatory efforts of the unskilled workers created unprecedented hopes and great enthusiasm, but the old miners discouraged every impetuosity and the strike wave soon ebbed and so it was on all following occasions. The mentality of the leaders is instinctively opposed to everything spontaneous and generous; they wish to maintain or increase the power which they control and not to give up any particle of it, exactly like statesmen do. Unless this mentality is gradually changed from now, how can it be expected to change in critical moments?

There is no doubt that during and after a revolution general assemblies, on the soviet principle, would be the most conspicuous mouthpieces of the popular will, but what can assemblies ever do but elect delegates, committees, plenipotentiaries, representing either dictatorial majorities or composed of member of antagonistic parties who would have to settle [111] urgent matters by negotiations and compromise, and in this way the power of the assemblies passes by and by in the hands of the most brutal or the most cunning leaders possessed of the most thorough governmentalist mentalities. Parliamentarism, impotent wrangling or dictatorship is the inevitable result of sovietist assemblies.

The conclusion from this is that mentalities must be changed in the pre-revolutionary period and this can only be done by giving up the present scramble for power and supremacy, which is, so to speak, the patriotic duty of every organization, of every shade of socialist opinion. We must prefer to see all movements of sincere anticapitalist tendencies healthy and strong, to see any particular movement, dear to us, paramount and be indifferent about what happens to all the other movements.

For this we must learn better to understand what is important and less important, large or small, a passing matter of today and an important factor for the future. We must prefer considerate, conciliatory, tactful and good humored conduct to combativeness, stickling for vindicating every claim, dogmatism, pettiness, irritability, party pride and all such sources of permanent discord. I have no right to give an advice to men who in the midst of much work and constant difficulties and frictions often must lose patience, but I see the result: polemics on paper are continued by the guillotine or the tche-ka in time of Revolutions and I ask the question again: is this really inevitable?

Even the most brutal private warfare of the aspiring middle ages was concluded by a general truce, enforced, it is true, but the State—another demonstration of the fact that antisocial chaos ends in dictatorship;—I suppose that it would be preferable to see socialist polemics ended by a

spontaneous truce. People in private life submit voluntarily to any quantity of prescriptions of conduct, based on the general desire to evade permanent conflicts. Why should socialist always remain possessed of the function of absolute righteousness, haunted by the sentiment that a different shade of opinion implies already the gravest danger to their ideals? We see the medieval corporations of workers divided by jealousies and animosities; the highroads of France were often red with the blood of the Gavots and the Dévorants of the wandering compagnons who came to blows wherever they met; the guillotine cut off the heads of the leaders of rivaling republican fractions; the early great socialist considered each other quite wrong and wrote most acrimonious mutual refutations. Marxism increased this intolerance to paroxysm and a policy of prestige, not a policy of solidarity, is [112] absolute rule ever since. Was any question decided by this general intractability? I think not; everyone has settled in a retrenched camp, the party machinery, orators and papers, keep up permanent hostilities, small fire. There are archives and recording angels, ready to demolish almost every one reciprocally by exposures of past inconsistencies and peccadilloes, just like criminal courts keep registers of former convictions. This process of mutual slandering is going on with might whilst modern history creates the situation described in the previous chapters of this essay. It is usually considered much more important to point out the wrongs of adversaries, than to act ourselves.

Is it not possible to make a clean sweep of all this, to proclaim a general amnesty? Not that we should condone the actions of worthless men and mingle with them or permit them to mingle with us indiscriminately. But simply that we do not debase ourselves by taking constantly notice of them. We live as private individuals side by side with the so-called criminal classes, with any number of people whom we know as mean and worthless fellows,—well, we do not quarrel with them, we simply have nothing to say to them, we keep them from our doors. Such an attitude would save much useless effort and time to the socialist movements. We must remember that we are but the most preliminary, casual workers of the great work of human regeneration, comparable in size to an anthill in face of an Egyptian pyramid, our work lays ahead of us and not in the direction of mutual improvement to alleged states of greatest personal perfection. We must rather tuck up our sleeves and do hard work at laying the foundations of the coming great structure, than idle away the time, comparing who is best gloved, who wears the most immaculated shirtfront of principles. By this I do not repudiate steadfastness of principles, but I recommend a right sense of proportion: neither I nor my opponent on minor questions are likely to see the day when this minor question may be decided by actual experience. In such cases it is better to adjourn a decision or to go every one his own way, than to waste energy in neverending disputes.

I do not advise the co-operation of incompatible elements on the basis of compromise, the so-called “unique front” and all that. I plead only for the abandonment of party megalomania, always combined with general myopia. The capitalist world even was wide enough to permit the evolution of the various types of socialism; is then the free social world of the future to be a blind alley, [113] where all these diversities are to converge into some narrow, obligatory and permanent unity and uniformity, some unique system? This prospect looks absurd to me and would be antisocial in the extreme. For homogeneousness of opinions can only be the outcome of long experience and will neither exist on the eve nor on the morrow of a social revolution; it may or it may not develop at some future time—a problem impossible to decide. A revolution, however promoted by widespread sentiment, accomplished by general action, producing temporary enthusiasm and solidarity, will always be confronted immediately by the most important problems which the different schools of socialist thought, new popular initiatives, retarding and reactionary influences will insist on handling in different ways.

If until then we have not learned really social conduct among socialists, as described here, there will be chaos, dictatorship, incompetence, everything but clear socialist progress. We must be satisfied with parallel realizations of the different socialist ideals on the basis of social means and free scope to everyone in proportion to his reasonable sphere of activity and needs, under conditions of non aggressiveness, the greatest possible mutual goodwill or, at least, correct non-interference, protected by agreements on neutralization, etc. as suggest above, and other friendly arrangements which will easily be made, when a real will to act in this way will exist.

I do not consider this as utopian, else I should consider socialism altogether as an impossibility. What else could be done? Bolshevism is not socialism worth that name; neither is social democracy. Nor are, in my opinion, syndicalism or trade-unionism, both of no homogeneous composition, nor anarchism, comprising very many shades of opinion, by themselves able to realize unique socialist systems, and anarchists refusing to coerce anybody, but likely to be coerced by those whom a unique system would place in power, would have to be rebels against bolshevism—but is this the most desirable solution? I think not and I believe that every other section of socialism will also see that co-existence and not dictatorship and uniformity is the only future open to every type of socialism. But our minds must be trained to this, dogmatism and intolerance which are always authoritarian characteristics must be eradicated, even when they grow sometimes in the very midst of anarchists and syndicalists. [114]

## XVIII.

An eventual reader of these chapters may think here that it were about time for me to begin to discuss the roads to anarchism. In my conviction I have been discussing them all the time, for I really do not consider anarchism as an isolated phenomenon capable of development independent of general evolution or in opposition to it. We are “all in the same boat,” active or passive members of a general milieu and the conviction that this milieu, society, has the strength and the tendency to overcome the authoritarian infection and the monopolist, parasitic outgrowths, proper perhaps to humanity and the price paid for its evolution from animality, but always more noxious and useless, as human evolution takes real shape,—that conviction makes me welcome anarchism and take part in its propagation, as the most perfect and comprehensive effort to promote general human emancipation. The better the soil, the better a plant will grow and therefore the alarming deterioration of even the capitalist system in this age of stupid nationalism, and the equally alarming degradation of socialism in this time of bigoted bolshevism and shallow social democracy are matters of the deepest concern to us. We cannot live, when the whole boat goes down; the present crisis must see us as men who have something to say, to give advice, to help, and not as idle spectators with a superoise “I told you so...” on our lips. In the way mapped out in chapters XV-XVI, in the exposure of the results of nationalism (chapters VIII-XIV), in penetrating the voluntary movements with a free spirit (chapters VI and VII), in trying to reach the widest milieus possible (chapters I and II), in perfect comprehension of the gulf between authoritarian and libertarian socialism (chapters III-V), anarchist can come in closest contact with the present-day problems and this is, in my opinion, more essential than specialization on otherwise interesting problems, birth control, free love, individualism, and many other subjects which, compared to the immense general evils are but side issues. A gift is not to be criticized; therefore I do not grudge these smaller movements the devoted efforts given to them, only I say again, when the whole boat goes down, it is more practical to lend a hand to try to help, than continuing some other, otherwise quite useful, occupation.



Some observations on the general features of present anarchist propaganda may follow here and [115] should not be considered as presumptuous strictures and naggings, but as an effort to point out how propaganda might be made most effective.

Pure principles are often too abstract mental food to people in the hard run of daily routine, chemical tabloids in place of fresh nourishment. Freedom is full of life, life's joys and beauties and these must be presented in the most tangible form, not as fashions and habits in some new fixed form, but as potentialities which everyone will shape to his own heart's desire. The poorest and the most miserable can become elated and rise upright, if such conscience of freedom is awakened in him and everyone can find ways to manifest his love and respect and understanding of freedom in a small sphere of his own, create respect for freedom around him, show freedom's power to the victims of authority in ever so many a large or a small way. These practical demonstrations in daily life are more valuable than contempt shown to backward surrounding and consolation by isolation and the frequentation of comrades and groups only.

Groups, meetings, papers, syndicates, shoplife, all excellent occasions for propaganda, seem yet to possess limits of expansion and of saturation, follow often by routine, stagnation, resignation or dissensions. The milieu is too small, the opportunities are exhausted and what might be called "spiritual inzucht [inbreeding]" leads to progressively unsatisfactory results.

Not everyone can give his whole time and effort to propaganda, nor become a talented speaker, writer or organizer. But no one ought to remain a simple member, visitor of meetings, subscriber to papers, contributor of donations. Everyone can do something more in his own way. He lives by his family and his private friends in a milieu of confidence where some hopeless, many indifferent and some hopeful elements exist. By upright libertarian and humanitarian conduct in this small sphere his opinion will be valued, his ideas discussed by and by and a small private group will inconspicuously grow around him and, by some of its components, may expand this sphere of interest, sympathies and upright conduct. Such private activity need not begin with the circulation of pamphlets and papers which are, to a much greater extent than is usually supposed, incomprehensible and often antipathetic to newcomers. There is so much occasion for practical elimination of authority, direct action, disobedience, exposure of the moral baseness of authoritarian ways and methods, humor and satire at the pompous inefficiency of authorities, etc. All this gives satisfaction to the depressed and cowed minds of many and by and by they see: [116] here is a man who sets a right moral example, and they become curious about what makes him act in this upright, unselfish way and then they might be told of the mental and economic enslavement of men and of the futility of authoritarian remedies even under socialist disguise. Then knowledge must be spread, mainly in the general results of science concerning the Universe, the Earth, organic life, man, the principal peoples, the history of religions, of civilization, modern history and the mechanism of modern life—such knowledge as will make people see their real position, their natural relations and the artificial superstructure, the State and the parasites, which keeps them in bondage and feasts upon them. Many good old books explain all this in a much blunter, simpler and more popular way than modern books which are much less independent. But all such publications will require critical judgment and criticism, which is so little developed in the popular mind, would thus be trained. Only people prepared in this way should be introduced into groups, invited to meetings and to read our publications. Otherwise the shortcoming which they will not fail to notice, will disappoint them, whilst, if prepared in the way described or similarly, they will understand that individual shortcomings and the value of an idea have nothing to do with each other.

As much as possible, I believe, new comrades should form new groups, relied with the old groups by some of their members. For the routine and peculiarities of the old and the innocent enthusiasm of the young do not always agree; the old belittle the young and vice versa.

It is necessary to take all this trouble, though some may think the contrary, believing anarchism arrived at a stage of development where this intensive work is no longer necessary. Unfortunately, whilst some considerable time ago, when Proudhon, Elisée Reclus, Kropotkin, Tolstoy were so much before the public, many people had a vivid interest for our ideals, this interest has largely flickered away, replaced by the war spirit, then by morbid interest in bolshevism, until after the disappointing course of bolshevism indifference or interest in inferior side issues seem to prevail and anarchism, it must be said, possesses for most people only its old notoriety, namely to be considered as an absurd [117] conglomeration of violence and chaos to which the most charitable would add: idle dreams, whilst the Marxists, the self-styled “scientific socialists,” have a variety of other ways to misunderstand and misinterpret anarchism, of which, as a rule, they are profoundly ignorant.

Today both the capitalist and the State socialist interest co-operate to prevent the awakening of mankind, to transforming man into a working and paying organism, directed by a technical, bureaucratic and police staff or underclass for the profit of the capitalist parasites who are not at all diminishing, as Marx calculated in abstract (concentration of capital), but who, like all organisms in specially favored conditions of life are pullulating together with the sub-parasite class of menials in their service. It was indeed a strangely weltfremd [unrealistic] inspiration to conclude that the most prosperous stage of capitalism, increasing concentration, would make it shaky and let it tumble over, whilst it just continually increase the burden on the people and this is done more deliberately than ever in our present time.

In early times the Church by religion was the most powerful agent of mental obscurantism. In the initial stages of capitalism, when machinism caused such suffering that rebellion was threatening, drink intervened to solace and soothe the nerves of the people and to obscure their brains. By and by this interfered too much with the physical efficiency of the working classes and capitalism since then prefers to infuse into workers a vulgar, petty-bourgeois mentality,—low passions, greed, curiosity on idle subjects and this is done under the disguise of sport and amusement. It really means gigantic organized effort in which billions of capital are quite profitably invested, to control the whole intellectual, moral, physical life of the people between the hours of work and those of sleep.

In these hours the mentalities are shaped and leveled by an always tighter round of fictitious interests, passions, distractions which all instill the vulgar spirit of admiration for performances, inclination before wealth, 100% patriotism, the cruelty of the arena, greed for easy winnings, morbid curiosity, etc. The public is absorbed by all this and capitalism and the State have their hands free for serious business in their own interest.

To create this industry of pleasure, every valuable intellectual, artistic and other product had to be transmogrified into a mass article, adapted to both the mentalities to be worked upon and those which were to be formed, that is uneducated taste and model bourgeois taste. The book and the theatre are adapted to the moving pictures show. Fine physical exertion, genuine raining degenerates into the [118] hothouse procreation of records and transforms sport into a Barnum show of freaks; the admiring multitudes pass their time in standing about in packed crowds and are farther than ever from doing any healthy physical training themselves. The morning paper, the evening radio is their mental food. Industry standardizes their personal and household implements, uniforms their food. This uniforming and standardizing of men is systematically done and it becomes difficult to rescue people from this magic circle of work for the capitalist, followed by the hours of play when other capitalists take the earnings away as payment for food and pleasure, and ended by the hours of

sleep for which the landlord takes away the last portion of the earnings as rent. This is modernized, sugared slavery, but it is slavery and the Roman panem et circenses (bread and play) still rules the most enlightened nations.

Against this electoral socialism and the large labor organizations, careful of plying to the taste of the masses will do nothing; on the contrary, they feel that they must imitate it. So we have the same eternal round of shows and performances under the cloak of labor and, of course, they see as well as the capitalists that this is an excellent means to keep people under control, to give them no time for study, no chance of criticism and to direct them from above.

Anarchists and all free minded people, however, can very well reach against this and ought to; in private life, which I mentioned above, there would be plenty of opportunities to point out the selfish character of greedy professional sport, breeding ambition, jealousy, enmity and brutality. Also the cruelty and ugliness of all this. Do we really wish to possess the physical abnormalities of the victims of supreme training for records? What we wish is skill and fitness and these require individual cultivation irrespective of records. We require the real execution of healthy exercise by ourselves, conform to our taste and disposition, and not to stand in crowds by tens of thousands to see a few others perform. I believe that even today those men will be welcome to many who have the courage to say this and to act upon it, who will take real walks, see real nature, real art, real beauty, read real books, think independently and turn their back on mechanized, capitalized amusement, as they turn it on religion and on drink, other against of mental enslavement.[119] for there is a subtle parentage between all the modern exaltations of authority—supreme capitalism, nationalism, fascism, hero worship in sport and play, stereotyped mentalities formed by press and pulpit, the politician and the picture show and the radio. All are birds of the same feather, all work in the great conservative cause and it would be a great mistake to underrate their power and the ground they have won and the plain fact that authoritarian socialism and the large labor organizations are no protection against them.

Our propaganda, then, ought to establish this private contact with the milieu accessible to every individual comrade. In the beginning anarchists were so few that they felt a natural satisfaction in meeting as much as possible in groups, to enjoy the fellowship of comrades. Then they felt that these groups, however social within, were isolated without and thirty years ago the syndicalist wave brought many in touch with their immediate fellow workers. This also is not sufficient and a further step in this direction would be the careful expansion in private life suggested which would also lead to greater interest in the many forms of voluntary co-operation for progressive purposes described in chapters VI and VII of this book. We must not forget that the usual forms of propaganda are, in fact, a repetition or an imitation of the machinery created for democratic movement and ours is a wider purpose. It is logical that authoritarian socialist should limit themselves to this machinery; they want only to drill opinions into peoples' heads to turn them into voters and members, but anarchism has larger aspirations. I do not wish, of course, to depreciate any form of anarchist activities; I wish only to see new forms added to it.

I will not discuss here the question of violence. I have never disavowed a violent action by anarchists, but I have never been able to do such an act myself, so I have but to abstain to express academic opinions on it. Everyone see for himself how hard life is and what obstacles obstruct the roads to freedom and solidarity and he will help to remove them in his own way, if the ideal goal is dear to him. Le Boetie in the sixteenth century, resume the by far greater part of all existing evil in the words la servitude volontaire (voluntary serfdom), H. D. Thoreau in the nineteenth century wrote the equally all comprehensive words on the duty of civil disobedience. To break up the spirit of submission and to rouse the free spirit by disobedience in very, very many ways, by direct action of ever so many forms, this is the real preparation for [120] anarchism and this will evidently require a

somewhat larger and more varied effort than anarchist home and family life, so to speak, in groups, at meetings, in our papers, etc. provides for. The work before us is so great, that new forms of activity, those suggested or others, should be found.

## XIX.

It is impossible to predict when freedom and solidarity, reposing in the spirit of libertarians and gradually expanding by the many form of human progress will be able to form real homesteads, settlements, communities and larger social organisms and finally the free society. Who can properly estimate the duration of the authoritarian era, whether the present inroads and devastations of the authoritarian Mississippi mark the culmination point of suffering or only the beginning of still greater degradation? We can but do two things: continue to work in our direction, expanding our sphere of real action and not losing time on side issues, and always endeavor to see quite clear, not to be hoodwinked by any well intentioned, but ill advised sentimental solidarity with the currents and tendencies of the past, cloaked as nationalism, authoritarian socialism, antisocial ideas of any sort which divide mankind and its claim of full use and enjoyment of all which the globe holds, irrespective of claims of States and monopolists.

Who can know how anarchism may first be realized? I suggested the possible co-existence of all types of non-aggressive socialism (chapter XVI)—will this remain an isolated personal opinion or be generally accepted some day? Will authoritarian socialism prefer to establish dictatorships, as in Russia, or to co-exist on sufferance in a mongrel form with capitalism, as it tries to do in a few countries and localities in Europe where post-war ruin has weakened the State and the capitalists—a provisional untenable situation as existing in present Austria and in particular in present Vienna? Syndicalism is nowhere so strong and homogeneous that it can be expected for some time to become the framework of a new society. We cannot know what will happen, because we do not know when and under what conditions a revolutionary crisis will happen.

Anarchists are of old divided on the economic basis of a free society—some wish the equitable, as much as possible equal exchange of products (mutualists), others wish free use of all products according to the needs of every person (communists), and others again wish to leave the selection of [121] the method of distribution or reward of labor to the choice of the producing and consuming collectivities which would agree upon exchange, reward by quantity of work done or by the time spent on work, or free use, as they choose. These were formerly called collectivist anarchists.

As we ignore when anarchists will be able to put their ideas in practice, not as a private experiment, but publicly, on a large scale and with the co-operation, or at least under conditions of non-interference, of the whole community, we cannot know whether these economic differences will still separate anarchists as they have done so long—or whether it may have been considered preferable to sink these differences which have lasted a long time up til now, but which need not be prolonged indefinitely; an old quarrel must not necessarily remain an eternal quarrel.

William Godwin's free communism (1793) remained isolated. Josiah Warren (1827), Proudhon (1840), Max Stirner (1844), Bellegarrigue (1848) were the first exponents of individualist or mutualist anarchism, but the group of the Paris Humanitarian (1841), Elisée Reclus (1851), Joseph Déjacque and Ernest Coeurderoy in the fifties, feeble and isolated voices under the conditions of those year, affirmed independent one of the other strong and perfect communist anarchist ideas without being able to spread them at that time. So Proudhon's mutualism kept the field in Europe in the latter fifties and first half of the sixies, until Bakunin, an anarchist socialist for many years, but particularly active since 1864, and César de Paepe in Brussels (about 1867, if not earlier) and the

Jurassian Swiss and a part of the French internationalists (since about 1868) gave to the antistatist ideas of Proudhon and others a thoroughly socialist basis (revolutionary collectivism or collectivist anarchism). This conception, spreading in Spain and Italy, maintained the above described indifference about the application of a measure or of no measure, to work done and to produce consumed, professing agnosticism about this and not wishing it to influence by present propaganda the decisions of a coming society which must be the result of the will and experience of those whom it concerned.

Then, first in 1876 with not lasting results, the Italian internationalists excepted, second about 1880 with lasting effect this time free communism was declared to be the only legitimate economic basis of anarchism and communist anarchism became widely spread since then the collectivist principle was for about ten years longer maintained in Spain in the old sense of a refusal to prejudge this important question, to anticipate future free selection. It had also some existence in German socialism in the early anarchist times of Johann Most (about 1883) and again ten years later in the early times of Berlin anarchism, but then it took the particular, secondary form of expressing the adherence to some method of reward for work done and not the free choice [122] between such a system and communism, as in Spain. But by and by, in the nineties, communist anarchism was generally accepted, collectivist anarchism, erroneously identified with exclusively labor rewarding anarchism, was considered an antiquated superseded doctrine. In reality the true essence of collectivist anarchism, a thoroughly socialist basis, but details not prejudged, but left to the future, had been quite forgotten and had to be rediscovered from scarce old prints and personal testimony (James Guillaume) and this remains still hardly known to most contemporary anarchists or is taken no notice of, though critical voices begin to be heard.

During this period individual anarchism of the Proudhonian type became nearly extinct, that of the Josiah Warren and B. R. Tucker type maintained its rigid antisocialism and was a progressive factor mainly as a personal rights doctrine, whilst Max Stirner's ideas, social at the bottom were those of Proudhon, were mostly but partially understood and defected by interpreters in the direction of Tucker or in that of the antisocial authoritarian individualism of Nietzsche. In later years, mainly in France and in Italy, tendencies have been developing which might be called individualist communist, expressing the desire for a socially free basis continued with an unlimited unfolding of individualism, free of social responsibilities: combinations containing, in my opinion, contradictory elements, but expressing a reaction against the submerging of personality under social forms even of society.

From this summary sketch might be gathered that anarchism is, as befits a living organism, not in any state of dogmatic petrification, but that ideas always move and neither the exclusive prevalence of one conception nor the definite acquisition of cut and dry dogmatic truths can happen in the preliminary, pre-experience period in which we live.

The tendency, the will and the hope of organisms, movements of ideas, parties, etc. are at all times expansion and full realization. Here the tendency of growth to the proper proportions, characteristic of each organism, and the authoritarian tendency of unlimited expansion often come in conflict when fluctuating organisms like movements are concerned. Every movement feels bound in duty to claim the necessity and usefulness of its universal expansion and would consider it a humiliation and a defeat to give up a part of this claim. I cannot enter more into this subject; I feel only that there is something wrong here and that the natural expansion, corresponding to the growth of an organism, including subsequent decline and decay and the unlimited authoritarian expansion, comparable to epidemic or cancerous infection, elephantiasis and socially represented by bolshevist, fascist and capitalist usurpations [123] and intellectually by imposed religious doctrines, excluding

further research—that these two types of expansion are different and that anarchy's place must be on the side of nature.

From this I conclude that Anarchism for Anarchists is a more natural and logical demand than Anarchism for All, which it is logical consequence in our opinion, which will be the sequel of 'Anarchism for Anarchists' in our hope, but which is not likely to be the next and initial stage of coming events. Many years past, between about 1862 and 1870, the ideas of Proudhon, later those of the collectivists in the International, mentioned above, were quite paramount in the Latin countries of Europe and prevailed in the great congresses of the International (1866-69) over the authoritarian and later over the post-Proudhonian ideas. This fact, welcome and hopeful as it was and influencing the memorable and heroic affirmation known as the Paris Commune of 1871, must yet not be overrated. It created the impression that the workers of these countries were penetrated with these advanced ideas, but it was a far cry from the limited number of collectivist anarchists to the masses of the workers which, when the authoritarian parties began their work seriously, about 1880, were mostly gathered in by those parties, with the exception of Spain and, in a minor degree, Italy. Bakunin saw this quite well and always distinguished between the anarchists of the Alliance and the organized workers of the International. The gradual isolation of the former in the seventies confirms this; the French congresses of 1880 preferring the Parti ouvrier (Worker's political party) to anarchists sealed this preference of the French workers for socialist politics; the German workers since the time of Lasalle had chosen the same route. At times, like in the Argentine Republic, anarchists, as the first and most active militants and organizers, held the field alone and all socially advanced workers listened to them, but even there moderates and authoritarians attracted great quantities of workers.

All this repercutes [echoes?] but the real fact that the masses are not anarchists and that, when their organizations become large and numerous, they are not anarchists, even were anarchists broke the ground, did all the initial work, as happened in many countries.

Does this convey a lesson to us or not? In my opinion it tends to show that the great bulk of the working classes is determined to use the method of the smallest effort to themselves, acting by delegates to whom they give political power by their votes, by collective action (unionism, strikes, etc.) which involve the minimum of individual responsibility. If these mills grind slow, [124] if there are deadlocks and setbacks, it is their own choice; they choose not to put more effort into it, though they all know by this time of the day that real collective action, the general strike, the occupation of factories, mere abstention from doing the capitalists' bidding day by day, would advance matters more than all the diplomacy of their leaders. I should not always be fascinated by these masses which show so very little reciprocity to all anarchist efforts, which permitted the Chicago martyrs to be hanged and left Sacco and Vanzetti for more than six years in agony of suspense, facing death. Anarchists will never desert their cause, never cease their propaganda, but their efforts might be more pointed, more well-directed to really progressive elements among the workers and everywhere, and not always to that general collectivity which will certainly not be moved by any arguments to give up the policy of the smallest effort, so opposite to ours. At present we are extremes and have as such little chance to meet.

The nearest approach to more hopeful views of this subject is offered by the Mexican peasants', mostly Indians, agrarian revolts twenty years ago in contact with the Mexican rebels of that time who were to a great part anarchists and professed this openly and confirmed it by courageous action and martyrdom. Práxedes G. Guerrero was killed in rebellion and Ricardo Flores Magón was slowly brought to death in an American prison. Until this day the Yaqui Indians defend their territories on the River Yaqui and are now by the "socialist" government of General Calles to be subjugated by arms

and Librado Rivera, one of the old rebels of the Magón period, has just been arrested again (April 1, 1927) for exposing in the Sagitario, a Mexican anarchist paper, the bloody campaign of Calles against the Yaquis. Here then, anarchists have been and remain in touch with an active population determined to throw off an old yoke and standing up boldly to face their enemies.

The peasants of a part of the Ukraine and the anarchist Nestor Makhno understood each other well and withstood for a number of campaigns every government, including the bolshevist government. In Russia the revolutionary period beginning in March 1917, witnessed many local anarchist efforts, but, as far as I know, they did not meet with such popular response as to be able, later, to make a stand against bolshevism, nor were the syndicates and the co-operative associations, the importance of both of which was certainly [125] well understood by the then Russian anarchists, able to much such a stand.

During the winter of 1918-19 when a social democratic government existed in Bavaria (München) and "socialization" was much under discussion, Gustav Landauer, the German anarchist who in May 1919 was done to death by the soldiers who restored that same social democratic government, had prospect of the grant of a territory for the Sozialistenbund held out to him. This was an anarchist organization, founded in 1908, proposing to start home colonies, productive groups in towns and other circles of social, artistic and intellectual life all over German, to exchange services on the basis of reciprocity and to form thus a network of anarchist oases. But in München he saw very soon that the social democrats offered but a swampy territory for dessication and rudimentary cultivation and that the idea was rather to concentrate the anarchists there in a sort of voluntary concentration camp and to keep them away from the capitol in this way. So nothing came out of it.

The occupation of the Italian (mainly Milan) metal factories in the summer of 1920 was a glorious initiative ardently supported by the anarchists, but a thorn in the eyes of the leaders of the moderate unions who cut short this momentous development by a foul compromise; in the spring of 1927 some of the same men have sunk so low already as to submit expressly to fascism.

In Spain in the years following 1918 periods of the greatest effervescence occurred, when the anarchists, syndicalists and indeed the bulk of the workers, especially in Catalonia (Barcelona) formed but one seething mass of men expecting a near social revolution. But here also somehow the right moment may have been missed and cruel reaction set in.

Before the war the great riots all over Italy in the spring of 1898, the "Red Week" in Romagna (1914), the General Strike in Barcelona (1901) and the Ferrer "Red Week," 1909, all popular movements inspired mainly by anarchists, are memorable and Buenos Aires also saw many a hot day.

These are, I believe,—besides relative small events in Spain, 1873, and the Andalusian and Xeres (1892) peasant revolts, and in Italy, 1874, 1877 and the Massa Carrara revolt of 1893—the principal occasions on which anarchist and popular action worked together on a somewhat larger scale; the many individual acts by anarchists, giving up their life for their cause, often met with popular satisfaction, but although they were by no means without influence upon the [126] governing classes—some men put water in their win when governing had ceased to be quite safe,—they were not followed by popular action of any kind.

Without pretending any knowledge of the inner history of all these and a few other larger events I believe that they carry the lesson, that the road from popular discontent to emphatic and extensive popular action is very short and increasingly short in some countries, whenever some real initiative is taken, but also, that after some expansion dilatory and contrary influences set in, mainly the determined ill-will of political socialist and moderate trade organizations. They are quite passive instruments nowadays in the hands of their leaders who always side with the cause of order, as long as there is any risk, and who will only turn up to usurp the fruits of victory, if victory is won and

they feel quite safe. Anarchists will not act as authoritarians and so after a while they find themselves deserted and usually pay the cost. In the Romagna riots of June 1914 some co-operation was established between anarchists, republicans and radical freethinkers, and worked well, but the moderate unionists did not support the movement. In recent times the experience of antifascist coalitions are very disappointing and the Spanish similar experiences not much better. Many anarchist gave their most devoted support to the bolshevist decisive action of November 1917, but in April 1918 their headquarters in Moscow were bombarded with cannon by the bolshevists and two years later the Kronstadt rebellion (not an anarchist movement, but a spirited protest) was cruelly stifled in bloodshed.

From all this I can but conclude that today the strongholds of capitalism are defended by an outer front of moderate socialists who to the social revolution prefer either their present state of co-operation or relative truce with the capitalists or a coming dictatorship of theirs over the capitalist and the working classes of the country, eliminating or silencing the refractory socialists and anarchists by the Moscow and Krostadt methods of massacre and tche-ka-repression.

Under such conditions, without discouraging other action which in countries like Italy and Spain may be quite inevitable, I think that in general work for a change of mentality—as described in this essay, and similar—is the most essential task for anarchists. As long as the working classes did not to the voluntary serfdom under capitalism and the State join the new voluntary serfdom under the leaders of authoritarian socialism and moderate unionism, it was always worthwhile to try to fight. Today and until this situation changes, I believe that the struggle by the splendid intellectual and moral weapons which our ideas give us, is the most essential thing and that to advocate it is not a counsel of moderation or cowardice, but an effort to leave the beaten tracks of routine and to give a strong practical basis to our position which is theoretically an morally unassailable, but which lacks such a basis. [127]

We ought also to discuss all these matters for the purpose of eliminating or adjourning sine die a number of everlasting controversies, minor subjects of every description, abandon specialization on side issues and just try to discuss the general questions mentioned in these pages and others with some of the less narrow-minded socialist and labor men with whom we may be on speaking terms, provided they have not all made up their mind to prefer a regime propped up by a tche-ka or a social democratic minister of many massacres like the German Noske, to a friendly co-existence with all other socialists and anarchists in a free society?

For fifty years nearly, since the international congress held at Ghent in September 1877, authoritarian socialists and anarchists have not met in conference on equal terms, since the so-called international socialist congresses of the years 1889-1896 (Paris, Brussels, Zurich, London) were all marked by incidents of the greatest brutality and unfairness to anarchists, countenanced by the authoritarian majorities. I am not pressing or begging for such a round table conference; I merely tell these facts which would appear grotesque, if not comical, were they not such painful demonstrations of the extent of bigotry and intrigue.

## XX.

Will syndicalism be able to become the prime moving factor of a social revolution and the first frame or foundation of a free society? Many cherish this idea, being averse to State mismanagement and skeptical of rapidly improvised new spontaneous forms of social production in the initial stage of a new life.



The organized workers would indeed be solid units, capable of intelligent expansion, trained to do efficient work. In the best days of the International, in the years 1868-1870 this idea was the current one and as the sections of the International were, in several countries of the continent of Europe at least (Belgium, France, Spain, Switzerland) very often the only then existing syndicates or trade unions at the same time, the whole organism of the International, the federation of so many syndicates in many countries, was considered to be already the real frame of the new society, filling in by and by with all the world of labor, and it was expected that the parasitic and obstructive elements outside of it, the State and the capitalists, would either by and by become exsanguinous shadows, vanishing finally or be brushed away by a shove of the shoulder of Labor's International.

Subsequent events, the Paris Commune which placed the communalist idea in the first rank of revolutionary interest [128] and other developments too long to be mentioned here, almost obliterated this inception, but it arose again twenty five years later, in the most flourishing period of revolutionary syndicalism in France. It was then expressed in what I venture to call a cruder form and a more narrow spirit. The International had been fond of this idea, because it seemed to be the most direct and complete realization of the initial stage, at least, of socialism. The later syndicalists proclaimed it in the name of "self-sufficiency" of syndicalism, flaunting a sort of contempt for socialism and anarchism as doctrines henceforth superannuated. Not all syndicalists acted thus, but the smart way in which some kicked off the socialist stepping stones or scaffolding and crowed about syndicalism pure and simple, did no good to this movement and made socialists distrustful of this exclusively "laborist" tendency which led backward towards old-fashioned trade unionist exclusivism, whilst we look ahead towards a regenerated and solidary humanity.

The soundness of the idea is not affected by such exaggeration and the idea is capable of enlargement and elaboration and worthy of them. Syndicates, the shop and factor organizations, the technical staff, the municipal and other public worker, the transport workers, the distributive apparatus of the co-operative societies, all organizations for social service and welfare, etc.—these form evidently a huge block which can stand out against refractory elements, such as the small trades, the small peasants, etc., and much ore against the parasitic elements, official and capitalist and their tools, the military and the slave-driving underlings, and also against the amateur blacklegs who they recruit and drill for some time past.

If syndicalism could in this way weld together the working elements of society against the parasites, it could win any day. But can it arrive at this?—that is the question. Experience shows that to act in this way requires not only what is called class-conscious, organized workers, but also workers with a really socialist will and these are up til now limited to the syndicalist ranks which cannot be expanded simply by formal enrollment as the ranks of trade unionists are, but only by the growth of strong socialist convictions. Trade unionism is inaccessible to those ideas, trusting in part to the State, in part to self-help and doubtful of general movements outside their usual sphere. It is yet in a stat of infancy as to other than trade movements, as the bungling in England, 1926, showed which so soon brought about the failure of the General Strike, followed by the most impudent capitalist aggressiveness. The same situation exists everywhere—syndicalism is full of spirit, but is small, large unionism is voluminous, but its spirit is flabby.

It is quite correct to say that all advanced effort [129] is the work of minorities, but these minorities formerly had only more or less indifferent majorities before them, many of whom they could rouse and carry along with them, whilst the others, an unwieldy mass, did neither harm nor good and adapted themselves to any changes. Today the majorities are better organized than the minorities and from really the solid reactionary block of organized social democrats, organized bolshevists, organized trade union moderates, organized fascists, organized peasants and farmers,

etc.; the minorities are on all sides confronted by organized authoritarian conservative and moderate armies, bent on foul compromises of some sort with the State and capitalism or on autocratic schemes of their own. This phalanx may collapse by their own worthlessness, they may interdestroy each other; the minorities can hardly expect to disintegrate it by storming its positions. They can wait for a downbreak and they can work with might and main for a change of mentality and are bound to do this—everything, then, except keep up some routine hope that by mere expansion of organization they will win some day. No, like electioneering socialism is only expanding by dilution and increasing shallowness, so also syndicalism could only expand on such terms and become inefficient large unionism. For the existing real socialist at each time are evidently already syndicalists and friends of syndicalism: so syndicalism could only expand among the precarious elements bordering on real socialism, sifting them as socialists would do themselves. So the sphere of syndicalism will remain a limited one and it is no general remedy nor can it become the principal revolutionary factor.

Experimental socialism is another factor of great value, but of equally limited power. It was very natural that for above a century on hundreds of occasions socialists got together some means, found a piece of land, a quiet corner in some country where they were left more or less to themselves as private people, and lived in their own way. This is still done and tiny oases of this kind are scattered over most continents, mostly perhaps over France, the Netherlands, England, the United States, Central and South America.

These dwarfish societies seem to exhibit the tendency to become almost smaller and more specialized. Where is the time of the large old communities, Robert Owen's New Harmony, the plans devised by William Thompson and thwarted by his untimely death, the Icarian community, the North American Phalanx, Modern Times, Considerant's Texas scheme, Weitling's communist settlements in the fifties, etc.? Such large efforts have either been abandoned altogether or they are made under conditions which, whatever they may be, are not those of complete socialism or real social co-operation and are more akin to co-operative housing schemes and all that. [130] Production in common is rather on the decline, that is efficient industrial production. The colonists often just work to get a living, cultivate vegetables and lead frugal vegetarian lives; they often prefer the tropic countries where a minimum of such work will permit to live. Sometimes ardent communists returned to measuring values and equal exchanges as Dr. Giovanni Rossi did in the colony Cecilia in Brazil. Often sexual freedom is the attractive element of such groups and they form and disintegrate frequently and rapidly. Agricultural experiments are another factor, but are often disappointing.

In general, then the real problems of collective production and distribution are left aside and more or less present-day habits may prevail in the larger, ordinary home or family habits in the very small settlements where frugality, sexual attractions, a rich tropical nature eliminate difficulties or smooth over want of comfort. These small settlements are sympathetic as examples of emancipation from the monotony and drudgery of modern city life, from the inevitable contact with exploiters and officials, also of friendly sociability, but they give little impulsion to general revolutionary action. They prove the possibility of a socialist butterfly or gypsy or convent life on the margin of society, contented with a minimum of comfort, if joined by a maximum of independence and personal freedom. But general society which has bread and educated all these men and women and to which they mostly reenter after a time is inevitable on the side of this social picknicking and camping holiday life, so I welcome all these efforts to escape from the capitalist yoke, but I do not overrate their importance and if excellent socialists, active in this specialty of experimental socialist life limit henceforth their socialist work to this, then I consider such specialization a loss to the movement, for no socialist

ought to specialize, but always exerce [practice] propagandist and other activities of every description.

The associatiative spirit did good work in the original stages of co-operative housing, Garden Cities and town planning initiatives, but most unfortunately most socialists and organized workers are shy birds at taking over some personal responsibilities and leaving the beaten tracks of routine. The protest against slum life and landlord tyranny that inspired the desire for healthy dwellings, renewed contact with nature, Garden Cities, etc., was raised by socialists and was such an evidently sensible and sympathetic initiative that, if the trade unions, the co-operative societies, the organized and unattached socialists, many of whom in those years, the nineties in England had been under the influence of William Morris, had responded to the initiative, they could have demonstrated the good of socialism to the whole of society in an unprecedented way and have got a real hold on public opinion. Instead, it was the usual thing to [131] heckle poor Ebenezer Howard, the initiator of Garden Cities, when he placed his ideas before socialists or anarchists, to expose the insufficiency of his personal socialist conceptions, the inadequacy of his proposal as a real remedy, to warn against dangerous palliatives, diminishing the revolutionary spirit (which, unfortunately, is still absent), etc., in short to demolish him was usually considered more meritorious than to lend help to the initiative. So this movement soon drifted into the hands of companies and architects, benevolent capitalists (Bournville), middle class reformers and municipalities, becoming an appendix to the platforms of town counselors, etc. and ceasing to be considered seriously connected with socialist aspirations, passing rather as a modern esthetic and cheaper surrogate of suburban villadom. Anarchist here and there are restarting such efforts now which they could have in working order for about thirty years now, if they had been less guided by doctrinary shyness at that time.

This was and is the ordinary fate of positive efforts: it is fear that they might interfere with preparedness for the great general effort expected—the social revolution. They do interfere, if they absorb the complete attention of good comrades. They must receive a good deal of attention, least they be dismal failures. In this dilemma abstention is the usual outcome and nothing or much too little is done. Under such conditions not one of the three great purposes of experimental socialism was reach or even approached ruing a century's socialist agitation.

There three purposes were (1) propaganda by example, the expected spontaneous frequent or general imitation of a successful local socialist creation; Fourier claimed for such an effect after the foundation of a first full-blown Phalanstery. (2) Active building up of a new society on the side of the old one which would wither away from inanition—the idea conceived in the time of the International, principally in Belgium. (3) Discovery of the best conditions of social life by actual experience.

This third purpose touches upon the all important problem of proportion, the disregard of which causes so much failure. Fourier was fully aware of this problem and the 1538 compact pages of his Treaty of domestic-agricultural association (1822-23) and his other works show his indefatigable effort to discover the right dimensions and inner proportions of a social unit combining economical, intellectual, sexual, artistic and other attractions in the right measure, evading the narrowness of the family and the village and the anonymous vastness of the city. Robert Owen attached equal importance to the dimensions of his proposed socialist townships surrounded by agricultural lands. Technical constructions, business, physical culture, etc. all require strictest regard to proportion.

Socialist experience on this subject is up til now exclusively negative. We have been warned by [132] failures that right proportions are not yet been found. They do not exist in the dwarfish socialist colonies and cannot exist in the haughty socialist skyscrapers devised by the State socialists and experimented about with very paltry success at present in bolshevist Russia. From this we may possibly have to take the lesson that a gigantic syndicalist society would also risk to be an

unstable colossus. Perhaps in later stages of a free society better conditions for immense organizations may exist than at the beginning, but it is not certain whether they would be wanted or preferred at such a time. For it there is real freedom, garden village life in a park country, as William Morris sketched it in *News from Nowhere* (1890) is more likely to become generalized than prison life in stone and iron cities, and universal solidarity will eliminate artificial overlarge organizations.

A free society cannot be hampered beforehand by a preconstructed frame, be it that of the most perfect present syndicalist organization. For the latter is a product of present society and we do not know the wants and the rhythm of social life of a new society. The present technical experience is invaluable, but will not influence the new society on the basis of present experience, but will deal competently with the new tasks. As socialists we possess but our good will, our belief in progress, as anarchists our faith in freedom and solidarity, respect for humanity and two more things: a quantity of economic and other hypotheses and surmises and varied insight into the difficulties of making large masses seem what is often dim and clouded to our own eyes and what dogmatism and fanaticism can not make clearer, only study and experience. From this we can only conclude that, however—and rightly so—our ideas are dear to us, we must recognize that the future belongs to all ideas and that, before even the free future will be reached, ideas will change, as they have changed in the past. All this is said not to discourage anybody, but to remind of the true position of anarchism which is ever-changing, ever-progressing as true science is and never stationary and dogmatic as religion, and which is free from exclusivism and fanaticism.

## XXI.

How can an incipient stage of anarchism be realized? Looking backward we see sporadic prophets of anarchism in early times, the ideas first definitely formulated between 1792 and 1894 (Godwin, [133] Warren, Proudhon, Max Stirner) and getting great ascendancy in the movements of the latin countries of Europe in the years before 1870 (Proudhon, Bakunin). Then followed much theoretical elaboration (Reclus, Kropotkin...) and propaganda all over the globe, but also intensive authoritarian organization, social democratic, since 1917 bolshevist, and, since 1895, syndicalist organization, relatively sympathetic or neutral to anarchism. Besides these growing reformist organization and since 1922 the counter-offensive of reaction by fascism. Anarchism was in the most favorable position, relatively, in the years about 1870 (1868-1870), received a passing support by the syndicalists, a somewhat larger support by the anarcho-syndicalists, but is treated as the enemy by all others, socialists and non-socialists. It hits back vigorously and is prepared to continue to fight every authoritarian system, socialist and non-socialist.

Can it count upon the people? Anarchists mostly believe in the slumbering revolutionary instincts of the people and its love of freedom and of justice, and they have made every sacrifice to rouse these instincts. Have they succeeded? In my opinion, not. The people, cowed by secular bitter experience, prefers relative safety and security, bought by submission, even if coupled with misery, and it has not developed—how could it develop it without experience?—the keener sense for freedom which is the characteristic of the anarchist. The people is still ready to accept what it can get in the easiest and safest way, by the State, be it bourgeois or bolshevist or fascist, by becoming ever so small a wheel or an underling in the competitive system which holds out prospects of advancement and betterment, be they ever so small or fallacious. The people is very old and wary and not naïf, generous, innocent at all. If it were announced that ten anarchists were to be hanged, greater crowds would assemble as spectators than if a hundred anarchists were to speak or to lecture—in most localities, a few regions, I believe, excepted.

So the general mentality has to be changed in a much greater extent than we generally imagine and, as I said before, I consider this the great task before us and so important that it will take some time to be achieved and then the situation would be so changed, that it is futile to speculate already upon what is to be done then. if a shortcut can be found at any time, so much the better, but I see no near prospect of this.

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But let us suppose that at some time indefinable anarchists have obtained elbow room for action, what would they do best to promote the realization of their ideas within the sphere of indefinable extension where they have a free hand? By this I do not mean that all the inhabitants were fully convinced and experienced anarchists, but simply that no militant opposition and no passive reluctance existed, on the contrary goodwill and sympathies. [134]

The new economic arrangements will depend on the degree of abundance or want of the necessaries of life then prevailing in the anarchist area. This factor will prime the application of any general economic system and will decide on the applicability of such systems at a given time.

Socialist authors and much more still, propagandists usually treat the subject of quantity and abundance with loftiness and imagination, maintaining the increase of products when all will work, the quick invention of laboring machinery, progressive abundance permitting a four hours work day, etc. These arguments have charmed very many people and made them socialists or communists (in the old sense), whilst they have also driven away many people from what they considered a utopian or a phantastic doctrine. It was natural to oppose to the people's misery under capitalism the socialist reign of plenty, privations replaced by abundance. When the early nineteenth century socialists wrote, Malthus and his followers professed particularly cruel and odious opinions and the socialist feelings revolted against them, preferring anything to looking mean and miserly like the Malthusian adulators of capitalism. So in repulsion against Malthus profusion and abundance were lauded to the skies and the axiom of plenty combined with the axiom of a minimum of work were thus firmly established as the leading features of society on the morrow of a social revolution.

Reasoning and calculations would have shown the extremely low standard of life of the masses of the people, their incredible frugality and abstention from so many joys which make life worth living, as one used to say; this lasted from times immemorial to the very eve of the war of 1914 which soon upset the old economic life in Europe. The war demanded so much extra work and reduced useful work, that the income of large categories of workers rose, while the greater quantity of commodities which they inevitably wanted to use was not forth coming in full and want became most visible and could not be remedied, as the general situation was not improving. If this was not felt everywhere, there were and are localities and domains where it was felt very hard. Thus where house rents were prohibited to be raised and consequently absorbed an always lower percentage of popular incomes, overcrowding by lodgers, etc. was gradually reduced, very many small households secured at last a somewhat better accommodation and then, as new houses could hardly be built, the housing crisis became acute. This opens a perspective on the very great increase in demand that will happen when after a revolution great masses [135] will expect, demand and enforce a higher standard of life and will also quite naturally work shorter hours in less haste and with less intensive physical energy. This is more likely to happen than the contrary, that they would exert themselves all the more. Some may do this by enthusiastic devotion, but the average man will wish to enjoy life at least and is not likely to inaugurate this by longer and harder work.

Nor are the existing accumulations of raw materials and ready products extraordinarily large as a rule. Every article in production and commerce that is not sold, represents capital lying idle, credit unnecessarily strained and deterioration and depreciation very often threatening; speculative

corners excepted, accumulations are a calamity and the opposite of brisk business, the rapid turning over of money, the capitalist's ideal.

So a new society would find much less goods than expected and a portion of them will certainly be concealed by recalcitrant owners. If these are seized by force, many goods will be concealed still more and authoritarian measures to get at them, would restore some, but would create disgust and indignation as the razverstkas (requisitions of grain in the Russian villages by the Red Army) and the tche-ka reign of terror and blackmail in the Russian towns have shown. A libertarian community will not degrade itself to an authoritarian level and must therefore put up with the scarcity of goods and some secret hoards and find other means to deal with this large problem, which the recovery by force of some hidden things cannot affect one way or the other: for there never was much to hide.

Under such circumstances a speedy continuation or reorganization of the production of necessaries with hygienic and other improvements for the workers, increasing the output by intensity, method and technical intelligence, is the first obvious necessity and its efficiency will depend from the then existing and increasing extent of the sphere of solidarity, the readiness of men in locally favorable conditions to balance the inevitable economic inferiority of populations in less well provided districts. Such solidarity would not exist if a rich town decided to form an economically independent socialist unit and poor villages forcibly had to do the same, to be poor isolated units. The same applies to diverse countries and all over the world. To me merely local socialism of the beati possidentes of localities, regions, countries, continents means no socialism at all; I recognize only the one indivisible humanity and the one indivisible solidarity, socialism, anarchism, as the friendly co-existence of the inhabitants of the globe [136] may be called. If this solidarity is only partially developed on the morrow of the revolution, it must be created by fair means. Coercion would only prevent it and defile the best cause. If there is gold to hand, accumulations easily found in abandoned government offices and banks, it would be better to use it to buy necessary goods for the people who do not practice solidarity, than to organized the forcible seizure of such goods. The refractory peasants who would be paid in gold for a speedy and large provisioning of the towns in critical weeks, would think better of the social change, than if red armies were sent out to make appeals to solidarity with the points of their bayonets. Even the gold thus scattered and sure to be hidden and hoarded and to disappear thus very efficiently, would be better got rid of in this way than if it were kept together: for in a compact mass it would become the pole attracting greed, ambition, authority, the very nucleus around which governmentalist reaction would try to center.

The tasks before continued or reorganized production, relative want, a competence, abundance, will, then, decide whether production in general or this or that product can be reasonably placed at everybody's disposition or must be husbanded or rationed for the time being. An indiscriminate free use of everything would lead to the greatest disappointment by successive depletion and denudation, lowering the standard of life, provoking encroachments by brutal and greedy elements and ending in a rationing imposed by new authorities, different in spirit from the voluntary rationing at the beginning approved by commonsense.

The essential point is that free communism must not be hurried on blindly and soon be played out, but that it must be built up by competent collective work and then be gradually realized in rising progression. People will be happy to see always more articles placed at their free disposition when experience shows that no further reasons for rationing exist. Within these two ascending evolutions: from small quantities to abundance and from some form of redistribution and rationing to voluntary work and free use of all products, any variety of economic arrangements will be made by collectivities, groups and individuals. This will be real life and it will as much ignore our present primitive cut and cry distinctions and disquisitions on mutualism, collectivism, communism, than we,

operating in any kind of practical skilled work or research, ignore in 1927 what the most up to day manual on that subject published in 1827 or 1727 says. We ignore not only 1827, we are often bound to consider the state of experience of 1826 already out of date. Therefore the permanent [137] quibbling on the exclusive value of this or that economic hypothesis on the reward of labor and distribution of products is exasperating and blocks more useful activities. Let every such hypothesis be considered the personal opinion, guess, predilection of the comrade who holds it, something that gives the greatest satisfaction to him on this subject, and let all others form their own independent opinions.

The hard facts are that abundance permitting free communism cannot exist at the beginning of a free society for the plain reason that capitalism, existing until then, does not dream to bring about such abundance: so from where is it to come as if by magic? Capitalism keeps the rich in abundance and the poor in distress; the many, the poor, manifestly cannot live more than a few weeks or days or hours on the existing abundance of the few, the rich; for if the rich man accumulates property and valuables, he does not accumulate food and clothes and the merchant who provides him, does not either and, in fact, nobody does who can help it. So abundance in an appreciable degree simply does not exist for the totality of a population and will have to be created.

The old objections that retribution by work done implies a wage system and authorities to regulate it, and that from saving by the more efficient new capital will be formed, are dictated by the distrust of each other which self-preservation imposes on everybody under the present system. They moreover start from the belief that a free choice between such economic arrangements and free communism will exist: but it will not exist, as abundance exists not—so we must make the best of the situation, instead of not recognizing it at all and noticing only a later probably epoch of abundance. We must encourage, not obstruct the incipient, less perfect stage and indeed I believe that if confidence and the conscience that from now every effort leads straight towards free work and free access to all products, inspire the men and women of those future first post-revolutionary times, all will end well. Communism can right along with this alleged new wage system find many partial realization and create the free communist spirit. If that spirit really is flourishing then, a few time checks or personal savings will not impeded it.

Since I came to conclusions like these described here, I felt relieved of the exclusiveness which the economic labels give to anarchists of the existing varieties. My personal preference for free communism remains unshaken, but the reasons to consider the mutualists and collectivists fools or old fogeys vanished. If I had myself any chance to live in a free society, I should welcome there in permanent co-existence of all economic varieties and should probably wish to change from one to the other, in case [138] the most complete inter-human solidarity was not yet realized. A smaller milieu may already practice free communism, whilst it keeps up mutualist relations with distant groups, etc.

Confidence, peaceable behavior, pliancy of temper, punctuality and reciprocity must vivify and intensity the productive effort, determined by technical skill and experience. Then abundance and ever-increasing extension and practice of freedom can be reached; the reverse is impossible. Free communism under penury would but lead back to an authoritarian system of the most brutal form, bolshevism or fascism. Every organism must grow from beginnings and under the conditions proper to its development. When a hundred possess one cow or five cows, they cannot introduce communism in milk; when they put themselves to the task, to have 10, 20, 30 cows and more, they will reach the point where they can dispense with restrictions for the use of milk, butter, cheese, etc. If they had killed and eaten the one or the five cows, they would have had nothing after a few days and the same task before the, to work, if they want more meat or milk products. Reasonable people will prefer the

former way. It were high time for anarchists to reason out these matters and to cease to be sectarian, led by sentiment.

[I wrote this chapter in a first draft of this essay, March 11-25, 1927 and discussed its subject in an article The initial stages of economic and social life in a free society, March 26, 27, which may come out in any Italian paper in the United States. Then I looked over a French translation Révolution sociale et Réconstruction économique of a chapter, dated December 5, 1919, which Peter Kropotkin added to the Russian translation of his Words of a Rebel published in 1921, at Petersburg-Moscow, by the anarcho-syndicalist Golos Truda group (pp. 336-348). I possess this book since three or four years, but had not read that new chapter. The translation appeared in La Voix du Travail, the organ of the C.G.T.S.R., Paris, March 1927.

Here I find that Kropotkin recognizes the overwhelming importance of the question of non-abundance, limited accumulations and diminution of the productivity of labor in the initial stage of a revolution and considers the most efficient technical continuation and reorganization of production the primary question and not that immediate fullest realization of communism which we usually associate with his ideas. I have examined his ideas more closely and recently only to the autumn of 1880 and cannot say now whether they contain the germs of an evolution leading to his remarks of December 1919. I discussed these matter in an article Observations on P. Kropotkin's additional chapter to the "Words of a Rebel," December 1919, written March 28, 1927 and which may appear in Yiddish in Freie arbeiterstimme, New York.] [139]

## XXII

All expressions of individual and social life would undergo changes in a free society, leading from lower to higher types. In what degree the adult generation of that period, grown up under pre-revolutionary influences will be able to change cannot be foreseen, so how the new generation would evolve and others after it. It is therefore an idle occupation to discuss in advance the questions of individualism and sociability of organization and of spontaneous action. Dissentions and struggles will happen, alternating with agreements or compromise, but it is useless to fight these eventual battles beforehand: it is loss of energy for us and will certainly weigh but little in the coming controversies under conditions unknown to us. We take no active interest in eighteenth century or medieval controversies nor will posterity be interested in our and we have better legacies to transmit than sempervirent controversies on what is to be done in coming time. If real events happen—and since 1914 events continually happen—we are in the midst of such disputes, thorough at loggerheads and withal unprepared, undecided, mere contemporaries who learn from the paper the convulsions of present society around us and who can but write articles, hold a few meetings and issue manifestos to comment the events and wash our hands of them this is too little for our great and good cause.

We must leave this scholastic and fanatical phasis behind us, we are not the censors of anarchism who must extinguish every independent opinion. The various shades of our ideas are a joy to us, like the manifold hues of roses and hyacinths, the mingling of the many flowers on a meadow, all sorts of trees and birds in a forest, all types of beautiful faces and forms. Isolation, persecution, sufferings breed faith and fanaticism, rebellion and sacrifice, so formerly in religion, later in socialism. If men of these types, passionate fighters, are one-sided and exclusivist, I do not criticize them: I consider them as inevitable phenomena swept by passions and it would be futile and even mean to argue with them, as they often throw their life in the scale and undergo martyrdom without flinching. But such men



are exceptions and the unnecessary controversies to which I refer are mostly perpetuated by much more placid men who might and could do better and whom I ask to do this.

Such dogmatism is not found with Bakunin, who limited his propaganda and action to indicate the method of destruction and the initial stage of social reconstruction. He had his hand full to do this and abstained from looking further ahead. It is not found with Elisée Reclus who had very definite opinions of his own, but, as his correspondence shows, regarded other opinions with interest, sympathy and toleration, when he felt assured of the sincerity of those who held them. [140]

I will not try to discuss what empoisoned anarchist polemics and perpetuated divisions, but I will just allude to one fact. It is inevitable that convinced anarchists should not all feel able to give exactly the same intensive expression to their convictions. Some are militant, some retiring, some are satisfied by steady propaganda, others wish to live as anarchists, to live a free life by all means. This can be done in the altruist way outlined above (chapter XVIII), but is also done by personal devices called in French le débrouillage (to rub along somehow), a life on the margin of society. Here again there are gradations; to some such independence permits the most useful propagandist effort; others will evolve backward into simple egoists. This is their right to do and they might simply leave the movement. But something induces them to affirm their contact with the movement, to present theoretical justifications of their very personal doings and by for too much time is lost in some countries to discuss their claims and equally useless efforts are made to erect barriers against them, as if anarchism recognized inner partitions.

Reciprocity would be the very simple criterium sifting individualists and egoists. The individualist gives and expects equal value—the egoist wishes to obtain a maximum of advantages by a minimum of effort of his own. The egoist is the pendant to the tyrant who wishes the maximum of freedom for himself and grants the minimum of freedom to others.

A free society will be elevated by the moral example of the altruist free communist, by the intellectual efficiency of the gifted individualists, by the wish for equity and reciprocity emanating from the mutualist and by every other manifestation of unselfish solidarism. The egoist is inseparable from the old system, the bourgeois and the State will fade away when their moral supports of his break down.

Education in a free society will have to face the same problem as education in all ages of humanity, to operate upon infant brains which should receive by direct instruction and tuition, by observation and example, by the most favorable milieu, such impressions as will impart to them the most important features of the collective experience, morals, habits, capacities and abilities which best correspond to the gradually developing desire of self-exertion, play and work, particular in detail to each child and adolescent. Education, consequently, will be social and individual. Public and domestic education, often so separated and counteractive today will find new syntheses, means to work in harmony. It is impossible to predict which will prevail, since both, the social and the home life will have attractions which we cannot anticipate. Parents will be, as the free life expands, more educated themselves and have more leisure; whether this will induce them to enjoy the education of their children as a pleasure of which they will refuse by all means to be deprived or whether the happy social life will altogether extinguish such desires, we cannot know. But [141] in all ages in good homes first tuition by the mother and later individualizing private instruction were very efficient and even when public schools improved, private lessons are a most useful concomitant. Education is so important that the very best one is but good enough.

We must not confound the present work of advanced socialists and humanitarians, modern schools and all that, schools combating reactionary types of education, with the large unfolding of the educational regeneration in a free society, when the present system will be ancient history to the

young and perspectives which we cannot divine, open before them. Both are incommensurable and experimental pedagogies are as primitive yet as experimental socialism is.

In any case, full education means imparting an always increasing quantity of valuable knowledge and there is no way round this. A simplifying curtailment of instruction is not much good. One may learn too little, but one may never learn too much. Socialists of every description need to be really at home, intellectually, in the great mechanism of the world system, the globe, history and the present peoples, and the mechanism of the present system, and every child should possess a quintessence of the materials displayed in the great works of Elisée Reclus: The Earth, the Geography and Man and Earth—then he would grow to be a free thinker, unassailable to bourgeois, Statist and nationalist argument. Play and leisure are happy substitutes for rigid discipline only, but cannot supersede also large and patient incorporation of knowledge by much solid reading, full explanations and the training of a genuinely critical spirit in youth.

We ignore equally the coming forms of sexual life. As in education, the present efforts fight and destroy the cruelty, enslavement and ignorance of the past, but they cannot anticipate the aspects of this problem in a really free society where protests against a cruel past surviving in the present (as today) are no longer necessary and freedom and mutual confidence create a sphere of security and ease which we can mention in words, but cannot fathom in its real essence. Hence here also experimentation is not necessarily a clear guide, because, as in economics and in education, we cannot create by our present means the conditions of a free society, and make them the basis of the experiment. We must guard against laying down new theories, produce a new moral code; all these are present-day products and will probably be considered by the men and women of a free society as we consider the earliest machines in a retrospective technical museum.

Let all enjoy their life and young years; all practice of freedom is of some good. But let them not lose over this the years when they could have used their brains and a strong arm to pull down this rotten system as a whole. Else, after a pleasant butterfly life they leave this system as it stands today, always more ugly and untenable, but still holding us all in its vicious grasp. [142]

The real character of a free society will depend on the extent and quality of the inter-social relations existing at the time. How far will the sphere of solidarity extend and will it be unconditional or qualified solidarity? I sketched in chapter XV the outline of universal solidarity and in chapter XVI possibilities of co-existence of social organisms which, though the present system would have gone, were still antagonistic, yet reasonable enough to live side by side on terms of equality and peace. I could but state the existence, as a material fact, of unsocial organisms, the national States (chapters IX-XIII), capitalism (chapter XIV) and authoritarian socialism (chapters IV and V). We see the unsocial organisms in the offensive in always more hideous forms (fascism, etc.), as if the deepest caverns had opened and the last prehistoric Saurians awakened from a sleep of ages come forward to make a desperate effort to reaffirm their reign and to make man their helpless slave and pasture. I cannot foresee the end—will the earth again belong to these monsters or will man triumph once more as he did in his young days. But then—I like at least to imagine this—man was solidary against the monsters; today they have the large majority of men at their beck and call—nationalism has, capitalism has, authoritarian socialism has, fascism has—so this treachery of a part of the human race against a free humanity makes the struggle hard and the issue uncertain—yet we will not despair....

Supposing then a free society started somehow some day, the inter-social relations—concerning new materials, products, transports, etc.—will be places on the basis of reciprocity, fairness, a broad-minded and conciliatory spirit, solidarity and punctuality—exactly the opposite of the present state of the bulk of such relations. The globe is our home, the continents are our garden, and whether goods

are used on the spot or shipped at the greatest distance, are details which will bring no profit and do no harm to anybody and which will be arranged and carried out in the same careful and dispassionate way, in which stamped letters thrown into a box are forwarded to a hundred different place in all corners of the globe in the most expeditious way. Statistics, reciprocity, confidence and security will regulate all these problems. A century ago letters going to all parts had to be weighed, registered, paid for by distance, singly and were traveling by a few slow routes only—we are still in this stage as to most inter-social relations; still there is hope.

It is also quite likely that the transfer of power, quick transport by air, television and other improvements of intercommunications and transport will really transform the surface of the globe in a single home, a single garden, a single workroom, and a single warehouse: if social socialism then prevails, mankind might become really free and happy; if the present system and its outgrowths [143] still prevail and the globe is a fascist or a bolshevist unit, they will probably screen every nerve to make war on the moon or the stars to conquer them, or, if the continents are split up international states, views in default of other national objects might quarrel for the repartition of the stars in heaven, since these were discovered by astronomers a very different nationalities!

One thing or the other—the absurd or the most elementary reason; modern man is sufficiently warned by modern history and ought to be wise enough to know which way to go.

### XXIII

The above is all I can say on means and efforts by which that most complete and perfected conception of socialism which is called anarchism might be approached even under the present overwhelming difficulties. I say once more that I regret or depreciate none of the usual method; I wish to make the more effective, enlarge their sphere and add others to them. I did not repeat hear many things upon which all anarchists agree, or explain the anarchist idea in general which is the scope of quite a wealth of good literature in most countries. I observed anarchist activities for the last 46 years from day today with the interest of a comrade and dive right into it earlier history with equal interest and some pertinacy. I have early formed the opinion that the widespread and beautiful idea of a free society cannot be confined within the compass of a unique doctrine, or unique method, or unique organization, but must be approached by many routes and then only will by-and-by-year-old up at secrets and permit accelerated access — the polar regions and all other unknown parts of the globe were opened in this way and science I was certainly much to inspiration (the conception of an anarchist society was one of the early human inspirations close parentheses, but much also, and most of it's practical application, to concentric advanced by many towards the focus of scientific interest. So my anarchism was on the secretary in and I welcomed every expression of anarchist thought, irrespective of my personal predilections.

The war of 1914 produced an anarchist crisis and conflict of opinions quite different from the theoretical and tactical divisions up till van. The advent of Bolshevism, 19 17–18, brought a further crisis, again dividing anarchists in several camps quite apart from the theoretical and tactical divisions mentioned. The end of the war and the cool postwar years up till now did not produce the antiauthoritarian revival which I expected for the time, [144] when the patriotic apprehensions might have been appeased, the Bolshevist delusions of vanished and the terrible chaos created in Europe became palpable to all. There were large revivals in Italy and Spain, indeed, but these succumbed to new authoritarian terror and fascism unmasked its hideous face. All this did not prevent, as far as my observation goes, the lapsing of anarchist propaganda into a sort of routine, into the old channels, taking as little as possible notice of the huge general events or including them into the general

criticism of society. This is too little in the face of the immense perversion of present day average mentality. Under conditions like these we lose ground and we cannot expect but even socially interested and advanced people will come to us when we have so little to say in the juncture like this. Not only must we make up our minds on several subjects of actuality and speak up, but we must also seek fresh contact with them, go to them, be lenient with their shortcomings, develop of the rudiments of free voluntary, associationist spirit which we find among them and before all, explain our ideas in broad, on the secretary and form.

The people's life remains a hard one and unemployment or the fear of it adds a new terror in many countries. We cannot expect on a large scale to interest them in theories and as for popular harangues, they hear them from many sides and are saturated with talk. It is also an unthankful task to criticize reforms, because the workers cannot be expected to give up even the smallest alleviation of their burden for the sake of principles which they do not understand. Besides it is really a somewhat far-fetched argument to reject relatively useful reforms because they make the workers contented and keep them from revolution. They do neither of the one nor the other; they are accepted as installments and there remains ever so many other causes for discontent. But from discontent to revolutionary will there is a wide step, however near they seem to each other.

But there is one great fact which we can always label for the people, as it applies to practically every situation. The voluntary serfdom, obedience is the mainstay of authority which is only to a small degree real power and in much greater proportion is based upon active or passive obedience, tacit consent, of great masses of people. They have acquired a mentality which makes them inoffensive domesticated tools of authority, its accomplices, basking in the sun. Authority grants them the relative security of a precarious living; it grants them absolute irresponsibility for whatever they do buy order and it grants them absence of most mental cares: they just do what they are told to do. This is good enough [145] For very many and they do not care to see further ahead. They may be members of parties, social Democrats and trade unionist; here they're placed in the same position — they get certain benefits, reforms, buy a minimum of personal effort and risk, as anonymous members of large bodies, and the thinking part is left to the leaders. They may make ammunition or transport guns in working hours, they may assist had an antiwar demonstration in the evening, they will never feel the inconsistency of their position. As socialists they may support a protest against naval armaments; as workers they will raise a cry if the naval dockyard is closed. They build prisons and forge chains, they prepare poison gas and produce any adulteration of food, by order, and others plant it on the customer. "Work is work" and "if I do not do this, somebody else will," this is all their reply. No unionist dares to blame them. No political socialist will risk to lose their votes to his party. Syndicalists and antimilitarists sometimes raise a voice of protest, but such movements are seldom popular. Here and there the transport workers refused to handle certain goods. If nationalist feelings are aroused, then such a boycott can take a large proportions as Ireland, India, China testify. Why are common fairness, human kindness, solidarity, rebellious thought so much less potent factors to stir up such collective protests?

Here, I think, ceaseless agitation must set him to rally's feelings of human dignity, to dispel the callous indifference which takes shelter behind "work is work" and "I must live." For it is easy to see that such men will from tools of capitalism become tools of authoritarian socialism and will never be with us. It is useless to talk to them of freedom, but—unless we despair—we must first try to break their moral obtuseness and much of this will best be done in a private, individualizing way without theorizing.

So there is a work of every description to do and renewed efforts ought to set in; for the disproportion between the beautiful anarchist ideal and the scattered efforts made to approach to

this goal, is getting too large. If not by the various proposals in the present essay, then by other more practical means new ground must be won and the present deadlock overcome. Like every living organism the free society of the future can either be formed after preconcerted plan, nor will it be born a full grown, spontaneously, the creation of a magic wand,—it can only develop from germs growing under the most eugenic conditions and then making headway by evolution and revolution as friendly and hostile factors may decide.

April 9–30, 1927.

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