

gument by saying that a certain course of conduct is beneficial; that, therefore, it is enjoined; and that, because enjoined, it is right: instead of saying, in a still briefer summary, that the act is beneficial, and, because beneficial, right. It will be seen that they interpolate a command and draw a conclusion from it when they cannot account for their belief in the command or for the reason of the command's existence, except by assuming the very proposition which they afterwards infer from the command, — a course of reasoning that is evidently circular.

If the suggestions which have been briefly presented are well founded; if, in our search through the moral as well as the physical world, we do not find any thing in the nature of authoritative command, but only order and regular sequence, — it is difficult to perceive how the solution of a question in ethics differs from that of one in chemical physics as far as instrumentalities and method are concerned. Our emotions evidently are not sufficient means with which to solve a problem in chemical combination; neither are they adequate to decide for us whether conduct is moral or immoral. It is not claimed by any one under any view of the subject that the moral sense or conscience has the power of informing us what, in a stated condition of circumstances, is the right course of action. The most that is claimed by any writer upon morals is that conscience gives only the first simple general axioms of conduct in accordance with which we are to regulate our lives, but that it never can be a trustworthy guide in the complicated affairs of social life until these are analyzed, simplified, and reduced to their first elements. Others assert even less than this, and claim that conscience does not give any rules whatever in regard to specific conduct in stated cases, but only enjoins upon us to do what is right after we have found out by other means what course of conduct is in fact right. They allege only that conscience enforces the obligation of doing our duty after we have decided by appropriate tests what our duty really is, — making conscience the guide in our choice of and obedience to motives, and limiting its functions to the province of subjective morality. They look upon conscience as the impulse to right conduct, and as useful only when we have already settled which line of conduct is right. To them it is analogous to the steam which propels the vessel, and not to

the pilot who holds the helm and selects the course. Under either of these views of conscience, the acquiring of knowledge concerning the objective morality of any specific act or particular line of conduct is still left to be exclusively an affair of intellectual research, and not of emotion or feeling.

T. F. BROWNELL.

THE REVOLUTION.

THERE is no pause. Still blow resounds on blow,
The order old making to shake and reel
From base to pinnacle. To dust brought low,
Crescent and Cross the shock of ruin feel.
Shallow Reaction tries in vain to stem
The Revolution's surge, which more and more,
Drowning tiara, throne, and diadem.
Spreads undulating wide from shore to shore.
What though Priest, Kaiser, Sultan, King still sit
Sceptred and crowned above the encroaching flood?
Belshazzar's legend is above them writ,
And they grow pale before Man's altered mood.
Voices of Revolution, trumpet-clear,
Byron and Shelley, lo, your day is near!

B. W. BALL.