On Picket Duty.

The "Twentieth Century" has just taken a post-office box. Its number is 2774. Liberty's box number is 3992. It will be noticed that 33 is just half of 66, and that 67 is just half of 74. Some crank believer in signs and wonders will probably discover a significance in this. I find in it only a numerical curiosity, to which I call attention for the convenience of those who cultivate numismatics as a fortification against the infidelity of munzeology.

The first number of a handsome new illustrated magazine, "Engineering," devoted to industrial science and progress, reaches this office. Though not a competent critic in this department, I may say that it seems to me to give evidence of ability and promise of prosperity. Its publisher, who is an Anarchist and a subscriber to Liberty, tells me that he means to have the Anarchist view of those problems which are both technical and sociological in character well represented in the pages of the magazine. The subscription price is three dollars a year. Address The Engineering Company, No. 124 World Building, New York, N. Y.

No individual is more deserving of pity (some will prefer to say, contempt) than the reviewer of the New York "Nation," who recently revealed the wretched poverty of his intellectual furnishings in the following remark, betokening imbecility as well as impotent malice: "Mr. Spencer's contributions to political and historical science seem to us more commonplace, sometimes true, sometimes false, but in both cases trying to disguise their essential flimsiness and commonness in a garb of dogmatic formalism." But perhaps I am not altogether just to the fellow: to charge Spencer with "dogmatic formalism" is certainly original.

I hear from an English correspondent that the league of action proposed by Mr. Donisthorpe is rapidly taking shape. It will probably be a society for insuring people against government just as they are insured against fire or any other calamity. All members who pay their premiums regularly will then be much better in standing for their rights, knowing that, if the government attacks them in consequence, they will be properly defended and that their interests will not be allowed to suffer. This is a capital idea and very practicable, I should think, in England; though in this country, which is so much less free, such a society would probably be suppressed as treasonable.

The Toronto "Labor Advocate" likens the Single Tax movement to "the Unitarianism of political economy"—a halfway house where the investigator may find rest for a breathing-spell, but not a permanent abode. In nine cases out of ten he will either go on thinking, and apply to other social abuses the arguments used by the Single Taxer as regards land monopoly, and so develop into a full-blown alienation of Socialism, or, if his courage fails him at the prospect, he will be scared back to orthodoxy." It seems to Liberty a more accurate analogy to consider the Single Tax movement the Episcopalizan of political economy, from which nine-tenths of its adherents will go backward to State Socialism, the Roman Catholicism of political economy, while a tenth will go forward to leave his wife without providing for her. In other words, the law will see to it that the legal husband fulfills his "duties," while denying him protection in his "rights." Now, what sensible man can regard this sort of arrangement with favor or patience? All free lovers may well thank the English Court of Appeal for this splendid service to the great cause of sexual freedom.

I hereby acknowledge my gratitude and obligation to the publisher of the "Twentieth Century" for reproducing in the publisher's column the New York "Citizen's" appreciation review of "My Uncle Benjamin," which serves, whether so intended or not, as an offset to the utterly inappraisable review that lately appeared in the editorial column from the pen of Mr. Pentecost, who finds in "Valmond, the Crank," the "highest and noblest expression" of "one of my heroes.

"Does Prohibition prohibit?" queries the New York "Press," alluding to a late killing spree in a Maine barn-room; and gets a sarcastic answer from the "Voice," as follows: "It does not seem to. The law prohibiting murder has been in force in Maine ever since the Indians were chased away; and yet here is his killing spree. We shall see that the law against murder is repealed next week." You may repeat the law against murder, but you cannot make murder a legitimate act. The fundamental law of associated labor would prohibit murder and murder would cooperate in enforcing that law if everything which we call government were entirely absent. Drink, however, can only be made a crime by statutory provision, and in the absence of such mediansme and tyrannical laws, it is hard to see how the length of punishing those who exercise their right to sell or buy a drink. Murder is committed only under the influence of passion or by "human beasts" with a less development of social sentiments; while the liberty to drink is insisted on by the most rational, intelligent, refined, and cultured men of all ages and classes. Can't the "Voice" see any difference here?

The decision in the Jackson abduction case has gratified a great many people and surprised everybody. The proposition that a "well-educated wife may legally quit her husband at her own discretion" certainly revolutionizes the marriage relation, and plays sad havoc with the ancient superstition that the man is the supreme ruler of the house, to be obeyed by wife and children without a murmur. But woman's gain in this case is man's loss. The absurdity of legal marriage has been emphasized and brought home to the least speculative mind. If the decision is allowed to stand, it will probably become a matter of self-interest in the narrower (but by far the widest) sense for men to repudiate legal marriage. For, while the law prevents the husband from keeping his wife with him if she chooses to leave him, it refuses to give him the remedy of divorce. Moreover, the law will hold him responsible for debts created by the woman who is his wife in nothing but the name, and will not allow him
Property and Equal Liberty.

I was very much interested in the little story with which Mr. Tucker prefaced his comments upon my article on "The Right to Aristocracy" in No. 189. The busy reader may have forgotten it, but I distinctly remember the little nemophila growing by the side of the road, and the question depends upon the solution of the whole problem. The only question is, Does Spencer, by the mere fact of placing his book under the title of "inequality," mean to take away my liberty to write my book and originate any ideas on the subject? Mr. Tucker says, Yes; I say, No. Mr. Tucker argues by the simple principle of equal liberty. If Mr. Tucker is right, then property in ideas is negatived by that principle. From the point of view of the question, he is not so wrong as he has been. In ideas has been advanced, nor does any other seem possible. Convinced that every unprejudiced and logical mind must reject the idea of equality for ideas, I have, in my turn, simply defined the principle of equal liberty, from which the right of property in ideas is a logical deduction. I protest against being covertly denounced as an "inconsistent anti-monopolist."

But, the reader may ask, even supposing that equal liberty justifies some functions in property, is it not true, then, that Mr. Tucker has not shown that any property in ideas would bring about economic and literary effects of the most deplorable character? You do then really adhere to equal liberty as to a fertile and not simply as a means of happiness? I answer that I adhere to equal liberty as to a socialistic law. A comparison of the various forms of the conduct of men in relation to their fellow men in the fields where such forms have been the most thoroughly tested has revealed the fact that the proportion in which these forms make for happiness, wealth, and other advantages, are in the proportion in which they observe and preserve equality of liberty. Centuries of experience have so established this ratio. The one unimportant step of the unprejudiced mind is to recognize that today they consider this generalization as a social law, and use it as a test of proposed policies in fields scaled our to us by that idea, in any way, it is useless, or nearly so. To serve as such a test, and to do away with the necessity of empirical observation in the first place, the men of the socialistic school would have a solution of this matter, and that equal liberty is the first principle of social welfare, I cannot but dismiss Mr. Tucker’s gloomy forecast of the results of equal liberty, as a product of intellectual property as the product of fear and prejudice.

Mr. Tucker’s effort to make out that there is only a surface conflict or obtrusion of absurdity in property in ideas and Mr. Bilgram’s [sic] supposition of obtrusions of real absurdity in property in ideas, and that beneath the surface similarity there is an essential difference, is not crowned with success. I think it is well for me to state again that it is not necessarily the case that property in ideas and that equal liberty does not always make for happiness and is not necessarily the property in ideas and that equal liberty is the first principle of social welfare, I cannot but dismiss, Mr. Tucker’s gloomy forecast of the results of equal liberty, as a product of intellectual property as the product of fear and prejudice.

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Cranky Notions.

I have followed the discussion of copy and patent rights in Liberty with great interest and can only say that I consider it one of their impertinent questions. My view is that the total annihilation of the patent right system, but the question of copyright came to me prominently only when the printers of Washington and the East became interested in the Chase copyright bill. Without giving the subject the attention I desired, the problem presented itself to me as being in the nature of a protective tariff, and I was "against it." A corollary was the demand of the Narrows union of Detroit urging the printers to pass resolutions favoring the Chase bill and to notify the congressmen from this district of this action. This was brought out considerable discussion, and I then took occasion to make a few remarks against copyright. The union took my words and laid them circularly on the table. Mr. Tucker’s criticism of Mr. George’s article in the “Standard” made the matter quite clear to me. I could then see no possible argument in favor of a copyright, and I can now see no difference. When Mr. Tucker was in Detroit some months ago, we had a brief talk on the subject, the argument of recompense to author and to inventor was in my mind then, and it is there yet. Of one thing I am satisfied: the equitable way to recompense authors is not by giving them a monopoly of their inventions. Besides my own conviction on the matter, ample reasons have been given in Liberty to make that conviction strong.

Suppose I am the employer of a large number of people in a given industry, and I think out a plan whereby their labor, through the process of recompense to author and to inventor, may be more productive, have I a right to prevent all other employers from substituting the labor of their employees in the same manner?

If by years of careful training and hard study I become a great actor, learn and practise the voice tones and physical gestures necessary to any one who possesses the talent, I have an influence as they were never before influenced, bringing to my wealth and fame, have I the right to prevent any one else from using the voice and making the gestures present, which he has? I cannot answer these questions. I have done this to-day: I cannot answer these questions. I have done this to-day: I cannot answer these questions. I have done this to-day: I cannot answer these questions. I have done this to-day:

The answers to these questions, it seems to me, will be that I have no right of property in these ideas; and, if there be no right of property in these ideas, there can be no right of property in any ideas.

The question of recompense is not necessarily involved in the denial of the right to property in ideas. This is another question, and one which I hope Mr. Tucker and his colleagues will take up.

Joseph A. Libbey.

London’s Independent Theatre.

[New York Nation.]

The Independent Theatre of London gave its first performance on March 18. If one can judge of its future by the success of its opening season, it bodes fair to have as prosperous a career as the Théâtre Libre of Paris. Of course, Mr. Antoine’s enterprise is really responsible for this new departure in the stage life of London. At one time or another, every one of the Independent Theatres, as of the Théâtre Libre, is to encourage the performance of plays which have a literary and artistic value rather than a material one. One must not overlook, to connect with the influence of long runs, and to give you an accurate chance to test their talents. There is no quarrelling with this object. It is a straightforward, as it were, to have white life to the French theatre, how much is needed to clear away the stifling atmosphere of sentiment and convention that prevails on the London stage! The question of actor-managers, long runs, and conventions is not involved in the question of a theatre’s life, of course, for one must not be so limited in his judgment — Mr. Levy — lately told us that “defensive institutions must be supported by some persons, and if the cost of the theatre is not paid, it must be paid by the innocent. I wish it were more practicable to make the aggressor pay for his own restraint.” This is very quaint. In fact, one of the things that Mr. Levy supports a universal compulsion which confinates alike the earnings of aggressors and non-aggressors, of good, bad, and indifferent ones.

It is not, however, easy to see the justice of compulsory taxation even when simply confined to the guilty. I give, we will, or a great deal of trouble. It is not for me to say what the law should be. Well, justice has got its pound of flesh, has it not? If the scale does not balance, put more in. I am the account clerk, and I will do it. You may tax without per- mission as well as fixed.

This leads me on to another point. Mr. Levy has lately given a somewhat new view of individual rights. The rights of an individual can be protected in the sum total of his possible activities minus such as are declared to be offenses. Are we, then, to suppose that the rights of the victims of the Holy Letters are such as the state can and will protect for them — a view indirectly well interpreted, and yet we, the press of the dramatic made itself felt. One might doubt whether the fair bill of a popular theatre, but there was no denying that the experiment of actually producing it on the stage was intensely inter- esting. And Mr. Antoine’s achievement, and the industrial theatre. Whether he will accomplish all that he hopes to for the English drama, however, is quite another matter. But the Taxation-Individualists say — to use a "Free Life" term — go much beyond this point. They argue, because it is impossible to make any one man to apply compulsion to the chief who has injured them, it is also right for them to apply compulsion (compulsory taking of taxes) to the peacable citizen who has not injured them. Consider a case in point. About six months since I came across a man who had served one month (I think it was) in Lewes jail simply for inability to pay rates. His only crime was that of being poor. Now, the Taxation-Individualists say that the same reasons which justifies the application of force to the chief also justifies the application of force to such a man as this. I fall entirely in agreement with them, and say that if we are not justified in taking the liberty or property of those who refuse to join us and are willing to take their own risks. I mean to say that a cost of their maintenance be paid not by the guilty man but by the innocent. We are only justified in using force when force is used to us, and all the helpers we get should be volunteers, not people whom we have impressed, and that there is no other warrant, save for force, for a majority confiscating any portion of them to form a national or municipal Life- and cooperative body. We are only justified in using force when force is used to us, and all the helpers we get should be volunteers, not people whom we have impressed, and that there is no other warrant, save for force, for a majority confiscating any portion of them to form a national or municipal Life- and cooperative body. We are only justified in using force when force is used to us, and all the helpers we get should be volunteers, not people whom we have impressed, and that there is no other warrant, save for force, for a majority confiscating any portion of them to form a national or municipal Life- and cooperative body. We are only justified in using force when force is used to us, and all the helpers we get should be volunteers, not people whom we have impressed, and that there is no other warrant, save for force, for a majority confiscating any portion of them to form a national or municipal Life- and cooperative body.
LIBERTY.

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RENÉ E. TUCKER, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER.

VICTOR YARROS, — ASSOCIATE EDITOR.

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"In abolishing rent and interest, the last vestiges of old-time slavery, the Revolution accomplished at once some of the great human objectives of its day. It put an end to the gaucheries of the courtier, the ignorance of the soldier, the folly of the politician, the ignorance of the subaltern in the service of the people, which young Liberty greatly benefits her heart. — T.P.

"Don't Be a Clam!

The appeal to the files of the "Twentieth Century." Columns on columns can be found there in which he has nailed the man reader than Mr. Penteccost to utilize his brother-man as a floor-mop, when the brother-man is a working whom he can handle safely and successfully. But the floor gets very filthy before he will run any of the men, and if he is put to work, the man danger presents itself, he no longer likes to argue, but prefers to "quietly think." And the silence of his thought sometimes gets very oppressive. No, I cannot accept this plea. First let Mr. Penteccost avoid discussion upon political questions. After that and then not till then will I allow him to dodge discussion with me.

Criticisms of me, sent to this office over a bona fide signature are not a part of the same rules which govern the admission of other matter, he has said something untrue in it. If a criticism appears in these columns it is usually not necessary to answer it. The readers are presumed to be able to decide on its merits.

And on those unusual occasions when it is necessary to answer the critic, are the readers then presumed not to be able to decide on its merits? Will Mr. Penteccost kindly furnish the exact measure of the intellectual acumen of the "Twentieth Century's" readers? If the readers may not be presumed to decide after hearing Mr. Penteccost and then his critic, why may they not also be presumed to be able to decide for themselves without hearing either of them? In that case why publish the "Twentieth Century" at all? As far as I believe in business (as far as I believe in passing the commodity of my labor on to the person to whom I can not at all do, that it is simply a business enterprise.) But if, on the other hand, they are aided by hearing Mr. Penteccost and his critic, why may not they be further aided by hearing the former's rejoinder and the latter's retort? Can an aid on both sides not make more than one or two more that is new or strong? In other words, why not discussion, debate, argument? It seems to me that the man who is unwilling to discuss with a worthy foe is either a coward or a nainy-pamby.

For my friend's statement of my "indictment against Anarchists," I have only a faint idea of what Mr. Tucker refers to. I do not know that I have ever indicted Anarchists. I think I know what Mr. Yarros' criticism was. If I have said anything untrue of Anarchists, I am ready to apologize for it the moment it is shown to me.

Two copies of Liberty go regularly to the office of the "Twentieth Century." Mr. Penteccost desiring, as I understand it, to have one copy for his own use. It is a little singular that the most conspicuous article of one issue, aimed directly at Mr. Penteccost, should have been that which appeared in the edition of his associates. Nevertheless such seems to have been the fact. Therefore I had no sooner read the above lines than I proceeded to clip Mr. Yarros' article and enclose it to Mr. Penteccost in a sealed letter. I trust that he knows me well enough to trust me in these matters. In this very article in which he writes: "I have never meant to say, and think I never have said, that I am not an Anarchist," I find, half a column shorter on the whole words: "I am not one, I do not agree with any doctrines which some Anarchists call Anarchism." This is a very funny instance of Mr. Penteccost's habit of loose thinking and writing. He cannot remember his own views long enough to write half a column without contradicting them.

What I have said, and say, is that I am unwilling to call myself an Anarchist. What other people call me I cannot control. I am in this particular a matter of doctrine. I am not a member of a sect — of any kind.

Mr. Tucker might as well refuse to call himself a publicist for the same reason. An Anarchist is not a member of a sect. An Anarchist is one who believes that a certain doctrine is true.

And, besides, I do not know what an Anarchist is. I understand that Mr. Tucker, and Mr. Yarros, C. L. James, Dyer D. Lum, John Kelly, and his sister, Dr. Kelly, and John Most all advocate Personal Sovereignty, but they all have different ideas of what Personal Sovereignty means. How, then, am I to know which particular "ist" or "ism" is the right one?

In the prospectus of the "Twentieth Century" Mr. Penteccost declares that he "advocates Personal Sovereignty" and "stands for it." Now, Mr. Tucker, and Mr. Yarros, C. L. James, Dyer D. Lum, John Kelly, and his sister, Dr. Kelly, and John Most all advocate Personal Sovereignty, but they all have different ideas of what Personal Sovereignty means. How, then, am I to know which particular "Personal Sovereignty" is the right one? And, if he does not know, how can he, according to his position, call himself an advocate of Personal Sovereignty?

I venture to say that if I should call myself an Anarchist Mr. Tucker would be prepared to prove that I am not, but he seems to criticise me because I will not take the name.

I am also prepared to prove that Mr. Penteccost does not always adhere consistently to his advocacy of Personal Sovereignty. I have never asked him to take the name Anarchist; I have only asked him not to slander those who do take the name, and have shown in a general way that his warfare upon names is ridiculous.

I believe people would be much happier if there were no nonsense about personal opinion of mine that such a condition will be possible when a sufficient number of people wish it. Is that the Law of Gravitation? I do not know, but if it is, it appears to me entirely unnecessary to give such a belief a name.

This is like saying: "I believe that all particles of matter attract each other with a force directly proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to the square of their distance. Is that the Law of Gravitation? I do not know, but if it is, it appears to me entirely unnecessary to give such a belief a name."

My observation convinces me that names for beliefs serve no purpose but to set people arguing with each other. The same thing would be true if you were to call me a Democrat or a Republican or a Labourer or a Socialist or a Homo-phenomorph. The only way to combat this "anarchy of names" is to give names to definite and consistent systems of ideas. But even so, I am far from certain that a name is much better than a system of ideas without a name.

As one could work effectively for the realization of his beliefs without first determining closely what they are and what they mean.

Mr. Tucker wants to know whether I wish people to regard me as an Arthist. No. The point, I suppose, is that if I am not an Arthist, must be an Anarchist. Etymologically the word "Arthist" is well taken, but it is trick with words. I am not an Arthist, and I do not agree with any doctrines which pass under the name of Arthist. I am not an Arthist. I am not an Arthist with many doctrines which some Anarchists call Anarchism.

The whole question involved here was fully treated in Mr. Yarros' article. It is useless to say anything further until Mr. Penteccost has answered it.

Now, I will ask Mr. Tucker a question: Is he not willing to recognize me as a fellow-worker for the accomplishment of compulsory human government, and to extend to me the courtesies of such fellowship, except on condition that I accept the definition of Anarchist and take unto myself the name Anarchist?

Inasmuch as I have never asked Mr. Penteccost to accept my definition of Anarchism in any other sense than the one I have stated, and all my views and arguments have been in support of it, if my support of them commends itself to their reason, the question is pertinent. I will recognize Mr. Penteccost as a fellow worker for the completion of compulsory human government as long as he really works in the same direction. While I am neutralizing his own work by an inconsistency, I shall call his attention to it. I shall do this courteously at first. If he answers neither "Yes," "No," nor "Perhaps," but reserves his answer until a reasonable time. Then, if he makes no signs, I shall again remind him of his inconsistency, but this time discourteously and sharply. And, if he still persists, I shall then heap upon him insult, sarcasm, and ridicule, which is not a proper method of dealing with the question of decency. I ask from him the same treatment in return. Only I shall never give him an excuse for speaking harshly to me, because I am sufficiently observant of the "courtesy of fellowship" not to preserve a calm-like silence when my fellow addresses me.
It is erroneous to say that I, in using the possible destruction of Spencer's works as a redhibitory absurdum of property in ideas, assumed that Spencer's works belong to the world. I assumed simply that the world is not himself that this possible makes for the world's happiness. If Mr. Yearos knows the difference between possessed and ownership, he will not dispute this assumption. The assumption granted, then I argue that property in ideas, since it might lead to destruction of the possessor, does not make for happiness; and further, that if such property is based upon equal liberty (which I deny), then at least one instance equal liberty does not make for happiness. If there is any question-begging here, I fail to see it.

To anticipate the possible objection to the foregoing paragraph that a thief may similarly argue against property in objects from the standpoint that continued possession of the thing for his happiness, I will explain that the thief's argument is sound provided he is strong enough to maintain his possession and provided he is correct in his estimate of the conditions of happiness. I apprehend that the most serious difference between Mr. Yearos and myself turns upon this point of correctly estimating the conditions of happiness. For instance, in the matter of philosophers: despite the fact that he would allow them a copyright while I would place a higher value upon them than he does. I cannot agree that the destruction of the works of the greatest of them could never amount to a great social calamity. The world, in my opinion, could more easily put up with a half-drunken French Boursier and a few thimbles through its nose with the permanent loss of the works of Spencer or the works of Shaksper. But I quite agree with Mr. Yearos that the greatest of them is not sufficiently great to have the whole civilized world at his mercy. . . .

The full significance of this unquestionable revolution in Mr. Yearos's view will be understood when we remember that all but a very small proportion of individuals that are living less of a life, in the true sense of the word, and live much more in their daily walks and business,—men with that mechanical genius and quick perception which enable them to comprehend machinery almost at a glance,—and that all these inventions thus placed are not at all remarkable with the fact that Mr. Yearos, in all his previous articles except the first one, has held in principle to permanent property in all ideas without exception, and in practice to permanent property in a certain class of ideas and to this extent of the so-called "copyright" were no longer to be held as property at all, despite the fact that Mr. Yearos, in all his previous articles except the first one, has held in principle to permanent property in all ideas without exception, and in practice to permanent property in a certain class of ideas and to this extent of the so-called "copyright" were no longer to be held as property at all.

In the first place we find that the man who uses an invention that he has seen is to be asked whether he saw it as he happened to pass it or whether he went "out of his way" to see it. In the former case it is his right to use it, but in the latter it is not.
street, and, "going out of my way," find the farik in the midst of it, then I cannot make and sell these banks. Wonderful!

In the second place we find that the man who uses an invention that he has seen is to be asked whether he comprehended it at a glance or whether he "stopped to study it." In the former case it is his right to use it, in the latter case it is not his right. By this distinction the man has to spend weeks before I can understand it, am to be forced to respect somebody's right of property in the idea; but the skilled mechanic, who perceives the modulus of almost instantly, cannot imagine buildings as many steam-engines as he likes. Admirmable!

In the third place we find that the man who publishes a book, or a part of a book, that has been previously published, is to be asked whether he simply refused to stop up his ears when it chance to be read or repeated in his presence. In the former case he is to be punished because he deliberately took away his rights. In the latter case he is to be allowed to proceed because he was deprived of this liberty, not by his own volition, but by the act of another. By this distinction, if I publish Longfellow's "Psalm of Life," which I read and understand, which all men understand, that mysterious way I know by heart, I am an honest man; but if I read "Evangeline" and then publish it, I am a thief. Profoundly!

Equally fine-squint is the distinction which allows man to use books in the street without the imposition of penalty, but which refuses him the liberty to look at the books that lie open before his eyes on the table of the friend whom he is visiting without losing the "liberty to write and publish books like them. As I pointed out before, Zamenhof, in his Esperanto, 1873, the man who expects his fellow-citizens to protect the privacy of his writings must take reasonable precautions in the direction of such protection himself; and if he is the party not to do so, as to spread in print on every hand, he must expect them to be read and must assume the consequences of such reading. If a man scatters money in the street, he does not thereby formally relinquish its title to it: no more than if he were to lay a book on his table, but those who pick it up are thereupon considered its rightful owners, though nobody obliged them to take it from the gutter. Similarly a man who reproduces his writings by thousands and spread them everywhere has no better reason to expect privacy, and those who read them, even though not obliged to do so, no more put themselves by that act under any obligations in regard to the author than those who pick up scattered money put themselves under obligations with the manufacturer. Yet another example: it may be considered that men are not obliged to read books settles the question of copyright, then the other consideration that men are not obliged to go into the streets (or to stay within the limits of civilization, for that matter) settles similarly the notion of patent right, and there was no reason for Mr. Yearro to retreat so hastily from his former position on the latter question. The truth is that neither consideration has property the smallest weight in either case. There are certain, even legal, cases in which patent right is protected, affording it only to authors and a very few inventors. And further they are impracticable, because they involve innumerable questions of petty detail which no jury could intelligently decide in accordance with the statute. A man who originates these distinctions and makes property in ideas begin at an uncertain degree of complexity, or at an uncertain degree of concealment, or with the reading of books, condemns Taki Kaki and myself for empiricism! Rather it is he who is the empiric; for, by his departure from principle, he has been obliged to leave it. There is nothing in principle that he can make so useless whatever.

When I last left Mr. Yearro, he was running up a blind alley. What has since happened to him? He seems to have found his direction; for he closed the blind alley at the end. It seemed large for a knob-hole, and in his despair he tried to squeeze through it. His legs went through all right, but his body stuck fast. He went in various directions on his knees and on his hands and knees, with his al with his vail, and twisting and twisting; in which helpless and painful predicament, I, with my usual cruelty, leave him. T.

Mr. Simpson's Final Shot.

To the Editor of Liberty.

You have a free and easy way of disposing of my difficulties. In a recent "pocket" note you wrote: "Then I was diverting from the direct road of Anarchy, and in last Liberty you assert that belief in monopoly of ideas is leading me away from the road of monopoly of land, and that soon, if I am logical, I will be a millionaire." I wish to make a statement to this. I may revert that your denial of property in ideas (and I am claiming property, not monopoly, in ideas) will lead you to Communism in all things.

I throw up any attempt to dispose of a logical possibility, and introduce the two arguments of Spenser, where he states that whether a man does work of discovery or production, in either case it is a rightful subject of property, being the result of the exercise of his mental faculties. The point is this: that ideas are immensely valuable, and, thinking, I presume, that your former replies that ideas are works of discovery and not of production has disposed of the point. You say: "You accept the idea as a kind of the spirit of intangible property. Well, I see no argument from Taki Kaki; I see only a statement that ideas cannot be con 11 nued without the help of the men who are the first to give this idea; that is, the idea is a complete negation of anything that a man has not actual need for should be considered as property private.

But your argument of Spenser, that ideas, being natural wealth, belong to the discoverer, on the same principle that he who first possesses any material product possesses control over that part of himself which brought it into existence, you attempt to reduce to absurdity by interpreting it to mean (in the case of land) that a man can take possession of as much land as he can merely by possessing a fence around it, and so owning immense tracts. And then you ask, What becomes of the Anarchistic doctrine of "occupancy and use"?

I, now, if you have any warrant in assum ing, that to be Spenser's property, is not to be found in his "Intellectual Property." There he several times states that a man is entitled to as much unappropriated land as he can reasonably possess. "Such laws of desire are a sufficient warrant for him to take whatever nature has spread before him for his gratification." "The first law of nature is that every man may have all of but an indeterminate portion of the whole, not even so much probably as would fall to his share if the whole were equally divided among the inhabitants of the globe." This may not be very explicit, but it is enough to show that there is little warrant in believing him to justify land monopoly. His Revolution pamphlet, a reply to Lord Dunraven, wherein he shows that landlords have no right to property in land that the people are bound to respect, is another proof that something else than mere natural possession was needed to make him a just title to land, and what else that could be except occupancy and use, I don't know.

That, supposing for sake of argument, Spenser was so stupid, the fact does not help you. He may have been wrong on land and right on ideas. The cases are not parallel. No idea is "natural wealth," whereas the possession of land, and so the right of property in land has to be qualified by the condition of occupancy and use, that being the best proof that the person is the owner of it. There may be many independent discoverers of the same idea, and all can have their property in their ideas, without violating the liberty of others. You might allow that I may own and use it: if land were like ideas, the principle of property would apply in the same way.

The "contradiction" between private use of ideas and public exhibition of same, and that question is being dealt with by you and Mr. Yearro, as Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Rabkin, or me. Similarly with books, which help to mystify more than they elucidate the real point which you and Yearro are discussing, I will retire in favor of the two greater gladiators of them all.

Yours, etc.,
A. H. Simpson

Mr. Simpson's retort that denial of property in ideas leads to Communism in all things is a silly one. There is nothing in the principle of property which necessarily renders everything appropriate. If there were, then Mr. Simpson's denial of property in men leads him to Communism in all things. But Anarchist posits equal liberty as a universal social law. Therefore to depart from equal liberty is, in the eyes of Anarchist, to deny it as a law, and after such denial the transition to Anarchist is so easy one. I am aware that after this Mr. Simpson has departed from equal liberty. But the fact that, in order to sustain property in ideas, he has been led to introduce a theory of landed property which all Anarchist agree is absurd, and that he has put forward by me to show that he has made such a departure, and that each new step in this direction prepares another. One cannot well state arguments so simple in any but a "free and easy way." If Mr. Simpson does not answer me in which way I answer him, let him ask me harder questions.

I do not like to be rude, but I must flatly contradict Mr. Simpson's statement that the doctrine of unlimited land ownership is not to be found in Spooner's writings, his opposition to Irish and English landlords on the sole ground that they or their ancestors took their lands by the sword from the original holders. This is plainly stated, so plainly that I took issue with Mr. Spooner on this point when he had asked me to read the pamphlet, and then asked him whether if Dunraven or his ancestors had found unoccupied the very lands that he now holds, and had fenced them off, he would have any objection to raise against Dunraven's title to and leasing of these lands. I stated that no. When he pressed me upon I protested that his pamphlet, powerful as it was within its scope, did not go to the bottom of the land question. Does Mr. Simpson consider Dunraven's landholding and landlordship (setting aside the original question of force by force) an illustration of occupancy and use?

It is not to the purpose to urge that Spooner may have been wrong on land and right on ideas. I was asked by Mr. Simpson to dispute an argument advanced by Spooner in favor of property in ideas. In my answer I pointed out to Mr. Simpson that this argument leads, through the same logical process, to property in ideas and to unlimited property in land, my contention being, of course, that, if this were the argument relied upon, the two results must stand or fall together. What point is there in saying, in reply to this, that the cases are not parallel? Mr. Spooner's argument, which Mr. Simpson asked me to dispute, was this: "The cases are parallel, it is true, in the following two cases. No, rejoincs Mr. Simpson, the cases are not parallel. Why does he bow before Mr. Spooner's logic in one breath and repudiate it in the next? T.

Information for a Newspaper.

In the New York "Sun" of March 31, the Rev. Dr. Gladden was "severely attacked in a violent editorial for a sermon he had preached in St. George's church on Good Friday. The head and front of Rev. Mr. Gladden's offending the "Sun" found in the following: "It is a great relief to know that our society is utterly corrupt and that we are in a state of political degradation almost without parallel in the history of civilization: "In ancient times thieving barons with their hands full of blood and plunder were sometimes taunted because they gave generously to monasteries. The modern briglent, who
more heavily loaded with public contempt than almost any other we have ever had. It gets no credit for good motives in its good work, and its failure is not mere harm is laid to lack of courage or lack of opportunity, not to lack of will.” — Perhaps the principal reason why the Legislature is in such bad odor is its deficient intelligence. There have been other Legislatures and if you want to improve the public mind, you must improve the legislators. Members were so much in need of guardians and so poorly provided with them.” — But the worst thing of all was the general atmosphere of boodle that infected the Capitol during the entire session. The sacks did not always contain the usual legislative nonexistent for newspapers, but they contained an abundance of facts fully justifying the charges which arose editorial indignation. Instead of calling upon the Rev. Mr. Gladden to produce evidence, the Sun, like an excellent paper this is, should itself assume the task of collecting evidence of the corruption and incapacity of our legislators. Real would not be a fine thing for some great paper to catalog and publish a list of legislative criminals, and then follow up the country. Change the names of his characters, and his book is laid in any other progressive country in the world. On the other hand, take Mr. Gladden, who is certainly a realistic novelist of no small calibre, and his tale will hold the reader as few have ever held a novel of certain localities and habits of life only. Mr. Gladden is to many interesting and dull; and some of these unappreciative readers have jumped to the conclusion that the realistic novel is essentially a dull and monotonous form of fiction. The fault, however, is not with the realistic novel, but with the life and habits and interests selected by the novelist for delineation. Few of us care to know about Annie Kilburn's fortunes and narrow existence; but we are all eager to know and to understand the story of Viola and Madame Caroline. A realistic novel may be even more exciting and absorbing than the most relentlessly romantic piece of fiction, — for is not truth often stranger than fiction? Is not "Germinal" an intensely, ward, irresistible absorbing novel? Yet there can be nothing more genuinely natural and realistic than that.

The Novel of Tomorrow will be just what the best novel of today is. Today we still are occasionally stimulated by the breaking of some of the traditions of things as the Haggards create. Tomorrow these rhythms will become impossible. But those who want to know what the novel of tomorrow will be need no more than fit themselves for the appreciation of the merits of the realistic novels already written.

Some of the novels that were intensely true and realistic at the time they were given to the world have lost the power of impressing us with such qualities which, after all, are not more than what we expect. Have a little reality with the characters in the "Scarlet Letter," and even in "Adam Bede," and these novels, if written today, would be declared unnatural. The world has passed what I call the "naturalistic stage," and there are under the so-called "realistic" stage. If you want the real novel of today, read Meredith, Howells, Mona Caird, Bourget, Maupassant, Daudet, and Zola,— the master, the greatest novelist of our time, the author of "Germinal" and "Monsieur Barnave.”

"Money" is undoubtedly the greatest work Zola has produced. It is a greater work than "Germinal," for greater skill is required for the evening of Saccard, the post-financier, and Madame Caroline, the free, the otherwise sterile attitude toward any thing previously attempted by Zola. In this book, as the reader already knows, the life of the speculator is portrayed, — the methods, tricks, passions, morals, hopes, and fears of financiers, gamblers, and fortune-lovers. That is the great novel of the nineteenth century in this novel, — a fact which shows that Zola at least has taken the step from probability to necessity to which Boyesen points. Gamblers cannot love money, since the love for money exalts them and leaves
treat them cold to everyone else. This is Zola's character, which comes from a lack of education. There is no one who is a success in society, and the greatest of them is an entertainer, a dreamer, almost a poet. But in all his other relations he is without the least human emotion or feeling. He is neither a good father, nor a good son, nor a good husband, and the old men and the rich, the weak and the strong, without compassion or remorse. Yet we know that he is not a monster; he is touched by certain manifestations of trust and devotion, and is deeply affected by the sight of others in distress, even by the sight of a man's face.

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