On Picket Duty.

Some months ago it was pointed out in these columns that numerous strikes have been known in the public service of Great Britain, both civil and military, contrary to the theory of State Socialism that governmental control of industry would settle the strike question. This theory has just received another blow in the strike of twelve hundred Buda-Pesth postmen for higher wages.

At a recent meeting of the building trade section of the New York Central Labor Union, James McGilly, delegate of the Operative Plasterers' Union, gave notice of a proposed amendment to the constitution of the Central Labor Union committing that body to advocacy of free banking as a logical application of the principle of free trade. This is an encouraging sign, though the proposed amendment will hardly be adopted.

It is quite safe to say that the boycott will never again be denounced as a hideous foreignism scarcely less heinous than bomb-throwing. The virtuous and pious Presbyterian General Assembly, in its determination to put down heresy, did not shrink from resorting to the boycott of Briggs and the Union Theological Seminary, whose graduates are apt to be infected with rationalism; and, while a number of religious papers have "deprecat[ed]" this "extreme step" and "manifestation of bigotry," none have ventured to denounce it in the familiar style of anti-labor fulmination.

Those who are agitating the question of jury reform are wasting their energy. Soon the system of trial by jury will be "reformed altogether." Omnious injunctions are the modern substitute for the slow, expensive, and uncertain trial by jury, and the plutoocrats governments are gradually obliterating the institution which was intended to operate as a check on their encroachments. First the right to judge of the law was withdrawn from juries and given to judges, and now the right to judge of the facts is to be restricted to the narrowest possible limits, at least at the first stage of the game. Of course, after an alleged offender has been imprisoned by order of the court, without indictment and verdict by jury, the plutoocrats are entirely willing to have him tried on the same charges by a jury. It is a fine trick, this injunction business.

A letter from a Cincinnati comrade contains the following passage: "Louis F. Post gave a lecture here on May 26. After he got through, I congratulated him on his progress toward Anarchy, because of his having so strongly advocated free competition and individual liberty. He also stated very plainly and clearly that occupancy and use was really the only true title to land. His attention being called to this statement after the lecture, he said that he advocated the Single Tax as the best method of getting to, or reaching, the occupancy-and-use title to the land. He spoke for an hour and a half, and failed to say anything about natural monopolies,—strange to say, as this used to be a great hobby with Single Taxers." If my correspondent did not misunderstand Mr. Post, this is one of the most significant facts that have lately been brought to my notice. I print it here that its correctness may be challenged, if any one feels authorized to do so. The Single Tax theory as expounded by Mr. George, Mr. Byington, the Philadelphia "Justice," and, as far as I know, its prominent champions generally, is a distinct denial of the theory that land belongs to the occupant and user and an affirmation that each and every piece of land belongs equally to all people. After Mr. George, Mr. Post is perhaps the most conscious man in the Single Tax movement, and, if he has taken a position which involves the rejection of the Single Tax theory and edges him to the Single Tax only as a measure of expediency and as a stepping-stone, the fact, I repeat, is one of no ordinary importance.

As a rule, free-traders favor a system of direct taxation. They believe, and rightly, that government could do far less mischief if the taxpayers had to settle its bills, pay for its follies, and receive daily object-lessons enforcing the connection between regulation and plunder. Nowhere would familiarity breed more contempt than in this case, for it is the ignorance of the modus vivendi of government which accounts in great measure for the superstitions of the average man in its power and wisdom. Naturally, therefore, the direct-taxationists ought to deplore a decision of the supreme court which entirely takes away the power of the federal government to levy direct taxes in any fair and practicable manner. Yet what do we find? That some of the most strenuous opponents of indirect taxation, who have for years fought the tariff with bitterness and vigor, are actually rejoicing over the income-tax decision! As a matter of fact, that decision has knocked all the stuffing out of the "tariff reform" issue, for the government has no other means of revenue now than direct taxes on consumption; and, if the free-traders were sincere, they would be among the first to demand a constitutional amendment empowering congress to impose direct taxes without regard to the population of the several States. But the newspaper free-traders are not sincere; their devotion to free trade was platonic and harmless, while their fidelity to the interests of plutocracy is deep and real. When the two clashed, the glittering generalities about free trade vanished into thin air. The poor consumer was forgotten; the natural laws of trade were lost sight of; all that was remembered was the necessity of relieving the plutoocrats from a direct tax which, theory or no theory, they refused to pay.

Judge Barrett, of this city, who is deeply impressed with the necessity of jury reform, has elaborated a plan which the next legislature will be asked to substitute for the present practice. It is simply an adaptation of the "struck jury" system to criminal cases generally. An official of high character is to select twenty-five hundred names from a list of double that number, and, used to contain none but leading citizens, whose intelligence and character are well known to the community at large. More specifically, we are told that only bankers, great merchants, and men of affairs are to be selected, the assumption being that a trial by such men must lead to just results. In many cases, where class bias did not enter, this would doubtless be true; but imagine a jury of bankers, landlords, and merchants trying Cuyler on a trumped-up charge, or Debs, or Most, or any other agitator! Would such a jury be inclined to deal fairly with a striker, boycott, walking delegate, vagrant, Communist, or any other "enemy of society"? Such a jury would, of course, represent only a class, and not the country as a whole, and would revolutionize the genuine, ancient conception of a trial by the country. The masses would be excluded altogether, and jury service would become the privilege of the few. It is passing strange that professes believe in universal suffrage should propose to exclude the bulk of the population from jury service. How is it possible that those who are fit to make laws and dictate policies, to decide abstract and complex questions in finance, trade, and taxation, should be incompetent to decide whether a man has or has not done something deserving of punishment? The truth is that jury service is of much higher importance than the right of suffrage; but our newspaper wiseacres and reformers are not aware of that; and, from their point of view, to adopt universal suffrage and restrict jury service to the few is to strain at a gnat after swallowing a camel.
we may talk of things having value, which value is always expressed in ratio. But, while a thing has value, value is not a thing. It is purely an abstraction, appearing and disappearing with the freaks of the mind. Any standard or measure of value must be homogeneous with the conception or thing gauged or measured. Hence the nature or standard of abstract value must be an abstraction.

For instance, the present so-called standard of value, 25.8 grains of gold, being a concrete substance, cannot be a standard of the abstract.

But the value of 25.8 grains of gold at a given time may be a standard of value. I say "at a given time," because the first change in the value of gold separates the concrete gold from the abstract.

The attempt to use a commodity standard has led economists and the world generally to conclude that an invariable unit and standard of value is impossible—yes, inconceivable.

But, while a material invariable standard is impossible, an ideal standard is easily possible.

Suppose that we were now devising a money system based upon an invariable unit of value.

At a certain moment of time we may imagine a line passing through all commodities (or one, it matters not how many or how few) which we will call the dollar line, using the term dollar arbitrarily because we are accustomed to it. This line indicates the purchasing power of a dollar at a given time. The dollar thus becomes a fixed proportion, never changing its position, but registering with absolute correctness the fluctuations above or below its line of commodity values.

Thus, if at the given moment the value of 25.8 grains of gold is one dollar, and that value should change the next moment after the adoption of the standard to one dollar and a twelfth, the invariable unit would indicate the change immediately.

The dollar, not being a commodity, but being endowed with value (except its purchasing power) not subject to the conditions which govern the value of commodities, and therefore its value must remain constant and invariable.

Thus we reach a scientific basis for a money system, an abstract unit of all values, the unit of values, value, the standard and measure of value. I claim to have discovered this invariable unit for the first time in the history of economics.

I hope that Mr. Whittaker and Mr. Bilgram will now confess his sins, as I have mine, and join me in the propaganda of the gospel of industrial salvation.

Wm. A. WHITTAKER.

The announcement of the revolutionary decision in the Debs case elicited noisy commendation in the press. Only a few of the quieter and more self-respecting newspapers demurred to the new doctrines promulgated by the court and expressed some apprehension with regard to the liability of gross abuse of power on the part of the federal courts; the overwhelming majority of the plutocratic press welcomed the decision with shouts of joy.

Lest, however, the enthusiasm should appear suspicious, they took care to protest that in reality there was nothing novel and surprising in the view taken by the courts. If it is a revolutionary doctrine, they told us, merely a reaffirmation of ancient truths that a few wretched demagogues tried to obscure, and nothing else or less should have been anticipated.

Now that many of the poor fools and all-around ignoramuses who constitute the bulk of American editorialism believed, or believed that they believed, at least at the time when they wrote, that such was actually the case, is beyond doubt. But there is conclusive evidence that record showing that some of the most blatant exponents of these doctrines were the authors of Debs knew better and deliberately lied when they professed to find nothing in the decision except orthodox, well-established, time-honored, and necessary truths. These hypocritically and dishonestly suppressed their real opinions, and pretended to endorse that which they clearly saw was mischievous in the last degree.

Take that aggressive plutocratic exponent, the Goldfinian "Evening Post." Its approval of the Debs decision was so unqualified and warm that the innocent reader is ready to swear that it never would have entertained any different view of the matter. But those with memories not too conveniently short can cover the brazen "Part" with shame and confusion by referring to its own editorial columns.
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of an earlier date and quoting the statements which it made at a time when there was a probability of a decision favorable to Debs. Its files will show that last year, when the judges issued injunction after injunction to overawe the strikers and crush the Debs campaign, it ridiculed the "droll use" of the equitable remedy of the injunction, and facetiously suggested that murder, arson, and burglary might likewise be proceeded against by omnibus injunctions. When they appeal from the whole decision reached the supreme court, the "Post," reviewed the whole controversy and expressed itself as follows:

There is no doubt that the injunction served a very useful purpose at the time. It became, in fact, a kind of substitute for martial law. Local government at the West had utterly broken down. The governor and sheriffs were afraid or unwilling to protect property and arrest rioters. What was to be done in such cases nobody knew, until the president intervened. So the judges really did the community a good turn in converting contempt of court into a special constable. But it would discredit us all greatly if such practices were permitted. We only think this of the day to be able to make the criminal law legal to all emergencies. For all that the Debs rioters did or tried to do, they were liable to indictment, trial, and sentence in the state courts. And they are the class of men on whom the eyes of the nation are always at a distance from the regular course of law is bad. They ought not to feel that they can drive society into unusual and abnormal courses for its protection against violence. The courts which try them should be courts organized for this very purpose. The processes by which they are tried and brought to justice should be the processes by which all crime is punished, and not crimes against railroad simply. There should be no license sundered in their eyes by special safeguards. They should always feel, when they begin rioting in railroad stations, that they are attacking, not a particular corporation or trade, but society itself.

By way of strengthening his position, the editor quoted some strong passages from a monograph written by a well-known legal writer on the anomalies of the new system of criminal administration," as the "Post" expressed it. The passages are as follows:

"We have seen courts of equity invoked in a private lawsuit between individuals or corporations to restrain, not alone the other party to the suit, but all the world, with or without actual notice of a court order or injunction, not only from interference with property which is the subject of the suit, but from committing, or conspiring to commit, or aiding or advising others to commit, acts which are criminal acts, criminal at common law, or made so by recent acts of congress, known as the railroads, or the interstate commerce law. We have seen more. We have seen persons committing, or about to commit, such acts, arrested by the civil courts, deprived of their liberty, and punished by imprisonment, and this, as in the Debs case and others, after the emergency which made the excuse for this prudential jurisdiction has long gone by. And we have seen them so punished without the usual safeguard of liber al afforded by the criminal law, without the right to counsel, without being confronted with witnesses, without trial by jury, and sentenced at the discretion of the judge. We have seen more. We have seen courts, not content with confining all the world what not to do, order at a word the ten or twenty thousand employees of a railroad system to carry out, each and every, the definite or indefinite duties of their employment, as directed by executives, i. e., the receiver of the court itself, so that for any failure or omission or, merely negative act on their part, they may be summarily brought into court and punished there and then, as the court may find less to sentence or its attorneys to a "complaints.

All this was written in March of this year. But now, when the court sanctions these "anomalies" and discretional practices; when it definitely establishes this "new system" of criminal administration, which is really only a revival of middle-age practices, the "Post," resuming on the forlornness and negligence of the same of all the powers, loudly applauds the rulings, without troubling itself in the least about its emphatic protest of a few months before. If this is not a glaring instance of dishonesty, what is? The champion of pluriplacernocracity stands exposed and discredited.

The Boston "Journal," another austere moralist and pillar of Christian faith, is guilty of the same offence as the "Post," though not in the same degree. In March it published a tolerably fair editorial, summarizing the arguments for and against the omnibus-injunction plan of governments, and wound up as follows:

Whatever the decision of the supreme court may be, it can scarcely be regarded with unmixed satisfaction. If the action of the lower court is sustained, Debs and his associates, instead of being punished after trial by a jury for crimes which they committed, will be punished for contempt of court at the order of a judge, without the protection of the privilege of a jury. On the other hand, if the decision is favorable to the petitioners, it will be broadly interpreted as giving a warrant to arbitrary and lawless acts. There is possible mischief either way.

Now, however, it professes to be in absolute accord with the supreme court, and congratulates the country on the happy outcome of the controversy. On what hypothesis other than knavery can this somersault be explained? Loyalty to their plutocratic masters is stronger in these intellectual prostitutes than any attachment to constitutions, traditions, or principles.

So much for the alleged "traditional doctrine" of government by injunction and the abolition of jury trial. On the other point involved in the Debs case, right of the federal executive to order troops into any state, without consulting the local authorities, whenever there occur any violations of federal law, there is even more complete agreement in the plutocratic press. The sophistry of the court is in its attempt to show that the government, although none of enumerated powers, possesses absolute sovereignty within the field of these enumerated powers, or, in other words, that the limitations upon it relate to the subjects of jurisdiction, and not to its territorial or method of action, is swallowed with an avidity and relish that must appear very perplexing to those readers (alas! they are few) who have not forgotten that, when Cleveland, for the first time in the history of the government, ordered troops into Illinois, in the presence of the governor of the State and the mayor of Chicago, who asserted that there was no need of such measures, the greatest authority on constitutional law, Judge Cockey, thanked God (or the president—I forget which) for the precedent Cleveland had so bravely established at the expense of such little bloodshed! Surely Judge Cooley would not say "God for an act clearly justified by "traditional doctrine," and the present distinction drawn by the court is nothing but an afterthought to sanction the "precedent" set by Cleveland. It may be said that to prove the hypocrisy and ignorance of the plutocratic press is very like the bursting of an open door. In general, this is true; but we seldom meet such specific and striking illustrations of the familiar truth, and it is not unprofitable to stop and bow down on them a word or two. v. v.

A Sound Criticism.

In the latest issue of "Egrosim"—which, by the way, continues to come along occasionally, much to my gratification—"H" very properly takes me to task editorially for my wholesale endorsement, in No. 312 of Liberty, of the position of J. Greeley Fisher regarding the relation of parents to their children, and of outsiders to both. While "H," like myself, endorses Mr. Fisher's assertion of the legal responsibility of parents for the support of their children, he criticizes me for not specifically disapproving the following passage that occurred in Mr. Fisher's article in "Personal Rights":

If a person, male or female, alleging paternity, beats, enslaves, or defrauds a child, the Individualist has a perfect right to interfere. He can voluntarily associate himself with the child in a mutual defence organization, and may undoubtedly assume responsibility for the child. No title to guardianship by a claimant, a rent ought to be admitted when the alleged guardianship is inferior to the minor.

So much of the argument by which "H" sustains his opposition to Mr. Fisher's view as implies that the cruel treatment on the part of the parent is bestowed upon an invasive child is hardly to the purpose, for invasion on the child's part is not included in the hypothesis. Parents may, and sometimes do, treat utterly inoffensive children in a most shocking manner, and the problem may well be simplified by confining the attention to the case of maltreatment of the non-invasive child. Putting aside, then, this irrelevant portion of "H's" argument, I hasten to say that his main contention that parental control of children is too excellent, too useful, too obviously proper a thing to warrant the setting-up of a superior right of the community in the premises, even in the interest of those who suffer from parental abuse of parental liberty, amounts to nothing more than sound.

The material with which the socialist deals may be divided into two classes, owners and owners. Now, under this classification the child presents a difficulty; for, while unquestionably belonging in the category of the owned, he differs from all other parts of that category in the fact that there is steadily developing within him the power of self-emancipation, which at a certain point enables him to become an owner instead of remaining a part of the owned. But I am unable to see that this singularity can alter his technical status pending the day of self-emancipation. Till that day he must remain in the category of the owned, and, as a matter of course, till that day he must have an owner. The only question is: Who shall own him, the parent or the community? We may decide upon one or the other, according to our view of the requirements of a true social life. If we are State Socialists, we shall decide in favor of the community. If we are Anarchists, we shall decide in favor of the parent. But to whichever of these two we award the control of the child, there the control belongs; and thereafter to
attempt to award a superior control to the other is to disregard the principle originally chosen for our guidance.

If parental ownership and control be acknowledged, it is absurd to say that the doctrine of equal liberty gives the community a right to deprive the parent of control and assume ownership of the child itself whenever parental control is exercised cruelly. This absurdity may best be recognized by turning the case about.

Suppose the community were to be acknowledged as the rightful owner of all children; and suppose, further, that in the exercise of its control it were to treat a certain child with extreme cruelty (as often happens in State "charitable" institutions). In such a case, would the doctrine of equal liberty give the mother of the abused child the right to take the child out of the house of the State in which by its hypothesis its rightful owner, and assume ownership of it herself? Clearly not. Yet displacement of the State by the mother in the latter case would be no more absurd than the displacement of the mother by the State in the former. The opinion which in either case would favor displacement arises from a feeling of sympathy which blinds the person holding it to the meaning of equal liberty. The question whether such sympathy is to be heeded is simply the old question as to when and where it is advisable to deliberately and avowedly violate the rule we find inviolable in the shaping of our social conduct.

The practical solution of this difficulty will probably be found in the fact that ideas are not realized suddenly and completely, but in a tentative and incomplete fashion by people who do not grasp them fully, and who are therefore less reluctant than the consistent philosopher to deviate in deference to a concrete obstacle. Even such partial, but increasing, realization of the doctrine of equal liberty would gradually eliminate the causes that lead parents to behave abnormally, and thus the question would settle of itself, we find inviolable.

"H," then, is right in saying that I should have taken exception to the sentences above quoted from Mr. Fisher's article, and I thank him for calling attention to my sin of omission. True, he imputes it to me as a sin of commission, and to this I object. It is not true, as "H" thinks, that I "intentionally committed" myself to Mr. Fisher's incidental error; I simply neglected it in emphasizing my agreement with his main position. But even this imputation of "intention" I am bound to take as a compliment, for it amounts to a declaration that carelessness cannot be assumed in the case of a person who is habitually careful in his statements.

The Matter Made Worse.

The little lesson in politeness which Mrs. Dietrick, in another column, reads me from the Greek would be more effective in this instance if it had a bearing on my case. But the coat does not fit me, and I cannot put it on. It fits, to use Mrs. Dietrick's own language, only "sages" who "resort to calling names in their inability to reason upon the main point." I am not here described. Savage perhaps I am, but not an unreasoning savage. Let me call to witness one who no more approves my controversial methods than does Mrs. Dietrick. Mr. John Beverley Robinson, in writing to "Solidarity" to renounce a Communist for neglecting his positions, once said: "He [Tucker] is desperately impolite, I know, and I have often told him so; but, after all, the dog has brains." Then Mr. Robinson bore testimony that, however harsh my words may be, I always accompany them with arguments. Moreover, this policy was definitely announced by me in the early issues of Liberty. To mere abuse I object as much as any one; but, on the other hand, once I have proved my opponent's offence, I claim the right and the satisfaction of employing a vocabulary adequate to the expression of my dislike thereof.

Mrs. Dietrick may prefer to deal with people who, though thinking her dishonest, profess to think otherwise; but I tell her squarely that she need look for no such hypocrite from me. I am far from regarding her as an essentially and mainly dishonest person, but I do consider that she has not been, and is not now, straightforward in this discussion; and nothing shall prevent me from saying so, having given my reasons therefor. Let us inquire, then, whether in her present article she succeeds in invalidating these reasons.

In order to have the matter freshly before us, I will quote at some length from my last article on the subject. In No. 312, speaking of Mrs. Dietrick, I said:

"In her letter in Liberty of April 6 she declared: 'I do not insist that it is a statement that I did not make in the contrary, I have entirely ceased it.' No reasonable person can deny that it is a justifiable inference from these words that Mrs. Dietrick claimed to have ceased her statements. The reader no longer held the same opinion. It is true that in strict logic it is quite possible to cease a statement without ceasing to believe it. But the manner and connection in which she used the words just quoted deprive them of any naive force, unless it be assumed that she intended them to be accepted by the readers of Liberty and by myself as a confession of error. If Mrs. Dietrick had not desired her readers to believe that she had changed her mind, she might have said: 'I have not repeated my statement, but I still adhere to it.' Of two things one: either she did not still adhere to it, and in that case it is dis honest to say now that she did; or she did still adhere to it, and in that case it was dishonest to pretend that she did not. For she knew perfectly well that, when she declared in substance: 'I formerly said so, but I say no more now,' the reader would naturally infer that she thought so no more.

In answer to this Mrs. Dietrick now says that she made the statement that she did not persist in her objectionable charge, not as an indication of change of opinion, but simply to get rid of me and my flings. It would seem to follow that this same motive, which caused her in March, 1895, to declare that she did not persist, determined her, _after_ July, 1894, to cease persisting. Is it not a little extraordinary, then, that, having determined in July, 1894, to treat me thenceforth as a child, she should again, in December, 1894, treat me once more as a grown man by renewing her charge of the previous July, and that in March, 1895, she should have entirely forgotten having done so?

But on this point of motive I have another curious bit of evidence to offer. Mrs. Dietrick's article of March, 1895, containing the statement that she did not persist, was delayed somewhat in this office, and did not appear until April 6 (Liberty, No. 310). Before its appearance, Mrs. Dietrick, wrongly inferring that I did not intend to print it, and having occasion to send me another article on an entirely separate subject, enclosed her note to me in which she expressed herself as follows: 'I presume you are not going to print any of my last communication to you, and that is all right. Do not let us dispute about that point any more. Liberty may say what it pleases about my inconsistency. I think I am in a process of evolution between two opinions.' If the sentence which I have here italicized, taken in connection with the sentences preceding it, did not mean that Mrs. Dietrick desired to discontinue the dispute because she had changed, or was changing, her mind, I should very much like to know what it did mean. It certainly inspires me in something more than a suspicion that this is the true explanation of her decision not to persist, and that the new explanation is an afterthought.

Yet, in spite of all, and in view of Mrs. Dietrick's positive assertion in the present number of Liberty, I should perhaps deem it the proper course to give her the benefit of the doubt and withdraw my charge of "dodging and worse," with an apology, were it not for the fact that she now makes another statement the falsity of which still remains.

Summoned by me to reconcile her December (1894) renewal of her July (1894) statement with her March (1895) declaration that she had entirely ceased to make her July statement, she offers this answer: "The only acknowledgment I have to make in this matter is that in March I overlooked my December article." Note now that this is a virtual admission of my claim that the December statement was in substance a repetition of the July statement, and, bearing this in mind, note further these two facts: (1) that in Liberty of April 6 (No. 310) I specifically quoted to the existence of the December statement, calling her attention to the fact that it was a repetition of the charge made in July; and (2) that in Liberty of May 4 Mrs. Dietrick, replying at length to my article of April 6, declared: 'I made it [the statement] in July, 1894, and have never repeated it, though eight months have passed by since.'

The italics are mine. Now I ask this question: Since Mrs. Dietrick recognizes the substantial identity of her July and December statements, and if her sweeping March denial that she had persisted was to be explained on the ground that she overlooked the existence of the December statement, why did she, in Liberty of May 4, with her December statement squarely before her eyes (placed there by me for the specific purpose), declare more emphatically than before that she had never repeated her July statement?

The case is plain. Whether or not she overlooked in March her statement of December, it is certain that in May she wilfully disregarded it, and this makes the excuse of "overlooking," which she now offers when I insist on an explanation as a condition of further discussion, something with a coldudge. As a matter of justice, I now find myself, in regard, not only to this explanation, but also to the other which I had an inclination to accept, somewhat in the position of the darkly whom the preacher tried to impress by narration of the wonders described in
Holy Writ. With gaping mouth Sambo took in the marvels, one after another, even to Jonah and the whale. But, when told of the three gentlemen who passed unharmed through a fiery furnace, his credulity was too severely taxed. "No, sah," he said, "I doan b'lieve dat, sah; and now, come t'ink it over, I doan b'lieve dat ar B'by story you tol me eber.

Rats!

In addition to the letter from Comrade Mc Craith, printed in another column, in which my position regarding the attitude of the American Federation of Labor toward the "Arena" is criticized, I have a letter from Comrade Cohen on the same subject, not written originally for publication, but extracts from which I have secured his permission to print, in order to dispose of the matter in a single article. First, however, Mr. Cohen defends his statement that the "Arena" had been boycotted by the Federation, saying:

I was not even formally in error. The delegates from the Typographical Union introduced a resolution asking for a boycott on the Boston publication. The "Arena" was one of them. The resolution was referred to the committee on labels and boycotts, which reported it favorably; this report was unanimously adopted. Cohen added, if I spoke with the committee at that minute. In the hope that a settlement might be effected, the boycott was not pushed, it being supposed that a magazine like the "Arena" would come to town without such measures being taken because of their large unionist patronage. War can be declared, even if we do not hear the firing. No boycott is ever pushed until it is shown that the boycotters persist in his way; and, whenever such a matter is referred to a committee, such a committee is always supposed to make another effort.

Very well. I accept Mr. Cohen's statement as correct. But, as Mr. Flower was disposed to deny the fact of the boycott simply because it had not been put into force, I preferred to admit that he might be technically correct rather than dispute the unimportant point.

Coming then to the main question, Mr. Cohen says:

The act of the "Arena" in buying in the cheapest market is in harmony with free competition, but it is also not only in itself the very act of exploitation. Now, of which of these features does its act partake the most? Clearly the latter. For in the one-sided freedom to rob all is it after. The exaltation of that freedom which is labor's hope opposes so thoroughly that it lies about when it makes a step forward and w'e're capitalistic papers tell the truth regarding it.

The "Arena," like all employers, is armed with legal privileges. The Federation is a voluntary association, and is often outlawed. The former is trying to get a few more dollars of "surplus value" into its pockets; the latter tries to get dollars, it is true, but, in getting dollars, it belongs to the "self-preservation" of the Federation surely cannot be compared to the narrow feelings of Flower. If the Federation is successful, it is an approach to equity. Then why your sympathies with the "Arena"?

You must not think that I would take this position regarding a paper that could not afford to pay, and was really struggling: the "Arena" boasts of its size and prosperity. Why is it unbecoming for me to call the "Arena" a "rat"? To pay "as high prices as possible" for all I consume. Trade Unions mutually pledge each other to buy union goods wherever possible. At this point, between our attitude toward the "Arena" and our refusal to endorse State Socialism, I take your meaning to be this: State Socialists oppose competition between laborers; in trying to obtain competition, the Federation does the same. This resemblance is not fundamental. State Socialists oppose competition as a principle; Trade Unions, not being able to shirk the monopolies immediately, do the only thing they can do—i.e., try to check the competition among themselves. As a matter of fact, Trade Unions are the most thoroughly Anarchistic organizations to be found in our present society.

As far as the criticisms of Comrades Cohen and Mc Craith are based on the idea that I sympathize with the "Arena" because it has been boycotted, they are entirely out of place. The paragraph which I wrote on the subject specifically recognized the propriety of the Federation's course in boycotting the "Arena" or anybody else in order to maintain the wages of its members at a certain figure. I insisted only that it was equally proper for the "Arena" to boycott the union in order to maintain its profits, or reduce its losses, as the case may be. As long as either the "Arena" or the Federation does nothing more than boycott, my sympathies are about equally divided. I am sad when the Federation printers succeed in getting high wages, and I am also glad when persons who perhaps could not otherwise obtain employment are employed by the "Arena" at wages not too high. It is only when one of these two parties (the Federation and the "Arena"), who are pursuing precisely analogous policies, blackguard the other that I feel like lifting up my hat in behalf of the party thus blackguarded. And I made it plain in my paragraph that my sympathy with the "Arena" was due solely to the bitter words and epithets applied to it because it sees fit to boycott the union. When two men, cast away in a boat, approach the starvation point, and finally grapple in desperation to see which shall kill and eat the other, I pity both alike, until finally one of them, as he raises his arm to deal a death-blow to the other, pharisaically shouts: "Oh! you infamous cannibal." Then my pity becomes partial. It leaves the man who is both a cannibal and a pharisee, and goes to the man who is a cannibal only.

"But," answers Mr. Cohen, "the 'Arena' is a pharisee too,—a general, all-round pharisee." Grant it; then blackguard it for its pharisaism, and you will hear no protest from me. But don't blackguard it because it exercises its right to boycott, therein doing just what you are doing yourself. In this special matter, which is the only matter that I am considering, the "Arena" is as good as you are. (Let not Messrs. Cohen and Mc Craith think that I am calling them pharisees. They will not be pharisees until they shall persist in their course after becoming conscious of its absurdity.)

"But then," again answer both my critics, "the 'Arena,' like all employers, is armed with legal privileges." I deny it point-blank. (The "Arena," it is true, possesses the copyright privilege, but that fact is of no avail as a plea for the printers, for they are partners in the crime. The copyright privilege was recently made much vaster in its power through an infamous bargain with the printers' union, whereby it was agreed that American authors and publishers should be protected against the competition of foreign authors if American printers were at the same time protected against the competition of foreign printers.) On the contrary, the "Arena," like employers in general, and like laborers in general, is a victim of legal privilege. It is paying rent on monopolized land and interest on privileged capital which it would not have to pay if land and money were free; and, if land and money were free, so that it would not have to rent and interest, the natural working of the economic law, unaided by any boycott, would force it to pay higher wages to its employees.

"Well," insists Mr. Cohen, as a final defense, "it is all right for me to call the 'Arena' a 'rat,' because I always pay as high prices as possible." Do you indeed, Mr. Cohen? Why, then, are you trying to keep up your wages? Why do you not seek the employer who charges you the great amount of your labor for his money? Why do you not become a consistent Altruist at once, and give all that you have to the man that fleeces you? Rats, Cohen, rats! You do not realize the meaning of what you say, my friend, and it is not true. As for the trade unionists who pledge themselves to buy union goods, they may properly denounce any one of their number who violates his pledge; but, unless they follow their principle to the point of paying the highest prices to men not in the union, they cannot consistently denounce as "rats" outsiders who act on the competitive principle.

I have no occasion to answer Mr. McCraith's defence of the Federation for resorting to compulsion through the State, since I have made no attack on the Federation on that ground.

Let us all defend our interests as best we can under the circumstances; but let us also remember that in one way or another we are all "rats" together.

Liberty is glad to find that the Baltimore "American" takes a more intelligent view of the merits of the Maryland jury system than the "Sun" of the same city, which favors a "reform" depriving the jury of the right to judge of the law. Discerning a recent murder case, in which the jury's verdict, by common consent, was just from an abstract point of view and entirely within the evidence, but illogical from a purely legal standpoint, which would have compelled judge and jury, under a different system, to do injustice either to the accused or to the community, the "American" makes these general remarks: "When it was first proposed to confer this power on Maryland juries in criminal cases, the change was regarded with serious misgivings by many able lawyers; but an experience of many years has convinced a large majority of its wisdom. Probably in no State of the Union is more substantial justice noted out in criminal cases, and there have been fewer scandalous miscarriages of justice in this State since this privilege was given to the jury than in the neighboring States. The spectacle is probably never witnessed in Maryland of the browbeating of a jury by a judge because the panel refuses to find in accordance with the letter of the law that a prisoner is guilty, when, in their opinion, he is not actually guilty of the more heinous offence imperatively prescribed by the statute. The juries in this State are often chagrined in criminal cases with making law to suit particular cases, and the charge is sometimes correct; but it would be difficult to point to any practical injury to the public which has resulted from it."
A Benedict's Repentance.

Sometime I wandered free in heaven's holy bounds;
No one was there to stay.
Soothed by an eternal concourse of sweet sounds, I worshipped angels clad in bright array.
Unfettered Freedom held me captive there;
No tyranny I knew or night or day;
I loved all that I beheld, as I was told,
Consulled by symph sylph deons.
Ah me! with what despairings do I view
That sweet succession of unplanned delights!
How vainly did I gaze now at the sun!
Those days uncherished, those shadowed rights!
Give me again, Great God, my liberty!
Give me my heaven once more, or let me die!
-Paul Prince

Liber Ty

Unfair Controversy.

When the Greeks were yearning savages, they carried on their arguments mainly by use of blows, or of offensive epithets, which possessed a power of stinging and irritating superior to that of physical blows. Thus Achilles, having a question of right or wrong to settle with Agamemnon, adopts this style: "Wine-bibber, having the countenance of a dog, but the heart of a stag, never hast thou at any time dared in soul to arm thyself with the people for war, nor to go out with the chief of the Greeks; for this always appears to thee to be death.... A people-devouring king art thou, since thou rulst over follows of no account." To this: an adversary replies (in the presence of the controversy): "This man is desirous to be above all other men; he wishes to have the mastery, and let it over all, and to prescribe for all; with which his liestres, I think, some one will not comply. If the ever-existing gods have made him a warrior, do they therefore give him the right to utter insults?"

But the question was not at all a question of the cowardice or the rudeness of either of the disputants. In their inability to reason upon the same point, the two savages resorted to calling names, and to charges against each other's character, simply because they did not know how to discover to each other the real right and wrong in the dispute between them.

I have never liked such method of controversy. It is too theological; too much in the fashion of those who shout "atheist, infidel, liar, blasphemer," etc., etc., because they have no confidence in the truth of their own cool arguments. It seems to me a very unfortunate thing that the editor of Liberty should needlessly resort to such savage style of refuting an opponent, in this day of improved quantity and quality of writing. He, no doubt, would say that "Mrs. Dietrich persists in falsely and inexcusably proclaiming in the 'Twentieth Century' that Liberty is opposed to the liberty of woman."

No! If I persist in falsely and inexcusably proclaimed that Liberty is opposed to the liberty of woman, why does not the editor quote the passages in the "Twentieth Century" where he finds such a proclamation? And then, if he can find such a proclamation (if I cannot), why does he not explain what he means by the editorials of June 80 and August 23, 1894? The editor of Liberty betrays that he, first, entirely misunderstands me, and, second, that, failing to understand me, he jumps to the conclusion that I resort to "dodging and worse." (that is, that I resort to "a low trick," "a shifty contrivance," or "an evasion," for this is the meaning of "dodging") against his putting words into my mouth which I never used mere "logomache," and that I have no right to say that I "do not persist" in the statement I did make, unless I would first confess that I have changed my mind since I wrote the statement! Shakespeare says, in effect, that, though one should beware of entrapment to a quarrel, yet, being in one, must bear arms bravely lest the opponent put an end to one. I stand throughout with intention of calling Liberty's attention to the fact that its position is inconsistent, when it opposes women's possession of power to speak in regard to the laws now with which the government is charged. I believe that women's request for men's acknowledgment of their right to such power is a demand for more liberty than they now possess, and that it is, therefore, an evidence of progress.

The editor of Liberty has said: "My demand for liberty shall be made in the quarter where it seems to me most imperatively needed, but no demand for liberty made elsewhere shall receive other than my unfavorable notice. No agitator shall be hailed by me as an 'advocate of progress.'" I thereupon called upon the editor to hail woman's demand for liberty to speak in regard to her own government as an evidence of progress, and said that failure to do so, while championing the removal of restrictions, in every other case, was evidence that Liberty "is prejudiced against women." Further evidence of such prejudice against women is found in Liberty's article of August 25, in which certain attributes of woman are assigned to the peculiars of attributes of woman as a sex.

As Liberty did not seem able to look at its position as I did, and as I was getting tired of its frequent things at myself, I wrote a prose pro-longation of the subject, and for that reason only I replied to Liberty's charge (that I "falsely and inexcusably," etc.), as one replies to a child whom one cannotavanaise, but hope to silence, that it would be silence. It was, therefore, perfectly true that I no longer "persisted" in saying anything at all on the subject. Liberty jumped to the conclusion that, when a person says, "I do not 'persist' in the contrary, I have entirely ceased it," that person says, in effect, "I have changed my mind!"

When I deny that I intended to convey any such implication, Liberty produces in support of this: "a lisping with a liar! Because I cannot truthfully say that I meant what Liberty thinks I ought to have meant by the phrase above quoted, Liberty flies into a rage and pronounces my denial of Liberty's interpretation of my words to be "dodging and worse," "dishonest," "insincere," and so on!!!

Now, I might retort that in all the numerous controversies in which I have engaged I have never encountered such an instance of dishonesty as this: the shades of meaning in words, unreasonable, bitterness, so obvious as this now revealed by Liberty's conduct. But what good would it do? I honestly think that Liberty is entirely right as a matter off its June 80 (1894) editorial to its editorial of May 4, 1895. But do I liberty the justice of believing in Liberty's desire to be honest in thinking that Liberty is entirely right. We simply see the case from a different point of view. It is absurd for Liberty to assume that I have "tried to deceive" any one into thinking anything. What motive could I possibly have for desiring to make the readers of Liberty believe that I had changed my mind? It is of such weariness of the unprofitable attempts to convince Liberty of any error that it had me ingloriously gave up the quarrel with the statement, "I do not 'persist.'" All I meant to convey was this, "I cease to con w. This it to cease with this. It never remotely occurred to me that that could be misconstrued. If it had, I should have made a more guarded expression of my desire to stop the controversy. I saw that, if Liberty was so unreasonable as to see no reason on my side, further argument was fruitless. Of course, if Liberty does not believe me, that is Liberty's misfortune, not my fault. But it might be wise to reflect that people do not usually resort to "dodging, dishonesty, and insincerity" without they have something to gain by it, and unless they have a general character as liar and cheat.

I am fearless and I am honest and I should have no expectation of the readers, or of any sort of profit, from readers of Liberty. The only acknowledgment I have to make in this mat ter is that in March i overlooked my December article, and that, therefore, my cessation of this matter in regard to the woman question was a cessation of only about four months, instead of about eight months,—a fact which, however, did not in the least affect the truth of any having ceased to take interest in regard to the time when I ceased the statement I did make, but, whether it was four months or one month, I contend that I was not bound to say more than that I had ceased to make life. Liberty was in error in publishing that I "persist." In saying it. My reason was that I was tired of the hopeless attempt to persuade Liberty that it was wrong, and wished Liberty to observe that I had entirely dropped the subject. When I made a confession that explained

muation of my position, and demanded that I should apologize, as a consistent conclusion to what it construed as confession of being in the wrong. I was forced to take up the article again, in self-defense. The only result is that Liberty now adds personal insult to itself by Liberty's past incisiveness and injustice on the question at issue. Is it not, indeed, hopeless to try to argue with such a controversy? —EUL MOTT.

Liberty's Latest Utterance.

Is Henrik Ibsen a teacher? If so, what does he teach? These were the questions that presented themselves to me, and to which I gave the decided judgments, as I closed the little volume containing the latest of his social plays, "Little Eyolf." In "Brand" we see the Christian ideal of self-sacrifice pursued unflinchingly to its end, yet tragic, failure. "What a satire on Altruism!" exclaims the Egoist.

In "Peer Gynt" the attempt to self-realization resolves itself into miserable failure,—an end possessing none of the ambiguity, but all of the tragic of which had characterized the former poem. "What a tremendous commentary on selfishness!" cry the delighted Altruists.

But you must read "Ghosts," chimes in a worshiper of nature, "if you would know what fate awaits those who prostrate themselves in submission to the moral law."

Read "Rosmersholm," graciously avows the moralist, and you learn the fearful penalties that attend any infringement of that law.

The invincible protest of humanity against Christendom, which rings like a peal of martial music through the usual to be "dodging and worse," "dishonest," "insincere," and so on!!!

It is not until we try to fathom the meaning of "Little Eyolf," however, that our perplexity reaches its climax. In few of Ibsen's plays does the spell of his strange genius exert itself more powerfully: in none are the characteristic features of the author reproduced more signally; yet in none is the denouncement so at variance (if it is to be taken literally) with the entire spirit and letter of the master's earlier teachings.

The curtain rises upon a scene in which almost all the actors have become known to us. Alfred Allmers is Roemer, transplanted into new costume.

Rita, his wife, is the type of woman in whose delineation the dramatist most excels: beautiful, impetuous, passionate, with an intellect wherein the grossest misconceptions alternate with electric flashes of most pestering insight: with a heart, sometimes fierce, often tender, never tranquil.

In striking contrast with this rich, wild nature is that of Asta, the sister of Allmers. Lovely and lovely always, she lives with but a single aim,—that of bringing happiness to others. She is one of those who, like the English poet's ideal, "on tip-toe seem to touch upon a sphere too guns to tread." We are tempted to believe that, if society were made up of these, the drama and the novel would never come into existence.

In the centre of this little group stands Zyoof, the child of Alfred and Asta, the fruit of his father's affectionate solicitude and his mother's jealous hatred.

Rita is passing through the old, well-nigh inevitable tragedy of a woman—suffering through the terrors of that of seeing herself valued by her husband, no longer as the object of a romantic passion, no longer as an individual to be expected, but solely for the sake of her motherhood. She looks upon little Eyolf as having supplanted her heart where she would reign the undisputed queen.

After the boy's tragic death, however, the wife learns, to her horror, that her husband had not at any time deceived her. He had married her in part, because she was entrancingly beautiful, but still more because of her gold and her green forests.

On the same day Allmers discovers that Asta is only his foster-sister, and perceives that the love which he
has pledged to the one woman he has given to the other. Asta, he said, "is the only one who has to be"—to be thanked, to be thanked for her. This being the rent, to be rewarded, to be rewarded instantly, is the last joke of life. And Riva stands together, watching the steamers that bear her away from them; watching the death agony of life’s dearest possibilities. They were the only ones to fall, they were the only ones to remain alive, and locked forever. But miserable blanks of human need lie before them, inviting endless labor. They are on the eve of a long day’s work, followed, perchance, by a contested evening whose sunset glow shall flow from the loving and approving eyes of Asta and little Eyolf.

And so the curtain falls on three molds of life, whose remains are left, without the joy of life, without the joy of love, without any service of mankind. Marriage, instead of a union sanctioned by the tie of mutual love, is a partnership for utilitarian purposes, philanthropic or otherwise.

Passion is an enemy to be feared, happiness an ignis fatuus never to be sought, and work our only refuge from despair. If this is the final message from the author of "Gossips" to the waiting world? Does he mean to tell us at all human endeavor ends inevitably in tragedy? Or is he, after all, simply an artist who plays a scene after phase of life, with no deeper purpose than the faithful interpretation of nature? Should we regard him as a philosopher, or look at painting by Millet or listen to one of Wagner’s operas, — as an end in itself, a master-piece of artistic power, rather than a vehicle of moral (or immoral) teaching?

I have long refused to entertain either of these conclusions. I am aware that, taken severally, the social dramas are capable of being interpreted as expressions of the most advanced social philosophy, but the veil of deep and constant gloom which envelops even his sublimest conceptions, the contradiction of the doctrines embodied in any one of these dramas by the doctrines embodied in another, and, most of all, the deepening pessimism of "ignis fatuus" and "Little Eyolf," — all these will lead the reader to question whether he has been right in regarding Ibsen as the high priest of Epic.

MRS. H. UDILL.

Ibsen’s Real Teaching.

A proof of the foregoing article was submitted by the editor of Liberty to Mr. Herman Kuehn, and his comments on it appear below.

Ibsen may be termed the high priest of Realism, though Realism is all that priesthoods is not. The tragedy element in his dramas is due to the persistency with which he insists on the existence of the masses and the individualism of the proletariat.

Tak Kak once said: "All life is a struggle, and every phase of it a battle." The struggle is against the domination of superstition, and the battles are engagements with the conventionalities growing out of our environment. Objects and fundamental ideas we inherit from our unenlightened ancestors.

As to "Little Eyolf," monopoliistic monogamy is the hegelism which mocks Riva’s love, for her mate and embitter her. Asta, the wife, is the personification of the masterfulness of the demon of monopoly. If constancy, steadfastness, fidelity are virtues, then monopoly is not the effective method of fostering them. Given the wrong kind of culture, under any circumstances, maintaining an enduring marital relation, the chances for their carrying out the conditions are weakened by the bondage of the monopoly element; they would be strengthened by Freedom.

Passion is an enemy to be feared, happiness an ignis fatuus never to be sought, and work our only refuge from despair," is Mrs. Udill’s summary. Ibsen gives no warrant for it. Passion is not to be feared, and it is a mistake to give way to the idea of passion as being an outward fallacy. It is the basic fallacy that is to be feared. Happiness is no delusion, but a real possibility, within the grasp of those alone who achieve stability. Work is indeed our refuge from despair, but more and larger and more important part depends on the productiveness of our work, and without physical comfort there is no possibility of happiness.

In "Little Eyolf" we find nothing inconsistent with Epic, but the attempt to make out the story of the children of the village. When Alfred learns of this plan, he is struck with the sense of its nobleness, and begs that he may remain at her side and aid in its execution. The dream land of love and happiness is behind them, and they remain close and locked forever. But measurelesss fields of human need lie before them, inviting endless labor. They are on the eve of a long day’s work, followed, perchance, by a contested evening whose sunset glow shall flow from the loving and approving eyes of Asta and little Eyolf.

And so the curtain falls on three molds of life, whose remains are left, without the joy of life, without the joy of love, without any service of mankind. Marriage, instead of a union sanctioned by the tie of mutual love, is a partnership for utilitarian purposes, philanthropic or otherwise.

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of outrage never come to light at all. The problem is whether something cannot be done that will curtail the murder of women, especially by husbands. The seducer must be made to feel safer in allowing his victim to live to testify against him than in murdering her. You, parole, for the protection of children, must create a public sentiment against lynchings for seduction.

Also, you must aim to create a state of public opinion that will decrease the penalty for seduction from twenty years to a period of time somewhat nearer commensurate with the crime. Rape must be more severely punished, but seduction must not be called rape at any age.

In this way many lives will be saved. Possibly the number of such victims would be slightly increased, but what is that to the saving of human life?

Mothers are the true movers in this reform, as men do not dare to have too much to say on such a subject. If mothers love their children wisely, they will not shrink from entering upon this work of education.

EDGAR D. BRINKERHOFF.

MORRISVILLE, PA., APRIL 20, 1883.

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.

The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send in his name for enrolment. Those who do so thereby publicly promise to firmly resist, while not to greatly increase the outrages. The seducer must be made to feel safer in allowing his victim to live to testify against him than in murdering her. You, parole, for the protection of children, must create a public sentiment against lynchings for seduction.

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