On Picket Duty.

Evidently no opportunity is being neglected by the Japanese for demonizing the Russian government. When the Russian prisoners in Japan get back to their native land, they will not be the same men that they were when they left. They are taking a course in political education, and they are not likely to be so tame and tractable any longer. The Japanese have been keeping them plentifully supplied with revolutionary literature which the propagandists in England and America have cheerfully furnished, and it is possible that the seed thus sown will be no small factor in the irrepressible overthrow of the Russian autocracy. This episode is also a reminder that there are some people of other nationalities who might profit through being Japanese prisoners of war.

Illinois has a drastic anti-boycott law, but this law has not prevented thousands of toasters and other unionized workmen from declaring, publicly urging, and openly carrying on a boycott against the powerful department-store interests of Chicago. "Enforce the law," the plutocratic newspapers, lawyers, and employers have shrieked; "arrest, try, and convict the officers of the boycotting unions; hold them responsible for the violence, the 'slugging,' and the rioting the boycott has provoked." But somehow the hue and cry has failed of effect. Even the injunctions obtained have been "barren idealities." You cannot punish men for boycotting—just while trial by jury survives and public sympathy favors the boycotter. Experience is teaching labor the beauty and virtue of passive resistance.

To the many occidental institutions which the Chinese have found it expedient to adopt has lately been added the boycott, and the use which they are making and promise to make of it bids fair to eclipse any application of it that has been made over here. The exclusion of the Chinaman from the United States has long rankled in his heart, and he has probably thought of it often when using American products in his own country. It is strange, however, that it has not sooner occurred to him what a powerful weapon against our unjust discrimination he holds in his hands; but he has discovered it at last, and already sales of American products in China are falling off. Americans in China are being severely let alone, and even the coolie longshoremen refuse to unload American ships. Unlike the American trade-unionists, the Chinsman believes in adhering strictly to contracts, so his boycott does not apply to contracts previously entered into, and these will be fulfilled to the letter; but, when a Chinaman goes in for anything, he goes in for it thoroughly, and, unless the rigor of the exclusion laws are soon modified, we may expect an epoch-making demonstration of the value of the boycott. It is amusing to see the frenzy of American politicians, who are being urged by Pacific coast merchants to revoke the law, while organized labor everywhere admonishes them to "stand pat." The result is that our consular agents in China are being instructed to secure a removal of the boycott, but these agents are met with the bland smile of the Mongolian, who tells them simply that nobody is doing anything, nobody is committing a crime or misdemeanor, how, therefore, can officials act? And so frenzy is fast merging into despair, for no relief is in sight. May we not now expect Mr. E. C. Walker to come forward with a demand for protection for the American exporter, who is being "invaded" by the fact that the Chinese can do without his wares?

Moses Harman, whose arrest was announced in the May number of Liberty, has been convicted, in the United States district court at Chicago, on the charge of sending obscene literature through the mails and has been sentenced to one year in prison. He was released on bail, however, and is now at liberty pending an appeal to the United States circuit court. As previously stated, the articles (in "Lucifer") upon which the conviction was based are unobjectionable by only the most rigid construction of the Comstock postal law,—a law of which Liberty's opinion is well known. The trial was, moreover, marked by a characteristic which is a striking example of the methods pursued by the federal judiciary in cases where ethical opinions opposed to those held by the presiding magistrates are involved. The accused was not permitted to address the jury in his own behalf, and, after the jury, upon the instruction of the judge, had returned a verdict of guilty, the convicted man was refused the privilege—commonly accorded to the least criminals—of giving his reasons why sentence should not be pronounced upon him. Following the conviction, the next number of "Lucifer" was deposited for mailing in the post-office at Chicago, was promptly confiscated, and was sent to the dead letter office at Washington, where the entire edition was destroyed by order of the post-office department, without even a notification of the fact being sent to the publisher. This application of the "administrative process"—patterned after those of the European autocrats,—was duly and formally protested against by a special representative of the Free Speech League, who was sent to bring the case before the assistant attorney-general for the post-office department, and this official promptly made the sweeping decision that the articles complained of (a couple of very mild disquisitions on the sex question) were obscene and should be excluded from the mails, giving incidentally his unofficial opinion that all literature on that subject should be denied transmission through the mails. Here are bigotry and intolerance run riot; but it has cleared the air, and we now have a real Russian censorship in full running order at the Chicago post-office, where the superintendent of second-class mailers paws on "Lucifer's" contents before the paper is mailed, deciding whether the matter is mailable or not. This certainly relieves the publisher of the risk of unwittingly violating the law, and to that extent it is an improvement upon the old system. But let us hear no more about the existence of a free press in America! Obviously money is needed to carry the case to a higher court, and all those wishing to contribute for that purpose may send remittances to the treasurer of the Free Speech League, Dr. E. B. Foote, Jr., 120 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

The Mountain Republic.

This is my country, these brave heights,
And that green fir loath my flag
In whose bright gleam mine eye delights.
How wild it waves above the crag!

Here is a true republic, ruled
By no god gold or Prince of Hire,
In golden Trade's mean wisdom schooled,
But only by the Heart's Desire.

No mastered men, or desk-doomed, haunt
These free-air'd wilds to slaver and sigh;
Here straight Convention makes no vaunt
And liberty is not a lie.

No constitution of men's choice,
But one that willing Nature signs,
Framed by the wind that lifts its voice
In yonder parliament of pines.

My church, low broad, how grandly broad!
The alpenglow her altar fire,
Her organizes the winds of God,
And that white peak beyond its spire.

Over my airy skyland home
The Vision floats within the reach,
And star-born thoughts are free to come—
Thoughts never to be muffled in speech.

Come, hearts that sicken, here is health.
Here shall the weeping, wasting cease;
Come to this cloud-blot commonwealth;
The peaks invite you to their peace.
The Life of Josiah Warren.

The advance subscriptions to William Baillie's book on "Josiah Warren, the First American Anarchist," have continued to come in, since the last number of Liberty appeared, but the total number is still somewhat short of what Mr. Baillie deems to be necessary to warrant him in sending the volume to the press. The readers of Liberty are so familiar with Mr. Baillie's contributions to its columns that they do not need the assurance that the book will be worthy of its subject and worth the price ($8.00) charged for it.

The Supreme Court as the Guardian of Liberty.

It is hardly necessary to premise a discussion of the opinions of the United States supreme court in the bakery's case by disclaiming sympathy with so-called "labor legislation," which is generally, if not invariably, paternalistic in intent and plutocratic in effect—which, in other words, is a delusion and a snare. To readers of Liberty this is a familiar position.

But to maintain that the only solution of the labor problem is the abolition of State-protected and State-fostered monopoly is not to say that we as libertarians are bound to hail with enthusiasm any and every court decision annuling a labor statute on pseudo-individualistic grounds. Plutocratic individualism is of a piece with "standpattist reciprocity"—all take and no give. The courts, with few exceptions, find no violation of individual liberty except where labor or the public at large hopes to benefit by the restriction.

The organized bakers of New York, lacking initiative, strength, or energy, obtained several years ago a statute limiting work in bakeries and confectionery establishments to ten hours a day and sixty hours a week. The act prohibited employees and journeymen, if a man chooses to work twelve hours, no one should have the power to restrain him.

But the courts of New York sustained the law as a proper and reasonable exercise of the "police power" of the State. They held it to be "a health measure," a restriction justified by due regard for public safety, hygiene, and morals. Since scores of laws plainly invasive are annually sustained under the police power, this view of the ten-hour bakers' act was in no way unnatural and extraordinary.

But the United States supreme court has reversed the State judiciary and killed the act. It said of it:

"It necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer and employees concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer. The general right to make a contract in regard to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. Under that provision no State can deprive any person of liberty, or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless there are circumstances which exclude the right.

As to the health plea, the opinion said:

"It is a question which of two powers or rights shall prevail—the power of the State to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract. The mere assertion that the subject relates to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of individuals to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor. We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this case.

An eight-hour law for the miners and smelter workmen of Utah was upheld a few years ago, though it was just as restrictive and stringent as the bakeries' act. The supreme court, therefore, claims the right to decide in any given case whether or not the subject relates to public health.

Lyman Spooner contended in his argument for the restoration of the original and genuine system of trial by jury that the real legislator is he who construes and "declares" the law. The pretensions of our courts have nullified the constitutional separation of governmental powers. The law is what the courts choose to make it.

What does the supreme court know about work in bakeries? What qualifications has it for deciding whether public health does or does not require limitation of bakers' hours of labor? The legislature is supposed to represent the public. Its members are drawn from all classes and ranks. Moreover, it grants hearings in cases of any importance; it conducts investigations and considers practical as well as theoretical objections to proposed legislation. It is far more competent to pass upon questions of fact than judges. Yet the supreme court undertakes to say that miners do, and bakers do not, need the protection of the State in regard to their hours of work.

Plutocracy undoubtedly prefers legislation and government by judges, and especially by irresponsible judges who are appointed for life and have no political campaigns before them to suggest consideration of popular feelings and prejudices. But for this very reason no intelligent libertarian will take them seriously in the role of guardians of individual rights.

So far as the New York bakers are concerned, they have learned that organization, strikes or the threat of strikes, boycotts or the threat of boycotts are more effective than legislative prohitions and interferences. A valuable lesson, this; after a series of such eye-opening illustrations labor will perceive the futility of paternalistic legislation and the need of self-help and voluntary cooperation for legitimate purposes.

The Simple Life and the Strenuous Life.

(Concluded.)

But I see I am beginning to assume that a certain amount of restraining from strenuousness is desirable; and, strenuousness being notoriously the delight of the American people, I cannot expect that all will let me assume this. We have been told, on Dr. Watts's authority, that Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do; and Watts took this from notorious experience. Furthermore, Gov. Vardaman of Mississippi says that he never knew of a case where a hard-working negro had committed a crime of a nature to provoke a lynching. Is it not true that idleness breeds vice and crime? Furthermore—to apply the test which H. C. Wells says is the only valid test for judging any social policy whatever—what is its effect on the children? How often does one hear of an idler's children turning out credibly, however amiable the idler himself may have been?

These are weighty charges, and I fear it may be safer not to try to deny that an over-indulgence in idleness is a vice just like any other gluttony. Yet there is another side. Against Gov. Vardaman we may set Josiah Elwyn, who testifies that the crimes committed by tramps are not committed by the true "hoboes" who refuse to do any work, but by the "gay-cats" who are on the tramp looking for work or at least willing to accept it if it comes their way. Against Dr. Watts we may set certain fine Bible texts about the moral peril of devoting one's self to strenuous pursuit of wealth and so on. It is not undisputed that Dusty Rhodes is either more vicious or more pernicious than Rockefeller. Over-strenuousness is at least another gluttony. It may be the legitimate resource of a man who foresees, like Caius Gracchus or Jesus Christ, that he will never be permitted to live out the span of life for which a common man must save his strength; but it has certainly been the ruin of many a good man's life. And, if you list the sons of the great strenuous men of history, how many of them are notably better than the sons of the admirable idlers of history?

The fact is—and it is pretty widely admitted, too—that over-strenuousness is a fault, and a very common fault, and a danger in our national life today; and that a certain amount of under-strenuousness on the part of some people furnishes a desirable balance, by giving us an example and a temptation to the normal share of rest which we are so unready to take, and by giving us the advantage of experienced companionship in the restful life when we do get ourselves into it for a fortnight or so. Besides, so long as we live on the un-Kropotkinian principle of the division of labor, certain elements of human life can best be furnished by letting some specialize in the direction of the contemplative life, for just the same reason as we specialize in other things. You can no more have Thoreau without admitting the swarm of village loafers than you can have Bismarck without ad-
mitting the swarm of ward politicians; and the world could better spare Bismarck than Tho-
rem.
But, to come back to the tyranny of public opinion,—we might yet put up with that if it
would stop there. But now we have a rea-
blessence of an old political fault, associated with the existence of race prejudice. Where two
races come together, and the more strenuous one is (naturally) dominant, it proceeds first to
despite the less strenuous, then to get angry at
seeing those contemptible creatures enjoy the
delights of loafing while their betters are toil-
ing and moiling, then (as of course the other
race’s labor is cheap when he can get it) to get
still more angry at seeing such a deal of such
delightfully cheap labor going to waste and
himself missing a whole lot of profits that he
could have made if this cheap labor had been
available to him; and at last he goes and erects
a law that the sheriff shall have authority to
seize and put to work any man (understood in
its application to be “any negro”) who persist-
enly idles without having a store of capital to
support him while he does so (this is the recent
enactment of one of our southern states), or
else a law imposing on every Zulu but a tax
which is intended to be so heavy that the ordi-
nary Zulu cannot possibly pay it unless he
work hard (this is Natal just now; you remem-
ber, the reason why the British cause was sup-
posed to be the cause of a higher civilization
because the Boers oppressed the natives so).

It should be borne in mind that the trouble is
not an impossibility of getting labor if you are
willing to pay the price that will bring out that
labor, as old-fashioned political economy bids
you do. I am willing to risk the statement that
any cotton-planters in the laziest county of Mis-
sissippi can have all the hands his fields can
hold by offering three dollars a day. Doubtless
half the sum would do it. Similarly, it cannot
be doubted that the Natal sugar-planters, by
raising the rate of wages, would bring out some
of these black idlers, and, if they raised it high
enough, would even attract European labor.

But, though the laws of political economy are
an admirable appeal when your employé tries
some mean trick to make you pay him ten per
cent more than he is getting, it is obvious that
political economy cannot have any validity at
all when it commands you to offer three shil-
lings wages where you have been accustomed
to paying two. No science on earth can be genu-
ine if it leads to such conclusions as that.

I think much simpler to tax the poor man so heavily
that, if he spends part of his time on strike, or
holds his labor waiting for a better market, or
any of those things that political economy re-
gards as so natural, he cannot escape having the
roof pulled down over his head for failure to
pay his taxes.

I never before happened to hear of a case
where taxation was used with the intent of hav-
ing it work in precisely this way. It strikes
me as beautifully simple and efficient, besides
the fact that you get the tax-money. But who
are these Zulus who need such a tax to make
them work? Doubtless an inefficient race who
might be taxed to death and the earth lose
nothing?

Let me inform you that within a hundred
years the Zulus, under their king Tyuka (Cha-
ka, or eight other spellings), conquered all
southeast Africa. Tyuka, like Philip of Mae-
don, had invented a new shape of spear to make
possible a new form of military organization.
Nothing but the white settlements, with which
he never chose to quarrel, stopped his conquests.
A runaway fragment of Tyuka’s army formed
the great inland Matabele (Matabele), probably
the most dreaded power on the inland side of
the mountains. A defeated tribe, flying from
Tyuka, bore down all opposition to its march
all the way to the Victoria Nyanza, and then
turned back and settled itself in what it saw
fit of the lands it had crossed. This is their
record in war; and in peace—and in our day—
hear what Dr. Clark, the head of the Christian
Endeavor Movement, says he saw on one of his
recent round-the-world tours of inspection:
That cheap corrugated iron church . . . holds,
Sunday after Sunday, the most active and devoted
body of Christians of any church in the world with
which I am acquainted; and yet all its members are
black Zulus. . . . When the service is over,
that church of two hundred and fifty members, with
some visitors, some church visitors, divides itself
up into forty-eight evangelistic bands, and
goes out to proclaim the gospel of Christ in differ-
ent parts of the city of Darbin. Every member of
the church who is of sound body and mind belongs
to one of these groups. . . . Sunday after Sunday,
summer and winter, in wet and dry, these bands
have gone out for more than a dozen years without a
break.

And so on. These are your lazybones! It
should be borne in mind that, in Natal, the
Zulus who have been under missionary in-
fluence are in especially bad odor for laziness,
because they are not so easily browbeaten into
working as the unmitigated heathen. This is
understood to be one reason why the govern-
ment, which as a Christian and English govern-
ment can hardly forbid English missionaries
from preaching, has seen fit to forbid the natives
to have any schools under their own management; there must be quarterly
inspection by a white man or white society
who are willing to be responsible, or else the
buildings must be burned and the institutions
broken up. This law is enforced against
churches whose pastors have been trained in a
theological seminary, and schools whose
teachers have been trained in a boarding-
school,—churches and schools that the native
Christians themselves—have gathered in entire
harmony with the white missionaries and with
their highest approval,—if the missionaries
are too far distant, across a wild country, to
give regular quarterly visits of inspection.

In other words, the Zulus are willing to be
strenuous for war, strenuous for religion,
strenuous for education, but they have not yet
learned the habit of being strenuous for money;
and because they cannot pass this test, which
appears to be the supreme test of all in our
civilization, this tax is levied in order to com-
pel them to put their time on money instead of
reserving it for their other interests, be these
other interests preaching or idling. This may
doubtless be the best way to make all the races
of the world just like ourselves. I hope we
admire ourselves properly, when we take such
pains to keep anybody else from living other-
wise than in imitation of us.

STEWEN T. BYINGTON.
immunity from invasion by each individual. The right to invade a neighboring tribe, however, is still only the right of might, until increasing wisdom points out the advisability of combining with that tribe, even if principally for defence against still more remote invaders.

And I do not mean to say that as we hope—equal freedom will come to be recognized as the guiding principle, and then, indeed, will a contract that contravenes this principle be ethically invalid.

Having thus gone back to first principles, no difficulty is presented by any of the illustrations which Mr. Walker cites. In the first place, I deny flatly that the child inherits the right to its body and brain. It has no right to either until it is able to maintain it. The thing that incontestably disposes, in my view, of the theory that there are natural rights is the reduction of that theory to its logical conclusion, which is that, if there are natural rights (which belong to the individual through the simple fact of his existence), the recognition of these rights must be naturalized, compelled by the simple fact of their existence. Do we find this to be true? Far from it. No one dreams of natural rights until some philosopher proclaims them. How does the same test apply to the theory of potential rights? Admirably. Their recognition is practically unanimous, from the spider that eats her mate to Japan that conquers Russia. The sooner this fact is adopted as the basis of ethics, the sooner will it become generally apparent that expediency prompts the acceptance of the principle of equal liberty.

I must call Mr. Walker’s attention to the fact that he places an unwarranted construction upon my statements; for instance, when he says:

I affirm the “natural right” of the baby to its foot. Does C. L. S. take issue? If so, to whom does he assign the “contractual right” to destroy it?

Now it is certainly obvious that a “contractual right” to destroy a baby’s foot is an anomalous thing, because the baby has no power to contract. If I am the possessor of the baby, I may delegate the power to destroy the baby’s foot to whomsoever I choose. The right, in this case, is the primitive one of might—there is no occasion for a contract for its acquisition. (Mr. Walker’s next proposition is simply the same thing stated in a different way. I take issue in the same manner.)

“The interests of those who do not enter into the contract are simply ignored. Like the people who are not members of a private fire or burglary protective agency, they derive no benefits from the combination. Since they do not guarantee the cooperating group against invasion by them, they in turn receive no guarantee of protection against deprivations by the contracting group, the abetment or non-abetment on the part of the latter from despoiling the former depending wholly upon the estimated expediency or inexpediency of the enterprise. If Mr. Walker were not inclined to take things too literally, I should not feel it necessary to point out that the foregoing remark applies to a more or less primitive stage of social development, and that, if we are to assume—for argument’s sake—that we are now living under the law of equal freedom, I should certainly consider myself invaded if I were despoiled by any one, since the acceptance of the principle of equal freedom by the community in which I live implies also that we not only guarantee to respect it as between ourselves, but to defend each other against its infringement by those who have not accepted it—provided always, of course, that we are able so to do. I mean enter a positive, unqualified protest against the construction which Mr. Walker insists upon putting upon the word contract. In almost every instance he uses the word as if it in no manner concerned the party most interested. It is certainly a misconception to assume that I meant that two persons contracting together to despoil a third create thereby his right to do it (except in the sense that their combination increases their power). The obvious and rational construction is that two or more persons may contract to let each other alone and to protect each other against others who attempt to invade. It seems strange that Mr. Walker should place any other construction upon my words.

Yes, frankly, my “contract is based on physical strength and in no way implies anything.” It has relation to society, however, in just so far as the contractors’ conception of equity goes.

Mr. Walker’s illustration of the Apache and the white settler’s baby is all right, except that he fails to see that, since there was no contract between the Indian and the white man (they being virtually at war with each other), the former merely exercised the right of might—which later was transferred to the white man, thanks to the intervention of the latter’s copartner, who in this case was the United States government.

I understood perfectly that Mr. Walker identified injury with invasion “only when there was an intention to injure the non-invading”—that, of course, was apparent. And still my one answer holds good; Mr. Walker has not overthrown it, his illustrations being absolutely worthless for that purpose. In the first instance, he neglects to take cognizance of the fact that his friend’s alleged intention is really an action, since he was responsible for bringing the team to its place on the top of a steep hill—“he has driven it there,” says Mr. Walker. His driving it there constitutes an action which does not cease until he has removed it safely from the public highway, and his responsibility for the results of the runaway is therefore clear. Again, a fireman is virtually under contract to assist in putting out fires wherever and whenever he is called upon to do so. Therefore his failure to respond when the fire is “destroying the property and endangering the life of one he does not like” is clearly a breach of contract, for which he may justly be held responsible. The third instance does involve a more delicate distinction, and, while there may be room for a difference of opinion, I think it must be held that, in such a case, every man is obligated by his contract of mutual defense to assist, to the extent of his ability, in preventing invasive acts against members of his group or association. It is quite clear that none of these illustrations is analogous to the proposition which called forth my former criticism, since in all of them the person who refuses to act is under tacit or actual contract to act, which makes all the difference in the world. The man whose action consisted in buying goods of a certain dealer, and who now refuses so to act, violates, by such refusal, no obligation, either express or implied. Naturally my contention that a mere refusal to act could not constitute an invasion implied that there existed no obligation to act,—in other words, that there was perfect freedom to refrain from acting. Let Mr. Walker meet the issue squarely.

On account of the length of this reply, I have refrained from considering some of the minor points in Mr. Walker’s article, such as his distinction between rights and the enjoyment of them, etc.; but I think these issues are in general subsidiary to the points I have discussed, and therefore practically covered by my remarks.

C. L. S.

Freeland and Its Protagonists.

In reply to both Mr. Horr and Mr. Wastall, it is necessary to point out that I alone am responsible for the remarks concerning “Freeland” which appeared in No. 388 of Liberty. Whatever of “trouble” there may be is wholly mine. I made no intention of using the name “Freeland” in a sense that the “scope and purpose” of “Freeland” were narrow and unpretentious. On account of its voluminous proportions and of my lack of time, I may not have given the book so thorough a reading as I should have done had Hertzka offered “a new solution of the land question, a new theory of value, a view of economic practice,” etc., shorn of his abortive attempt at fiction. It is almost too much to ask of one to burrow into so much chaff to find the grain that may be therein.

I have not deliberately shirked a difficulty. If Mr. Horr wishes to know the bare, bald facts in the case, I can tell him that I have not found in “Freeland” what I consider “a new solution of the land question.” What Hertzka offers in this matter is a crude proposition of occupancy and use with a sort of single-taxiform appendix, with all of which I, as well as the readers of Liberty, have long been familiar. The “new theory of value” I have not found at all. As for the “view of economic practice almost diametrically opposed to that for which Liberty stands,” I still see nothing more than the hybrid to which I referred in No. 388; and so to classify anticartism has, so far as I can see, nothing whatever to do with “the history of the development of political terminology”; neither do I consider it necessary to occupy Liberty’s space with a theory the separate parts of which have been so thoroughly nipped in this paper in the past. I have no right, of course, to question the originality of Hertzka’s “theory of machine production,” as well as his reaching, independently of other economists, a more or less rational conception of economics; but, while granting him all the credit for which he deserves, it is none the less true that all he gives to the world in “Freeland” was known before the world knew him. The idea that machinery, in order to make its use profitable, must save a difference between its own cost (including wear and tear and cost of operation) and the cost of producing the same article without the use of machinery is of course obviously true; that were labor to receive its full product (thus increasing its capacity for consumption), machines saving a smaller percentage of labor than when the cost of labor was less could be profitably used; and that, at the same time, the demand for the product would be increased, are
facts of which I was cognizant long before I ever heard of Hertza and before the date of the first appearance of "Freeland"; and I cannot, therefore, accept Mr. Horr's contention that Hertza's presentation of the theory is "uniquely" original.

Horr is not conceivably to Mr. Horr that I can wish his Freeland colony success; but, as I have no ill will toward the colonists, and am curious to know what results success would produce, I do not feel that I am inconsistent in doubting, at the same time, the value of a successful reproduction of Hertza's plan when I am convinced that such success can come only through the angelification of the colonists; for I have never had any faith in reforms which depended for their accomplishment upon the regeneration of human nature.

Mr. Horr's assertion that "the antiactionists are almost alone in their willingness to abide by the law of equal freedom and its corollaries" is merely evidence of a congenital characteristic which none of us who know him expects him to outgrow; and, when he retreads that remark, Anarchists are simply amused.

It may be true that, socially considered, Hertza's individualism, as Mr. Wastall says, is beyond question; but my reading of his book has not given me the idea that his scheme is very near the Anarchist ideal. It is quite apparent that he has tried to build a "bridge to span the gulf" which separates Anarchism, Communism, and Socialism; but the result is just what I characterized it in my previous article, except, perhaps, that the hybrid really has some Anarchist tendencies. A bridge, however, which rests upon such piers as majority rule and compulsory taxation is not one upon which Anarchists will trust themselves, even to reach more than Hertza promises.

If either Mr. Horr or Mr. Wastall feels that I have misinterpreted any of the statements made in "Freeland," I invite him to point out the divergence; for, with such a vague and disjointed presentation of economic theories as the book offers, it requires some enthusiastic disciple of Hertza to expand the doctrines the author attempts to promulgate. C. L. S.

Judge Morrow, of San Francisco, has granted an injunction against a sympathetic boycott, holding that it is a "criminal conspiracy" to injure an innocent third party by what he terms collective "action" of this sort. Just what has been enjoined is not clear from newspaper reports, but it is well to go to the bottom of the case and see what, if anything, can be enjoined. The labor organizations of San Francisco warned all persons to abstain from buying of a firm that handled so-called "unfair" goods. Assuming that the labor organizations were not contemplating any invasive act toward those who did not heed the warning—that is, that only penal for ignoring the warning would be the loss of the patronage of the members of the organization—against what can the injunction be effectually directed? The only possible proof of the violation of the injunction would be for some person to admit that he withheld his patronage from the boycotted firm in obedience to the warning issued by the organization. Would
A Protest from an Anticart.

To the Editor of Liberty:

C. L. S. in reviewing Hertzig’s “Freeland” makes a comparison between Hertzig’s work and Bellamy’s, and it is certainly an author of “Looking Backward” and “Equilibrium.” But this is your trouble and not mine. I do object to the impression the reviewer conveys of the scope and purpose of Hertzig’s work by fragmentary quotations that represent neither the theory nor the general trend of the author’s ethics and sociology.

I am rather surprised that C. L. S. in dealing with the essentials of “Freeland” have nothing to say about the attempts to solve serious problems in sociology and especially in economics. It smacks too much of the polite platitudes that emanate from professional sources, when giving a friendly boost to some scribbling aspirant for academic honors. This is not the way Liberty (and she surely responsible for C. L. S. tactics in this matter) has handled opposing views in the past when held by earnest men. I look back with pleasure at the strenuous warfare carried on by Liberty against such stalwarts as George, Biglum, Byington, Walker, Demithorpe, Shaw, Levy, Anbuen Herbert, and a host of others; but I do not remember a single case where Liberty shielded or concealed the truth to the extent of refusing to deal with the essentials at issue. “Freeland” offers a new solution of the land question, a new theory of value, a view of economic practice almost diametrically opposed to that that Liberty stood up for, and I am sure you will not be put to the expense of defending it.

Are these propositions and the skill with which Hertzig handles them not critical? I ask the question advisedly, for I want to mention the work to all! If it is good enough to raffle, it ought to be good enough to be met. Are the theories of “Freeland” sound or unsound? If sound, why this skepticism? If unsound, why not point out the error as part of the task of clearing up the past? Or has Liberty lost her grip and is she reduced to the necessity of meeting new problems with shrugs and sneers? I should regret to see Liberty sink to such a level; it is certainly flat and smacks of criticism, and deserves very much too much contemptuous silence.

Another Unsatisfied Freelander.

To the Editor of Liberty:

In your critique of “Freeland” and comment on Mr. Bellamy’s “Looking Backward”, you surely do not, elicit the intrinsic value of the economic discovery of Dr. Hertzig unimpeachably made. No less a critic than Darwin’s collaborator, Alfred Russell Wallace, gave kind words to Hertzig’s contribution to the theory of value.

Liberty’s attitude towards any movement that diverges from the plumb-line of Amanarchism is comprehensible—but it is at least open to doubt whether the writer of “Freeland” has not hit upon a new and better way of solving the problem of land tenure.

Already the work has been quite successful in the way of attracting the attention of the public. In fact, it will be of the greatest interest to see the outcome of this work. In this your opinion is certainly at fault. Bellamy’s work failed of the stick by the wrong end. He made use of economics for purposes of fiction and probably achieved all the success he really deserved. But, as far as I can see, the work is one of the most important and original contributions to the theory of value that has been made in recent times.

Theorists have been of the opinion amongst the world’s best Thinkers as to the correctness of Amanarchist ideals. The question that still awaits an answer is whether or not it is possible to carry on the work of Hertzig and achieve the same results. It may be that the true value of the work is yet to be seen.

Warren himself, it should be remembered, was a colony enthusiast, and as such believed, no doubt, that the future would belong to those who worked for it. It is not the work of Hertzig that is degenerating into a set of ‘argumentations’ and disputations.

Now, the Freeland plan is nothing if not fundamental—a plan that is absolutely and always elastic to suit all the means of divergent views, growth, and development. It is therefore clear that, to fail, it successfully, must show it to be economically sound. It is noteworthy, however, that the plan has been associated with the movement twelve years back, as a member of the committee of the British Freeland Association—no critic has yet attempted this feat. On the contrary, those who closely investigated it agree that its vulnerable parts are at least not vital, and it has never therefore been vitally hurt.

As I see it, it’s far away the best solution yet found of effective combination against governmentalism and, of course, capitalism. You may doubt this, and, as you say, doubt its plan; but, if you persist in doubting the value of the success of such a plan, then I must consider your blindness of the high of those long and strong-legged birds, the necessities.

What is not yet made clear is just how every reformer’s breast, and inspire him or her to trust more to deeds than words? Would it not afford all of us—who are sick of the irrational and scold character of our Rights, and consider the Freeland’s opportunity to vastly ameliorate our condition here and now, and hand on a farewrit of free-loan to generations yet to come! Surely such an acridment would be worth striving for, whatever the cost. It is true, though the risk of government interference and assimilation—which, I am free to confess, is great under the American flag.

But, if Freeland once takes root to the extent of instituting ex-Governor P. C. House, Secretary of Freeland Colony.

Bow, Wash., May 11, 1903.

I will stop at no point so long as clear reasoning will carry me further.—Huxley.

Eugene W. Walker.
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No Intractable Jurors Wanted. To the Editor of Liberty:

On June 12, 1903, I was called for jury service before Judge Holland in the United States court of this city. I informed the judge, publicly, that I was an absolutely free trader, and that I could not, therefore, find a verdict for the government against any persons charged with violation of tariff laws, or excise laws; that I considered such laws immoral, and reserved to myself the right to judge of the morality or immorality of any law under which I might be asked to serve. The judge, therefore, excused me because I was not thereby disqualified from acting under other than tariff and excise laws but that in such cases I would probably be excused from service. I attended court for five days; I was called into the jury box twelve, but, with the excuse of breast cancer, was excused from serving. I cannot know whether the challenges evinced from the prosecution at the defense, no reasons having been given in any case.

SAMUEL MILLER.

Philadelphia, Pa., June 23, 1903.

Some New Books.

Mrs. Mabel MacCoy Irwin recently published a small but beautiful volume on "Whittman, the Poet-Liberator, Woman." The work of Whitman is treated and applied in a new and original way, and which some modern Whitmanites may seem sterile; but the poet himself would not exclude her; he well knows what she has written, and she may rest secure in the knowledge of having made a contribution of lasting value to Whitmaniana. The book is bound in "good gray" cloth, with a special leave-of-grace cover design, and may be had from the publisher of Liberty for one dollar and postage, six cents extra.

Among other books which Liberty has received, but for the review of which no opportunity has yet been found, are:


"Paris and the Social Revolution," by Alvan Samborn, with drawings by Vaughan Treadwell, has just been published by Small, Maynard & Co., Boston. It is a large and beautiful quarto volume of over 400 pages, and is an exhaustive study of the subject.

"La Grande Revolution (General Strike)," by Charles Malato, is a "social novel" published by the Librairie des Publications Populaires, 1 Rue des Peres-St-Jacques, Paris, France, 500 pages, 3 francs 50 cts.

"Immediatist, a Book of Dramatists," by James Huneker, has recently come from the press of Charles Scribner's Sons. It is a collection of critical essays on those modern dramatists (including Ibsen, Shaw, and Hauptmann) who have something to tell the world, in spite of their too-low price, essays, so it is dated, having first appeared in the volumes of the New York "Sun," when the author was dmr. matle editor of that journal. Bound in cloth, 430 pages, $1.50.

The "Sallys" by Edgar Montell, translated from the French by Frederic Mitchell, has just been issued by the Truth Seeker Company (62 Vesey Street, New York), price 35 cents. The same company has also just published new editions of "Old Testament Stories Comically Illustrated," and "New Testament Stories Comically Illustrated," illustrations by Watson Hudson. In cloth, each $1.00; in cloth, $1.50; both in one volume, boards, $2.00; cloth, $2.50.

The Ariel Press, Woodstock, Mass., has brought out a book by J. Wain, Lloyd, entitled "The Dwellers in Vale Sunrise," being a sequel to the same author's 'Natural Man.' Cloth, 195 pages, $1.00.
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