On Picket Duty.

Owing to the recent collapse of a "modern" iron-framed building, there has been a revival of the agitation for licensing architects, and even certain semi-individualistic newspapers assert that the employment of incompetent men by builders cohesively establishes the argument for such licensing. But how about the government inspectors whose business it is to prevent faulty construction? How is their quality to be improved? If government officials do not show any greater honesty than architects, on what ground is it assumed that a license will insure stricter regard for safety?

Fortune continues to favor the German Socialists. Because they have protested against the anti-French riots, a number of their editors have been imprisoned, and another systematic crusade against the Social Democracy is to be started. The absurd emperor calls upon his troops to "resist the treasonable hand, and wage a war that will free Germany from such elements." Special laws may again be demanded from the Reichstag to suppress the Socialists. All this will but tend to strengthen their movement, however. It is to be hoped that the general liberal movement will also receive some benefit from this reactionary crusade against a free press and free speech.

To escape the tyranny of the country legislators it is proposed by some Democrats that the greater New York should be cut off from the rural wastes and made a State by itself. The "Tribune" denounces this as secession, and says that "your dyed-in-the-wool Democrat of today is nothing less than an Anarchist in disguise." No, the dyed-in-the-wool Democrat is an Anarchist without disguise. Unfortunately there are few genuine democrats in the Democracy, and the government is in no immediate danger. The average Democrat of today is not only no Anarchist, but he is not even a centralizationist. He is as stupid as the "Tribune," and does not understand the difference between individual secession and the breaking up of greater States into smaller.

The champions of hard money and the gold basis generally meet the complaints of reformers in regard to the scarcity of currency by pointing to the great accumulations of gold in the banks. At first sight this appears a most telling argument, and even such authorities as the London "Economist" employ it with an air of complete triumph. What! they say; not enough gold when the banks have more of the metal than they can find room for? But, as a matter of fact, the fallacy is the argument is almost childish. Here is what the "Saturday Review" says on this point: "Bimetallists argue, and argue rightly enough, it seems to us, that this accumulation of gold testifies to the fact that there is an ever-increasing scarcity of gold, strange as the proposition may seem to the thoughtless. They say that the scarcity of gold is shown in an appreciation of the value of gold or a depreciation in the price of commodities. Every man, therefore, who embarks in business has to sell on a falling mark. Consequently, men restrict enterprise as much as possible, and gold accumulates in banks because there is no profitable employment for it." The very evidence of depression is sought to be converted by the monopoly advocates into proof of abundance and prosperity.

The Prohibitionists are now divided into single-issue men and multi-issue men. The latter triumphed at the recent State convention at Saratoga, and secured the adoption of a platform having a number of planks—all governmental, of course—in addition to prohibition. Those who go into politics as a party and seek to obtain control of the government, correctly argued one of the delegates, must have definite ideas regarding every subject with which government has to deal, and the people have a right to know what to expect of them. It is probable that the single-issue men may bolt and set up a separate organization. The Prohibitionists, it is evident, are losing ground, and are willing to fuse and take up new issues in order to escape political annihilation. Although they claim to have been making "mighty advances," the facts adduced in support of this claim all indicate the advance of the cause of temperance rather than prohibition. The fact that trade unions, benevolent and social orders, and financial corporations decline to extend membership or employment to men with drinking habits, instead of being encouraged to Prohibitionists, is an obstacle in their path. The advance of temperance is fatal to prohibition, and the attempt to confound the two is futile.

The chief issue in the coming campaign in this State is Sunday liquor, and the attitude of the two great parties toward it is definitely characteristic. The Republicans met in convention and adopted a two-line plank declaring in favor of maintaining the "Sunday laws" in the interest of labor and morality. This was naturally construed to mean that the present anti-Sunday excise law would not be modified in a liberal direction, and the rural population manifested its attitude in it. In all large cities, however, the majority of Republican editors and politicians have either sought, by transparently sophistical quibbling, to put upon the plank a different construction, more in consonance with "side-doors" and Sunday liquor, or else have openly repudiated it and declined in favor of local option in the matter of Sunday saloons. The Democrats met next, and adopted an excise plank which means all things to all men. It favors local option and home rule in excise ostensibly, but it is so worded that those who are bitterly opposed to the movement have no cause for kicking. The local option favored is such as the State legislature might deem reasonable, and, if the legislature does not deem any local option reasonable, then the platform clearly authorizes it to grant none. As both parties are after votes, and as neither knows which way the wind blows, they had to dodge the question in some way. The Democratic dudgeon is the cleverer of the two.

Manifestly, Nordau is not at all deceived as to the intellectual acumen of his journalistic disciples. With an eye strictly to commercial advantage, Nordau has had his "Conventional Lies of Our Civilization" republished and put upon the market. The success of his "Degeneracy" with the Philistines, he wisely reasoned, would insure an eager demand for another book of his. That the "Lies" contain teaching diametrically opposed to the burden of his "Degeneracy"; that the earlier work is, in fact, a typically "degenerate" production, full of heresies and shocking radicalism,—did not trouble the smart Max in the least. He knew that, having proved himself a statesman conservative and pillar of sanity by his "Degeneracy," neither the ordinary reader or the ordinary critic would perceive or expose the inconsistencies between that book and the "Lies." The event has completely justified his speculation. No critic has detected the trick, and the "Lies" are received as a perfectly natural thing from the author of "Degeneracy." A few writers, it seems, have found Max out, and are denouncing him as an ignorant pretender and charlatan. It is a pleasure to state that Shaw's review of "Degeneracy" in Liberty has had considerable influence on the course of criticism and has done much to reduce Nordau to his proper level. Shaw has rendered a great service to a number of American editors, as anyone reading their editorials on Shaw vs. Nordau can plainly see between the lines."
Some "Facts" for Mr. Bliss.

In my comments on Mr. Bliss's letter regarding the success of "municipal Socialism" in Great Britain, I ventured to express the belief that the facts, if closely examined by critical eyes, would tell a different tale from that which we hear from partial and prejudiced witnesses. Curiously enough, I did not have to wait long for strong confirmation of this belief. It comes, too, from a source which will command the respect of Mr. Bliss. The "Tribune" English correspondent (Mr. Samuel's successor) has been writing an interesting series of letters on the "municipal Socialism" of Glasgow, Birmingham, Leeds, Bradford, Manchester, and other cities, and his tone is extremely friendly to the experiment. He has endeavored to point out every advantage afforded by "municipalization," and he has referred to the arguments of the opposition only for the sake of exposing their alleged unsoundness. editorially, in commenting upon these letters, the "Tribune" expressed the correspondent's attitude, and argued that the name "Socialism" ought not to blind rational men to the beauties of the "illustrations of municipal Socialism." Now, it is in one of these pronunciamento letters that I find the following statements under the sub-heading of "increased tax rates":

Taxpayers in these Yorkshire towns have felt the burdens of municipal progress. Huddersfield's rates have been nearly doubled. Bradford pays over six shillings to the pound, which is a very large increase over the rates of twenty years ago. Leeds has a debt of $20,000,000, and taxation is higher than it was. These towns have not done so well as Glasgow and Birmingham in the utilization of town finances. They have left the work of the councilmen and housemen who feel the pinch when they pay their taxes are inclined to shake their heads ominously, and to declare that the town councils have done too little and paid too much to the "faddists," which is probably the most overused of the new words in the English vocabulary. Much criticism of the same general tenor is expended upon the county and parish councils, which have recently been reorganized on a more democratic basis; and the opinion is frequently expressed that public discontent with the work of these local councils was one of the main causes of the recent political revolution. .. Progressive local government, such as is now known in these Yorkshire towns, is expensive. Great municipal debts have been created, and the interest charges and sinking funds have to be carried. The largest city cannot be expected to be entirely self-supporting. Even small towns and villages have to pay a large proportion of their expenses on account of the police, the fire department, the department of streets, the department of public health, and other necessary public services.

The appearance in the editorial column of articles by other signers than the editor's initial indicators that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by unimpeachable men indicates that he approves them in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by motives of convenience.

The Voting Passion.

I have heard, with considerable surprise, that a valued friend of Liberty and intelligent individualist has resolved to vote the ticket of the Socialist Labor party this fall in support of a rather peculiar negative policy. While he has no sympathy whatever with State Socialist doctrines and would vigorously oppose any practical effort to impose upon any part of the constructive State Socialist programme, he is of the opinion that, at present, when the State Socialists are in the minority and utterly powerless for mischief, it is perfectly safe to support them politically. And the reason he desires to support them is that, in his judgment, such a course would best answer his immediate purpose, which is to enter an emphatic protest against the existing social system. In politics, in other words, for party, he holds, is most prominently identified with vocab against present arrangements, and hence every uncompromising enemy of injustices and wrong can best express his dissent by fighting under its flag.

This is a curious, incomprehensible attitude for an enlightened, well-informed, and level-headed individualist, and it is worth while to subject it to some examination.

Our friend, then, in the first place, is at war with the present system, and he is anxious to aid in destroying it. If he had no ideal of a better system, and sought to destroy the present belief that something more satisfactory would necessarily emerge, it would, perhaps, be consistent for him to make common cause with the party which promised most speedy destruction. The Socialist Labor party would not, however, answer to this description, for it does not content itself with destroying, but builds, and lays special stress on its constructive work. No one who aids it can separate its negative from its positive task. To cooperate with it implies either real sympathy with its building operations, or, at least, such indifference to them as proceeds from a vague belief that, while the system might be somewhat more help than it is now, there is some probability of their being fairly successful. A man might say to himself: these people are destroying something which I want to see removed and building something which may or may not be better than the old; let me help them to destroy, and run the risk involved in the constructive work. But our friend occupies a different position. He has an ideal, and holds that the State Socialist substitute is not an improvement on the present system, not a step in the right direction. He would not consciously help them to build something which he would have to pull down in order to be able to carry out his own ideas of what the new structure should be.
never think of putting his shoulder to the wheel. He is willing to cooperate with them, provided their work remains without positive results.

This is certainly an amazingly inconsistent attitude. The assumption underlying it is that there is no way of protesting against existing conditions except through voting with the State Socialists. But this is clearly, flagrantly erroneous. Politically, there may be no party so radically opposed to our industrial system as the State Socialist party; but why is it necessary to protest through the political method? Must we be dejected or dissatisfied with everything else—in order to record our dissatisfaction? What does the ballot do? Is it intended to influence others, or merely to carry out the best of one's own conscience? Surely either, or both, of these purposes can be subserved by other means than the ballot. There is the pen, and there is the tongue. There is the boycott of the ballot—xx and current policies, which, by the way, may be accompanied by the other two. In short, there are many ways of recording one's protest outside of party politics, and it is incumbent on our friend to show that voting the State Socialist ticket is the best and most efficacious method of antagonizing the present order.

There are people in this world to whom activity is of more importance than the object of the activity, who forget that means are employed only for the sake of the end, and who cannot understand that passivity, waiting, may be as essential as active campaigning. For example, there are people who feel that they must vote simply because other people do so. The fact that the others vote, because they expect to get something (or believe that they expect to) is right, but that they vote—because they are afraid of getting nothing. Our friend is not one of this class. Then why must he vote? Why cannot he leave party politics altogether, if his side is not represented by any of the warring factions, and adopt other means of impressing his fellows?

After all, it is impossible to rid one's self of the suspicion that the man who is ready to lend his support to a party at any time and for any purpose must feel a vague sympathy in the innermost recesses of his soul for the principles of that party. He may be largely unconscious of it, and may try to excuse himself by plausible explanations of the name of active sympathy with the party attracting him is present. If this suspicion is not wholly without foundation, our friend is an embryonic State Socialist.

A Superficial Suggestion.

As may be seen from his letter in another column, Mr. Henry Seymour, who strayed for a time from the path of reason on the standard-of-value question, but afterwards returned to it, thinks that he has discovered a solvent in which the differences between the standard and no-standard adherents will ultimately disappear. He tells us that, if we just say standard value instead of value standard, the breach will be closed forever. I fear that Mr. Seymour does not yet clearly appreciate the extent of this breach. If the use of the phrase value standard is, as Mr. Seymour says, an error more verbal than real, and if this verbal error is all that separates the two theories, then it cannot be true, as Mr. Seymour claims, that one theory is fundamentally wrong and the other fundamentally right. But it is not true that the difference between the two theories is merely verbal; it is real and vital. The no-standard advocates are no more strenuous in their contention that there is and can be no standard of value than in their contention that the selection of a definite quantity of a commodity as a monetary unit is the central error of prevailing monetary systems and naturally progressive of the mutualistic idea in business. It is the idea of the money standard that they combat. Consequently Mr. Seymour's proposal to change the name and retain the thing will not satisfy them for a moment.

Nevertheless I am not at all hostile to Mr. Seymour's suggestion. Although to my mind the two phrases, value standard and standard value, denote precisely the same thing, it is possible that the latter connotes more forcibly than the former the idea that the standard, whatever it may be, is man-selected rather than God-appointed. To lay emphasis on this idea can do nothing but good. But it will not open the eyes to the money standard. In fact, their argument might be stated in the form of a proposition that, God having appointed no standard, man cannot appoint one. Of course the argument is a false one. In nature there is no irrevocable standard of length; yet man has appointed one, and thereby has greatly enhanced his powers. It varies, but it serves. And, if Mr. Seymour will note that there is as much reason for calling the yard the standard length instead of the length standard as for calling the dollar the standard value instead of the value standard, perhaps he will realize that he places undue importance upon his present proposal.

What is Property?

Having disposed of the arguments of Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Matter against property in children prior to their mental development into social beings, I now come to those of Mr. Badcock, whose letter appeared in the last issue of Liberty. The difference between Mr. Badcock and myself seems to hinge on the determination of the prime motive that prompts defensive association. He thinks that the motive is sympathy—"that we associate primarily to defend others, not to defend ourselves. He thinks that, when A and B combine for protective purposes, A is moved to this course chiefly because he wishes B to be secure in his liberty and property, and that B is moved by a similar prime interest in A, or, it may be, that both A and B are moved to make their combination because each is primarily interested in securing the liberty of an outsider, C. This is all that I can gather from the opening paragraph of Mr. Badcock's letter, and especially from the sentence in which he states that without the stimulus of the sympathetic feelings no plans would be pushed. Such a declaration clearly involves the idea that the desire for one's own liberty is insufficient to prompt one to associate with others to secure it by agreeing to secure theirs in return. It greatly puzzles me to find such doctrine propounded by an Egoist. If we were convinced of its truth, I should at once abandon my claim that children should be property. But in the same breath I should abandon many other things as well. Once show me that mere sympathy is sufficient to make interference justifiable and expedient, and I shall undertake to govern my fellow-men in many thousands of ways. The difficulty will be to find a sufficient number of persons whose sympathies are identical with mine to enable an ex-reise of controlling power. If sympathy is to determine our course in these matters, there is no reason why those who believe that total abstaining from liquor-drinking is conducive to the happiness of the abstainer should not enforce abstaining on all, or why those who believe that unequal distribution of wealth is a cause of suffering should not resort to collective ownership of the means of production in order to level fortunes, or why those who believe that godless teaching is inimical to human welfare should not suppress all propaganda save that which emanates from the Vatican; and similarly, of course, there is no reason why those whose sympathies so move them should not combine to protect children from cruel parents. In fact, I do not see why anyone who chooses to make the attempt may ignore well-founded political teaching, and act, either individually or in association, for the attainment of any purpose whatsoever. The only question for such people to consider is whether such action can result successfully and is expedient. To determine this they will find it necessary to take into account the facts and conditions confronting them and the motives that govern mankind in general.

And here, taking direct issue with Mr. Badcock, I assert that sympathy is not the prime motive of defensive association, and that the one motive common to all persons who enter into such association is the protection of self. It seems to me that this fact is very clearly recognized by Mr. Badcock in his "Slaves to Duty": "In defending others against aggressors, he says in this pamphlet. "We lessen the chances of being attacked ourselves. In pursuing such egoistic conduct our sympathetic natures are developed." What does this mean, if not that we primarily defend others in order to make ourselves safe, and that sympathy is by and secondary,—in fact, largely a direct outgrowth of the associative action which the desire for self-protection originally inspires? Self-protection being, then, the motive of the association, it is of the highest importance to suit the association to the attainment of that end. Now, how will this matter be viewed by mankind in general? We can best answer this question by assuming the non-existence of all political institutions and the confrontation of human beings such as they are today with the problem of association for defence. In the absence of such association each individual is a ego, at liberty to consider the unwarranted invasion of his humanity, as his own as far as he has power to make it so. Now, inasmuch as the proposed defensive association, in order to the attainment of this end, must be as inclusive as possible, so that there will be no temptation for persons capable of joining it to remain outside and thereby constitute an obstacle to the association's object; and inasmuch as it is parti-
and a very important sense, in which the sympathies, after their development, do extend the liberties. They extend the liberties voluntarily allowed by the owners to the beings that they own, and thereby both animals and children great, good, clean; they do not extend, however, but rather are born of, those liberties which is the function of defensive association to enforce. It is true also that the sympathies may and do become, in a steadily increasing number of individuals, an additional and secondary motive for participation in the contract, but they are never base; and, while it is conceivable that they should become so strong and universal that even the least sympathetic individual would then be willing to exclude children from the property sphere, this condition would in itself imply a cessation of cruelty to children and the prohibition thereof superfluous. In other words, this again would be a voluntary or, by owners, of a degree of liberty to be the being-owned. This same development of sympathies might lead in the same manner to the exclusion of masterpieces of art from the property sphere. Knowing the inestimable happiness that a chef-d'œuvre can give the human race, and knowing the virtual impossibility of its reproduction, and knowing its liability to abuse or destruction by an unappreciative owner, we should, if we obeyed our sympathetic instincts, take it from such an owner. But to reduce the property sphere in this and similar ways would tend to cause the non-sympathetic and ill-disposed persons whom it is the purpose of the defensive contract to bring to terms, to decline to come to terms,—that is, to decline to join in the contract. Therefore, since a defensive association that will be attractive to such persons is of the first necessity for all of us, it would be in the last degree inexpedient to exclude works of art from the property sphere before the motive for such exclusion had disappeared through the decline of the disposition to abuse works of art. All of which is, as that the work of sympathy properly belongs in the property realm, and that the matter of the contract, not to meet the sympathies, but to protect the primary interests of those who constitute it. It seems to me unnecessary to deal with Mr. Badcock’s subsidiary considerations. In the first place, his letter was written before he had seen my later articles on this subject, in which I have already met points similar to those which he raises. In the second place, the argument employed above meets squarely his central contention. If it’s sound, it is conclusive, and renders the discussion of other points needless. If it is unsound, it is for Mr. Badcock to point out the fallacy upon the measure of my view. I voluntarily relinquish, reserving my right to appropriate any other being or anything that exists and is not already appropriated."

In this line of reasoning we find the necessary condition of defensive association arrived at in obedience to the single motive: that is common to all the contracting parties, and it is clear that these conditions place undeveloped children in the property sphere. That out of this mutualism in protection there grows an interest in the welfare of others, developing the sympathetic nature in the human breast, is not only not deny, but assert as joyfully a. Mr. Badcock. I look upon this development too, as a finer and more delightful thing than the soil in which it has its root. But upon this soil it is dependent none the less. And the logic of this growth is not that the sympathies extend the liberties," as Mr. Badcock claims, but that the liberties extend the sympathies. If you make sympathy the soil, tyranny will be the ugly growth. But, if you make the desire for self-liberty the soil, the beautiful flower of sympathy will ultimately bloom. From the lower to the higher,—that is the order of nature. There is a sense, indeed, Mr. Badcock is alone in bringing forward. To distinguish children from property, he says that & quotes are not producers of their children in the same sense that they are the producers of their livelihood, because the evolution of the child’s complex tissues and endowments goes on independently of the parents’ will. If it is proved anything, it proves too much and shows the property alphabet, for their no production whatsoever which is not aided by and absolutely dependent upon the qualities inherent in matter, which the producer did not create. How much, pray, has a farmer’s will to do with the evolution of the tissues and endowments of a potato? If it is “ grotesquely impudent” for a mother to claim that she produced her child, it is equally so for the farmer to claim that he is the producer of his crop of hay. It is an old charge of the Communists that all believers in private property are " grotesque in their impudence.” Does Mr. Badcock agree with them? And similarly does Communism show its head in the doctrine of Mr. Phipson, stated in another column, that the rights of sentient beings are determined by their capacities. The capacity of a sentient being to eat may establish its right to get food if it can, but it does not establish its right to be provided with food by others, or the duty of others to feed it. To declare otherwise is to adopt the Communist principle, "To each according to his needs." If Mr. Phipson is not an Egoist, his only means of converting me to his views of a child’s rights is to show me that the Egotistic philosophy of the egoist is a better one. If he is an Egoist, then he cannot claim that children or adults have any rights except such as they may acquire by contract or such as may be granted them by other contracting parties. It remains then to consider whether it is consistent with the primary purpose of the defensive contract to grant rights to undeveloped children. I have advanced arguments to show that it is not. Until these arguments have been refuted, I have no occasion to review Mr. Phipson’s letter. But take this occasion to congratulate him on being, I believe, the first among my critics to recognize the fact that there are other dangers than that of cruelly to children which must be weighed in this discussion.

Conrad Lloyd as Critic.

I join Mr. Lloyd in congratulating our English friends on their contributions to the literature of Anarchism, but I do not join him in all his criticisms upon them. What he says of Mr. Seymour’s “Two Anarchisms” (which is modeled after Leysig’s “Two Socialisms”) is perfectly sound both in principle and in substance. But there is no foundation whatever for the exceptions which he takes to the motto adopted by Mr. Gilmour from Macaulay for his "Credo of Liberty," or to Mr. Badcock’s contention that “duty to self” is an absurdity. In considering the Macaulay motto some attention must be paid to the obvious meaning of the author. No man in his senses could be guilty of claiming that men will discard slavery for liberty before enough of them have grown sufficiently wise to understand the superiority of liberty to make it impossible for others to sustain slavery. Yet that is the meaning
which Mr. Lloyd attributes to Macaulay. That author's statement, on the contrary, is clearly to be interpreted as if it were worded as follows: "If men are to wait for liberty till they become perfectly good and wise in slaver[y], they may indeed wait forever." Macaulay undoubtedly intended the reader to understand the adjectives good and wise as descriptive of those qualities in their entirety or perfection, and the idea that he desired to reframe was that pernicious doctrine which Mr. Lloyd is always doing his best to counteract,—the doctrine that we shall have Anarchy when the millennium comes, and not before. Macaulay believed that liberty is a condition that further the development of mankind and wisdom, a means as well as an end. Mr. Lloyd, on the contrary, often writes as if it were only an end.

True, he sometimes, as in his criticism on Mr. Secker, writes exactly the other way. But then, consistency in thought is the last thing to be expected from Mr. Lloyd. Of all the prominent writers developed by the Anarchist movement Mr. Lloyd, though in some ways one of the best, is surely the most inconsistent, the most unreliable intellectually. He remains the poet even when writing prose. He sees the truth in flashes of exceeding brilliancy, and the next moment becomes again a dweller in the outer darkness. He seldom writes an article without undoing at the end all that he did at the beginning.

His interpretation of Mr. Badcock is as unwarranted—I could almost say as perverse—as his interpretation of Macaulay. When one expects to be criticised by Mr. Lloyd, he must never employ a style that is in the least elliptical, for that gentleman has no eye for that which is hidden between the lines. If Mr. Badcock had stated his view without any ellipse, the sentence quoted by Mr. Lloyd would read as follows: "The call to action is an internal compelling force which overcomes the individual's disinclination to take that course which seems to him likely to prove, in the long run, the least agreeable or the most disagreeable." When the position is put thus fully, Mr. Lloyd's criticism upon it loses all its point. The man who is far-seeing enough to "take nauseous medicine to recover health" does not, in taking the dose, overcome his repugnance to the disagreeable. Such overcoming, in his case, could be accomplished only by refusing to take the dose and thereby bringing upon himself whatever he foresaw as the most disagreeable. One way or another, the disagreeable does not do its obedience to the internal compelling force to which Mr. Badcock refers, and therefore does not act from a sense of duty. That philosophy which takes the name of Egoism while insisting on duty to self differs in no important sense from Morality itself.

The "Conservative" brings me what it calls the "important and significant" information that Mr. Kitson's book on money has received the indorsement of Robert Blatchford, the author of "The End of England." Let Edward Bellamy now give it the stamp of his approval, and Kitson's discomfiture will be complete. If Anarchism shall succeed in unloading this book upon the State Socialists, it will indeed have cause to congratulate itself. But I do not understand Toelzl's adjectives. Even were Blatchford the most competent man living in questions of finance and currency, can he be compared to Toelzl? I thought that he rejected all authorizations, and that with him expert testimony settled nothing. Why, then, does he call Blatchford's views on value "important and significant"?

"It would be rash to say with Herbert Spencer," writes the great philosopher of the New York "Press," that "the propitiation of the spirits of ancestors is the first germ of all religions." Conservative and fit for Spencer, but rash for the "Press" ! Here you see the difference between a reckless, ill-informed, irresponsible scribe like Spencer and a cautious, learned, and deliberate scientist like the "Press" writer. Can you hesitate between them? And, if Spencer is so rash in religion, how can you follow him in sociology? What a pity the "Press"—one cent a day only—is not more widely appreciated! Its profound teachings on finance, trade, intellectual law, and ethics are all there, but the man may be a fool, and the idea has apparently made little headway. A great deal hangs upon this issue, I am convinced, and land reformers will have to consider it sooner or later.

While, however, I have so much to approve in Mr. Davidson's writings, I am reluctantly compelled to point out that he has unnecessarily suffered himself to be influenced by the absurd and sophistical conclusions reached at by Mr. Kitson in regard to the question of value and its denominator. Before Mr. Kitson published his book, I warned him of these economic heresies (which had obviously been borrowed from Macleod, Jeunin, and others), and predicted that his book would meet with a good deal of ridicule from competent sources. No need, however, was paid to that. But no sooner did the book appear than the battle began to rage, and in the New York Liberty there has been, for some months, a most fulsome debate over the nature of the denominators of value and its denominator. The result is, as I anticipated, and there can be no escape from the conclusion that the position has been literally cut in two. But these errors are usually said to affect the scientific value of the question.

The STANDARD-OF-VALUE Controversy.

To the Editor of Liberty:
The recent interesting discussion in Liberty about the standard of value has had the effect of stimulating me, for one, to examine more closely, and from an independent and impartial standpoint, the problem involved. Even those of us who are habituated to free thought on all matters are apt occasionally to run in a groove. We are, of course, unconscious of such an intellectual vice, until we are rudely awakened thereto by the appearance of some obstinate fact that positively refuses to harmonize with some preconception or other. But to the point.

In judging between the two theories propounded,—the one by Mr. Kitson, the other by Mr. Bilgram and yourself,—I am bound to say that my faith has not been shaken in the slightest degree with respect to the latter theory. But I have clearly perceived one important thing, the full recognition of which must eventually harmonize the two divergent schools. It is this:—that Mr. Kitson's position is fundamentally wrong, and the commodity-standard advocates are fundamentally right, the latter, by mere routine, have been guilty of an error in terminological nomenclature, and have been more far-reaching than at once appears. It is true, a 'Macleod, Wespup, Kitson, and others have declared, that a standard of value is an impossibly irreducible by the very nature of things; for the presumption contained in the phrase "standard" is that there is some absolute and invariable criterion, which may be referred to as evidence of what value consists in.

Now, the already constituted value—the commodity standard of value—has been assumed as a unit,—is quite another thing. Such is, properly speaking, a standard residue (it being the one selected to which all others may be compared) which may be expressed, but it is in no way a standard of value, if words have any definite meaning at all. While, as I have said, the error committed by the commodity-standard advocates is more serious than real, I am nevertheless convinced that the misconception resulting therefrom has led their opponents to speak in one and the same sense of a standard of value and a monetary denominator. From which confusion of idea has resulted the conclusion that the former is being impossible, the latter is equally so.

HENRY SEYMOUR.

51 AUSTEN SQ., LONDON, APRIL 10, 1893.

Kitson Made Into Hash.

Mr. Kitson says in his recent publication: "I have followed Mr. Morrison Davidson's latest utterances on political and economic subjects with profound interest, and have rejoiced that they have revealed so much close reasoning and so thorough an analysis as is fortunately too seldom met with in your average labor "reader," ml., in seeking in scientific data, generally relying upon more sentimentality claptrap to supply its place."

In plain truth that I read his endorsement of Mr. Arthur Kitson's view, in his recently-published book on the money question, that the idea that the land question is the fundamental or bottom question: for the workers is a great superstition; that the money question is of infinitely more importance. This is especially encouraging to me, inasmuch as I have been peering away at this idea for some time; and, while I have never yet been able to see any logical position, the idea has apparently made little headway. A great deal hangs upon this issue, I am convinced, and land reformers will have to consider it sooner or later.

While, however, I have so much to approve in Mr. Davidson's writings, I am reluctantly compelled to point out that he has unnecessarily suffered himself to be influenced by the absurd and sophistical conclusions reached at by Mr. Kitson in regard to the question of value and its denominator. Before Mr. Kitson published his book, I warned him of these economic heresies (which had obviously been borrowed from Macleod, Jeunin, and others), and predicted that his book would meet with a good deal of ridicule from competent sources. No need, however, was paid to that. But no sooner did the book appear than the battle began to rage, and in the New York Liberty there has been, for some months, a most fulsome debate over the nature of the denominators of value and its denominator. The result is, as I anticipated, and there can be no escape from the conclusion that the position has been literally cut in two. But these errors are usually said to affect the scientific value of the question.

Every inch of the ground covered by Mr. Kitson has been gone over in the columns of Liberty, with the result that the two ridiculous propositions smudged by Macleod and Jeunin—(1) that value is merely a relation (they here unwittingly confounding value with price), and (2) that a commodity standard or monetary unit is both impossible and unnecessary—have no longer any economic significance, and are as dead as a door-mat.

What is to be kept clearly in mind is that the idea of either money or credit is unthinkable apart from a commodity unit, and that there is not the slightest evidence that the mere irrespective of value, and an expression of the value of a unit,—is quite another thing. Such is, properly speaking, a standard residue (it being the one selected to which all others may be compared) which may be expressed, but it is in no way a standard of value, if words have any definite meaning at all. While, as I have said, the error committed by the commodity-standard advocates is more serious than real, I am nevertheless convinced that the misconception resulting therefrom has led their opponents to speak in one and the same sense of a standard of value and a monetary denominator. From which confusion of idea has resulted the conclusion that the former is being impossible, the latter is equally so.

HENRY SEYMOUR.

51 AUSTEN SQ., LONDON, APRIL 10, 1893.
The Government Fakir.
I'm elected, I'm selected, and I'm feeling gay and grand.
How the statesmen gather round me, how they grasp —
by the hand!
No more for votes I'm trading; the battle's fought and won;
I am now a legal fakir, and I'm bound for Washington.

Of course it was expensive, the running the campaign
With beer and bands of music; (But I'd everything to goal).
The people so love jingo and the politician's bray
That they voted for me often, and we've nobly won the day.

Now I'm going to save the country: I'll advance our glorious cause;
With a tariff for the whiskey trust, more sumptuary laws.
The sugar trust protection can always get from me,
And the platinum (for money) shall have my sympathy.

For the railroad kings and combines I will do my level best;
I'll give them whatever they want; the devil take the result.
I purchased my election, and freely paid the cost;
But, when I retire from office, I shall have nothing lost.
The workingmen (poor folks) expect to find a friend in me,
And how I love them (for their votes) they very soon will see.
When they become unruly and refuse to drudge and slave,
I'll order out the tawdy-boys and force them to behave.
When I retire from office, then I'll travel for my health;
No questions ever will be asked about my sudden wealth.
With the parasites and flunkies I then will take my stand,
And the fakir will be honored as the saddened one.

Anne K.

From "Menschliche, Alzumenschliche."
[Translated from the German of Friedrich Nietzsche by George J. Pomeroy]

The Worth or Woe:—In order to justly determine the worth of a piece of work, we should have to be able to consider most closely how much time, industry, good or bad, compensation, ingenuity or blunders, or skill or shams, was put into it,—that is, we should have to be able to place the whole personalty of the workman, his intellect, his moral, and other worth, into the balance,—which is impossible. Therefore it must be said also here: "Judge not!" But it is precisely the cry after "justice" which we hear from those who are dissatisfied with the appraisal of work. If we think further, we shall find that every personality is irresponsible for its product, its worth, instead of being the measure of the workman whether he works, or how he works, either. Only the narrower and broader aspects of utility have created the valuation of work. That which we now call justice is in this field very well in its place: as a highly refined utility which not only takes cognizance of the moment and exploits the opportunity, but tem- plates the stability of all conditions, and therefore considers also the welfare of the workman, his physical and mental contentment, so that he and his descendants may work well also for our descendants and constitute a trust even beyond the term of an individual human life. The exploitation of the workman was, as a means to an end, a piece of stupidity, a robbery at the expense of the future, an infringement of society. Now we already have, as a consequence, almost war, and certainly the cost of maintaining peace, of making treaties, and re-
gaining confidence will now be very great, because the folly of the exploiters has been very great and projected.

The Right of Universal Supplication.—The people did not give themselves universal suffrage; they re- ceived and provisionally accepted it wherever it is now in force; but they have not the right to re- quish it, if it does not meet their expectations. This appears now everywhere to be the case: for, if,
on any occasion where it is exercised, hardly two-thirds, yes, as few as one-twelfth of those who are entitled to vote go to the polls, this is a vote against the whole electoral system itself. We must reason still more closely here. A law which gives to the majority the final decision in matters pertaining to the welfare of all in the same foundation which it itself creates; it necessarily requires a still broader one, and this is the universal consent of all. Universal suffrage must not only be the expression of a majority, but it must mand it. Therefore the opposition of a very small minority is already sufficient to abandon it again as inexpedient: and the non-participation in an election is just such an opposition, invalidating the entire elec
toral system. The "absolute veto" of the individual, or, not to speak narrowly, the veto of a few thousand, is suspended over this system as the logic of justice; in every exercise which is made of it, it must first be proved by the manner of the participation in it that it is still in force by right.

Exchange and Equity.—An exchange would be honest and equitable only if each of the two parties to it demanded so much as his commodity seems to be worth to him,—the price of equiting, its necessity, the time spent on it, etc., being taken into account. Besides, it supposes dema-
tion, besides its affecntional value. As soon as one of the parties fixes his price with regard to the need of the other, he becomes a fitter robber and extortioner. If money is one of the objects of this exchange, there remains to consider that a dollar is an entirely different thing in the hands of a wealthy heir, a day-laborer, a merchant, a student; each, according as he did almost nothing or much to acquire it, may value little or much for,—that would be equitable; in truth, the reverse is the case. In the great world of finance the dollar of the richest millionaire is more profitable than that of the poor and the industrious.

Anarchism and the Trade Union.

To the Editor of Liberty:
Comrade Cohen's statement that trade unions are the most thoroughly Anarchistic organizations to be found in our present society; is one that, as an Anarchist, I cannot agree to pass over. I do not think that Cohen's zeal for the cause that is "noble and holy" has blinded his judgment, and that, if he is not checked, he will become a soft-brained sentimentalist like that other thing, a policeman.

My personal knowledge of Cohen precludes the sus- picion of his being a demagogue; otherwise certain expressions in his communication to you would bear witness to that opinion. Referring to the particular boycott on the "Arena," I have nothing to say, except to hint to Cohen that the facts of the case are necessarily unknown to him, and to declare my opinion that the whole action is stupid, mean, and undignified one for a union to take. Cohen may be right in his case of boy-cott, when he says, "you must not think that I would take this position regarding a paper that could not afford to pay, and was really struggling." I in- quire why other unions don't do the same; and that straight unionism makes no distinction? For ten years or more, as a union man, I have endeavored to establish this principle of distinction, and have en- deavored to prove the fallacy of what is called a uni- form scale of prices, always being depended on be- cause, but sometimes getting support as an ex- pediency measure. Does Cohen boycott or oppose only rich concerns? In boycotting does he use his in- dividual judgment to choose, or does he boycot— which is the same thing,—does he set his judgment against the order of the union? Does he not boycott anything which the Federation ordains, as well as those without a union label? Does not having a label prove that a concern is prosperous and could pay higher wages, and does having a label prove that the con- cern does not exploit its laborers as much as those

without one? Would Cohen, as a union man, dare to say hard, that, shoes, etc., without a union label, even though he had proof that higher wages were paid to the laborer on the unlabeled goods? Could he justify his action in smocking a K. of L. cigar by showing that that particular jobber pays higher wages? By his own testimony he should support the "Arena," if it could be shown to him that the magazine is a struggling, poverty-stricken organ, hardly able to exist; and I can assure him that it is only because of the bl suits on the publisher that the book has been hushed up; but show him the success, it being my private opinion that Flower's "claudality" is due rather to the fact that the printer of that magazine is Flower's creditor and to the fact that Flower has more money. Prove this as I may, yet Cohen dare not support that organ, even though its pages were filled with plumb- line Anarchy.

This talk about paying highest prices is childish; worse, it is a stupid. Certain swindlers use labels to sell off inferior goods and play on the gullibility and loyalty of innocent people to exploit them all the more. Besides, what prevents Cohen, as an indi- vidual, from buying cheap goods? And, label or no label, if he knows the price paid doesn't justify fair wages, what prevents him from forwarding the extra money to the employees directly? Don't say this can't be done until you are willing to sacrifice your family, your willingness, and I will show you plenty of methods. Why not hire women direct to make collars, cuffs, ties, etc., and men direct to make your shoes, etc.? Because it costs too much? It is not meant to say that in buying necessities of life you pay less than to quality and worth and more attention to labels and boycotras? Quality and other things equal, will you pay more for the article with a label on it than for the article without a label? Don't be the question, and say labeled articles are best. That has to be proven; and, if they are the best, where is your sacrifice? You ought to be ready to pay higher prices for the worst. I would like to dise that, because in it is involved the whole economic fallacy of trade unionism.

Comrade Cohen's adhesion to unionism as an "ism" will soon lead him into unconscious parrhism. His symptoms are not with all laborers as a class against capitalists. In this sense K. of L. is far superior to trade unionism from a humanitarian point of view, and their leaders are as "noble and holy," al- though they were defeated at the last Federation con- vention. "My ism is orthodoxy, your ism is hetero-
doxy," is too narrow for a broad-minded humanitarian like Cohen. (This is a long subject; else, I'd like to say it in this very long letter.)

I am a laborer, and I am a union man. I am a laborer, and I am an anarchist. I maintain that a trade union is a despotic, tyrannical, arbitrary, and ignorantly body; that its individual members are as selfish, overbearing, and intolerant of any other body as any other body. I am a laborer, and I am an anarchist. I maintain that a trade union is a despotic, tyrannical, arbitrary, and ignorantly body; that its individual members are as selfish, overbearing, and intolerant of any other body as any other body. I am a laborer, and I am an anarchist. I maintain that a trade union is a despotic, tyrannical, arbitrary, and ignorantly body; that its individual members are as selfish, overbear
a demagogue. My reasons are a personal matter, and not a public issue.

If Congress then wants to discuss these propositions as they are stated, let him begin. If he cares to change the wording of the propositions, let him suggest modifications; and then let us stick close to the point.

Yours truly,
A. H. STEWART.

The Rights of Children.

To the Editor of Liberty:

Although, I hope, through going an Anarchist as anybody, I was certainly startled by your proposition that children are not entitled to the same rights as adults or animals.

The fact, however, that you lump these two together, although there is manifestly considerable distinction between an inanimate chattel and a sentient being, indicates that there may be further distinction between an animal and a human child, just as there are gradations in the status of the child as it becomes more and more competent to understand.

While, however, a child progresses in intelligence and the capacity for mental suffering, it remains all its life, like an animal, equally sensitive to physical pain, and this, it seems to me, is what gives it an absolute right to growth and happiness. And, as happiness is the sole end of any ethical system whatever, to deny it to children, or even to animals, is to say, "the whole science and repute entire owes to animals.

Indeed, it is difficult to believe that you use the word "rights" here in the ordinary sense, but that your real meaning is, while admitting the abstract right of children to happiness, that it is impossible to enforce it without a still greater infringement of liberty than that which might result if parents were left free to treat their children as they pleased. Now, there is no doubt there is much force in this contention, but it must be remembered that a child is not more than 2 or 3.3% of all an Anarchist "juries," which regulate people's conduct, and to let it be admitted that children might be punished, tortured, or killed at their parents' discretion, in the same manner, as cases, lead to such outrages being perpetrated; just as in France, where it is the custom, animals are much more cruelly used than in England, where there is general sentiment and law against such ill usage. Mrs. Monica Cattell's essay, as set forth in "Personal Right," seems to be the conclusion, viz., that the rights of all sentient beings are determined by their capacities; the obvious deduction from which is that, while both man and beast are to be cherished, the beast, may be painlessly destroyed, and older children who have no purpose in life, but dread the knowledge that death is coming, may only be killed if that is done instantly and without torture, so that no child who has begun to understand the value of life may be deprived of it without his consent, nor one who is capable of mental suffering be compelled to endure it, and no child at physically assaulted except according to the same rules as apply to adults.

And, speaking of mental torture, I have a word to say respecting the controversy between yourself and Mrs. Dietrich. Here again the main postulate to be borne in mind is that no child has a right to consent or to be evicted from the rule, and, if not physical pain, a fortiori still less mental pain, seeing that this is the worse to bear of the two. And there are greater outrages of this kind, as is called a form of theft, and where one is still more defenseless. If, for instance, a man chooses to wear long hair, or sandals instead of boots, this surely is no affair of any other person, and yet in a drawing room he would be grimmest if he did. In the case of a young lady, it is more to this disaster on a bicycle, especially if dressed in knickerbocker costume, and what kind of treatment will she receive? Yet she has no redress, and, if she ventures to express an objection, the seller is likely to ask: "Poor! there is no law against laughing." No, and, consequently all we are held in abject terror, and compelled, whether we like it or not, to do, within narrow limits, the same as everybody else does.

The only change for the weak in combination, and just as Anarchists, by striking together and invoking the aid of other persecuted bodies, can manage to make the weak more and half the amount of consideration, so children must look to those whose sympathies are with them to resist the tyranny and cruelty of parents, and compel them to grant the same right to happiness as they themselves enjoy.

EVANGELINE A. PHIPPS.

P. S. — One of the strongest arguments I know against Anarchism, because of experience instead of theoretical, is the horrible tyranny and bullying that goes on in large boarding-schools. These are practically Anarchistic, since "sneking" to the master is as much child abuse as is killing a combatant when he is floored, and any boy resorting to such a means of protection would be ostracized. Yet, so far from such equal liberty leading to the concession of equal rights for the weak or even a sen-

omatric system of aggression in force, the younger boys being treated worse than slaves by the elder, while, instead of the weak majorly heading together for protection, they do nothing but applaud the bullies, and even take pleasure in witnessing or assisting in the torture or abuse of their fellows.

This proves at least that the unscrupulousness and cruelty of children is due to the struggle for a living, and that, even where ample bodily requirements are supplied without effort, and all are on an equality and without any privileged government, there is a constant striving after mastery and delight in inflicting pain on the vanquished. Also that the personal sentiment is rather with the invader than the invaded, the most flagrant example of which is the respect shown for a murderer, while every one loathes the hangman who but gives him a dose of his own medicine.

Creed and Summaries.

For a long while I have been trying to notice two or three good things which friends in England have sent me.

I used to wish that Anarchism could be boiled down, and, instead of being bound only in large books, or scattered through all the libertarian papers, be condensed in such plain, simple language and cheap handy form that anybody might have it in a nutshell.

The Two Anarchisms," by Henry Seymour, is an admirable attempt to meet this want. It is a very pretty leaflet, printed on tinted paper strong and fine. It is a sharp, clear cut comparison between Communist and Mutualist Anarchism. In each definition common words are defined in each system, and, this order being maintained throughout, it is very easily understood. The language is good and the tone dignified and fair.

Here follow a few quotations:

One believes that everybody would cheerfully labor under no faulting government; the other has not faith in being got rid of by conditions which rela-
tion ceases.

One believes in an equality of Comforts; the other believes in an equality of Rights, which guarantees to each the opportunity to be equally comfortable.

One desires to expropriate everybody; the other de-
sires to make human beings.

One says: "The product to the community, and to each according to his needs"; the other says: "The product to each according to his deeds."

In brief, so generally admirable and brilliant is this leaflet that I am very sorry I cannot endorse it without criticism; but the last three definitions check my emo-
tussion a little. One would destroy marriage and the family; the other would consolidate them.

Just what is meant by "consolidate" here? At the best it looks doubtful, and at the worst it may mean: the destruction of every kind of marriage, and every woman the wife of every man, and all adults responsible as parents, in the one great Consolidated Family.

Better explain, Mr. Seymour, or drop it.

In the next paragraph my objection is verbal. The defensive organization is spoken of as a "free govern-
ment."

This was doubtless well meant, but, as An-
archists define government as coercion, the term, translated as "free organization," would look funny. Anarchists stand for no government, and, to

advocating, we had better let the terms "law" and "government" alone.

On the other hand, we are told that Mutualists believe: "that it is through struggle and alone that crime may be completely eradicated, and with it the necessity of the State."

Now, while any Anarchist may hold this faith, I doubt that very many do. As are most of those who favor strife, the "alone" is too strong. Speaking for myself, I have no more faith that crime ever will be "completely" eradicated. So far as I am concerned, all these things besides strife will conduco to that result; for example, education in enlightened egoism and natural rights; abolition of State government; sympathy; fear of the heinous and defenses associated with the feeling of a proper strictness, lack of opportunity, and mere habit and custom of being just as found in free society; and all these and others will render strife not even "alone" in the good work.

"The Creed of Liberty," by William Gilmour, is so good that I believe I have no word of fault-finding. Clear, definite, brief, and simple in language, it seems nearly a model. I shall recommend it everywhere.

This man's enthusiasm and good sense bid fair to give him a leading place among our pioneers. But I do not like the motto from Macaulay: "If men are to wait for liberty till they become good and wise in slavery, they may indeed wait forever." On the contrary, I am more and more wise enough to understand liberty and good enough to establish and maintain it and (at) a means to be "wise and good" in a very real sense, they must remain slaves. External liberty without freedom and goodness beneath it is a house built without founda-
tions, sure to result in ruins. External liberty is in reality a good thing, but cannot be maintained for a moment except in so far as it is in the interests of those in its supporters. Given internal liberty, and external liberty will be as inevitable as its shell is the healthy oyster. Real Anarchism is an individual and public spirit of non-invasion. Anarchism, as an external factor, is its egoistic desire for freedom, for political, social, and defensive associations, so-called, may be as complete and terrible an engine of invasion as any government, unless the spirit of human non-invasion is real and not nominal, the spirit of those who maintain it. Names are nothing; the will is every-
thing; for in the long run the purpose is sure to expess itself. The intellect is its servant. Slavery is "unnatural". If we, under protection, become wise enough to understand liberty and good enough to will it, we shall be free. Otherwise not. And that is the all of it.

Slaves to Duty," by John Badcock, is a gracefully written little booklet, with a great deal of real litera-
ture merit. A fine contribution to the literature of Egoism.

A better summary of the arguments against Duty in the special sense, the artificial duty of Church, State, and conventional morality, I know of nowhere; but, with all hearty acquiescence in the spirit and inten-
tion of his book, I think Mr. Badcock has made a mis-
take in fighting against "natural duty" and "duty to act" as justifiable terms. He says:

"The call of duty is an internal compelling force which overcomes the individual's disinclination, to do something disgraceful or indifferent. The per-
sonee acts under an influence, he accepts it.

I accept that. It is excellent. A sense of obligation resulting in an internal compelling force, even in the overcoming of the resistances of the disgraceful, is something that occurs to every man on almost every day of his life, and, therefore, whatever the theory, duty, as thus defined, must be admitted to naturally and naturally enforce it. The next time Mr. Badcock sees any one take a nauseous medicine to make him well, he should attribute it to the creation of "natural duty," "egoistic duty," or "duty to self." If he will analyze the situation, he will find the "ob-
ligation," the "internal compelling force," the "creation of the disgraceful," the "sense of relief," "like the payment of a just debt," all these. This kind of duty exists in nature, and always will exist, whether we affirm or deny it or give it other names.

"Duty to self," the last resting place for the duty argument, is a sound conclusion. Duty is not thinkable, except as an obligation. He can't and indi-
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