

3.— *The Life of Edgar Allan Poe.* By WILLIAM F. GILL. Illustrated. New York: C. T. Dillingham. 1877.

A GENIAL critic will approach this book with perplexity. From one point of view it is to be exceedingly commended; from another, very little praised, if not, indeed, altogether condemned. Shall we take our stand severely upon literary worth and purity, like a censor for the protection of art and language? Or shall we permit ourselves to be charmed out of watchfulness by sympathy with an honest and kindly purpose, honorable alike to the author's heart and head? There is so much sincerity in the work, so much generous admiration of the subject, so much devotion to the aim, and withal so much freedom from the taint of self-consciousness in the writer, indeed such entire forgetfulness of every thing (English and grammar included) except the object of the work, and that object is such a worthy one, — namely, to vindicate the reputation of a sad life and character from posthumous calumnies, and to give an extraordinary genius in letters his due place in moral estimation, — all this I say is so admirable that we feel only a desire to record our thanks and commendation. But we fear we must be as just to the manner from a literary point of view as to the purpose from a moral one, and this is to say, with regret, that the book is very ill done. First of all, as a biography it is ill done, because it utterly fails to set the hero before us. After reading it, we find that Griswold's malice is severely exposed, and no doubt successfully broken down in the main, so that Poe is rescued from an enemy; also that several misstatements that have passed current are corrected, — such, for example, as that Poe utterly disappears from all eyes for two years, during which he wanders in Europe, it being asserted by Mr. Gill, upon competent testimony apparently, that Poe never left this country at all; also that testimony, some new, some old, is brought to bear in the poet's favor as to character in a manner that will be a comfort to a generous-minded lover of Poe, or even only an admirer of him. But these somewhat negative satisfactions are all that can be gleaned from the work. It leaves a good biography of Poe as desirable as it was before. It altogether fails to set before us a portrait of the man. We do not see him as he went out and came in, as he studied, composed, thought, dreamed. Except a mere glimpse at times, these, as well as his family life, are altogether sealed from our view. One particular point, and that not at all pertaining to an infinite matter, will suffice to illustrate. There are few purely literary authors and poets of modern schools whose works display more erudition than Poe's, and that too not only in literary, historical, and scientific

matters, but in curious learning. Now, this does not come by intuition. Poe must have studied and read hard. But no glimpse of this study appears in Mr. Gill's work, nor even hardly any leisure making it possible. We are not competent to decide whether a biographical picture of this sad but extraordinary genius is possible. There are hints of the destruction of papers by Griswold, perhaps by others, and what needful material may have been destroyed for ever we cannot say. But we feel justified in three opinions: first, that a minutely detailed and complete *daily* biography of Poe is very desirable; secondly, that if such a work, or one much more nearly approaching it than Mr. Gill's, be absolutely impossible thirty years after Poe's death, when many of his contemporaries who had more or less knowledge of him, and even some of his relatives and friends, are still living, it is "something new under the sun" (and we suggest in parenthesis that possibly sufficient industry might even discover some of those boon companions several times alluded to by Gill as meeting the poet at unguarded moments, and leading him astray to liquor and madness); thirdly, that Poe's letters to private friends or business acquaintance, of which it is reasonable to assume there must be many existing, have not been brought to enrich this work of Gill or others previous to it. Yet it is to be mentioned that some interesting letters of Poe, bearing on both his character and his circumstances, which we have met elsewhere, receive no notice in this work of Mr. Gill. One of the most graphic and valuable passages in the volume is that describing Poe's midnight walk with Mr. Sartain of Philadelphia. It is pitiable, pathetic, terrible.

Mr. Gill cannot fairly be credited with literary skill, either in construction or in expression, and his lapses from good English appear in unfortunate prominence beside his subject; for Poe's diction is classical both in purity and elegance. In the preface, on page 4, the author says, speaking of Griswold: "His shafts were none the less pitiless, although *barbed* with *poor* *rustian*." The italics are ours, introduced to indicate the ludicrous metaphor. The pitfall herein seems to be an unwise effort to be fine in writing to the forgetfulness of that simple precision and specific applicability of words which constitute their consummate grace as well as their highest utility. To be just to Mr. Gill, he does not often fail by trying to be fine; but why say, "Griswold sneers *avant* this theory" (p. 103), using an uncommon Scotch word for the proper English *at*? *Illy* (p. 10) is bad English: *ill* is an adverb as well as adjective. On page 133, we have, "it has been deemed not a little remarkable that he should have put forth what he must have known to have been," etc. This is very bad, — "a most vile martext;" it should read, "not a little remarkable that he should put

forth what he must have known to be." The author writes (p. 94), "incapable of sensing delicate distinctions:" this is not English, indeed is no better than a sentimental affectation or slang; *sense* is not in use as a verb. But a more monstrous error of this kind appears on page 162, where the author speaks of "*newspaperial* headquarters!" "Phœbus! what a name!"

We have marked other errors or infelicities, but the foregoing are enough, perhaps more than enough. As a literary performance the work is of too little importance to deserve so much criticism. It is rescued by its moral purpose, by the worth of its subject-matter, and by its considerable success in the vindication from many calumnies and misunderstandings of a sad, suffering, gifted son of song, whose extraordinary writings stand by themselves, unapproachable in their peculiar powers, and shedding the lustre of a classical elevation upon the literature of his country and his language. That Poe, after all is said, had lamentable faults, is true; but it is also true that he had many surpassing virtues, and that some of his sufferings are to be ascribed not to his weakness or sins, but to his singular fidelity to his ideal of his vocation. Probably no man ever lived as to whom more readily the good parson of Auburn would have "quite forgot his vices in his woe." It has been remarked that Poe was devoid of moral sense. We think the remark is wanton. There is no space here to take up this topic, which is intimately connected with Poe's views of the poet's art. But two things may be briefly said. First, that Poe's relations with woman-kind seem without any stain, and, indeed, marked by a singular fidelity to him of his wife and of her mother, in penury, cold, sickness, obscurity, loneliness,—a devotion which never wavered, and which is as much a testimony to him as it is honorable to themselves. Whatever his faults, it is certain he was chaste toward all women, and tenderly true to his own. He was as far as possible from a sensualist in any direction, even in the melancholy lapses of his intemperance, or the early ungratefulness of his extravagance and gambling. Secondly, it is to be said that one may search in vain throughout his works for an unclean word or suggestion. His writings are clean, perfectly clean, from beginning to end. Whatever of morality they may fail to teach, or not aim to teach positively, there is not in them a syllable which by the most remote suggestion can grieve the most sensitive spirit. It is from this point of view that all who admire the genius of Poe owe gratitude to Mr. Gill. For as long as the malicious (Graham says "dastardly") assertions of Griswold were left to stand, the apparent discrepancy between the man and his works was distressing and perplexing. If we do not much better know, by reason of Mr.

Gill, what Poe was, we are thankful to him for demolishing the odious fabrications of what he was not.

J. V. B.

4.—*An Epitome of the Positive Philosophy and Religion, explanatory of the Society of Humanity in the City of New York, together with the Constitution and Regulations of that Society; to which is added an important letter of Harriet Martineau in regard to her religious convictions.* Published by the Society of Humanity, 141 Eighth Street, New York. 1877. pp. 60.

This little work, a mere *brochure*, bears the distinctive earmarks of the earnest and vigorous pen of Thaddeus B. Wakeman, who is rising to be the larger luminary of the American branch of the "Positive," or Positivist, movement, as it slowly, but surely, forces its way upon the attention and convictions of the world. And yet, after half a century of announcement, "Positivism" is not so well known, even by the intelligent public at large, as not to be told of somewhat as if it were a new thing. A little ambiguity first has to be disposed of. The term *positive*, as the common property of the scientific world, means whatsoever is certainly known, or rather whatsoever is scientifically ascertained and demonstrated. In this sense, all scientists,—those who carefully hold hypothesis in the true place of hypothesis, and never allow *facts* to glide over surreptitiously or unconsciously into *scia*,—are positivists, unless they choose to call themselves *ecosophists*. But the Positivist movement sometimes means something more specific, as when it is confined to the full or partial disciples of Auguste Comte, the great French philosopher, now dead, who filled a place in France not unlike that which Herbert Spencer has filled, and now fills, in England.

Comte, while less extensively known among English speaking people than Spencer, is more widely known over Europe at large, and is impressing himself probably more profoundly upon the general thoughts of the world. He preceded Spencer by two or three decades as a writer, and Spencer has experienced some difficulty in guarding himself from the imputation of being one of his partial disciples. Each, however, is a great original thinker, and the coincidence between them is only incidental to the fact that they have worked somewhat on parallel lines in the grand sciento-philosophic evolution of the past half-century. To point out the difference between them

is more important in this sketch than to indicate their likeness. That difference lies, perhaps, most fundamentally in the inspiring *animus* of their respective labors. Spencer is scholarly, scientific, and philosophical; Comte is scientific, philosophical, and *reformatory*. Spencer stops, for the most part, with the analysis of what has been and is, and the synthesis *in idea*, or *our knowledge* of the matter. Comte is intently bent on accomplishing the needed changes in human society, and his whole philosophical elaboration is simply the building of a platform upon which to operate for the beneficent reconstruction of human institutions. Spencer is a philosopher; Comte is both philosopher and reformer, the reformatory purpose preponderating, how profound soever were his preliminary investigations.

The result of this difference on the part of Comte has been, as he himself planned and intended, the springing up of small, incipient organizations in various countries, intended to replace the prevalent church organization, and to charge themselves with the general education and development of mankind. It is claimed for Comte that he was the founder, at once, of the science of sociology and the religion of humanity, as contrasted with the divinity schools and religions of the past. The Society of Humanity in the city of New York is, at a second remove, one of these organizations, but so enlarged as to cease to be distinctively Comtean. It retains and prefers the term Positive, enlarging it to embrace the labors of all the great thinkers. Henry Edger was incipiently, and for some years, the personal head of the distinctively Comtean movement in America, and, we believe, still retains that position. Mr. Wakeman is the active man and leader of this later effort to found a church upon the distinctive basis of science.

The first thing, in order to understand something of Positivism, is to know that certain frequent and important words have a distinctive and technical meaning, differing from the present popular use. The CREED of this church is, or means, the entire body of the sciences, or all that is known certainly of the world and its inhabitants. Positivists, even Comteans, are by no means atheists, although they make society, or humanity rather, the direct object of their worshipful devotedness. They simply demand scientific proofs of the existence of God, or else they leave the question in abeyance, among matters unsolved, in respect to which they are neither entitled to affirm or deny. So also of spiritual existence beyond this world. According to their view, church and religion are natural needs and outgrowths of humanity, not resting, as ordinarily assumed, upon faith in God or immortality, but upon the necessity for human culture and improvement; so, indeed, that if there be no God and no worldful of immortals to look after us, then

all the more do we need to organize for the care of our own spiritual and material destiny. We should be all the more religious, and not less so, if there is no superhuman machinery intent on watching over and providing for us. But we cannot do better than to let Mr. Wakeman himself tell us what Positivism means by RELIGION.

"This word has been defined as belief in, worship of, or obligation of man to, some particular God or Supreme Being. Thus each Protestant or Catholic Christian, or Mohammedan, or Hindoo, has his 'religion.' Each sect and people regards itself as having the one true religion, because its god is the only true one. The word 'religion' has thus come to express the relation of the worshipper to his supernatural god. Religion and theology are, in this view, indissoluble. The moral and practical effect of thus limiting the meaning of this word has been to make enemies or strangers of the adherents of the various gods or theological conceptions. It was this old theological meaning of the word that made the earth the battle-field of 'religions.'

"But in the newer — that is, in the human and scientific — sense, the word 'religion' has come to mean that 'convergence' or unity of people, or of peoples, that has resulted, or may result, from any common belief or sentiment, whether springing from a belief in a god or otherwise. In this sense, the *unity, integration, or binding together* under the influence of a common conviction, is the substance of the meaning, of which the gods are ever but variable incidents. Thus, in the march of history, each god in his turn falls into insignificance, but the social unity — the collective man — is more and more. In this view the lesson of history is clear that human progress must be arrested, or man must, in this newer sense, become more and more religious, and yet at the same time less and less theological.

"The whole law of human progress may well illustrate the new meaning of this word 'religion,' for that law is but the application of the law of growth in biology to human societies. There is an ever-increasing cooperation of parts and organs, which are ever more and more *specialized*. That is, the growth or integration of the people, or of peoples, is attended by an ever-increasing liberty and also convergence of the individual as a part and organ of the integration. Each religion in history is an integration, and each therefore has been in turn succeeded by a broader faith, while the individual has generally become more free, and less a slave or serf, — that is, less a creature of *status* or birth. To illustrate: —

"1. The fetichistic religions formed the bond of communities small in size and simple in organization, while the individual was the slave of Nature or of tribal authority.

"2. Out of these tribes arose the larger religious integrations of astrology, — *e. g.*, Egypt, Assyria, Persia.

"3. Over these grew the still larger polytheistic empires of Greece and Rome.

"4. Over and out of these grew the grander monotheistic integrations of the Papacy and Mohammedanism.

"5. The fierceness of the faiths last named was expended in the Crusades; and the feeling that all men are brethren, and that all nations are, under the law of nations, parts of a great commonwealth, announced the dawn of a new and still higher integration. This has been properly called the RELIGION OF HUMANITY. It is based upon the conviction that mankind and their interests and destiny are the matters of supreme interest on this planet. 'I come not to bring peace, but a sword,' was the

old import of this word 'religion.' *Liberty and Union, Order and Progress*, are the watchwords of its newer meaning.

"This scientific and human use of this word 'religion' Comte (Catechism, p. 51) finds to be most happily included in the generally received etymology of the word, by which it is derived from the latin *re*, back, and *ligo-are*, to bind. The word is thus made to tell us that it is the *binding back* of man to his fellows and to the world. It is the *tie* by which his feelings and thoughts *within*, and his actions *without*, are co-ordinated into health and harmony with each other, with society and the world, with the past and the future.

"Some modern scholars, however, suspect that the truer derivation of the word is from *re*, over again, and *lego-ere*, to gather or consider, — i. e., to ponder or carefully review. Thus the common Latin phrase, '*Religio jurisjurandi*' (the *religion* of an oath), would mean, under the first derivation, the bond or obligation of the oath; but, under the second derivation, it would mean the care and scrupulousness of the oath. Fortunately, under the 'new faith,' the meanings sustained by both derivations are happily included and harmonized. In it, *religion* stands, as never before, for the great reconciliation, in which social unity and moral obligation rest upon, and grow ever stronger from, the ever-tested truth and scrupulous exactness of science.

"The substance and the constructive feeling of the word 'religion' is admirably presented in the meaning and etymology of the word 'holy,' which, as an adjective, is often associated with it. The derivation of this word points to the Anglo-Saxon verb, to '*heal*,' to make '*whole*,' — that is, to secure the *wholeness* or *harmony* of *health*."

In a similar manner, the Epitome proceeds to define *science, humanity, egotism, altruism*, and other words, either new or employed in modified senses. Perhaps the use of the term *priests* by the Positivists is most novel and confusing. The creed of the new church being science, the whole body of scientific men becomes, or should become, the future priests of humanity. Their calling becomes elevated and sanctified. It is they who, in a special sense, are hereafter to take charge of the destinies of the social world. They should realize to themselves the sanctity and responsibility of their position. They should recall themselves from their vagrant and merely speculative investigations, tending now loosely outward in a thousand directions, and concentrate themselves upon such science as will most effectively and immediately contribute to the social welfare. In this manner sociology looms up as the supreme science. All other sciences should be studied in subservience to this. Such is a slight sketch of the religion of humanity. Its American development takes on certain modifications, never contemplated by Comte, from the more radical and cosmopolitan thinking around us. Already American "Positivism," itself a branch of empiricism at large, has become a pretty broad eclecticism, assimilating evolution, social freedom, and much other recent doctrine; and Wakeman is preëmi-

nently a leading, perhaps *the* leading, mind of this American eclectic empiricism.

S. P. A.

5. — *The Cradle of the Christ: A Study of Primitive Christianity.* By OCTAVIUS BROOKS FROTHINGHAM. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 8vo.

As regards seriousness of purpose, importance of subject, and charm of diction this book is to be classed with such works as "Ecce Homo" and "Literature and Dogma;" but, in the time which has already elapsed since its publication, it is made evident that the somewhat eager reception accorded to those works is not to be accorded to this. It is to be regretted that it could not have come to us from across the water, with some little mystification as to authorship, and backed by a trans-Atlantic reputation. The experiment were worth trying, had it been possible. Mr. Frothingham is a *bête noir* to so respectable a portion of the reading public that his writings must fare as fares any cause presented to a hostile tribunal. If the court knows itself, and respects itself, it will give no countenance to so revolutionary utterances.

But the experiment would be impracticable, for the authorship of Mr. Frothingham's books could not be hidden; they need no autograph; and its absence from the title page could give rise to no mystification while on all the other pages its presence is so pronounced.

Mr. Frothingham's rather flippant treatment of other essays in the department of Christology may, however, partially reconcile the even-minded reader to the unjust indifference of the public towards himself. Why not serve him up with his own sauce? Why not include his own works with those others, and dismiss his own claim to attention as lightly as he dismisses the claims of others, saying with him: "Books have been written about the New Testament by the thousand, — libraries of books; but they merely supplant and refute one another. Each is entitled to as much consideration as the rest, and to no more?" This is substantially one more book about the New Testament. Are we, then, to concede off-hand that a prophet has come to judgment at last? In view of a self-assurance so sublime, and in defence of the splendid literature so carelessly contemned, one is sorely tempted to condone the public inhospitality. But the book must still be judged on its merits. And it is to be said, moreover, that this dictum of our author is not quite so complacent as it seems, standing alone. He may

fairly claim, and impliedly does claim, that his own work is exempted from the judgment thus flung broadcast upon the works of others by reason of its different method. Whereas *those* have been written from the standpoint of supernaturalism, *this* is not so written. *Those* were dogmatic; *this* is literary. In dogmatism all is confusion, — mere assertion and refutation. The literary method, on the other hand, gives promise of definite result. There is, therefore, neither praise nor blame. It is not in the man that walketh to direct his steps; all is of the method which the spirit of the age permits him to grasp.

The literary method, as employed by the author, leads straight to one result sufficiently definite to alienate the great majority of Bible-readers from his present undertaking: "The literary laws forbid under these circumstances our reading the gospel narratives as authentic histories, — constrain us, in fact, to read them, in some sort, as disquisitions, making allowance, as we go along, for the infusion of doctrinal elements." This statement involves the fundamental premise of the whole work. Here must the opponent make a stand, if he would not incontinently yield himself or flee. When we have once surrendered the notion of a special inspiration of some sort exempting the New Testament from literary treatment, will our next step place us by the side of our author? If so, we shall be quite likely to go with him the rest of the way. It surely is not far to his inference that "the actual Jesus is inaccessible to scientific research."

At any rate, by this statement the author opens wide the way for the enterprise of tracing the origin and development of the Christ-idea; the book is partially devoted to that undertaking. But it is also "a study of primitive Christianity." Unfortunately the two subjects thus indicated only lap marginally one upon the other; they are not coincident; for the most part an excursion into one involves a departure from the other, so that the reader finds himself unwittingly attempting the feat of being in two places at the same time; or, seeking to read with undivided mind, he is put to the labor of assorting the author's material, and discovering for himself — a task not always easy — what has reference to the principal thesis and what to the sub-titular "study."

The "Cradle of the Christ" was the Hebrew hope of a national deliverer. The Messianic faith of the earlier disciples pertained to the prevailing Jewish conceptions of the period. The "Son of Man" of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, "their Pauline elements being eliminated," does not transcend the requirements of the common expectation. Jesus does but repeat with persuasive lips what the law-givers of his race had proclaimed. "He is a radical Pharisee, who has at heart the en-

franchisement of his people." He is made a native of Galilee, "the insurgent district of the country;" is associated with Bethlehem, the city of David, and laboriously connected with the royal line; is represented by frequent iteration as fulfilling Old Testament anticipations; and is formally welcomed by John the Baptist, himself thoroughly imbued with the popular Messianic expectation. The story of the Temptation is patterned after incidents in the career of Moses. The story of the Transfiguration derives its point from the introduction of the law-giver and prophet of the old dispensation. The phrase "kingdom of heaven," as used by Jesus, was interpreted into conformity with the common expectation, as describing the reign of a prince of David's line. It was expected that the Messiah would work miracles, and Jesus is made to fulfil that expectation. His moral precepts are in character with his position, echoes of ancient ethical law. His religious beliefs are the ordinary beliefs of his age and people, nor does his conception of his office differ materially from that of his countrymen.

The Pauline phase of Christianity is put also under the lineage of Hebrew thought. Paul's religious belief was not altered by his conversion. He was a Messianic believer before that crisis and after it. His writings thoroughly reflect the speculations of the Talmud. His teachings do not go beyond the times of Jewish thought.

In the fourth gospel — the Johannean authorship of which is unqualifiedly denied — "vestiges of the popular Jewish conception appear but faintly here and there." But the conception underlying the representation of Christ as the Logos — the conception of the divine reason personified — was of ancient date, and had worked its way into the substance of Jewish thought. "Here is already the germ of a trinity maturing within the bosom of the Hebrew monotheism. The process has been simple; the consecutive steps have been inevitable. But in the process the solid ground of Judaism has been left; the massive substance of the ancient faith has been melted into cloud."

To the Christ-idea thus formed in the East the West gave currency; made it the central feature of a vast religious system; crowned it, and placed it on a throne. There is a supplementary chapter in which are considered the claims of Jesus to a place in history. Throughout his work the author distinguishes between Jesus and the Christ. The Christ-idea has had obviously an historical development; the historical status of Jesus is another question, — a question which his subject does not oblige him to touch upon, but which he is not unwilling to consider in deference to the reader's probable expectation. He doubts if such a person as Jesus is presumed to have been was necessary to

account for the existence of the religion afterwards called Christian. "As an impelling force he was not required, for his age was throbbing and bursting with suppressed energy." "Jesus is not necessary to account for the ethics of the New Testament. They were, as has been said, the native ethics of Judaism unqualified." He concludes that "no clearly defined traces of the personal Jesus remain on the surface, or beneath the surface, of Christendom." "The image of Jesus, has been irrecoverably lost." "The person of Jesus, though it may have been immense, is indistinct. That a great character was there may be conceded; but precisely wherein the character was great is left to our conjecture."

We have sufficiently indicated the general scope of the volume before us. What is the bearing of this argument upon the common faith of to-day? Does it tend to invalidate the claims of Christianity? The author affirms that it does not. He separates religion from criticism, and divests the subject in hand of religious implications. He disclaims all purpose or desire "to undermine Christianity." He believes that religion is independent of history, and that Christianity is independent of the New Testament. Any system of religion must stand on its merits, — that is to say, its uses. "The church that arrogates for itself the right to control the spiritual concerns of the modern world must not plead in justification of its pretension that it satisfied the requirements of devout people in another hemisphere two thousand years ago." "Christianity must prove its adaptation to the hour that now is; its adaptation to days gone by is not to the purpose." In short, "a church that does not bless mankind cannot be saved, and a church that does bless mankind cannot be destroyed."

This is well and truly said. The question remains, however: Are the author's conclusions just and true? That question must be referred to the reader's judgment. It must not be concealed, however, that the book has much the appearance of an *ex parte* statement. And this may be said without imputing to the author either wilful reservations or conscious partisanship. The fault is in his stars; he is apparently equipped with organs to discern very clearly the *under* side of things. Towards sentiment, which gives presentiment of an *upper* side, his attitude is indulgent, but not sympathetic. "Sentiment is conservative. The poetic feeling detains in picturesque form the ideas which, if exposed to the clear action of intelligence, would be rejected as unsubstantial." Must we, then, reject as unsubstantial ideas that are not wholly clear to intelligence? Possibly; but if the reader of this work is *not* prepared to concede that whatever is undemonstrable is unworthy of regard, and that there is no verity in the unverifiable, he must ap-

prehend that a mind intolerant of the undemonstrable and unverifiable will ignore some aspects of a religion that are essential to its complete presentation.

While the author is indulgent towards sentiment, in regard to the flat-footed class of writers and speakers his utterance is more decided. "The acute, unimaginative, determined minds, impatient of the mists, however beautiful, that conceal knowledge, clear a way for the homes and gardens of the new generations." It may be fairly doubted, however, whether a mind that is impatient of the mists that veil in mystery the sources of religious sentiment and devotion (mists that no impatience, or science either, ever can dispel); a mind that is *only* "acute, unimaginative, determined," — is fully qualified for a fair estimate of the sources and sanctions of the Christ-idea.

However this may be, the unbroken terrestrial tenor of the work must give it an appearance of one-sidedness, even to impartial readers. The mental prepossession is too apparent to be questioned. After following out this theory that the Christ came *up*, born of a nation's mood and nurtured by political emergencies, one feels that, though the case is well made *out on that side*, — or *because* it is, — an advocate should be immediately heard upon the other side, in favor of the alternative — or rather supplementary — hypothesis that the Christ came *down* "from above."

The questionable prepossession now referred to appears distinctly in the following allusion to Jesus: "If the time ever comes when his lineaments are fully revealed to sight, he will be found not much greater nor much better than his generation justified." The theory here, it is noticeable, is essentially identical with the theory concerning the Christ-idea, and the doubtful character of this reflects doubt upon that. What is the maximum limit under this rule? Does Shakespeare, for example, transcend the limit? If he does, so perhaps may Jesus; if he does not, the rule would seem to have no application; it would be difficult, to say the least, to adjust the proportion between Shakespeare and "his generation."

The stature of *soul* is not to be estimated in that way. And it is a supposition not to be altogether ignored that, whether through special inspiration from on high, or through a fortuitous concurrence of atomic felicities, or through a happy combination of ancestral gifts, the soul of Jesus attained such stature that he himself was able to lift the Jewish notion of a Deliverer to the sublimity of the Christ-idea.