On Picket Duty.

Henry Cohen writes me that he has already sold one thousand copies of "Mutual Banking." It is the best piece of news that I have heard for a long time.

The "Sun" often denounces frauds, the "Voice" inveighs against bigotry, it is the habit of the pot to call the kettle black, but the climax of audacity in this line was never reached till "Paragraphs" described Liberty as "curious."

General Weyler's plan of campaign in Cuba is denounced as inhuman and intolerable by our pious and philanthropic editors, and they urge the United States to interfere and either free Cuba or accord her belligerent rights. As a matter of fact, Spain has done nothing that any other "civilized" government would not do under similar circumstances. In crushing a rebellion the United States would be little better than Spain, and our virtuous editors would deem capital punishment too good for traitors who ventured to defy the authority of their great government. How sickening this hypocrisy is! Government, good knives, is government.

A Southern congressman has declared in the house that the secession principle was sound, that the south was right in its position at the time of the war, and that under the same circumstances he would fight again against the federal government. Barrett, the Boston editor whose seat in congress helps him to boom his paper, wants a resolution passed charging the southern congressman with treason, sedition, and violation of his oath, but the patriotism of the Republicans is held in check by the fear of offending the south and making it solid once more. Patriotism, love of union, and devotion to the government are "all right," except when undue emphasis threatens to alienate voters and reduce the Republican delegation from the "rebels section."

That devilish Jesuit, Charles A. Dana, has for some time been carrying on simultaneously in his paper, the "Sun," two campaigns which clearly show, by their contrast, that insincerity is incarnate in his person. One is directed against the free-silver members of the United States senate; the other against those members of the New York board of aldermen who favor the acceptance of the Heine memorial fountain which has been offered to the city.

Against the free-silver senators it is charged that they are traitors in continuing to vote in favor of free silver in spite of the fact (alleged by the "Sun") that, since their election to the senate, there has been a revision of opinion upon the silver question in the States which they represent; and because of this "treachery" the "Sun" has been putting them individually in the pilory, raking up their private lives, and endeavoring to show that they are thieves, liars, and adulterers. But, on the other hand, against the objectionable aldermen it is charged that they are prostituting art to politics in ignoring the adverse verdict of the Fine Arts Federation upon the Heine fountain, and voting, in obedience to the expressed wish of their constituents, to accept it on behalf of the city; and because of this "prostitution" the "Sun" is showering abuse upon their heads. The senators are damned by Dana for disregarding the voice of their constituents, and the aldermen are damned by Dana for doing the will of their constituents. An analysis of the editorial columns of the "Sun" for the last decade would reveal an abominable record of alternation between appeal to principle and attack upon principle, according to the effect that adherence to principle would have in satisfying or thwarting the sordid interests, bitter hatreds, paltry prejudices, and cranky conceits of the wickedest man in America.

A writer in the "Yale Review" is so disgusted with modern legislative bodies that he advocates their abolition. So far as the passage of new laws to meet the changing conditions of the time is concerned, no worse and more unsuitable system can be devised, according to him, than that of parliamentary wrangling. In former times parliaments performed useful service in keeping the people informed in regard to the intrigues of the courts and kings, but to-day the press has rendered all this unnecessary. The "Yale Review" writer could have committees of experts appointed by the executives to frame laws and suggest changes in governmental policy, and he would have all new laws submitted to a popular vote for acceptance or rejection. This plan is a modification of the referendum, retaining the legislative feature. Whatever we may think of the value of these suggestions, from the point of view of individual liberty it is encouraging to find evidence of the growing contempt for so-called popular government.

In a notice of Mr. Salter's "Anarchy or Government," the New York "Critic" says that the author spends more time in confusing the extreme individualism of Spencer and his followers than is at all necessary. As Mr. Salter has written only a few pages on this special subject, it is to be inferred that, in the opinion of the "Critic," a dozen lines would have been enough. With delicious unconsciousness of incongruity, the "Critic" goes on to say that Mr. Salter is disposed to extend the functions of government in the industrial department further than it can approve, and that his failure to see with sufficient clearness that society exists only for the benefit of its members renders his discussion of some points unsatisfactory. In other words, the "Critic" wants more individualism than Mr. Salter, and yet considers the position of more logical and thoroughly-going individualism unworthy of serious consideration. I am afraid the "Critic" does not realize that its own position on this question is treated with absolute contempt, not only by the extreme individualists, but also by the governmentalists.

In an article in the "Contemporary Review," George Bernard Shaw gives some advice to millionaires, though it is not clear why he calls his advice "Socialism." He tells them that they may change the community by making their donations to ordinary public institutions, which, as he assumes, it is the business of the rate-payers to maintain by taxing themselves. The only safe, wise, and meritorious plan millionaires can pursue is to create new needs and establish institutions which would not otherwise come into existence. There is considerable truth in this, and, it is hardly necessary to say, the article is bright and clever and well-written. Still, Anarchists will take little interest in the subject, and dissent radically, in passing, from the fundamental assumption that the State is entitled or bound to do numberless things for the poorer classes. Among Shaw's side sayings is one to which Liberty must take exception. He declares that Socialism is the doctrine of the proletariat and labor, while Anarchism is the doctrine of the aristocracy and the wealthy classes. Some will consider this an acute observation, because there is something in the surface appearances to warrant it, but as a matter of fact Anarchism was first promulgated by a true tribune of the people as a solution of the social problem, and is now accepted by all as primarily a settlement of the question of labor and poverty. True, it requires brains to grasp it, while what Shaw calls Socialism is largely a matter of faith and superstition with thousands. How would it do to say that religion is for the masses and atheism for the aristocracy? There is just as much superficial ground for this statement as for the other.
Mr. Salter’s "Anarchy or Government." II

Why, seeing that the assumption is always on the side of liberty, should government deal with private wrongs? If society is not threatened by external enemies, why should government come to the aid of individuals injured by members of the same society, instead of leaving each to be his own protector? Mr. Salter, putting these questions, proceeds to justify governmental interference, and to argue that liberty is utterly impossible in the promises. To answer the question, says Mr. Salter, it is necessary to define society. A society is, of course, made up of individuals, yet any number of individuals forming a society is not one individual and another and another and so on, but these conceived of as somehow fitting together, making a unit, a body, an organism. These individuals make up a whole, with ties to one another and more or less conscious of them, feeling that in some sense they belong to one another, that they are not mere units, but members together of a somewhat beyond their individual selves.

Suppose we accept all this, what follows? Mr. Salter tells us that, in the light of this conception of society, the question of how a private injury becomes a matter of public concern may be said to answer itself. For it would hardly be going beyond the bounds to say that a society in which this was not the case would not be a real society. If a wrong to any one individual excites no resentment in the minds of the rest, there is not properly a society, but simply an aggregate of individuals—the social bond does not exist. If, then, we take the social standpoint, "then may a society interfere to protect the lives, and property of its members: may, not because individuals wish it to interfere, not on the basis of any hocus-pocus of elections or of an imaginary social compact, but because in the nature of the case it must interfere or have the right to interfere, else it ceases to be a society, a real whole, a true social body."

Mr. Salter develops this "theme" at some length, but the substance of his argument in favor of government interference in the matter of internal aggressions is contained in the above sentences, and we may stop to examine it closely and critically. The astute reader will perceive at once that Mr. Salter has really introduced no new argument, but has simply begged the question. He virtually says: "You ask why society should do certain things. You question its right, title, warrant. Why, if it did not do these things, it would not be society. By 'society' we mean something which does these things, and, if you do not allow it to do them, you really abolish it." The real question, however, is why certain individuals, merely because they happen to live in a certain arbitrarily circumscribed sphere, give themselves the name of society and straightway proceed to do all the things which they would not otherwise dream of doing as a matter of course. Mr. Salter strangely forgets that the individual who asks the questions he is answering is also a member of his "whole." How is it that his membership does not prevent his questioning of society's right to interfere with him? The individuals who put the questions cannot logically be said to question the right of "society," but the right of the other individuals, or the majority. In the right of this consideration, if Mr. Salter's proposition should be paraphrased thus: "Unless we, the majority, are permitted to force certain things on you, the minority, against your will, all of us together cease to form a whole, a social body." Is there any validity or cogency in such reasoning?

But let me ask, before going further, why Mr. Salter reserved his argument from society till he reached the subject of interference in private wrongs or internal aggressions? Why did he not employ it in his first chapter, with reference to the question of repelling external invasion? This it will be remembered, he argued that the general feeling justifies the forcing of unwilling persons into the ranks, and that the conscience of the coerced persons themselves would approve of the force used against them. Why, I ask, did Mr. Salter resort to this weak plea, instead of trotting out the "society" argument? Why did he not tell us that a society which did not force every member to defend it would not be a real society? Certainly he must admit that this argument is more fundamental and goes to the very root of the question.

Whatever the reason for its tardy appearance, there is no doubt that Mr. Salter really rests his whole case upon it. Being of such vital importance to him, he ought to make sure that it will bear criticism.

Now, we entirely agree with Mr. Salter that society is a thing to be preserved. Anarchism is not intended as an attack upon the social principle, but upon governmental. That protection against internal invasion is essential to the preservation of society is admitted, but that the methods employed are better, ways of attaining this end than the governmental way is clearly not to attack society. Society would cease to exist if life and liberty were not protected against invasion, external or internal; but it would not cease to exist if the governmental method were abandoned.

What does Mr. Salter mean, in the last analysis, when he asserts that society, in virtue of being society, has the right to interfere for the protection of individuals? Nothing else than that protection is essential to all who desire to pursue happiness and live free lives.

Now, we contend that, whenever society interferes in the governmental way, the "right of compulsory taxation and compulsory protection, more evil is accomplished than good, and society, instead of being strengthened, is weakened by such interference. If Mr. Salter questions the validity of this contention, it is incumbent upon him to submit evidence and prove the inferiority of the Anarchist method from the point of view common to us both—the social point of view.

Mark the difference between Mr. Salter's method and the Anarchists' method. Mr. Salter, recognizing the necessity and propriety of protection against internal aggression, would have voluntary defense associations organized by the citizens for the purpose. Experience would teach them whether it is better to have one large association, or a number of cooperating small associations. A non-resistant, or a person who preferred to take his chances, would not be compelled to belong to the defense organization. It is certainly absurd to pretend that the recognition of the right of individual secession would destroy society, for not only would the defensive associations protect their own members, but they would also be justified in restraining those who aggressed upon non-members, provided they perceived danger to themselves in suffering the aggressors to go scot free. The non-members would have no claim on the associations, and they would not interfere to punish invaders of the former's rights unless their own interests demanded it. Mr. Salter's method, on the other hand, involves this: that a majority of the society organize what they call a government, force the kind of protection they please upon the minority; and tax willing and unwilling alike. So, because society has the right to press crime, the majority claim the right to say what crime is, what protection is, what the expense shall be, and what the methods shall be. By what hocus-pocus do the majorities become the sole mouthpiece of "society," and the minority their slaves? Mr. Salter must realize that he who says government says majority and no individual secession, and he who says liberty says Anarchism.

I must not omit to remind Mr. Salter here that in his first chapter he admitted the attractiveness of the proposal for competing defense associations, and did not seem to discern any danger to society in individual secession.

Here I may, in passing, disabuse Mr. Salter of the erroneous notion that Spencer, in explaining social action for the protection of life and property, resorts to the idea of a social compact, and imagines "how, for example, Englishmen would vote if their wishes were taken now." This error serves to illustrate the course of Mr. Salter's own thinking. In the connection alluded to, tries to explain, not "social action," but "governmental interference through majority rule." He seeks an ethical warrant for government, for compulsory organization, and not for "social action." Arguing that majority rule is a gross political superstition, he points out certain limits within
which, in his opinion, the majority may be presumed to act as the agent of the entire community. He does not base "social action" on an imaginary compact; he excuses the majority's pretension to act for society on that ground. The distinction, it is hardly necessary to add, is of high importance, whether one agrees with Mr. Salter or not.

So far, then, as the ethical question is concerned,—the right of society to interfere,—Mr. Salter has not bridged the gap between society and government. As for the question of expediency, which Mr. Salter discusses towards the end of the chapter, there is little to be said. He does not think the plan of voluntary defense associations would work, while we think it would. He thinks it could succeed only in an ideal society; we think it would be more successful than government even in the present society. This is not the time to discuss practical questions.

Summing up his argument on this head of life and property, Mr. Salter says:

"Anarchy as a matter of right: Anarchy based on the notion that a society has no business to act, since this involves an interference with the freedom of individuals: Anarchy founded on the idea that each person is in his own manner answerable to do as he pleases unconstrained,—is, from a social point of view, absurd. There is no individual right to act against the common good. . . . There is no such thing under heaven as the right to do as we please, using the phrase "as we please" with scientific strictness.

"Windmill fighting again. Here we have the same old fallacy that Anarchism is liberty to invade, to do as one pleases regardless of the rights of others. Such Anarchism would be an absurdity, a contradiction in terms, for it would mean the rule of the stronger and less civilized over the sympathetic and peaceable. But there is nothing absurd in demanding that protection of life and liberty shall be left to voluntary social action, and that the monomaniac shall be allowed to stay outside of the defensive organization. This is all that Anarchism implies. It is government which is absurd as a matter of right, for government means necessarily the rule of some over others. There is no difference, in principle, between the rule of one and the rule of a majority. It is strange that Mr. Salter, an ethical teacher, should be blunt to this manifest truth.

In his sixth chapter Mr. Salter discusses the propriety of the government for other ends than those already dealt with. May society, he asks, provide for education, recreation, health, and so on? And he answers that he fails to see why not, if it needs to. As a matter of policy or expediency it might be well for government to leave such matters to private enterprise, but its right to act if it sees fit cannot be successfully challenged, in Mr. Salter's view. "If it be objected," he very logically observes, "that people ought to provide for their own education, the same thing might be established with public provision for the security of each one's person and possessions." And with equal consistency Mr. Salter concludes that "no line of principle can be drawn as to how far a society may go, and where it must stop, in securing social welfare." It is impossible to believe that Mr. Salter's mind is really satisfied with this worse than lame and impotent conclusion. He virtually declares here that there is no ethical science of society, no principles for the guidance of individuals, no such thing as justice between citizens and the "collective whole." "Society can do no ethical wrong," is Mr. Salter's substitute for "the king can do no wrong." Society might fall into practical blunders, but it can never be guilty of aggression, since it has the right to do everything that it deems well to do. Now, it is safe to say that, but for the confusion caused by Mr. Salter's use of the vague term "society," instead of the definite term "government," he would revolt against such an absurd and unexpected conclusion. Even legalism has always recognized the possibility of government doing wrong, and injustice to its citizens, and surely 5- Mr. Salter would not dream of maintaining that monarchical or minority governments are the authorized representatives of "society" or the social organism in such a sense that everything and anything they choose to do must be accepted as just. But, if he limits his statement to popular or majority governments, will he tell us by what hocus-pocus the majority becomes the spokesman and executive of "society"? Only unanimous action can be properly described as "social action," since we are all members of society and of the "organism." The moment unanimity ceases and conflict arises, the "organism" disappears, and none of the conflicting groups can with propriety claim to represent "society." Unless Mr. Salter is ready to affirm that the majority is always right, it is clearly unwarrantable for him to identify the majority with society.

In truth, the "organism" theory of society is false and ridiculous. Mr. Salter says that Spencer recognizes the theory in an imperfect way; perhaps he now sees the reason of Spencer's unwillingness to go beyond the admission that there are certain important similarities between the individual organism and the social organism. It is because Mr. Salter's "more perfect" recognition of the organism theory leads him to overlook the important dissimilarities that he discovers himself in the impossible position of denying that there is such a thing as justice in the relation between the majority and the minority, and that government may do whatever it pleases.

Society is a scientific abstraction. Society never acts and never thinks. Individuals think, act, and cross each other's paths. Social science is the science which defines the limits of individual action. Government, we are told, is an agency, resting upon the command of the governed, for the protection of individual rights and restraint of aggressors. Government cannot protect individual rights unless it knows what these rights are. Now, the opponents of government maintain that the governmental method is itself a violation of individual rights, and that the maintenance of equal freedom is impossible except under a system of voluntary organization for defense. It is needless to discuss the origin of government; the point is that it is an obstruction to the establishment of justice between individuals. Government once out of the way, there is a scientific standard for individuals, the standard of justice or equal liberty. Mr. Salter will doubtless admit that no private association can impose its schools, aesthetic

notions, religion, or hygiene upon outsiders. It can insist upon being left alone and having its rights respected, but it can go no farther. But a majority is only a group of individuals, and the locus of power of government does not give, from an ethical point of view, any more rights than other voluntary associations do. How can it impose its protection, education, method, etc., upon society? What right has it to speak for "society," when society means all of us, majority and minority? I sincerely trust Mr. Salter will ponder over and deal with these criticisms. The length of this article renders it necessary to defer consideration of his last chapter—on industrial relations—until the next issue.

A Remarkable Young Poet.

A few weeks ago a young man called at this office in search of literary employment. He was a Russian,—of not more than twenty-five years, I should think; perhaps not more and twenty-two,—with dark hair, refined features, a dreamy expression, and a soft voice,—in fact, a typical Slav of the finer sort. He was profoundly convinced that he had literary talents of a high order, and his chief desire was to develop them. He was so constituted, he said, that he could not work at anything else, and even in the literary line he seemed unwilling to do work not in strict accord with his tastes. I found that an opportunity of translation in a newspaper office was open to him, and that he refused to avail himself of it, because the matter to be translated did not suit his views and ideas, although the work was light and at least remunerative enough to keep him from going hungry. The young man's sincerity impressed me, but his willingness to appeal to strangers for aid in getting employment rather than take the (to him) somewhat unpleasant work that lay within his grasp made me a little impatient with him. Whereupon I ventured to remind him that we are all residents, not of dreamland, but of a work-a-day world, and said that it seemed to me good policy to devote a share of one's time to anything if thereby one could gain the means of decently living out of it to the satisfaction of desire. In short, I gave him advice which was as near an approach to a lecture as the rules of good behavior would warrant in a case of so short acquaintance. For myself I could give him no employment, nor did I know at all how much confidence I could place in his own high estimate of his literary talent, as he had no specimens of his work to show me. But I gave him a letter to a friend, hoping that it might in some way help him, and it resulted in an offer of employment, which again was not to his liking, and which he rejected,—in this instance wisely, I think, for the duties of the post were of a commercial nature,—for which the young man would probably have proved unfit.

For some weeks I heard nothing of him, but the other day he called at this office in my absence, and left for my examination several specimens of his verse. After reading them I was filled with astonishment and joy, for I was convinced that a new and great poet had discovered himself to me. Though some of his work was inferior to the rest and much of it bore marks of crudity, all of it was indicative of genius; and it now seems to me that the
poem which I print in another column, if we re-
member that its author is a youth who two
years ago knew not a word of the English lan-
guage, is nothing less than a wonderful per-
formance. I feel elated that I did not per-
ceive the young man’s power at my first in-
terview with him. And now I am inclined to
say to him, as Emerson said to Whitman: “I
greet you at the beginning of a great career.”
Tell me, Gork, Lloyd, Truth, and all the
other libertarian poets, who know more about
poetry than I do, am I mistaken in thinking
that I discern in the firmament a new star, per-
haps of the first magnitude? Is my telescope
a liar? Am I too enthusiastic over this young
man? Is not this poem, “To the Toilers,”
really worthy of attention? Does it not con-
stitute a really noble début in the history of
American letters? So at any rate it seems to
me. And I am correspondingly proud that it is
my privilege to be the first to print an
English poem from the pen of Basil Dahl.

Zangwill is actually perversé and paradoxical
enough to praise Nordau’s “Right to Love,”
— an alleged play without art, verisimilitude,
or imagination, and with a most unnatural
moral deliberately dragged in to catch the
Philistines. He says absurdly that Nordau’s
comedy is intended to emphasize his opposition
to Touson, and finds it remarkably coherent a d
logical in its evolution. As a matter of fact, in
order to prove his case against free love in gen-
eral, Nordau is reduced to the wretched device
of making the lover a deep-voiced villain and
cold-blooded imposter who simply deceives the
silly and romantic wife to whom he makes
love. He exposes the villeness of this sham
lover, and puts quixotic sentiments in the
mouth of the dull heroine, thus comp-
elling the betrayed wife to realize the su-
periority of her husband. To say, as Zangwill
does, that this husband makes a trenchant reply
to the modern attack on marriage is to evince
utter ignorance. The whole tendency of the
plays in which Zangwill further exhibits unfitness to
discuss reform questions by expressing amusement
at the fact that Nordau has come to be looked
upon as a degenerate himself. No, he is not
looked upon as a degenerate, but as a faké;
and imposter. He would be pronounced a
degenerate, if, in his own definitions and tests, were
applied to him; but no competent man attaches
even importance to his pseudo-science to
apply it even to its author. —

A fair sample of the stuff that is written by
upholders of legal marriage is an article in
“Harper’s Weekly,” in which the “other
side” of the question is supposed to be rep-
resented by one who professes to be tird of
superficial attacks upon marriage. One of the
profound propositions solemnly made is that
“marriage can never be proved a failure until
love in marriage has been pronounced so.”
Another is that in the nature of this
trade-mark this judgment must be suspended until we have the
“final utterance about marriage in which love
has been tried.” Now, it is far wiser to let a
case go by default than to attempt to use such
meaningless and empty phrases by way of ar-
gument. Those who assert that legal marriage
is a failure mean nothing else than that love
does not long survive marriage, and that, no

matter how auspicious the beginning is, the end
is disappointing and bitter. Marriage has been
fought precisely because it has proved the
glory of love,—because love it has failed to
hold its own against the adverse influences let
loose by the arrangement.

Truly extraordinary is the political situation
of to-day. The Democratic party, a few
months before the national convention, stands
before the world like a disgraced and confused
criminal. It has no principles, no platform,
no leaders, no candidates, and no hope. The
Republicans claim to have a large surplus of
available presidential timbers but the claim is
sinfully preposterous. The principal candidate
is a man who has given no evidence of any
ability, and who is simply an agent and tool of
the greedy manufacturers. The Republicans
are generally expected to win in the next cam-
paign, no matter who the candidate is and
what the platform is; but their only advantage
over the Democrats is in the circumstance that
their opportunities for inspiring general
disgust and contempt are limited. At the end of
a year, they would be kicked out for pernicious
activity and inactivity.

The “Voice” protests that not everybody
and everything is drifting in politics. The
Prohibition party, it says, is one to which a
man can still tie without fear of being swept
away by the current. It has “preferred” de-
feat in five successive campaigns to the aban-
donment of the claims of justice and morality.
“Preferred” is gaining but defeat never
come to the party? The party which has
victory within its grasp and throws it calmly
away for the sake of a principle is the only
party which can boast of preferring defeat
to moral surrender. It is needless to say that no
such political party ever existed, or ever will
exist. It is easy to be honest when here is no
opportunity of doing wrong and no temptation
from any quarter.

Ambrose Bierce, who foams at the mouth
when Anarchism is mentioned, and whose
degree of loyalty to government would be strange
even in a stupid and respectable citizen, in-
dulges in rather tall and revolutionary language
with regard to the Pacific railway muddle.
He accuses Huntington of having “syst-
ematically and mercilessly” crushed out of
existence small competitors, and describes him
as the survivor of a group of robbers and
thieves. What is more, he finds that senators
and representatives display very little concern
in these truths, implying that our legislators
conceive at crime and lawlessness. But all
these are reasonable; but disloyal, and can only please
the rebels and cranks whom Bierce delights to
hold up t · public scorn and derision.

The president of the American Bar Associa-
tion expresses the hope that the legal profession
will undertake a thorough study of the science
of legislation. He thinks that wise legislation
may be promoted by dogmatic instruction.
But he is mistaken. There is no science of
legislation. There are sociology, history, politi-
cal economy, and other sciences which any
one who undertakes legislation ought to be
conversant with. In other words, only politi-
cal philosophers and well-informed men are fit
to become legislators. The trouble is, however,
that such men would generally refuse to legis-
late. Their knowledge would make them dis-
trustful of the powers of government and dis-
posed to let matters take their natural course.
A legislature composed of real students would
never enact any legislation; it would resolve it-
sel into a debating society, and disagree upon
every subject.

That the world moves is again demonstrated
by the significant failure of the religious woman
suffragists to pass a sort of a consu-ray vote
upon the so-called Woman’s Bible of the radical
minority of the movement. The women suf-
fragists have, of course, no sympathy with free
thought and rationalism, but they manifestly
recognize the fact that they cannot afford to
offend the most intelligent of those whom they
seek to influence. Just imagine what sort of
reception the Woman’s Bible would have been
accorded twenty years ago by a gathering of
women! How about that reaction against rad-
icalism? When even women refuse to stand
by the old faith, the bankruptcy of the churches
and theologians must be disastrous indeed.

Gerry, president of the Society for the Pre-
vention of Cruelty to Children, opposes the ex-
tension of the age of consent from sixteen to
eighteen years, on the ground that it will make
convictions under the law more difficult, and
confound rape and fornication in such a way
as to jeopardize the entire law. Gerry’s objec-
tions are sound, but his motives are rotten.
He is one of those soundrels who, of the two,
would much rather punish vice than crime.
Being shrewd enough to see that, if crime is
confound led with vice, juries will refuse to
punish either, he is anxious to avoid such con-
fusion. Intellectually he is superior to Flower;
ethically the two are on a level.

Resenting the violent attacks upon congress
and public men in which editors indulge, the
Brooklyn “Eagle” says: “The one rule for
sane and civilized writing and speaking is for
a man never to advance in public expression
terms which he could not address to his ad-
versary in private discourse.” This overlooks
the fact that in private and face-to-face dis-
cussion men are generally inclined to be kinder
to their opponents and to spare them as far as
possible. Even when we know that one de-
server the hardest treatment, our sympathies
naturally hold us in check, and we temper our
censure by putting it in milder form. Only
in extreme cases, when higher considerations
render charity improper, do we resist this in-
pulse. In public expression, however, parti-
cularly in controversies carried on in print, it is
not so difficult to suppress one’s sympathetic
feelings and say things in the strongest and
plainest terms, and there is no reason why it
should not be done. The real and only safe
and proper rule is never to say anything which
will subject the writer or the newspaper
printed, and which cannot be repeated without shame
or regret. We must be deliberate, just, and
fair at all times, but we are not to feel that
generosity is always due our enemies. Even
a little extravagance and over-emphasis, when it
is obviously intended to show the earnest-
ness and depth of our feeling and cannot
be mistaken for literal truth, is not necessarily

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an offense against sanity and civilization. Extravagance is unjust only when it misleads; when it misleads, it brings home the gravity of the real matter in hand, it is legitimate.

Says the "Voice": "Now let the Goddess of Personal Liberty weep and tear her hair. Senator Page has just introduced a bill into the New York legislature making it a misdemeanor to keep a dog in any house in New York city, occupied as a dwelling by three or more families." Liberty has a sample of the Goddess's hair, frightfully torn on this occasion, which will be exhibited to the editor of the "Voice" whenever he comes around with that $10,000 check which Liberty claims from him a few weeks ago. In explanation of the tearing, it should be said that the Goddess began tearing it in grief, but most of the tearing was done in wild spasms of hysterical laughter at the logic which makes it lawful for one of two families in a house to keep a dog, even if the other objects, but criminal for one of three to do so, even if both the others want the dog kept.

To the Toilers.
I hate your superstition, workingmen, I loathe your blindness and stupidity. Your pointed quips have never made me laugh; Your senseless chat is wearisome to me; Your shallow joy is not the joy I like. But when I encounter your unceasing toil, Your quiet activity and sunless life, Your works of splendor, and gigantic strength, I bow my head in reverence to you. The cliffs and mountains, the wildernesses, The woods are terrible when shock by storm; The streams are awful in their hasty course; But cliffs, and woods, and streams, all disappear, When touched by your uncorroborated hands. You were the purest and most powerful. You were happy, great, and reverend. You take much pride in your humanity, And think you are the Maker's masterpiece. But know what it is to be a man? The eagle builds a nest as well as you; The swan and heron build their nests; The swift, the bee, the lark, the bird of paradise; Have you essayed to look into your thoughts, To know the secret motives of your deeds? Love you the noble and the beautiful? Love you the pure and true and just? Love you to live in liberty and peace? Say, is your friendship true, your love unaltered? If not, are you then? What are you then? You live, and know not what existence is; You die, and know not what the grave entombs; You trust, and know not what your faith implies; You hope, and know not what it is to be. If you would know the mysteries of life, And know the secrets of the dismal grave; If you would know the meaning of your faith, And also know the sequel of your hope— You would not then able in wretchedness, And be not dead not having lived before; You would not then believe in wind and dust, Or ever hope for heaven. Yes, just got out with a young lady who is visiting my family, and we met on the steps. I tried to ignore him, but he wouldn't have it. He leered at the young lady in a friendly sort of way, and then informed me that "some of our friends have been talking about it." Then he has a habit of speaking in球场 at the convention, borrowed a dollar, and left." "Yes!" said Tom, still inquiringly. "Yes," retorted Percy, irritably. "And, when he had gone, the young lady looked at me in a surprised sort of way, and asked me if he was one of my friends. Is that part of the game?" "Why, oh, we had to put up with those little annoyances," return'd Tom. "Even when we go into politics to force such people out?" "Even then," return'd Tom. "Well, that settles me!" exclaimed Percy. "Why, I had my mind all made up to propose last night, but what kind of a chance do you suppose I would have stood after that? I'll have to wait at least two weeks now for the effect to wear off." "That's politics," said Tom. "Hang politics!" retorted Percy. "I never supposed it would get mixed up in my love affairs." "It will get mixed up in everything." "Then I'm going to draw a line." "You've accepted the nomination." Then Percy said something about the nomination that will not bear repeating, and swore he would get the nomination by tearing the legislative, and if the young lady got in the council. And Tom smiled and said: "Of course.

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.
The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send his name for enrolment. Those who do so thereby pledge themselves to write to the "target" assigned in Liberty for that fortnight, and to notify the secretary of an executive department failure to write to a target (which is hoped will not often occur), or in case of temporary or permanent withdrawal from the work of the Corps. All, whether members or not, are asked to lose no opportunity of informing the secretary of such withdrawals. Address, STEPHEN T. BRINTON, Flushine Institute, Flushine, N. Y.

A member of Section A put in a volunteer shot at J. R. Treasur, target before last for Section B, and sent him a copy of "Mutual Banking." He gets this answer:

I have just finished reading with much interest and general approval the pamphlet, "Mutual Banking," so kindly sent me by yourself. Should you share my solicitude to re Invent the States with the powers they should rightfully exercise, mutual banking, as advocated by you, would furnish the foremost of redeeming and regulating agents. Such letters as this make it hard to understand why more don't join the Corps.

Target, section A—"Rockland Independent, Rockland, Mass., on February 21 published a sermon by Rev. F. O. MacAulay of that place, beginning as follows:

They: The prisons are rebellions, and companions of thieves; every one that hath gifted is not followed after rerctors; they judge not the fatherless, neither does the cause of the widow remain in distress.

The philosophical Anarchist believes in absolute freedom of the individual, with no restraint of force. He goes further, and advocates the doing away with all universal institutions, leaving every function to be performed by the individual. Anarchy looks feasible, yet with such perfection there will always remain certain universal functions; there will ever be the necessity of government of some sort. Anarchists are the embodiment of the idea that the people and of the progress that they have made in perfecting this social organization. Anarchists are great educators, and are necessary from the standpoint of mere efficiency.

The body of the sermon is a vigorous account of the decadence of our political institutions and leaders at the present day. Write to the paper, correcting Mr. MacAulay's misconception of Anarchism, and showing why his text must always be applicable as long as government exists.

Section B—"Populis," Neosho, Mo., said, a year or so ago: "Only slaves need protection; free men do not. There is a place for all in this government. The government interferes with our caring for ourselves in all ways, and how much better we could provide for ourselves if government would let us alone.

STEPHEN T. BRINTON.
Why I Am a Trade Unionist.

Why am I a trade unionist? Because I have to be. It is not a matter of sentiment, charity, or a sense of right and wrong. It is necessary that my trade union be strong, independent, and free. I am a trade unionist because there is no other agency which will secure for me more wages, a shorter workday, greater independence, and sometimes, I hope, complete.

Nor of any agency! A bold statement. Prove it. Problem: To secure the product of my labor. Not a school of economic thought—but there are many—but the necessity of union to attain as well as union to hold when attained. One individual cannot lift ten hundred weight; ten individuals can do so with ease. History avouches it: All evidence and experience sustain the claim of unity.

In this instance, then, a union of what? Of all men: Landlords, bankers, lawyers, manufacturers, merchants, wage-workers, such as make up a political party? No, the first two rob me; I cannot unite with them. There are those on whose backs shall we "treat a passage to fags" for him; too, I must exclude. With the fourth and fifth, fellow-sufferers of mine, I would combine against the first, but they were not even for us. They can gain us only by keeping me, their patron down. Am I left, then, to unite with my fellow wage workers? But wait! We overlook the professions. Ministers, physicians, lawyers, salesmen, merchants, newspaper managers, and printers. They are not necessary; and, as such, they cannot be united. But, with creditable exceptions, the working class is united; not leaders. Men of political opinions.

So—wage workers. And they? Robbed, deceived, damned! Scuffed at, shot at, jaled! Ubanous, of course? Men of similar ideas, purposes, and means? Well, hardly. Rarer, men of vastly different ideas, purposes, and means, is the maximum of unity in action. Non-bastard, non-dress, non-union, non-capitalistic, non-conventional, non-excepted, select. But, with creditable exceptions, the working class is united; not leaders. Men of political opinions.

An Interesting Announcement.

Comrade Francis D. Tandy has written, and will publish about the first of April, a book entitled "Vul-untary Socialism," in which he will present a complete outline of the philosophy of Anarchism. The scope of the work may be seen from the following synopsis:

Preface—Introduction, dealing with study of Social Science.

Chapter I is devoted to evolution and contains a brief outline of the nebular hypothesis and Darwinian theory.

Chapter II is devoted to "Egoism." In it the author attempts to demonstrate the result of attempts on the part of an organism to place itself in harmony with its environment, and this is suggested as the basis of ethics.

Chapter III deals with the development and nature of the State, showing that all progress has been by curtailing the powers of the State and enlarging the liberty of the individual.

Chapter IV compares the conclusions reached in the previous chapters, and from them deduces the State cannot exist under a system of equal law of freedom; suggesting a few deductions from this law, it is shown that it ultimately demands the entire abolition of the State.

Chapter V deals with the rights of the individual to the protection of person and property without State interference.

Chapter VI is devoted to an analysis of value according to the marginal utility theory of Boeheim-Bawerk. It also deals with the Marxian theory of surplus value, showing that all our economic disturbances are due to the existence of that surplus value.

Chapter VII contains general considerations in regard to the nature and functions of money, and an analysis of interest.

Chapter VIII suggests as a solution of the money question the Mutual Bank of Issue, outlined by Greene, which is practically the same as Proudhon's Bank of Exchange.

Chapter IX deals with the land question. In it the author deals in the entire abolition of all paper titles to land, and claims that occupancy and use should constitute the sole title. Incidentally, he criticizes the Single Tax theory and the position taken by Herbert Spencer in "Justice."

Chapter X deals with special privileges, principally patents and copyrights; showing that they are forms of monopoly that must be abolished.

Chapter XI contains an analysis of wealth, profit, which is calculated for its own account, mainly upon interest and rent, and, when these two factors are eliminated and special privileges are repealed, will cease to exist, surplus value becoming a thing of the past.

Chapter XII is devoted to the question of transportation, showing that private enterprise will be perfectly capable of dealing with this problem, as soon as free competition is made possible by the reforms suggested in the previous chapters.

Chapter XIII contains a discussion of the various methods of accomplishing reform. It points out the evils of legislative, administrative, and political methods, and shows that education and passive resistance are the most successful methods.

Chapter XIV treats of the prospects of the accomplishment of the reforms set forth. It repudiates the claim of the State Socialists that collectivism is inevitable, and shows that the ultimate attainment of the author's ideas is as improbable as is often supposed.

The book is followed by a suggestive bibliography of works which will be of value to those who wish to study the question more deeply. It also contains a complete index.

The simplicity and directness of language have been aimed at throughout, so as to make this an elementary book, within the mental grasp of all who are at all familiar with modern reform ideas. It will be printed from good clear type, on fine stock of paper, and bound in beer cloth. Price, $1.50.

"Michael and His Lost Angel."

In January last a new play was produced simultaneously in New York and London, "Michael and His Lost Angel," by Henry Arthur Jones. It was my privilege to see it, and I promptly declared that it was the best new play of the season, though I was not entirely satisfied with it. Therefore, when the "Saturday Review" arrived with Bernard Shaw's account of the London performance, I was greatly pleased to find that first of English critics expressing my own view, and revealing to me, as a true critic should, more clearly than I had before seen it, the cause of my partial dissatisfaction. His article is so excellent and so interesting that I give it here almost in full. I may add that the play, being very good indeed, failed dismally. Why it failed in London I do not know; there can be no doubt that here the critics killed it.

One of the great comforts of criticism is the work of Mr. Henry Arthur Jones is that the critic can go straight to the subject matter without troubling about the dramatic construction. In the born writer the style is the man; and with the born dramatist the play is the subject. Mr. Jones's plays grow; they are preceding chapters and from them deduces the State cannot exist under a system of equal law of freedom; suggesting a few deductions from this law, it is shown that it ultimately demands the entire abolition of the State.

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When I respond to the appeal of Mr. Jones' act by throwing myself sympathetically into his characteristics attitude of mind, I am conscious of no self-righting in "Michael and his Lost Angel." It then seems to me to be a mere idea, a mere idea, a mere idea. I can't imagine, written with knowledge as to the man and insight as to the woman by an author equipped ... only with the experience of an adept playwright, and a kinwoman's sense of the phrase and common manners, but with that knowledge of spiritual history in which Mr. Jones' nearest competitors seem so superficially deficient. It is all in vital contact with that substance of religious movement of his century, as fully quickened art always has been. I am comparing it in this relation with the ordinary personal sentiment of Mr. Grundy, and with those grotesque flashcards after some sort of respectable persons by Mr. Pinfold. I am the buming Illude from Mrs. Eldridge's store, and his redemption of Mrs. Peasr by the social patronage of the bishop's wife, I unmercifully class Mr. Jones as first, and eminently first, among the surviving list of his own generation of playwrights.

But when, instead of throwing myself sympathetically into Mr. Jones' attitude, I remain obstinately in my own, I find myself altogether unable to offer to "Michael" that final degree of complete sympathy and approval which is implied in the conviction that I would have written the play that way myself if I could. In fact, I ask nothing further than at the beginning of the third comes the parting of our ways, and I can point out the exact place where the roads fork. In the first act Michael, a clergyman, commits a girl who has committed what he believes to be a heinous crime in public. In the second act he commits that sin himself. At the beginning of the third he meets the lady who has been his accomplice, and the following words pass between them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amicia.</th>
<th>You're sorry?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michael.</td>
<td>No. And you?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, after this, what does she say? Does she say, "I'm sorry, but this is the last significant fact that he is not sorry,—that at the very point where, if his creed were valid, his conscience would be aching with remorse, he is not only impotent, but positively glad,—he proceeds to act as if he were really penitent, and not only put on a humor shirt, but actually makes a confession to his congregation in the false character of a contrite sinner, and goes out, accompanied by two young ladies, and is exiled from the church. The church is exiled from the church. This is a tangible sign of the end of the old religious development of man?" or, "answerable to a sufficient woman who has done a sufficient thing to show her sufficiency to throw itself into Mr. Jones' sense of the word and enjoy the play from his point of view, unless it can do so without going out of its own way. And I cannot help thinking that the public dislike a man of Michael's stature....

Here you have the disqualification of "Michael and his Lost Angel" for full tragic honor. It is a play which neither creates nor fulfills the last three things, and you shall have your Reverend Michael embracing the answer of his own soul, that is, the answer to his steps, and marching out through his shaken and shamed phalanxers, with colors flying and head down, and so come in at the end, and take, by the divine right of a hero, "captain of his soul," the crowd that slips through the dead fingers of the philosopher; who, at the hospital of his folly and guilt, is搜索，which he did not feel and a throne which he did not want? Forthbras can, of course, never be anything more than an Adelphe hero, because his bloodline is not an imperial one and ambitious efforts are comfortably vulgar; but both the Adelphe hero and the tragic hero have fundamentally the same heroic qualification,—feared pursues of their own ends and championship of their own fall. The hero always will, and must,...

Michael fails to satisfy this condition in an emergency: here a hero self-realization alone could save him from destruction; and if this failure was the subdued nature of Mr. Jones' act, the failure without a hero might be as tragic as 'Imprisioned.' But Mr. Jones does not secure Michael's situation in that light: he shares his fate with the glib sea, confuse Michael with a monsoon. I must say, however, that the man and death of the woman as the only possible stage ending,—surely not so much an ending as a shoppers up of the remains of the two parts; and I cannot help being from being a sorry business by the man's plucking a sort of courage out of abandonment, and by a humorous picture in the dying woman, whilst submitting, out of sheer fearlessness of character, to Michæl's attitude, is apologetically conscious of having no sincere or vicarious sin. When the priest offers his services, she replies: "No, thank, I've been frightened wickedly, it doesn't much matter, eh? Can't help it now. Haven't any reasons to feel sorry. So sorry I can't feel sorry." This gives a pleasant quaintness to the back-nedged position of a stage death, but it does not obliterate the fact that Amicia is dying of nothing but the need for making amends, that she is a deplorable disappointment, considering her promise of force and originality in the first two acts. A play without a hero will most likely to be a hero; and, in my opinion, he can't ask any of the question, 'What will this woman do when she discovers that the soul of Cleopatra is nothing but a hysterical coward, whose religion is a mofad perver- sion of her spirit.' The fate of the noblest development of man?... annoyed after a sufficient woman who has done a sufficient thing to show her sufficiency to throw itself into Mr. Jones' sense of the word and enjoy the play from his point of view, unless it can do so without going out of its own way. And I cannot help thinking that the public dislike a man of Michael's stature....