Marx versus Proudhon.*

Dr. Arthur Mülberg, in the Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie, criticizes the "Conventions," 1844-1845, for its lack of a comprehensive view of history and society. He argues that the "Conventions" are based on a narrow economic perspective and fail to provide a complete understanding of the social forces at play.

* * *

Marx, on the other hand, argues that the "Conventions" are an attempt to reconcile the contradictions between the old and the new social order. He sees the "Conventions" as an attempt to create a new society based on the principles of freedom and equality.

* * *

At all events, as I shall show, in the choice of his means.

The almost forgotten work of Marx was translated into English for the first time in 1844, and a second unaltered edition appeared recently. It has gradually advanced to the rank of a code of agitation, a sort of socialist-democratic catechism, for which various reasons it is well fitted. In the first place, Proudhon's work, against which it is directed, is by its very plan and exposition well-nigh inaccessible to the Grand workingmen, a juxtaposition of the two works consequently not to be feared. In the second place, Marx's pamphlet was until very recently entirely unknown in German socialist society. There was no occasion for revising Marx's book, therefore. In the third place, finally, the specific trait of Marxian construction is formally and materially so conspicuous in the pamphlet as to secure it in advance a deep influence on every un critical reader. Objectively the significance of the work lies in the fact that it yields an exceedingly clear insight into the origin and growth of the Marxian movement. Considering the enormous actual significance secured by Marxism at the present time, this is a point not to be underestimated. For the history of German socialism its real value, therefore, however paltry its ideal results appear in the light of serious criticism.

Aside from a rank petitoffery which delights in cauli- vening about a hundred inanimate material, the Marxian pamphlet acts as a series of views which merit a cri- tical consideration. Of these, I select of course only the most important.

The "Conventions" open with the theory of "l'isome". It is the idea that the end of economic evolution is "the constitution of value," an idea which Adam Smith intuitively suspected, but which J. S. Mill formulated only in its antithesis. It is incredible, he says, that "so many men have overlooked the fact that the end of economic evolution is "the constitution of value," an idea which Adam Smith intuitively suspected, but which J. S. Mill formulated only in its antithesis. It is incredible, he says, that "so many men have overlooked the fact that the end of economic evolution is "the constitution of value," an idea which Adam Smith intuitively suspected, but which J. S. Mill formulated only in its antithesis. It is incredible, he says, that "so many men have overlooked the fact that the end of economic evolution is "the constitution of value," an idea which Adam Smith intuitively suspected, but which J. S. Mill formulated only in its antithesis. 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This would be perfectly moral, because it would be non-invasive. If, however, he is an invader and yet a believer in, and an advocate of, society, he should be restrained as the sovereignty of the individual and the law of self-preservation demand or require. And if he be an advocate of society, he has no moral obligation, whatever. He is simply a wild beast that should be shot at sight. Society is paramount over an enemy of society, because defence against invasion is always moral.

On the contrary, he who believes in society is morally obliged to conform to the law of society, which is non-invasion. The professed Anarchist who is a believer in non-invasion and the sovereignty of the individual is morally required to respect the social conduct of others with his professed principles. It is his duty. Otherwise he is an arrant hypocrite, to be despised by all pure moralists. Hence moral obligation is the supreme duty of Anarchists, as it is the logical necessity of their professed principles,—viz., the sovereignty of the individual and non-invasion.

Thus have I, a Moralist, demonstrated that all Anarchists and egoists, who are believers in society, are in duty bound to observe the moral laws of society. I am therefore the victor, and the egoists are the vanquished. And you, sir, may no longer deny right and wrong, duty, and moral obligation.

W.M. HANSON.

I charged Mr. Hanson with reasoning in a circle. Straightway he so recasts his argument that it is no longer circular, and then cries triumphantly: “See! I do not reason in a circle. Your argument that I do needs verification.”

No, you do not now, Mr. Hanson, but you did; and as you admit my argument that you did, I have not to verify it.

And in fact I have no occasion to carry this discussion any farther, since I am one of those easy-going persons who is perfectly satisfied when he gets all he wants. Mr. Hanson hags the delusion that he has vanquished the egoists, but what he has really done is this: he has come over to the egoistic position, and labelled it Moratism. Mr. Hanson declares without the least qualification that an enemy of society has no moral obligations whatever. Now, this is precisely what I have been insisting on. But because, in my controversy with Mr. Bryaning, I insisted on this point, he endeavoured to find a reason why a man should refrain from injuring another except the satisfaction of his desire for social peace. Mr. Hanson stepped in and took me to task. Why did he do it? Simply because he understood neither me nor himself. But in consequence of our discussion, he is now beginning to understand himself. Presently he will understand me also, and then he will see that he is what I am,—an egoist. Even as he now states himself, the only difference between us is that he, after admitting that the enemy of society has no moral obligations, is yet upholding the tendency of a believer in society to satisfy his desire for society a moral obligation, while I call simply what it is, a satisfaction of desire,—that is, egoism. “He who believes in society,” declares Mr. Hanson, “is morally obliged to conform to the law of society, which is non-invasion.” As well say that a man who desires to preserve his physical integrity is morally obliged to refrain from jumping over Niagra. For me it is enough to say simply that such a man will not jump over Niagra. If Mr. Hanson will have it that such a man is morally bound not to jump over Niagra, but that a man who desires to kill himself is not... such a moral obligation, then I say that he is an egoist using the phraseology of the Moralist. His terms are unscientific and misleading, but his position is sound.

One word of remonstrance, however, before I am done. Mr. Hanson says that the non-invasive hater of society should be allowed to live and let alone, that the invasive advocate of society should be restrained as the law of self-preservation may require, and that the invasive enemy of society should be shot at sight. So far as obligation is concerned, the egoist has no exception to take to this view. Certainly he is not so inconsistent as to first assert that an individual is under no obligation to refrain from making war on society, and then declare that society, or the mass of other individuals, is under obligation not to make war on the avow enemy. Still, as a matter of policy, the egoist is disposed to inquire of Mr. Hanson why he discriminates so savagely between invaders. There is clearly good ground for discriminating between invaders according to the degree of their invasion. But why simply restrain the greater invader—a murderer, say—who happens to believe in society, and shoot at sight the lesser invader—a pickpocket, for instance—who happens to be an enemy of society? Why not do in both cases just what the law of self-preservation requires? Why be needlessly cruel or hopelessly summary in either? Perhaps the ‘wild beast’ can be tamed. If so, he may be of valuable service in our appeal in behalf of the enemy of society. Under the emergency strictly forbids it, let us give him another chance. I think Mr. Hanson is just a trifle harsh. But this is natural. Harshness is a conspicuous attribute of Moralism. Egoism is kinder. Now that M. Hanson has become an egoist, he will soon fall in with his new environment, and then he will be kinder, too. Welcome, brother, welcome!

Readers should guard against misapprehension of Dr. Müntberger’s phrases, “anarchic commerce” and “individual exchange,” in his article translated for the purpose by George Schumm. They should not be misconstrued as a justification of legal restriction of commerce and exchange. The most that can be said is that Proudhon believed that freedom would lead to a generalization of cooperation in production and distribution. But there is some ground for the belief that he laid more stress on this than he would have done had he not desired to gain the adherence of the believers in “national workshops” to his project for the organization of credit.

Marx versus Proudhon.

(Continued from pag. 1.)

 Hegelian juggling with ideas seriously and now attempts to explain the economic relations and antithesis held by Marx. To the intended three things are plain: First, the attempt to make of Proudhon an ideologic Hegelian is as ridiculous as possible, because Proudhon had actually long ago outgrown Hegelianism, and, as regards its real content, had really never been very close to it. Secondly, it is evident from a hundred places in Marx’s expositions that he has completely missed the fundamental idea of Proudhon. His errors are not a whim, but a whirlwind of misunderstanding and animosity. But thirdly,—and this is the most amusing part of Marx’s effort,—it is beyond a doubt that the “economic relations held by Marx and his disciples quite Thiensa to no measured terms, is not swamped in Proudhon’s ‘Contradictions,’ although covered up by the abstract formulation and the unhistorical method of the book. Already, in the second memoir on ‘Property,’ Proudhon has furnished a demonstration, as elegant as profound, of this economic materialism in the light of history,
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and free from all Marxian one-sidedness. "De tout temps," he says, "la constitution politique a été le reflet de l'organisation économique et de l'organisation des états selon en réalité l'organisation économique politique." To him this "materialism" is a self-evident basis and assumption, concerning which there is no need of wasting words; to Marx it is a dogma which is at once directly and deductively" inferred from the "dictatorship of the proletariat." In a theoretical jacket designed for the conflicts of the present time, and from which, as is well known, he never again freed himself. His "economic materialism" is a change into a dogma of the proletariat, while the eagle eye of Proudhon at every moment surveys the ensemble of the social relations. The Marxian conception of history remains purely dialectical and doctrinaire, and is admirably well adapted to the "dictatorship of the proletariat," or, what is the same thing, the leap into the dark, the uncertain.

This is not the place to prove these assertions in detail. Nevertheless a few remarks may be in order. "Si l'activité individuelle," says Proudhon in the "Contradictions," "accompagne l'autorité sociale, l'organisation dégénère au communisme et aboutit au néant. Si on construit l'initiative individuelle manque de contre-poids, l'organisme collectif se corrompt, et la civilisation se trouve sous un régime de cauchemar, d'iniquité, et de misère." This counterpoise, in accordance with his dogma, Marx seeks in a proletarian government, Proudhon, however, thinks of the realization of a comprehensive solidarity on the basis of economic liberty, under the gradual reduction and simplification of all government whatever. The fundamental idea of the "Contradictions" is that Proudhon adds to his "socialism" of political freedom an element of the social system made up of two terms tending in opposite ways. Proudhon demonstrates this in the chapters on the division of labor, competition, credit, property, etc., the new social ideas, and therefore the institutions that are produced by them, having a positive and a negative side; how they consequently lead to a twofold series of diametrically opposed results; and he always concludes with the necessity of harmony of the two social sciences, when it shall at last find time for the examination of its fundamental concepts which is so necessary, will not ignore Proudhon's "Contradictions." The greatest question of the century has never been more profoundly formulated than in this work.

The supplements of the Marxian book, which the German publishers considered necessary to add, also deserve mention. It is a work of Holbergus. Since the latter agrees with Proudhon on certain points respecting the equitarian consequences of the classical theory of value, Engels takes occasion to illustrate a picture of Holbergus to alleged to some extent, the "patriotism" of comparison to the portrait of Proudhon. Already this classification of the two men reveals the complete misapprehension of Proudhon. For as regards both the fundamental philosophico-political views as well as the practical attitude towards the social-political problems of the time, there is hardly conceivable a greater difference between two investigators than exists between Holbergus and Proudhon.

The Brussels speech of Marx on the question of free trade, 1849, with which the book closes, rises in no respect above the prevailing social-democratic level. Only the point of it is interesting, because it makes palpable the absurdity, of a famous Marx's phrase. "In general," he says, "the social question can be solved by the law of social freedom." And then: "The modern system of free trade, together with political liberty in general, has swept England into its social revolution. Under this government, each of the workers can rise to the place of the capitalist and the bourgeoisie has become smaller. In no country of Europe has social reform a better prospect than there.

But the jewel among the supplements is undoubtedly the article which Marx published in the "Socialdemokrat" in January, 1865, immediately after the death of Proudhon, and which gathers as in a focus of misunderstanding and absurdity lying loose con-

erning the French thinker. I do not care to say any thing here regarding the total misapprehension and misconstruction of the fundamental theory of Prou-

dron. The few notes already mentioned may suffice. But there is a point of the interpretation of the "Contradictions," which is in the incredibly slovenly way in which Marx describes the life of this man, who in his own country at any rate has played an exceptionally important part. In the fifth chapter of his book, Marx merely tells us that he no fore him," but that does not prevent him from putting on paper with apodictical assurance the crassest stuff in order to furnish a picture of Proudhon to the German working-man. It is as if one of the most important works, not even of those of the revolutionary period, much less the latter, but even his few observations relating to the matter in hand are so thoroughly false and malicious that no other explanation is possible than that Marx did not again take any notice of Prou-

dron after his violent attack upon the "Contradic-
tions." According to his custom, he had placed him where he did not belong,—among the democratic bour-
gneux. A glance at Proudhon's journalistic career and his position in the February revolution suffices to re-

veal the absurdity of this classification.

To characterize Marx's methods I will submit a few extracts from the same article.

In 1878 there appeared in Proudhon's own printing office a linguistic treatise by the Abbé Bergier: "Les Éléments Primitifs des Langues, Découverts par la Compa-
nion des Racines de l'llévénements avec Celles du Grec, du Latin, du Russe, du Chinois et du Turc." Mr.

Proudhon added to this book an "Essai de Grammaire Générale." Two years later he revised the work and handed it to "the fasti-
tus" In its altered form, to compete for the Volney prize, it was entitled "Traité des langues An-
tarctiques." There were only four competitors.

The prize was not awarded to any of them, but two works, among which was Proudhon's, received honors of a sort. One of these works was as follows: "Prou-

dron's first essays I do not remember. His school composition on the "Language universelle" shows how readily he approached problems for whose solution he lacked the most elementary knowledge." Worse still is his "Études de la Langue Turque." Shortly before the ap-

pearance of his second important work, the "Philoso-

phie de la Misère," Mr. writes, "Proudhon himself announced it to me in a very full letter, containing the only opinions he expressed on the subject of the pres-

tence of the impossibility, and cast into the hands of the hero the Humphrey, exactly as it came to pass, —

Proudhon's book appears as nothing else than a condensed outburst of rage against the powers that be. Marx appears here as the very type of those demagogic poli-

ticians of whom Proudhon, looking back upon the excesses of the revolutionary period, says in the "Con-

fessions": "They spoke of liberty and dreamed of no-

thing but a dictatorship of the proletariat...

Thus the "eighteenth Brumaire" would not have been such a bad thing if the name of the dictator had been "Karl Marx" and not acci-
dentally "Napoléon Bonaparte." And such is essen-
tially the position of Marxian science. They do not express the key to the personality of Proudhon in "vanity" the crowning of his work and forms a worthy conclusion to it. Whosoever misapprehends the intellectual significance of a man will just as much misapprehend his work. While the as-

santa, are disputing whether to class him with the So-

cialists or the Communist, I am prepared to prove that social science has not produced a single argument against the doctrines of Proudhon. In the last thirty years that has not been formulated by Prou-

dron in a better and a more beautiful way. To Prou-

dron the word "Socialism" does not signify a dogma, but the word "Socialist," and thus, confers a false and then always in a definite connection. However, this is qu wrangling about words. If the conception of a Socialist implies the abolition of private property, in-


teances, and the remains of the dualism of Saint-Simon, of Marx, then Proudhon is not a Socialist, but rather the most powerful opponent of this theory. But if the belief in the possibility of an ad-

justment of the social antagonism is the basis of a progressive reform, which, if indeed not in a day, may yet be quickly and surely realized, entities one to the name of "Socialist," then Proudhon is a Socialist, and indeed the most intelligent, consistent, and clearest-

headed of all.
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