On Picket Duty.

My reply to Mr. Lloyd on the child question is postponed till the next issue.

The "old" men are uneasy over the discovery that the new women are losing faith in the three great "M's"—men, marriage, and maternity. The new men, however, know that their own standing with the new women is greatly improved, while maternity is gaining in quality what it loses in quantity. Marriage is the only thing that will go, and, whether the new men or the new women will miss it.

The London "prowling prudes" and fanatics have been ignominiously beaten on the question of licensing the music halls. Last year, it will be remembered, these busy-bodies succeeded in depriving the Empire Theatre of the license to sell drinks, and the moralists of the whole world congratulated themselves on a great victory. Political reverses, it seems, have taught the London county council a salutary lesson, and the protests of the meddlers were ignored this year. May this triumph of common sense prove more lasting than other waves of political sanity!

I lately expressed the opinion that the author of "Merrie England" is not a competent critic in matters of finance. As it to offset this, Mr. Traubel, displaying his customary lack of logic, contrasts my opinion with that of Mr. Henry D. Lloyd—that Robert Blatchford has put a racy and fetching indictment of the present system, and proposed a remedy in a style well calculated to reach the public ear, and in so doing has shown himself a great educator of public opinion. May I point out to Mr. Traubel that I have not said a word in denial of any of these claims for Mr. Blatchford, and that consequently between Mr. Lloyd's opinion of Mr. Blatchford and mine (so far as I have expressed it) there is no contrast at all?

A flood of gold is predicted by many financial authorities. Owing to the discoveries of new gold fields in South Africa, and improved methods of mining, an enormous increase in the annual output is said to be inevitable. It is remarkable, however, what differences of opinion discussion has disclosed as to the effect of this anticipated glut of gold. Some hail it as nature's cheerful remedy for the evils of a gold system; others predict most disastrous consequences to the business world; others still congratulate the gold-mining industry on the bright prospects of prosperity. No wonder the experts are not allowed to settle the financial problem.

The proposal to give the State a monopoly of the manufacture of matches was recently submitted to the popular vote in Switzerland, and the result was an adverse majority of thirty-five thousand. Some European correspondents aver that the result is due to the apathy and ignorance of the rural voters, who do not know or care anything about factory laws and other restrictions upon greedy capitalists. The "Sun." London correspondent, however, states that the vote has been preceded by an actual campaign in which the German-speaking State Socialistic cantons were opposed by the French and Italian cantons, and that the proposal was from the first understood to be a test question. If so, the defeat of the measure must be regarded as a setback for Swiss collectivism.

"Rhodes's Journal of Banking" and the "Evening Post" have a new theory in explanation of industrial depression. There is a redundancy of the currency, they assert, and the portion in excess of the amount required for legitimate business has accumulated in the centres and reduced the rates of interest and discount, thus giving rise to intense competition in all kinds of business and rendering trade unprofitable. Only a short time ago all authorities readily admitted the reasonableness of the demand of the south and west for more money, and the question with them was simply how to satisfy the demand in a safe and "sound" way. Those sections have not ceased to cry for more money; how, then, are we to account for the change that has come over the spirit of the speculations of the aforesaid journals?

Governors of several States have been convening legislatures, reforming laws, and calling out troops, to prevent a voluntary encounter between two professional prize-fighters, and a stupid nation has shouted itself hoarse in cheering these glorious battles for virtue and law. At the same time mobs of respectable citizens have been reviving all the horrors of the inquisition and slowly torturing human beings to death in public squares and in the presence of women and children. Yet some editors seriously ask whether our civilization is not a failure: Have they forgotten that there is not a single State or territory in which prize-fighting is now permitted by law, and that lottery gambling is also forbidden everywhere? Have they forgotten Comstock? Surely, in comparison with these supreme evidences of a high state of Christian progress, the burning at the stake of a few niggers is as dust in the balance.

The London "Saturday Review" states that a distinguished correspondent has written to it declaring that "an association for the protection of the public against the police is necessary," and that many other correspondents are complaining of outrages perpetrated by the police. Recently a policeman arrested Professor Ray Lankester on the charge of drunkenness and disorderly conduct, and a magistrate, brutally declining to receive explanations, bound him over to keep the peace. He appears that the professor was "run in" for refusing to "move on" when caught by a guardian of the peace in the act of speaking to an unfortunate woman. The incident is not to be altogether deplored. Professor Lankester has expressed himself in very contemptuous terms, if I remember rightly, in referring to Spencer's ideas of the function of government; he was for more law and greater State control. He has now received an object lesson which may, perhaps, open his eyes to the logie he has affected to despise. It is a good thing, too, to have distinguished correspondents of respectable Tory papers cry out and ask to be saved from their police friends.

A letter from a Denver comrade contains the following paragraph: "I presume you are interested in anything concerning the experiences your 'Instead of a Book' passes through.

The other day I brought none a copy from the public library, and, on opening it, found it thoroughly annotated by some religious fanatic. Below the signature of the frontispiece he started in by placing in parentheses the words so familiar to Bible students, 'The Beast.' To this I found the key on the blank space of page 173, where he gave vent to the following: 'No decent man can read this first part and not see Mr. Tucker is a beast and an offence to the world. Think of many Tuckers! Think of such a man given admission to your home and women folk! A rapist, a blackmailer (in belief, at any rate). It appears that he is a "Moral Lepor."' There is hardly a page in the first part on which he has not made some similar commentary. I shall leave it for others to read. Such sentiments will do more good than harm. What think you?" I should almost think that my friend Badecock had become a resident of Denver. My correspondent did quite right in not erasing the annotations. But what is the practice of the Denver librarian in such cases? How does he know that I will not see him for libel if he continues to give circulation to these slanderous epithets?
Liberty.

Issued Fortnightly at Two Dollars a Year; Single Copy, Eight Cents.

Ben. H. Tucker, Editor and Publisher.
Office of Publication, 51 Green St.,
Post-office Address: Liberty, P. O. Box No. 3112, N. Y.
Entered at New York as Second-Class Mail Matter.

NEW YORK, N. Y., NOVEMBER 10, 1893.

In soliciting retail and interest, the last resort of old-time slavery, the Bollweevil ashes at one stroke the record of the encroachments of the villain of the pen, the deceit of the cough, the flagellation of the nation, the cheapening of the extension, the cropping knives of the department clerk, all these tenets of Politics, which young Liberty prides herself to hold fast. — Procurement.

The appearance in the editorial column of articles over other signatures than the editor's initial indicates that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by no means indicates that they are disapproved by him in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by motives of convenience.

Plutocracy Near Its Climax.

A prominent New York lawyer, Mr. Hornblower, who was nominated by the president for the federal supreme court and defeated by the opposition of Senator Hill, has made some marks on the subject of plutocracy (in an address to the Georgia Bar Association) which have seriously offended the plutocratic press. They are astonished to hear sentiments expressed by a quiet, prosperous, and conservatory writer who only the Altgelds, Deese's, and Moats are expected to entertain. He spoke of the encroachments of monopoly and the dangers of a social convulsion. He declared that the tendency of the age was plainly in the direction of a centralizing plutocracy, and that the disparity between the rich and the poor would necessarily go on increasing. It is natural that these things should annoy the plutocratic press, and it is also natural that the significant ideas subsequently expressed by Mr. Hornblower would have utterly failed to impress them. Here is what he said further: "I hazard, however, the conjecture that during the earlier period of the coming century this tendency will have reached its climax and will have passed the danger point. The developments of applied science in the mechanical arts during the present century have thus far all been toward greater combinations of capital. . . . The tendency, now, however, seems to be towards the simplification of mechanical arts, and this will bring back, to a certain extent, individualism. When the dream of aerial travel shall be accomplished—and few doubt that it will be—the rights of way will become literally free as air; no costly roads will be needed, and individual enterprises can once more compete with corporate enterprises." There is a good deal of truth in this, although under the pat at laws inventions are either altogether suppressed by monopoly or else are used in the service of a few rather than in the interest of the public. It is proper to recognize the influence of what a French writer has called "the real revolutionists," the inventors and discoverers, but, in order that the public may get more than a minimum of advantage from their work, it is necessary that the other kind of revolutionists, the literary and conscious kind, should bring about such a change in political conditions as will render it impossible for monopoly to intercept the results of science and industrial progress.

Free Divorce Not Enough.

Zangwill, the new literary star, has been criticizing Grant Allen's "A Woman Who Dared." Some of his remarks are very acute, and others rather superficial. Perhaps the most superficial of all is the remark regarding the alleged mistake of Grant Allen and all free-love writers in emphasizing the freedom of union instead of the freedom of disunion. Zangwill says:

It is, in fact, not at all marriage to which they object, though they think it is. For marriage itself is but the publication of the desire of man and woman to live together as man and wife; the proclamation and registration of the mutual obligations they have entered into. And surely society has some legitimate interest in the doings of its atoms, especially when they wish to form a bond. So clear is this that publication constitutes marriage with many. Jews and Scotchmen, at least, have been able to publish the fact to two witnesses to make their marriage legal. Quaker couples marry themselves, standing up hand in hand before the congregation and declaring their desire to live together as man and wife. Yes, to the State, publication is all that marriage means; to the parties themselves it should mean love,—free love; love not bought and sold, nor mere society love; love that, being free, would bind itself. . . . These sentiments are platitudeus, and we do not need the free lovers to teach us them. But what they really mean to get at is not free love, but the impossibility of it; and what they should blazon on their banner should not be "free union," but "free disunion." They should attack the "holy estate," in fact, at the other end, leaving the sacred and inexpressible sinful unmeaning. Marriage is free love; half the poster is a foolish word quarrel, a noisy fighting of shadows. But if "free disunion," or, rather, "free disunion," were to take the place of "free union," the cause would gain more followers.

There are several serious errors in this exhortation. Were Zangwill so afraid of family with actual law, it would show how marriage is, as a rule, more than "publication"; it is subordination of the woman to the man in some important respects. In the matter of children and property marriage has signified an extinction of woman's rights, and, while statutory changes have abolished most of the property disabilities of married women, those with respect to children still survive. In many civilized places woman is twice to own her own body after marriage, and the husband is allowed to discipline and "correct" her in a reasonable manner i of case of disobedience. Again, Zangwill omnipotence that society has a right to prescribe "publication" of a union indicates insufficient familiarity with the real position of free lovers. They totally deny this "right" to meddle with the "heart affairs" of the "atoms," and would restrict the demand of publication on principle, without reference to the motives of society. Finally, it is simply not true that free lovers have failed to put due stress on the freedom of disunion. By free love they have always intended precisely this freedom of ignoring the State in everything,—marriage, disunion, and what not. The demand for free love implies a protest against the attempt to compel continuance of a love relation when love has disappeared. Indeed, even Grant Allen's heroine emphasizes the freedom of disunion no less than the freedom of union. Zangwill is evidently misled by a phrase, and imputes to free lovers an omission which they have never made.

Loose Ladation of Liberty.

Henry D. Lloyd, whose high-mindedness and sincerity command the respect of all who know him, whether they share his opinions or not, has recently delivered an address before a Boston club on the scholar in politics. According to all accounts, the address was eloquent, graceful, and inspiring. Mr. Lloyd spoke of needed reforms in industry, politics, and government, and in the main the views he expressed were apparently progressive and sound. Unfortunately, however, Mr. Lloyd frequently uses terms without regard to their real meaning, and unconsciously contradicts himself and misleads others. Thus, while insisting on greater political freedom, on freer contracts, on real instead of seeming consent as the basis of political organization, he, in the same breath, also indulged in expressions which, logically interpreted, point to tyranny and compulsion rather than to freedom. Here is one of his characteristic periods, italics mine:

To be as good as our fathers we must be better, says Mr. Lloyd. But, as a republic, we have inherited only by winning new ones to liberty, another has said. The contract of the voter, the buyer and seller, the laborer, the lover, shall be made free, and the public will stand in its individuality by uniting with him in equal in countless forms of association,—the State, the local benefaction of all, and the voluntarism, getting its only authority from the consent of the governed. It is into this scheme of things, in which there is not the slightest inclination to the idea that the public complete by abolishing the economic eats, prato- geniture, privileges, and use of force in the distribution of the common product. The people cannot be politically equal with those upon whom they are economically dependent. A single privilege, like a single leap, will founder a ship.

It seems almost ungracious to criticise this fine period, but a close study of its meaning is really a service both to Mr. Lloyd and his readers. When Mr. Lloyd speaks of the State as the "most voluntary" of all associations, does he contemplate abolition of so-called free government or majority rule? Nearly, for, if he did, he would be an Anarchist. He doubtless strives after many radical reforms in politics, but the one thing that would convert our political organization into a truly voluntary association—abolition of compulsory taxation—he has never inserted in his platform. But, if he is in favor of maintaining majority rule, how can he honestly encourage people to regard him as a champion of the voluntary or consent principle in government? The shallow politician doubts fail to perceive the distinction between genuine consent and majority rule, and their empty phrases are treated with deserved contempt; but Mr. Lloyd, in justice to himself as well as to those who actually do advocate political freedom, ought to weigh his words and take pains to state his position plainly and precisely.


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dependence or independence, we have excellent reason to think that he uses these terms in the State Socialist sense. He is not a believer in free competition, and economic independence to him means, not equality of opportunity and a field free from legal monopoly, but compulsory cooperation, government control of production, etc. Yet his Boston hearers did not so construe him, and at least some of the liberal press acquiesced in his address by the Boston press was misdirected in the sense that the editors, misled by the vagueness of statement, approved something with which they have no sympathy at all. Mr. Lloyd, I am sure, does not seek such praise, and does not value it in the least; yet the editors are not to blame for anything except lack of insight. Their error might serve as a warning to Mr. Lloyd in the future. He certainly does not intend to mislead, but there is no way of preventing misinterpretation, save the good old way of saying what one means in the clearest and most exact terms that one affords. Perhaps this objection conflicts somewhat with the requirements of eloquence, but Mr. Lloyd will certainly agree with me in placing truth far above effect.

V. Y.

“The Right of Persecution.”

The shallow press has lately improved some fine opportunities to air its ignorance or misrepresentation of fundamental principles. Several decisions have been rendered in cases involving the questions of boycotting and blacklisting, the aforesaid press has been impelled to give as the benefit of its views of the matter.

Two of the decisions have given it entire satisfaction, and to the judicious this fact is sufficient to throw considerable doubt on the rulings of the courts concerned; one decision has been challenged by the same authority, and we may infer that the court was probably right.

Following the order of time, the first case to be mentioned is a Massachusetts action for boycotting, decided by Judge Holmes, a son of Dr. Holmes, and a progressive jurist, who has given utterance to more than one radical sentiment. He laid down the rule that “deliberate and combined interference with a man's business by persuading others to have nothing to do with him” was criminal only if the interference was malicious and reported with the purely malicious intention of harming the boycotted person. Interference for a good, legitimate purpose, such as compelling an employer to raise wages, shorten hours, etc., would not be deemed malicious, according to Judge Holmes, and hence the use of mummery to prevent other men from making terms with the employee would not be justifiable boycotting. Judge Holmes recognized that “the weight of judicial opinion was the other way,” but he thought that the old rule was inconsistent with modern ideas of freedom and contract.

This view was applauded by the labor papers and criticized by the plutocratic press. Neither side was right, but the plutocracy's mouthpieces, if more intelligent, might have successfully attacked, not the decision itself, but the logic upon which it was based. Judge Holmes, perhaps, could not have taken more advanced ground in face of the unbroken line of adverse precedents, but on principle it is impossible to

justify the introduction of the irrelevant question of motive. When an act is legitimate in itself, no “good purpose” is required to sanction it, and pure boycotting is clearly legitimate in itself. The question is not whether, and for what reason or purpose, boycotting is intended to injure, but how they intend to injure. If merely by bringing social pressure to bear,—if they seek to render one boycott effective by merely threatening another boycott,—then they do not offset the bounds of their proper freedom at any point.

The second case, decided in England by Baron Pollock, does not present a clear view as to the right of boycotting. Libel and breaches of contract constitute important features of the case. The facts are stated as follows:

The defendants were the managers of a trade union of plasterers, and they had a difference with a master plasterer named Peck, and withdrew their men from his employ. As he was engaged on a contract, among other matters, the other master and some men. The union then attacked Wright by endeavoring to get his men to leave him, and to induce people to break their contracts with him, and by printing and circulating. They did pressure the breach of certain contracts with him, and did prevent his getting employment. He sued for libel, and asked for an injunction. The defence set up was substantially Judge Holmes', that there was no malicious, that their motives were good, and that they acted from a sense of duty.

The jury found malice, libel, and breaches of contract brought about by the defendants, and rendered a verdict against them. Whatever one may think about the right to publish libel and induce breaches of contract (I do not propose discussing these questions here), it is clear that they are entirely distinct from the right to boycott, and hence the decision cannot be regarded as throwing any light on this latter problem. The charge of the judge, however, was broader than the issue required, and referred to the right of pure “boycotting.” He laid down this rule:

“Now had a man a right to do that which injured another man, unless by acts he had a legal right to do. In this country every one had a right to express his opinion clearly with reference to the questions of the day. But, if an individual, in order to enforce his particular views, did an act to bring about injury and intent to inflict injury upon another, the law did not allow that to be done. Nor could a man say: ‘If you don’t employ a certain class of people, we shall do certain things which will injure you in your business.’ The question was: did the defendant say to himself: ‘I will go to these people and will write such letters as will prevent them from employing Mr. Wright, and then he will be obliged to come to terms, and not to exercise any free will of his own.”

This piece of reasoning is wholly muddled. First, we are told that a man has a legal right to injure another by acts he has a legal right to do; then we are told that the law does not allow the doing of “an act” (that is, any act) with intent to inflict injury upon another. The two propositions fall flat and clearly contradict each other. To harmonize them, the second proposition would have to be amended thus: "But, if an individual . . . did an [illegal] act knowingly and intending to inflict an injury upon another, the law did not allow that to be done." The question turns, not upon the "injury," but upon the legality of the act. If the act is legal, the injury is a matter of indifference. Now, if a man says: "If you don’t employ a certain class of people, we shall do certain things which will injure you in your business," the only question would be as to the nature and quality of those "certain things." In the case of the defendant before Judge Pollock, the question was not whether his letters prevented the employment of Wright, but in what way they prevented it,—what they contained. It is one thing to write a libel and thereby secure boycotting, and a quite different thing to secure boycotting by merely threatening withdrawal of favor or suspension of voluntary relations. The letters of the defendant did contain libels and other matters assumed to be illegal in themselves, and the decision on these grounds may have been right; but the judge’s charge clearly goes beyond these points, and attempts to cover cases of pure boycotting.

Finally, we have a still more recent American case, in which blacklisting was declared illegal. The company defended the action by claiming, in a demurrer, that it merely exercised a simple right in describing the blacklisted employees as "undesirable employees," but the judge overruled the demurrer. His reasoning is thus stated in the press reports:

The right of an employer to prevent an employee from obtaining work ends when he discharges that employee. The right of the employee to obtain work cannot be taken from him, any more than can the right of the employer to hire laborers. The right to sell his labor is the one thing which stands between the workman and starvation, and it is against public policy for a number of employers to combine to prevent the exercise of this right by any man or body of men. If a man leaves, or is discharged from the employment of any person or corporation, it is not for his former employer to say whether or not he is a fit person to be employed by another party; that is a matter to be determined by the new employer for himself.

This ruling is a fit and natural complement to the above anti-boycott decisions, and the shallow press has been quick and "astute," as lawyers say, to parade it as significant evidence of the law's impartiality. Imperious, yes; but not intelligent. Labor ought not to congratulate itself upon this alleged evidence of fairness of the courts and be lulled into indifference to the loss of the boycott.

What strikes one about this ruling is the utter lack of any leading principle to which the judge’s assertions—for he merely asserts certain things instead of any arguing—can be referred. Why the right of the employer ends where he says it does not explain. Certainly the propositions that the right to work cannot be taken away, and that it is against public policy to prevent the exercise of this right, instead of justifying or explaining the limitation of the employers’ right, themselves require justification and explanation. They are question-begging, at best. The question whether the right to work can be taken away cannot be answered generally; everything depends on the case. Similarly, it is not necessary against public policy "to prevent" the exercise of the right to work; it depends on the merits of the prevention.

Suppose an employer who has discharged a workman is consulted by another employer in regard to the character and qualifications of the workman; would it be illegal for the man thus applied to be offered warning to the applicant? It is improbable that any judge would decide in the affirmative. Yet, if it is proper to give such warning upon application, why would it not be justifiable for him to communicate that he has already discharged the person? The fact that there is no rule on this subject is sufficient to show the element of guesswork in the opinion, and the asserted "common sense" of the statement is unconvincing.
why is it improper to volunteer it without waiting for application? Upon what principle is it held that a man cannot caution another against lending money or giving a daughter in marriage (and I presume that the right to lend and borrow, and the right to marry, are as important as the right to work, and that it would be against public policy to prevent their exercise) or offering employment to a given individual? None has been assigned, implied, or hinted at.

One of the editors who has commented approvingly on one of the decisions discussed above has sought to cast discredit upon boy-eccy by characterizing it as "persecution," and has assumed it to be self-evident that civilized society cannot recognize "the right to persecution." Such appeals to prejudice as are involved in the use of evil-suggesting epithets and terms are eminently calculated to darken co. ael and befog the essential issue, but the self-thinker is not misled by the trick. He will not shrink from demanding even the right of persecution, when the term covers such forms of persecution as boy-cociting. Civilized society cannot refuse to recognize this right, unless it is ready to abandon the claim to civilization.

The Woman Who Didn't.
The conversation between Florence and Lauren which R. S. Y. reports on another page was still in progress when R. S. Y. left the room. Fortunately I was earwaxing and heard it to the end. Here is the rest of it.

Florence. Are there any married women among our acquaintances who married rather than live in illegal relations, because thereby they could enjoy an economic independence impossible to a woman who has an acknowledged lover?

Lauren. Why, yes; there's Mary Jane, who married Peter.

Florence. Hi! Let me see; Mary Jane has no children, I believe?

Lauren. None.

Florence. Am I right, also, in thinking that it was not, and is not, her intention to have any?

Lauren. You are.

Florence. And that she knows enough of sexual physiology to enable her to make it, if not absolutely sure, at least highly probable, that her intention will not be thwarted?

Lauren. That is also true.

Florence. Then we can hardly allow her to plead anxiety regarding her offspring in extenuation of her choice of a married life.

Lauren. But think of the friends that she would have lost, had she chosen to live illegally.

Florence. Is it not true that she has a large circle of friends among people like ourselves,—Anarchists or people only less radical?

Lauren. Yes.

Florence. Do you think that many of these would have treated her with less consideration, if she had chosen a more Anarchistic method of life?

Lauren. Probably not; but she has also conservative friends whom she values.

Florence. Value conservative friends!

Lauren. Certainly. Why do you exclaim? Would you, then, exclude from your circle of friends all people not in agreement with you?

Florence. By no means. But I would not accept, much less value, the friendship of those who would exclude from their circle of friends all people not living in accordance with their views. One who marries to save such friendship cannot, it seems to me, really look upon marriage as the detestable slavery which Mary Jane professes to consider it.

Lauren. But what if the aid of such friends were essential to Mary Jane's economic independence?

Florence. That, indeed, is a motive which one might be forced to entertain, though at the expense of pride. But the need of such aid is growing less and less, and is much overrated even now. You and I know women who have had, not one, but several, lovers, and who, nevertheless, in legitimate callings that are dependent on conservative patronage, are supporting, not only themselves, but others. However, let this pass. Granting that such friends are serviceable, was marriage the only way by which Mary Jane could earn a living? In your elaborate defense of such women as Mary Jane you seem to have overlooked the fact that it is not absolutely essential to the continuation of the universe, or even of Mary Jane herself, that she should live with Peter, either legally or illegally. As a single woman, could not the "young, intellectual, ambitious, and active" Mary Jane have kept her friends, pursued her profession, achieved economic independence, and satisfied her zeal for freedom and reform?

Lauren. Certainly. But she loved Peter.

Florence. So you admit that by entraining into the slavery of matrimony she gained nothing. Is it Peter. The choice that she made, then, was not between illegal relationships, accompanied by poverty and disappointment of ambition, on the one hand, and, on the other, marriage with its accompanying prosperity and success. Her real choice was between the freedom of celibacy without Peter, and the slavery of marriage with Peter. The case of Mary Jane, which you have been at such pains to defend, may be stated in these simple words: she wanted Peter more than she wanted freedom.

The Reformer That Stevenson Forgot.

Four reformers met under a bramble bush. They were all agreed the world must be changed. "We must abolish property," said one. "We must abolish marriage," said the second. "We must abolish God," said the third. "I wish we could abolish work," said the fourth. "Do not let us go beyond practical politics," said the first. "The first thing is to reduce men to a common level.

"The first thing," said the second, "is to give freedom to the sexes."

"The first thing," said the third, "is to find out how to do it."

"The first step," said the first, "is to abolish the Bible."

"The first thing," said the second, "is to abolish the laws."

"The first thing," said the third, "is to abolish mankind."—Quoted from H. L. Stinson by H. L. Tilton in the "Conservator."

Then came a fifth reformer under the bramble bush. He was a conservator—of all things save one. But the exception sufficed to make him a reformer.

"The first thing," said he, "is to abolish reason."

Edgar Fawcett is an independent writer who occasionally disposes Philistia by taking a progressive attitude, but some of his most recent critical utterances are calculated to improve his standing with the respectable majority and disappoint the enlightened minority. His utter failure to comprehend Whitman, exhibited in an article in "The Conservator," indicated an unfortunate intellectual narrowness and littleness, and his estimate of Ibsen proves him to be destitute of all true qualitites as for philosophical criticism. Here is what he says: "I admit to a strong dislike of Ibsen, as inarticulate, tediously didactic, moralistic, undramatic, clumsy. But I do not hold this impression to be of any more importance than the lavish eulogies of certain professional adepts, who do not know anything more than I know of the tongue that he employs, of the social conditions under which he writes, or of the general Scandinavian atmosphere which has nourished him as a maker of plays." To see how absurd this is, it is but necessary to suggest that Ibsen is not the only Norwegian writer translated into a language known to Mr. Fawcett: there are comparison of Ibsen to other Norwegian writers ought to enable a trained literary philosopher to judge whether the "general Scandinavian atmosphere" accounts for the traits alleged to be found in Ibsen. Of course, as a matter of fact, no trained critic will ever resort to any such method, for he will never be silly enough to think that anything in the atmosphere of an old nation, with a history, civilization, and literature, will cause a great writer (and even Mr. Fawcett will admit that Ibsen is a third-rate scribbler) to be inarticulate and clumsy. The question is simply one of fact: is Ibsen clausmatic and undramatic? If he is, he is not a great dramatist, and no "atmosphere" is necessary to account for it. Mr. Fawcett lacks the courage of his opinions; he mistrusts his own instincts and impressions. Considering their nature, it is well that he does so. The deficiency is in himself, not in Ibsen. Any proper application of true critical tests and principles shows Ibsen to be a consummate dramatist and artist, as even some of his enemies are forced to admit.

Matthew Marshall makes a good point à propos of the current talk of financiers regarding the necessity of the government's retirement from the banking business. He writes in the "Sun": "There is something pitiable in the child-like simplicity with which the eminent bankers, convened at Atlanta, Georgia, are urging the country to increase the interest-bearing debt of the nation by the sum of $900,000,000 for the purpose of retiring the legal-tender notes and turning over to the banks the profitable business of issuing paper currency. These worthy gentlemen live in an atmosphere so exclusively peculiar to themselves that they cannot understand why any citizen should be unwilling to make the nation pay $15,000,000 a year forever, in order to have the dividends upon the bank stock be correspondingly increased. Some of them even go so far as to propose that the government should guarantee the payment of their circulating notes in order to make them more acceptable to the public, and, while with one breath they insist that the government should go out.
of the banking business, with the next they ask that the same government should take charge of all the banks in the country, act as their re- demption agent, and, in ease of the insolvency of any of them, collect its assets and pay its debts." Of course, Matthew Marshall is guilty of the fallacy that the greenbacks constitute a "cheap" form of currency and bear to interest.

As a matter of fact, there is some reason to believe that they are largely responsible for the late bad issues; hence they cost the interest on the bonds. But the inconsistency of the banking reformers is well brought out by him. It is preposterous for these alleged reformers to pretend that they want free banking. Free banking means banking with which the government has no more to do than it has with the manufacture and sale of shoes and hats. The true adherent of free banking relies on competition and public prudence or self-interest for the prevention of unsound financing, not on government supervision and warranty.

Refusal to engage in controversy is a policy whose practice is easily forgotten by its professors. Liberty has already pointed out that Mr. Truabel, of the "Conservator," has such a role. When I make a criticism on one of his public utterances, he does not answer, taking the ground that controversy is unprofitable. Instead of this, he reprints my criticism, and besides it places a quotation from some other writer expressing what Mr. Truabel supposes to be an opposite view. The question occurs to me: wherein does this differ from controversy? If answer to criticism is profitless per se, why is it well for Mr. Truabel to answer me in the words of another, and ill to answer me in his own words? I find inconsistency here. And I find it again when he expressly invites Mr. John Burroughs to reply in the "Conservator" to a severe criticism passed upon Whitman's poetry by Mr. Edgar Fawcett. One can hardly doubt that Mr. Truabel is quite honest in his disbelief in controversy. But such is poor human nature that, when he desires to answer, he forgets this disbelief entirely, remembering it again only when he prefers not to answer. I am reminded of the ancient music-hall joke of the farmer who, being asked how he managed to dispose of his enormous crop of fruit, answered: "We eat what we can, and what we can't we can." All unconsciously Mr. Truabel follows quite another rule in disposing of the considerable crop of opposing considerations which his illogical utterances call forth: "We answer what we can, and what we can't we won't."

The growth of Anarchistic influence is to be seen in the constant ontering of Anarchistic opinions in the popular press. My recent re-print from the "Brickbuilder" is a case in point, and "Fack" and "Town Topics," quoted in this issue, furnish instances equally notable.

Mr. John Henry Mackay writes me the good news that he and his comrades are about to start an Anarchistic reading-room in Berlin. To help him in this work, I suggest to Liberty's friends that they make contributions to this enterprise, or literature, saving Anarchistic tendencies,—books, pamphlets, periodicals. Works written in German are preferable for this purpose, but any in English or French are also very acceptable. Such contributions may be sent by mail to "John Henry Mackay, Vacht-Machterorganisation, 12, II, Berlin, S.O. (Germany)."

Father and Son.

[From "Welt in Lautbuch."]

Son. Did you send for me, father?

Father (within). Yes, I have been there.

Son. What is it that you wish? Father. What is it that I wish? And you ask that? You dare to ask that? You certainly cannot be in any doubt about it. What time did you come in last night?

Son. Last night? Why, about midnight.

Father. And what did you do in the evening?

Son. Now, don't hunt for an answer, but answer.

Son. You don't give me time. Well, I took a walk.

Father. You took a walk . . . and with whom?

Son. With comrades.

Father. Really! And where did you go?

Son. To the cafe. We played billiards, and I won.

Father. Tore the clothes.

Son. Ah! he tore the cloth! And did you sleep at home?

Son. Naturally.

Father (beside himself). It is false! You slept somewhere else. And, if you continue the life that you are leading, I will disown you.

Son. But, father . . .

Father. There is no "But, father," about it. You did not go out with your comrades, you did not play billiards, and your clothes tore nothing at all.

Son. Ooh! Papa!

Father. Now, let me tell you what you did. You went to the cafe, escorted by a woman,—a coquette, no doubt.

Son. In the first place, she is not a coquette.

Father. Coquette or not, she was a woman . . . and at your age it is shameful!

Son. Really?

Father. I was there, and I saw you.

Son. That being the case, I prefer to confess.

Father. Luckily.

Son. I, too, saw you. The woman, too, saw you.

Father. What song are you singing now?

Son. And, as soon as I noticed you, I wanted to go away. Then she asked me why. I pointed to you, saying: "There's my father; let's be off!" Well, do you know what she answered? "Your father, he? Why, that's my old lad last night!" (16 rules to heard outside.)

Father (very pale). Hush! your mother's coming.

Missions and the State.

To the Editor of Liberty:

Since the British government is the only civilized one that has the reputation of generally doing well on mission fields, an extract from the "Church Missionary Intelligencer." (London) will form an interesting appendix to my recent article on government and missions, some of which disturbance rising from religious disension in Uganda, the British protectorate undertook to assign half the country to the Protestants and the other half to the Catholics. The Catholic missions had been under French leadership, but the peace has now replaced the French bishop by an Englishman, whose diocesan boundaries disregard the aforesaid division. Here follows my clipping:

Colonel Hulme, on the official consider this new delineation of the various interests of the mission field a matter of the Coeur de Porta. The division of Uganda INTO Protestant and Roman Catholic territories is not in itself new, but does open both before for the missionary enterprise of both. The illustrated Catholic Missionary News considers that religious freedom is preserved for all British subjects in Uganda, in other words, Roman diplomacy has been allowed to dictate to and override the arrangements of the English government officials.

Take notice, admirers of British liberty. In the words of a British authority, which itself evidently sides with the government in this matter, to "pro-

chiam religious freedom" is "to dictate to and override the arrangements of the English government officials."

The American Board's "East Central African Mission," near Mabulamond, in the country lately conquered by the British and governed by the Char. Company, is having its first taste of civilized government. They write:

A resident magistrate has arrived, and we hope the district will be better governed. We shall have several differences between the governor's orders. These we are making every effort to have righted.

It is clear that "hope for something better" is the most promising feeling yet aroused by this government.

STEPHEN T. BRYANT.
“The Woman Who Did.”

Florence. I have hardly been able to do anything since Herminia’s death. Day and night I find myself thinking about her. How did I love and admire her! The news of her death almost killed me, it came so suddenly and so unexpectedly.

Laura. It was not so unexpected to me. I had often thought that, if some day Dolores disappointed her mother, in not being able or desirous to “regenerate humanity,” there would be nothing left for Herminia to live for, for her own sake only. Indeed, I could never understand how Herminia, with her good sense, could have had such implicit faith that her daughter would necessarily be a second Herminia. It was the same kind of hereditary for something of known quality and quantity; and, even if that was the case, she entirely overlooked the importance of environment in the formation of the character of the children. Herminia’s followers only mean the immediate influence of parents and surroundings at home, but includes everybody and everything that a child comes in contact with and receives impressions from. Herminia had no rational basis for such implicit faith, — since except her own hopes and desires. It really pained me to see her cherish that faith. I remember once telling her that my personal experience, as well as the experience of others, had been that the training of children, from the highest to the lowest, from the most powerful to the weak, is the same sort of thing. She did not accept it and do with the formation of strong prejudices against heresy and non-conformity in general.

Florence. The question, to my mind, is really: what was the cause of her doing? I remember Alan was dead and Dolores had disappointed her so dreadfully! She certainly could not have done anything for the freedom of women.

Laura. She could have done a good deed, if she had been rational. Had she been less sure that Dolores would necessarily take up her own cause, she would not have been crushed, when Dolores proved to have no sympathy at all with her mother’s views. No doubt it would have been much more distressing and extremely painful to be so cruelly treated by her own child, but she would have been able to take a more philosophical view of the matter, and would not consequently have lost her life.

Florence. Then, Herminia was a victim of a false philosophy of life. She had old-fashioned altruistic ideas. She believed she had “duties” to her sex. She felt that she must fight a certain “battle,” which had been imposed upon her. In fact, she did everything in a spirit of self-sacrifice or martyrdom. Such interpretations of one’s impulses to do what is right are always sure to lead to keen disappointments. It does not seem to me that a person starting out in that way can ever accomplish as much as one who rationally interprets his motives. Such people are usually crushed by the unforeseen amount of suffering which they have to endure.

Florence. The only thing that you mean by “old-fashioned altruistic ideas.”

Laura. Under the head of old fashioned altruists come, first, those who believe in a supernatural being imposing upon them duties, and next those who consider self the second importance and claim that we live primarily for the happiness of others. When self cries out for one thing, and the happiness of “others” cries for the very opposite thing, it is said to be our duty to sacrifice that which is dear to us for the good of another. But this is an absolutely altruistic motive, which, however, is an impossibility, because it would lead to the destruction of all selves, which means destruction of the very thing that is dear to us. Then comes one who has no self at all, that is no self in it, although not all motives are equally selfish. A woman with rational views might do just what Herminia did,—i.e., if asked to marry a man she loved, resist not because of her duties to her sex, and so on, but because she desired to avoid marriage laws which she regarded as the cause of slavery of women. Some might go further, as Herminia did, and say: “I wish to set an example to women, and show that they can get rid of that slavery if they really wish. Although I fully realize what a hard task it is, and that it means suffering and struggle, I want to do it.” Such a woman would be regarded as unsensible, but there would be clearly the gratification in doing so, and the knowledge that she would set out with such motives would be able to stand more hardship, for there is self there; she would not be crushed so easily, because she would not worry over the fact that she had performed her duties. If she were compell’d to give up this work, she would not be protesting against the marriage institution, she could still live and look for other means to further the cause. Such a woman would not at least discourage other women from doing the same. And in that case I would not give the conservatives warrant to say “that those who violate our laws must die.” She would live and fight in spite of the numerous obstacles.

Florence. Herminia’s followers have enthusiasm and courage enough not to be deterred by anything.

Laura. You never told me plainly that you agreed thoroughly with Herminia, but I have suspected it of late. But, Florence, have you reached the point where you are ready to repent Herminia’s experiment? It would cause me great pain, if that were really the case.

Florence. I have long wished to speak to you about it, for I care more for your opinion than for that of anybody else. Laura! I have considered the subject thoroughly, and, since I have learned what marriage is, I have come to the conclusion that the whole happiness of woman as an individual is maintained and made possible, I have felt that I could never marry, no matter how I loved. I feel that I too could give my life as a sacrifice for the freedom of the women. I condemn the women who have been forced to do it.

Laura. I see plainly where you stand now. I scarcely hope to make you see the irrationality of such conduct, for, like Herminia, you are of the impulsive variety of women, and the worse’s e’re the virtue of reason.

Florence. But still I wish to tell you my views on the subject.

Laura. I always try to be reasonable, but I confess that I feel intensely the evil of the marriage institution.

Florence. Why, Florence, every true believer in individual liberty feels that the marriage institution is a relic of slavery, and, as such, must be protested against and denounced, just as we oppose every other institution which violates individual freedom. I have no justification for the existence of the marriage laws, but I insist that every rational person, who has an educated mind, must be able to see the evil of every marriage institution. The marriage institution must think over carefully the following questions: Is the marriage institution the greatest existing evil? Can this question be approached directly, or does it depend on the solution of more fundamental economic and political questions? Is freedom of women possible without economic independence, and is economic independence possible under present conditions? Is self-sacrifice of individual women for the benefit of others a thing that can be really done? Does the marriage institution contemplate the greatest existing evil? Can this question be approached directly, or does it depend on the solution of more fundamental economic and political questions? Is freedom of women possible without economic independence, and is economic independence possible under present conditions? Is self-sacrifice of individual women for the benefit of others a thing that can be really done?

Florence. I remember the time, and that was not so very long ago, when you yourself warmly advocated Herminia’s principles, and did not shrink from any practical and unpractical results. It is curious to see how practical you have become!

Laura. I believe more in freedom of women than I ever did before; in this respect I can never change as long as you are left in that condition. But I have become more practical, and I am not ashamed of it. I see more clearly what I then saw only faintly,—that, marriage or no marriage, a woman is not capable of realizing economic independence. Unless she can provide for her own needs, she is a man’s slave in some form or degree (it might be in a very civilized form, by the way), be her legal or illegal lover or husband. The majority of women are not awakened to the real cause of their slavery. Why do they live a life of legal prostitution? Not from fear of the law, or even of public opinion, but from the instinctive fear of the hard struggle for their own, as well as their children’s, materials. Because they are too often controlled by their husbands, they forget the law, they forget public opinion, but they cannot forget the poverty that is in store for them, if they leave the house of their lord any longer than they have been accustomed to. Women, not independent women; marriage does not enamel them, if they wish to be free, because they are independent materially of their husbands.

Florence. I don’t see why you talk so much of the influence of economic independence to me, just as if I or Herminia did not realize it.

Laura. No, you do not realize it, for a full realization would necessarily make you see that such independence, though it is for a woman who would accept the collaboration, is, in fact, the entire community—take excellence; that she should suffer, for they fear the effect of her example upon their own children, and so she must necessarily fall back for her support on the man she associates with. Think of the prospect to a young, intellectual, ambitious, active woman, with probably a profession she loves, with all the zeal for actual freedom, finding herself in a state of thorough dependence for her own existence and her child’s, or even isolated from the world of her friends, for most of them are usually either conservative or lacking the courage to receive her. To depend on only one person for your subsistence, he might left practically with very few or no friends at all, coupled with the possibility of ceasing to love this man, or noticing signs of his indifference,—imagine, if you can, the horror of such a situation! Take Herminia’s experience. Could she have lived alone, he might left practically with very few or no friends at all, coupled with the possibility of giving it up? Was she not deprived thereby of her economic independence? Was she not entirely and wholly dependent on Alan’s companionship? Supposing her house to be an entirely different person, as soon as he realized that he was practically Herminia’s master, that she was no longer the respected Miss Barton, who was perfectly independent, who supported herself by teaching school on John E. McNeil’s farm, who was as his mercy as far as her material and moral support were concerned. He might have been influenced even more certainly by it, as every husband is rightly supposed to be, after the law gave him full possession over a woman who was once free, and whom he probably loved even. Alan might have then asserted his authority in many things that concerned Herminia, and the marriage.

Florence. The only thing to do in such a case is to put an end to any relations with such a man.

Laura. To put an end is not so easy, when you think what a desperate struggle Herminia had to make for the very scanty support of herself and Dolores after Alan’s death. She who, if married, would have been able to support herself and child in comfort! When you think of the prospect left to a woman under such conditions, you will then realize that the marriage is really between two evils,—e.g., poverty, privation, sneers, for herself and young child on the one hand, and submission to her lord on the other. It is very hard to choose under such conditions. To talk about freedom of choice remains only for those people that the workingmen are as free as their masters. What are their alternatives? Starvation, or starvation wages. No; and then they get desperate and decide actually to starve; that is the time when they strike, but they usually soon decide (at least, the majority of them do) that starvation wages are, after all, better than no wages at all, because then at least they have something to hand for the night.

Florence. But you must not forget that Alan was a good man; if he had lived, the world would not have triumphed. He certainly would have helped Herminia to escape from her
t

Laura. You don’t seem to realize that you too are giving your case away. You practically admit that with him she would have accomplished everything, without him nothing. What does this mean, but thorough dependence on a man? With Alan, rich, influential, living in splendor, of course Herminia would have suffered. He would have protected her as
Liberty. 326

Anarchism and the Trade Union.

Since the American Federation of Labor meeting last winter, I have received letters from friends telling me what happened there, and the further they are from Denver, the more they know about it. Thus do we see that silence can lead other things besides enchantment.

The "Arena" correspondent received the news from the convention by psychic telephone. The wires got twisted. Long after the convention was over, and now comes Comrade Simpson, and tells us that hypnosis was the great force at work there. Verily, God moves in a mysterious way His wonders to perform. The people in the Modern Athens seem to think so.

Where is Simpson's proof that I was hypnotized? Or that Gompers was beaten at his own game? What is Gompers' game? And who are the Denver crowd? Simpson tells the circumstances surrounding the "Arena" boycott are unnecessary to me. May I be permitted to remind him that the distance from Denver to Boston is just as great as the distance from Boston to Denver? So I may know just what about the "Arena" boycott he does about the Denver convention.

I know that the editor of the "Arena" is not the most truthful man in the world, but I did believe him when he said this magazine had a large circulation, and I still think so. If, however, it is not the case, and I have been silly enough to believe Flower "just once," I will repent and assure my good friend Simpson that it will not happen again.

Many of Simpson's questions are answered when I tell him I am not a strict trade unionist. I know that trade unions have raised the wage of some men in some trades, and they have preserved the freedom of wages in others. If I can be induced to become a member of any labor organization I will do so, as long as I can find one that will confer the benefits of labor to its members. But I still think so. If, however, it is not the case, and I have been silly enough to believe Flower "just once," I will repent and assure my good friend Simpson that it will not happen again.

When I say trade unions are the most thoroughly Anarchistic organizations in our present society, I mean that they are Anarchistic in their theory.

They are not so because the men who started them believed in freedom, but because the State allies itself with capital in fighting the unions. Thus it happens that, instead of the skirmishes between capital and labor, labor finds itself arrayed against the State. A voluntary association formed for the mutual benefit of its members, using the boycott and other passive weapons in its fight against capital, the State, certainly seems to me very near the Anarchist idea.

When men pledge one another to buy union-made goods and thus mutually strengthen their unions, it is evident that they expect to gain as much as or more than they lose. It is not a desire to sacrifice, and I never pretended that it was.

The trade unions that have been successful—result of the only effective way of having their work undone by the Socialists, who are trying to introduce politics into the unions and ram their doctrines down the throats of the union members, Whether they are willing or not. Those unionists who are so inclined to the semi-Socialist doctrine are dubbed "pure and simple" trade unionists.

In defence, they point to the work they have already done when the State Socialists find fault; but, when they have proved a point and the union men are more secure, they are gone, and their answer to the politician is only a negative one.

If these men understood Anarchism and could bring up the positive arguments against autocracy and revolution, and the value of free competition and the work of the State Socialists, Besides, the educational work of Anarchism could be done side by side with their regular union work without their hindering each other in the least. Politics, on the other hand, will break up a union in no time.

By showing the "pure and simple" unionist that the voluntary idea is a much more valuable one than the organized idea, they would not be "playing them. It did not take me long to come to the conclusion that the boycott and seeing my favorite play; so I suspended the boycotting for one night and saw "Ghost."

The next morning I told my fellow workers where I had been. They said that, when it came to a choice between Anarchism and the union, I did not hesitate, and I assured them they were right, and there the matter dropped.

The fight between the Federation and the K. of L. I deplore, and I have no sympathy with it, or with any other squabbles between union men. I don't know the leaders of K. of L. I am not interested in them at the last Federation convention, although I attended all the sessions. It must have taken place during my hyp· no tic trance. Perhaps Simpson and Lynch can tell me who those leaders were.

Puck Preacheth the Word.

[Perk] Let no man, therefore, judge you must or in-drink; or in respect for a hunger; or the new men; or of the Sabbath day. — Coldman, 216.

Dearly beloved, to say that the greater number of you be mullin is to slender a deserving heast of bar. Yet it is held to be uncommonly stupid and stubborn, it hard to qualify more fit+telingly those of you that uphold our so-called Sunday laws. God, in his wisdom, endowed you with rest; and even since you got it you have judged your fellow man in meat and in drink; in respect for holydays, and of the new moon; and of the Sabbath day. Your wicked passion for shaping your neighbor's morals has been the root of all evil, and all your neighbor's sins. You have been wrong in your interference, and you have been stupid in your way of interfering. In nineteen hundred years you have not learned the simplest lesson that the Galline fisherman taught—the lesson of brotherly love and gentleness and charity. If you see your neighbor showing a dangerous fondness for chess or cigarettes or bicycling or beer (that is, a greater fondness than you have for abstinence, and other vices), you should be able to conform to those indulgences to your own ideas of propriety.

You have great faith in the virtue of a law. You believe that all people would be moral and upright, if they had a law forbidding it. That is because you are as stupid as a mule would be if he were as stupid as we generally think he is. You worship Law as a high thing, with all power to coerce or to command. It is a mistake to look at the central truth about Law: that it is the product of a small number of people who are supposed to voice the

wishes of all; and that, however low it may fall, it can rise no higher than its source.

Let your brethren, let me here warn you, that spiritual enlightenment never advances except in disobedience of the law. This has always been true, because it is man's way to think he knows it all, and to enact laws forbidding any one or know any one. The man who really remembered, did so in defiance of the law, and was punished for his crime. I do not expect to avert you from your moulding course by showing you that it has always been useful to disobey; but I do expect seri·ously when I say that your laws for making other people moral never did any good. Take the man who wishes to buy his beer fresh on Sunday. Suppose his heart is so sinful; your laws do not make his heart less black, his will less vicious. He lacks the spiritual grace which prompts you to lay in your Sunday beer on Saturday; he also lacks an ice-box and some ice. You try to put him up to his meet until he has both the desire and the ice-box, and then he will need no forcing. In the meantime you only bother him, put him to needless expense, and irritate him to foolish excesses. Some of you, my hearers, who are ultra radical, will concede that it may not be sinful to desire as fresh beer on Sunday as on Monday; "yet," you say, "if we let beer be sold on the Sabbath, it will open the way to further licence." Think of it. Do you really believe that it is your law that keeps the Sabbath from becoming a mere week-day of work? Don't you know that Sunday is a day of rest because the people have learned to keep it? Do you think the Sabbath is not made for man, but it is made by man. He has always moulded it to his will, whether it was a bare-臂ature Sabbath or a day of national rest and enjoyment such as we are to have in this country. If the people are temperate and decent, it is because they wish to be so. Your Sunday law never made a man temperate and decent against his will. And yet you proceed as if the spiritual graces could come to a man of the breast of man by a tattoo of a policeman's club on his skull.

On a hot week Sunday, some weeks ago, a certain desperado was caught in the net of selling lee to the criminals that throng the tenements of houses of Essex street and of the new moons; and of the Sabbath day. Yours vicious passion for shaping your neighbor's morals has been the root of all evil, and all your neighbor's sins. You have been wrong in your interference, and you have been stupid in your way of interfering. In nineteen hundred years you have not learned the simplest lesson that the Galline fisherman taught—the lesson of brotherly love and gentleness and charity. If you see your neighbor showing a dangerous fondness for chess or cigarettes or bicycling or beer (that is, a greater fondness than you have for abstinence, and other vices), you should be able to conform to those indulgences to your own ideas of propriety.

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