On Picket Duty.

"The Science of Society," by Stephen Peari
Andrews, which has been out of print for the last year, has just been reissued,—this time in paper as well as cloth. See advertisement in another column, accompanied by premium offer to purchasers.

Judging from the character of my recent mail, I conclude that certain persons are beginning to find out that the "Twenty First Century" is pursuing a reactionary policy, and accordingly to entertain contempt for it. For myself, I am more disposed to reserve my contempt for these persons themselves, who for two years have been cooperating in this reactionary policy without knowing what they were doing.

Mr. Godkin's little poem, "The Ballot," printed on the sixth page, presents so forcibly, compactly, and simply the argument against reform by suffrage that I intend to issue it on a little slip, with an advertisement of Liberty printed on the back, in the hope that friends will purchase it in quantities for gratuitous circulation. It will be ready in a week or two, and will be supplied, postpaid, at ten cents per hundred copies.

Since the publication of the last issue of Liberty it has come to my knowledge that the letter concerning Lord Rosebery upon which I therein commented was published in the English newspapers nearly in full, and that the French translation of the sentence which I quoted did not accurately represent the original, in which the Marquis of Queensberry spoke of Oscar Wilde as "a damned cur and coward of the Rosebery type." This wording, coupled with the context (which the French journais did not print), leaves at least a matter of doubt whether Queensberry intended to accuse Rosebery of practices similar to those attributed to Oscar Wilde, and hence I deeply regret having commented on the subject in the way that I did.

John Z. White, who is regarded as one of the ablest and most eloquent champions of the Single Tax, has declared that the only issue before us is the land question, and that there are no other issues. It is difficult to say which is the more reactionary position, this of White, which finds nothing wrong in the present system outside of the land laws, or that of George and most Single Taxers, who want flat money, government railroads, and a number of other things, in addition to the Single Tax and incompatible with true individualism. At the same time White is more consistent than the Single Taxers who profess to favor other reforms, more consistent than those even who profess to be libertarians in everything except land tenure.

A lift, a palpable hit is made by the Boston Transcript when it observes, a propos of the criticisms passed upon unconventional plays by these preachers of righteousness and worshipers of commonplace, the dramatic critics, that "it ill becomes any critic who praises so many fine and true dramatic instincts of the day to condemn Spence as not belonging to these contemporat social conditions as Mr. Fiske's "The Second Mrs. Tanqueray." These men, continues the Transcript, who frown on realistic and purposeful plays, "will unhappily praise any plays which make fun of and deride the most serious emotions and the most holy passions in life." It would be intersting to determine whether the hypocrisy of these critics is conscious or unconscious, as I no man is better qualified for this interesting task than G. B. S., who is making the "Saturday Review" worth reading by his admirable weekly studies in contemporary dramatic art.

In a notice of Mr. Donisthorpe's "Law in a Free State," the English "Review of Reviews" is perspicacious enough to say that Mr. Donisthorpe inculcates "scientific Anarchism." Possibly the reviewer is aided by the preface of the book, in which the author deliciously offers an apology to philosophical Anarchists for putting forth a work that contains matter more or less familiar to them and profitable only to the aspiring Individualists. There was no real occasion for the apology. It is a great service to all of us to open the eyes of such men as the editor of the "Review of Reviews" to the existence and importance of scientific Anarchism. In time even Mr. Spencer may be induced to honor us by his attention. Is it not somewhat strange, not to say unfair, that he has so far betrayed no consciousness of the existence of philosophical, individualist anarchism? Mr. Spence does not belong to these philosophers for whom the movements and struggles of the real world possess no interest. He is, on the contrary, an alert, keen, interested observer, and permits nothing of significance to escape him. This being the case, it is fair on his part to maintain perfect silence as to the theoretical and practical claims of our movement? Is it honest to ignore it?

Robert Lindblom, a well-known member of the Chicago board of trade, who was one of Bellamy's converts a few years ago, at a recent meeting of the Chicago Single-Tax Club avowed himself a philosophical Anarchist. He declared that philosophical Anarchy is the highest type of society, and that education must precede the establishment of individualism. Discussing the land question, he defined his position as follows: "I do not look on the Single Tax as a solution, but I would be foolish not to cooperate with you because I cannot all at once have my own way. To absolutely prohibit anybody from putting a legal fence about land not actually in use is my solution of the land question, but that is impossible now, and so I favor the Single Tax as an educator. . . . The Single Tax leads up to the Anarchistic position, which I think is true,—that a man has the right to use land that somebody else is not using."

This, it will be seen, is a more advanced position than that of our friend Byington, who believes in the Single Tax as a permanent institution. Mr. Lindblom, if I understand him, is ready to work for the Single Tax simply because he thinks it an easier and simpler thing to obtain, but, as soon as he has succeeded in obtaining it, he will start an agitation for occupancy-and-use tenure.

The rulers of old-world monarchies ought to emigrate to the United States. Their methods of governing are obsolete and played out. Heresies of all kinds thrive and flourish in our dominions, and armies and navies can do nothing to check them. In the United States alone do piety and virtue truly triumph over vice and infidelity. We do not bother ourselves about forms and externals, but we secure the substance all the same. Fine phrases have no effect on our legislators, and we have no difficulty in passing laws calculated to promote morality and religion. How easy it was for us to suppress lotteries and gambling of all kinds,—evils which are as yet in full play in less pious countries. We know how to get things done when we are really bent on having them done. Our rulers rule. Our citizens obey. No more patriotic country exists on the face of the earth; no more law-and-order-loving people has ever been known. Our masters require no trappings, no stage-thunder, no divine-right nonsense. We appeal to two things exclusively,—to piety and the pocket. What the pocket is incapable of accomplishing we leave to piety: and where piety fails the pocket is sure to respond. The credit of discovering this marvelous combination belongs to us. In Hawaii piety and pocket crushed an absolutist monarchy and established a Christian republic; in this country we keep the people pure, economical (they haven't much to spend), and patriotic. There is no chance here for theorizers and cranks. They have absolutely no influence in our halls of legislation. There only God and the Dollar are recognized.
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"In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God." — John 1:1.

**The Inadequacy of Co-operation.**

The ordinary State Socialist seems to be incapable of discovering that three voluntary association and compulsory cooperation. Anything that is in the line of organization, whether voluntary or compulsory, is hailed by him as a nOve in his direction. In reality such movements are sometimes in a direction diametrically opposed to State Socialism. More often they are mere 'little chases after the will-o'-the-wisp known as "something practical."

The Colony has long been a favorite means of salvation. Though still believed in by many, it seems to be giving way to the Cooperative Company. These companies are very liable to fall. But, even if they are successful, their effect upon social conditions is very trifling, and so they cannot hope to command the support of intelligent reformers.

The object of these concerns is to abolish the profit of at least one middleman, and so reduce the price of goods to the consumer. In order to do this successfully, it is necessary to conduct the company on strict business principles. This involves buying goods and labor at the best possible figure. It is upon this principle that the Rochdale companies have been conducted, — at least so Carrol D. Wright tells us in his report on Industrial Democracy and Cooperative Enterprise. It is to this strict adherence to business principles that they owe their success. Consequently it is futile to expect such enterprises to increase the wages of the laboring classes, except as they do so indirectly by enabling them to purchase what they need at a lower figure.

The fact that a cooperative company is selling goods below the market price at once affects that market price. Other dealers immediately cut their prices so as to retain as much of the trade as possible. This in turn necessitates a material reduction in expenses, which is effected by reducing the wages. Prices having been reduced on many staple articles, living is now much cheaper than before. So men can live on, and will accept, lower wages than formerly. As the cooperative company is forced by competition to buy at the most advantageous terms, it will be unable to do anything to maintain the old rate of wages. While these concerns may reduce the cost of goods to the consumer, they limit the purchasing power of the producer. The saving in profit really involves a corresponding reduction in wages, leaving the position of the w'ener much as it was before. If any saving is effected, the land lord and money lender . . . will reap the benefit. For the cheeseparing of living in any place is liable to attract people to that place — usually people with small but permanent incomes — and so
The Independence of the New Woman.

The New York "Herald" of March 26, reporting a debate in the Political Study Club the preceding afternoon, quotes Mrs. Blake (was it Lilie Devereux?) as saying: "Well, I believe in shopping; it is man's business to earn money, and a woman's to spend it." What, then, became of the "libertine independence of women? Why should man earn money for woman to spend? We well know the answer of the world,—although that answer is more often implied than expressed, for politeness' sake; but it is strange that one demanding equal rights for woman should recognize the legitimacy of a social arrangement that forces women, as women, to receive money from men on different terms from those on which they would receive it from each other, or on which men would pay it to each other or receive it from women. Why demand the ballot for women, who rejoice that she is securing entry into trades and professions where she can be self-sustaining, if it is "a man's business to earn money and a woman's to spend it"?

E. C. WALKER.

Aid to Perplexed Reformers.

To many well-meaning editors and earnest labor reformers the recent Illinois decision is regard to the eight-hour law for women appears to be a hard nut to crack. They are forced to admit the force of some of the court's reasoning, but at the same time the conclusion is so revolting to them that they refuse to accept it, notwithstanding their inability to point out the flaw which, they are sure must lurk somewhere in the argument. Thus the Springfield "Republican," a fair and liberal paper which holds no brief for the existing system, but which is not committed to any definite scheme of reform, condemns the decision as illogical and whimsical. To its mind, the court seems to have completely lost its bearings; for, as it justly points out, the logic of the decision would undermine most existing factory and labor legislation.

If, it argues, an eight-hour factory law for women is unconstitutional because it interferes with the freedom of contract, the ten-hour laws, the anti-truck laws, and the weekly-or monthly-payment laws in force in so many States are equally repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of contract. This is undoubtedly a logical inference. But what follows? That the Illinois decision is bad? That is what the "Republican," as a supporter of past labor legislation, is bound to conclude. But the true and logical deduction is that the other labor laws are also void and illegal, and that the Illinois decision simply reaffirms the original true principle, which had long been lost sight of and swamped by quibbles, strained interpretation, and juggling.

But are we to wipe out all that years of struggle with greed and oppression have enabled us to realize in labor's behalf? Must we revert to a condition of absolute slavery of capital? These are the questions which such well-meaning friends of labor as the "Republican" will naturally ask. Alive to the injustice of the present system, they regard the restrictions imposed on capitalists as victories for the cause of humanity and equity, and it really pains them to contemplate a condition under which employers could compel their workmen to toil longer hours than now and submit to harsher terms in other ways. Even Mr. Foster, the editor of the Boston "Labor Leader," who has often displayed a firm grasp of fundamental principles, is led by this fear of possible further turning of the screws by capital to denounce the Illinois decision as an "aggression" on labor's rights. So it is an aggression to vindicate the right of labor to free contract and to annul statutory laws as minors incapable of entering into agreements! Can the assertion of freedom within the bounds set by equality of freedom ever be an aggression?

An attempt to meet this argument may be found in an editorial in the New York "Voice." Doubtless the "Republican" and Mr. Foster would endorse its reasoning. Says the "Voice":

We confess that we do not quite see how the reasoning: the court is to be refuted on the assumption that contracts between employers and workmen are entirely voluntary on both sides. We suppose the court could hardly be expected to adopt any other assumption; and yet, as a matter of fact, the assumption is no longer true. Too often the workman, and especially the workwoman, accepts the terms of such contracts only because compelled to do so or to starve. They have little or no choice in the matter; and, if the law did not forbid it, "it serves them right," they must submit to them; it is no exercise of liberty, but compulsion under the guise of liberty. "Labor is property," says the court, "and the laborer has the same right to sell his labor and to contract with reference thereto as has any other property-owner." This sounds well; but there is grim sarcasm in it, in view of the fact that it was the corporations that were attacking the law and labor that was defending it. If there were open labor and competition, it is frequently there is not, the reasoning of the court would be flawless. But, if the sale of labor is a forced sale on the employer's own terms, we fail to see that a law rendering those terms less harsh is any infringement on the right of labor. The trouble is not with the court's reasoning, but with its assumption.

The fact that capital, and not labor, contested the validity of the legislation in question is entirely immaterial. The question was one of constitutional interpretation, and the court could not refuse to pass upon it merely because those theoretically most interested did not appeal to it. Besides, the employers are parties to contracts with workmen, and it is of as much importance to them to have the liberty of offering longer hours as it is for the workmen to have the liberty of accepting such offers. To prohibit the employers from entering into contracts providing for a longer number of hours than fixed by statute is an infringement on their right, and their is no grim sarcasm in their effort to protect themselves. But how about labor? The "Voice" fails to see that under prevailing conditions, which render the sale of labor a forced sale in most cases, it is an infringement on labor's right to compel the employer to offer less harsh terms than he would do if the law did not intervene. This failure is due to a confusion of ideas and loose use of terms. To say that a law cannot be an infringement because it operates advantageously to labor under given conditions is to beg the whole question. How can the employer be a point to consider? It aids him by depriving him of a contract right, and in no other way. Now, a denial of such a right is an infringement. No further argument is necessary to demonstrate the invasive character of the law: it takes away a positive, fundamental right,—the right to make a certain contract, perfectly legitimate in itself. True, labor does not value or appreciate this right, and prefers the aid of the invasive statute, but that does not alter the character of the statute. Men will surrender most valuable rights and freedoms under the influence of passion, prejudice, blind impulses, grinding poverty, and similar factors, but that does not make their loss any less real and unmitigated. Those of their friends who retain the use of their faculties and appreciate the true character of the acts ought to protest, and prevent, if possible, the consummation of the dangerous bargain.

What is the position of labor today? Owing to many important antecedent aggressions upon and infringements of its rights, it finds itself compelled to accept very unfair, one-sided contracts. Being unjustly deprived of many natural opportunities, it is so restricted in its choice of employment that, in order to avoid starvation, it is forced to bow to restraints. It is really, as the "Voice" puts it, compulsion under the guise of liberty. But what is the remedy for this? Certainly not further aggression, additional denials of fundamental rights, even though these additional infringements assume the shape of restrictions upon the employer, but the removal, abolition, eradication, of those prior, primary evils which have rendered labor so helpless and pitiable.

The rights which labor does not value ought to be valued, and the rights which it has already lost ought not to be given up and waived in consideration of further ones. We want to preserve the rights it has and recover those of which it has been deprived. Instead of surrendering more ground, we want to retake that improperly seized. Instead of assuming labor that it has no use for freedom of contract, we must show it that it needs much
more, is entitled to much more, and should demand much more.

Those who hold that labor is the victim of injustice want, not legislation rendering employers' terms a little less harsh, but the removal of the injustice and the establishment of right and normal conditions. Those, on the other hand, who do not admit that labor has in any way been wronged and invaded, can only commend so-called labor legislation on the ground that labor is too ignorant and impotent to defend itself against would-be oppressors. Such a view is degrading to labor, and the sentimentalists who entertain it are the worst foes labor can have. Labor needs nothing but equality of opportunities and of freedom. It does not realize this fact yet, and it never will if the few of its friends who do realize it will not neglect everything else and devote themselves to educational work.

The Vanishing Point Reached.

Mr. J. K. Ingalls seems to imagine that the answers which he now gives to my last series of questions are as equivocal as his answer to my previous question. Not so. The terms in which he answered my previous question implied two opposite motives influencing at the same time a business man fulfilling a double capacity,— as borrower and lender, and cancelling each other. As my question did not concern men who, as individuals, were in the market as lenders, but only those who were in the market as borrowers, this answer was equivocal. But the answers now given to my last questions distinctly recognize the borrowing business man and the lending business man as two individuals, and this recognition removes all the equivocation; for the desire of a lender to lend at a high rate cannot cancel the desire of a borrower to borrow at a low rate, provided the borrower, by association with other borrowers, can provide himself with a source from which to borrow at a low rate,—a condition not as paradoxical as it seems, since the fact of association creates a credit that before had no existence.

The present answers, then, being straightforward and satisfactory, let us review the admissions which I have secured. Mr. Ingalls has admitted that business men desiring to borrow have an adequate motive for embarking in mutual banking (see his article in the present issue); he has admitted that the loans of a mutual bank's credit would cost the bank nothing but running expenses and incidental outlays and losses (see No. 305); he has admitted that this cost would probably be covered by a discount of one-half of one per cent. (see No. 305); and he has admitted that, "in the absence of State or collective meddling, competition would tend unquestionably to reduce discount to its lowest term, which would ordinarily be something above cost" (see No. 305).

I have interpreted this last admission as meaning that in banking the force of competition would have a tendency of the same strength as that which it has in other businesses similarly free from physical limitations,—in other words, that the tendency would be strong enough to cause the price to hover around the cost limit, now rising a little above it, now falling a little below it, but averaging, or perhaps a shade more. In neither of the two articles which Mr. Ingalls has written since this interpretation appeared he has taken any exception to it. I am justified therefore in assuming that he admits this also.

Now, this series of admissions constitutes the entire case for mutual banking. Whether or not it was ever demonstrated before that mutual banking would abolish the payment of interest for the use of money, I have now led Mr. Ingalls to demonstrate this himself. His declarations show that under freedom the rate of discount was cut to nearly one-half of one per cent. This is equivalent to the abolition of the payment of interest, for in such a money market an individual case of interest payment would cut no figure economically, any more than one's occasional payment of a quarter to an usher for delivering a letter cuts no figure now that letter-postage has fallen to two cents. Mr. Ingalls has formally allowed that mutual banking will do all that it claims for itself, and he is forever debarred from repeating that denial or denouncing its claims which has been heard from him at intervals for many years.

I began this last campaign of question and answer for the purpose of silencing this gun, and I have effectually done it.

At present Mr. Ingalls finds but one course open to him,—viz., to deny that he ever denied. The plea comes at a suspiciously late hour. Strange that he did not advance it in response to my first questions four months ago, and thus save much trouble, time, and ink. But never mind; is it true or false to settle this question, I go back to No. 302, containing the article by Mr. Ingalls which gave rise to our controversy. And I quote from it this passage (italics mine):

"The economist sees the economic increase from successful labor, and thinks it just; and, whether just or not, it is unescapable,—not because, as he imagines, property is productive (unless, indeed, it is made to embrace the land or the laborer), but because of the contract itself, which all become men are willing to pay a premium for the opportunities and advantages which secure success, or the immediate gratification of desire. Now, that official circulating credit could erase this uncertainty and variability of productive industry is quite problematical. Would it affect the rate of interest in any way, it could not abolish it for the reasons given. That mutual banking, or freedom from change in the issue of circulating credit, once eradicate usury has never been demonstrated or logically made to appear. The legal or market rate of interest is at present greatly increased by the charge for the endorsement of one firm by another. Owners of funds do not care to pay for the privilege of keeping their money in a paper which even more is voluntarily given to a party of well known soundness by a party not as well known, though sound in point of fact. Had each party the freedom to circulate their credit at will, it could be no worse after this alteration of the parties in such transactions."

By these words Mr. Ingalls denied—or, if he did not deny, he expressed a doubt equivalent to a denial and equally calling for proof—that mutual banking can eradicate usury, and the phraseology shows that he meant by this to deny that mutual banking can eradicate the payment of a premium for the use of money. And, if I had his entire writings for the last fifteen years before me, I could point out equally conclusive instances. As I have not, I can only say that I remember such.

Thus ends this matter. Now Mr. Ingalls desires me to discuss with him the question of the existence of what he calls economic interest,—that is, the question whether people can do more with capital than without it. He asks me to retract my "denial of the existence of economic interest." I pledge him my word that I will retract it as soon as he shall quote to me the passage in which the denial occurred. There exists no such passage. To have denied so trite a truth would have been no less remarkable than Mr. Ingalls' great persistence in affirming it. I do not approve the new use that Mr. Ingalls makes of the word interest, but I have nothing to say in dispute of the entirely undisputed idea which he expresses by the phrase "economic interest." When he denied my position, I had a right to expect him to answer my questions. When he shall show that I have denied his position, he will have a similar right to expect me to answer his questions. And, if he drives me into a corner, I swear that he shall hear no complaint from me that he is trying "to force answers," while I have as yet no occasion to discuss "economic interest" with Mr. Ingalls, it is fitting that I should answer him on certain incidental points that he has made concerning the manner in which mutual banking may be put into practice, and with these matters I purpose to deal in a later article.

Dodging and Worse.

Mrs. Dietrick, in her article on the seventh page, takes an appeal to the readers of Liberty,—a tribunal from which I never shrink. I have charged her with making and persisting in the false and inexcessable statement that Liberty is opposed to the liberty of woman. But I never claimed that she had used precisely those words; the absence of quotation marks indicated that I pretended to give only the essence of her complaint against Liberty. In now denying that she ever said this, it must be remembered that she intends to convey the idea that she never said anything equivalent to this.

And yet she admits that she said in July, 1894, that "Liberty seemed to argue that all women should be deprived of the degree of freedom men now enjoy." In the very article I have produced her assertion made in December, 1894, that "Liberty absolutely is prejudiced against women. On every other question Liberty champions the removal of restrictions." She now seeks shelter behind the words "seemed to argue," as much as to say that her July statement did not amount to a positive charge, but carried the idea that Liberty's real position was not its apparent position. But there is no such uncertainty in the December statement. If the charge was not positive in July, it became so in December. In July she charged that Liberty seemed to favor freedom for men that it does not favor for women, and in December she charged that Liberty actually does favor such a distinction between the two sexes. But every reader of Liberty, including Mrs. Dietrick, knows that it makes no discrimination whatsoever between the sexes in the matter of freedom. Now, these facts completely justify my statement that "Mrs. Dietrick persists in falsely and inexcessably proclaiming in the 'Twentieth Century' that Liberty is opposed to the liberty of woman." But I have not persisted in my July statement, Mrs. Dietrick tells us, for persiste is to continue steadily. Does she really think that
I meant to say that she went without sleep in order to steadily continue her false charge against Liberty? When one expresses an opinion, and five months later reiterates it, making in the interval no retraction or qualification thereof, it is perfectly in accordance with good English usage to say that he persists in stating the opinion.

Apparently placing little reliance on this logomachy as a help out of her difficulty, she goes further, and declares that she has never repented her July statement. At the same time she very carefully ignores my citation of her December statement. She said, in substance, in July: 'Liberty seemed to oppose the liberty of woman, and she said, in substance, in December, that Liberty does oppose the liberty of woman. That is to say, she made more positively in December the statement that she made less positively in July. To bear out her prevarication claim that she has never repeated her July statement, she must show that her December statement differs from that of July otherwise than in being an aggravation of it, and she does not in that case help convey the idea of opposition to liberty of woman.

In her next contribution to this controversy these matters must receive attention; otherwise her article cannot be admitted to these columns. I will not be doctored if I can help myself.

But Mrs. Dietrick's next maneuver is something worse than a dodge. In her letter in Liberty of April 8 she declared: 'I do not 'persistent' in the statement that I did make. On the contrary, I have entirely ceased it.' No reasonable person can deny that it is a justifiable inference from these words that Mrs. Dietrick claimed to have a right to her past position by the reason that she no longer held the same opinion. It is true that in strict logic it is quite possible to cease a statement without ceasing to believe it. But the manner and connection in which she used the words just quoted deprive them of any raison d'etre, unless it be assumed that she intended them to be accepted by the readers of Liberty and by myself as a confession of error. When, therefore, she now declares that they were not so intended, I am placed under the disagreeable necessity of telling her that I do not believe her. Indeed, in all the numerous and sometimes bitter controversies in which I have been engaged during the last twenty years, I do not remember to have encountered any instance of insincerity so obvious as this. If Mrs. Dietrick had not desired her readers to believe that she had changed her mind, she would have said: 'I have not repeated my statement, but I still adhere to it.' Of two things one: either she did not still adhere to it, and in that case it is dishonest to say now that she did; or she did still adhere to it, and in that case it is dishonest to say now that she did not. For she knew perfectly well that, when she declared in substance: 'I formerly said so, but I say no more,' the reader would naturally infer that she thought so no more.

The remainder of Mrs. Dietrick's article is an attempt to prove that her original statement was true. At present I must decline to consider her argument. In her previous article she made two pleas for woman suffrage: one, that it would create a healthy division of power, resulting in benefit to liberty; the other, that it would intensify the craze for tyrannical legislation, resulting in a final abandonment of tyranny through experience of its evil effects. 'Vexat to no little pains to refute these two pleas. Now she writes another long article, in which she takes not the smallest notice of my reasoning. It is a game that two can play at.

Anarchism and the Children.

Pat Collins, the witty Democratic politician, once said of the late Prohibitionist leader, Robert C. Pitman, that he would be a first-class man if he would only let rum alone. And I always think to myself, when I read the writings of Mr. G. Crude, then in behalf of liberty, that he would be a first-class philosopher if he would only let money alone. After my numerous battles with him on the money question, it is pleasant to quote here with my warmest approval a letter from his pen that appeared in the April number of "Personal Rights," dealing with the question of parental responsibility for the support of children. Addressing the editor, Mr. Fisher says:

"On page 18 of "Personal Rights" for 15th March, it is stated that a Socialist must about to be laid before the French chamber "bears a striking resem- bance to the proposals of certain grand Individualists in England." It is not clear what are the proposals or who are the grand Individualists referred to in this phrase.

"The moral and the legal responsibility of fathers, like those of other many other classes in the community, are extremely difficult to define. In fact, it may be said with little hesitation that it would be highly danger- ous to attempt a definition generally and universally embrace all moral responsibilities, because, if it were attempted, the enforcement of every virtue and the suppression of every vice would become objects of legislation. The principle taken to the proposed French law in the paragraph which alludes to it seems mainly to be that it reassembles a long-standing maxim of French law that search for the guardianship of the child is forbidden. But it is far from clear that, upon Individualistic principles, the search either for the father or the mother, or the enforcement of their parental affection, should be allowed or undertaken by any outsider or (under the powers of these outsiders). Thus long as individualists can justify any mode of molestation of other persons by showing that it is undertaken solely to prevent neglect of invasion or invasion of themselves or those they choose to deny any impro- nent position. But it can hardly be urged that causing or giving birth to a child is an invasion or molesta- tion of the personality or life of the child. The care shown to offspring is a universal necessity that, if a race is to continue, it must successfully pro-" Neglect of offspring is a form of suicide. It is fatal to the race and exhibits a morbid, perverted instinct. Here is a child; there is a woman and there is a man. The three, who constitute a second party. Finally, here comes an Individualist in persona or by deputy. He says: 'Here is a young fellow- citizen. It is my duty to see that no one molests or invades his right to this child. There is a pack of persons somewhere who have procured the young- ster. I feel nearly sure that young woman is one, and I have strong reasons to suspect that man walking by her side that he has given him birth. It is right that I should insist upon their footing the child, and I feel most strongly on the subject that I will, if necessary, fix or imprison them if they won't carry out what I regard as their responsibilities."

What is the logical connection between this so-called Individualist's principles and his proposed action in this matter? To whom are the parents responsible? Is it to the child? If yes, how so? Is the child a person who may have come as undesired to them as vermin or any other pest which dogs man's steps and thwart their efforts in the pursuit of happiness or pleasure. By highly endowed intelligent persons the arrival of the child would be hailed with love and joy; but this is no guide to the course to be taken when, through some unaccountable misfortune or error of nature, a child is born which is not what he or she was expected. Neglect is not a fact. It is unsafe for an Individualist to own a duty to raise his children, for the fundamental principles of Individualism are closely similar to those of the Social Democrats and Socialists in general. If a person, male or female, alleging parentage, beget, conceives, or confessed a child, the Individualist has a perfect right to interfere. He can voluntarily associate himself with the child in a mutual defence organization, and may undoubtedly assume ac- quisites for the child. No right of ownership by a claimant parent ought to be admitted when the alleged guardianship is inimical to the minor. Beyond this point it is unsafe to take one step. Neglect can be better remedied by upholding liberty for anyone directly to supply the wants of the neglected. It can- not be safely dealt with by attempts of a third party to force someone, supposed to be responsible, to under- take the duty.

No doubt it would be perfectly futile today, and in this country, to advocate the action which complete and true liberty from molestation demands in considering the question of interfering between other per- sons and their apparent children. Nevertheless, it will prove on analysis not merely the consistent, but in every respect the most highly advantageous, course to follow liberty in this matter, as in all other relations- ships of public and private life.

This letter brought great sorrow to the heart of the editor of "Personal Rights," to whom these days give frequent cause to grieve over the sure displacement of halting Individualism by intrepid Anarchism, and he appended to Mr. Fisher's letter the following comment:

We have printed this letter with some hesitation and much regret. The doctrine of parentage put forward by Mr. G. Crude is a direct attack upon the Anarch- istic one, as he will see by referring to Liberty for 3rd September, 1892, page 2. And the principle from which our correspondent deduces this doctrine is also Anarchistic. The assumption is that we must not in- sist on the necessity to prevent neglect, but only to repress positive invasion. If a parent begets his (or her) child, we may constitute ourselves and the child a "mutual defence organization," and may undoubtedly assume ac- quisites for the child. But the parent (or her) child to starve, we may not join in the defence of this and other children, and may not entrench the question of the child's acquirements. If this were Ind- ividualism, the distinction between it and Anar- chism would be merely verbal.

On no question does the difference between Socialism, Individualism, and Anarchism come out more clearly than on that of parentage. The Individualist and the Socialist agree that the child should have the legal right of maintenance; but the Socialist would throw the corresponding duty on the State, while the Individualist would throw it on those who are responsi- ble for the child's existence. Then the Anarchist agrees in repudiating parental responsibility for the maintenance of the child; but the Anarchist would do this at the expense of the child, while the Socialist would do it at the expense of the community.

Barring the possible implication that Anar- chism would countenance compulsory or the neglectful parent, the child should acquire in the community. But a child, who at least partly supports himself when he sees it, states the case in a way which I, as one Anar. in. sun very willing to accept. Put it should be added that, as a matter of fact, the expense under Anarchism would fall, not on the child, but on the benevolent agencies which, moved by sympathy and by prudence, would almost certainly undertake to support abandoned children. I have never been able to

(Continued on next page.)
The Ballot.

The Knaves and the Fool and the Quite Bright Man
Lived all by themselves on an island fair.
And the very smart Knaves formed a marvellous plan
To own that same island and all the things there.
So he said to the Fool: "I’m a man divine
And a friend of thine; be a friend of mine."

And he then explained to the very dull Fool
The thesis of government great and strong.
"Dame Nature herself," he remarked, "goes by rule,
If the rule were written in the sky, or the book along.
We must have in futuro a code of laws,
With Justice and Honor in every clause.
"

So he drafted a code that would go thirteen ways,
And he read it aloud to the Fool and the Man.
Referred to committee, reported with praise;
And then on each section the voting began.
A full referendum was held in form,
With courteous discussion to any amount.

They voted on this, and they voted on that;
A two-thirds majority’s certain to rule.
The other man’s head-piece from under his hat
They voted, they voted, — that Knaves and that Fool.

Thus ever. Whenever a Freeman shall choose
To shake the old ballot-box, he will lose.

William Walcot Gordon.

The Woman Who Did.

Great Allen has given us in his latest work (published by Bobbs, $1.00 a copy) a book which he says is the first he has written that is satisfying to his own taste and conscience. The book is a caustic arraignment of the institution of marriage. Herminia Barton, her reason being that she is in refinement, who strives to carry into practice her notion that woman is the equal of man, and that the conveniences to the contrary are to be nullified. She does not shrink from the logical extremes to which the principle expressed in this view necessarily leads. Herminia assumes a free relation with a young barrister, though the love which Allen Merrick bears her urges his insistence upon some ceremonial form to shield her from the consequences that her behavior entails. Herminia feels that she cannot in refinement, who strives to carry into practice her notion that woman is the equal of man, and that the conveniences to the contrary are to be nullified. She does not shrink from the logical extremes to which the principle expressed in this view necessarily leads. Herminia assumes a free relation with a young barrister, though the love which Allen Merrick bears her urges his insistence upon some ceremonial form to shield her from the consequences that her behavior entails. Herminia feels that she cannot

Point of the Interest Question.

To the Editor of Liberty:

Before replying to your questions as amended, but still so ambiguous as to invite equivocal answers, I will briefly attempt to ascertain, where we are (at) in this discussion. At the conclusion of my brief essay on "Unecessary Capital," I had invited discussion of the truth of which the word "unecessary," can be said to prate that, "instead of a book," or even a paragraph of argument. I was met by a string of questions, with statement of right to force answers, and refusal to discuss the question until the question was disposed of, and until I should retract or refuse to retract a denial I had never made, — viz., that "mutual banking will make it possible to borrow money without interest;" or that a free market will have a tendency to carry the rate of interest to an equilibrium, and that it does not seem to have occurred to the editor that a "free market" embraces anything more than liberty to divide, coin, and circulate credits and commodities, or true freedom to give and take as he likes, with the condition that value were necessary before free banking could have more than a theoretical existence.

To your early question I answered that it was based on three conditions, neither of which was even supposed to be indispensable, to derive and advantage, profit, or interest therefrom. In the editor's eagerness to make me "fuss," he did not become aware that, in establishing the existence of a motive for mutual banking, he was at the same time establishing the existence of economic rent or interest for the use of capital, since the reduction of the percentage would be so much gained to capital or to the increased profit of labor in the use of capital. He made the extraordinary statement that the use of capital increases production is an admission of the same kind.

In order to avoid misuse of terms, I think we should use the word usury for monopoly interest, which is its exact meaning, while the mercenary as shall be called interest used, as that is its original meaning; — "premium for the use of capital" being only one, and the fifth in order, of Webster's definitions. It might also be used to indicate the usury that is paid after it last was captured from the rightful holder; but usury is a better term for that. Rent, which is synonymous with interest or usury, is also used to denote the normal advantage of superior soil location, whether held by the occupier or captured by a landlord; and rent from use of more or better capital, whether enjoyed by user, or plundered by lord of money or capital, is still called rent, as in France, or annuity, as in England.

The discussion seems to have arrived at a point capable of reduction to a syllogism something like this: Interest, or increase of labor's production from use of more or better capital, is the efficient motive for forming mutual banks; but mutual banks will kill interest; therefore, mutual banks will kill the motive for their formation.

A deduction less absurd would be: the interest constituting the motive to form mutual banks is a wholly different thing, or a different relation of the same thing, from the thing the banks were formed to

Herminia Kuehn.

Lending has not the remotest relation to exchange.

I can understand that completion of one side to an exchange can be deferred and usury charged up as a penalty. That is very common in State banking, where there is no exchange without compounding the penalty — in itself a misdemeanor — I do not see, how it can even then become a factor in exchange. Credit other than the interests of the lender, is optional with the lender, and the circulation of commodities, to the amount of land, or to the capacity to labor. Credit and money are economic factors only as they become institutions in facilitating the completion of exchange.

It is to be regretted, first of all, to show an economic necessity for borrowing, which at the same time will prove the impossibility of killing interest, either economic or monopolistic. Indebtedness and usury are simply the result of the failure to explain the circulation of commodities, to the amount of land, or to the capacity to labor. Credit and money are economic factors only as they become institutions in facilitating the completion of exchange.
Liberty's Views on Woman's Liberty.

In its issue of March 9, 1865, Liberty asserts that "Mrs. Dietrick persists in falsely and inexactly proclaiming in the 'Twentieth Century' that Liberty is opposed to the liberty of woman. To this charge I plead 'Not guilty.' I have never yet made the proclamation, anywhere, that 'Liberty is opposed to the liberty of woman.' I appeal to the jury of impartial readers of this journal to say, and judge whether the epithets "falsely and inexactly" belong justly to me or to my accuser.

The inexactness of Liberty's charges, even with printed avowals, certainly fills me with the spirit of the April of 6, 1865. In that number I deny Liberty's charge (quoted above) and say: 'On the contrary, I have entirely retracted the statement I did make, which was that Liberty: 1. wished to argue as follows: 'Every last law should be made free from coercion and interference as possible; therefore, all women should be deprived of even the degree of freedom men now enjoy.' Now, to "persist" is "to continue steadfastly.

I maintain, firstly, that I never did say what Liberty charges me with saying; and, secondly, that, of even the statement which I did really make, it is incorrect, untrue, to say that I persist in making it, when I made it in July, 1864, and have never repeated it, though eighty of the arguments made against it by Liberty, in this April 6 number, assumes that I retract my July statement, and calls upon me for an apology! Liberty misunderstands my words completely. I simply pointed out Liberty's error in declaring that I had "persisted" in what I said in July. While it is untrue that I have, hitherto, "persisted," I see that the time has come for me to reaffirm my position that Liberty does seem to argue that, though every individual should be as free from coercion and interference as possible, women should not have a chance to, in any manner, free themselves from the coercion and interference of man.

Moreover, the congress are meeting in legislatures and making laws which interfere with every act of woman's life in relation to others, from birth to death, and yet Liberty argues against allowing any woman as a slave in these last law-making bodies and says a word in her own defense! In twenty-three States men have appointed commissions of men only to reshape divorce laws. As women are not recognized as workers by the law-makers, and a woman's work is a woman's work, every woman has been placed on these commissions. And yet the interests of men and women concerning divorce, though equivalent, are by no means the same. And yet these commissions of three male commissions will make divorce more difficult, will place increased restrictions about it, even if they do not make divorce impossible save for one cause. But far worse, all the women of these United States in the United States during twenty years were asked for by women who found their husbands unendurable. Thus woman's interests lie in the direction of easier, freer divorce, and it is profoundly important that their right to check hasty masculine legislation should be recognized as speedily as possible. I regard the present separation of the man and woman into law-making and law-having subject as the cause of many of the worst evils that Liberty seeks to cure. Shuttering woman off from all participation in the common affairs of humanity collected in a city or State or the whole country, the choky atmosphere which men acquire simply through their greater freedom. As they are thus partly walled and partly forced into the attitude of virilism, their powers get depressed, they get out of their feel the cravings of those who are at liberty by other means, in one breath, chomps the receiption of certain restrictions, and, in the next, declares that it favors the removal of all restrictions upon liberty! That Liberty is awry by prejudicing against women, as a sex, needs to be clearly established by the statements of June 30, 1864, and of August 25. In the latter Spencer was editorially quoted to say that "on biological and psychological grounds women naturally and always must be at a disadvantage; and penalties are not given of individual cases of feminine narrowness, silliness, shallowness, and conservatism; but the sweeping assertion was made that such are: the attributes as seen in a sex". I regard such a "prior" as open as possible, as keeping with the liberty of the debate upon the woman. I am a woman.

I deny that such traits are common to ignorant people; that they are not at all attributes of sex, and that Liberty's assertions are "falsely and inexactly" maligning the nature of woman. I appeal from Liberty to the reader of Liberty to judge between us.

ELLEN BATTYLE DIETRICK.

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.

The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send in, for circulated correspondence with anarchists, to pledge themselves to write, when possible, a letter every fortnight, on Anarchism or kindred subjects, to the "Anarchist assigned in the Anarchist annual directory, and to notify the secretary promptly in case of any failure to write. Anarchists will not often occur, or in case of temporary or permanent withdrawal from the work of the Corps. All, whether members or not, are asked to lose no opportunity of informing the secretary of suitable targets. Address, Stephen T. Brinklow, Bordentown, N. J.

Comrade Cohen wishes me to remind the members again that he can use any number of letters, and is crippled unless he gets more than are now being written. He asks that members may be allowed one letter apace in a fortnight, and that friends outside the Corps will also help. I have said all this before, but I am glad to say it again, if it will produce the result. Last letter I asked the following questions as personal to himself or herself: First, do you believe in any part of Liberty's doctrines as an important contribution to the solution of the "labor problem? Second, how do you react to these? Third, how do you use the "labor day", and what if any means do you take to celebrate it. Fourth, do you think it is necessary to take advantage of some of the finest opportunities that will offer in several years. Comrade Cohen says that what is sent to me will be printed in some paper, and I can use any number. The trades union papers are still talking about the defeat of Plank 10, and politics does not have the favor with them that one would expect. There is no time like the present to work well. "

Target, Section A and B. — Henry Cohen, 1189 Welton St., Denver, Col. Write letters for publication in labor papers, as directed in last to. a. issues.

Section C. — Miss Adeline Knaap, care of "Morning Call," San Francisco, Cal., a Staline of some local prominence, and an occasional lecturer before the localites.
Anarchism and the Children.

(Continued from page 5.)

understand why it should be considered more dreadful to support a helpless child than to support a helpless adult. A man beyond my comprehension is the theory which, after compelling parents to support their children because of the responsibility of the former for the existence of the latter, ceases to compel them to do so after the children have passed a certain age.

Why should a man be restrained from leaving his infant son to the mercy of the community, but allowed to abandon the care of others this same son when grown-up, even though he be a helpless cripple or perhaps unwilling to support himself? By what right does the law declare that, when helpless individuals have reached a certain age, the authors of their being may transfer the burden to my shoulders?

The simple truth of the matter is that no person, parent or not, may be rightfully compelled to support any helpless being, of whatever age or circumstances, unless he has made that being helpless by some invasive act.

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BY ÉMILE ZOLA.

Translated from the French by Benj. R. Tucker.

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